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Governing Climate Change in the Mediterranean: Fragmentation in Dialogue, Markets and Funds

by Angelos Katsaris (College of Europe, Natolin Campus, Poland)
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Dr Angelos Katsaris joined the College of Europe as a Postdoctoral Research Fellow as the European Neighbourhood Policy Chair in November 2014. Dr Katsaris received his PhD in October 2014 in Politics and International Relations from the University of Southampton, UK and his MA in European and International Studies from the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece in December 2009. His doctoral thesis focused on the Europeanization of the EU’s southern neighbourhood through policy networks. In particular, he examined how the European Commission advances climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation in Morocco and Algeria taking an actor-centred policy network approach. Dr Katsaris’ research interests are in the fields of EU external governance and public administration, with a specific focus on energy security and climate change policies.

Abstract
The article analyses the challenges of interregional cooperation for the two regional secretariats in the Mediterranean – the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean and the Secretariat of the Mediterranean Action Plan – in the policy fields of climate change mitigation and adaptation. Mediterranean climate governance is structured around complex governance arrangements, where multiple actors attempt to integrate the issue of climate change. However, the lack of financial commitments for long-term infrastructure investments and bilateral differentiation under the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy undermine region-wide cooperation. As a result, fragmentation in dialogue, markets and funds challenge the efforts of regional institutions in each climate sector and lead to variable governing outcomes.

KEY WORDS Climate Change Governance, Climate Change Mitigation, Climate Change Adaptation, Southern Neighbourhood, Euro-Mediterranean relations, North Africa
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Governing Climate Change in the Mediterranean: Fragmentation in Dialogue, Markets and Funds

by Angelos Katsaris*

Introduction
The Mediterranean climate and the Mediterranean region are like a model for the whole world.¹

The Mediterranean is one of the four regions on the planet most vulnerable to climate change. An increase in annual mean temperatures of between 2.2 to 5.5 degrees C and extreme weather events, such as heat waves and intense droughts, are key factors that will have a direct impact upon the whole region. Moreover, sea level rise is expected to increase by fifty per cent more than the average global estimate by the end of this century (IPCC, 2014).

As a regional space, it includes developed, industrialized countries in the north (EU members and EU candidate countries) emitting significant greenhouse gas emissions, and developing countries in the south, located in North Africa and the Mediterranean coasts of the Middle East, with an insignificant contribution to global warming. Southern Mediterranean countries (SMCs) are non-Annex I countries of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), without greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments. On the other hand, the EU and its member states are Annex I parties of the UNFCCC, with significant greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments and targets under the Kyoto Protocol. These different positions vis-à-vis climate change

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¹ Author’s interview with a high-ranked official in the Secretariat of the United Nations Environment Programme – Mediterranean Action Plan (UNEP MAP), Athens, August 2012.
generate different priorities: whereas the main priority for SMCs tends to be adaptation to climate change, the EU’s main priority is the mitigation of greenhouse gases and the development of renewable energies (Katsaris, 2015).

Climate change in the Mediterranean is governed through dense, complex, and at times contradictory structures of overlapping institutional frameworks (Cardwell, 2011). The primary drivers of climate change initiatives are the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the EU. UNEP-led cooperation tends to focus more on environmental issues such as pollution reduction, wastewater treatment, oil spills, and coastal zone management in the Mediterranean. For example, the Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) Protocol has been the first regional protocol aiming at establishing a regulatory framework for the protection of the Mediterranean coastline. On the other hand, EU-led initiatives, such as the Union for the Mediterranean, pay attention to both policy areas, yet with clearer market incentives in the mitigation sector, through the Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP). In particular, MSP aspires to establish regulatory approximation between the two shores on solar energy and to develop a Mediterranean-wide renewable energy and energy efficiency market. In contrast, the Depollution of the Mediterranean project is projected to tackle sea water pollution and address climate change adaptation through capacity-building in SMCs.

However, the Secretariats of UNEP Mediterranean Action Plan (UNEP MAP) and UfM face several challenges in terms of generating and sustaining regional cooperation in the issue-areas of renewable energy and water depollution: The overlap between different regional and national programmes of the United Nations and the EU towards SMCs generates fragmentation in regional efforts towards effective climate change governance. Also, both policy areas lack tangible financial commitments that would support long-term infrastructure projects, be it electricity interconnections or the construction of dams. Market prospects
are mainly offered bilaterally through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and focus most on renewable energies (Fritzche et al., 2011; Katsaris, 2014).

It is against this backdrop that this paper seeks to understand the extent to which UNEP MAP and UfM Secretariats are capable of establishing cooperation over interregional climate-related projects in the Mediterranean and offer an integrated response to this growing phenomenon. To this end, the paper briefly provides an overview of the two institutions and their current efforts to advance climate change governance in the region. It then outlines the complex institutional setting of the multiple (Euro-) Mediterranean political and technical fora and their programmes as regards climate change policy. The third section analyses the challenges for the two secretariats in achieving interregional climate change cooperation. The paper finally assesses the 2011 EU initiatives, namely the revised ENP and the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, through the prism of regional climate change governance and concludes with some final remarks.

This paper contributes to the unexplored policy field of climate change governance in the Mediterranean. It benefits from several field research face-to-face interviews with various European, UNEP, UfM, Moroccan and Algerian officials during the period between May 2012 and June 2013 for the doctorate thesis ‘Europeanization and Policy Networks in the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood: The European Commission’s Relations with Morocco and Algeria on Climate Change Policy’.

The UNEP MAP, the Union for the Mediterranean and Climate Change Governance: A Brief Overview

The United Nations Environment Programme - Mediterranean Action Plan (UNEP MAP) is a much celebrated regional initiative, dating back to the 1970s with the entry into force of the Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution (from here onwards Barcelona Convention) and its protocols. UNEP MAP emerged from the growing
concern among several Mediterranean countries about the level of pollution in the region (Haas, 1990). The Mediterranean Action Plan was the first ever regional seas program under UNEP coordination.

UNEP MAP originally involved sixteen coastal Mediterranean countries: the northern Mediterranean countries (France, Italy, Greece, Spain, Malta, and Cyprus), the southern Mediterranean countries (Egypt, Israel, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Algeria²) and the European Community. Today, the Convention counts twenty-one contracting parties including the European Union, the Western Balkans, Monaco, Turkey, and all North African and coastal Middle Eastern countries (except for the Palestinian territories and Jordan). The Convention was initially implemented in 1976 and was amended for the first time in 2004. As an umbrella convention, the Barcelona Convention constitutes the legal component of the UNEP MAP framework and obliges the contracting parties ‘to take all appropriate measures to prevent, abate, combat, and to the fullest possible extent eliminate pollution of the Mediterranean Sea Area’ (Article 1, par. 1). Seven Protocols complete the MAP structure, ranging from pollution from ships and exploration, land-based sources and biodiversity to integrated coastal zone management.

Although climate change was part of the discussions in several technical meetings, mainly as a response to international summits on environment, it was mainly introduced in 2008 at the Almería Conference of Parties (CoP). The contracting parties decided to extend the system of protocols of the Convention by developing a framework for the protection of the Mediterranean coasts. The Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) Protocol – the latest Protocol of the convention, which was signed in 2008 and entered into force in March 2011 – addresses matters such as natural hazards (Article 22), coastal erosion (Article 23) and responses to natural disasters (Article 24) that highlight the issue of climate change. A Protocol was considered a suitable option

² Full member since 1980.
as it would be legally binding on all parties, and regulations could be filtered by state administrations across the region. Moreover, a legally binding document could better address the problem, because seventy percent of the region’s population lives on the coastline which is expected to be severely affected by the adverse effects of climate change, such as desertification, water salinization and extreme weather events (IPCC, 2014).

National focal points are engaged in regional meetings through Regional Activity Centres (RACs). RACs are an integral part of UNEP MAP structures and refer to decentralized monitoring bodies of the Convention, which are supervised by the MAP Secretariat and focus on various environmental issues related to the Barcelona Convention (biodiversity, oil pollution, ICZM etc). Technical focus groups in each RAC assess the progress of the Convention in each sector and are in close collaboration with the MAP Secretariat and the national focal points. In relation to climate change issues there are two RACs: the Priority Action Programme RAC (PAP/RAC) in Split, Croatia and the Blue Plan RAC (BP/RAC) in Sophia Antipolis, France. PAP/RAC focuses mainly on ICZM issues and other climate-related ones such as water scarcity, desalination plants, carbon capture and storage, and promotes financial cooperation with GEF and the World Bank in regional projects such as MedPartnership-ICZM. PAP/RAC organizes regional meetings, training for regional and international actors, and conferences on exchanging best practices and discussing studies and reports. The Blue Plan is mainly a clearing house of regional and national reports in relation to climate change, sustainable development, agriculture, water management, tourism etc.

Apart from UNEP MAP, in 2008 the UfM added another layer in Euro-Mediterranean relations. This EU initiative aimed to build on the EMP and was supposed to give a

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3 Author’s interview with

4 Author’s interview with a UNEP MAP Secretariat official, Athens, August 2012.
new impetus to regional cooperation mainly through the pursuit of technical projects (Bicchi, 2011). One key innovation of this initiative was the establishment of a Secretariat with a separate legal personality. The UfM Secretariat was mandated to collaborate with already existing regional institutions, such as UNEP MAP, the European Commission and other international actors on functional technical projects of Mediterranean-wide interest. To this end, the Secretariat is responsible for promoting the financing of UfM projects, in collaboration with regional and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the European Commission, and ensuring their successful implementation (Katsaris, forthcoming).

Projects related to climate change are at the forefront of the whole initiative as included in the 2008 UfM Paris Declaration (UfM, 2008). The Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) and the Depollution of the Mediterranean are considered to be two highly visible regional projects with explicit climate change mitigation and adaptation ambitions. The MSP aspires to develop a regional legislative framework among participating countries in the renewable energy sector, mainly for solar energy. In particular, the MSP foresaw the development of 20 GW of new renewable energy production capacities, and the achievement of significant energy savings across the Mediterranean by 2020. In contrast, the Depollution of the Mediterranean project is the second UfM project with a climate change focus related to environmental protection, water management and adaptation to climate change. The project intends to offer capacity-building in SMCs from regional and international funds using mainly European and international expertise.

As regards the MSP, climate change mitigation was seen as a functional policy sector that could generate dialogue and visible results in the region’s natural potential in solar and wind sources of energy (Bicchi, 2011). Energy production based on sustainable sources of energy could reduce the increasing energy demand
in both shores of the Mediterranean. Green electricity production could also diversify the region’s energy mix with the establishment of agreed rules on a Euro-Mediterranean renewable energy market and the deployment of relevant technologies. However, the process has been slow and the Secretariat has yet to deliver tangible results across the region. Between 2010 and 2014, several expert and technical meetings took place to prepare a Master Plan for the Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP). The project ‘Paving the Way for the Mediterranean Solar Plan’ (PWMSP) is the instrument that finances related meetings and feasibility studies across the region. The completion of the Master Plan was initially set for 2011. However, because of the Arab uprisings, the Joint Committee of MSP national experts finalized the technical work on the Master Plan on 21 February 2013 in Barcelona.

Nevertheless, energy ministers did not manage to reach a unanimous consensus on 11 December 2013 at the UfM Ministerial Meeting on Energy in Brussels where the document was supposed to be launched. While the ministers supported the development of a regional electricity market and the role of the Secretariat in this regard, SMCs were sceptical concerning the EU’s willingness to establish mechanisms to manage the costs and risks of large-scale projects (PWMSP, 2014, p.133). They also stress the absence of international sponsors willing to absorb extra costs from pilot or large-scale projects. In response to the failure of the UfM ministerial meeting, it was decided to launch the ‘Extended Technical Committee’ and national representatives pointed instead towards more research on energy efficiency options. Thus the committee is expected to suggest options for renewable energy markets and identify related projects to international funding institutions. Currently, however, the only project related to the MSP is the Ouarzazate project in Morocco that benefits from financial support of the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF).
Climate change adaptation is an integral part of the Depollution of the Mediterranean project, mainly in the context of water management and desalination plants. Water scarcity is a key challenge among all SMCs because of the growing effects of desertification, water salinization and extreme weather events affecting the densely populated coastal urban centres across SMCs. Since the early stages of the project in 2011, the environmental division of the UfM Secretariat aimed to build links with similar projects in the region. UNEP MAP was an obvious choice as it constitutes a regional environmental setting that allows for uninterrupted technical discussions on the depollution of the Sea. In addition, the Secretariat started participating in the UNEP MAP Conference of Parties. Also, since December 2013 it has deepened its relationship with UNEP MAP by signing a Memorandum of Understanding.

Lately, the Secretariat is engaged in the promotion of regional dialogue and awareness-raising on the environment and climate change through several regional meetings co-organized with the European Commission. For example, the Secretariat managed to organize its first ever UfM ministerial meeting on the environment and climate change in May 2014, which, in fact, was the first Euro-Mediterranean ministerial meeting on environment since September 2006. However, the meeting failed to identify concrete sources of funds for coastal zone management, construction of dams and sustainable agriculture. Moreover, there are still no concrete adaptation projects that can be targeted or filtered through UNEP MAP.

Regional Differentiation and Multiple Mandates
Climate change policy in the Mediterranean is pursued in multiple diplomatic fora that bring together various states, non-state actors and regional and international institutions (Katsaris, forthcoming). These diplomatic fora mainly offer financial and expertise incentives that intend to develop administrative and regulatory capacities in SMCs. UNEP and the EU are the primary drivers of climate change cooperation in the
region. Yet, fragmented membership, various mandates and different incentives offered in each climate policy area contribute to considerable complexity in the Mediterranean (Cardwell, 2011). To put things into perspective, the number of actors is broad and membership is diversified. For example, the United Nations Environment Programme Mediterranean Action Plan (UNEP MAP) comprises twenty-one contracting parties including the EU, the Western Balkans, Monaco, Turkey and all coastal North African and Middle Eastern countries (except for the Palestinian territories and Jordan). Instead, membership under the UfM is extended to forty-three countries, whilst the ENP is primarily structured along a bilateral basis, i.e. a one-by-one rationale.

Different mandates further exacerbate fragmentation in the region (Katsaris, forthcoming). Climate change policy is not the overriding focus of governance in either UNEP-led or EU-led processes. In particular, UNEP MAP mainly addresses environmental issues, such as pollution reduction, wastewater treatment and oil spills. In contrast, the main focus of the then Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was on the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area and greater liberalization of markets, along with cultural and political cooperation. Although energy and climate change formed an integral part of the cooperation, they did not appear high in regional and bilateral dialogue and programmes (Costa, 2010).

Furthermore, the EU is the main donor in the region with comprehensive market access and expertise offered to SMCs. Yet, its initiatives are more comprehensive in renewable energies than in climate change adaptation and are mainly filtered through the bilateral channel of the ENP. In the framework of the ENP, the EU offers the prospect of market access to reform-willing SMCs and green electricity exports to the EU in exchange for regulatory convergence to the 2009/28/EC Directive (Article 9). Willing SMCs can engage in bilateral relations with the Commission in order to bring their legislation closer to the
2009/28/EC Directive. Such market prospects are also supported by long-term legislative advice and targeted technical projects, to narrow administrative and regulatory gaps (de Arce et al., 2012).

EU climate change adaptation rules are less embedded in the EU acquis itself and do not feature high in ENP agreements with each SMC. In addition, their regulatory framework is not followed by prospective EU market access or even comprehensive expertise offers, as in the case of renewable energies (European Commission, 2013). On the other hand, UNEP MAP offers expertise and capacity development in each SMC through regional programmes, mainly as regards climate change adaptation and integrated coastal zone management. However, its budgetary restrictions allow only for a limited number of capacity-building and information-sharing events across the region.⁵ Given its highly decentralized structure across the Mediterranean, various research centres and specialized projects depend on the budgetary contributions of the hosting countries. As a result, assistance focuses mostly on the hosting country’s needs rather than on regional or sub-regional technical interests.⁶

Politics and Financial Challenges for Climate Change Governance in the Mediterranean

So, what are the main challenges that regional institutions, such as the Secretariats of UNEP MAP and UfM, face in governing climate change in the region? With respect to climate change mitigation, there are several technical and political challenges that impede the development of a coherent Euro-Mediterranean renewable energy framework and thus the success of the MSP. First, green electricity imports from SMCs by EU members are not meant to be included in the energy markets of EU members before 2020 (Katsaris, forthcoming). The National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAPs) of Spain,

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⁵ Author’s interview with UNEP MAP official, Athens, August 2012; author’s interview with president of Euro-Mediterranean NGO, Athens, July 2012.

⁶ Author’s interview with senior UNEP official, Athens, August 2012.
France, Italy and Greece do not foresee the purchase renewable energy surpluses from SMCs. In particular, the Spanish NREAP states that there are limited physical interconnections between Spain and the rest of the EU (France) that can afford the increase of electricity exchanges up to 2GW ‘on the basis of infrastructural reinforcements that have yet to be defined’ (Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce, 2010, p. 139).

In addition, the current legal framework of the article nine of the European Directive 2009/28/EC allows only for joint ventures on renewable energies projects in the Mediterranean. However, it rules out the possibility of statistical transfers from SMCs. Statistical transfer is a permit scheme where an EU member can buy renewable energy units from another EU member state with renewable energy surplus so that the former complies with its 2020 EU renewable energy targets. Such permits are only available among EU member states and exclude third countries, such as SMCs.

Furthermore, energy producing SMCs (i.e. Algeria, Egypt) are reluctant to engage in the development of renewable energies as the sector touches upon sensitive sovereignty issues, which are related to oil rents from hydrocarbon exports and entrenched interests with the Arab world. EU energy relations with SMCs have traditionally focused more on conventional energy resources, such as oil and natural gas, than on electricity exports. A shift to an alternative energy relationship with Europe will incur revenue losses for local state elites in terms of energy rents, and even jeopardize their political regimes (Katsaris, 2014). In addition, Arab Mediterranean countries have close economic, energy and cultural relations with the oil-producing countries of the Gulf.7 Traditionally close energy relations based on conventional energy sources may be put at stake in case SMC’s shift their energy model towards renewable energies.

7 Author’s interview with president of a Euro-Mediterranean NGO, Athens, July 2012.
On the other hand, climate change adaptation is a policy sector that requires significant amounts of funds that are not currently available in the region. For example, one of the UfM priority projects has been the Gaza Desalination project. Despite several appeals to international funding institutions, such as the European Investment Bank, the World Bank and the Islamic Development Bank, the project has yet to secure funds to support the Palestinian water administration towards the implementation of the project that was scheduled to be finalised by 2016.

Similarly, the absence of funding impedes the development of less capacitated administrations from SMCs to integrate related regulations in their systems. As Slim and Scovazzi (2009, p. 47) argue, most SMCs have no specific tools for monitoring progress on the prevention of or adaptation to climate change. In addition, several SMCs have yet to introduce national plans on mitigating climate change, because other most pressing issues, such as poverty, unemployment, feature higher in the domestic agendas. Although according to article 3 paragraph 2 of the Convention contracting parties have to report every two years on national policies and measures regarding the Convention, most SMCs do not have the necessary resources to deliver those reports.

Apart from administrative and financial issues, there are other reasons for the limited implementation of the ICZM, especially in SMCs. According to Slim and Scovazzi (2009, p. 22), ‘the main reason of delays in the ratification and implementation processes is probably the advanced character of the protocols from the point of view of the protection of the environment’. Most SMCs do not have the technical means to respond to the measures that several protocols impose. As a result, they prefer either not to proceed to the ratification or to wait for EU assistance. For SMCs, the role of the EU is significant, since financial and technical

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8 Author’s interview with Commission official, Algiers, April 2013.
9 Author’s interview with president of a Euro-Mediterranean NGO, Athens, July 2012.
assistance, the sharing of best practices, training of administrative personnel and the transfer of modern technology are necessary elements for the effective implementation of the Barcelona commitments. Capacity-development programmes can better frame a policy problem, in order to persuade others about the need for, and possibilities of, action (Bulkeley and Newell, 2010, p. 61).

However, as it will be argued below, the EU pays less attention to climate change adaptation and the advancement of adaptation rules through capacity-development programmes. The 2013 EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change currently frames the regulatory framework of EU adaptation policy (European Commission, 2013). The main focus of the strategy is on the integration of adaptation considerations in the EU’s agriculture, fisheries, maritime and cohesion policies and the development of national adaptation plans by EU members (European Commission, 2013, pp. 4–9). However, the external aspect of adaptation to climate change is not included in the strategy. Although the Mediterranean is characterised as being particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, there is no concrete action that explains how adaptation will be introduced into the EU’s external policies (European Commission, 2013, p. 5). Finally, there are no market-making incentives for third countries as compared to renewable energies, similar to the 2009/28/EC Directive.

**Enter ENP and Mitigation Priorities**
In addition, the EU prioritises closer bilateral relations with reform-willing SMCs at the expense of regional structures. As a result, regional institutions face the challenge of growing regional fragmentation. Differentiated bilateral relations are critical for the EU in order to manage its relations with its immediate neighbours and can provide these countries with ‘tailor-made’ solutions to their needs and capacities (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005). In other words, those willing neighbours that wish to reform according to the legislative framework of the EU’s single
market would be rewarded with aid, technical assistance and closer political and economic ties with EU member states. Those who lag behind would not be given such rewards (Pace, 2007, p. 669). To that end, the Commission responded to this with the establishment of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. This policy was based on the concept of ‘sharing everything with the Union but (EU) institutions’, whose relations with this ‘ring of friends’ would depend on the latter’s performance and the political will on each side. The main reward of the policy was to be a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and prospective mobility and trade liberalization, regulated by EU rules (Vincentz, 2007).

Furthermore, bilateral relations under an Action Plan offer a more targeted framework of cooperation on climate change mitigation for a reform-willing SMC. Bilateral ENP agreements require SMCs to bring their legislation closer to the EU in return for market access, as per the 2009/28/EC Directive and prospects for electricity exports to the EU. Market incentives are less clear in adaptation issues, given the loose EU acquis in this field (Katsaris, 2014, pp. 114-115). In addition, bilateral relations offer insulated relations from the highly politicised regional framework caused by the Arab-Israeli conflict, and can promote implementation of tailored reforms through comprehensive capacity development programmes (Bailey and de Propris, 2004).

In response to the 2011 Arab uprisings and growing political instability, the EU launched two new initiatives towards SMCs in March and May 2011 respectively: The Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the southern Mediterranean and A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood. Bilaterally differentiated relations are even further promoted at the core of Euro-Med relations. Both initiatives argue for greater EU support for reform-willing SMCs, while EU support will be reallocated for SMCs that stall or retrench on agreed reform plans.
At the same time, the documents envisage an EU-Mediterranean partnership on production and management of solar and wind sources of energy through the establishment of an ‘EU-Southern Mediterranean Energy Community’ in the medium to long run (European Commission, 2011a, pp. 9-10; European Commission, 2011b, p. 10). In particular, joint renewable energy investments in SMCs could develop such partnership provided that the appropriate market perspective is created for electricity imports. Instead, climate change adaptation only features in the form of envisaged contributions towards international climate change negotiations. Furthermore, regional cooperation through UfM projects, such as the MSP and the de-pollution of the Mediterranean, remains relevant, while the UfM Secretariat is earmarked as the most appropriate institution that can organise effective and result-oriented regional cooperation supported by the EU.

However, after the first three years of the implementation of these initiatives, the UfM remained rather unchanged in its substance, while UNEP MAP is still unable to expand its funding scope from international donors. One of the few changes has been the UfM co-presidency, in which the Commission now represents the EU. However, bilateral relations under ENP are more advanced than regional structures, mainly through several Advanced Partnerships and renewed ENP Action Plans with reform-willing SMCs, such as Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. Furthermore, although political instability hampers to a certain extent regional fora, the EU has yet to identify how in practice ‘differentiated and gradual’ bilateral relations with each SMC could advance the idea of an EU-Mediterranean renewable energy market and how renewable energy will be ‘managed in SMCs and then exported to Europe’, since physical interconnections are only available between Morocco and Spain. The current capacity does not allow for larger electricity volumes or even transportation towards France.
Moreover, the Neighbourhood Investment Facility is the only funding source that partly covers certain regional investment needs (Katsaris, forthcoming). Yet, its operations currently support only the Ouarzazate project in Morocco, while UNEP MAP operations are only based on limited financial contributions from the EU Budget. Also, the EU has yet to identify feasible financial sources and identify robust commitments for long-term infrastructure investments and electricity interconnections. As a result, network-building and exchange of best practices seem to be the only viable means of regional cooperation in both policy areas, whilst at the same time bilateral differentiation is not in line with region-wide coordination. In addition, networks in regional contexts can allow for information-sharing and trust-building among experts and develop routinized dialogue over technical matters. For example, UNEP MAP processes have a long record of uninterrupted discussions and technical cooperation, through which the EU wishes to benefit by aligning with its structures and encouraging similar projects, such as the UfM de-pollution of the Mediterranean and the EU-led programme Horizon 2020 on the depollution of the Mediterranean (Barbé et al. 2009).

In contrast, networks in bilateral settings are different from regional processes. Market prospects play a significant role in this case. For example, while Algeria considers EU mitigation rules to be highly politicised, it encourages instead network-building on climate adaptation projects. In contrast, Morocco has a rather indifferent attitude towards the offer of expertise from that of the Commission over adaptation, despite being its immediate climate priority.\(^{10}\) Its interest to converge with the 2009/28/EC directive on renewable energies offers strong market incentives for Morocco to allow network-building and administrative advice from the EU.

**Conclusions**
Overall, climate change governance is advanced at variable speeds in the

\(^{10}\) Author’s interview with Moroccan official, Rabat and London, June and October 2012.
Mediterranean. Regional institutions can bring together regional actors to build common regulatory frameworks in both policy areas. However, they suffer from limited funds and regional political problems that impede their potential. Instead, bilateral EU initiatives seem to offer market prospects and more targeted capacity-building grants than regional structures; yet they mainly do so regarding climate change mitigation in reform-willing – and most often energy importing – SMCs with functional interests in renewable energies.

Regarding climate change mitigation, political and technical challenges in the Mediterranean seem to reduce the potential of developing a Euro-Mediterranean regulatory framework on renewable energies under the MSP. The Mediterranean is a highly differentiated region on energy, as there are countries that have abundant energy resources and export energy to Europe, and on the other hand the majority are energy dependent countries (sometimes up to 90 percent). While for the latter an integrated regulatory framework on renewable energies could even serve their option to reduce energy dependence, for the energy supplying SMCs MSP is considered as a threat. Such a shift towards a different energy future may compromise their domestic energy rents and the focus of their economy to a market that may reduce their revenues. On top of that, green electricity imports from SMCs are not an immediate priority for EU members. As a result, although MSP could enhance the natural potential of the region towards the production of green electricity and reduce the energy dependence of SMCs, political and other technical issues impede the UfM Secretariat from achieving progress in this project.

Furthermore, there are no concrete sources of funds that can manage to address needs for technology transfers for climate change mitigation projects on one hand, and the construction of dams and other adaptation projects on the other. The absence of financial commitments impedes even the
mere functioning of institutions, such as UNEP MAP, constraining its potential to promote capacity-building projects in less capacitated SMCs (Slim and Scovazzi, 2009).

As a result, administrative incapacities and limited funding for UNEP MAP reduce the potential for comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean cooperation on ICZM issues under the Barcelona Convention.

Finally, the prioritisation of bilateral relations under ENP undermines interregional climate change governance. Market prospects under ENP in the form of future green electricity exports to Europe motivates reform-willing SMCs to engage in bilateral technical discussions with the European Commission and benefit from capacity-development programmes. With the advent of the Arab uprisings, the EU stresses even further its interest in closer differentiated relations with each SMC. The on-going revision of the ENP could adjust these asymmetries and prioritise a more balanced approach that can shape an inclusive role for regional secretariats in order to narrow existing governing gaps and address climate priorities and financial needs on both shores of the Mediterranean.

References


