Dependence and independence: Malta and the end of empire

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Abstract

The end of empire was rarely a neat or seamless process. Elements of empire often persisted despite the severance of formal constitutional ties. This was particularly so in the case of Malta which maintained strong financial and military links with Britain long after formal independence in 1964. Attempts to effect the decolonisation of Malta through integration with Britain in the 1950s gave way to more conventional constitution-making by the early 1960s. British attempts to retain imperial interests beyond the end of formal empire were answered by Maltese determination to secure financial and other benefits as a quid pro quo for tolerating close ties with the former imperial power. By the early 1970s, however, Britain wearied of the demands placed upon it by the importunate Maltese, preferring instead to try and pass responsibility for supporting Malta onto its NATO allies.

Reflecting a widely held view in British governing circles, Sir Herbert Brittain of the Treasury remarked in mid-1955 that Malta could ‘never be given Commonwealth status, because of defence considerations’. Indeed, Malta’s perceived strategic importance, underlined during the Second World War, coupled with its economic dependence on Britain, apparently made independence a distant prospect. Despite the significant constitutional advances in the early 1960s, strong ties between Britain and Malta, especially in the military and financial spheres, endured beyond formal Maltese independence in 1964. In this sense, the example of Malta supports the growing recognition that decolonisation could be an open-ended process, with traces of empire outlasting its formal demise. Indeed, a study of Malta in the era of decolonisation supports Stephen Ashton’s recent observation that ‘Historians of the British empire have long debated the question of when empire began. Equally open to interpretation are questions of when it ended or whether it continued in a different form’.

1 This article is based on research undertaken for the Malta volume of the British Documents on the End of Empire Project, published by the Stationery Office in 2006.
2 The National Archives (TNA), CO 926/249, no. 19, letter from Brittain (second secretary, Treasury) to Sir T Lloyd, 22 June 1955.
Writing at the beginning of 1965, Britain’s high commissioner in Malta, Sir Edward Wakefield, recorded: ‘For the moment … the change from dependence to independence appears to have been one of form rather than of substance. Before independence the Maltese were managing – or mismanaging – their own internal affairs. They are still doing so. Before independence their economy was sustained by British Services’ expenditure in the island, coupled with British financial aid. It is still being sustained by the same means’. In a similar vein, a Treasury official remarked: ‘Psychologically the Malta Government have not yet come to grips with independence, and have assumed … that H.M.G. would always be prepared to finance Malta’s budgetary deficits because it was politically inexpedient to increase Maltese taxation.’ As late as 1970, the British high commissioner, Sir Duncan Watson, mused: ‘It is not easy to bring the Maltese, after centuries of dependence on an external power, to real and realistic independence’. In his memoirs, the former colonial secretary, Olivier Lyttelton, depicted Maltese problems as ‘amongst the most difficult to deal with in the whole world’, concluding that the ‘underlying reason which makes them so intractable is that the Maltese aspire to political independence and to financial dependence’. This dichotomy explains much of the tension in Anglo-Maltese relations in the era of decolonisation.

In 1947, the British government fulfilled its war-time pledge and restored responsible government to Malta, which had been in abeyance since the 1930s. Consistent with its inter-war predecessor, the new constitution was characterised by a division of powers, or diarchy: responsible to an elected assembly, the Maltese Cabinet of eight (including the prime minister) dealt largely with local issues while the colonial government, under a governor, maintained control of matters of imperial concern such as defence, civil aviation, and nationality. Even before the re-introduction of dyarchy, the colonial secretary, G H Hall, emphasised the importance of reaching ‘agreement on a financial settlement sufficiently generous to ensure a reasonable prospect of success for responsible government’. Consequently, he recommended the granting of £25 million, in addition to the £10 million which had been provided in 1942. A settlement on the basis of a fixed capital sum, confidently predicted Hall, would ‘free us from what might prove to be a perennial source of friction between His Majesty’s Government and the Malta Government’. While agreeing to a lump sum settlement spread over some fifteen years, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton, reduced the amount to be offered to £20 million. He also stressed that British financial assistance should be capped at this level and that it would be for the Maltese themselves ‘to finance their own continuing expenditure in the future’. Dalton’s hopes for Maltese self-sufficiency proved forlorn, however.

At the beginning of 1948, the recently elected Malta Labour Party began pressing for continued imperial assistance towards food subsidies which had been due to cease at the end of the financial year. The Colonial Office remained unmoved. Challenging

6 TNA, T 225/2664, f 132, minute by J. A. Patterson (principal, finance department, Treasury), 26 Nov 1965.
9 TNA, T 220,818, letter from Hall to Dalton, 14 Feb. 1946.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., letter from Dalton to Hall, 28 Feb. 1946.
the argument that HMG remained indebted to Malta as a result of war-time service, one CO official snapped ‘we cannot go on admitting an unspecified moral obligation for ever’, while another asserted that Britain had already been ‘exceedingly generous to Malta, generous far beyond the scales which are justified by our existing resources or by comparison with what we are able to do for other Colonial territories’. Differences over financial assistance soon resurfaced.

In late July 1949, a delegation of Maltese ministers travelled to London to discuss food subsidies and participation in the American-sponsored European Recovery Plan, or Marshall Aid. Although the former was soon settled, the later became a controversial issue between the imperial and Maltese governments, and also within the governing Malta Labour Party. The deputy prime minister, Dom Mintoff, induced the Maltese cabinet to put its name to an ultimatum which threatened to seek aid directly from the United States in return for US use of Malta as a base. Although the prime minister, Paul Boffa, induced the cabinet to withdraw the document, this precipitated a split in the Malta Labour Party and the subsequent fall of his government. Malta’s political turmoil was matched by its economic instability.

By mid-1951, the island was close to bankruptcy. This situation was exacerbated by the difficulties of sustaining Malta’s ever-increasing population, a problem to which emigration offered only a partial solution. The head of the CO’s Mediterranean department, J S Bennett, drew constitutional conclusions from Malta’s precarious economic situation, questioning whether additional financial assistance was compatible with preserving Malta’s self-governing constitution. Three years earlier he had gone so far as to assert that ‘I doubt personally whether Malta can be run as a self-contained economic and financial unit, since its economy depends so much on external factors, and since it is so tiny…. Unless Malta is, and can remain, self-sufficing financially, self-government will become impossible and the constitution will break down’. Another official had predicted that ‘The day is not far off when we shall have to consider whether the almost certain financial assistance which Malta will expect of us will not involve some modification of her present constitutional status’, adding that ‘The ablest politician in Malta, Mr. Mintoff has voiced the possibility of incorporation with the United Kingdom as a possible solution to Malta’s problem’.

By contrast, the Maltese prime minister, Nationalist Party leader Dr Giorgio Borg Olivier, favoured Malta’s evolution towards dominion status. In pursuit of this aim, Borg Olivier requested in 1953 Malta’s transfer from the Colonial Office to the Commonwealth Relations Office. Secretary of State for Colonies Lyttelton viewed such an innovation with scepticism on the grounds that continued British control over defence implied by Malta’s status as a fortress colony, as well as the island’s lack of economic and financial self-sufficiency, militated against bringing Malta within the remit of the CRO as a full member of the Commonwealth. Instead, he favoured assimilation with the status of the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man by a transfer of responsibility for Malta to the Home Office. Despite Borg Olivier’s new demand for ‘full autonomy within the Commonwealth in all fields of Government’, the Home

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12 TNA, CO 158/566/89036/9, minutes by J. S. Bennett and Sir John Martin, 11 and 13 March 1948.
13 TNA, CO 158/586/89036/1, minute by Bennett, 22 Aug. 1951.
14 Ibid., minute by Bennett 11 March 1948.
15 TNA, CO 158/567/89036/10/1, minute by P. A. Carter, 25 May 1951.
Office offer was still proffered. In addition to the Home Office idea, other possible solutions to Malta’s unresolved constitutional status included the appointment of a Royal Commission to review the workings of the 1947 constitution which in itself underscored the fact that existing arrangements had failed to provide a stable basis for Malta’s constitutional development. ‘[T]he trouble is’, recorded the secretaries of state for the Home Department and for the Colonies, ‘that we have tried to complete self-government in internal affairs (including finance) to a territory which does not, and probably never will, have a viable economy’. CO Assistant Secretary Morris had already referred to gaps in the constitution which provided ‘numerous opportunities for the Maltese Prime Minister to be obstructive, unless the constitution is worked in a co-operative spirit’. ‘The present Prime Minister’, he bemoaned, ‘has seized on these opportunities with relish.’ CO Assistant Under-Secretary Sir John Martin was in full agreement with this analysis. ‘A diarchy’, he wrote, ‘is an uneasy form of government and it can only work if there are good personal relations and a spirit of give and take. The latter is conspicuously absent on the side of the Maltese Ministers, whose methods of dealing with H.M.G. are those of a Levantine carpet-seller.’

British confidence in Borg Olivier was further undermined by his procrastination in replying to the Home Office offer which prompted Governor Sir Gerald Creasy to observe that the Maltese premier was ‘certainly no man of action’, being ‘obviously incapable of taking prompt decisions’. In a similar vein, the Colonial Office noted that it was ‘virtually impossible to get any concrete action’ out of the Maltese prime minister. While Borg Olivier wavered, Mintoff continued to advocate Malta’s integration with the United Kingdom. Mintoff’s growing enthusiasm for the concept reflected in part his determination to insulate Malta from the economic consequences of a future decline in the strategic value placed by Britain on the island. Assessing the virtues of integration, a Colonial Office official emphasised that ‘Mintoff does after all want to draw closer to the United Kingdom which should surely be preferable to independence or “enosis” with Italy’.

Mintoff’s decisive victory in the Maltese general election of February 1955 brought his integrationist ideas to the forefront of the constitutional and political agenda.

Early reservations about the financial consequences of integration were expressed by the Treasury which implored the Colonial Office to eschew any indication that the UK would underwrite either social insurance or other social welfare schemes. However, the new secretary of state for colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd, was disinclined to reject the Maltese proposal for closer association with the United Kingdom on the grounds that, since Malta could aspire neither to independent

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16 TNA, CO 926/403, telegram from the Commonwealth Relations Office to UK high commissioner, 23 Sept. 1953.
18 TNA, CO 926/93, minute by W.A. Morris, 17 June 1953.
19 Ibid., minute by Morris, 18 June 1953.
21 Ibid, 327.
23 Ibid.
24 TNA, CO 926/249, letter from Sir Herbert Brittain to Sir T. Lloyd, 22 June 1955.
nationhood nor full Commonwealth membership, it would have to seek combination with a stronger power."\(^25\) By rebuffing closer association with the UK, he warned, the Maltese might be tempted to pursue integration with Italy. ‘Such a development would be gravely embarrassing,’ insisted Lennox-Boyd, ‘especially at a time when Cypriots were agitating for union with Greece.’\(^26\)

The advantages and disadvantages of integration were soon exercising British statesmen. Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan was entirely supportive of the concept. ‘[A]t this moment in our history’, he enthused, ‘the voluntary and patriotic desire of Malta to join us is something we ought not to repel. Centrifugal forces are very strong at the moment. Let us cherish any centripetal movement that we can find’.\(^27\) In his diary, Macmillan wrote: ‘There was an interesting discussion about Malta, who want to join the UK! This extraordinary request has taken everybody by surprise! If we don’t accept we shall be shooting the Cypriots for wanting to leave us and the Maltese for wanting to join us!’\(^28\)

Cabinet Secretary Sir Norman Brook was more sceptical. Arguing that what the Maltese were looking for was an assurance their economy would be supported through external assistance, Brook opined: ‘is there not much to be said for trying to do a deal on “money”, which appeals to men of all Parties in Malta and creates no constitutional precedents?’\(^29\) Certainly a key element of Mintoff’s integration plan was ‘the progressive betterment of social services towards British level’.\(^30\) He also asserted that the Maltese ‘adhered to the British model of the Welfare State’.\(^31\) On the other hand, Mintoff was reluctant to acquiesce in the imposition of taxation at UK levels until Maltese wages and social services had reached parity with the United Kingdom, provoking an acerbic response from the Cabinet Official Committee on Malta: ‘what he is proposing, at least for a period of 15 to 20 years, is “representation without United Kingdom taxation”’.\(^32\) Henry Brooke, the financial secretary to the Treasury, was adamant that ‘proposals which involved according Malta equality with the United Kingdom in economic standards would have to be resisted’.\(^33\) Secretary of State for Scotland James Stuart even threatened to resign from the government over integration. Accounting for his position on this question, Stuart informed Prime Minister Anthony Eden: ‘I cannot force myself to believe that anyone has any right to wield powers without responsibility - which is what we seem to be in danger of offering the Maltese’.\(^34\) Developing his theme, the Scottish secretary remarked: ‘The people of Malta are divided and I am assured that they have not the slightest idea as to what the plan involves: they have no knowledge of P.A.Y.E. or Insurance and will only squeal like silly half-wits when they are asked to contribute a share, however small: they will say that we (the British) have swindled them and let them down.’


\(^{26}\) Ibid.

\(^{27}\) TNA, PREM 11/1432, f 552, minute by Macmillan to Sir Anthony Eden, 2 July 1955.


\(^{29}\) TNA, PREM 11/1432, minute from Brook to Eden, 4 July 1955.


\(^{32}\) Ibid.

\(^{33}\) TNA, CAB 128/29, CM 31(55)1, ‘Malta’: Cabinet conclusions, 15 Sept. 1955.

\(^{34}\) TNA, PREM 11/1491, letter from Stuart to Eden, 14 March 1956.
Although the Malta Round Table Conference, convened in September 1955 to discuss Malta’s future status, came out in favour of Maltese representation at Westminster, an inconclusive referendum on integration six months later served only to fuel scepticism towards the scheme. Wrangling over the scale of British economic assistance to Malta under integration further undermined its chances of success.

Talks in London in mid-1956 found Lennox-Boyd in uncompromising mood. Referring to the Maltese prime minister, Lennox-Boyd averred: ‘I am getting rather tired of his methods of doing business, particularly his fondness for holding a pistol at Her Majesty’s Government’s head. I think we must try to teach him a lesson on this issue of future financial aid, even at the risk of precipitating a major political crisis.’

Predictably, Mintoff refused to accept a ceiling of £5 million for HMG’s contribution in the forthcoming financial year, claiming that such a unilateral imposition would ‘wreck all prospects of Integration, and make impossible government of the Island by democratic methods’. Lennox-Boyd remained unmoved. The principal attraction of integration, he recalled, was to provide a fresh basis for co-operation. Nevertheless, he confessed: ‘I have become convinced in these negotiations that Mr. Mintoff is either unwilling to make or incapable of making his contribution to that co-operative endeavour. He shows no inclination to compromise on any issue; and without a spirit of compromise, no scheme of closer association can hope to survive.’

On the eve of the Malta Round Table Conference, the Colonial Office had confidently predicted that under integration future problems would be dealt with in ‘a new spirit of hopefulness and realism, instead of a spirit of rather sullen frustration that has been evident before’. Less than a year later, Lennox-Boyd presented a very different picture to the Cabinet in which he warned that the implementation of integration ‘may give rise to serious friction in the near future if not in the long run’, the main reason for this being Mintoff’s ‘erratic and intemperate character’. In a similar vein, CO Assistant Under-Secretary Eugene Melville opined: ‘I am myself now convinced that Integration won’t work – or rather that Mr M[intoff] won’t let it work – in any way which is tolerable to us and which preserves our vital interests in Malta’. Britain’s disenchantment with Mintoff was increased by his unhelpful, and apparently anti-British, stance in the wake of the international crisis sparked by President Nasser of Egypt’s nationalisation of the part British-owned Suez Canal Company in July 1956.

It was this, coupled with the Maltese premier’s insistence on ‘economic equivalence’ with the UK as the price of integration, which scuppered the scheme, rather than any fundamental reassessment of Malta’s strategic significance in the wake of Suez.

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36 TNA, CO 926/251, no 92, letter from Lennox-Boyd to Laycock, 5 June 1956.
37 TNA, PREM 11/1433, letter from Mintoff to Eden, 21 June 1956.
41 TNA, CO 926/327, minute by Melville, 21 Aug. 1956.
Lennox-Boyd not only questioned whether equivalence could be achieved through increases in Malta’s productivity, but also expressed concern about the repercussions of its acceptance. ‘[T]here is a danger’, he conceded, ‘that other claims for privileged treatment will arise in Colonial territories which might think integration financially worth while’. Reversing his previous enthusiasm for integration, Harold Macmillan, now Chancellor of the Exchequer, argued that associating HMG with the concept of equivalence was ‘extremely undesirable’. Summarising his objections, he stressed: ‘it is so vague that its interpretation will lead to endless friction; it will constitute a drain on our limited resources; and it will prejudice any chance of reasonable development in Malta itself’. Macmillan’s successor as Chancellor, Peter Thorneycroft, was equally dubious about economic equivalence, highlighting the inherent problems in applying UK taxation to Malta. In keeping with his predecessor, Thorneycroft was also aware that Malta’s importance as a naval base might decline.

During talks in London in February 1957, the Maltese prime minister clarified his conception of ‘equivalence’: attainment in ten years of comparable social services, including heath and education, as well as equivalent wages and salaries for government and imperial employees within a similar timeframe. ‘In other words, give a blank cheque’, sniped the CO minister, Lord Perth. For Harold Macmillan who had replaced the ailing Anthony Eden as prime minister in January 1957, equivalent meant ‘comparable’, rather than ‘equal’. While conceding that the Maltese had the right to ‘seek a comparable standard of living as their ultimate goal following political integration’, he insisted that the disparity between the economies of Malta and the UK made full economic integration ‘impracticable’. Not surprisingly, Mintoff refused to accept such reasoning, impressing upon the British premier that the abandonment of the principle of economic equivalence would ‘kill integration before it sees the light of day’. Anglo-Maltese relations were disturbed further by the cuts announced in the 1957 Defence White Paper. In discussions with the minister of defence, Duncan Sandys, the Maltese deputy prime minister, Ellul Mercer, emphasised that ‘whereas the British economy was not based on defence, in Malta reductions in defence expenditure attacked the very foundations of the Island’s whole economy’. Reporting a conversation with Mintoff, the commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, Sir Charles Lambe, commented that the Maltese premier had ‘lost faith in the British Government’s intentions’ over integration and consequently this left ‘only the alternative of “Independence”’. Certainly Mintoff’s so-called ‘break

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44 TNA, CAB 134/1202, CA(56)32, ‘Malta: economic equivalence’: memorandum by Lennox-Boyd, 15 Nov. 1956.
46 Ibid.
47 TNA, CAB 134/1555, CPC(57)4, ‘Financial provisions of Malta integration Bill’: memorandum by Thorneycroft for the Cabinet Committee on Colonial Policy, 6 Feb. 1957.
49 TNA, CO 926/692, PM(57)8, minute from Lord Perth to Macmillan, 22 Feb. 1957.
50 Ibid.
53 TNA, CO 926/694, record of a meeting between Sandys and representatives of the Maltese government, 26 April 1957.
with Britain’ motion of 30 December 1957, in which he proposed to ‘sever ties’ with Britain, pointed in this direction.\textsuperscript{55}

Independence, nevertheless, presented its own problems. On the one hand, Malta’s longstanding, and indeed systemic, economic dependence on Britain militated against the colony’s achievement of genuine self-determination. On the other, the committee charged with responding to Macmillan’s famous call for a ‘profit and loss account’ for Britain’s colonial possessions had concluded in relation Malta that ‘Her Majesty’s Government’s strategic requirements cannot be met unless Her Majesty’s Government retain jurisdiction in the field of defence and foreign affairs.’\textsuperscript{56} On the assumption that HMG were not prepared to accept independence at this stage, the island’s lieutenant-governor, Trafford Smith, reasoned that ‘we cannot afford to run the risk of an election in which the Maltese people may decide for independence since once the campaign has started we cannot effectively influence it’.\textsuperscript{57} Taking his analysis further, Smith speculated that ‘means must be found of closing down Maltese democracy for a while’. Such an opportunity soon presented itself.

On 6 April 1958, Mintoff denounced integration and affirmed his intention to seek independence. His government resigned on 21 April, but agreed to resume office on a caretaker basis. The refusal of ministers to give an assurance about the maintenance of law and order brought matters to a head, nevertheless. At the end of the month, the governor was given permission to declare an emergency and take control of government into his own hands thus providing the breathing space which Trafford Smith had called for. During this time the pros and cons of Maltese independence were vigorously debated by British decision-makers.

So far as the Chiefs of Staff were concerned, the preservation and use of military facilities in Malta could ‘never be guaranteed under conditions of complete independence’.\textsuperscript{58} ‘If independence were granted it might, therefore, be considered necessary to give up Malta as a United Kingdom national base’, they warned. However, the Cabinet Committee on Malta did not discount the possibility on the grounds that ‘In view of our experience elsewhere it would be unwise to declare ourselves outright against independence as an eventual possibility’.\textsuperscript{59} Lennox-Boyd did maintain, though, that ‘independence or full Commonwealth status is not compatible with H.M.G.’s present defence commitments and interests in the Islands, and is certainly quite impracticable at a time when the Maltese economy is almost wholly dependent upon U.K. Services expenditure in, and H.M.G.’s financial aid to Malta’.\textsuperscript{60} In keeping with these sentiments, Lennox-Boyd impressed upon Mintoff, during talks with Maltese party leaders in November 1958, that complete independence risked condemning the Maltese people to ‘appalling poverty, mass unemployment and the extremes of hardship’ which would not only be ‘completely

\textsuperscript{55} TNA, CO 926/855, no 363, telegram no 5 from the CRO to UK High Commissioners, 3 Jan. 1958.
\textsuperscript{57} TNA, CO 926/918, letter from Trafford Smith to E. M. West, 27 Feb. 1958.
\textsuperscript{59} TNA, CAB 134/2234, MM 2(58), ‘Malta: review of current situation’: Cabinet Committee on Malta minutes, 6 May 1958.
\textsuperscript{60} TNA, CAB 134/2234, MM(58)3, ‘Future constitutional arrangements for Malta’: memorandum by Lennox-Boyd, 12 Nov. 1958.
contrary’ to British policy, but would also be regarded by the rest of the world as an ‘irresponsible abnegation’ of Britain’s responsibilities. Internal debates within the Colonial Office, nevertheless, revealed a more flexible approach to Maltese independence.

As early as March 1955, J S Bennett had questioned whether ‘a base on a small congested island within easy range of potential enemy aircraft is not now an anachronism’. Developing his analysis, Bennett suggested there ‘might be a case for giving the Maltese freedom to sell themselves elsewhere if they wish’. Although this idea was not pursued at the time, three years later Colonial Office opinion demonstrated a similarly progressive streak. Emphasising that the Maltese were not immune to the appeal of nationalism, one official predicted that ‘any future constitutional arrangements which do not hold out the prospect of full sovereignty within the foreseeable future will eventually break down’. Another likened the continuation of direct rule to keeping a cork in a bottle while all the time pressures were generating inside it. ‘The time may well come’, he observed, ‘when our insistence on defence needs being met by full sovereignty will be self-defeating’. In a similar vein, other officials doubted whether defence concerns should be seen as an insuperable barrier to constitutional progress, and indeed questioned whether any settlement short of independence would provide the stability necessary to continue using Malta as a base. By the end of the 1950s, such expressions of Whitehall opinion found an increasingly receptive audience at Westminster.

The ‘winds of change era’, symbolised by Macmillan’s famous speech to the South African Parliament in February 1960, is normally associated with the rapid demission of empire in Africa. Its ethos, however, found echoes in British policy-making towards Malta which the new secretary of state for colonies, Iain Macleod, visited in December 1959. On his return he impressed upon Macmillan the unsatisfactory nature of direct rule, pointing out Malta’s ‘very long history of representative government’. In response to foot-dragging from the colonial government in Malta, as well as the Chiefs of Staff, Macleod underlined that ‘H.M.G.’s policy for all dependent territories is that they should be advanced to independence or to responsible self-government, preferably within the Commonwealth. There are no exceptions to this rule.’ Returning to the Maltese people’s tradition of self-government, he stressed that ‘no solution which fails to give them a full share in the management of their affairs can be expected to attract their sympathy or support’. ‘[I]t is not a question whether, but how and when Malta should achieve a greater measure of self-government’, Macleod insisted. On 27 July 1960, he announced in the House of Commons the formation of a constitutional commission under the chairmanship of the former governor of Mauritius, Sir Hilary Blood. The Blood Commission was charged with making recommendations for ‘the widest measure of self-government consistent with Her Majesty’s Government’s

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62 TNA, CO 926/292, minute by J. S. Bennett, 10 March 1955.
63 TNA, CO 926/797, minute by N. B. J. Hujsman, 30 Sept. 1959.
64 Hyam and Louis, 699, document no 245.
65 Ibid., 700.
responsibility for defence and foreign affairs’. Recalling the infamous comment made by Colonial Minister Henry Hopkinson six years earlier that ‘there are some certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent’, James Callaghan for the Labour Opposition quipped: ‘we recognise that the Government have at least learned that it is no good using the word “never”.

The Blood commission visited Malta between 7 October and 1 December 1960. As a result of its findings, the commission recommended the abolition of the form of dyarchy which had characterised the constitutions of 1921 and 1947. In its place, all matters, other than defence and foreign affairs, would be the responsibility of the locally elected Maltese government. In the spheres of defence and foreign policy, the Maltese government would possess ‘concurrent powers’, UK legislation and executive instructions prevailing in instances of conflict. Despite broadly supporting the Blood Commission’s recommendations, Macleod was prevented from making a statement in favour of Malta’s ultimate right to self-determination by opposition from the British defence establishment. Further planned cuts in defence expenditure, coupled with a re-assessment of Malta’s strategic value, served to remove this obstacle.

Within the context of planning for the 1962 Defence White Paper by which defence expenditure was to be kept within seven per cent of GNP, Macmillan decreed that future plans should be made on the assumption that Malta would no longer be required as a major naval base. This decision had been anticipated in a proposal communicated by the first sea lord, and backed by the Chiefs of Staff, that Malta should be ‘progressively reduced to a forward operational base’. The reassessment of Malta’s strategic and military significance encouraged CO officials to review the island’s future constitutional development: if Malta’s value in these areas was declining, they queried, couldn’t Britain give up its sovereignty and consent to Maltese self-determination? Further impetus was provided by the result of elections under the Blood constitution in February 1962. The Nationalists’ victory, claimed Borg Olivier, had vindicated his party’s policy of independence within the Commonwealth. With a popular mandate behind him, Borg Olivier journeyed to London towards the end of March to discuss Malta’s future constitutional development.

Debate over this question had already started in earnest among British decision-makers. The UK Commissioner for Malta, Sir Edward Wakefield,
optimistically concluded that a corollary of generosity in the constitutional field would be a diminution in Britain’s responsibility for supporting the Maltese economy.\textsuperscript{77} CO officials, moreover, pointed out that the two perennial objections to Malta’s self-determination, its small size and the need to retain British sovereignty for strategic reasons, no longer possessed such force.\textsuperscript{78} On the one hand, the achievement of independence within the Commonwealth for Cyprus and Sierra Leone was seen as opening the way for other small states to follow this path. On the other, the downgrading of Malta’s strategic significance appeared to reduce the risks inherent in preserving Britain’s remaining interests through a defence treaty. Against this background, Borg Olivier’s formal request for independence was received sympathetically. In July 1963, on the eve of the constitutional conference in London called to determine Malta’s future status, the Cabinet supported Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys’ recommendation that, providing a new constitution could satisfactorily be settled, Malta should be granted independence, possibly as early as the end of the year.\textsuperscript{79} Clearly trying to restrict the freedom of action of the Maltese, the minister of defence, Peter Thorneycroft, insisted that future financial aid should be dependent on the conclusion of a satisfactory defence agreement.\textsuperscript{80}

Following the London conference Britain publicly committed itself to the achievement of Maltese independence by 1 May 1964. A concatenation of events at the beginning of the year created doubts in the minds of British decision-makers about this timescale, however. Instability in Cyprus and uncertainties over the future of base rights in Libya appeared to give Malta renewed strategic significance, while a coup d’état in Zanzibar served to underline the dangers of granting premature independence.\textsuperscript{81} As Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home conceded: ‘We don’t want another Zanzibar in the Mediterranean.’\textsuperscript{82} Emphasising that Malta could become the ‘only place in the Mediterranean east of Gibraltar where our forces had any prospect of security of tenure’, Thorneycroft hoped that the achievement of Maltese independence by 31 May 1964 would be ‘frustrated’,\textsuperscript{83} a sentiment with which Douglas-Home concurred. Referring to the impending vote on independence in Malta, he added: ‘I hope the referendum will be completely indecisive, but if not, we will have to try and delay independence again.’\textsuperscript{84}

With barely fifty per cent of the popular vote in favour of independence, Douglas-Home appeared to have had his wish fulfilled. Bearing in mind that many of those who voted against the Maltese premier’s constitution were Malta Labour Party supporters who backed the concept of independence, if not in the form proposed by Borg Olivier, Duncan Sandys concluded: ‘a large majority of the total electorate had voted for independence, although they had been divided on the form of independence

\textsuperscript{77} TNA, CO 926/1309, ‘Negotiations with Malta’: note by Wakefield, 26 Feb. 1962.
\textsuperscript{78} TNA, CO 926/1309, minute from C. G. Eastwood to J. M. Kisch, 22 Feb. 1962; minute by Sir J. Martin, 12 March 1962.
\textsuperscript{79} TNA, CAB 129/114, C(63)112, ‘Malta independence:’ memorandum by Sandys, 1 July 1963; CAB 128/37, CC 44(63)5, Cabinet conclusions, 4 July 1963.
\textsuperscript{80} TNA, T 225/2174, ‘Malta defence agreement’: minute by Thorneycroft to Sandys, 16 July 1963.
\textsuperscript{81} TNA, DEFE 13/384, ‘Strategic importance of Malta’: minute from Lord Mountbatten to Thorneycroft, 25 Feb. 1964; ‘Strategic importance of Malta’: minute from Sir R. Hull to Thorneycroft, 12 March 1964; ‘Malta’: minute from Thorneycroft to Sir A Douglas-Home, 17 April 1964.
\textsuperscript{82} Hyam and Louis, 713, document no 253.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 714.
constitution to be adopted'.

Hard-bargaining over the terms of the defence agreement and the privileges of the Catholic church, however, delayed the achievement of independence until 21 September 1964. With discussions facing deadlock a bargain was reached: in return for securing a defence agreement which did not contain any ‘unacceptable limitations’ on Britain’s right to store nuclear weapons on the island, the British dropped their stipulation that Maltese electoral law should preclude the Catholic church from exercising undue spiritual influence in elections. A financial agreement was also reached under which Britain made available £50 million over ten years, £18.8 million during the three years up to the end of March 1967. In keeping with Thorneycroft’s suggestion, the remaining £31.2 million was made ‘subject to the continued operation of the Agreement on Mutual Defence and Assistance’.

Echoing the pious hopes expressed by Hugh Dalton nearly twenty years earlier following his acquiescence in the post-war grant of £20 million, an official of the Ministry of Overseas Development remarked: ‘Certainly the Treasury, and I think all the Whitehall Departments concerned, agreed to the £50 m. settlement with Malta as a final and all-embracing one intended to remove in future all the tedious, unpleasant, and dishonest arguments in the past’. Just as Dalton’s hopes were dashed in succeeding years, so too were those of his successors following Maltese independence.

In February 1965, the Malta government asked for budgetary aid. This request received short shrift from the Ministry of Overseas Development, one official stressing that budgetary aid was ‘in every way an inappropriate form of aid to give an independent country’, another that Britain should ‘avoid falling back into the position of the Colonial power having to meet budget deficits in Malta, but without the control of the budget that went with that position’. Pointing out to her colleagues that the £50 million already pledged in development aid was a ‘higher figure per head of population than any other recipient country’, the minister of overseas development, Barbara Castle, strongly opposed Maltese claims. ‘I nearly burst a blood vessel arguing’, she later recorded. Despite her best efforts, defence arguments won the day, an additional £1.2 million being authorised in order to maintain stability in Malta and bolster Borg Olivier. That Malta would request, and the British grant, additional aid on this scale indicates the degree of mutual dependence which endured beyond formal independence. This was also demonstrated with respect to British attempts to reduce force levels in Malta in the wake of the 1966 Defence White Paper.

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85 TNA, CAB 128/38, CM 26(64)3, Cabinet conclusions, 7 May 1964.
86 Ibid., CM 40(64)1, Cabinet conclusions, 21 July 1964.
88 TNA, OD 34/33, ‘Malta’: minute from C. J. Hayes to E. C. Burr, 30 Dec. 1964.
90 Ibid., letter from Hates to C.S. Pickard, 29 March 1965.
91 TNA, CAB 148/18, POD 21 (65)5, ‘Malta budgetary aid’: Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee minutes, 12 April 1965.
93 TNA, CAB 148/18, POD 21 (65)5, ‘Malta budgetary aid’: Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee minutes, 12 April 1965.
The White Paper referred to the need for ‘substantial economies in our contingents in Cyprus and Malta’.

In practice, this meant scaling down Britain’s military establishment in Malta to a staging post with a reconnaissance squadron. Despite the projected economic repercussions, not least a potential unemployment rate of 20 per cent by 1970, British ministers initially adopted an uncompromising stance. In response, Borg Olivier’s government sanctioned the administrative harassment of British forces in Malta, as well as declaring that the 1964 defence agreement had lapsed as a consequence of the planned reduction in force levels. The Maltese premier’s brinkmanship paid off. Aware of the impossibility of maintaining a military presence in the face of active Maltese hostility, the British government re-opened negotiations on the basis of a re-phasing of the rundown in order to mitigate its effects. Labour Cabinet minister and diarist, Richard Crossman, described this climb-down as a ‘classic example of mismanagement – first to propose a phased withdrawal, taking a tough line with the Maltese and being unnecessarily brutal, then to back-pedal half-way through’. Nevertheless, the episode does highlight the degree to which British attempts to limit their liabilities in Malta were circumscribed by residual strategic interests, the retention of which depended upon maintaining the goodwill and co-operation of the Maltese government. The anticipated social and economic distress caused by a precipitate British military disengagement risked not merely undermining that goodwill, but also damaging the prospects of Borg Olivier whose pro-Western leanings were seen as eminently preferable to the increasingly neutralist stance adopted by his main rival, Mintoff.

A similar desire to sustain Borg Olivier in power was in evidence when the terms of the 1964 agreement on financial assistance came up for renewal. Despite opposition from the Treasury, the Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office lobbied strongly for a continuation of aid on the basis of seventy-five per cent grant and twenty-five per cent loan. Presenting not dissimilar arguments to his Labour predecessors, the Conservative Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas Home, argued that ‘failure to reach agreement could not but weaken Dr Borg Olivier’s chances in the forthcoming Malta elections, and the prospect of having to deal with a Government headed by Mr Mintoff was uninviting’. Douglas-Home’s recommendations were accepted only with reluctance in British governing circles indicating a growing weariness with dealing with the problems of Malta. The chancellor of the Exchequer, Anthony Barber, acknowledged that it was ‘very disappointing to see that the Maltese have successfully beaten us back all along the line without making a single worthwhile concession’. Responding to the Maltese government’s request for Britain to pay the interest on loans taken out as a result of

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96 TNA, CAB 148/30, OPD 4(67)1, ‘Malta’: Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee minutes, 2 Feb. 1967.
97 Ibid., OPD 13(67)1, ‘Malta’: Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee minutes, 17 Feb. 1967.
99 TNA, CAB 148/101, DOP 1(70)2, ‘Malta: agreement on financial assistance’: Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee minutes, 1 July 1970.
100 TNA, PREM 15/525, ‘Malta: financial assistance agreement negotiations’: minute by Barber to Edward Heath, 9 Sept. 1970.
the suspension of aid during the protracted negotiations, Prime Minister Edward Heath snapped: ‘not a penny’. The hardening of the British premier’s attitude is also reflected in his depiction of the situation with respect to aid as ‘unsatisfactory’ and one which could ‘not be allowed to continue indefinitely’. Taking his analysis further, he added: ‘Since the defence facilities provided by Malta were now primarily of interest to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), it would be logical that NATO should assume financial responsibility for them.’ Ironically, the concessions wrung out of the British government were not enough to save Borg Olivier who was defeated, albeit narrowly, by the Malta Labour Party in the June 1971 elections. With Mintoff’s return to power, Britain faced an altogether more intractable foe.

As early as 1958, a CO official had prophesied that Mintoff was aiming to achieve complete independence, after which he would endeavour to ‘squeeze the UK lemon until the pips squeak’. Even after the Nationalists’ success at the polls in 1962, the British fretted that ‘However much we may believe today that a Maltese Government of the future will positively ask us to retain our Defence posture in the Island what may happen tomorrow, particularly with a Mintoff regime, is frankly quite unpredictable’. These fears were soon borne out. Within days of returning to power, Mintoff was demanding the revision of the 1964 defence and financial agreements. In particular, he sought the amalgamation of the two into a single agreement in which Britain would pay ‘rent’ for use of military facilities at a rate considerably higher than the existing aid provisions. Douglas-Home also told the Under Secretary of State at the US State Department, John Irwin II, that Mintoff wanted ‘more money for fewer facilities’.

Ruminating on the changing relationship between Britain and Malta during discussions with Michael Gonzi, the veteran Archbishop of Malta, Heath observed: ‘Mr. Mintoff seemed to feel that Malta was still a colony and he had to fight the British Government as if it were a colonial power. Malta was now independent, and, if the British Government were asked to leave, they would go.’ Following the logic of this argument, Heath speculated subsequently whether ‘the time had come for a completely fresh approach, under which we might say to the Alliance that we were moving out of Malta, and that, if they wanted to ensure Maltese neutrality, they would have to buy it for themselves.’ Although dissuaded by Cabinet colleagues from such a drastic solution, Heath was adamant that Britain’s NATO partners should share the burden of any increased contribution.

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103 Ibid.
104 TNA, CO 926/773, minute by Huisjman, 22 Nov. 1958.
Negotiations to put this principle into practice took place in Rome and London in the early months of 1972. Referring to Mintoff’s negotiating technique, the former Labour Cabinet minister, Tony Benn, commented: ‘He is an absolutely direct oriental bargainer which puts the stiff-upper-lipped British in great difficulty’. The American Ambassador to Malta, John C. Pritzlaff, had earlier likened Mintoff to an ‘old style English trade unionist’. According to Pritzlaff, this gave the Maltese premier the propensity to approach negotiations in the following manner: ‘The other person is the employer, or protagonist, so he will use bluff, ultimatums and noise.’ The man leading the British team, Defence Secretary Lord Carrington, recalled that Mintoff’s temperament alternated between ‘periods of civilized charm and spasms of strident and hysterical abuse’. Not surprisingly, hard-bargaining characterised the negotiating process. By March 1972, however, accord had been reached under which NATO countries would contribute to the £14 million annual payment which Mintoff succeeded in extracting for the continued use of Malta by British forces.

The new Military Facilities Agreement, which ran for seven years, ensured that Britain’s long association with Malta would continue until 1979. The involvement of NATO, however, underlined that Britain’s role was no longer an exclusive one, itself a key indicator of the end of empire, whether formal or informal. That the shadow of colonial influence and responsibility cast so far beyond Malta’s achievement of independent status signifies the degree to which vestiges of imperialism persisted after empire. This existed as much in the minds of Britain’s former colonial opponents as in the imperial metropole itself. Mintoff, in particular, appeared unable to abandon a mentality associated with an earlier era. ‘We must expect’, remarked the UK high commissioner in July 1972, ‘to be misunderstood and unfairly attacked because of the persecution complex dating from Colonial times which he seems incapable of shedding’. Equally, Britain’s hopes that it could limit its liabilities in Malta after independence, while preserving remaining imperial interests, proved forlorn. Indeed, the experience of decolonisation in Malta suggests that dependence and independence frequently co-existed, often uncomfortably, at the end of empire.

112 Ibid.