

HUMAN RIGHTS AND MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY

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1. If we examine world events during the last years, we realise that it is not easy to draw a detailed and realistic picture of the factors which could determine the new world order and define, within this context, a precise structure of European security. The end of the bipolar world has led to a modification of the fundamental concepts of collective and regional security in Europe which were rooted in the old system. This transition is now rendering obsolete those concepts as well as cultural considerations which put the state at the centre of international law.

If the exclusive agents in international affairs were the states, since they have come into existence, and in recent decades international organisations, today new entities and factors are playing an extremely significant role in the dynamics of international relations. There are entities which do not identify themselves either with states or traditional international organisations. These entities, without using means considered in international law, wield significant *de facto* powers and condition the political decisions of the international community without using classic coercive methods.

These are non-governmental bodies and representative "cartels", formed because of interests that are transversally present in states such as associations of producers or consumers etc. They are forums which establish directives and parameters on which the legality of the behaviour of states or other international subjects is evaluated, without being expressions of either a single state or the international community. They are supranational or transnational agents which constitute a real framework involving nearly all states. In such a way a new customary law is produced at root level, i.e. not by states and international organisations, but by the dissolution of ideological creeds which enveloped the planet.

This is actually a law which, considering its formative process, can be considered a real "law of the people". Bearing this in mind, it would seem that issues such as national security, the balance of military power, national interests and non-interference are to become things of the past.

The world has become more complex and articulate. Security is no longer provided by some countries and utilised by others.

Unquestionably, the two superpowers constituted a considerable unifying force. The end of a security regime based on two opposing superpower poles has conferred more autonomy to medium and small sized powers. Once the protection provided by the two powers disappeared, these countries were no longer relegated to a second class role in international security matters. In the emerging multi-polar world, medium and small powers are partly recovering their sovereignty in matters of security as alliances between them become more equal. Even medium-sized powers which, until now, did not have access to heavy military arms can today play a more incisive role on the international stage. This is because military resources now have less decisive weight in relations between states than economic cooperation.

There is no longer the threat of direct, massive and imminent aggression on a large scale with little time for warning. This obviously modifies the nature of military alliances and the concept of neutrality and non-alignment. Conflicts can no longer be resolved in the context of equilibrium between the two superpowers; they require specific solutions, often in a regional or even a sub-regional framework. They also need to strengthen the role of the United Nations, by enforcing powers and prerogatives that exist mainly on paper. These powers were stopped from the outbreak of the Cold War and the non-peace, non-war situation which lasted for more than forty years.

Today the prospect of returning to the original intentions of the United Nations Charter seems more tangible. To start with, it would seem that the UN monopoly of power can finally be achieved. Although recognised by the Charter, this power was never put into practice because of contradictory and paralysing vetoes of superpowers which blocked the political organs of the organisation.

The creation of a new order is inevitable as the old "bipolar order" no longer exists. After the fall of Communism a new international order means that, perhaps for the first time in history, the world's problems will have to be tackled on a global rather than local or regional scale. To implement this, new principles and rules must be created and new international institutions established. Traditional institutions will have to experience radical transformation.

Above all the new order must be characterised by the principle of integration with its own hierarchy instead of the "anarchic" principle of disintegration. It must also be characterised by a wide dispersion of power instead of concentration of power in a few; by interdependence and cooperation instead of nationalism; by ideas and values instead of power;

by the creation of participatory regimes instead of authoritarian regimes that destroy liberty.

Taking these factors into account, it is impossible for military alliances to remain unchanged and this is why the characteristics of the new international order are still vague. However, in the future, military force will be considered less instrumental in attaining political objectives. The process of militarisation was linked to the idea of an unavoidable use of force, considered the privileged instrument of states' international policies, to dissuade and coerce.

The current situation leads to a policy which is becoming less and less militarised in nature. The reduction of conventional and nuclear strength, the affirmation of the concept of collective security, the emergence of a multipolar system characterised by the "phenomenon" of the dispersion of power all create the conditions for a heightened prevalence of political will over military will.

Cooperation is gradually replacing competition as a way to guarantee security. The fact that security can no longer be only expressed in military terms involves new responsibilities for all states. The threat used to be perceived as an external attacking enemy. Consider the recent history of Europe. The threats came only from the historical enemy - the Communist countries. In fact, NATO had the task of politically isolating and militarily containing this external threat. Today, many states in the world's "danger zones" have to deal with internal threats such as totalitarian ideology, intolerance towards minorities, political extremism, poverty and the role of religion. It is now a question of guaranteeing political stability within states and entire regions. This means the creation of global systems which know how to use security regional systems according to model indicated in the UN Charter.

In a nutshell, the concept of security is taking on a new and even more dynamic meaning. In this context military intervention can no longer be the same as when the two superpowers constituted a stabilising force. In other words, military means are to be used only as a final and exceptional solution, thus reducing the importance of dissuasion.

In this context, we can say that a historical period is now over. The last events in the military confrontation and competition between the two superpowers were the occupation of Afghanistan and the Euromissiles issue. But on a political level the antagonism ended one month after the fall of the Berlin Wall, on a Soviet ship anchored to the south of the island of Malta. In the course of a raging tempest, Bush and Gorbachev signed a real political alliance guaranteeing US backing to Soviet perestroika and Soviet support for the policy of *détente* sponsored by Bush. They also supported the reinforcement of the role of the UN. The old

system of antagonism and global obedience in favour of one of the two superpowers disappeared forever.

The signals which followed the historic agreement were unequivocal. The USSR would never have backed the military action under the system of collective security of the UN against Saddam Hussein during the Cold War. The dialogue between the PLO and Israel (the Madrid talks) took on a new intensity and led to the historic autonomy of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Warsaw Pact was to be dissolved. The UN was to take part in more active peace-keeping missions – from the intervention in Somalia to that of Haiti – giving itself tasks that went beyond the simple enforcement of a cease-fire. Often the UN has to control states' use of their "domestic jurisdiction" and react to the most serious violations of human rights and democratic principles. This UN commitment has now obtained the consensus of all, or almost all, the world states.

As a result the normal means of maintaining security have today become political and economic. World opinion, particularly that of more evolved European societies, has accepted the new scenario. In fact, the end of the Cold War has been seen not only as the end of the nightmare of the nuclear holocaust, but as a worldwide "explosion" of peace. However, this is not the way things stand, as can be proved by the re-emergence of local conflicts, which seemed to have been long resolved, and by the outbreak of new conflicts in different parts of the world. It would seem that the end of the Cold War has brought about new disorders. The new world that emerged from that period seems incapable of ending the tragedies caused by the re-appearance of old ideological structures, old hates and old nationalistic resentments.

It would seem that although people are now more free to choose, they feel more insecure. The fall of Communism has created, at least in the eyes of public opinion in Western countries, a general desire for peace but has also created in certain states a hostile attitude towards any form of armed peace enforcement. In other words, some countries want to cash in the dividends of peace before the international situation has become really peaceful. This situation has brought about a general refusal by all countries to engage in heavy military expenditure or to finance the reconversion of existing military resources to conform to new political exigencies.

These positions are understandable, yet so is the warning which Willy Claes, the former Secretary-General of NATO, gave to the partners of the alliance when he urged them not to drastically cut their defence budgets. Claes stated that even if the Cold War was over, "peace has not been acquired, and therefore there has to be a limit to the reduction of military expenditure".

But when the "welfare state" declares it can no longer fulfill many of its traditional roles because of disastrous public expenditure and poverty increases, even in rich countries, it is inconceivable that military expenses can be maintained at present levels. In fact, it is impossible to cut expenses for pensions and health while at the same time maintain military expenditure at previous levels.

The period following the end of the Cold War is as uncertain as that following the two major wars of this century. In fact, as has been observed, this period is more similar to that following the first World War than that of the second. In other words, the situation resembles more that of the 1920s than that marking the appearance of the Soviet threat and the tension caused by antagonism between the West and the East. Every region seems inclined to turn in on itself now that the historic enemy no longer exists, ignoring the rest of the world.

Therefore, the end of Communism, and consequently, the end of ideological conflict that divided the world for fifty years, renders the contemporary world order more disorganised and dynamic than the one that preceded it. On the other hand it forces public opinion to seek new certainties and new models for cohabitation among and within states. World public opinion is much concerned with the crisis of the welfare state and its impact on the lifestyle of various peoples, and, at the same time, there is still considerable interest in problems which affect humanity on a large scale or international factors which condition state wealth. In fact, if the "rich" countries are condemned to live according to lower standards, this would as a consequence affect the poorer countries since the richer states would not be able to assist them. As a result the need arises to study new effective methods of cooperation in the "global village".

However, once there is no longer the threat of a nuclear holocaust, a certain feeling of freedom is permeating all major democratic countries. It is producing a popular revolt even against people in power and political elites. Everywhere in Europe, both in the East and in the West, there is a certain opposition towards traditional politics. The crisis of old ideologies is bringing about a crisis of politics in themselves. It is as if, at the end of Communism, values and ideas which dominated the European politics have come to an end. Such decline of politics favours the emergence of nationalist and often explicitly racist tendencies. It would seem, now that the Communist threat has receded, people in some Western countries want to flaunt their adherence to a new conservative belief which encourages them to ignore foreign affairs and concentrate on internal issues.

In order to face problems regarding the future of European security, basic considerations need to be kept in mind. Since many European nations

consider NATO their main instrument of defence, it is necessary to examine the future of the alliance as a political and military pact. Within this framework, it is not easy to define the recent strategy regarding the southern flank of the alliance. The alliance and major western organisations are focusing their energies on the East and also working intensely to institutionalise and reinforce CSCE (now the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe). Apart from this concentration on the East, the Gulf crisis has showed that the North-South conflict is the first important challenge western security institutions had to face after the end of the Cold War. The problems of the South, that is, the regions of the world destined to underdevelopment, bears a great weight on the definition of the new identity and mission of institutions safeguarding western security.

The first element that must be pointed out is that the end of the Warsaw Pact has transformed western strategic thinking. The southern flank must not face one single monolithic threat, but a series of risks. This is, however, also true of the East, where the crisis of communist power has given way to a series of crises with the same pattern as those characterising the South: ethnic problems, ecological disasters, underdevelopment, extreme nationalism and territorial disputes. This situation created the expression "new arc of crisis" which formerly used to refer to crises between the Atlantic and Eurasia and which, at the end of the 1970s, also covered developing unrest in the Arab world, Iran and Afghanistan.

The southern flank and its specific problems today do not have the same importance as they did before, for the simple reason that the nature of the threat has changed. Security problems in this area have to be faced in the context of a security system in the Mediterranean. In other words, the global dimension, which until very recently was composed of the relationship between East and West, has been transformed, within the Northern hemisphere, into one between North and South, the latter referring to the Third World as well as the countries of the former Communist bloc.

If we examine the new geopolitical formation that the West faces today, which will model its aims and institutions guaranteeing security and multilateral solidarity, we can observe a new regional hierarchy emerging from the structure of the "new arc". This hierarchy is based on the fact that although the regions face similar crises, they are distinguished by their strategic and economic importance. These distinctions are clearly expressed by the degree of interest and concern shown by the West.

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and its difficult development are of prime importance in this scale of values. Russia still holds strategic nuclear weapons and, even though the CIS is today in

crisis, it still has great industrial and technological potential. It also claims a greater role in international matters although no longer on an equal footing with the US. Besides, if this crisis is not stemmed, it could destabilise the CIS, and this would have more important consequences for the West than any other crisis within the "new arc". In this context, the Middle East and Gulf regions continue to present serious risks to the security of the whole Mediterranean region. Likewise, the situation in the Balkans deserves a special mention. The efforts made by the international community did not prevent an escalation of violence and instability involving a much wider area.

It has already been stated that this evaluation of regional crises can be seen in the varying degree of interest by western countries. Although their motives may be different, the US and Germany are focusing their interest on the CIS crisis. The US are deeply involved in the Middle East and the Gulf crisis and in the way this has been managed. The European Union is directly involved in the crises of the Balkans and the Maghreb States. These diverse interests create a different degree of international solidarity *vis-à-vis* the various areas of the "new order", which highlight the distinctions between one area and another.

Returning to the southern flank, we can see a clear distinction between the Middle East and the Gulf areas and those of the Maghreb and the Horn of Africa. Within this new framework, an important connection can be established between the Maghreb and the Balkans. These distinctions and similarities are determined by the role played by different western countries in the regions concerned and the different degrees of solidarity that they inspire. In the four main critical areas in the southern flank, the European Union is heavily engaged in the Balkans and the Maghreb, where it tends to play a key role. It is only indirectly connected to the Middle East and the Gulf crises but it is only marginally involved in the crisis of the Horn of Africa. The commitment expressed by Europe in dealing with certain crises is not always reflected in the objective interest which Europe has in those areas. For example, so far, Europe has remained almost silent about the peace process in the Middle East. However, there is no doubt that it is one, but not the last, of the beneficiary of that very process.

Let us try to draw some practical conclusions from the considerations we have been elaborating upon. In concrete terms, what does the present southern flank mean for European Union countries? If we take into account European involvement in finding a solution to the problems of the countries in these areas, we can distinguish three concentric circles. In the outer circle, encompassing the Horn of Africa and Africa south of the Sahara generally, the European Union is engaged in upholding action

by the UN, in particular through humanitarian and economic aid, by means of its important systematic contributions through its multilateral and bilateral arrangements. Some countries within the European Union are trying to find a bilateral solution to certain local crises, such as Italy's role as a mediator between rival parties in Mozambique.

In the middle circle, the countries of the European Union are involved in the socio-economic dimension of Arab-Israeli negotiations, by supporting the political mediation being brokered by the US.

In the inner circle, the member states of the European Union and the Union itself are at the forefront of the Balkan crisis. At the same time they are concerned that certain conflictual situations, ethnic or religious, could develop into serious political crisis perhaps also in some African state, particularly of the Maghreb due to increasing fundamentalist movements.

2. Taking into account all that has been discussed, with particular reference to the new problems of European security, we can state that:

(1) The Soviet threat has disappeared, but Russia still has the potential to mobilise massive armed forces. It possesses a vast quantity of weapons which require a parallel Western capacity to confront eventual Russian mobilisation. As we shall see this means, firstly, that the potential of NATO defence must be restored.

(2) In the Mediterranean, there is still the threat of missile, nuclear and chemical proliferation. We must bear in mind that chemical agents are less effective than passive defences but have enormous psychological consequences.

(3) What cannot be underestimated are threats to the Gulf region, as they could compromise Western access to oil resources, and destabilising action in pro-Western countries of the Mediterranean by external forces, potentially obliging the West to intervene, or run the risk of losing all capacity of limiting conflict.

(4) The end of Communism gave rise to forms of nationalism which, from what has preceded, can really be defined as an extreme phase of Communism. This type of nationalism creates an explosive concoction out of old party bureaucrats' efforts at self-preservation and extreme forms of nationalistic feeling. Ethnic realities and national identities, which had disappeared from European history for many decades, are now reaffirmed. The process started by the October Revolution levelled out these identities, which are now re-emerging as ghosts from the past.

(5) The situation in Bosnia does not concern only the Balkans; the threat has also involved and continues to involve a wider area. Countries such as Italy are concerned by the threat at their door, the connected

possibilities of terrorist escalation and by the risk of having to sustain the shock and pressure of fleeing masses of refugees. It is therefore in their interest that the conflict is resolved as quickly as possible.

We have thus outlined the new "arc of crisis" that spreads from the Atlantic to Eurasia. It includes countries enjoying political stability, which could be easily upset, such as Egypt.

If we observe what is happening in the Mediterranean in particular, it appears obvious that the end of the Cold War and the reduction of Russian pressure have not produced an immediate state of peace despite positive developments in middle-eastern parts of this area. We are here referring to the beginning of the peace process between the PLO and Israel. Although its outcome still appears hazy, the direction it is taking should be encouraged by all means. There is no other alternative than direct dialogue between the two parties.

Altogether, many factors indicate that the end of East-West bipolarism could transform the southern Mediterranean into a new theatre of conflict, this time between North and South. If this point of view is accepted, it clearly indicates that although the Berlin Wall has fallen, this area is still of vital strategic importance. There is no single way of defining this strategic importance by examining the threats to peace in the area. Old and recent social problems give rise to various critical zones which, in a sense, are fuelled by factions and rivalries within the Arab world. Consequently, the possibility of guaranteeing an efficient system of collective security in the area appears alarmingly questionable.

Faced by such a complex and risky situation, Western propensity towards involvement in this area varies greatly. The only certainty is provided by a massive US deployment throughout the Mediterranean, except perhaps in the Maghreb where the traditional political and cultural influence of southern European countries prevails.

Thus if we examine briefly the new "arc of crisis" we have described as spreading from East to West, we can see that the Gulf war was followed by a general break-up within the Arab world. This may not be conducive to widespread political consensus. While the Iraqi threat has been reduced, a new state of unbalance has occurred, with the scales tipping in favour of Iran.

It is certain that the situation in the Middle East is showing encouraging new developments, while at the same time no one can confirm that it is definitely heading towards a stability situation in that area. After the Gulf War there emerged a desire for revenge against Iraq and for area leadership. These factors can create instability.

Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey appears to be progressively changing its role. The country no longer seems indispensable to US

interests in Europe. This new condition could force the country into a dangerous marginal position with regard to the European process of integration. It could dangerously underline the contrasts between its cultural and social models and those of the European Union. And only the Turkish fundamentalist groups would benefit from such a situation. We cannot afford to underestimate certain real dangers of instability in the area where Turkey still occupies a key position. After the fall of Communism, no one can foresee the political situation that may develop in the Transcaucasian area.

It is therefore important to ensure that Turkey does not experience frustration now that the bipolar situation has finally ended. The same may apply to Egypt. The country, traditionally pro-Western, could suddenly be destabilised by an increase in the political weight of pro-Islamic minorities. Even the relatively homogeneous and generally pro-European area of the Maghreb, traditionally the calmest in the region, is exposed to these fundamentalist stimuli.

What has occurred in Algeria need not necessarily be considered an isolated case, even though all the pessimistic predictions regarding its future have turned out to be unfounded. Algeria does not seem keen to start an ideological war against the West or to export its revolution to neighbouring countries.

The situation in the Balkans seemed to have reached a point of no return. In this region the international community suffered many defeats and humiliations. For years all diplomatic efforts by international bodies failed. The same applied to peace plans drawn up to reflect conflicting interests of different European countries. The threat that the conflict may spread to areas such as Macedonia and Kosovo, which, until now, have kept out of the fighting, was very real. Furthermore, in the US Congress there seemed to prevail a position in favour of Bosnian rearmament and the removal of the UN multi-national contingent from Bosnian territory.

In addition to the seriousness of this crisis, there was also the risk of reviving old tensions which seemed a thing of the past (for example Greek-Turkish antagonism), or of "latching on" new dualisms producing harrowing and lasting consequences (such as Turkish-Iranian antagonism). Fortunately, the situation in Bosnia has stabilised even if the problems to be solved are still numerous. The "Bosnian lesson" however, gives us much to cotemplate. Europe, above all, proved powerless in the Bosnian situation which created further complications. Looking into the future, Europe's helplessness could have a devastating impact on areas of the Arab world which view Europe as the main point of reference for political initiatives aimed at settling long-standing disputes.

Europe's political stability and democratic traditions should allow it to show intransigence every time it has to deal with violations of human rights or democratic regulations. It is impossible for Europe to remain indifferent to the expectations and appeals of so many countries in this region.

It would seem, however, that no strategic plan of the southern Mediterranean area has yet been drawn up. This indecision is matched by a dangerous syndrome of neglect which could have an impact on the region's people, who may interpret the new international situation as relegating them to an even more marginal position.

This syndrome could develop further through increasing aid to East European countries (which are culturally closer to Western Europe than south Mediterranean countries) and the fact that each country in this area has lost its former importance since it is no longer "contended for" by the US or the USSR.

Paradoxically, this feeling of neglect may be supplemented by a feeling of excessive control, vigilance or attention. The Gulf War has shown how a medium-sized country left to its own devices can threaten Western interests, especially since global empires created by the Cold War have been dissolved. The particular social realities and needs expressed by some countries make them a potential threat to peace and so they must be kept under "special surveillance". In the new equilibrium of forces, these countries have replaced Russia as a threat to world peace. This awareness gives rise to resentment and provides the ideal terrain to cultivate anti-Western propaganda amongst Islamic fundamentalists.

Therefore, taking this into consideration, the situation in the Mediterranean is charged with tension because it is exposed to worrying developments. Yet what happens in this area will obviously have enormous repercussions on Western stability. Therefore the events of 1989 have increased the central strategic and political importance of the Mediterranean.

The West's economic interest in maintaining stability in this area is revealed by statistics. Until the Gulf War 50% of the volume of oil transported throughout the world, as well as 50% of world maritime transport, half of which is made up of oil products, involved the Mediterranean, while 30% of imports and exports of Eastern-bloc countries came through Black Sea ports.

All this goes to show how the political situation in the Mediterranean region could suddenly become more tense and turbulent with direct and serious repercussions on world security.

The present state of affairs forces us to consider not only present areas of crisis, but other possible areas. Not only do we have to see how the

traditional threat has been modified, but how it involves the internal affairs of the main strategic entities concerned. It includes, therefore, the behaviour of strategically placed countries which have to be contended with to establish a stabilising policy in the area.

When we speak of the development of strategic entities, with reference to the Mediterranean or to the area of Southern Europe, we automatically include the US, USSR, Western Europe, and, especially, Germany and Turkey. In other words, we have to examine what decisions for collective action can be taken in view of the possible evolution of hostile situations and ethnic conflicts within particular countries.

This latter point forces us to consider the foreseeable evolution of the role of the main existing institutions of collective defence security and the possible structures of the emerging European multi-institutional security systems. Taking all this into account, we do not have or at least not completely, the conditions to create any new structure of European security based on general formalised agreements. We must therefore adopt a more flexible structure, which would allow for on the spot agreements and ad hoc coalitions, particularly regarding the interests of individual states.

The problems of regional security in southern Europe and the Mediterranean must contend with a generalised situation which, in coming years, may be subject to various developments. This situation creates new problems regarding the configuration of a complex security system. However, it is difficult, especially for the principal strategical actors, to determine the right course of action. Consequently, this makes any hypothesis regarding the position they may assume technically valid but difficult to evaluate politically.

In past years, Europe did not provide its own security but made a limited contribution. The main political and strategic reason for the aid given by the US to Europe is no longer valid today. Before, European defence was central to the system of universal security, both politically and strategically. This situation determined that Europe obtained what it asked for, within the context of a system of atlantic security to which not everyone contributed in the same measure. Europe must now contribute more to its own defence, bearing in mind that the US can only provide limited "aid". This requires a common effort towards improved cooperation between national defence systems. It also requires a re-orientation of European security since it is no longer the eastern front which is most vulnerable but the southern side.

Certainly with the fall of the Communist empire, Europe no longer has to face threats from the Mediterranean area. There is no longer an aggressive Soviet fleet requiring constant surveillance. In fact the Soviet fleet has disintegrated and its bulk is now controlled by Ukraine. European

security, particularly in the Mediterranean, is no longer threatened by the East. The challenge is posed by unresolved social situations in the most depressed areas of the southern part of the Mediterranean where ecological disasters could destabilise the area. The threat of terrorism has also moved away from its traditional forms. Terrorist attacks might no longer resemble former spectacular episodes, such as kidnapping and killings in Western cities. Some Islamic fundamentalists prefer to hit emblematic Western objects within their territories. New dangers are no longer expressed in terms of military threat, but of "cultural offensive".

3. To what extent can Europe still count on US aid? American policy and public opinion are divided. US isolationist tendencies in the recent political debate will prevail. At the same time the US, like the rest of the West, cannot avoid the need to limit its public expenditure.

US public opinion views the disappearance of its historical enemy and the end of the world fight against Communism as a long awaited opportunity to re-direct US foreign policy towards reducing military intervention. The main reasons behind its position as the guardian of the world have disappeared.

The reduction of US troops in Europe and the US delay in fulfilling its financial commitments towards NATO are all signs of a foreign policy which does not want disengagement in Europe, but is directed towards more "reasonable" engagement.

Not only political reasons, such as former ties between Western countries, point towards this direction, but also economic considerations which necessitate that the US does not abandon Europe. Even after the fall of Communism the game with Russia is not over. The process of Russian disarmament has to be monitored. Huge arsenals have to be dismantled and it is important to see which direction these armaments take. In fact, because of its catastrophic economic situation, Russia would like to sell everything to anyone. Obviously, the US also wants to participate in the process of the economic reconstruction of Russia. However, Russia must be introduced into an economy market system without creating serious social conflicts. Russia therefore needs full international solidarity.

The US must also monitor the western region of the Mediterranean to ensure no conflict arises which could have possible consequences in the Gulf, where there is still unrest. The US must also follow Middle Eastern developments and encourage the success of the peace process between the PLO and Israel. The US must also guarantee that maritime traffic flows freely in the Mediterranean to support the economic interests of

powerful US groups. It is unthinkable that the US will abandon this key nerve centre or that it will ignore European and Mediterranean affairs.

The presence of the US in this area will perhaps be less involved on a military level than in the past and also less exclusive on a political level. It will establish partnership relations with Europe requiring equal collaboration. The US will no longer have a monopoly on security in this area, but will help maintain it on a par with the Europeans.

It will be difficult for any US President faced with an increasing national debt to convince the Americans that the burden of US military engagement in Europe cannot be questioned, particularly when large sectors of public opinion do not believe "the enemy" still exists.

4. Radical changes on the international scene, the reduction of military expenditure and progress in the process of European integration provide the conditions for the creation of a project of Euro-American partnership first proposed by John F. Kennedy in the 60's. During Kennedy's time as President of the US, this was a means to moderate De Gaulle's anti-American intransigence, by offering Europeans an alliance with the US on equal terms. Today, from a more pragmatic perspective, it is a means to share the costs of European defence equally between the US and the Europeans to avoid burdening the former with political and military responsibilities.

In any case, equal partnership relations between Europe and the US can only enhance the consolidation of a true European awareness, regarding issues linked to the security of the European continent and the role of Europe outside its territory for the prevention and resolution of regional crises. This type of equal partnership also paves the way for a process of European political unity preventing Europeans from squabbling over greater or lesser "Atlantic" loyalties. It should also end the mistrust with which the US political establishment and public opinion viewed "United Europe".

Equal distribution of responsibility between Europeans and Americans should, moreover, constitute a general principle of European security and not only that of southern Europe. In order to attain this balance, it is important that Europeans have a clear idea of their true, and hopefully, lasting political vocation. Once the threat from the East has subsided, the concept of "sufficient security", to which both Europe and the US should refer, can appear highly ambiguous.

A new security policy presupposes a definition of the aims of European policy itself. But this depends on the results of the European integration process. This integration is being realised in fits and starts because it is

trapped between two important options: the German desire to extend Europe and the general wish of EU member countries (despite the well-known UK position) for a more deeply united Europe.

A problem exists concerning the form of the relationship which Europe should establish with former European Communist countries. This relationship involves more than security issues, even though these countries are looking towards NATO. Armaments in these countries now affect the security of all. The new relationship also involves tackling huge social problems which must be solved to ensure the tranquillity of Europe's richer areas.

The obligations of the West in general and of Europe in particular towards former Communist countries of the Eastern bloc are not easy to fulfil. It was one thing to show political solidarity with perestroika; it is another far more expensive undertaking to sustain the creation of a true democratic system in these countries, involving the development of a market economy and helping governments resist nostalgic social reactions.

The building of democracy in the East is proving to be slower and less direct than it was expected to be just after the fall of Communism. Only a few years have passed since 1989, but some former Communist countries are already registering disturbing signs of dissatisfaction with democratic institutions. One reason is that the social costs of transition tend to dissipate the consensus that emerged in favour of the change of regime.

Since 1989, one thing appears certain. Western democracy with its market organisation, its social rights and its systems of redistribution of wealth cannot be reproduced quickly in this type of scenario. On the contrary, what is happening is that the creation of a market economy in tandem with new manifestations of injustice and oppression, beyond even the excesses of former occurrences, are being identified as symbolic of Western egoistic hedonism. These fundamental concerns obviously distract European attention away from Mediterranean problems, particularly the southern shores.

Once the danger from the East has abated, it is only natural that Europe, urged on by Germany, will try to recompose its cultural unity. This is acceptable, on condition, however, that it does not occur at the expense of the process of European integration and Mediterranean political stability. Destabilisation is a danger to Europe. It is sufficient to imagine the threat to European soil by overwhelming numbers of immigrants who are not easy to regulate, let alone any possible terrorist relapse.

After Maastricht, Europe has to provide itself with a common means of defence to uphold a common security policy. Unfortunately, the problem of former Yugoslavia revealed a serious lack of European political initiative and ability. When confronted with an emergency that concerned the whole

of Europe, major European countries as well as the EU itself, opted to "wait and see".

It is not easy to define the perimeters of the area in the Mediterranean where Europe is to play a leading political role. Opinions in European countries differ greatly. There are those who feel that after the end of Communism, the cultural and political frontiers of former Europe have been automatically extended eastward. There are others who believe that, apart from real initiatives that must be taken, attention to southern Mediterranean shore countries and the Arab world would confer international prestige and authority to Europe and enhance its political role.

5. Europe has an enormous responsibility to define and implement a world order where peace prevails, particularly since security policies are no longer a matter of military resources. Furthermore, with the disappearance of the Communist threat it is clear that the new global conflict of the next century will develop between North and South. This responsibility weighs heavily on Europe, because of the pressure of hundreds of millions living in terrible conditions on the Mediterranean's southern shores with no visible future, contrary to the populations of Eastern Europe.

If it is true that an effective security system cannot exist without social justice, i.e. sound development and acceptable lifestyles, it is also true that without political stability there is no development. It is not a question of guaranteeing order for order's sake, but of creating the political conditions needed for sustainable development. If this is the task, it is therefore necessary to achieve an historical reconciliation in the Mediterranean between the North and South, with a commitment on the part of all, especially Europe.

Europe cannot disregard the North-South conflict because it is developing in a region and "sea" of which it forms part and where many of its interests converge. The fact that this area is one of the most unstable in the world means that Europe faces a cluster of serious risks rather than a single massive threat from one particular isolated area of crisis. We have already seen that traditionally, great "historic" conflicts converge politically in the Mediterranean.

Space in the Mediterranean is limited and the forces of conflict and tension are strong and violent, especially in the south. The Mediterranean is only a small pool in a global context, however the contradictions which destabilise it are emblematic, because the Mediterranean is a synthesis of the history of the world. It is an area inhabited by some of the most well-educated people in the world with three monotheistic religions facing

each other – Judaism, Christianity and Islam – and with three cultures – Western, Islamic and Orthodox.

The southern region is also one of the most underdeveloped areas of the world. Yet in this area, particularly to the east, there are some of the world's largest oil fields with a huge source of wealth. Until now instead of facilitating development and creating a proper welfare state, this wealth has generated a steady increase in military expenditure.

It is necessary to take into account the fact that the economic recession that hit rich countries in the mid-1980s caused even greater ruin in the economies of southern countries. These economies have been, until now, supported by international solidarity. But, in the absence of the adequate development policies and in the presence of a decreasing international economic aid, for the people of these countries there is no other alternative than emigration.

Misery, demographic explosions, religious and ethnic rivalry and recent environmental upheavals have sparked off an explosion of uncontrollable and contagious violence, with racism and religious intolerance assuming central roles. Poverty, the sense of unequal justice, the sense of humiliation, with roots in the times of colonisation, are the prime causes of the development of religious fundamentalism.

Western-type democratic regimes and political regimes conditioned by religious fundamentalisms also coexist in the Mediterranean. There are ferocious dictatorships and autocratic monarchies as well as parliamentary regimes and republics in permanently precarious states. Moreover, the Mediterranean region is the principal theatre of the conflict between North and South, given that it is more than anything else one between the West and Islam.

Unless its special characteristics are heeded, the conflict will become more irreversible as it is a conflict between values. It is primarily cultural and cannot be resolved or mediated by simply re-organising the distribution of wealth among people. On the contrary, the West must recognise diversity as legitimate and tolerable. Islamic values must be appreciated as having the same equal status as Western values. Western culture must show greater tolerance. After all, its traditions should encourage it to do precisely this, to question itself and make its position more relative. The West is clearly heir to the most enabling cultural tradition in this context.

This political and social framework illustrates the complex problems facing this area, and the numerous conflicts between neighbouring states. The origins of some of these conflicts are longstanding and seem insoluble. Often their roots lie in the very same peace treaties by which certain territories were divided between different states after the colonial wars and World Wars. For example, consider the conflict between the

Arab states and Israel or between Greeks and Turks, or Kurds and Turks.

These territories were divided at the negotiating table to satisfy the interests of victorious powers, without taking into account the identity and the aspirations of the people concerned. The loyalties imposed by the two superpowers after World War II forced the suspension of some of these historical conflicts, but they exploded again with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of Communism.

In the last fifteen years Western society has gone through a crisis of prestige and identity. This stems from cultural backgrounds as well as from the difficulty of ensuring attained standards of living are maintained. At the same time Islamic fundamentalism has spread. Its most strident expressions, as far as the West was concerned, were the Iranian revolution and the Gulf War. At the root of these two events, there is the ideological conflict between the Arab world and the West with the former's often violent rejection of the processes of social and political modernisation. This rejection does not involve the whole of the Arab world, as there are also moderate elements, however the feeling is growing.

The results of this are easy to identify at the level of interstate rivalry, particularly the increase in violations of human rights and the denial of the basic rules which are conditions of survival not only of a fully democratic regime, but even of a regime moving timidly towards democracy. The nature of these emerging tensions means they cannot be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Before defining a strategy, Europe must attain a shared understanding of the problems of this area and perhaps we should go so far as to speak of its "mission". This is the only way in which Europe can achieve the appropriate profile to lead at this historical point.

Do the necessary conditions for the emergence of a single unified European position on these issues exist? Perhaps a common awareness will slowly appear, but it requires facing security problems on a global scale. It will be more difficult to achieve common attitudes and the willingness to make joint sacrifices. Democratic Europe has in fact been slowly extending its scope. Compare the geopolitical map of Western Europe today with that immediately after the war. The rules of democracy are now the common heritage of Western Europe. Since Spain and Portugal moved from a totalitarian to a democratic regime, Europe in effect presents a united political front. The fact that in the last twenty years the frontiers of democratic Europe have been extended has influenced the very process of integration.

Democratic culture rejects, as we shall see later, the use of force in relations between states. Democracy creates a climate of reciprocal trust.

Democratisation favours the production of the right conditions to tackle the problems of peace and security as "Europeans". This means facing old and new threats in a unified way, especially as far as European interests are directly concerned. This is also the case with critical situations in the Mediterranean. The different centres of crisis are all interrelated and for this reason they tend to spread over an ever wider area. If these emergencies are faced together, without necessarily resorting to military solutions, it would mean fostering cooperation at another level.

It would also mean not taking for granted the difficulties and misunderstandings that arise when Islamic reality is viewed from a great distance. Why should anything from the Islamic world be judged as implicitly anti-Western or as going against the interests of old Europe? Why should we distinguish *a priori* before examining evolving political realities that may or may not be pro-Western and then formulate different cooperation policies according to the various beneficiary countries?

Pessimistic forecasts regarding the future of Algeria are a case in point. Besides Islamic fundamentalism, there is also Islamic moderation and it is in the interest of Europe and the Western world to see that moderation prevails rather than extremism, by first avoiding sweeping judgements. The development of the relationship between the PLO and Israel, notwithstanding many difficulties, should persuade us that, while being wary of extremists in both rival camps, this is the best course to follow.

There are enough signs to indicate that many Arab countries are moving towards moderation. The events in September 1993 leading to the agreement on the autonomy of the Jericho and Gaza territories and the subsequent difficulty of putting it into practice again showed the contradictory division within the Arab world. There are those who are willing to negotiate and those who have taken an intransigent attitude to the historical problem of coexistence with Israel.

The peace process between Israel and Palestine is not an easy one. Arafat correctly defined this peace as the "peace of the courageous". Each step forward encounters new obstacles, as the murder of Rabin showed. However, peace in this area of the world does not depend just on the outcome of negotiations between the PLO and Israel. There are too many crises in the region, and too many intransigent protagonists. There will only be real peace when the method of dialogue is accepted by everyone, particularly Lebanon and Syria.

It is therefore in the interests of Europe to support by all means, even economic, the process of tranquillity and stabilise the position of Arafat, who assumes an emblematic role in the context of the forces of Arab moderatism. Any political downsizing of Arafat would reverse the progress made in the relations between Israel and Palestine. Arafat is at present

being attacked by extremists from both sides. On the right-wing of the PLO there are those who want to continue the Holy War against Israel and there are supporters of a western-leaning left wing, persons like Abdel Shafi, who accuse Arafat's leadership of being marred by nepotism. This faction does not want to wed the movement's traditional lack of organisational democracy with the democratic set-up which needs to be constructed in the autonomous territories where the Palestinian State is to be born. Unfortunately, even the noblest of initiatives (such as that aimed at guaranteeing authentic democracy within the PLO) at present may destabilise the situation and obstruct the peace process which has already faced innumerable difficulties.

The historic decision to concede autonomy to the Gaza and Jericho territories has in a way cancelled out the most traumatic rifts caused by the Six Day War of 1967. The decision to grant administrative autonomy to these territories not only provides the beginning of a solution to the Palestinian problem, but it will perhaps end the quarrel over the restitution of the territories occupied by Israel after the war with Egypt. There thus emerges a possible solution to traditional conflicts which have created instability in the Mediterranean. New political conditions are emerging which makes dialogue possible even between historical antagonists.

The most significant event in this context was the treaty signed in Cairo in February 1995 by Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, Palestinian leader Arafat, King Hussein of Jordan and Egyptian President Mubarak. The purpose of this agreement is to fight extremism through the systematic collaboration of the police of the four countries. This is the first time that the prospect of peace in the region does not depend on bilateral agreements but on a "working forum" formed by the principal local protagonists. This created two major blocs: a moderate bloc of these four entities and an opposing bloc led by Syria.

All things considered, only Europe can produce in this area an effective global security policy of lofty political inspiration and tackle problems that would otherwise lead to instability and disorder. Europe, unlike the US, also has the cultural instruments with which to understand this part of the world. Europe has always been in contact with the Arab world. Relations in this context cannot be established solely on grounds of military dissuasion. Certain contradictions within the Arab world cannot be ignored, but should be interpreted politically. The lack of a European political presence in this area would only allow the situation to escalate.

Every medium or small power will try to have a larger say than its neighbour-competitor and arm itself more heavily. Military expenses will cause starvation among people who are already hungry. A proliferation

of arms in a situation already heavily charged with political and social tension can only result in conflicts with inevitable repercussions in Europe.

The Cold War has come to an end. Yet the Mediterranean region is saturated with weapons. The reason may be the end of the Cold War itself. The protection of the two superpowers is over and everyone has set up shop alone. Since the political system which obliged aligned countries to show unwavering obedience to one of the two leading powers has gone, local conflicts are increasing. Furthermore, since the weapons of the great Soviet arsenal are now for sale, any country can buy what it likes without serious control.

Even though the peril of a Third World War has ceased to exist, stupefying sums of money are still being spent on armaments; around 1.9 million dollars per minute. This constitutes the greatest post Cold War scandal in the world as more and more people continue to die of hunger. The situation in the Mediterranean is particularly worrying from this point of view. In 1960, 8.3% of the world's expenditure on armaments occurred in this area. Twenty years later, the Mediterranean share of the global sale of arms had increased to 18.1%. In 1990, despite worldwide military expenditure cuts, the countries of the southern part of the Mediterranean still accounted for 13.9% of world expenditure. This tendency has remained unchanged if it is true that in 1992 Syria purchased 1.2 million dollars worth of arms from the Soviet Union.

The arms race has continued despite the fall of the Wall. Just compare the military expenditure of the countries on the northern shore of the Mediterranean with those on the south. Northern countries have cut down from 92 billion dollars to 87 billion in military expenditure between 1985 and 1990, while in the south expenditure increased from 66 billion to 71 billion dollars during the same period. This occurred despite the end of the Gulf War, the dissolving of the Communist empire and the solid establishment of the peace process with Egypt.

It is true that apart from Israel there are no nuclear powers in the area. But the escalation in conventional arms, the presence of missiles with nuclear warheads and the possession of chemical weapons by some countries make this area highly risky. Negotiations on disarmament in this area cannot reach a happy ending in terms of bilateral agreements, but through a single comprehensive security system including countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Iran.

Israel, the only nuclear power in the region, has so far shown an unwillingness to adhere to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation. Israel believes that deterrents are essential to ensure peace, its enemies however argue that it is useless to discuss reducing conventional arms while Israel

remains a nuclear power. The conditions Israel demands from the others – recognition of the State of Israel, restraint and control of conventional arms; controls to be carried out, not only by supranational organisations but also by Israel itself and significant developments in the peace process – are just as difficult as those demanded of Israel. The truth is that Israel does not have as many men or (conventional) arms as the other countries put together. It can only count on the quality of its defence. Therefore, only a positive development in relations between the PLO and Israel can create the necessary political conditions for negotiations on the disarmament of the entire region. On this matter, however, it is difficult to break the deadlock produced by numerous cross-vetoes.

6. Military risks and the paradox created by the escalation of military expenditure, in sharp contrast to stagnant social expenditure, are set starkly against the living conditions of the overwhelming majority of the population in this area which offend the democratic conscience of developed countries.

Public opinion in these countries seems to have matured and is more demanding of its governments. Television brings into the homes of people in affluent countries scenes of collective despair and genocides caused by hunger and illness. These scenes deeply offend the conscience of those who have been raised to respect the values of human solidarity and the rule of law.

Today large masses of people migrate from poor countries to rich ones. They invade those neighbouring countries which can provide shelter to refugees as well as countries further afield. This creates great imbalances in very large areas of the world, because no protective barrier can really separate the affluent world from that of need and desperation. No rich country can absorb thousands upon thousands of foreign citizens who ask for help and work. The social problems that such a situation creates in receiving countries are reflected in their internal political balance. One witnesses xenophobic episodes based on purely emotional reasoning which is manipulated for political ends.

As well as these irrational manifestations, very real problems have to be faced in a responsible way because in some countries the huge number of foreign workers which have to be integrated can upset the very basis of peaceful cohabitation. This situation seems to be particularly serious in those countries which, having agreed to and enforced the Schengen Agreement and having abolished the controls on their internal frontiers, cannot stop third country nationals from moving from one place to another. The flow of migrants must be organised rationally as no country alone

can withstand the impact of repercussions which may damage its social and economic fabric as well as public law and order.

A global strategy is therefore necessary to control the flow of migrants and to direct it on the basis of an equal sharing of burdens among all countries concerned. A quota system must be established so reception of migrants is organised as well as possible. However, firstly, the social question at the root of mass emigration must be tackled to create in the countries of origin conditions for the survival of so many millions.

If we do not work towards this, the heavy burden on the shoulders of countries taking in immigrants will no longer be sustainable. Many migrants head for countries with a solid economy such as Germany and France. Other migrants head for countries with a less stable economy such as Italy. Taking this into consideration, what is happening is that the local population feels that its social tranquillity is threatened by the new arrivals. This is a real problem. In this context it is predictable that xenophobic and intolerant feelings will emerge.

It is important to again underline the nature of the task facing us. The tendency towards distorted economic development between the North and South must be reversed. This tendency penalises the rich world, besides giving the ever-poorer southern countries the role of producers of work-force for export. If the development of this area is not organised and sustained by the more developed countries, then the demographic growth of the countries in the South will disrupt the economies and social systems of the North.

The data available seem to justify the darkest predictions. If we limit ourselves to the Mediterranean, we can observe that the ratio between the number of inhabitants on the Southern and Northern shores was one to three in 1950. This relationship will be completely reversed in the year 2025. One third of the total population will live in the North and two thirds in the South. In 1990, the population of the North African shore (excluding Egypt) was 63 million. In 2025, it be 142 million.

From this information, an irrefutable truth emerges – demographic imbalance creates an imbalance of migration. Such a situation inevitably generates conflict between the rich countries, which host the immigrants, and poor countries which “produce” the immigrants. This conflict will be the most important question of the future, considering that demographic imbalance will continue to grow. The exodus of entire populations towards rich countries is the direct consequence of the unequal distribution of wealth between peoples. In contrast to former immigration, this new immigration is not a brief phenomenon. Immigration in the first fifty years of this century was the result of the unequal distribution of wealth between social classes within European countries. This situation

prompted many people to seek their fortune in the New World, outside Europe.

The new immigration, however, pushed masses of people to move from the underdeveloped world towards Europe. This is not easily reversible. Many still believe that modern capitalism will resolve the contradictions of a lopsided development involving the whole planet. But is it possible to invert the negative political and economic tendencies of capitalism and bring about a new economic world order? Only one provisional solution is immediately possible: to organise the efficient inflow of immigrants, on the basis of planned distribution between the rich nations. The tempting alternative to this solution is to seek to create an insurmountable barrier to keep out the immigrants. This alternative will not work. The definitive solution lies in the tenacious reduction of the demographic explosion, that is birth control. But who is to determine such control, the developed countries? This would not be a politically acceptable solution.

Policies aimed at controlling migrant flow are necessary for host countries. Yet to the people of the south these policies appear to be another source of harassment to exclude millions and millions who risk dying of hunger from survival. On one hand, this helps Islamic fundamentalism to gain a firmer grip even on populations who have always been friendly towards the Northern shore of the Mediterranean. On the other hand, it could make any politically fanatical act, any irresponsible initiative against the West appear to be an act of holy revenge against an intolerable situation. During the Gulf War, the popularity of Saddam Hussein among these populations was extremely high, because the Iraqi dictator appeared to be taking revenge against the rich on behalf of all the poor people of the South.

It is therefore necessary to control the flow of migrants, preferably through flexible measures without host countries imposing forced assimilation. To understand what should not be done, a great deal can be learnt from the case of the "Islamic veil" in France.

Many claimed that in a secular school the pupils could not use clothes which could manifestly show their belonging to a particular religion. The problem of the Islamic veil also posed the problem of the manner in which immigrants are to be integrated into the social texture of the country that welcomes them. By prohibiting Islamic girls from wearing the veil, a minority was being denied this right to preserve its collective identity. The veil is a symbol of Islam, an Islam which the Western man can, on occasion, appear as fundamentalist and politically violent. Their refusal of the veil was in reality the refusal of a minority religion.

This runs contrary to the principle of tolerance. Social harmony may not be imposed from above, it must respect the pluralist tendencies in

society. Tolerance demands the recognition of the identities which would otherwise be excluded; identities which have to be woven into the social context. One cannot be tolerant towards "different" individuals without tolerating as well the usage and the customs of the community of which those individuals form part. Any individual should not be made to renounce to his sense of belonging to the collective identity, in order for him to be able to enjoy his fundamental rights or to obtain the citizenship of the country which receive him. Tolerance is not a matter of allowing "compatible difference". There are differences which are harder to accept because they conflict with our different religious and political convictions, but such differences must be allowed. The distinction between liberalism and jacobinism is as follows: liberalism consents every individual to adopt his favourite lifestyle while the jacobite society suggests to his members to follow a certain model which is represented as the best for the protection of the common interest.

On this basis, every immigrant should be free to choose between his own social model and that of the host country. Assimilation cannot be imposed by law, but encouraged through the advantages of sharing a single social culture. Assimilation is more efficient, that is, when it is supported by factors and objectives which make the social model of the host nation desirable. The choice towards integration becomes irreversible in schools and in workplace. It must be added that military service in the host country becomes a real shortcut normally used to obtain full citizenship. Any other instrument of assimilation - especially of co-active assimilation - may give rise to reaction and to the creation of difficult situations and real tension which inevitably falls under the umbrella of the policy of public order, thus creating citizens who are dangerously marginalised. For example, it has been observed in this context that there is a double advantage gained by inserting non-naturalised foreigners in the police forces within those immigrant communities which tend to retain their own cultural identity (such is the case in France notably, but also in Great Britain, Belgium and Germany). Not only is assimilation encouraged (the immigrant sees his possible inclusion in the police force as a privileged position), but in this manner further bitter and permanent tension is avoided between a group of citizens which puts the law into action even when force, where necessary, and the great mass of immigrants who seem to have no choice but to experience more or less on the margins of society. From the experience gained in the US, the presence of members of the same religion and citizens of the same country within the police force creates a feeling of trust and avoids the conviction amongst immigrants that they are being treated differently because of their race. This also generates more discipline within the police force.

A single policy for cooperation is, however, necessary in the most underdeveloped areas, where the greatest flow of immigrants originate. Such a policy should start off the development process, especially in the creation of job possibilities by targeting investment to serve the interests of the receiving country, not those of the donor.

This problem is particularly felt in Europe given that integration between East and West has an enormous social cost because unemployment is today the common social problem in both parts of the continent. In a period when Western economies seem to be inclined towards expansion, wealth channelled towards underdeveloped countries is a guarantee for social peace in the developed countries themselves.

To this end it would be useful to establish a Bank for Mediterranean Development running along similar lines as the European Bank for the Development and Reconstruction of Eastern bloc countries. It is necessary however to find a solution to the problem of the debts of poor countries. The majority of these debts cannot be paid off and can only generate further resentment and ultimately a feeling of conflict ending in violence.

One thing is certain. All aid should be given within the context of specific development projects. The money for international cooperation should not be used to fill arsenals. Specific restrictions about money use should be made, such as the loss of advantages in the case of any increase in military expenditure.

From this it clearly results that a collective commitment is required of the international community and of Europe in particular, for the development and stability of the Mediterranean. If the concept of security is socio-political and no longer only humanitarian, we cannot talk of security in the Mediterranean as we once did, in terms of trying to "dissuade" the adversary through threats or the use of force.

In Europe, after World War II, there were two conflicting alliances. Today, with the end of the Cold War, the Mediterranean region is characterised by a multiplicity of crisis situations. On the other hand, the American Sixth Fleet is not in a position to maintain order in the region. A guarantee of stability and development cannot only be offered by the "private sector". Public commitment is also needed, commitment on the part of states, and especially European states. It is a matter of establishing relationships of trust in the area, which military measures alone cannot create. It is a matter of putting into practice effective cooperation programmes which require compatibility and complementary national behaviours. It is a matter of establishing between Europe and the countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean a dialogue which is not vertical, from Europe to the rest of the Mediterranean, but horizontal. On these lines underlie the structure of the proposal which

emerged at the Barcellona Conference of 1995. No single state was made the sole bearer of the responsibility for the "sustainable development" of the Southern shores of the Mediterranean. Rather, projects of co-development inclusive of such fields as education, multi-media, etc., were envisaged. Thus, the most interesting aspect of the Barcellona proposal is that the flourishing of a prosperous society on Southern shores cannot result from a mere transfer of either technology packages or cultural models from North to South, but requires a strongly participative and co-productive response. The transaction cannot be merely receptive on the one side, and proactive on the other. Only with these conditions can cooperation guarantee security, because it will be inevitably translated into new lifestyles. Europe has shown this capacity to understand and the will to act in relation to the East. The same should also happen with the south.

North-west Europe was in conflict with north-east Europe during the Cold War, both politically and culturally. Liberal-democratic and free market Europe is now supporting the north east. The south needs the same solidarity. There are the conditions to create a "global village" in the Mediterranean. It is not a problem of economic growth, but of fostering a unified culture respectful of differences. Cultural cooperation is the basis for all forms of cooperation. The Mediterranean would be crossed more often, from north to south and vice-versa, as happens with the Atlantic.

The idea that security must not be entrusted just to military means must be inculcated whenever people believe that only weapons guarantee safe frontiers. Facts show that the situation is different. Arsenal do not guarantee security in the world, but force people to live in poverty. The persuasive capacity of great European democracies must be convincing in this respect. Political stability depends on the way in which the international community guarantees the development and the peaceful solution of conflicts between states. States must demonstrate through their behaviour that conflicts cannot be resolved with the definitive and irreversible victory of one side over another. The concept of total victory, through the use of force, must be banned from international relations. Faced with conflict, compromise, not victory, should be sought. Territorial dispossession, changing frontiers and the humiliation of an ethnic minority will not resolve conflicts. In this turbulent region of the world, there is the need to assert the principle that a military victory is politically ineffective. True victory is the acquisition of new opportunities for the future, in terms of economic development and political stability.

Everyone agrees that the situation in the southern Mediterranean is

more critical than before; that Europe must deal with threats, against which simply shifting troops from the Eastern to the Southern flank, is of little use. It is understood that a multi-dimensional reply is required, in which military aspects are not the surest means of guaranteeing security, because if the world is in danger of becoming an explosive dustbin, the danger cannot be prevented by more weapons. It is not by arms that the destructive potential mustered by marginal states with ill-intent can be neutralised, now that various powers can produce the atom bomb. It is obvious that security also depends on the careful use of military resources, which should be deployed when critical situations arise.

However, if we take into account the kind of threat previously described and the social and human factors behind it, we can see that security can be achieved through political and diplomatic "preventive" action. Conflicts need to be forestalled by the type of preventive action envisaged by Boutros Ghali in his "agenda for peace", despite the failure of preventive diplomacy in former Yugoslavia. They can be solved by tackling, once and for all, the important social questions from which they arise.

It is also necessary for military intervention to be tactful when handling situations of local crisis so these do not degenerate into true wars. There is need for international policing action every time the international legal order is seriously violated. A proper security framework for humanitarian operations and the protection of ethnic minorities threatened by extermination should also be guaranteed. The new tasks being set for military intervention require a body which is less intent on the passive defence of territory but more flexible and better organised to intervene in countries which are distant from its native land. The military establishment should, moreover, resist the temptation to impose a particular political regime against the will of local populations, even if it were democratic.

Peace guarantee in the post Cold War era requires all members of the international community to respect a minimum standard of the rule of law even if recourse to force is necessary. No single country can be expected to fulfil these duties alone. A collective response is necessary. Yet it is not enough to redeploy traditional systems of defence. A multi-dimensional security system must be set up to deal with all the factors determining political stability, prevention and conflict solution today.

It must start from one consideration: states of the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean must also have a common policy for security because it is of fundamental importance to European security. Every European initiative in this area must take account of the need to building international relations based on systems where legal rules are valid for all and controlled by a single governing body for peace.

A European security system can only be valid if it refers to this new international order and if it uses all means possible to maintain it.

We can say that once Communism has come to an end, the West is now its own sole enemy. The end of Communism does not mean the end of problems which gave rise to it. Communism did not descend on us like an alien force from space; it was born within Western culture. The Communist utopia derived its force from the contradictions of Western development and democracy. The end of Communism presents capitalism with the challenge of building solidarity among and within states. Even the richer ones in which democracy succumbs to the logic of the "two-thirds society", according to the term coined by Peter Glotz, must cease condemning a third of their citizens to poverty.

The conflict between North and South cannot be solved by arms or by the instruments of ideological "penetration". Now that Communism is dead, the West has no alibi. Formerly the challenge of the danger of nuclear holocaust coming from the East was invoked by the West as an excuse for its incoherence and its failures to fulfil its obligations towards those parts of the world which were sinking in degradation produced by misery. Today these contradictions stand out without any obfuscating screens. This means that the West will be crushed by the weight of these contradictions. In this respect, it is unacceptable that certain declarations of principle have remained a dead letter. It is right to state: "The West of Enlightenment and civil rights is still to be attained. Democracy still needs to be taken seriously. This 'ideal West' appears more than ever as the concrete utopia that can only be achieved approximately."

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