THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN REGION AND ITS UNIVERSITIES: AN OVERVIEW OF TRENDS, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

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Abstract - This paper argues that despite the very real differences between the various sub-regions of the Mediterranean, a shared political history and a common state of peripheralisation to the global economy make the comparison of the university systems of the region possible. The paper first outlines the context in some detail, in order to then generate a set of testable propositions that throw light on trends that have marked the region over the past years. These include (a) the prioritisation of the University sector, (b) a broadening of access, (c) a diaspora of Mediterranean students, (d) privatisation (e) the increasing legitimisation of the entrepreneurial university, (f) a greater degree of autonomous management, (g) secularisation, (h) an 'innovative accommodation' in resolving the issue of choice of language of instruction, and (i) the use of interactive pedagogies. It is argued that this set of propositions, while grounded in data, could constitute an initial agenda for further qualitative and quantitative research in order to put comparative Mediterranean higher education studies on a firmer footing.

Introduction

The Mediterranean heritage of higher learning

The Mediterranean region has some of the oldest, as well as some of the most recently established Universities in the world, a reflection of the particularities of development of the scientific community in this region throughout the ages. The 'old world’s' first university is to be found in Fez in Morocco, where Qaraouiyine University was established in AD859. Almost as ancient is Al-Azhar University, founded in Egypt in AD970. European universities appeared later - and when they did, it was in Bologna (1088) and Paris (1160), major cities of Mediterranean powers. In the 8th and 9th centuries, at a time when northern Europe was steeped in its 'dark ages', the Abbasid Caliphate scholars were busily translating and teaching major foreign works - mainly Greek, Persian, and Hindi (Benhamida, 1990) - and transmitting that classical knowledge through the nerve-centres of learning in Cairo, Kairouan, Fez, Toledo and throughout Andalusia. Later on,
University students and teachers flocked to Moorish Spain to learn from the foremost intellectuals of the time, prefiguring the modern secular pilgrimages that are organised through 'academic mobility and exchange' programmes and schemes. The production and circulation of knowledge around the Mediterranean basin has a rich history behind it, with different indigenous and exogenous actors dominating the scene depending on the fluctuations of political, economic, religious and cultural fortunes. The power house of ideas that still forms the backbone of much of what we call our cultural heritage today, lay initially in the hands of the Greek philosophers, re-vitalised and transmitted onwards by Arabo-Muslim scholars (Vernet, 1985), with 'Europe' having the (for some, dubious) honour of heralding in the Enlightenment and modernity. An overview of the state of universities in the Mediterranean must necessarily connect with and acknowledge – even if briefly – such a rich history of inquiry and pursuit of knowledge and 'truth', if anything because it is only in appreciating such a legacy that the significance of what today appear as 'trends', 'challenges', and 'prospects' can be grasped.

Universities of the Mediterranean

There are about 200 Universities in the non-EU Mediterranean countries, with close to 250,000 teachers and researchers, and more than 3 million students. The community of students and scholars increases dramatically in size if we add the EU Mediterranean states of Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Greece to the list. The figures given are undoubtedly conservative. As we will have occasion to note further on, the University sector in the Mediterranean countries is in flux, with new institutions being established every year, barely keeping up with the explosion of students banging at the doors of further education. If we take the case of Turkey, for instance, The World of Learning (1999) refers to 30 universities. Simsek (1999) however informs us that the number is 68. The statistics given for Jordan include 5 universities and 55645 students, but Zughoul's (2000a) count for 1999 is 19 universities, catering for 103001 students in all. The exercise of tallying numbers obviously depends on what it is we are actually counting, and on what Guri-Rosenblit (1999) refers to as the 'internal' and 'external' boundaries of higher education. As in Europe and the rest of the world, this sector has, in the Mediterranean, become diversified, so that over and above universities we also find versions of community colleges, higher vocational education institutions, and so on. That in itself constitutes a problem in gathering statistics from a variety of sources, as these do not necessarily adopt the same definition of what constitutes 'higher education', nor do they necessarily give details regarding the differential make-up of the sector. It is therefore important to establish that, for the purpose of this article, the focus is solely on universities.
The Mediterranean region

The comparativist setting out to write about 'trends' in university education in the Mediterranean faces a number of challenges, empirical and conceptual in nature. Empirical because, as has just been intimated, data is not readily available, and is often dated and/or unreliable, both due to the fact that many 'southern' countries have a limited capacity for the collection, organisation and reporting of statistics (Puryear, 1995; Cook, 1998), and also because this particular 'rim' has not, until very recently, been the subject of comparative education studies (see Sultana, 1996, 1998). The conceptual challenges are many, not least because the definition of what this 'Mediterranean region' in fact is - or whether it 'exists' at all in the first place - is subject to contestation. What are we referring to when we speak about 'the Mediterranean', and to what extent can the geographical and climatic unity most famously celebrated by Braudel (1949, 1992), and most recently by Matvejevitch (1992), also signal other forms of unity, or at least 'affinities' or *ressemblances*, if that is at all necessary to carry out regional, comparative studies? It is not a coincidence that much of the literature on the Mediterranean refers to the region as a 'constructed' space, one that needs to be defended, re/invented, imagined (Balta, 1992; Ravenel, 1995; Maalouf, 1998).

For our purposes, a state is said to be Mediterranean if it has access to the basin's coastline and - as in the case of Portugal and Jordan) its hinterland. On that basis, delineation and definitions become straightforward: there are 22 such states, representing an overall population of over 416 million which can be repartitioned in the following manner: 176 million in the EU Mediterranean states; 26 million in the Balkans; 146 million in the Eastern Mediterranean; and 68 million in the Maghreb countries. In this particular article, the focus will be on the 'Euro-Mediterranean', namely the 12 countries that have a close partnership with the European Union. These are: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. Libya is also included in our purview.

Unities and diversities

This partitioning of the Mediterranean into sub-regions is symptomatic of the real differences that exist, and which deserve to be highlighted, for while some characteristics are shared between universities to the 'north', 'south' and 'east' of the Mediterranean, the divergences are equally important. Economically, politically, and culturally, it is obviously reasonable to group Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece together as a Southern European bloc. France, over and above being a continental European and Atlantic, is also a Mediterranean power, belongs
to this so-called 'Latin arc', and indeed dominates it through its superiority in economic, political and military terms. If by 'region' we refer to a group of states whose pattern of co-operative (or conflictual) relations or interactions exhibit a particular degree of regularity and intensity, then the enactment of the Single European Act in 1986, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, and the intensification of the process of European integration and enlargement (1973, 1981, 1986, and 1995) have consolidated the intergovernmental and trans-national relations between the northern states of the Mediterranean and Western Europe (Calleya, 1997: 89, 91). Malta and Cyprus are often included in that bloc, both because of their aspirations for membership in the European Union and their attempts to measure up to the EU's *acquis communautaire*, and also because of their deeply ingrained cultural, historical and religious affiliations to the old continent. Turkey too is sometimes associated with this sub-region in some of the 'Southern European studies' literature - despite the cold shoulder it has consistently been shown by the EU for both political and economic reasons, and the increasing permeability and influence of political Islam in defiance of Ataturk's secular legacy.

The countries of North Africa (i.e. the Maghreb and Mashrek), as well as those of the Levant, form, for our purposes, another discrete bloc in the Mediterranean. Among their key unifying factors one can underline the Arabic language, the history of the Islamic Empire, the Muslim religion and (often but not always) economic under-development. In addition to this, there is what can be referred to as the 'transnational political force of Islam' (Buzan, 1991), which effectively challenges secular European nationalism which dominates an area that was Islamic for well over a millennium' (Calleya, 1997: 95). Israel's misfortunes are very much part and parcel of the historical and political development of this sub-region, but its economic status differs from that of its neighbours, and indeed, several of the challenges that apply to Mediterranean universities and that are identified in this article are only of marginal significance to that country. The North African and Eastern Mediterranean sub-regional grouping differs from the north-western, European 'bloc' because while the latter's regionalism has co-operative, transnational and intergovernmental dimensions (Calleya, 1997: 93), in the former case 'most of the states have been too preoccupied with distinct domestic or regional subgrouping security issues to attempt nurturing a complex network of relations with all the states in the region. Indeed, one could say that here, centrifugal forces have superceded centripetal forces as the majority of states in the Maghreb see their future in securing market access to Western Europe' (Calleya, 1997: 97, 99). This despite the attempts at co-operation between Arab states in areas such
as security and energy (the Arab League, the Gulf Co-Operation Council, the Arab Maghreb Union), as well as education (ALECSO, ISESCO).

The North-Eastern Mediterranean sub-region, comprising Albania and what previously constituted Yugoslavia are also, according to our definition, 'Mediterranean', and indeed their older history inscribes them in the economy of exchange that was facilitated - indeed made possible - by the Sea. Nevertheless, the dynamics in this sub-region are more properly 'Balkan' than Mediterranean, in the sense that their present systems and institutions - educational or otherwise - have been deeply marked by the Cold War, and the economic, political, and cultural upheavals that have come with its demise. The subsequent crises in ex-Yugoslavia have generated regional dynamics which have a more direct impact on European relations than those of the Mediterranean. However, it is not insignificant that it had to be a Croat intellectual, Predrag Matvejevitch (1987, 1992), who wrote the most moving testament to the Mediterranean this side of the century. For the purpose of this article, occasional reference will be made to the Balkans, but claims as to the convergence of higher education trends with those proposed for the rest of the Mediterranean region remain even more tentative and exploratory in nature.

The distinctions between these different sub-groupings in the region are far from insignificant. Indeed, they are critical if we are to avoid the temptation of ignoring major differences in the present attempt to consider the higher education sector in regionally integrative terms. Thus, the countries to the economic 'North' of the Mediterranean stand in stark contrast to those due 'South' when the commonly used indicators of development are taken into consideration. Starting with the economy, the annual per capita income is less than $US1000 in the southern and eastern Mediterranean, while that of the north Mediterranean is at least 10 times as much. The gap is expected to widen from 1:10 to 1:20 by the year 2010 (Regnault, 1992). There is a huge negative balance of payments between the north and southern shores: Two-thirds of the Maghreb's commerce is with the EU (mainly France, Italy and Spain), but the region represents only 3% of the external commerce of the Union. Indeed, the EU ran a trade surplus of 12.1 billion ECU in 1993, and 9.3 billion ECU in 1994 with Mediterranean countries (Calleya, 1995). Imports by the EU from the Mediterranean fell from 41 billion to 31 billion ecus from 1980 to 1993 (Labaki, 1997). While between 1960 and 1985, GDP per capita in Middle East and North African (MENA) countries grew by close to 4% per year - a growth that outperformed every other region except East Asia, the next decade saw that growth fall precipitously: from about 4.5% per year to 0.5% per year in Egypt; from 2.2% to 1.0% in Morocco, from 2% to -2% in Algeria, from 1% to -4% in Jordan, and 4% to 2.5% in Tunisia (Heyneman, 1997: 449). The north-bound flow of migrants over the past three decades (Liauzu, 1996), while
mitigating the problem of unemployment, and occasionally having a positive boomerang effect in terms of financial, scientific and technology transfer, \(^9\) nevertheless represents a veritable hemorrhage that further exacerbates the weak economic position of the south (Sabour, 1993).

There are other significant differences between the northern and southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. The Latin arc is characterised by a low birth rate regime, with a fertility ratio of 1.2 for Spain and 1.3 for Italy for instance. In contrast, the south is a demographic time bomb of another sort, with birth rates of over 3.1 for all Maghreb and Machrek states (with the exception of Tunisia), topped by Libya where the fertility ratio is 6.4. Algeria and Morocco have doubled their populations since the French retreat, and Egypt will double its population in 25 years (Regnault, 1992). Significantly for education, the percentage of working women in the Mediterranean EU countries is 37.6, while that of the Maghreb is 6.7.

**Education**

A focus on education also reflects similarities and discontinuities in the region. The ‘north’ of the basin has seen major educational development and expansion of services following the achievement of democratic rule, with systems now approximating closely - in reach and achievements - those to be found in longer established democracies. By contrast, the south Mediterranean - despite the progress that marks the post-independence era - has still a large number of fundamental problems and challenges to come to terms with. Despite the fact that public expenditure on education as a percentage of GNP is - at 5.5% - higher in the Arab world than anywhere else in the developing world, up to 34% of students in the southern Mediterranean are still not receiving a primary education. The average Arab state spent approximately US$267 per student in 1990, while OECD countries spent about five times that amount, i.e. US$1,327 (UNESCO, 1995). We find high illiteracy rates for several Maghreb and Machrek countries such as Morocco (50.5%), Tunisia (34.7%) (Gizard, 1992), Algeria (43%), and Egypt (48%) (Nucho, 1998), and generally speaking, the quality of education in MENA countries is lower by a factor of seven when compared to that in OECD countries along an index that combines three characteristics, namely expenditures, student flow, and classroom contact time (Heyneman, 1997: 456). The eastern Mediterranean fares better, with rates of 20% illiteracy reported for Jordan and Lebanon (ibid., 1998). The atrocities of war in ex-Yugoslavia have left their usual mark on the educational infrastructure and services. In Croatia, for instance, the number of pupils in primary school classes has had to be increased by 20%, with schools being burdened by lack of space, teaching aids, and a chronic shortage of teachers - 2,121 were lacking in 1995 (IBE, 1998). The refugee situation in the Balkans is nothing short of tragic, with the
obvious repercussions this has for education: the count for refugees and displaced persons is 404,066 for Croatia alone. The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is even worse, as the stark picture painted by Benedek (1997) shows with reference to various sectors of society - higher education included.

University education in the Mediterranean

Given the differences, it may therefore appear a foolhardy enterprise to speak about the Mediterranean as a unit of analysis, and to try to compare higher education systems in the region. As has been noted, the region has several discontinuities and fractures, where, to use Cowen's (1998: 69) useful phrasing, the economic, political, cultural and educational 'genealogies' or 'codings' of different states and groups of states reflect and occupy different 'sociological times'. And yet, there are unités which are worth highlighting in this 'imagined community' (Anderson, 1982) that is the Mediterranean. Maalouf (1998) has made the point that this region has been quite capable of constructing its 'mythologies of difference', particularly those based on ethnicity and religion. In the face of this, the Mediterranean should mine its rich history of exchange when, under the sway of a variety of constellations of power, it displayed forms of economic, cultural, and political harmony - in order to rise to the political and cultural challenge of building an inclusive 'mythology of unity'. As has been argued elsewhere (Sultana, 1995a, 1998), the purposeful construction of regional identity is not the prerogative of the European Union - particularly if, as in the case of the Mediterranean but increasingly less of what, from the perspective of the South, increasingly appears as a 'fortress Europe', that construction is centred around inclusive values, ones that bring together the developed and developing worlds, the 'North' and the 'South', the 'East' and the 'West', the different faiths of Christianity, Islam and Judaism.

Comparative studies, therefore, contribute directly to the process of identity construction, and may indeed constitute what in the jargon of international relations is referred to as a 'confidence-building mechanism'. Given the process of globalisation, comparative study of Mediterranean higher education systems is, in this context, particularly promising.

Globalisation and the University

If, as the introduction to a series of books collectively entitled *Enciclopedia del Mediterraneo* suggests, the development of Mediterranean regional studies is 'a wager', then a focus on higher education systems is certainly a very good place
to place one’s bets. Of society’s institutions, universities are among the most permeable to the influence of globalisation. Most, if not all, have regional and international networking as a declared goal in their charter. That networking takes very particular and substantial forms in the Mediterranean, with several scholars gaining their higher degrees in metropole countries (Sultana and Ebejer, 1997). Much of modern science – including information technology – is accessible through the medium of English and (to a lesser extent) French languages, and science and technology are never shorn of sets of values - as those with an ultra-orthodox and fundamentalist persuasion who see a dualism between the knowledge paradigms of modernity and of tradition, and who would reject ‘western knowledge’, are so keenly aware. Universities have their own structured rituals to ensure that interaction between similar institutions worldwide does take place – and that includes publications and attendance at conferences, seminars, round tables, workshops, bi-lateral and multi-lateral cooperation agreements, and so on. The search for scarce research (and travel) funds in the ‘South’ ensures that scholars seek to enter University networks in the ‘North’, while Europeans and Americans are not unhappy to accommodate, genuine academic interest and commitment to aid often going hand-in-hand with the titillation of exoticism.

In an age of globalisation, therefore, it is not unlikely that institutions such as universities – often privileged in having not only the highest concentration of open-minded and outward-looking individuals, but a relatively highly developed infrastructure for international networking as well - display common elements and enter into the general stream of trends that govern higher education elsewhere, despite the fact that economically, politically, and even culturally the countries in which they are located are out of synchrony with ‘the centre’. It is not irrelevant to point out, in this regard, that practically all Universities in the Mediterranean - with the exception of Syrian and Libyan ones - generally have access to the internet, and that if, for many citizens who are lucky to have running water, let alone a computer in their home, the concept of the ‘global village’ is still a pipe dream, it nevertheless does tend to be a firm reality for many university academics and students, whose participation in a virtual, scholarly community is facilitated by the new technology of communication.

In addition to the issue of permeability to globalisation, a comparative study of education systems in the Mediterranean seems to me to be possible because practically all the states bordering on the basin share a common political history of domination and economic peripheralisation. All the states of the Mediterranean - with the exception of France - have only recently emerged from decades - and in some cases, centuries - of either colonial domination, or dictatorial rule. Cyprus,
Malta, Jordan, Egypt, Palestine were all colonies or ‘protectorates’ of Britain, while Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Lebanon fell under French rule or mandate. Libya fell under the sway of Mussolini’s Italy at a time when it was ‘fashionable’ for European states to have Empire. The tardy establishment of democratic government in Portugal (1974), Spain (1975), and Greece (1974) means that in these countries as well, memories of totalitarian regimes are still fresh, as are those of Albania (1990), Croatia (1990), Slovenia (1991), Macedonia (1991), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992). As part of the semi-periphery of the world economy, therefore, the Mediterranean ‘rim’ plays a specific role in the international division of labour and capital accumulation. A consideration of a global economic regime using, for instance, a world-systems approach (Wallerstein, 1984; Santos, 1990) helps us distinguish between processes in the education sector that are common to ‘central’ countries and those that are ‘semi-peripheral’. While the former are generally ‘policy-making’ countries, the latter are often ‘policy-taking’ ones.

This shared history of permeability to globalisation forces, of domination and peripheralisation is therefore bound to have had an impact on the form, pace, and direction of the region’s educational development, and it is certainly worth considering in a manner that does justice to the linkages between what appear to be, at first glance, very different situations. Indeed, even if comparative Mediterranean studies are articulated in a tentative, almost eschatological form of discourse that gropes towards the identification of patterns, and reasons for those patterns - often on the basis of flimsy, scarce, and not entirely reliable data - enough material can nevertheless be brought to bear on the subject of higher education to hazard a number of propositions regarding common ‘trends’ which could, in turn, become the focus of further and more systematically grounded research that contributes towards the development of the field.

Clearly, different Mediterranean states are at different phases of development, and there is no claim that there is some form of ineluctable and linear historical force or ‘logic’ that necessarily leads higher education systems in the direction indicated. The argument will nevertheless be made that there is evidence of a movement in the same direction, despite the very real differences that characterise the countries in the region, and that we have taken pains to identify. While, as has been noted earlier, the focus will be on the Euro-Mediterranean countries (including Libya), reference will, from time to time, be made to Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece, because their location on the semi-periphery of advanced capitalism does inscribe them within the logic of at least some of the forces of development – and hence trends – that are outlined below. References to the Balkan Mediterranean states will be limited, and very tentative in nature.
Trend 1: Prioritisation of the University sector

In most countries of the southern and eastern Mediterranean, education suffered under colonial or dictatorial rule. The British and French, in their own different ways, were mainly interested in education as long as this provided for the training of clerks and functionaries for the administrative service. Compulsory education at the primary and secondary levels was introduced very late in the day - often a century after those services had become available in Europe. University education was available only to the elite, either at what was often a solitary institution in the country's capital city, or in the metropole country. One report notes that in Morocco, for instance, in 1943 - i.e. 31 years after the establishment of the French Protectorate - only 23 Moroccans held a first university degree, the licence (Nucho, 1999: 640). In some cases, education fared worse under occupation than before it: such is the case of Algeria where, from the start of French dominion in 1830 till independence in 1962, the literacy rate actually declined (ibid.: 14).

A look at the development of higher-level institutions in such countries suggests that the establishment of a university represented a key dimension of a national strategy to assert identity and nationhood - either on the road to, or in celebration of independence. Such is the case of Egypt, for instance, when Britain's educational policy, solely interested as it was in training manpower to satisfy the needs of the administrative apparatus and in co-opting elites, was met with opposition. This led, in 1908, to the establishment of the first secular Egyptian university – later to be known as Cairo University – by prominent Egyptian nationalists (Nucho, 1998: 200). Under different circumstances but for similar reasons, Cyprus finally achieved its goal of establishing its University in 1989 (teaching started in 1992), an aspiration that it had harboured for over half a century but which, according to Koyzis (1993; 1997) and Persians (1999) had become vitally important in order to ensure the State's legitimacy in the international arena, particularly after the invasion of the island by Turkey in 1974, and the subsequent drawing up of the infamous 'Green Line'. In Palestine, universities became a symbol of national identity and of resistance to Israeli occupation. They also became a breeding ground for young political leaders, and the fact that they were frequently closed down by Israeli troops is a clear witness of the national role played by universities under occupation.16

While the setting up of universities in the Mediterranean has often been couched within a discourse of national economic revival, a closer reading of the situation reveals that the semi-peripheral State, in its search for legitimation, adopts Western-style discourse and models, often at the expense of neglecting
the needs of its own specific situation. This has led several Mediterranean countries to invest in the more visible higher education sector, without addressing more carefully the massive problems in the compulsory education sector.

Several MENA countries spend much more on their higher education students than on those in basic education - 8 times more in Tunisia, 15 times more in Jordan, and 15 times more in Morocco (Levin, 1995, cited by Heyneman, 1997: 454). The fact that university studies are more expensive than compulsory education could be considered to be normal, but it is pertinent to point out that in OECD countries, the state spends only twice as much on students in the former sector than it does on those in the latter.

The importance attributed to university education in Mediterranean countries following independence or despotic rule is obviously not just a reflection of the need to assert identity and legitimacy - it is also the result of a very real popular demand for further studies. This demand can be said to have been caused by a number of factors. One obvious reason is the fact that invariably, and for both ideological and economic reasons, newly independent states, or those which had succeeded in overthrowing authoritarian rule, put education at the forefront of their policies. Despite the uneven success achieved, the fact remains that, in these countries, several more students reached the levels normally required for entrance to university-level studies - indeed, the numbers became so large that, as we shall see below, states have had to resort to a variety of strategies to cope with, and ultimately manage, control, and even reduce the flow. If we take the Arab states of the Mediterranean as an example, we find that several governments have generally placed great emphasis on the expansion of schooling as the primary cornerstone of nation building. The increasing number of secondary school graduates knocking at the doors of tertiary institutions far outstrips demand. In 1989 in Jordan, for instance, 26,180 students had passed the tawjihi examinations which theoretically gave access to University – however, only 33.9% of these could be absorbed (Nucho, 1998: 342).

States were also partly responsible for triggering off the upsurge in higher education provision: consonant with prevalent political ideology, educational access to further studies was widened to avoid a situation of dependence on the 'Nortn' for science and technology. Also, a belief in human capital theory encouraged many states to see a direct relationship between investment in human resources and economic development. In many cases, however, opportunities for such development did not occur in areas that required highly qualified personnel, but in the low or medium skilled areas such as the textile industry and tourism.  

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Trend 2: Broadening of access

The massification of the higher education sector which, in Europe and the United States had already commenced by the middle of the 20th century, took off in earnest in the Mediterranean countries from 1970s onwards. Indeed, it is estimated that more than half of the universities in Arab countries were established after 1970 (Shaw, 1997), with the student enrollment figures increasing fivefold in most countries over the last two decades, and even more in Algeria (increased by 13 times), Morocco (16 times), and Jordan (by 20 times). Such an exponential increase is also true for Malta, with a fivefold increase in the student population between 1988 and 1995 (Sultana, 1995b). In Turkey, there was a 42% enrollment increase in formal tertiary education between 1983 to 1992, and within one academic year (1992-93), the capacity was increased by another 33% (Simsek, 1999, drawing on Guruz, et al., 1994). Between 1994/95 and 1997/98, Palestine saw a 78% increase in the number of its university students (Hashweh and Hashweh, 1999). The first EuroMed Civil Forum (Institut Català de la Mediterrània, 1996: 162) noted that between 1979 and 1995, the number of university students had multiplied ten-fold in almost all the countries of the Southern Mediterranean.

There are important class and gender dimensions to the widening of access to higher education. In terms of social structuration, available data coincides with that of many other countries world-wide, namely that those from middle and upper classes are most highly represented in universities. With regards to gender, the subordinate role of women in intellectual and educational life in several Mediterranean states has been well documented (Fergany, 1994; Dore-Audibert and Bessis, 1995; Sabour, 1996; Belarbi, 1996; Morsly, 1998). The World Bank's higher education report (1994) notes, for instance, that women constitute only 36% of the total enrollment in that sector in MENA countries, with wide divergences being recorded for the different Arab countries.

Despite this, it is undeniable that the percentage of female students has increased steadily in several fields of studies (Beirut Declaration, 1998). The Libyan report to the IBE World Data Bank on Education (1998) notes that the country was moving away from policies that went against the interests of women, including the idea that university and advanced studies or fields of studies were unsuitable for women (see also al-Harari et al., 1994). The same report notes that for 1995-6, 40% of the 160,000 students enrolled in universities were female - a substantial increase from the 21% in 1980-81. In Malta, 50.5% of graduates in 1997 were women, compared to only 24.6% in 1980 (IBE, 1998).

It is however important to highlight the fact that women tend to be found congregated in specific areas of studies (Chabchoub and Haddiya, 1995). This

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- Expressed as a percentage of the total enrollment at the third level. Figures in ( ) refer to Graduates. – * education includes humanities – + humanities includes social science
- Percentage of female students in each field of study, expressed as a percentage of the total enrollment in the field specified.
- Gender Segregation Index: percentage of all persons enrolled in 3rd level who'd need to change their field if gender ratio were to be the same in all fields.
- * data refer to universities only      # data do not include students at ISCED level 7, for which registration is not required
becomes evident when we consider the data presented in Table 1, which provides a picture of the percentage of students (and graduates) by field of study, the percentage of female students in field of study, and the gender segregation index in the different countries of the Mediterranean, at least as these were reported, country by country, in the World Education Report (Unesco, 1998). Drawing on Hatem (1995), Mazawi (1999a) argues convincingly that gender-specific enrollment policies enable 'entrenched élites to redraw the distribution of social and political power and enhance regime legitimacy', providing women with sheltered educational and occupational trajectories, which lessen competition with men, enabling women 'to carve out their own professional and occupational spaces in gender-based occupations', such as medicine and education. One could also raise the question as to whether the availability of women on the highly-qualified job market serves to counter-balance the tendency for higher wage claims in that sector.22

It would not be remiss to point out that one finds several attempts on the part of governments of Mediterranean states to direct or control the surge for higher education, to 'ensure' a better fit between supply and demand, to preempt problems related to armies of disaffected unemployed or under-employed youth, and to create conditions which improve quality educational provision. These strategies have included the arbitrary raising of the pass mark at pre-university level examinations, the setting up of provincial universities, the off-loading of responsibilities for training and research onto private institutions, the diversification of the higher education through the establishment of community colleges which absorb potential university applicants, and the increase of post-secondary vocational institutions and tracks. Egypt is a case in point, with the number of students entering universities in 1989 being 68,000 - a 26% decrease from the number that entered in 1981 (Nucho, 1998: 200). Libya too has, since 1990, raised its university entrance requirements, channelling lower achieving students towards higher training institutes and vocational training centres (IBE, 1998). Some of these issues will be considered in other sections in this article.

Trend 3: A diaspora of Mediterranean students

Another strategy adopted by different Mediterranean states in an attempt to manage the demand for higher education has been the provision of scholarships and other forms of incentives and aid so that students carry out their studies overseas. Target universities have generally been those in metropole countries, though increasingly the USA has become the preferred destination for study, given the perception that it offers a superior education in such fields as
engineering, mathematics, computer science, business and management - particularly at the post-graduate level. Zikopoulos (1991) reports, for instance, that in 1989-90, 311 Algerians were studying at US institutions. In a survey of academic educational scholarship in the Mediterranean carried out by Sultana and Ebejer (1997), it became clear that of the 262 respondents from 17 Mediterranean countries who filled in a network form set out in English and French, 102 had carried out their studies at foreign universities. Of these, 52 had obtained their doctorates from USA institutions, and 23 from UK ones.

This is not to say that the flow of Mediterranean students has only been in the direction of the ‘north’: Jordanian students, for instance, used to go mostly to other Arab countries - particularly Syria, Egypt and Iraq - for their university studies (Zughouli, 2000a). Before the war broke out in 1975, Lebanon - and Beirut Arab University in particular - was the preferred destination for students from elsewhere in the Arab world, Africa, and Asia (Nucho, 1998: 545). Of the total 45,786 BAU graduates through 1990, only 18.3% held Lebanese citizenship (ibid.: 550). In the seventies, the majority of Palestinian students carried out their higher level studies in other Arab countries, mainly Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.23

The number of Mediterranean students studying abroad has reached staggering proportions, and was particularly impressive in the seventies, before declining economies and strained international relations took their toll (Za’rour, 1988: 21). The Jordanian government, for instance, estimates that 40,000 students are carrying out their studies overseas, largely due to lack of space in home universities (Nucho, 1998: 342). 25,000 go abroad to foreign universities each year (Burke and Al-Waked, 1997). For Egypt, the number is about 10,000 (ibid.: 212). As many as 12,000 Cypriot students were studying abroad in 1988 (Persiani, 1999), with the number going slightly down to 9,067 in 1994 (IBE, 1998).24 Students from the Maghreb have, in the past, flocked to France where university studies were heavily subsidised. A total of 55,830 students from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia carried out their higher education studies abroad in 1983, with 78% of these going to France (Za’rour, 1988: 21). Among the Latin arc countries, Greece has more university level students studying abroad than does any other European nation (Eliou, 1988, 1992; Saitis, 1993).

The downside of this transfer of knowledge ‘southwards’ is that what starts off as temporary migration becomes permanent - Odysseus does not necessarily always return to Ithaca25 Irrespective of whether degrees are earned at home or foreign institutions, the temptation for graduates to seek their fortunes in the more lucrative ‘north’ has taken an enormous toll on human resource development in the region. Gizard (1992) reports, for instance, that an estimated 250,000 graduates have emigrated northwards and eastwards from the Maghreb alone in the last twenty five years, representing an average of 10,000 graduates per year.
For Algeria alone, and with reference to 1996/97, the Minister of Education is quoted as saying that 1200 university lecturers had left the country.26

A more recent trend noted by Al-Nouri (1995) is a growing disenchantment with college degrees, especially those earned in Western Universities. Similarly, Coffman (1996: 17) reports that less Arabic students are going to the 'west', and that partly as a result, the latter - and particularly the United States - has moved to Arab states, with several American universities setting up programmes in Arab countries. Harvard University and the University of California at Davis, for instance, will be overseeing the academic aspects of the newly established and private Middle East University in Cairo (Nucho, 1998: 212). In Palestine, an Arab American University is to be opened in Jenin, to the north of the West Bank, with support from the University of California.27 U.K. universities as well - having allowed themselves to be thoroughly colonised by market ideology - are making the best of their erstwhile contacts in the Mediterranean to establish 'outpost campuses' or 'foreign university extensions' to offer degrees, cashing in on the escalating aspirations of young people, in a context of decreasing financial resources. This is the case with Intercollege in Cyprus, while Henley College, Oxford Brookes University, and Maastricht University are actively engaged in prospecting candidates in Malta. A recent amendment to the Higher Education Law in Israel has facilitated the creation of a 'transnational system of tertiary education suppliers', largely controlled by the U.S.A. and the U.K., and in response to an ever growing demand for higher studies (Gottlieb and Yakir, 1998). The Civil Forum held in tandem with the Barcelona Conference in 1995, noting the American university presence in the region, formally proposed the 'introduction of European universities in the Mediterranean' (Institut Català de la Mediterrània, 1996: 168) in order to enhance co-operation and influence (ibid.: 164).

**Trend 4: Privatisation of the university sector**

One of the strategies adopted by several countries in the developed world in order to cope with expanding higher education systems and contracting capital has been the systematic stimulation of non-public sources of higher education finance. This, until recently, had not been the case in Mediterranean countries, where legislation generally prohibits private universities from being established or from operating an outreach campus on their territory. Increasingly, however, the situation is changing. There are many reasons for this shift: one of these has already been extensively referred to, namely the impossibility for the State to cater for the ever-burgeoning number of students wanting to further their studies.
Another reason is the cost associated with providing higher education free of charge or at highly subsidised rates, catering for grants, scholarships, food, medical and accommodation subsidies and so on. In this regard, the World Bank (1994: 17) has noted the inability of governments in MENA countries to keep up with their initial investment in higher education, with average public expenditure per student declining from $3,200 to $1,900 in less than a decade. Only Israel seems to have maintained its high levels of investment in higher education, putting 1.7% of its GDP into the sector, thus ranking second, after the U.S.A., in international comparisons with developed countries (Limor, 1999).

That privatisation of universities has responded to a real demand can be seen from the fact that once such an enterprise became a legal possibility in a number of Mediterranean countries, several such institutions were set up in a short space of time. In 1986, the Jordanian Ministry of Higher Education, in response to a request by expatriates, authorised the establishment of the private Applied Science University, which opened its doors to students in 1990. Within eight years, eleven other private universities had been set up, with an enrollment approximating 25% of the total student population in Jordan’s universities in 1994-95 (Burke and Al-Waked, 1997; Zughoul, 2000a).

Turkey approved the establishment of private universities in 1984. Seven were founded in quick succession, with as many being granted permission to start operating in the near future (Simsek, 1999). Egypt legalised private universities in 1992, with two such institutions being established immediately after (Nucho, 1998: 200, 212). Indeed, it has been reported that as part of an overall strategy to stimulate business, the French - and specifically the bank Société Générale, the tourist company Accor and the telephone company Alcatel, have invested capital and plan to launch a University in Cairo in the year 2001 (Murris, 1999). In Morocco, private higher education schools have been operational since 1985, and by 1999, 79 such institutions had opened, with a reform in the pipeline which intends to group these schools into universities, which will remain private (Meziani, 1999). A private University was opened in 1993: an anglophone institution built on the anglo-saxon model, the university is named after the late King Hassan II, and is based in Ifrane. A new reform under discussion forsees two different kinds of universities other than public institutions: private, and semi-public, i.e. financed by student fees and state subsidy. In Israel, Gottlieb and Yakir (1998) note that the first step towards privatisation of higher education has been paved with the amendment of the Higher Education Law, which now licences foreign universities to offer degree courses, within the framework of specific guidelines, and in response to a demand for higher education qualification that the State could not accommodate.
Politically useful though privatisation may be in that it decreases some of the pressure on the State, it is nevertheless viewed with suspicion and ambivalence in several Arab states as it represents a threat to government control over standards, curricula, and recruitment of personnel (Za'rour, 1988). Zughoul's (2000a) detailed account of the development of the private university sector in Jordan is a timely reminder of the dangers of unbridled and unregulated private involvement in education, where 'profiteering' takes over the traditional mission: the quest for excellence. Despite the fact that there is little evidence to support claims that private involvement in universities lead to cultural imperialism and a lowering of standards, Gottlieb and Wark (1998) note that in Israel as well, foreign university extensions have attracted considerable criticism from the ranks of traditional academe. Furthermore, while privatisation may reduce economic pressure on the state, it can ultimately contribute towards the increase of social pressure, since it is likely to reinforce and augment unequal access to the university.  

**Trend 5: The Entrepreneurial University**

Within the same ideological terrain of privatisation is the reconceptualisation of the University as an entrepreneurial organisation (Clark, 1998). The argument behind the development of this model is that full public funding of universities can only be sustained in a situation where only a small percentage of each age cohort aspired for and entered the higher education sector. With the burgeoning of numbers, that kind of investment on the part of the State could not be maintained, and it is now up to the University to attract funds by entering into collaborative projects with the productive sector. In the more developed countries, industrialisation forced the universities to reconsider their inward-looking attitudes that protected their traditions, and began instead to participate in the process of development, establishing new research institutions, new curricula, and eventually new relationships with the productive sector of society. In peripheral and semi-peripheral states, where the economy was and remained largely agrarian, the University was not challenged to sever the umbilical tie it had with the structural and cultural forms it had inherited from the Middle Ages. Indeed, social commentators from such peripheral countries, who saw educational development as a means of industrial development, were often frustrated by the backward-looking gaze of these elitist institutions. In 19th century Malta, for instance, Wallace (1842: 7) exorted the University to seize "the pruning knife", judiciously severing "from the tree of knowledge the leaves of Cicero and Demosthenes and graft in their stead enlarged branches of scientific... knowledge". University lecturers were castigated for their narcissistic fascination with the classics.
literature, metaphysics and theology, and were urged to shed ‘vain illusions and motives of self-conceit...and to reduce] the empty phantoms of imagination to the realities of a productive and fruitful active life’ so that ‘a solid alliance, constant and unshakable in its hereditary usages, be formed between scientific theory and practical labour’ (ibid.: 8).29

Such a transformation, in the case of many Mediterranean universities, did not happen until relatively recently, and at least partly explains why such higher education institutions have tended to be dominated by Faculties providing traditional professions such as doctors, lawyers, pharmacists, architects, and religious specialists (Boissevain, 1982).30 Increasingly, however, and under the influence of globalisation, the pressure of student numbers, and the decline of public resources, the model of the ‘entrepreneurial university’ has begun to gain legitimacy. Sings of this trend are more evident in the non-Arabic Mediterranean universities, particularly in those countries that have strong linkages with the European Union. In Malta, for instance, the University established its commercial arm, the Malta University Services, which attempts to generate supplementary funding for the institution and its employees, and to promote faculty skills, research and products among the business community (Serracino Inglett, 1993: 11). This is partly due to the hegemonic pull of market and corporate models of financial management, which have become firmly entrenched in Europe.31

**Trend 6: Greater autonomous management**

The Napoleonic tradition of centralised government has deep roots in the Mediterranean countries, where State authority - often coupled, as will be noted in another section below, with varying degrees of religious control - holds sway over large arenas of social life.

Reasons that could be given to explain this trend in the different sub-regions of the Mediterranean include: (a) political histories of colonialism or indigenous autocratic regimes, where a strong State apparatus had to keep a tight control over the production of ideas and identities; (b) industrial underdevelopment and delayed modernisation, where the lack of an indigenous entrepreneurial class and the dynamics of the international division of labour led the State to take centre-stage in several dimensions of the country’s life, including investment in human resources;32 (c) the influence of the ideology of centralised planning which, in the 50s and 60s, was common to most developing countries, and which led States to undertake manpower planning exercises and to plan and manage educational structures and services in view of pre-established economic goals.
One major stumbling block to autonomy in Mediterranean universities is financial: as long as it is the State which carries the major share of the burden of costs, it will feel justified in maintaining power over the institution: as always, it is the one who pays the piper who calls the tune. As Sabour (1996: 79) notes, in State financed universities, faculty members are employed as civil servants, so that 'the hierarchy of organisation, the process of decision-making and academic policy-making is under the strict centralised control and supervision of the state' (Sabour, 1996: 79). Thus, the Arab academic 'is still in many respects dependent on this bureaucratic power which functions as a gate-keeper of the state market, which constitutes the main space where he [sic] can invest his knowledge and capital' (Sabour, 1991: 226).

In a sense, therefore, the trend towards privatisation that has already been noted signals not only a devolution of aspects of responsibilities that previously belonged solely to the State, but also - and concomitantly - a weakening of centralised administrative regimes, where cost-sharing necessarily leads to power-sharing. Indeed, practically every country report on higher education that was perused to write this article notes a trend towards decentralisation - though of course, nothing less that empirical and grounded research can indicate the extent to which such declarations represent a sop to what have become - in addition to 'privatisation' and the 'free market' - aspects of a fundamentalist 'world ideology', adherence to which signals modernity, progress and efficiency. The European Union's commitment to decentralisation and subsidiarity has been an important influence, not only with the Mediterranean members states, but also with those who look towards Europe for inspiration in reforming their educational systems (see Sulana, 1995a). With his characteristic sharpness, Weiler (1999:20) notes that the trend towards devolution of power to the university on the part of the state is not innocent: at least part of the motivation has been the serious shrinking of public resources available for expanding systems of higher education. 'In this situation', comments Weiler wryly, 'it is very tempting for governments to transfer to the universities the increasingly unpleasant (and politically onerous) task of administering scarcity'.

Another obstacle to university autonomy is 'patronage', much in evidence in Mediterranean societies (see Boissevain, 1974; Gellner and Waterbury, 1977). The more 'advanced' a society, the more differentiation there is, with less of a reliance on kinship systems and on patronage and more of a reliance on institutions that operate with a bureaucratic rationality. Developing states are characterised by an absence or weakness of rational bureaucracies, with the result that recruitment (and promotion) of personnel - even at higher education levels, is often subject to feudal patronage ties rather than to formal qualifications of skills and proven ability. In Jordan, for instance, such wasata or 'influence' can
determine the percentage of a budget that a particular university obtains from public monies (see Burke and Al Waked, 1997). Across the Middle East, Shaw (1997: 214) reports that leading families are allocated their domain in the state apparatus, 'so that it is not unknown for the university to be a personal fief of a notable'. These and other practices lead Shaw (1997: 206) to conclude that in the Middle East 'higher education and the intellectuals are controlled and managed by the power holders', that they are 'in many respects incorporated into government and bought off by government employment' (ibid., 211), and that the only alternative to this predicament is either retaliation by the influential families, groups and rulers, silence, cunning or exile (Keddie 1972: 56).

Bursalioglu's (1995) brave account - and confrontation - of the excesses of both the Turkish state and its minions within the higher education sector might well be an eye-opener, given the revealing details of ministerial meddling, favouritism and autocratic decision-making - but it will hardly be news to Mediterranean readers who have suffered (or enjoyed!) first-hand such practices in areas that include the granting of tenure, promotion, relatively lucrative administrative posts, and research grants. For many academics in the region, a change in government can spell fortune or disaster, depending on who's side one is - or perceived to be - on!

It is only in Israel, it seems, where the higher education law grants the sector 'total' academic and administrative independence, making the situation unique. Limor (1999: 28), the director general of the Council for Higher Education of Israel - the buffer body between government and academia - states that 'no similar law exists, in any other known country, that grants such a vast degree of academic and administrative freedom to institutions of higher education'.

It would however be true to say that a definite trend towards greater autonomy in university affairs can be perceived across the Mediterranean basin. A few examples will help flesh out this development. Italy's 51 universities now enjoy more autonomy in the management of funds and personnel, in the determination of fees and contributions, and in the evaluation of their own activities. In Albania, where up to the collapse of its totalitarian regime school and University curricula were strictly controlled because of the fear of the penetration of foreign ideology, new laws have been passed (1994, 1999) which guarantee the autonomy of universities and all higher education level institutions. Higher education is now based on self-assessment under the supervision of the State, with syllabi being developed by each lecturer or group of lecturers (Musai, 2000). In Algeria, despite the fact that the educational system remains highly centralised, with the Ministry of National Education and that of Higher Education and Scientific Research determining the curricula for various educational levels, Regional Academies of higher education have been established so that deans and directors of grandes
écoles participate in taking responsibility for the academic administration of higher education in their respective regions (Nucho, 1998: 15).

**Trend 7: Secularisation of universities**

One important aspect in regard to the autonomy of universities in the Mediterranean region is the relationship between educational institutions and religious, besides secular ones. As the birthplace of the three Abrahamic religions, the faiths can be said to have historically both initiated and stultified educational development in the region. Islam is a case in point. As al-Otaibi and Rashid (1997: 2) note, ‘from its inception, the religion of Islam honored education and strongly encouraged Muslims to study and learn’. Such a commitment to learning, as we have already had occasion to note, led to the development of universities in Islamic countries, before they made their appearance in the West.

The issue of secular higher education in the Mediterranean is a complex one, and the direction of change is not entirely clear given that the struggle to establish a hegemonic position by either of the two ‘camps’ - i.e. the secularists and the religious - is still in balance. While in Europe it is the influence of Islamic fundamentalists that is given most - if not exclusive - coverage, it should be noted that what could be called ‘aggressive conservatism’ is also a feature of Catholicism and Judaism, and that all three religious groups have developed strategies to influence the form and direction of education, sometimes at the tertiary level as well.

Such an influence can take various forms. The character and sometimes very charter of the University can reflect the fact that they were founded by religious orders of one kind or other. Malta’s only university started out as a *Collegium Melitense* in 1592, under the leadership of Jesuits. Graduation ceremonies, senate and council meetings, the opening of a new academic year - one and all are accompanied by religious rituals, prayers, and in some cases, mass. The order of the Jesuit fathers was also responsible for the establishment of what would later become St. Joseph University, in Lebanon in 1881. Egypt’s oldest university, Al-Azhar, specialised in Qur’anic studies, as did that of Morocco, which started off as Qarauyiine University Mosque. Al-Janun University in Tropoli, Lebanon (est. 1993), is an Islamic institution affiliated with the Muslim brotherhood (*ikhwaan al-muslimiin*), while in the same country, Balamand University (est. 1988) operates under the auspices of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch and All the East (Greek Orthodox), and Holy Spirit University (est. 1949) under that of the Maronite (Catholic) Order. While Jewish ultra-orthodox groups tend to keep away from the higher education scene in Israel, it is pertinent to point out that Bar Ilan University is in fact a religious institution.
The power of religious groups can be felt much more directly, particularly when alliances are made with the State. In Malta, for instance, a secular socialist government had closed down the Faculty of Theology at the island’s only university in 1978. A subsequent government of Christian Democrat persuasion re-instated that Faculty, and established a binding agreement with the Catholic authorities whereby staff selected to teach Theology at the University had to first be approved by the Archbishop before a definite appointment was made by Council. The Rector hand-picked by the same government to lead the newly ‘re-founded’ University was a priest, with the University council not having any say at all in his appointment.

Hladnik (2000) describes how at the very beginning of the transition of Slovenian society to democracy in 1991, the Catholic Church attempted to claim back its traditional, political, economical, and above all educational role in society - roles that, for the previous forty five years, had been limited to liturgical rites by the communist regime. Hladnik in fact notes that the educational agenda is confronted with two opposing visions: on the one hand there is modernity, human rights, individualism and secularism, while on the other there is traditionalism, corporatism, Christian values and anti-secularism. Attempts at educational reform in the former direction through the publication of a White Paper in 1996 have met with a fierce opposition of the Slovenian archbishop and the clergy, who vowed that they would never accept the reform, and that they would fight it, even if it took for ‘five, ten or fifty years to destroy it’ (quoted in Hladnik, 2000).

But perhaps it is in Arab universities that we see the most developed form of influence by religious - specifically Islamic - groups. There is a long history to this, for it was precisely the inability of the Arab scholar to prise a free space between the ‘church’ and the ‘state’ that led to the withering of the idea of the university as a separate body of masters or fellows, and rang the death knell of Muslim academic leadership. As Clark (1987: 264) perceptively notes, institutions of higher learning in Islamic countries became organised around specific forms and associated cultures that became static. ‘Notably,’ Clark proposes, ‘they concentrated exclusively on legal and religious studies, becoming in effect colleges of religious law. They did not themselves develop corporate legal personalities, even though often endowed, but remained closely bounded by larger religious structures and tenets...The individual teacher or student remained closely constrained, and the college as a whole was restrained from moving into new areas of inquiry and professional practice’. In Europe, the organisational culture that was developed in universities led guild-like units to work relatively autonomously, and particularly after the Renaissance, the stress on rational inquiry rather than tradition enabled a dynamic interaction that not only altered old forms of knowledge, but developed new ones as well. While both the Islamic
madrasa and the christian university were threatened by the same sclerosis of thought and ossification into orthodoxy, Europe managed to emerge thanks to three movements that were absent from Islam. These Khôi (1998: 33) identifies as a critical spirit in theology that was made possible thanks to the rivalry between Pope and Emperor, and which led to the Reformation; humanism, that is an individualism which also opposed itself to the Pope's authority; and printing, which islam refused till the 18th century.

Fundamentalism is, in essence, contradicted by the spirit of open quest that is of the essence of universities - a quest that permits doubt, multiplicity, and scepticism. As Fabre (1998: 10) claims, fundamentalisms, be they Islamic, Jewish, Orthodox or Catholic, are a 'product of modernity, and specifically of intense urbanisation - but they do not convey modernity. They suffocate culture and creativity under the black veil of religious ideology, because they consider them to be illicit... Only the One prevails, in its dangerous purity, the Multiple having no right to abode. A sovereign monologue of all these fundamentalisms, which meet each other in a concerted movement that drowns, with a vengeance, the polyphony that is the Mediterranean.'

It was earlier noted that, of all social institutions, universities tend to be among the most permeable to foreign influence. It is precisely that which makes them the object of criticism of religious movements that cannot tolerate difference. Modelled on French or English institutions, and increasingly on American-style programmes, credit-system and all (Coffman 1996: 17), with curricula that are increasingly dependent on knowledge produced in the Western world, couched in language that is of the West, Arab universities are prime targets for fundamentalists. It is no wonder that, given the mounting concerns regarding the perversion of spiritual values and ideas, the exploding Algerian fundamentalist movement made Arabisation of the university its primary demand in 1989.36 Abu-l-As'ad (1994) notes that while at the turn of the century, Egyptian teachers had been considered to be the cream of the modernist lobby, the avant garde troops representing 'progress' because of their adherence to, and communication of modern secular ideas, the situation has today changed drastically. Teachers are increasingly co-opted by the Islamic movement, with many of them being active members of such groups.37

Arab state leaders have had to make their own uneasy peace with Islamic movements, which tend to see higher education as a filter through which Western technologies are introduced into society. Many Arabic universities clearly state in their mission statement that one of their goals is the maintenance of Arabic-Islamic values and the adaptation of the modernisation process. Islamist student groups have attempted to dominate several University campuses in North Africa, and Coffman (1996: 16) reports that governments have taken 'strong measures
to repress, or at least defuse, such activity. A large and visible police presence on campuses, as well as an effective network of student informers, has kept fundamentalist activities under control. In Syria, Islamic zealotry within the confines of higher education has been neutralised - with some degree of violence, we are told (Shaw, 1997: 209) - by the 'socialist' element of Baathist ideology. Nevertheless, as a cursory look at some recent publications on the matter show, the goal of 'islamising' all levels of education in the Arab world, if perhaps kept in check, is still very much alive (see Sultan, 1995, 1997; Bajunid, 1989). In a short but valuable contribution on the impact of globalisation on higher education in MENA countries, Sabour (1999) notes the increasing attraction of religious extremism among university student who, having jumped through all kinds of social, economic, cultural and symbolic hoops and hurdles, end up unemployed or underemployed. In this case, fundamentalism signals a disenchantment with the secular, western dream of credentialing and progress, vehicle as it has been by globalisation. The disenchantment with socialism and left-wing radicalism and the shift to other all-embracing ideologies such as that provided by religion can perhaps best be seen in Palestine. In the 1980s, Birzeit University was the bastion of the radical left, and that was reflected in both student and faculty union elections. Now, the most powerful political group is the Islamic Hamas and Jihad, followed by Fatah (pro-Arafat). The left has almost disappeared at the student level, and has been drastically weakened at the faculty level.

Trend 8: ‘Innovative accommodation’ in the choice of the language of instruction

Echoes of the religious question - which is also, and predominantly, a question of identity - can be found in another major issue that confronts Mediterranean universities - the language of instruction. Language, as sociolinguists such as Trudgill (1995) and Moatassime (1992) have pointed out, is intimately linked to national identity, and acts as a symbolic resource to project feelings and ideologies of nationhood, and the position of the post-colonial State in the region and world. The language of instruction has both politico-cultural and political-economic components: the first related to identity formation on gaining political independence, the second conjuring up the problems related to the dearth of resources which limits the production of required textbooks, as well as the marketing strategies used by international publishers from core countries.

For Arabic countries especially, language represents a major symbolic issue over which countless ideological battles have been fought. An account of the
herculean efforts on the part of Arab states towards Arabisation (maximising the use of Arabic) – including the setting up of a Bureau for Coordination of Arabisation in the Arab World, established in 1961 by ALECSO, is provided by Zughoul (2000b). Arabisation of higher education has been on the cards for at least three decades, and comprehensive use of Arabic was supposed to have been achieved by the year 2000 (Barkho, 1984). But there are serious doubts as to the extent that the movement has succeeded in getting close to this goal, as Zughoul (2000b) points out. With perhaps the exception of Syrian universities, where all subjects are taught in Arabic (de Leeuw, 1996), university instruction in science, technology, and business in the Arab world is still generally conducted in French or English. This to the extent that students have experienced a compulsory school system that teaches through Arabic - have to spend a whole year at University improving their language proficiency before embarking on their course of studies. It is increasingly being found that one year does not suffice (Massialas and Jarrar, 1991: 99-107). A similar situation exists in Malta, where university students are often requested to follow remedial courses in English to be in a better position to profit from the courses they follow.

Most Arab countries do not appear to be unduly perturbed by the situation, showing a greater degree of openness towards linguistic plurality within the university than in the immediate post-independence years. Zughoul (2000b) notes what is possibly a major trend - what he refers to as ‘innovative accommodation’ - with lecturers and students code-switching between Arabic and English (or French) in order to get their points across. Anybody who has interacted with Maghrebin scholars knows the extent to which this code-switching is not only frequent, but almost instinctive, producing an effortless and seamless flow of language that is comprehensible and acceptable within the academic community. This ‘innovative accommodation’ has also been the subject of research in Jordan (Zughoul and Hussein, 1985) and in Malta (Schembri, 1999), where empirical data exists on the code-switching behaviour of lecturers in a number of faculties. It is certainly an aspect of the problem that deserves further investigation.

Other countries are, however, less tolerant of the situation, even if - as always with language policies - legislation cannot control the linguistic habits of interlocutors. In Algeria in particular, there has been much controversy over the language of instruction, with a law being passed in 1991 requiring that education and training in all sectors at all educational levels, in all specialisations bar foreign language teaching, be in Arabic (Nucho, 1998: 15). Despite such legislation, French continues to be the language of instruction in applied sciences, technology, architecture, medicine, veterinary medicine, planning and statistics, physical education and demography (ibid.: 31). Even when presented with a choice
between Arabic and French, students will tend to opt for the latter medium, particularly since Francophone lecturers tend to have a higher degree of expertise in their area of studies, given their studies in France. Increasingly, English seems to be displacing French across North Africa, as unpublished British Council reports, cited by Zaghoul (2000b), indicate. Sometimes, this shift is encouraged by government policy – in Algeria, for instance, and as from 1993, students were allowed to choose English instead of French as a second language from the fourth year of primary schooling onwards.

The earlier reference to the situation in Malta highlights the fact that the language question at universities is not limited to the Arabic world. There are other places in the Mediterranean where the dual role of universities in affirming a nation’s identity, while at the same time opening doors to the outside world, constitutes something of a dilemma. In Cyprus, for instance, Cypriot nationalists and Greek politicians and scholars bitterly opposed the use of English as one of the languages of instruction, a proposition that had received unanimous support in the House of Representatives when the matter was raised in 1981 (Persiani, 1999). Instead, Greek and Turkish were adopted. One could also refer to the Spanish situation, where there is constant code-switching, in some universities, between Catalan and Spanish.

**Trend 9: Interactive pedagogies**

The evolution of universities from elite to mass institutions has had a major repercussion not only on the identity of the institution, but also on the pedagogic interaction between teacher and taught. In the guild-like set-up of the medieval university, the student was apprenticed to the ‘master’ or ‘doctor’, and initiated into realms of knowledge and tools of inquiry. That relationship is today only possible in those few privileged and generously funded research institutions (which sometimes, as in France, are in fact not universities, and which tend to export the formal teaching component to universities), and in the context of dissertation supervision. Mass lectures with hundreds of students has generally had a deleterious effect on the quality of teaching in higher education everywhere, and the response to this has been positive, to some extent, as academics have begun to make their own teaching the subject of sustained reflection and research, and to integrate the new technology in their repertoire of instructional strategies.

As we have already noted, massification of higher education is also a feature of the Mediterranean region. In addition to the challenge that numbers have for the development of interactive and effective teaching methods, there is another
aspect of Mediterranean culture that has a negative impact on pedagogy. The authoritarian relationships that have tended to prevail in Mediterranean societies, and the magisterial modes of teaching that are common at the compulsory education level reinforce instructional over educative concerns in most Arab universities (Za'our, 1988: 13-14; Benrabah, 1999: 149ff.; Boubekeur, 1999; Beirut Declaration, 1998) and in many others across the rest of the Mediterranean (Boissevain, 1982, 1990). Shaw (1997: 215), writing about universities in the Middle East, notes that after schooling 'the survivors often arrive at higher education socialized to transmissive teaching and dependency on the text'. Benrabah (1999: 149), drawing on Boudalia Greffou (1989) and Rebah (1991), refers to what he terms 'pavlovian pedagogy' in an Algeria under the grips of an islamist onslaught. Boubekeur (1999), reporting on research carried out at Algeria's University of Constantine, notes a general dissatisfaction among students with the standard of teaching, even when this refers to the theoretical elements of the courses they follow, which is supposed to be the University's traditional strength. Reports from several Arab (Za'our, 1988; Bubtana, 1992; Benrabah, 1999; Boubekeur, 1999; Hashweh and Hashweh, 1999) and other Mediterranean countries (Baldacchino, 1995; Bursalioglu, 1995; Bertoldi, 1999; Ledic et al., 1999), suggest that the formal lecture method, memorisation of notes and textbooks, and examination-oriented teaching are the norm, with students having little opportunity for discussion, questioning, or meeting professors.

In Jordan (Heyneman, 1997: 454) and Malta (Baldacchino, 1995), to mention only two examples, students tend to do least well in precisely those areas where strength is required in modern economies, namely problem-solving in new and unanticipated circumstances. The fact that there are very high faculty-student ratios in most subjects - and especially so in the humanities - does not facilitate instructional styles that lead to critical interrogation of set curricula. Neither does the fact that in several subjects teaching takes place in English or French (see Salmi, 1987). In Albania, the totalitarian regime in place since the Second World War led to the imposition of a rigid, totalitarian pedagogy (Musai, 2000).

Studies such as these at least serve to signal the beginning of an important shift - namely, that university staff are beginning to study and research their own practice and effectiveness within the institution. Several initiatives have been reported indicating that quality auditing measures - including staff evaluation by students - is on the agenda in the Mediterranean (Sultana, 1997). An Arab Network for Staff Development has, for instance, been set up to encourage a shift in the learning process from passive absorption of knowledge to active participation (Al Hares, 1994).
Conclusions

Clearly, the nine trends that have been identified in this article are not the only ones that apply to the Mediterranean context; other trends can, I am certain, be identified, particularly when the propositions advanced here are subjected to further reality checks, and when data are collected in a more grounded fashion from the different national contexts. Neither, it must be added, are these trends unique to the Mediterranean region. Connections between the problems and challenges in the higher education systems of the Mediterranean and other semi-peripheral and peripheral states can easily be established, and parallels noted, by perusing the work of Ziderman and Albrecht (1995) for instance, or of Brock-Utne (1999) or Abagi (1997). Caught up as they are in the process of globalisation (see Brock-Utne, 1996), universities of the South seem to be struggling to shape themselves according to the mould of the corresponding institutions in the North. The trends towards privatisation, entrepreneurship, massification, and so on echo the footsteps trodden earlier by the universities of the more economically and industrially developed nations. Indeed, we can use Pampanini’s (1999) useful image, suggesting that ‘Medi-terra-nea’ lies not only betwixt and between geographical terrains, but economic ones as well. Compared to the situation in black Africa, for instance, Mediterranean states are the ‘middle class’ of this world, despite the scarcity of resources reported by the likes of Palestine (Hashiweh and Hashiweh, 1999), for instance, or the serious deficiencies in standards in places such as Algeria (Benrabah, 1999). It would be easy - if perhaps slightly simplistic - to argue that a continuum exists whereby a number of the different trends outlined above apply, with various degrees of intensity, to universities internationally, whether we are speaking of the more or of the less developed worlds.

This should not lead, however, to the kind of theory of mimetism that argues that poorer individuals/groups/nations are psychologically disposed – ‘driven’ even – to emulate the echelons above them, and to ‘catch up’ with them. The challenges facing Mediterranean universities, while coinciding with those that have had to be faced earlier by the North, have their own specificity. Certainly, universities of the Mediterranean will have to find ways of better managing themselves as mass institutions without succumbing to the temptations of elitism or mediocrity, how to find alternative sources of funding without losing their ‘soul’ in the process, how to distance themselves from the political and elite class without alienating them as sources of support. Mediterranean universities have to rise to the challenge of maintaining their identity - linguistic and cultural - without disengaging from the universal mission that is at the heart of their institutional ethos; of affirming the religious and ethical principles that are often so much part
and parcel of their heritage of scholarship, without denying alternative view points, closing the doors to an ‘open society’, or succumbing into what Arkoun terms (1977: 22) – with particular reference to Islam, but which is here used to refer to the different religions of the region – ‘an idealized and constricted vision’ of orthodoxy, ‘forged under the defensive imperatives of a community threatened from within and without’. Certainly, universities of the Mediterranean - like those of the more developed and wealthier regions of the world - have to find the right balance between quality teaching and generative research, in their search for relevance in a complex and fast-changing world. They have to do this in contexts of scarcity that would alarm any scholar from the first world, who takes the availability of a modicum of resources for granted. But they have to do it nevertheless. The alternative is too unpalatable to consider, even though many institutions may be hovering over the brink and staring that particular phantom in the face, sucked as they are into a situation where what matters is screening and certification, rather than knowledge transmission and creation.

That process of transmission and creation has to have a critical edge about it. Scholars of the Mediterranean must, while learning from the North, maintain their grounded-ness in pertinent issues and problems, and apply knowledge to solve the most pressing questions that have to do with securing the dignity of all citizens. Rather than uncritically adopting dominant paradigms from western countries, straight-jacketing local data to fit fashionable accounts in order to gain legitimacy and currency in the international circulation of ideas (Bonal, 1995; Brock-Utne, 1996), scholars need to engage in useful research that empowers and speaks to the locale, providing the conceptual, analytic, empirical and operacy tools that are required to generate a fruitful and productive dialogue both internally and in interactions with the international community.

Notes

I am indebted to several colleagues from Mediterranean countries, and scholars in Comparative Education Studies, who made comments about earlier drafts of this paper. I mention them because they were, in a very real sense, part and parcel of the methodology used to generate the empirical data that is reported in this paper. Through their reactions, I could carry out a 'reality check' that could not have otherwise been done. New information was added, and changes and modifications made to incorrect or partially correct statements. This is a list of the scholars who kindly agreed to give me feedback: Mohamed Millani (Algeria); Helen Phtiaka (Cyprus); George Flouris (Greece); Sarah Guri-Rosenblit and Yaacov Iram (Israel); Marco Todeschini (Italy); Ragii Abou Chacra (Lebanon); Ahmed Meziani (Morocco); Mahir Hashweh (Palestine); Belfriro Cabrito (Portugal); Miriam-Miltarvic Hladnik (Slovenia); and Xavier Bonal (Spain). In addition to these Mediterranean-based scholars, I would also like to acknowledge the very helpful remarks made by Abdel-Jalil Akkari (University of Fribourg); Mark Bray (Comparative Education Centre, Hong Kong); Rob Crowen

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1. This is a Euro-centric view, of course. Lê Thanh Khôl (1995: 212 ff.) speaks of ‘universities’ when referring to the centres of higher learning in India and the Far East, developed under the influence of Hindu and Buddhist monasteries. He specifically refers to the university of Nalanda, founded in the first century, and which in its heyday had 1500 teachers catering for 5000 students from Tibet, China, Korea, Japan, Sri Lanka, Tokhara and Mongolia. In a sense, it all boils down to our definition of a ‘university’, which in the west is generally taken to be an institution which fulfils two criteria, that of a Papal or imperial charter, and a juridical personality which finds expression in the studium generale or the approved course of studies backed by the pertinent guilds. When commenting on this definition, Farrugia (1993: 41) points out that Byzantine scholars refer to the University of Constantinople, which was founded by Theodosius II in 425 A.D., even though it only fulfilled the first of these two criteria. Others would claim that the first institution of higher learning was Plato’s Academy, founded in about 387 B.C. Definitions are not merely pedantic and petty academic squabbles: the way we define what a university ‘is’ or ‘should be’ determines what we consider to be ‘normal’ and what we judge to be ‘problematic’ (see Kuitunen, 1999).

2. Alfred North Whitehead has famously asserted that ‘the safest general characterisation’ of Western thought is that ‘it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato’ (Honderich 1995: 284). Newman noted in one of his lectures ‘Looking, then, at the countries which surround the Mediterranean Sea as a whole, I see them to be, from time immemorial, the seat of an association of intellect and mind, such as to deserve to be called the Intellect and the Mind of Human Kind. Starting as it does and advancing from certain centres, till their respective influences intersect and conflict, and then at length intermingle and combine, a common Thought has been generated, and a common Civilisation defined and established. Egypt is one such starting point, Syria another, Greece a third, Italy a fourth, and North Africa a fifth - and afterwards France and Spain. As time goes on, and as colonisation and conquest work their changes, we see a great association of nations formed, of which the Roman empire is the maturity and most intelligible expression; an association, however, not political, but mental, based on the same intellectual ideas, and advancing by common intellectual methods’ (quoted in Serracino Inglott 1992: ix).

3. To my knowledge, none of the major organisations that provide educational statistics - such as OECD, the World Bank, and Unesco - identify ‘the Mediterranean’ as a category for the aggregate presentation of information; the researcher interested in this region must collate data on a country-by-country basis, and extirpate information from groups of countries that have been bundled together under a different - perhaps more immediately apparent - logic. ‘Europe’, ‘Middle East and North Africa’, ‘Balkan’, ‘Arab’ are some of the categories with wider purchase and legitimacy in comparative studies. It must be noted, however, that the OECD did have a Mediterranean Regional Project in the sixties.

4. Bursalioglu (1995: 175) provides one example of how educational statistics are manipulated by the state - in this case, Turkey - in order to curry favour with international funding agencies.

5. One could claim that comparative education should be at least as interested in identifying differences as commonalities, particularly where they are least expected to be found.

6. Despite more than a 1000 kilometres of Mediterranean coast-line, Libya has been, for several reasons, distant from the Euro-Mediterranean partnership project. It has been reported, however, that
the constituent session of the Euro-Mediterranean parliamentary forum, held in Brussels on October 27-28 1998, adopted a final declaration recommending the participation of Libya (and Mauritania) in the Mediterranean process launched in Barcelona (Arabic News.com, 29.10.98).

7. The political issues revolve around Turkey’s human rights record in relation to the Cypriot and the Kurdish questions, while the economic concern is Turkey’s level of underdevelopment requires a level of aid that would drain the EU’s reserves and funds. Turkish ambivalent attitudes towards their own westward-looking identity is caught brilliantly by the ironic coment of the novelist Orhan Pamuk, who, with more than a pinch of sarcasm notes that the Mediterranean represents, for the Turks, a necessary myth to encourage the many attempts that, over the past two centuries and not always with great success, they have launched in order to westernise their country. Pamuk (1998: 46) argues that ‘it seems that to aspire to be Mediterranean is like winning a second class ticket to the West. The image of the Mediterranean is neither totally western, nor totally oriental: it is an acceptable, middle-of-the-road identity, easy and accessible’ (my translation from the French). I would personally build on Pamuk’s insight in more positive terms: for many in this region, identification with a Mediterranean identity represents a creative way of taking a position against forms of fundamentalist implosions that mark their national context, without necessarily metamorphosing into ‘Europeans’ and losing deeply cherished values and world views - and a sense of one’s own dignity in the process.

8. Within the Arab world there is a gap between the ‘north’ which, with the exception of Algeria and Iraq, groups the nine oil-producing countries with small populations, and the ‘south’, which groups the remaining twelve Arab nations. Calleya (1997: 99), drawing on Hitti (1994: 90), notes that while the GDP of the former group was $US300 billion in 1990, that of the latter group was only $US119 billion.

9. In this regard, Meyer and Brown (1999) have argued that the new phenomenon of networked scientific communities (e.g. the Tunisian Scientific Consortium) has the potential of transforming the ‘brain drain’ into a ‘brain gain’ phenomenon, with knowledge transfer being facilitated not only by the ‘return’ option, but also by the ‘diapora’ option.

10. It is worth noting, for instance, that historically, the wars and conflicts between christians outnumber those between christians and muslims.

11. This is not the place to rehearse the way in which the Mediterranean basin has evolved as a region, with leading actors continuously challenging one another’s authority in the area. That task has been addressed by historians (Rose, 1933; Braudel, 1949), anthropologists (inter alia Pit-Rivers, 1963; Peristiany, 1965, 1976a, b; Geliner and Waterbury, 1977), economists (Amin and Yachir, 1988; Yachir, 1989; Baack, 1994), international relations specialists (Gillespie, 1994; Calleya, 1997), with education comparativists making a rather belated appearance on the scene (Sultana, 1996, 1998, 2000; Pampanini, 1999; Cowen, 1998).

12. This is one of the rare and exemplary co-operative ventures in publishing in the region. It is a co-production by the Tunisian Academy of Science, Humanities and Arts, and the Italian Embassy, in collaboration with French and North African publishing houses. Each book appears in Italian, French, Spanish and Arabic. The publications appear under the Joca Book imprint.

13. Al-Faruqi (1988: 16), for instance, chides Muslim scholars who add new subjects to curricula in Islamic schools without realising that such imports contain ‘alien values’, ‘facets of an integral view of reality, of life and the world, and of a history that is equally alien to that of Islam’. Meyer (1984), on her part, provides a useful discussion of the problem posed by modernity to the traditional structure of knowledge in Islam.
14. With specific reference to the Mediterranean region, one could refer to the EU-funded Med-Campus scheme which encouraged interaction and knowledge transfer between Universities of the ‘North’ with those of the ‘South’. The Med-Campus programme by itself has promoted the setting up of more than a hundred Euro-Mediterranean networks concerned with a great variety of scientific disciplines. These have led to the participation of around 10,000 students and more than 1,000 academics from 300 universities from the Euro-Mediterranean countries (Institut Catalá de la Mediterrània, 1996: 165). More rarely, we find ‘horizontal’ interaction schemes between Mediterranean universities. These have tended to be led by NGOs, such as Italy’s Community of Mediterranean Universities (located in Bari), the Laboratorio Mediterraneo (located in Naples), and UniMed (located in Rome).

15. In this sense, therefore, the Caribbean is the American ‘Mediterranean’, while the space between Indochina, South China, the Philippines, and Indonesia constitutes an Asiatic ‘Mediterranean’ (Lacoste, 1993: 1000).

16. I am indebted to Maher Hashweh for this information.

17. I am indebted to Abdel-Jalil Akkari for this point. In this regard, Xavier Bonal also comments (personal communication) that the more peripheral and semi-peripheral countries receive foreign high technology companies, the more the rates of return for highly qualified jobs.

18. In Western Europe, about 2% of each age cohort went to the University at the end of the 1960s. By the 1960s, the proportion had gone up to 10%, while today it is 35% and climbing (Halsey, 1991). Holzbawrn (1996) notes that the massive growth of higher education was, together with the loss of peasantry, one of the worldwide changes that marked the ‘social revolution’ of the post-World War II era.

19. Most Mediterranean countries lag behind European levels of university enrollment. To reach those levels, Turkey would have to multiply its capacity for admittance by 3.5, Morocco and Algeria by 5, Tunisia by 6, and Egypt by 3 (Institut Catalá de la Mediterrània, 1996: 162).


21. It is possible that the fact that Libyan families have supported coeducation in universities has encouraged this trend (Al-Nouri, 1995: 137).

22. I am indebted to Xavier Bonal for this point (personal communication).

23. According to Maher Hashweh (personal communication).

24. These were repartitioned as follows: Greece 39.9%; U.K. 27.4%; U.S.A. 20.2%, Germany 2.6%, and other countries 9.9%.

25. For some countries, the brain drain takes on another dimension, given the intolerance shown to intellectuals in the country of origin. Such is the case of Algeria, for instance, where thousands of academics and artists had to flee for their lives given the systematic carnage addressed against them. As a result of this, 75% of University teachers are at the ‘assistant’ or ‘maître-assistant’ level (Bennahm, 1999: 172), Schmid (1998), in a series of interviews, captures the thoughts and feelings of such intellectuals in exile.
26. As reported to the author by Mohamed Miliani.

27. Information provided to the author by Maheer Hashweh.

28. I am indebted to Xavier Bonal for this point.

29. For the very same reasons, Napoleon closed down the University of Malta during the eventful two years of French occupation of the islands (1798-1800) after centuries of rule by the Order of the Knights of St John. In its stead, Bonaparte promoted the establishment of more vocationally-oriented institutions that could generate wealth among the miserably poor population.

30. Other reasons as to why degrees in the arts and humanities have, until quite recently, been more heavily subscribed than science and technology include (a) the fact that contrary to western societies, higher education preceded industrialisation, with the State being the only or main employer of graduates. Employment opportunities were available in the state bureaucracy, rather than in industry; (b) Universities have tended to impose artificial barriers (e.g. raising of entry qualifications) to such courses as medicine, engineering, and technology - rather than social sciences, humanities and the arts. The reasons for that include the higher cost per student for these kinds of courses, the perceived necessity to preserve and improve quality provision, and the strength of some professions, relative to others, to exercise occupational closure.

31. See Mora (1999) for an account of the development of such a model in Spain.

32. As authors such as Bonal and Rambla (1996), Gomes (1996) and Kanakis (1996) have noted, the problem of centralisation is the result of a mismatch between production and social consumption - i.e. while consumption and social rights patterns and expectations were repressed under autocratic indigenous or colonial rule, a new-found liberty leads to incessant demands that are at a level which is closer to central capitalist countries than is development of production. As a result, the State is continuously forced to face a situation where the demand for new social rights (e.g. to widen access to higher education) is not accompanied by capital accumulation. The State is obliged to spread out its regulatory action into a very wide arena, in order to be in a better position to act as arbitrator, and ends up playing a central role in social and economic regulation, even though its direct role in production or in service provision is very limited.

33. Some of the problems with these assumptions are explored by Green (1997). The devolution of the State from its responsibilities as the guardian of education as a 'public good' raises issues as to what happens to entitlement and equity.

34. Ignatius of Loyola, the founder of the Society of Jesus, had planned to open a college in Malta, an island he had identified as ideally situated to open the doors for missionary activity among the Islamic communities of North Africa (Sauvé, 1993).

35. Information provided by Yaacov Iram.

36. In personal communication with the author, Mohamed Miliani noted that there are often reports that 'too much preaching and not enough teaching' goes on in a number of Universities in Algeria.

37. In this regard, however, it is useful to consider Herrera’s (1998) warning, namely that while private Islamic schools have indeed increased in number in Egypt, we need to be careful not to think of them as if they were all characterised by the same qualities - such as entrenchment in tradition, priority to religious ritual, subordinate place to women, etc. She in fact criticises the way the West
writes about ‘Islamist movements’ as if they were the same, and focuses on Caliph Oman Islamic Language School to show hybrid identity in what is increasingly being referred to ‘post-Islamism’ (see Bayat, 1996; Roy, 1998). In a critically important review of comparative education studies of Arab states, Mazawi (1999b) also makes the point that there is a need to focus on processes at the classroom, school and community level rather than simply on macro and structural-functionalist approaches, if we are to understand educational dynamics, and how it is not only society that produces education, but also how education produces society.

38. Bajunid quotes from documents published by the International Institute of Islamic Thought, which compares the contemporary goal of Islamising modern knowledge to the task of the early Muslims who succeeded in Islamising Greek, Persian and Indian knowledge: ‘The modern Muslim scholar’, is the injunction of the Institute, ‘must Islamize the international legacy of modern knowledge to reform its methodologies and establish systematic and scientific approaches in all fields of social and human sciences and other fields of studies from an Islamic point of view’ (1989: 3). That mission was reasserted at the Sixth International Conference on Islamic Education, held in Cape Town, South Africa, 20-25 September 1996 (see Saeed, 1997 for a report).

39. I am indebted to Maher Hashweh for this information.

40. In this regard, Bennarab (1999: 177) notes how in Algeria, despite the official policy of enforcing the Arabic language as a means of communication, linguistic interaction takes on a life of its own, marked by a ‘conviviality and tolerance between all the extant languages: Algerian Arabic, Berber and French. On the streets of Oran, Algiers or elsewhere, the Algerian uses occasionally one, or the other, or a mixture of two or three idioms’. [my translation].

41. Information shared by Mohamed Miliani (personal communication).

42. Fine examples are to be found in the issues of the journal Teaching in Higher Education, recently launched by Len Barton and his colleagues (first issue, 1996).

43. Several Mediterranean countries report a situation where academics find themselves obliged to supplement their regular salaries by taking on additional employment, to the detriment of excellence in teaching and research. This is true of Egypt (Klausner, 1986), Greece (Ellou, 1992), Malta (Shatock, 1990), and Turkey (Bursallouh, 1995) among others. In the more developed world, the swelling of student numbers and the drying up of resources has also led to the whirling down of the advantages that used to be enjoyed by the academic cadre. In particular, a ‘reserve army of academic labour’ has been created, with conditions characterised by marginality and insecurity (Collins, 1999). These are, however, nowhere near the deprivations that have to be faced by scholars in the intermediary developed and developing world.

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