



Post-Hegemonic Global Governance

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INTRODUCTION

For the third year in a row, the Institute for Training and Development (ITD) is pleased to present essays by young International Relations scholars and practitioners from 18 different countries on their views about key issues in world politics in the current non-hegemonic era. These individuals were selected and funded by the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs to participate in ITD's six-week study tour of the United States from early March to mid-April 2014. Javier Corrales from Amherst College was academic director for the program, and Jon Western from Mt. Holyoke College was the main academic advisor.

During their time here, participants listened to 31 lecturers from 16 different universities or think tanks, all experts on a variety of topics and regions. They also had the opportunity to work on their own research projects, and share their work among themselves and with U.S. scholars. The essays in this collection are the result of their academic work during their time in the United States.

As was the case last year, our scholars were invited to reflect on the theme of post-hegemonic world politics. Since the end of World War II, the United States has maintained a privileged position in global politics. In this time, the United States has been instrumental in the development of a series of global liberal and neo-liberal institutions, rules, and practices designed to organize and manage global political, military, and economic affairs. But that system of global governance and management is changing. The United States does not confront enemy nation-states, but it faces increasing difficulties constructing partnerships with other nation-states to address issues that require collective action and collective investments. Today, the international system is in a period of significant transition with a series of political crises and economic malaise across advanced democracies, the continued rise of a still-authoritarian China, unpredictable regime changes in the Middle East, regional tensions in South Asia and East Asia, natural resource dependence and civil strife in Africa, the persistence of crime, drug trade and corrupt governance in the Americas, the shift in the unifying beliefs underlying the post war order, and a looming set of global environmental, resource, and demographic challenges.

We are now entering an era of profound uncertainty. Without the prospect of U.S. hegemonic leadership, with a declining consensus about guiding principles and policies, and in light of the substantial growth and influence of international institutions and non-state actors, it is now widely accepted that international rule-making today is more complex than ever. We now live in a world with multiple overlapping actors and regimes that do not conform to a homogeneous set of shared rules backed by enforcement mechanisms.

To gain a better understanding of the uncertainty and complexity associated with the new global environment, the Five College International Relations Program (consisting of International Relations faculty from the University of Massachusetts Amherst and Smith, Mount Holyoke, Amherst, and Hampshire Colleges) has been conducting a multi-year research colloquium to investigate a series of critical issues on global governance and international security in the coming decade. The colloquium has been hosting a series of senior scholars to examine the macro-level questions on this set of topics from a range of theoretical and methodological perspectives.

As part of this effort, the colloquium partnered with the group of 18 International Relations scholars who participated in ITD's 2014 Study of the U.S. National Security Policymaking Institute. The participants spent four weeks on the Amherst College campus and at ITD facilities. They traveled from Amherst to Harvard University and the Council of Foreign Relations in New York. And they spent an additional two weeks in San Diego (University of California at San Diego, University of San Diego) and Washington D.C. for more lectures.

We asked each of our visiting scholars to write an essay and present views from his or her own regional focus or areas of substantive expertise on the broad questions associated with post-hegemonic global governance. These are the essays that they prepared.

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Research Advisor

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Academic Director


Jon Western served as Research Advisor for this Academic Institute. He is a professor of international relations at Mt. Holyoke College and Five Colleges, Inc. His teaching and research interests focus on U.S. foreign policy, military intervention, human rights and humanitarian affairs. He is the author of *Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media, and the American Public* (Johns Hopkins, 2005) and co-author of *The International Community and Statebuilding: Getting Its Act Together?* (Routledge, 2012) and co-editor of *Global Giant: Is China Changing the Rules of the Game?* (Palgrave, 2012).

Javier Corrales served as Academic Director for this Institute. He is professor of Political Science at Amherst College in Amherst, Massachusetts. He obtained his Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University. He is the co-author of *The Promise of Participation: Experiments in Participatory Governance in Honduras and Guatemala* (Palgrave 2013), *U.S.-Venezuelan Relations Since the 1990s: Coping with Midlevel Security Threats* (Routledge 2013), *Dragon in the Tropics: Hugo Chávez and the Political Economy of Revolution in Venezuela* (Brookings Institution Press, 2011), and author of *Presidents Without Parties: The Politics of Economic Reform in Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990s* (Penn State University Press 2002). He serves on the editorial board of *Latin American Politics and Society* and *Americas Quarterly*.

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***POLITICAL ISLAM,
TERRORISM,
AND
INTRA-STATE RELATIONS***



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THE PARADOX OF HEGEMONIC DECLINE: AMERICA AT A CROSSROADS IN THE 21ST CENTURY AND THE SCOURGE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Introduction

The Merriam-Webster dictionary describes "Hegemony" as the "preponderant influence or authority over others" and also as "the social, cultural, ideological, or economic influence exerted by a dominant group." Interestingly, the Oxford English Dictionary defines it as "leadership or dominance, especially by one country or social group over others." The word originated in the 16th century and comes from the mid-16th century: from Greek *hēgemonia*, from *hēgemōn* (leader), from *hēgeisthai* (to lead).

During recent times, dominant scholarly as well as popular literature seems to linger on the fact that America is in a state of decline, quite like that of Imperial Rome, or Ancient Egypt or perhaps more in the way of the gradual decadence of France in the 18th century, a decadence that ultimately paved the way for the French Revolution of 1789 and the disastrous Napoleonic Wars of the early 19th century. Or in simpler terms, America's hegemony over the world as a dominant power is gradually on a decline, and this decline could lead to internal and external turmoil. More specifically, other states could be quick to take advantage of the vacuum that the old and tottering superpower has left behind. In short, public opinion seems to have slithered into the quagmire of uncertainty and towards the

feeling of utter despondency with regard to America's role in global politics.

The most dominant question that may be asked here: Is America really on the path of decline or is the nation merely at the crossroads of a political history that necessitates a reevaluation of its performance in the international sphere? Thus the importance of this paper lies in analyzing whether the menace of international terrorism, as well as the recent US involvement in the War on Terror, have in any manner contributed towards the changing policies of the country, which might have in turn necessitated the formation of a formidable world opinion regarding the declining hegemony of America. Further, such questions and scrutiny would in the long run contribute towards reaching a conclusion with regard to America as a nation, and the future of the same when studied through the lens of realism and national security.

America and the Fatigue of International Terrorism

America's War on Terror has in fact contributed substantially towards a fatigue with respect to not only foreign policy but also domestic policy. This fatigue has been the legacy of not only the burden of international terrorism, but also the resultant economic implications of the same. It suffices to say that the costs of the War on Terror have been expensive in more ways than one, both in the field of economics as well as that of the loss of human lives. Various research organizations have come up with ample evidence that illustrates the fatigue faced by America over the last decade or more. Although such data is quantifiable, it should also be kept in mind that the statistics are an illustration of the general feeling of despondency that has been a direct result of the losses incurred as a result of the country's involvement in counter terrorism operations in the last decade or more.

Brown University's "Costs of War" project estimates that the total monetary cost — including long-term veterans' care — of the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan may eventually total as much as \$4 trillion. A 2011 Congressional Research Service report, "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11," estimated that the total price tag through fiscal year 2011 was \$1.28 trillion for such purposes as military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs and veterans' health care.¹ A March 2013 paper from Harvard Kennedy School budget expert Linda Bilmes estimates that the total costs for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars may run as high as \$6 trillion, depending on how long-term macroeconomic factors play out. Further, "the legacy of decisions made during the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts will impose significant long-term costs on the

federal government, and in particular, on the consolidated national security budget."ⁱⁱ

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments notes that the 2012 defense budget included \$118 billion in requests to support operations in the current conflicts; the Center also notes that, as of 2012, \$813 billion had been spent on Iraq and \$445 billion on Afghanistan. The New York Times estimated that the United States spent \$3.3 trillion in the decade after the 9/11 attacks; this figure included not only military operations and future veterans' care, but also the economic fallout from the terrorist attacks and associated homeland security costs. A Congressional Budget Office report estimates that by 2020 the price of treating Iraq and Afghanistan veterans alone could be more than \$8 billion annually.ⁱⁱⁱ

However, economic data is not the only way to measure the costs of international terrorism. There is also a human factor to the same. The Brown University project estimated that together, all countries involved have lost a total of 31,000 uniformed service members and military contractors. In addition, the researchers estimated in 2011 that between 152,280 and 192,550 civilians in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan have died as a "result of the fighting at the hands of all parties." In March 2013, the Brown researchers revised the civilian total estimate to 200,000; and they estimated that 330,000 people had been killed overall as a result of the conflicts, accounting for all soldiers, militants, police, contractors, journalists, humanitarian workers and civilians involved.^{iv}

A 2013 study published in the peer-reviewed journal *PLoS One Medicine*, "Mortality in Iraq Associated with the 2003–2011 War and Occupation," estimates that the war and occupation caused about 460,000 deaths. Using surveys and other data, the authors find the "wartime crude death rate in Iraq to be 4.55 per 1,000, more than 50% higher than the death rate of 2.89 during the two-year period preceding the war." However, these estimates carry significant uncertainty. Another 2013 study, published in *The Lancet*, had generally lower estimates: "At least 116,903 Iraqi non-combatants and more than 4800 coalition military personnel died over the 8-year course. Many Iraqi civilians were injured or became ill because of damage to the health-supporting infrastructure of the country, and about 5 million were displaced." Moreover, the New America Foundation estimates that as many as 307 civilians have been killed as a result of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan between 2004 and fall 2013; the estimates go up if the Yemen theater is included. Those estimates are being refined by further reports from organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.^v

It should be noted that the number of service members killed in action is central to any such analysis. A February

2013 Congressional Research Service report, "U.S. Military Casualty Statistics: Operation New Dawn, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom," updates data relating to the post-9/11 conflicts, including the numbers of wounded.^{vi} (Operation Enduring Freedom refers to the Afghanistan conflict; Operation New Dawn refers to the Iraq War during the final transition phase, which ended in December 2011.)

The Threat of Al Qaeda Today and America's Response

In 2013, President Obama outlined fighter rules for drone strikes and renewed efforts to close the Guantanamo Bay prison, while calling on policymakers to rethink the nation's battle against terrorism.^{vii}

"Our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must continue," President Obama said during a 59-minute speech at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. "But this war, like all wars, must end," he added. "That's what history advises. That's what our democracy demands."^{viii}

Under a new set of rules, President Obama stated that drone attacks would be confined to suspects "who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people," and who cannot otherwise be captured. "Before any strike is taken," he said, "there must be near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured — the highest standard we can set."^{ix}

Al Qaeda has not completely been obliterated as a threat from the map of global politics. The death of bin Laden has not done away with the impending threat posed by the group. In fact, according to various expert opinions it seems that Al Qaeda has in fact become not only more decentralized as a group, but also more bureaucratic in nature. Perhaps it is because of this nature that it is difficult for governments around the world to both identify the operatives of the group and decimate the same. At present Al Qaeda's influence is not only spread all over Africa (particularly Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the Ansar Dine faction, Ansar al Sharia and various other groups), but also to a considerable extent over Europe, the Arab world, South Asia (with particular reference to Pakistan and Afghanistan), and South East Asia as well as in the cyber world.

The American response towards terrorism has, particularly in recent times, concentrated on the aspect of employing drones in countering terrorism. They have been regularly employed not only on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, but also in the Middle East. This counter terrorism response has been effective to a

certain extent with important terrorist leaders falling victims to incessant drone attacks; however, the fact that domestic fatigue with regard to the War on Terror still prevails in the United States, it may be pertinent to question the effectiveness of employing drones in countering terrorism. Further, new studies have shown that Al Qaeda is fashioned more along the lines of a bureaucratic organization. In such a case, a more robust policy is perhaps needed not only to completely wipe out the threat of the same, but also to prevent another spiral in foreign and domestic policy and yet another bout of political fatigue.

The Eagle Flies High: The Myth of America's Decline

Global Terrorism Database,^x an open source database on international terrorist incidents created under the auspices of the University of Maryland, has clearly illustrated in its recent studies that incidents of terrorism are on a decline. Not only have the drones led to a decline in the number of casualties, but also incidents of terrorism directed towards the USA have been on a decline for the last few years. This throws light on two major points: drones have been effective as a counter terrorism weapon; and it is quite evident that America's decision to move away from the War on Terror and other subsequent conflict situations has actually contributed towards a decline in terrorist incidents directed exclusively at the USA.

Coming back to the oft-debated rhetoric on the decline of the US, it may be stated that according to various reports and statistics by the Wall Street Journal, the Dow Jones Indices, and the Commerce Department, as well as statistics propounded by the Federal Reserve, the decline is merely an elaborate myth. Many indicators demonstrate that the US economy did strengthen considerably in 2013 and bodes well for the year 2014 as well. It may also be noted that during recent times the unemployment level has fallen, home prices have risen, consumer spending has grown admirably and household wealth has rebounded.

Further, with regard to military strength, although it is often stated that China and Russia are rising in the global political skies and that the United States is on a decline, a simple comparison of military might will clearly illustrate the fact that the concept of decline is merely a myth. Global Fire Power,^{xi} yet another database, one which focuses upon worldwide military power, has compared the military strength of the USA and Russia and the USA and China. As of May 2014, the US ranks as the number one country in the world with regard to military power. America is closely followed by Russia, China and India.

The myth of decline is quite evident if we take into account not only the prevalence of statistics, but also

the fact that even today America does play a considerable role not only in regional politics within its own backyard, but also elsewhere, and also the fact that its preponderance as a global power is still extremely important not only with respect to other states, but also with regard to international organizations such as the UN, the NATO, the EU and others. A brief change in policy as a result of the fatigue incurred during prolonged wars on terrorism does not necessarily mean that the importance of a world power has declined in global politics. It simply states that the eagle continues to fly high; although its course might have been altered due to the exigencies of troubled times.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it may be stated that America should follow a more robust policy towards terrorism. The threat of Al Qaeda still looms large in the horizon, and it has spread its tentacles to areas that fall within the purview of the cyber world. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that a more comprehensive policy to weed out the remnants of the group as well as other affiliates of the same should be formulated and implemented with renewed enthusiasm. However, it should be kept in mind that this policy should not in any manner lead to the fatigue felt during the course of the War on Terrorism. It should not in any manner drag the country into a quagmire of convoluted economic and political consequences.

Further, this new policy should be cost-effective and multilateral rather than unilateral. America needs the support of her allies in combating terrorism. She also needs the support of the international community at large. Therefore, a multilateral policy would definitely benefit her in the long run. It should also be noted that the foundation of such a policy should be based on cultivating good relations with not only regional powers but also regional organizations throughout the globe. Joint counter terrorism operations are at present quite prevalent throughout the world. These joint exercises should be enhanced. Bilateral exercises as well as programs formulated under the aegis of international organizations should ensure a more global approach to the problem of terrorism. Also, strategic relations should be given importance especially in core areas where the threat of terrorism is formidable.

Last but not least, newer international task forces should be created to deal with specific kinds of terrorism, and existing international organizations should be involved in dealing with the same. Over here particular importance should be given towards creating a new international task force on cyber terrorism quite similar to that of the Interpol. A broad based structure as well as the involvement of experts from various countries would be

beneficial in countering the menace of terrorism in cyberspace.

In a nutshell, it may be stated that the hegemonic decline of America is nothing more than a sophisticated myth. Ample evidence, both in terms of the dominant academic discourse as well as statistical evidence, proves contrary to the belief. However, what America needs at present is an effective pull out from areas of contention and conflict and the creation of a comprehensive counter terrorism policy that should in the future not only prevent the country from being sucked into a treacherous marsh of domestic discontent, but also effectively counter the scourge of international terrorism. The eagle still flies high in the sky. Perhaps she should change her course from time to time.

ⁱ Fischer, Hannah. "U.S. Military Casualty Statistics: Operation New Dawn, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom," Congressional Research Service, Feb. 5, 2013.

ⁱⁱ *Ibid.*

ⁱⁱⁱ *Ibid.*

^{iv} *Ibid.*

^v *Ibid.*

^{vi} *Ibid.*

^{vii} Jackson, David, "Obama Outlines Counterterrorism Policy," USA Today, May 23, 2013, at

<http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/05/23/obama-counter-terrorism-speech-drones-quantanamo-bay/2354001/>

^{viii} *Ibid.*

^{ix} *Ibid.*

^x Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland, at

<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>

^{xi} Global Fire Power, at <http://www.globalfirepower.com/>



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THE CHILDREN OF JIHADISTS: COLLATERAL DAMAGE OR NATURAL BORN JIHADISTS?

Abstract

This report explores the phenomenon of the sons of the Muslim radicals who lost their lives or were jailed during the American war on terror. It uses a Moroccan NGO study on this issue. It argues that this phenomenon is not specific to Morocco, but that children of jihadists live in almost all Muslim countries. It also examines the impact of indoctrination, radicalization, terrorism and war on terrorism on these infants and suggests that the way the Moroccan Government and almost all Muslim countries respond to this fact is making things worse, not better. As a main target of terrorist attacks, the US must help Islamic countries invest in their human capital.

Key words

Jihadists, terrorists, radicals, indoctrination, brainwashing, child abuse, psychological-profiling, radicalization.

Terminology

There is sometimes disagreement and confusion over the use of terminology relating to Muslims and Islam. To clarify, this report makes a distinction between jihadists and terrorists. Many jihadists reject the use of terrorism to achieve their goals.

Why this issue?

"What do Muslims want?" is a question that has increasingly preoccupied Western policy-makers over the past 12 years. Since 9/11, Muslims and Muslim

communities have been examined to try and understand the mindset of terrorists who claim to act on their behalf. The public demand for answers has been intense and has fuelled a prodigious output of books, websites, lectures, pamphlets and television documentaries about Islam and its adherents. Many Westerners want to know and to understand: What makes a terrorist? Why do they become terrorists? Why they are terrorizing us? And, are all terrorists Muslims? Are all Muslims terrorists? How do war and terrorism affect us?

In my essay, I approach this phenomenon from a new perspective. Indeed, I focus on the biological sons, grandsons, and nephews of the radicals who lost their lives or were jailed during the American war on terror. Who are these children? What kind of education do they have? Are they "normal" children? Are they "potential" jihadists? And, should they be protected from religious fundamentalist parents who want to completely immerse them in jihad?

Children jihadists Indoctrination

To comprehend the gravity of the phenomenon of children at risk of radicalization at the hands of their parents in Morocco, as well as in all other Muslim countries, it is first necessary to understand the process of indoctrination, which ultimately socializes young people to be hardened fighters.

Arnold Markowitz and David A. Halperin [1] provide the most complete and compelling explanation of why child indoctrination is likely to be associated with cultic groups. First of all, because these groups are centered on the personality of a charismatic leader, the leader's idiosyncratic beliefs, no matter how mundane, may influence the group's child-rearing practices.

Because these groups' ideologies tend to be non-falsifiable, subjectivist systems that are threatened by the outside world, ideology must be treated as sacred and unchallengeable. This feature becomes especially destructive with regard to children, in that, as Markowitz and Halperin note, "there is a primacy of ideology over biology...childcare may be seen as a disposable superfluity" [2].

The cult's hierarchical structure and the way it sets itself up as "family" turn parents into "middle-management" with regard to their own children. How they discipline their children, what activities they encourage in their children, what they teach their children: such decisions are dictated by the group's leader. The parents' role as middle-managers can become especially dangerous for children when the leader measures the parents'

dedication to him by their willingness to abuse their children at his request [3].

As cult recruiting techniques have become more sophisticated and complex, the term "brainwashing" has frequently been interchanged and replaced with the terms "mind control," "thought reform" or "coercive persuasion." [4].

Of all the types of indoctrination children are subjected to, this is the worst, because of the nature of the claims made (moral and ethical), the mode of making them (absolutist authoritarian) and the resulting individual psychological damage (all kinds of trauma) and social division (people who believe as we do and those who do not).

Victims of indoctrination, "brainwashing," or mind control are capable of being persuaded to commit acts that they would not normally do outside the cult. "The victim of thought reform typically commits criminal acts fully aware of their wrongfulness (according to society's standards). He (or she) acts consciously, even enthusiastically, and without overt coercion." [5].

Like Father, Like Son ?

The study of a Moroccan NGO [6] worked on a panel of 150 children whose fathers were killed or jailed during the American war on terror. They are between 8 and 12 years old. 78% of them live in big cities (Casablanca, Rabat, Marrakech, Fes), 12%, in small towns. This study focuses on six aspects:

1. Education
2. Scholarship
3. Extracurricular activities
4. Social integration
5. Religious and cultural values
6. Psychological profiles

From the Biological to the Spiritual Father...

The parents of these children were not shaped by a conservative Arabic education or brought up in a rural and poor area culture. They grew up in the streets of Casablanca, Rabat, Marrakech, etc., attending good universities and top business schools. It is true that some of them may have learnt the Qu'ran by rote from an early age, but these individuals also spoke fluent French, listened to pop music, watched soccer and shared many other cultural reference points with non-Muslims. As this study points out:

45% of fathers came from middle class,
20% from upper class,
35% from lower class,

6% had a postgraduate degree
33.3% had a college degree.
70% joined the jihad at the average age of 28.

Indeed, the more one looks at today's self-proclaimed jihadists, both in Morocco and elsewhere, the harder it becomes to see them principally as products of traditional Muslim society. Marc Sageman's study [7] of 172 Al-Qaeda operatives around the world indicates that most Islamic extremists have not been brought up with a strong religious influence. Nor are they the products of economic deprivation. In fact, many come from relatively wealthy homes.

The aims of this study

This study is more interesting in pointing out different aspects of the jihadists' children's lives. Even if the following figures should be interpreted with a great deal of caution, they still contribute to an indication that the roots of radicalism are complicated and run deep. The future of the war on terror would become more difficult than it has ever been in the past. The following key aspects of this study are much less reassuring.

What kind of education do these children have?

65 % : Salafist education
35%: Moderate Islamic education

What kinds of scholarships do they receive?

40% : public schools
35% : private Quranic Salafist schools
25% : e-learning radical Islamic scholarship program

What are their religious beliefs and values?

100%: say they are practicing Muslims
90%: accomplish Friday prayer in the mosque
100% : regret Oussam Ben Laden's death (Uncle Oussama, Uncle Aymane)
80% : want to fight in the cause of Allah
60% : want to be martyrs
60% : wish to go (back) to Afghanistan (Islam House)

What are their extracurricular activities?

15% : street soccer
85% : no extracurricular activities

How is their social integration?

62% live in semi-closed community (their friends are from Salafist families)
56% do not have strong contact with neighbors (they are not seen often).

What are their favorite hobbies?

80% don't watch national TV Channels
60% watch kids' programs in radical Islamic satellite TV channels
75% play Internet games (violent video games).

What was their worst nightmare?

35% : spent more than 9 months with their mothers in prison ("Moroccan black site")
45% : 1 month
20% : 2 weeks

How is their psychological profile?

47% suffer from depression, anxiety, irritability
32% suffer from sleep disturbance
21% suffer from social isolation and aggression

Are they "potential" jihadists ?

This study makes no pretense to give key answers about the destinies of these young people, but it is valuable in that it gives us some indications of what their model society may look like. Radicalization has a global reach and any explanation for its rise must look at geo-political trends. A major factor in the increasing religiosity of Muslims everywhere and anywhere has been the influence of Islamist groups operating from abroad that are funded by the oil profits of countries like Saudi Arabia [8]. There is a proliferation of propaganda targeting young Muslims through games, DVDs, the Internet, children's societies and charitable organizations. Numerical estimates of Muslims going to fight abroad in conflicts such as Afghanistan or Bosnia have been as high as two thousand a year [9].

In numerous armed conflicts, children continue to be used as weapons of war. According to Human Rights Watch, the military recruitment of children under 18 years of age and their use in hostilities occurs in at least 14 countries and territories, with Amnesty International estimating that there are approximately 300,000 children fighting in conflicts worldwide[10]. In the PBS documentary Children of the Taliban, journalist Sharmeen Obaid Chinoy interviewed Taliban commander Qari Hussain, who boasted that he also recruits children as young as five, six and seven years old, emphasizing, "Children are tools to achieve God's will. And whatever comes your way, you sacrifice it." [11]

Children at a young age are deeply vulnerable, malleable and impressionable, traits often manipulated by their parents or group leaders in conflicts throughout the world to indoctrinate children. "The psychology of morality and conscience is something that is absorbed during childhood, and if that childhood is spent

carrying out or viewing acts of violence, it can be a very powerful and scary phenomenon." [12] These children have also heard the same messages repeated over and over again and have been socialized in an atmosphere of hatred and intolerance. Many radical parents base their fundamental narrative around the notion that Islam is under attack. They infuse education of religion with anti-U.S. sentiment, delivering firebrand sermons that depict the United States as the villain in the narrative, the force that threatens Islamic traditions and values.

These children may constitute the fourth wave of radicals stirred to battle by the ideology of global jihad against the United States and Western influence in the Muslim world. They could form fluid, informal networks that are self-financed and self-trained. They would have no physical headquarters or sanctuary, but the tolerant, virtual environment of the Internet offers them a semblance of unity and purpose. There is a scattered, decentralized social structure -- a leaderless jihad.

A Moroccan jihadist father has recently taken his five kids to Syria to fight alongside al-Qaeda militants in their war against the Arab country [13]. Hassan Al-Haddad, a Moroccan social activist and newspaper reporter, said that numerous Moroccan children have been sent to Syria through various ways, including through European countries.

Child Abuse

Victims of their own parents, victims of terrorism, victims of the war on terrorism, these children are prime targets for radicals seeking to recruit indoctrinated and desperate youth. Paradoxically, the Moroccan Government's policies regarding these children and their families focus just on security issues, which makes things worse. These policies make them feel more persecuted and excluded. The exaggeration of security measures does not make this population feel protected but instead reinforces feelings of victimization and alienation. Some local NGOs provide financial support. Unfortunately, all of these children need psychosocial or rehabilitation/reintegration into their real society. They are seriously psychologically damaged. They need stability and psychological help.

A child may be taken into care if he or she is being exposed to pornography, or is being abused – but not if the child is being habituated to this utterly bleak and nihilistic view of the world that could lead them to become murderers. In his weekly column for the Daily Telegraph, London Mayor Boris Johnson has claimed that Islamist radicalization of children should be treated as child abuse, and that the kids of Islamist radicals should be "taken into care" [14]. "I have been told of at

least one case where the younger siblings of a convicted terrorist are well on the road to radicalization – and it is simply not clear that the law would support intervention. This is absurd. The law should obviously treat radicalization as a form of child abuse. It is the strong view of many of those involved in counter-terrorism that there should be a clearer legal position, so that those children who are being turned into potential killers or suicide bombers can be removed into care – for their own safety and for the safety of the public” [15]. Johnson is also right to stress the importance of counter-terrorism work and the dangers of radicalization: “Every day in London and other big cities, there are thousands of counter-terrorism officers doing a fantastic job of keeping us safe. They have to work out who are the most vulnerable young people, who are the most susceptible - and they have to stop the infection of radicalization before it is too late.” [16].

Johnson's analysis confirms that the phenomenon of radicalization of children does not only concern the Muslim countries but also the Western world. It also demonstrates that this type of radicalization is a multifaceted and complex challenge.

Some specialists suggest that the United States and other Western democracies, which are the main targets of terrorist attacks, should invest more funds in foreign aid for Muslim countries with a special emphasis on supporting social education and investing in human capital. However, this kind of this aid is seen as an interference in local affairs.

Conclusion

This essay has tried to offer some explanations for the roots of Islamic fundamentalism, but it has not presented a straightforward solution to “the problem of terrorism”.

This is not because there are not specific things that the Moroccan and Muslim Governments can do to reduce the potential terrorist threat. However, there is no quick-fix policy that one can implement tomorrow that will deal with the broader social and cultural factors that this essay has tried to explore. We may be able to dismantle some existing policies and soften the edges of failing strategies (INDH) [16], but the problems we have identified need to be challenged through intellectual debate and persuasion.

Islamist terrorism is a threat to national and international security, but it also represents a set of ideas and attitudes that we need to confront.

More importantly, we should guard against the logic that any policy is good as long as it will reduce the terrorist threat. There are valid arguments for improving

the living conditions of the children of jihadists, or for changing foreign policy in the Middle East, or for teaching both moderate Islamic values and “universal” values in Muslim countries' schools, but these should be argued for in their own terms, not because they will stop young Muslims from becoming radicals. There are over 10 million young people in Morocco, and the politics should be about them, not just a group of young men who want to join the jihad wherever it is needed.

Some have described the war in Iraq as “the elephant in the room” and argued that we should change foreign policy if we want to end terrorism. Not only is this a simplistic analysis of why terrorism has emerged, but it is a pathetic approach to politics. A society that prioritizes its safety above all else will soon have no values left to lose.

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NON-STATE ACTORS AS A PLATFORM IN U.S. FIGHT AGAINST TERROR: THE CASE OF SUFIS

The Arab Spring environment presented new opportunities for the spread of the Salafi-jihadi ideology in the Middle East and North Africa. Simultaneously, there have been increasing attempts to spread this ideology, which is identified with Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, to Muslim communities who live in the West, particularly in the USA.

Salafi-jihadi ideology can be understood as a millenarian radical Sunni movement. It seeks a major transformation of the existing political status quo and a return to an idealized past by using violence and force. It aims to expel the USA from the Middle East, eliminate the state of Israel, overthrow apostate governments in the Muslim world and re-establish a global Caliphate - a jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph.¹ This radical Islamic ideology also strongly advocates launching terrorist attacks on Western soil in order to terrorize the population and weaken the economy of the West.

There is significant evidence of an increasing radicalization process of Muslims in the West and of home-grown terror as a result of exposure to Salafi-jihadi ideology. In a report released by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), analysts found

that home-grown terrorist plots in the US have risen sharply since May 2009. US authorities have thwarted 50 home-grown jihadist terrorist plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents of the United States.² However, they failed to prevent three terrorist attacks. In April 2013, for example, two Muslim Chechen brothers who lived in US carried out a terror attack during the Boston Marathon, killing three people. Another well-known example relates to Nidal Hasan, a former US Army psychiatrist and Medical Corps officer who shot 13 people in the Fort Hood mass shooting on November 5, 2009. These terrorists, who are often regarded as "lone wolves," were all influenced by Salafi-jihadi ideology.

This is not the place to elaborate on the discussion about the disseminating channels of this ideology, but I should briefly mention two main channels. The first channel is related to propaganda spread by radical local Muslim preachers in the West, such as the radical American Yemeni preacher Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki. The second channel, and the most prominent, relates to the use of the Internet, which is also used to recruit Muslims to the cause of Al-Qaeda. Hence, the US must find ways to counter the spread of Salafi-jihadi ideology and to portray it as a twisted version of Islam.

Sufism as countering to Salafi-jihadi ideology

In light of all this, this paper suggests that the US should cultivate stronger relations with moderate Muslim non-state actors in order to reduce the influence of the Salafi-jihadi ideology on Muslims, especially those who live in the West. The Sufis are a very important non-state actor in this regard and can be considered a reliable ally to the West thanks to several reasons that will be elaborated below.

Sufism is a central mystical stream in Islam. Sufis are Muslim believers who make efforts to experience the existence of God individually and emotionally. In order to achieve ecstatic union with God, they incorporate techniques of sound and movement, chanting and music, swaying and dance. Since the 11th century, Sufis have organized in brotherhoods or orders, each following a charismatic leader (Shaykh), as a collective framework that enables them to practice mystical theory. Several Sufi orders enjoy great influence on Muslim communities in the Middle East and the West, such as the Naqshbandiyya order.

¹ Richard H. Shultz, *Global Insurgency Strategy and the Salafi Jihad Movement*, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2008.

² William L. Painter, *Issues in Homeland Security Policy for the 113th Congress*, CRS Report for Congress, September 23, 2013, pp.7-8. <http://www.fas.org/sqp/crs/homsec/R42985.pdf>

The Sufis have several advantages over other moderate non-state actors and should be supported due to several factors:

1. Sufism is rooted in Islamic heritage, dates back to the 7th century and represents a moderate and tolerant interpretation of Islam.
2. Sufis are usually organized, as mentioned, in religious orders. Their structure and the fact that they are spread all over the world and tied with each other in some way enables them to act as a social network. Hence, Sufi orders may function as strong political, ideological and economic units.
3. Many Sufis are pro-Western & support democracy.
4. There are millions of Sufis around the world such as in Egypt, Turkey, Nigeria, Central Asia and in the West as well. That means more "ambassadors" for the US.
5. Most Sufis are well respected among non-Sufi Muslims in several countries in the Middle East. In Egypt, for example, Sufis have influence within Al-Azhar, the most important religious Sunni institute in the Muslim world. Most of Al-Azhar's heads (Sheikh al-Azhar) were Sufis and supported Sufism.
6. Several regimes in the Middle East and North Africa support Sufis in order to minimize the political power and ideological attraction of extremist Muslim groups, such as in Egypt.
7. The US and most Sufis share the same agenda: fighting Salafi-jihadi ideology. There is growing tension, suspicion and hostility between Sufis and Salafi-jihadi activists, especially after the Arab Spring. This is because of the aggression of Salafis against Sufi shrines, monuments and Sufi activists such as in Libya, Egypt and Somalia. Hence, most Sufi actors are interested in fighting this ideology. Hence, there is a common ground between the US and Sufis in this aspect.
8. Supporting Sufis may increase security and stability in Muslim societies.

It should be noted that the Nixon Centre and the Rand Corporation recognized Sufi actors, in 2003 and 2007 correspondingly, as a potential factor in challenging the Salafi-jihadi ideology.³ Both of them recommended cultivating ties with Sufi actors. The Nixon Centre, for example, met Sheikh **Hisham Kabbani**, one of the prominent Sufi leaders of the Naqshbandiyya order in

the US, and considered him a Super-empowered Sufi leader who had the ability and will to fight the Salafi-jihadi ideology.

With that in mind, I have identified new powerful Sufi actors who may contribute to the war on terror. The first one is **Sheikh Ali al-Jifri**, a Yemeni Sufi Sheikh who engages in extensive activity around the world preaching for dialogue between religions and against religious extremism. The second actor is **The World Federation of Sufi Orders (WFSO)**, a Sufi coalition that was established in November 2013 in order to fight extremist Muslim religious ideology and terror. To my knowledge, contacts with the above mentioned non-state actors have not been actively cultivated.

1. **Sheikh Ali al-Jifri as an Super-Empowered Sufi.**

Ali al-Jifri was born in the city of Jeddah in Saudi Arabia on April 16, 1971, and grew up in Yemen. He belongs to the Sufi Ba'Alawi order (established in the 13th century) in Hadhramawt in southern Yemen, which is also spread across the Indian Ocean.

In 2009, he was listed 34th in the world's 500 Most Influential Muslims list made by Georgetown University's Prince Al-Waleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding and the Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre of Jordan. He holds a wide range of posts:

1. He is the founder and director of the Tabah Foundation, a research institute based in Abu Dhabi, UAE, whose mission is "the renewal of contemporary Islamic discourse to fit the needs humanity" through its three divisions: Research, Projects, and Media.⁴
2. He is a member of the board of Dar al Mustafa in Tarim, Yemen, an educational institute established for the study of traditional Islamic sciences.
3. He is a member of the Royal Ahl al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought in Jordan.
4. He is affiliated with various other international Islamic organizations.
5. He is involved in promoting Islamic-Christian dialogue and international dialogue between religions and civilizations.
6. He contributed to the project "A Common Word," a document signed by 138 Muslim scholars representing different sects and schools of thought as well as countries.
7. He is the founder of the Guidance Media Company and Magazine in the UK.

³ <http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/Sufism.pdf> (not active) ;

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG574.pdf

⁴ See: <http://www.tabahfoundation.org/en/about/>

8. He is the founder of the Board of Trustees for the European Academy for Islamic Culture and Science in Brussels, Belgium.

Thanks to Al-Jifri's charisma, influence and good ties with different Muslim communities and Muslim scholars around the world, he may be seen as a Super-empowered individual who can be productive to US interests. His spiritual activism can bridge the gap between Islam and the West, Muslim and non-Muslim, and his messages of peace spread throughout the globe via modern technology, broadcasting and internet sites can contribute a lot to the fight against Salafi-jihadi ideology.

In March 2010, he took part in an important conference in Mardin, Turkey, where a prominent group of Sufis, Muslim scholars and theologians from across the Muslim world convened in order to denounce the Salafi-jihadi ideology and criticize those who justified the use of violence. Mardin was chosen to host this conference because of its historical symbolism. Mardin was the place where Sheikh Ibn Taymiyya, a scholar from the 12th whom many Salafi-jihadi admire, issued a fatwa allowing shedding blood of Muslims who were not applying and practicing Islamic law (*Shariah*). Al-Jifri challenged Al-Qaeda's ideology by proving that its theological basis was wrong. In response, Al-Qaeda criticized this conference and its participants three times. This response indicates a serious concern among



Al-Qaeda's high ranks regarding a potential erosion of their Salafi-jihadi ideology.

Recently, Al-Jifri published a declaration in which he denounced the kidnapping of 230 Christian School girls by Boko Haram, an offshoot of Al-Qaeda in Nigeria. He addressed Boko Haram saying, "Know that your actions - aggressing upon innocent women and girls - show absolute weakness."⁵

2. The World Federation of Sufi Orders (WFSO).

On November 2-4, 2013, the Egyptian Sufi Sheikh Abu al-Azayim organized an international conference of Sufi sheikhs in Paris on the topic of "The Sufi Role in [Ensuring] Security and Stability in Society." Nineteen leaders of Egyptian Sufi orders attended the conference, as did

several sheikhs and members of Sufi orders in Turkey, Europe, and North Africa. At the end of the conference, participants announced the establishment of "The World Federation of Sufi



WORLD الاتحاد العالمي للطرق الصوفية
Federation of Sufi Orders

Orders" (WFSO), led by Abu al-Azayim. It also announced the opening of its headquarters in Paris and several branches in various locations throughout the world, and declared that all Federation decisions would be made from the Al-Azmiyya Order's offices in Cairo. The main cause for the establishment of this organization is fighting against the Salafi-jihadist ideology.

Although this is a new organization, it deserves attention thanks to the increasing number of Sufi activists who have joined it and thanks to its main goal of fighting terror. In addition, Abu al-Azayim enjoys good ties with Muslims in Egypt, Sudan and Europe.

According to Abu al-Azayim, the Federation was designed to unite 600 million Sufis from dozens of Sufi orders around the world. It was also created to serve as a model of moderate Islamic faith and the spirit of solidarity in order to prevent the spread of terrorism by Islamist organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi-jihadist organizations. At the end of the conference, Abu al-Azayim sent a message to the Muslim countries explaining that it is better to support the Sufi orders since it will guarantee their success in the fight against Islamic terrorism: "The Sufis have begun to emerge from their historical, forced self-isolation, and have decided to enter the political, social, economic, and philanthropic arena. [They have done so] in order to not give the extremists the opportunity to spread their poison among society."⁶

How can the US support Sufi non-state actors without damaging their reputation?

There is a fear that US's support for these Sufi non-state actors may damage their reputation and label them as collaborators. This may fuel the Salafi-jihadi ideology and cause the opposite of the intended result. Hence, it is recommended that the US support them indirectly by taking the following measures:

⁵ http://www.alhabibali.com/writings_details/In/en/typeof/2/writingid/163

⁶ http://dayan.org/sites/default/files/Michael_Barak_TA_NOTES_al-Azmiyya_27042014.pdf

1. Encouraging countries to consider providing, where appropriate, assistance and possible financial support to non-state Sufi actors.
2. Establishing and financing satellite TV channels which will help them reach Muslim audiences and spread the voice of moderation all over the globe.
3. Establishing new and supporting old Internet sites of the aforementioned actors as a platform to promote moderate voices which will challenge the Salafi-jihadi ideology.
4. Inviting the aforementioned non-state Sufi actors to the US in order to hold lectures in front of Muslim American audiences, especially young people, introducing them to the errors of the Salafi-jihadi ideology.
5. Conducting conferences on the subject of religious tolerance with the participation of the aforementioned non-state Sufi actors.
6. Financing translations of Sufi literature, which challenges the Salafi-jihadi ideology, into Western languages.

Conclusion

In sum, supporting non-state Sufi actors, as mentioned above, can contribute a lot to promoting religious tolerance of the "other," reducing the influence of the Salafi-jihadi ideology and preventing a radicalization process not only among Muslims in the US but also around the globe. In other words, strengthening Sufi non-state actors will provide an effective bastion against terrorism. However, it should be kept in mind that this is only one factor in war against terror, although it is a very important one.



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THE SYRIA CRISIS AND THE U.S. POLICY

The Syria crisis, which began as an unrest on 15 March 2011 and grew nationwide by April 2011, has been raging for over three years. The protests that led to the ongoing armed conflict between Bashar Assad's government and those seeking to oust him were a part of the protest movements known as the Arab Spring. The figures regarding the Syria crisis are startling: the estimated death toll is over 150,000, and nearly half of the population in Syria have been affected by the crisis (over 2.5 million as refugees, 6.5 million as internally displaced) and are in need of humanitarian assistance. Most of the refugees, around 97%, are now in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. More than 2% of the Syrian population has been killed, maimed or wounded over the course of the conflict⁷. According to UNHCR, the total number of persons of concern was 2,655,458 by 8 April 2014. The number of refugees are: 1,009,730 in Lebanon, 679,843 in Turkey, 590,515 in Jordan, 219,579 in Iraq, and 136,894 in Egypt⁸. As is seen from the figures, this crisis is not one that is just political; because of its human rights dimension it is also an humanitarian crisis. Although the Syria crisis has a human rights dimension, most academics and the media mainly focus on the political aspect. The international community, especially

⁷ Rhoda Margesson, Susan G. Chesser, "Syria: Overview of the Humanitarian Response", Congressional Research Service, February 25, 2014.

⁸ <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php>.

⁹ R2P norm which was adopted at the UN World Summit in 2005, and applied to Libya crisis in 2011 has three pillars. First pillar: a state has a responsibility to protect its population from mass atrocities (genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing); second pillar: the international community has a

responsibility to assist the state to fulfill its primary responsibility; and third pillar: if a state fails to protect its citizens from mass atrocities and peaceful measures have failed, the international community has the responsibility to intervene through coercive measures such as economic sanctions. Military intervention can be undertaken as a last resort.

Main Reasons Concerning The Nonintervention of The International Community:

Until now, the international community has mentioned the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm on different occasions during this conflict, but they have been very reluctant to intervene by employing this norm⁹. Because they used it in the Libya crisis, many people ask: what makes Syria so different from Libya that it does not warrant an intervention?

The international military action against Libya approved by the UN Security Council was the first such authorization and the first such use of substantial force since the 1999 Kosovo operation by NATO. Despite the application of R2P in the Libya crisis, the UN Security Council (UNSC) could not follow the same procedure in the Syria crisis. Although the violence of the Assad regime surpasses the violence of Qaddafi regime, there is still no action regarding Syria. The main underlying reason is the complex challenge presented by Syria to the UNSC¹⁰. Compared to Libya, Syria has a strong army, strong alliances, a complicated neighborhood and a weak and divided opposition. Due to these factors, if any military intervention took place it would be long and costly both in lives and money.

But when we look at the Libya crisis, we can say that the conditions for international intervention were more appropriate than Syria crisis. In other words, the legal, moral and political/military dimensions all merged to create perfect conditions for intervention. Because of the UNSC resolution, the action was legal. The West's and eventually NATO's military action along with regional support (especially the Arab League) meant the political will and military capacity were apparent. Qaddafi's intention to eliminate "rats" and "cockroaches" – language also used by Rwanda's

responsibility to assist the state to fulfill its primary responsibility; and third pillar: if a state fails to protect its citizens from mass atrocities and peaceful measures have failed, the international community has the responsibility to intervene through coercive measures such as economic sanctions. Military intervention can be undertaken as a last resort.

¹⁰ Lloyd Axworthy and Allan Rock, "A Reflection on Responsibility: What Does Syria Mean for R2P?", Diplomat & International Canada, October 4, 2012, diplomatonline.com.

regime in its 1994 genocide – indicated the moral imperative¹¹.

Also, the Libya regime was in a weaker position than the Syria regime. Libya had relatively few military resources; its army was divided, and this led to large scale defections. Due to isolation of the Libya regime in the region, there was little likelihood that neighboring states would enter to defend the regime. Also the opposition forces in Libya had already made significant gains¹².

Although, because of the worsening situation, the authorities in the US and other countries appear to feel compelled to respond to the Syria crisis, they hesitate to do so as it has political and security risks. The spillover of the crisis – a possible region-wide sectarian war – and significant civilian deaths from any military action have been considered as some of the risks.

Particularly, the role of Russia and China in the UNSC is one of the main factors that prevents the UNSC from adopting a resolution against Syria. They voted against three resolutions regarding Syria. There is also a strong adverse reaction, especially by Russia and China, to NATO's interpretation of the mandate. They think that NATO activities in Libya went far beyond the letter and spirit of the resolution adopted by the UNSC. Russia and China believe that NATO used military action in Libya for regime change, and they do not want the same thing to happen in Syria. Although they both, especially Russia, have good relations with Syria, the two countries' overemphasis on sovereignty over humanitarian action is an important factor in their opposition. Russia and China fear that an application of R2P to Syria could blow back someday because of the possible serious domestic tensions at home. They try to prevent any model/pattern for any international intervention both in their or allies' domestic affairs in the future.

In sum, although the R2P norm saved the lives of many people in Libya, ironically its implementation led to diplomatic deadlock regarding the Syria crisis. In other words, Syrians paid the price of NATO excesses in Libya. Also, R2P is considered by many people to be "a paper tiger" concerning the Syria crisis.

The US Policy Towards the Syria Crisis and Its effects on US Image and Interests:

Since the beginning, the US policy towards the Syria crisis has been very cautious and included a sustained international diplomatic effort to establish a negotiated

transition, the provision of assistance to some selected Syrian opposition groups, and the provision of humanitarian assistance in Syria and neighboring countries. Despite its desire that Assad step down, the US has shown a preference for an orderly transition rather than a unilateral military intervention.

From the beginning of the civil war, the Obama administration publically announced its intention not to send US troops to Syria. In March 2012, the US made it clear that it would not pursue an intervention without a Security Council authorisation. In a response to the question of whether or not the US contemplates using unilateral force, President Barack Obama announced that, "for us to take military action unilaterally as some have suggested, or to think that somehow there is some simple solution, I think is a mistake." President Obama also said that military force is not the only way to deal with Syria, saying, "We've got to think through what we do through the lens of what's going to be effective, but also what's critical for US security interests."¹³

President Obama's reply is consistent with the US National Security Strategy Document, which says: "Military force, at times, may be necessary to defend our country and allies or to preserve broader peace and security, including by protecting civilians facing a grave humanitarian crisis... While the use of force is sometimes necessary, we will exhaust other options before war whenever we can, and carefully weigh the costs and risks of action against the costs and risks of inaction. When force is necessary, we will continue to do so in a way that reflects our values and strengthen our legitimacy, and we will seek broad international support, working with such institutions as NATO and the U.N. Security Council."¹⁴

From President Obama's reply and the US National Security Strategy, we can deduce that the high points regarding the US military intervention in the Syria crisis are: no unilateralism, thorough attention to US security interests, effectiveness, trying all other options before war, evaluations of the costs of action and inaction, legitimacy and international support.

In the US policy towards Syria, the red line for US was the "whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized." According to President Obama, this

¹¹ Thomas G. Weiss, "Military Humanitarianism: Syria Has'nt Kill It", *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2014.

¹² Spencer Zifcak, "The Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syria", *Melbourne Journal of International Law*, Vol.13, www.law.unimelb.edu.au/files/dmfile/downloaded11.pdf.

¹³ Eva Maria Jellinek, "The Impact of the Responsibility to Protect on State Behaviour: An Analysis", A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Laws Graduate Program of the Faculty of Law University of Toronto, 2012.

¹⁴ "National Security Strategy", <http://www.whitehouse.gov>, May 2010.

would change his calculus and equation¹⁵. However, even after the chemical attack in Syria on 21 August 2013, the US did not use military force against Syria. When we look at the discussions concerning any military strike on Syrian regime after the chemical attack we see that according to the US, if the military strikes do occur they ought to be limited, short term and targeted.

Despite the approach of President Obama regarding the unilateral intervention, many people are wondering about the underlying reasons of US inaction, as the humanitarian situation is getting worse day by day. Some argue that the US inaction concerning the Syria crisis is due to relative decline of US power and influence. However, when the Syria crisis is considered, this is not a sufficient explanation. The underlying reasons, factors and concerns affecting the US policy are more complicated, and most of them are interrelated.

Some of them can be specified as follows: Syria's bilateral relations with Russia, China, Iran and Iraq and their interests in the continuation of the Assad regime; lack of international consensus/legitimacy for military intervention; ineffectiveness, costs and negative impacts of a limited military strike and a large scale opposition; lack of a real political alternative to replace the current Syria regime; possibility of a power vacuum after the collapse of the Assad regime; due to any change in balance of power, the possibility of an increase in Iran's influence; anti-Americanism as a result of intervention; stability and security of the region and allies particularly the security of Israel; existence of chemical weapons; foreign fighters in Syria especially violent extremist fighters; large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons; deterioration of the humanitarian situation; US pivot to Asia; the US retrenchment policy and the priority of nation building at home; impacts of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars; and the US public opinion about a new war in Syria. According to a poll, even though eight in ten Americans believe that Assad's regime gassed its own people, a strong majority doesn't want Congress to pass a resolution authorizing a military strike against it. More than seven in ten say such a strike would not achieve significant goals for the US, and a similar amount say it's not in the national interest for the country to get involved in Syria's civil war¹⁶.

Above all, two main concerns are high on the US's political agenda regarding the Syria issue: the first one is the growing challenge of violent extremist fighters in Syria and the flow of these fighters into and out of the country,

and the second one is the lack of a real political alternative to replace the existing regime. Due to the challenge of violent extremist fighters, a top US priority in the Syria crisis is preventing the establishment of a permanent terrorist safe haven. For that reason, the US is now organizing itself and its partners to address this growing challenge. The US is also committed to helping contain the conflict by bolstering the security and stability of Syria's neighbours. Besides the security issues, the US is coordinating closely with the international community to alleviate the suffering caused by the Syria crisis. The United States is the largest single donor to the humanitarian cause, providing more than \$1.7 billion in humanitarian assistance¹⁷.

Despite the fact that the situation in Syria is not the number one priority of the US, avoiding an intervention will still affect the image and interests of the US.

Especially in the Middle East and North African countries, many people think that the intervention for prevention of humanitarian suffering is only valid if it is in the interest of the Western countries, particularly the US, not because of humanitarian situations. This leads to a perception of hypocrisy. Also, within the region, there is a consideration regarding the relative decline of US power and influence. Some believe that the US is not as powerful as it once was and could not carry out an intervention as it used to be able to. Furthermore, both due to the "US pivot to Asia" and the lack of support for some ex-authoritarian leaders like Hosni Mubarak during the Arab uprisings, many countries, particularly the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, have begun to question the credibility of the US. They believe that the US is playing a very small role in the Syria crisis, and they are suspicious of US support. Whether all these considerations are true or not, the only real truth is the importance of ending the worsening humanitarian situation in Syria immediately.

Also, due to lack of any intervention or solution, if the conflict spills over into the region and destabilizes the neighbouring countries, or if violent extremist fighters take control and Syria becomes a safe haven for them, or if sectarian issues lead to a deep polarisation among the countries or to a region-wide war, the conflict will inevitably affect the interests of the US and its allies in the region. Due to the lack of US leadership concerning the Syria crisis, the leadership void has been filled by some countries that have close relations with radical groups. Those countries' financial and military support for rebel

¹⁵ Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps, August 20, 2012, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps>.

¹⁶ "CNN poll: Public against Syria strike resolution", <http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/09/politics/syria-poll-main>.

¹⁷ Anne W. Patterson, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, "Syria After Geneva: Next Steps for U.S. Policy", Testimony, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/223971.htm, March 26, 2014,

groups affiliated with Al Qaeda will threaten US strategic interests. Also, the lack of US involvement in the region and the lack of a political will to solve the crisis can weaken US negotiating power regarding the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs. Considering all these issues, notably the humanitarian situation in Syria, something must be done either through diplomacy or intervention.

Conclusion:

The current situation in Syria is: a military stalemate, the failure of political mediation efforts and massive humanitarian suffering. The Syria crisis can be defined as the worst humanitarian disaster of our time. However, despite the worsening humanitarian situation in Syria, there is still no intention of an international intervention.

The current situation in Syria is far beyond the power of any single country including the US, but the US has the capability to play a leading role in ending the crisis in Syria. However, the possibility of a military intervention is still too low and is almost impossible.

In sum, the longer the international community fails to take action, the more the civilian population will suffer and be massacred in Syria. Also, some of the regional countries will inevitably be affected by the crisis.

A

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SAME AS IT EVER WAS? USING STRATEGIC CULTURE TO UNDERSTAND CONTEMPORARY U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

INTRODUCTION

The recent developments in Ukraine, and more specifically, Russia's accession of Crimea have once again placed Russia on the top of the international agenda and, subsequently, on the top of US Foreign Policy Makers' to-do list.

In the wake of Russia's movements along the borders of Crimea, and a referendum that resulted in an alleged astounding majority in favour of accession to Russia, the United States and its Western partners appeared shocked and helpless. Meanwhile, President Putin justified these events by drawing on comparisons with Kosovo's secession from Serbia.

These developments resulted in the culmination of tensions in US-Russian relations that had been souring over the past few years. With regard to developments in Ukraine and the secession of Crimea, the administration and foreign policy elite within the United States have acknowledged that these events were unforeseen and unexpected, "they didn't see it coming", and they appeared at a loss with regard to structuring and working towards a feasible way forward. In the meantime, the media has been quick to speculate as to whether the current crisis is symptomatic of a "New Cold

War" or a "New World Order" that is characterised by tensions between the United States and Russia.

Yet rather than pre-empting the emergence of a "New World Order" or "New Cold War", this paper will argue that these developments should be assessed within a broader historical and strategic context. Russia-US relations have long been characterised by cycles of tension, followed by efforts to re-set, re-start, or re-boot the relationship.

In order to understand these cycles, and particularly the current period in US-Russian relations, I will argue that an understanding of these two countries' strategic cultures provides a useful framework for understanding the prisms through which their strategies, policies and behaviour develop.

WHAT IS STRATEGIC CULTURE?

Whilst the notion of states having a strategic culture is not particularly new, the term itself came into popular usage following the publication of **Jack Snyder's** 1977 RAND paper entitled "The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear options".¹ Here he maintained that "neither Soviet nor American strategists are culture-free, preconception-free game theorists." He went on to argue that individuals are socialised into a particular mode of strategic thinking, which results in strategic patterns that achieve a sense of semi-permanence, and therefore can be better described as "culture" rather than policy. He therefore described strategic culture as "the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to strategy." He argued that such a culture would persist, despite the changes in circumstances that might take place. It is interesting to note that in later writings, Snyder himself argued that he felt that strategic culture was not a particularly helpful framework.

Another useful definition of strategic culture has been put forward by Colin Gray, who described strategic culture as the "milieu within which strategic ideas and defense policy decisions are debated and decided. ... an understanding of which can help explain why policy makers have made the decisions they have."² The "contextual" nature of strategic culture in the decision-making process is notable here, together of course with his assessment that an understanding of strategic culture can assist in explaining policy decisions.

¹ Jack L. Snyder "The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options" R-2154-AF, RAND, September 1977

² Colin S. Gray "National Style in Strategy – The American Example" *International Security*, Vol.6, No.2, Fall 1981, p. 22

In his work on China's strategic culture, Alastair Iain Johnston states that strategic culture is "an ideational milieu which limits behavioral choices."³ What is particularly worth highlighting here is his use of the word "limits", thus implying that strategic culture somehow constrains the way in which states assess and pursue policy options and behavior.

In the light of the assessments of strategic culture that have been put forward by such authors quoted here and others, together with my own research and findings, the definition of strategic culture that I would put forward is the following:

Strategic culture may be described as the ideas, values, beliefs and behaviour patterns regarding the continuation of politics through coercive measures that are common to members of a particular strategic community. Such a strategic culture is unique to that community and provides the lens through which strategic scenarios are perceived and policies formulated, thus conditioning strategic policy decisions taken and implemented. Strategic culture emerges as a result of the country's history, geography, politics and strategic experiences, and may be seen as the product of the political and military cultures that exist within the society in question.

Consequently, the influence of existing political and military forces may emerge to form subcultures within the broader strategic culture. Like any other aspect of culture, strategic culture is not static. It is therefore a product of not only domestic experiences and conditions, but also of the state's interaction with its external strategic environment. Strategic cultures therefore evolve and adapt to events within a continuous ebb and flow of change and continuity.

WHY STRATEGIC CULTURE?

The study of international relations abounds with theories that seek to explain the behaviour of states and their interactions with one another. Strategic theories tend to rely heavily on realist frameworks and perspectives that emphasise the ways in which national interest and power are pursued by states. Whilst the notion of strategic culture does borrow from realist frameworks in identifying such factors as determining the strategic culture and behaviour of states, realism alone is insufficient as it falls short of identifying the individual national characteristics and perspectives that are fundamental in determining the strategic culture of

states. Strategic culture theory therefore also borrows from Constructivist theories due to the fact that national interest depends also on domestic and socially constructed factors.

As will be seen in the following discussion on the strategic cultures of the United States and Russia, the particular insights that can be achieved through an understanding of their respective strategic cultures, and the interplay of the variables that make up those very strategic cultures, complement and provide added value over and above traditional International Relations theories.

USA'S STRATEGIC CULTURE

The strategic culture of the United States is one that has been remarkably consistent despite changing international developments and world order, and despite the evolved role that the United States chose to play within the international community particularly with the end of the Second World War.

Like all nations, US strategic culture is firstly shaped and determined by **geopolitical and historical considerations**. The relative "insularity" afforded by the geography of the United States, whereby it enjoys the protection of two oceans on either side, has meant that the US has tended to go to war "over there" rather than fight international wars on its own soil.⁴ The US' outlook with regard to its international role is also very much a product of the history of its political formation.

This has led to a further fundamental aspect of its strategic culture: the role played by **its identity, national beliefs and way of life**. The United States of America was founded as an alternative to the "European way", and projected itself as a bastion and protector of the greater good, a city on a hill that would serve as an inspiration for mankind and the rest of the international community. This self-perception also brought with it a sense of moral superiority that is often displayed in US Foreign Policy. The American Dream and way of life, together with the democracy that the United States so staunchly upholds, plays a central role in its strategic culture, as these factors have become vital interests that are securitised and defended, becoming one of the primary protectorates in US strategy. In fact, Lind states that "there is no interest more vital in American foreign policy and no ideal more important than the preservation of the American way of life".⁵

US strategic culture is also characterised by the presence of **subcultures**, which at times fluctuate and at others

³ Alastair Iain Johnston "Thinking About Strategic Culture" *International Security* Vol.19, No.4, Spring 1995, p.46

⁴ Bradley S. Klein "Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American power projection and alliance defense politics" *Review of International Studies* (1988) 14, p.136

⁵ Michael Lind *American Way of Strategy* (Oxford University Press, 2008) p.7

complement one another. These subcultures are the product of a number of factors, including the diversity within the United States⁶; the political subcultures that are reflected in the internationalist versus isolationist perspectives, or perhaps Mead's more nuanced Wilsonian/ Hamiltonian/ Jeffersonian/ Jacksonian framework; or the bureaucratic subcultures that prevail within the numerous departments and government agencies. Yet in a visit to the State Department hosting the SUSI National Security Policy participants, Department of Defense officials argued that the varying subcultures that prevail across the different agencies are brought together by a common belief in American freedoms.⁷

Also rooted in US geopolitical and historical considerations is the sense of **primacy** that underpins US strategic culture. The rejection of European power politics⁸ that took place with the struggle for independence at times translated into a posture of quasi-hegemony that has become innate in the United States' sense of self as well as within its national identity.

Whilst the United States has centred much of its attention on international power projection, and its political discourses fluctuate between internationalist versus isolationist tendencies, the approach that has continued to be an important feature of US strategic culture is **Multilateralism**. Particularly since the end of the Second World War, the security architecture developed and the approach utilised by the United States is one that indicates a preference for relying on international or multilateral efforts, or if that fails, coalitions of the willing.

Finally, US strategic culture and its way of war is largely characterised by an emphasis and reliance on advanced **technology**. This is also made possible by the financial resources that are made available, which in turn allow such capabilities to enhance US primacy and power projection.

RUSSIA'S STRATEGIC CULTURE

Similar to the United States, Russia's strategic culture has also remained extremely consistent, not only within a changing international environment, but also in spite of the radical domestic changes that have taken place.

Thus, the features of Russian strategic culture described below may be described as salient and continuous for the strategic cultures of Russian Federation's predecessors, that is, the Soviet Union and Imperial Russia.

Geopolitical and historical considerations play a fundamental role in shaping Russia's strategic culture, whereby these have provided the foremost reasons for which such continuity has prevailed. Donaldson and Noguee argue that "the foreign policy of Russia – whether in its tsarist, its Soviet or its democratic form – is an expression in some measure of certain relatively fixed geopolitical realities."⁹ Russia is both a European and Asiatic power, and it has always been inclined towards an expansionist outlook.

Adam Ulam describes this as the impact of the "inheritance of the past".¹⁰ It may be argued that in the light of this, a **state ideology** has emerged that is characterised by varying degrees of centralised authoritarianism. In recent years, this has evolved into the notion of "sovereign democracy", whereby Russia projected itself as a possible model for "non-Western" democracy.

Colin Gray argues that a historical memory prevails, underpinned by the fact that every subsequent generation has experienced conflict.¹¹ This, in turn, has raised the level of the nation's tolerance for war, as well as an acceptance for a stronger centralised regime.

Yet this is not to say that subcultures do not exist within Russia's strategic culture, or indeed in that of her predecessors. Tsygankov describes various strands that have characterised Russia's foreign policy over the decades – including Statist, Westernist, and Civilisationist approaches.¹² Institutional influences and variances between militarised or more political approaches have also prevailed. Perhaps one of the starkest variations that has persisted over the years is the fluctuation between a deterrent and preventive approach to war, versus the perceived need to be in preparation for war.¹³ One might argue that this shift has in part been brought about by the threat of nuclear conflict, which altered

⁶ William Kinkade "American National Style and Strategic Culture" in Carl G. Jacobsen (ed.) *Strategic Power: USA/USSR* (Macmillan, 1990) p. 13

⁷ Walter Russell Mead *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and how it changed the World* (Routledge, 2002)

⁸ Thomas G. Mahnken "U.S. Strategic and Organizational Subcultures" in Jeannie L. Johnson, Kerry M. Kartchner & Jeffrey A. Larsen (ed.) *Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Palgrave Macmillan) 2009) p.71

⁹ Robert H. Donaldson & Joseph L. Noguee *The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests* 4th Edition (M.E. Sharpe, 2009)

¹⁰ Adam Ulam *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-73* (Praeger Publishers, 1974)

¹¹ Colin S. Gray *Nuclear Strategy and National Style* (University Press of America, 1986) p.74

¹² Andrei P. Tsygankov *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006)

¹³ Colin S. Gray *Nuclear Strategy and National Style* (University Press of America, 1986) p. 68

the perception that war and victory in such confrontation is inevitable.

Russia's strategic culture is also characterised by **primacy** and power projection, and the need to be recognised as such by the rest of the international community. This primacy is underpinned by domestic considerations, in that military mobilisation reminds domestic audiences of the state's international prowess. Associated with Russia's sense of primacy is the perception that this is countered by hostility within the international community, particularly by the United States of America and the West.

Closely linked to concerns regarding its primacy, Russia has historically been inclined towards expansionist ambitions, which in the aftermath of the Second World War and again in more recent years following the dismantling of the Soviet Union, has extended into seeking **spheres of influence** or spheres of interest. Grey argues that "territorial aggrandisement has always been the Russian way"¹⁴, whilst Ulam cites the tsarist notion, "that which stops growing begins to rot".¹⁵ Such an "expansionist" outlook has always had multi-layered considerations, whereby it was political, strategic and also ethnic in scope. Thus, over the past two decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has viewed NATO's expansion along its borders with nervousness and hostility, whilst concerns over the rights and interests of ethnic Russians have time and again been expressed.

Whilst over the past decades, Russian officials have continued to speak of the importance of alliances, securing and defending the interests of partner countries, as well as the importance of multipolarity within a post-Cold War international community, Russia's foreign policy behaviour and strategic culture is marked by a greater willingness to act **unilaterally** in defence of its national interests and primacy.

Russia's strategic culture has also been influenced by **technology** and military industrial factors. In this regard, one may note the way in which Russia's strategic developments have depended on economic considerations and the restraint that this has posed on Russia's ability to develop or utilise advanced conventional capabilities. Russia has therefore been far more reliant on nuclear deterrence in the face of relatively weaker conventional capabilities.

IMPLICATIONS FOR USA'S FOREIGN POLICY?

In the light of the respective strategic cultures of the United States and Russia, and in the context of recent

developments, several questions come to the forefront. Is the United States' concern with decline inevitable? Is Russia's concern with primacy inevitable? Are these countries doomed to remain entangled as salient features of one another's grand strategy and strategic cultures? How can an understanding of their respective strategic cultures be useful in understanding current developments and working to prevent the deterioration of relations?

It is imperative that policy makers are aware of both their own strategic cultures as well as the strategic cultures of their counterparts, as this may facilitate an understanding of policy decisions that have been or are being taken, and may in turn lead to a more "conscious" decision-making process, rather than defaulting on decisions that were previously taken without a full understanding of their rationale and implications.

In recent years, the United States has become increasingly concerned by its relative decline within the international system. However, power projection and primacy will remain a key feature of US foreign policy and strategic culture, as well as in terms of the standing of the United States within the international community. The US will not shed its primacy, but rather will adjust its projection according to domestic as well as international considerations. What fluctuates and must be balanced is the focus placed on different variants of US power. In the words of Joseph Nye, the United States may utilise military, economic or cultural sources of power – or use a combination of the three – but not one at the expense of another.¹⁶

Primacy is also a salient feature of Russia's strategic culture. Power projection and concerns with regard to its real or perceived sphere of influence are not only central to its strategic culture, but fundamental to its national identity and sense of self, and any indications that these concerns appear to 'disappear' are temporary.

It is essential that US policy makers have a profound understanding of the strategic culture and perspectives within Moscow. It is not helpful to write off Russia's actions as simply irrational, aggressive and imperialistic. Having a better understanding of one's counterparts may allow for a better structured and constructive dialogue between two countries that, on the one hand, cannot afford engaging in conflict with one another, but on the other hand, would be unable to co-exist within an international system characterised by tension and aggrandisement.

¹⁴ Colin S. Gray *Nuclear Strategy and National Style* (University Press of America, 1986) p.72

¹⁵ Adam Ulam *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-73* (Praeger Publishers, 1974) p.12

¹⁶ See Joseph S. Nye Jr. *The Future of Power* (Public Affairs, 2011)

Moreover, I believe that the United States must realise the extent to which the USA is still a source of concern within Russia's foreign policy, being considered as a potential hostile nation and one that actively threatens Russia's status within the international system. Russia's strategic culture and pursuit of primacy are also characterised by a perception of hostility towards Russia within the West, and in particular, the United States.

Whilst there still remains – to a certain extent – an element of Cold War hangover within the United States, the concerns regarding Russia are by no means comparable to those concerns within Russia vis-à-vis the United States. A more realistic comparison might be made to the way in which the USA is actively concerned about China's Rise and the potential impact (benign or otherwise) that this may pose to the primacy of the United States.

In a period where US Foreign Policy appears to be characterised by international reluctance, war fatigue, and preoccupation with the possibility of its own decline, the United States cannot afford an escalation of tensions with Russia. Whilst today's Russia might not command the same political and economic clout that the Soviet Union once did, Russia remains an important regional and international power as a key energy provider and as a country that still boasts a strong nuclear arsenal. The United States must therefore manage its relations with Russia to ensure that dialogue and engagement continue to proceed constructively at a bilateral level. It must also ensure that Russia does not find itself in a position where it feels that it can act unilaterally and aggressively in the knowledge that direct confrontation is neither feasible nor likely.

An understanding of Russia's strategic culture may facilitate in understanding its policy making and rationale, and facilitate policy makers, diplomats and negotiators in coming to solutions that are in the best interest of all.



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RUSSIA'S NEW POSTURE: WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR THE BALKANS?

Abstract

The annexation of Crimea and the unfolding of the crisis in Ukraine have shown that Russia is not interested in cooperating with the West and is seeking to create its exclusive sphere of influence. This essay looks at the implications of this new posture of Russia in the Balkans, a region which is burdened by sluggish democratic progress, unresolved statehood issues, and conflictual inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations and where Russia's influence over the last few years has increased while the Euro-Atlantic integration process has stagnated. The main argument is that the assertion of Russian interests in the region, the uncertainties about the EU and NATO enlargement and the US policy of disengagement may lead to a further increase of Russian influence in the region and overall negative implications for European security. The ultimate outcome may be the stagnation or even reversal of the realization of the Western project of making the region part of the Euro-Atlantic community.

The Balkans' unfinished business - ethnic divisions and sluggish democracy

Following the intervention of the US and its European allies to stop the worst violent conflicts in Europe since the end of the Second World War, the Balkan region was given the opportunity to build a peaceful coexistence and economic development under the NATO and EU umbrella.

Building on the post-Second World War experience, the Western vision was to create multiethnic societies in the Balkans. Such a vision was enshrined in the fundamental principles of the state-building model applied in the Dayton Peace Accord in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Ohrid Framework Agreement in Macedonia, and the Ahtisaari Plan for Kosovo Status Settlement in Kosovo.¹

However, nearly fifteen years after the end of the Yugoslav conflicts, the realization of the Western vision has remained incomplete.² Apart from failing to produce any significant improvement of multiethnic relations, these frameworks have created governance problems because consensus and cooperation between the different ethnicities and religious groups, which constitute the cornerstones of these frameworks, have been missing.

In Bosnia, the different interpretations of the Dayton Accord by Bosnian, Croat, and Serb leaders are used as a means to maintain control over their political and ethnic factions and have made the country's central institutions dysfunctional, inefficient and corrupt.^{3,4}

In Macedonia, the promotion of ethnic Macedonian nationalism by the ruling VMRO-DPMNE party has worsened not only the relations between ethnic Albanian and Macedonian communities, but also the country's bilateral relations with Greece and Bulgaria.⁵ Nationalism has been the cause of Macedonia's worsened relations with Greece and Bulgaria too, making the country's EU and NATO integration process even more unpredictable.

In Kosovo, the relations between ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians have remained stagnant. Despite the political negotiations and the agreement on normalization of relations, the members of both communities do not trust each other, and people-to-people communication is very limited.⁶

¹ Woodward, Susan L. "Varieties of state-building in the Balkans: A case for shifting focus." (2011).

² Hamilton, Daniel. *Unfinished business: the Western Balkans and the International Community*. Edited by Vedran Džihic. Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2012

³ Donais, Timothy. "Power Politics and the Rule of Law in Post-Dayton Bosnia." *Studies in Social Justice* 7, no. 2 (2013): 189-210.

⁴ Bassuener, Kurt, and James Lyon. *Unfinished Business in Bosnia and Herzegovina: What Is To Be Done?*. United States Institute of Peace, 2009.

⁵ Fouéré, Erwan. "Macedonia-A country in crisis." CEPS Policy Brief 299 (2013).

⁶ 'The Citizens on the Serbian-Albanian Relations and the Regional Security Cooperation', Security Research Forum Belgrade-Prishtina-Tirana, Belgrade, October 31st 2013, pp.15, 27, 43

But nationalism has not been an increasing political trend only in the post-Yugoslav countries. In other countries of the Balkans, political parties with nationalist programs have become more and more entrenched in mainstream politics.

In Albania, nationalist rhetoric has intensified after the proclamation of Kosovo's independence.⁷ During last year's elections, the emergence of the Red and Black Alliance, which promotes the unifications of Albania and Kosovo, prompted the two mainstream political parties to increase their nationalistic rhetoric in order to avoid losing votes.⁸

In Greece, the Golden Dawn has moved from a fringe movement to becoming part of Greek mainstream politics with nearly 10% of seats in the Greek parliament.⁹ In Bulgaria the nationalist party Attack has emerged as the fourth largest party for three consecutive parliamentary elections.¹⁰

In sum, ethnic and religious divisions continue to remain deep in the Balkans, and the idea of drawing entirely new borders and creating ethnically pure states is present as a political alternative throughout the region, although the strength of political representation varies in different countries.

Apart from the sluggish progress in improving ethnic and religious relations, democracy in the region has stagnated. The average democracy score of the Western Balkans in the annual Nations in Transit rankings by Freedom House has improved only marginally, from 4.22 to 4.07, while in all key indicators, from election to civil society and judiciary, the progress achieved in the early 2000s after the fall of the authoritarian regimes has receded.¹¹ As US Foreign Secretary Kerry pointed out recently, democracy in the region is 'being threatened by corrupt, oligarchic interests that use money to stifle political opposition, buy politicians and media outlets,

and to weaken the judiciary and nongovernmental organizations'.¹²

In addition to the above, the region has failed to produce the desired outcome in terms of market reforms and progress towards EU economic governance standards. The EU Commissioner for Enlargement clearly pointed out to a forum with the region's heads of government that 'none of the Western Balkans is a functioning market economy... public deficit and debt levels have been increasing... Competitiveness is often hindered through politicization of decisions that should be market-driven'.¹³

Stagnation of Euro-Atlantic integration and increased Russian influence

The stability of the Balkans after the end the conflicts in Yugoslavia was closely linked to the Euro-Atlantic integration perspective. The realization of this policy rested on three pillars: the substantial security engagement by the US in the region, the foreseeable prospect of EU accession and support by the region's political elites of the political and territorial status quo in the region.¹⁴

However, by the mid 2000s the three pillars of Balkans stability had ceded. The US strategic attention has been concentrated on areas beyond Europe's borders, making NATO enlargement less central to Washington's foreign policy agenda.¹⁵ Enlargement fatigue and the uncertainties that appeared following the 2006 and 2009 gas crises and the ensuing Eurozone crisis¹⁶ pushed EU accession increasingly to the future. The state and nation building processes, too, have been unsteady, as discussed previously, with the statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo being questioned as the region's political elites.

From the Russian perspective, the Balkans have constituted a historically strategic area. Following a period of weaknesses and policy incoherence that was

http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/the_citizens_on_the_serbian-albanian_relations_and.pdf

⁷ Vilma Filaj-Ballvora and Zoran Arbutina, 'Dream of 'greater Albania' alive at centennial', Deutsche Welle, 28 November 2012, <http://www.dw.de/dream-of-greater-albania-alive-at-centennial/a-16409739>

⁸ The European Elections Monitor, 'What kind of majority will emerge after the Albanian general elections?' 28 May 2013.

<http://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/eem/1443-what-kind-of-majority-will-emerge-after-the-albanian-general-elections>

⁹ Antonis A. Ellinas (2013) The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece, South European Society and Politics, 18:4, 543-565

¹⁰ Popova, Maria D. "Attack and Counter-Attack: Mainstream Party-Radical Challenger Interaction in Bulgaria." Available at SSRN 2274166 (2013).

¹¹ Florian Bieber, 'The Western Balkans are Dead - Long Live the Balkans! Democratization and the Limits of the EU', Brookings Institution Press, 2012, pp.5

¹² John Kerry, Remarks at Munich Security Conference, February 1, 2014,

<http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/02/221134.htm>

¹³ Stefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, 'Speech: Investments in Western Balkans – a new approach', European Commission - SPEECH/14/156, 24/02/2014

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-156_en.htm

¹⁴ Gordon, Bardos N. "The Balkans' new political dynamic." Balcanica 37 (2006): 283-294

¹⁵ F. Stephen Larrabee, 'Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: the return of geopolitics' Journal of International Affairs. 63.2 (Spring-Summer 2010): p33.

¹⁶ John Henley, 'Is Europe's gas supply threatened by the Ukraine crisis?' The Guardian, 3 March 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/03/europes-gas-supply-ukraine-crisis-russia-pipelines>

evident during the 1990s, Russia began to restoring its presence in the Balkans after Putin's takeover as President. Russia's policy towards the Balkans through the mid 2000s, which combined diplomatic and economic tools, was considered by some as 'better developed, better coordinated and better implemented than the EU's.'¹⁷ At the end of the Black Sea summit of June 2007, President Putin took the opportunity to make clear Russia's future intentions. In essence, his message to the leaders of Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece, Moldova and Serbia, the nations participating in the summit, was to announce Russia's comeback to the Balkans and the Black Sea region. He pointed out that '...everybody knows that the Balkans and the Black Sea region were of special interest to us... Russia, with its increasing potentials, is coming back to this region. This is an obvious fact... this is in the interest of Russia but also of our partners'.¹⁸

In order to implement its policy, Russia has employed diplomatic assertiveness, economic dependence and conflict prolongation as tools to strengthen its influence, and it has relied on countries with no immediate prospect for Euro-Atlantic integration, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia,¹⁹ and on its 'traditional partners', Serbia and Montenegro.²⁰

Russia has systematically supported Serbia in blocking Kosovo's efforts to gain international recognition. It has also provided economic and financial assistance to help Serbia overcome the financial crisis and has offered to integrate Serbia in major energy projects. From 2003 to 2012, Russian investments in the Serbian economy amounted to around 2.85 billion USD.²¹ In 2012, Russia agreed to support Serbia in bailing out its budget deficit

at a cost of 300 million USD and to lend 800 million USD for railway development. In addition, Gazprom plans to invest about 2.6 billion USD for the construction of the Serbian section of the South Stream pipeline.²²

Russia's influence in Serbia has increased in the military sphere too. Despite the EU criticism, Serbia allowed Russia to build a base for so-called humanitarian operations in the city of Niš in 2011.²³ In 2013, Serbia became a permanent observer of the Collective Security Treaty Organization defense alliance and signed a defense cooperation agreement with Russia that includes the sharing of strategic information, military exchanges, and participation in military exercises.²⁴

Due to lack of international conflicts and internal problems, Russia's influence in Montenegro has consisted of increased economic presence in the key areas of the country's economic activities such as tourism, real estate and industry. During the period from 2001 until 2010, Russia has invested 568.3 million Euros in Montenegro, ranking as the top foreign investing country. In 2012, Russian companies owned 32% of the business entities in Montenegro,²⁵ while Russian politicians and billionaires own more than 40% of Montenegro's real estate.²⁶ Another area where Russian presence has increased is the tourism industry, which in 2013 accounted for 20% of Montenegro's GDP.²⁷ The number of Russian tourists has tripled over the last five years, making up nearly 30% of the total number of visitors in 2013.²⁸ More recently, as the future of its military base in Tartus is becoming uncertain due to the conflict in Syria, Russia approached the Montenegrin government, asking for permission to set up a military base in the port of Bar, the largest port in Montenegro.²⁹

¹⁷ Leonard, Mark, and Nicu Popescu. A power audit of EU-Russia relations. Vol. 9. London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2007.

¹⁸ KANLI, Yusuf. 'Russia is back', Hurriyet Daily News, 27 June 2007 <http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=russia-is-back>

¹⁹ Bugajski, Janusz. Return of the Balkans: Challenges to European Integration and US Disengagement. Army War College Carlisle Barracks Pa Strategic Studies Institute, 2013.

²⁰ Alexander Pivovarenko, 'Modern Russia in the Modern Balkans: Soft Power through Investment', Russian International Affairs Council, 23 May 2014, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=3744#top

²¹ Alexander Pivovarenko, 'Modern Russia in the Modern Balkans: Soft Power through Investment', Russian International Affairs Council, 23 May 2014, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=3744#top

²² 'A new era in Russian-Serbian relations?', The Economist Intelligence Unit, 12 September 2012, <http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=939550278&Country=Serbia&topic=Politics>

²³ 'Russia opens humanitarian base in Serbia', Euractiv 18 October 2011, <http://www.euractiv.com/enlargement/russia-opens-humanitarian-base-s-news-508382>

²⁴ 'Russia, Serbia Sign Military Pact', RFE/RL's Balkan Service, November 13, 2013

<http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-serbia-military-pact-25167365.html>

²⁵ Jasna Jusic, 'Worldwide: Russia's Presence in Montenegro: What It Means for Trademark Owners', 26 September 2012

<http://www.mondaq.com/x/198546/Trademark/Russias+Presence+In+Montenegro+What+It+Means+For+Trademark+Owners>

²⁶ Haris Stefanatos, 'Ukrainian crisis: Montenegro between NATO and Russia', Independent Balkan News Agency, 24 March 2014, <http://www.balkaneu.com/ukrainian-crisis-montenegro-nato-russia/>

²⁷ 'Travel & Tourism, Economic Impact 2014 Montenegro', World Travel & Tourism Council,

http://www.wttc.org/site_media/uploads/downloads/montenegro2014.pdf

²⁸ 'Montenegro's tourism statistics cite Russia and Serbia as top markets', TTG Balkans, 29 August 2013,

<http://www.ttg balkans.com/tourism-boards/item/835-montenegro%E2%80%99s-tourism-statistics-cite-russia-and-serbia-as-top-markets.html>,

²⁹ Podgoritsa correspondent, 'Government refuses Russia's request to set up a military base in Montenegro', Independent Balkan News Agency, 20 December 2013

<http://www.balkaneu.com/government-refuses-russias-request-set-military-base-montenegro/#sthash.4ZPqIT8u.dpuf>

Besides Serbia and Montenegro, Russia has increased its influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, considered as 'prospective partners'.³⁰

Russia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have no agreements on mutual protection of investment and double taxation, nor do they have a bilateral free trade agreement. However, Russia has developed close relations with the Republika Srpska by providing its political leaders with support to resist handing over more powers to the central government in Sarajevo and to maintain the secessionist perspective of the entity.³¹ In the investment sphere the Russian state-owned oil firm Zarubezhneft has bought the majority of the shares of Republika Srpska's refineries and retail chains for a total of 125.8 million Euros and pledged to invest another 600-700 million Euros to modernize its oil industry.³² More recently, Republika Srpska announced that it is negotiating a loan of nearly 300 million Euros from Russia, to replace the need to borrow from the IMF and to avoid the IMF's political conditions.³³

In Macedonia, the blocked EU membership processes since 2005 and blocked NATO membership processes since 2008 have provided Russia with opportunities to expand its influence. Russia has contributed to promoting the view that Albanian nationalists are seeking to undermine Macedonia's sovereignty and territorial integrity,³⁴ so Russia can guarantee the defense of Macedonian interests against Albanian separatism and Islamic radicalism.³⁵ In terms of investments, Russia has not featured as prominently as in the other countries discussed above. In 2013 Russian direct investment in Macedonia was only 12 million dollars, although this was considerably higher than in previous years.³⁶

In addition to investments in individual countries, Russia has invested in major regional projects too. In summer

2012, the Russia Sberbank acquired for 505 million Euros the Austrian Oesterreichische Volksbanken AG banking group, acquiring thus a network of banks in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia.³⁷

But the largest Russian project that has sparked major contradictions between Russia and the EU and that is expected to further increase Russian influence in the Balkan region and beyond is the South Stream pipeline.³⁸ The South Stream project, which will cost 20 billion USD to be built, is the centerpiece of Russia's strategy which seeks to secure Russia's position as the EU's principal gas supplier. The South Stream will bypass Ukraine and at the same time will compete with the alternative European energy network, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which will link Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Europe.³⁹ Bulgaria and Serbia are the two most important Balkan countries for the implementation of the project, but Russia has promised to extend branches of the South Stream to Macedonia and to Republika Srpska too.⁴⁰

The implications of increased Russian influence and the Western response

As evidence shows, Russia has been able to increasingly assert its position in the Balkan region. The unambiguous reaction of some of the countries of the region in support of the Russian annexation of Crimea and against the EU sanctions show that Russia has been able to convert its increased economic influence into political support, even when it has openly violated international law.

The president of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, was among the very few politicians to congratulate Putin on the annexation of Crimea. Dodik took this opportunity to remind the world about his secessionist ambitions and pointed that 'we are observing world events very closely, and we will follow the best examples from the world once the time for that comes'.⁴¹

³⁰ Alexander Pivovarenko, 'Modern Russia in the Modern Balkans: Soft Power through Investment', Russian International Affairs Council, 23 May 2014, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=3744#top

³¹ Bugajski, Janusz. Return of the Balkans: Challenges to European Integration and US Disengagement. Army War College Carlisle Barracks Pa Strategic Studies Institute, 2013. pp.137

³² 'Russia-owned Bosnian Oil Refinery Reopens', Balkan Insight 27 November 2008, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/russia-owned-bosnian-oil-refinery-reopens>

³³ Elvira M. Jukic, 'Bosnian Serbs Seek Russian Loan to Replace IMF' Balkan Insight, 3 April 2014 <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/russian-credit-to-replace-the-imf-in-republika-srpska>

³⁴ Malek, Martin. "The Russian Return to the Western Balkans." Austrian Federal Ministry of Defense. Vienna: 2008, pp.136.

³⁵ Bugajski, Janusz. Return of the Balkans: Challenges to European Integration and US Disengagement. Army War College Carlisle Barracks Pa Strategic Studies Institute, 2013. pp.139

³⁶ Alexander Pivovarenko, 'Modern Russia in the Modern Balkans: Soft Power through Investment', Russian International Affairs Council, 23 May 2014, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=3744#top

³⁷ Sberbank Buys Volksbank International for 505 Mln Euros', RIA Novosti, 16 February 2012 <http://en.ria.ru/business/20120216/171341558.html>

³⁸ Victor Avramov, 'The Contradictions between Brussels and Moscow over South Stream', Risk Management Lab, 2014, http://riskmanagementlab.com/en/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/news/contradictions_about_south_stream.pdf

³⁹ Ratner, Michael. Paul Belkin, Jim Nichol, Steven Woehrel, 'Europe's Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversification', 20 August 2013, Congressional Research Service, Report R42405, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42405.pdf>

⁴⁰ South Stream gas pipeline progressing on schedule, PennEnergy, April 28, 2014, <http://www.pennenergy.com/articles/pennenergy/2014/04/south-stream-gas-pipeline-progressing-on-schedule.html>

⁴¹ Branka Mihajlovic and Robert Coalson, 'Crimea Dispute Tests Serbian Government's Middle Course', Radio Free Europe 25 March

Wahhabi movements,⁵³ but also Turkey, which over the last decade has competed to emerge as a new power in the Balkan region.⁵⁴ The instability of the Balkans would have negative consequences for all of Southeastern Europe. As has been the case in the past, problems in Southeastern Europe have become wider European problems, and European problems sooner or later will become problems for American security interests.⁵⁵

In order to deal with the complexity of these problems, the focus of the US and its European allies must be on renewing the credibility of the Euro-Atlantic integration process. However, given the challenges that the EU is facing and the complicated membership process, NATO enlargement may be easier to deliver. NATO credibility remains high in the Balkans and could be further strengthened by inviting Montenegro and Macedonia to join the Alliance in the upcoming Summit in Cardiff in September 2014. Both countries have met the membership criteria, but NATO has been reluctant to invite Montenegro due to the low popular support and Macedonia due to the Greek veto over the name dispute. The invitation of Macedonia must show NATO's determination to give priority to the broader European security, rather than disputes that can be resolved bilaterally. The US military presence in Kosovo should also be maintained, as the establishment of Kosovan armed forces has not been concluded yet, and their effectiveness will be a long term challenge.⁵⁶

The US has a crucial role to play as the only factor that can ensure the convergence of the EU and NATO efforts. As the Montenegrin Prime Minister Đukanović recalled recently, 'the Western Balkans made progress until the US was leading the international efforts... but things became complicated when the US attention moved elsewhere'.⁵⁷

⁵³ Bardos, Gordon N. "Iran in the Balkans." *World Affairs* 175, no. 5 (2013): 59-66.

⁵⁴ Petrović, Žarko, and Dušan Reljić. "Turkish Interests and Involvement in the Western Balkans: A Score-Card." *Insight Turkey* 13, no. 3 (2011).

⁵⁵ Gordon, Bardos N. "The Balkans' new political dynamic." *Balkanica* 37 (2006): 283-294

⁵⁶ Ivana Jovanovic and Safet Kabashaj, 'A debate on the future Kosovo army' *Southeast European Times*, 9 May

2014, http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/blogreview/2014/05/09/blog-04

⁵⁷ 'Webcast: Montenegro's Moment: Moving Forward with NATO', A discussion with Milo Đukanović, Prime Minister of Montenegro, Atlantic Council, Washington 8 April 2014 <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/events/webcasts/webcast-montenegro-s-moment-moving-forward-with-nato>



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THE DECLINE OF U.S. POWER: PERCEPTION OR REALITY?

The topic of the decline of the US power has become a matter of intense debates and discourse among politicians and experts in the field of IR. Some argue that the decline of US influence is overstated, while another group of scientists outlines some facts which can be regarded as proof of the US decline and the transition of the world system to multipolarity.

What is power? Can we regard the definition of power in the 21st century, in the globalized world, from the same classical angle that lots of scientists did in previous centuries? Or do we need to revise the classical approach to the notion of power, and how it should be kept? Moises Naim, in his book *The End of Power*, gives the following definition: "Power is ability to direct or prevent the current or future actions of other groups and individuals."¹ Often, *hegemony, power and influence* are confused by experts and analytics. Ian MacMillan laid out in his book *Strategy Formulation: Political Concepts* the conceptual framework of power and influence. Both power and influence can change the behavior of others, or make others do something or stop them from doing something. But influence seeks to change the perception of the situation, not the situation itself. On the other hand, power includes not only the actions to change the situation, but also actions that alter the way the situation is perceived. Thus, we can say

that influence is a form of power, but power can be exercised through means other than influence².

Another notion that is actively being articulated in academic and political fields is a notion of *hegemony* and the decline of US hegemony. What is hegemony? According to Edmund Clingan, "Hegemony in a power system means an overwhelming dominance such that the country can regularly get its way...Hegemony is achieved when the largest economy is far larger and is also larger than the next three combined. Hegemony does not mean control. Never has even the strongest hegemon held total control or gotten everything it wanted."³

Very often, the decline of US hegemony, power or influence is regarded as the same thing, without being differentiated. Power and influence are constituent and indispensable parts of hegemony. But these two ingredients of hegemony have different levels of influence on the recent one. The decline of influence, from our perspective, does not necessarily mean the decline of hegemony, while the decline of power brings the downfall of hegemony. The decline of power usually brings systematic changes in the system, which can transform it or collapse it. While the decline of influence can change some elements of the system and create a new configuration of power, this doesn't necessarily change the nature of the given system.

In the 21st century, it is easy to gain power, but it is difficult to keep it. It mostly depends on one's methods of exercising the power. There are lots of constraints for conducting power, which means that to have power and to have the ability to use it are not the same thing. Power always depends on context, and here we should clearly separate power of resources and power of behavior. Power can be exercised in different ways: coercion, obligation, persuasion and inducement. The ability to use power of resources to get what you want or to translate it into the power of behavior is one of the key indicators of a powerful state. The US has a power of resources, but whether this power has been effectively translated into the power of behavior, or has given the US ability to get what it wants, are disputable. And here we face the problem of perception of the US decline. As Bruce W. Jentleson points out, "...in terms of baseline measures, the United States still is the most powerful nation in the world, but what is missed, it is power-influence gap – that the possession of the resources of power is not bringing commensurate capacity to exert influence over other international actors or ensure favorable policy outcomes. The capability-utility gap

¹ Moises Naim. *The End of Power*//New York, 2013, p.16.

² Ian MacMillan. *Strategy Formulation:Political Concepts*. 1978.

³ Edmund Clingan. *Twilight's Last Gleaming: American Hegemony and Dominance in the Modern World*. New York, 2013, p.2.

between military superiority as traditionally measured and the utility of that superiority for achieving strategic objectives was all too graphically demonstrated in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars."⁴

There are debates and discussions among US scholars and policymakers on the US decline, but less attention is given to the perception of the US decline within new emerging or rising powers, and how these countries' perception of the US decline influences their political behavior. The perception or misperception of the reality can be no less important for experts than the observation of the reality itself. These rising powers' perception of the US decline could create the reality that they envisioned through their perceived actions. Thus, when we are asking the question of whether the US decline is a reality or not, we should also ask the second question, how others perceive that reality and how they translate their perceptions into actions.

According to a poll conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2013, a majority of the American population thought that the US was losing its influence in the world. An even larger majority said that the U.S. is losing respect internationally. Fully 70% said that the United States is less respected than in the past, which nearly matches the level reached late in former President George W. Bush's second term (71% in May 2008). Early last year, fewer Americans (56%) thought that the U.S. had become less respected globally⁵.

Both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, despite differences in their foreign policies and their visions of the US's global role, ruled in an America-centric, unipolar world. They felt very comfortable and confident in exercising US power both through coercive and persuasive measures. They really believed that the US was the only superpower and had to take responsibility to preserve international security, order and stability by promoting democracy and liberalizing the world. And this belief was quite natural, because the world system itself allowed the US to think and act in that way.

During George W. Bush's presidency, the balance between the coercive and persuasive methods of conducting power was shifted in favor of the first one, which put under question the legitimacy of the coercive diplomacy of the US, which in turn had negative repercussions for US soft power and hegemony. Many

argue that wars in Iraq and Afghanistan proved the limits of military power, stretched the US beyond its capacities, and weakened the nation at its core. Some even compare the United States to the British Empire at the end of nineteenth century, with the Iraq and Afghanistan wars serving as the equivalent of Britain's difficult and demoralizing Boer War⁶.

During the George W. Bush presidency we saw the inability of the US in different instances to translate its military power or resource power into power of behavior. The US easily overthrew Saddam Hussein's government and the Taliban in Afghanistan using its power of resources, but it could not manage to translate it into political victory. The US is the world's leading economy and has very advanced and professional institutions and economic power, which unfortunately couldn't prevent the economic crises of 2008. The US often violates international norms (drone attacks, invasion of Iraq, humanitarian interventions), thus reducing the legitimacy of the use of its power. The US was behind the creation of international institutions, but we often see US inconsistency towards them, which weakens the institutional bases of the current world order. All of the aforementioned factors have influence on the perception of other rising powers and make them think about the new world order.

Regarding Obama's foreign policy, some experts describe it as retrenchment, which always raises doubts about the future of American power, which is vehemently disputed by the Obama administration. Obama's vision of retrenchment is laid out in many of his speeches, in which he points out that now is the time to focus on nation-building at home. Obama's foreign policy team had long vehemently disputed the idea that United States was losing its grip on global leadership.

But is the policy of retrenchment an indicator of the decline of US power? After WWII, the US had presidents whose retrenchment policies turned into more active diplomacy and engagement in world politics. Retrenchment is not new in US history. It can be seen as sort of a pendulum. The US stays aloof, then it get dragged into a conflict, it overdoes it, and then it tries to retrench. Maybe there is a cycle here. Clinton after the collapse of the bipolar world order essentially reduced the military expenditure of the country and tried to get more involved in solving domestic issues, but eventually,

⁴ Bruce W. Jentleson. Strategic Recalibration: Framework for a 21-st Century National Security Strategy//The Washington Quarterly, Volume 37, Spring 2014, p.118.

⁵ *Public Sees U.S. Power Declining as Support for Global Engagement Slips America's Place in the World 2013*<http://www.people-press.org/2013/12/03/public-sees-u-s-power-declining-as-support-for-global-engagement-slips/>

⁶ Robert Kagan. *The World America Made*. New York, 2012, p.102.

the retrenchment policy turned into an active engagement in Balkan crises. George W. Bush, after taking his office, even criticized the active military engagement of Clinton's administration, but then had to use the US resource power to combat terrorism, and therefore invaded Iraq and Afghanistan.

Regarding Obama's retrenchment policy, it should be mentioned that if that policy is not followed by a new strategy of how to keep US power in the changing world order, we can consider it a decline of US influence. But if the main purpose of the retrenchment is some kind of a pause to evaluate the US post-bipolar strategy, to understand advantages and disadvantages, to perceive whether the world is really changing, and if yes to what extent, to assess the challenges of the new world order and to elaborate the new US grand strategy to lead this transformation, then it should not be regarded as a decline of US power, but rather as the strength of the US to understand the changing nature of the world system and to elaborate a clear vision of the future, in which the US can preserve its power and play the leading role. Even if the transformation is not clear and measurable, this doesn't mean that it is not taking place; it is of vital interest to the US, and to rising powers, to have a clear strategy for the future world order in advance. The decline of US power or hegemony is not only a matter of prestige, but may also pose serious threats and challenges to the stability and security of the world system. From history, we know that the shift of power from one hegemon to another has always led to turbulences and major wars in IR. Thus, the US, as a main provider of international security and peace, should take on that responsibility in order to minimize possible negative repercussions for the international system, even, to reiterate, if it is not clear in which direction we are moving now.

The US is the only military and economic superpower in the world, its military budget nearly five times more than the second power, China. The US is the largest economy, even though China is developing rapidly and according to different analytical dates may overcome the US by 2020-2025. So we can say that the US continues to be a superpower, but its influence is decreasing because of its inability to use its power resources to get what the US wants, to convert it into power of behavior. The rising powers, in most cases assess, the US power of behavior rather than power of resources and tend to build their foreign policy based on that assessment.

What should be the future US grand strategy or vision? From our perspective, US foreign policy should be based on following principles:

1. Elaboration of effective mechanisms of cohesion between the US's power of resources and power of behavior.
2. Elaboration of a new model of the management of relations with great powers. The US should be actively engaged with them. On major international issues, these countries hold opposing positions to the US approach may and try to counterbalance the US by making coalitions.
3. Taking into account the above mentioned issue, the US should focus more on "partnership diplomacy." It is in the US interest to be more purposeful and persuasive with the rising powers and share with them the burden of responsibilities. US policy towards the regional leaders should be based on their socialization into the current world order, in which, from our perspective, the US should put more emphasis on its soft power and recognize its interests in other regions to a reasonable extent. The US pivot to Asia should not be regarded as a threat to rising China, otherwise it may push China to resent the US and make China more reluctant to participate in the world system. The US's new partnership relations with Vietnam and the Philippines, as well as traditional alliances with South Korea and Japan, should not be developed at the expense of relations with China.
4. The US, through socialization of the regional powers, should create strong regional sub-systems, oriented towards the liberal world order; in case the current world system is transformed or collapses, these regional sub-systems can either preserve the current liberal order or minimize the negative implications of that transformation. To which extent the rising powers might be interested in preservation of the current world system depends also on future US policy. The US should use the rising powers' potential to strengthen the current liberal order. To achieve that purpose, the US should show the rising powers how they can benefit from maintaining the current world order and that US dominance is not directed against their rise.

The United States should strengthen current international institutions through reforms and codification of international law. Stronger institutions and rules may constrain the ambiguity of new rising powers and legitimize the US power of behavior. Violations of international norms from the US can create a precedent for the rising powers to bypass international law in pursuit of their own national interest. It is even more dangerous in the 21st century, when rising powers feel that they have the capacity to pursue their own national interests

through violation of international norms, very often referencing US actions. That is why the Obama Administration should put more emphasis on multilateralism, trying to solve international issues with regional powers through multilateral mechanisms, which means maintaining US global leadership through multilateralism.

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STEER INTO THE SKID – AMERICA'S BURDEN SHARING PROBLEM IN ASIA

This essay argues that the primary challenge the United States faces in Asia is not a lack of leadership in responding to the rise of China but rather the need to establish burden sharing amongst US allies. Solving the US's burden-sharing problem by having its allies and partners step up their diplomatic, economic and military capacity is of fundamental importance for peacefully managing the rise of China. It will also substantially help the rebuilding effort the Obama administration has been trying to pursue at home. Instead of fighting the skid it finds itself in, it should accept the necessity of change and use this moment to calmly regain control in a way that is more integrated yet less vulnerable long term. This essay will begin by outlining the challenge posed by China's rise and then detail why getting US allies to bear the burden of responding to Beijing is in the interests of the region and the USA.

In 1949 while the Berlin blockade raged there was a major debate between the US diplomat George Kennan and Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Both men were committed to rejecting Soviet assertiveness in Europe and deeply worried about the weakness of their European allies and partners. Kennan wanted a strategy that would shake the region out of its dependence upon the US. Acheson worried that unless American commitment was unshakable Western Europe could not resist the Soviets. Acheson won the argument and 'Containment' became a doctrine of expanded US presence across the globe.

In 2014 questions are again being raised about the US responding to another assertive great power, this time the emergence of China in Asia. By far the most popular view amongst policymakers and scholars is that Acheson's approach still holds, with American security dependent upon demonstrating 'leadership' and 'reassurance' to its allies'. Before the US once again seeks to carry the can for its allies, it is worth considering Kennan's cautions and alternate approach.

During the Cold War US politicians kept looking for allies to help. Yet when they found them weak-willed or incapable, they tended to grumble and then absorb much of the cost and risks. Acheson's logic was strong, and history seems to have borne out his approach. In Europe in the late 1940s the US faced weak allies and a strong threat. Neither of these conditions is true in Asia today. This has significant implications for American strategic policy in the region. It calls into question all elements of US strategy, most notably Washington's willingness to accept the burden for the region's security public goods — from crisis negotiation to open sea lanes—on behalf of its allies and partners.

China is not the USSR version 2.0

Given the rise of China is the most discussed news story of the twenty-first centuryⁱ, it is hardly surprising that some analysts view it akin to the post-Second World War emergence of the USSR. Yet while both states began life with a communist rebellion, the similarities are few. China today has been capitalist longer than it has been communist. It has spent decades reforming its economy to establish deep integration into the international economy, even to the point of allowing – admittedly small – daily fluctuations in its currencyⁱⁱ. Recent scholarship has demonstrated that China has steadily aligned its behaviour and internal structures with international norms such as on the use of force, non-proliferation, climate change and economic policy^{iv}. It may not be a liberal democratic member of the international order, but its trade-oriented economy makes it dependent upon the overall stability of the world economy. This is fundamentally different from the USSR in 1945.

In military terms China has focused substantial spending (though kept close to 2% of its GDP) on defensive capabilities known as A2/AD (Anti-Area/Access Denial) that enable it to protect its coastline and —at best— make aggressive moves against Taiwan and some nations in the South China Sea. Chinese military spending however remains around 1/6th of what the US spends and has been spending for well over a decade. Where the US military has honed and refined its equipment, tactics and doctrine in literally dozens of

conflicts around the world in the last few decades, China has more often used its military as a domestic (and political) police force than in the field. It also spends more on internal security than it does on the military.^v China maintains a reserve supply of around three hundred nuclear weapons, but has adopted a no-first use principle. Over the next ten to twenty years, China will remain a regional power, not a global challenger to the US.

A major reason for this internal focus – along with historical and cultural tradition – is that China is beset with major internal problems. It has violent non-state actors in its remote western regions, increasingly powerful businessmen in its cities and in-between a massive aging population which accepts the rule of the Communist Party on the basis of continued high economic growth and improving living standards. This 'model' of authoritarian state capitalism has led some to worry about a 'Beijing Consensus' that other states will seek to emulate. But the origins of this approach can be traced to the 'Asian Tigers' which were encouraged to move in this direction by the US. With China struggling to articulate and implement a coherent approach at home, the ideological challenge China presents the US is minor.

None of this is to say that one day China could not become a serious challenger to the US. It has an aggressive tendency that all too often comes out when dealing with countries it thinks weaker than it (such as its announcement of an Air-Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in early 2014). With 1.4 billion people and in time the world's largest economy it will certainly have the capacity. It's just that there's little risk a true threat will emerge in the next two decades and not enough evidence that it will ever occur. Rather than acting as a challenger, China seems to be acting akin to a release valve, letting the air out of US leadership and authority. Beijing's success and actions encourages unfree and partly free states to delay and pause their progression on the path towards a liberal, capitalist, democratic order. China's preference is not for mini-Chinas but nearby states that are stable and reliable in order to provide China the economic supports it needs for its own in-house projects.

In short, China is not seeking to be, nor capable in the medium term of being a strong threat to the US. Yet unfortunately America has seemingly granted China membership of the global power club. The 2011 'pivot' to Asia is the ultimate sign of China having made it as a great power on par with the US. Likewise celebrated one-on-one summits between the two nations' leaders (such as at Sunnylands in 2013) help to firmly embed the image of an emerging G-2. This has emboldened

China at a global level, encouraging discussion of US decline (now that at least one other nation has seemingly 'caught-up') and led the US to underestimate and actively retard the capacity of the rest of Asia to respond.

Asia in 2014 is not Europe in 1949

One reason China is not a true global power is because it can't count on allies or partners around the world to assist it. Indeed it can barely gain help within its neighbourhood. The imbalance of alliances/partnerships of Asian countries in favour of the US is so stark it is easily overlooked. China has no allies or strategic partners of merit. The two states closest to the mark are Pakistan and North Korea. Both are weak, often fractious and show little capacity for supporting Chinese influence. They are more likely to force China to help them than offering any political, economic or military support. Further afield analysts have found little evidence China's massive aid spending is buying it any meaningful influence in the foreign policy choices of Asia's capitals, even in the poorest areas^{vi}.

By comparison the United States has alliances and strategic partners with almost all the top ten military spenders in Asia (India — who the US is courting — is the only notable exception). The US has alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia and Thailand and emerging military relationships with a number of other significant and growing countries.

Yet these military alliances are not delivering the US the security assistance it might expect. None of these countries spend anything close to what they should to seriously contribute to keeping the region peaceful and prosperous. Japan is constitutionally limited to spending only 1% of its GDP. Australia has promised increases, but more often delivered cuts to its defence budget over the last decade. South Korea is understandably focused on North Korea, but only spends 2.5% of its GDP. Southeast Asian countries, while undertaking some recent modernizations, are still decades away from capable military protection of their own region.

Critically however, this 'weakness' is by choice, not circumstance. South Korea, Japan, Singapore and Australia are all stable, peaceful and prosperous. Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines might have their challenges, but like other states in the region, they have barely contributed to the regional management of peace and prevention of war. US allies are not weak by nature but rather in a state of atrophy induced by US policy. No wonder some American policy makers – once they've left office – are willing to describe this behaviour as free-riding^{vii}. It is.

Whose choice was this weakness? Washington's. Thanks to US troop build ups as parts of the Second World War and Cold War, along with US failure to retrench, the US has an extensive presence in Asia. There are nearly 30,000 American troops in South Korea, over 20,000 on the Japanese island of Okinawa. In recent years this has been extended with increased agreements for basing in Australia and Singapore and exploration of new facilities with Vietnam and the Philippines. Meanwhile further out into the Pacific can be found US PACOM in Guam and Hawaii, which host well over a hundred thousand troops, hundreds of ships and several major fleets of aircraft. Along with troops, time and again whenever the region has had a problem the US has been willing to step in and provide leadership and structures. For over sixty years in Asia the US has carried the can for its allies, involving itself in everything from seeking to constrain North Korea and protecting sea lanes for trade through to major humanitarian and disaster relief.

Thus we see the US has two faulty judgements underpinning its policy in Asia. China is not a strong opponent and American allies are not weak. The essence of Obama's pivot however is to re-apply Acheson's approach by having the US again seek to provide leadership and presence on behalf of its allies. Though useful in Europe in 1949 it risks being counter-productive in Asia today.

Steering into the Skid: Why the US needs to fix its burden-sharing problem

This section will outline the reasons why the Pivot is not working, and is actually making Asia and in turn the US less secure. There are three primary reasons. First it increases the risk of tension and conflict between the great powers. Second it decreases the likelihood of a regional solution emerging. Third and finally the US is unlikely to be able to implement the policy long term.

First, a heavy US presence in Asia is increasing the risk of a military conflict with China. The recognition of Asia's importance by the US has elevated China and given it a new authority. While scholars note the many limitations and difficulties China faces, US policy has effectively granted China entry to the great powers club without question. Yet this decision and continued US presence also turn many of Asia's regional problems into great power questions. North Korea's nuclear proliferation, cybersecurity, trade agreements, even which multilateral forums are pre-eminent are now increasingly viewed through the lens of how particular outcomes are a victory for the US or China. This in turn raises the importance of these issues, reducing the chance of successful negotiation.

The dispute over the South China Sea is a useful case study here. The view that the US was supporting the small players against China has delayed and reduced any chance of establishing a multilateral norm for the issue. China is less willing to compromise as it looks like it is bowing to Washington. US support for the claimants (such as the Philippines and Japan) has encouraged their national leaders to avoid compromise and express increasingly hostile rhetoric towards China. Thus both sides are acting in ways that increase the chance of a clash. Ironically, those calling for more diplomacy between the giants may for this reason be increasing the chance of war. This focus is increasingly locking Beijing and Washington into seeing the world as a bipolar, competitive environment at the same time it is giving a free pass to several smaller countries to confront China in the belief the US is supporting them.

Second, thanks to US willingness to carry the burden, Asian countries have not done enough politically or militarily to adequately respond to China's rise. Just as US presence increases tension, it also decreases the chance of a regional solution. On the military side of the equation as noted above, many Asian countries are not spending sufficiently to balance China or ward off its (limited but real) threats. Beijing rightly fears being encircled by a number of countries in Asia, yet there is little likelihood of this occurring in a way that substantively checks Chinese power while the regional countries can offload the task to Washington.

Moving towards such a regional burden sharing will not be easy. The tension between China and Japan threatens to spiral into an active security dilemma. Likewise there are already fears of an arms race developing in Asia.^{viii} However, part of the problem is the type of spending we are seeing and the lack of a justification — beyond hedging regional instability. If the US could begin to get allies such as Tokyo, Seoul and Canberra to help provide some of the regions' public goods — especially protection of sea lanes of communication— it would help the US step back while also benefiting China's own security concerns. By giving a regional rather than conflictual purpose to the military spending that Asian countries are increasingly able to undertake, Beijing will have less reason to respond in kind, just avoiding a spiralling action-reaction armament pattern.

Perhaps more important than military burden sharing is the political, economic and social links that need to be built. Asian countries have also not responded seriously enough to China's rise diplomatically. The liberal order that has served them so well is still seen as a US order, rather than something the regional countries need to work together with China to sustain for a new century.

Japan and South Korea indulge nationalist movements aimed either at each other or China, rather than seeking a form of regional organisation that can defray tension and help them manage pressing economic and security questions (especially what to do about North Korea). Southeast Asia has insisted its regional forum the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is in the 'driving seat' of any long term political change, yet it has little internal agreement about what that change should look like. Meanwhile in Australia there seems a blithe dismissal that any problem exists at all. The Australian government swings between assuming the US can deal with the problem on its own, or that China will simply realise the error of its ways, back down and liberalise its politics and economy in short order. So on both the military and especially diplomatic scales, the investment by Asian countries to resolve an Asian problem (a rising regional power) has been simply far too little. US policy to leave troops in Asia after the Cold War and by pivoting or 'rebalancing' back in 2011 (while protesting they'd never actually left) has simply encouraged this approach.

Finally, real doubts must be held as to how capably the US can implement its policy long term. Washington needs time to get its financial house in order, rest its troops (and public) and think carefully through its strategies such that if a real military threat from China should emerge, the US will be in a place to respond to it. By carrying the burden of its allies, the US is preventing these changes from occurring. The Obama administration, led by a President who grew up in Asia is as committed to the region as anyone could hope for, and yet its focus has consistently been half-hearted and questioned. An administration famous for its eloquent language has signally failed to explain what it is trying to do in Asia (exemplified by the switch from calling it a 'pivot' to a 'rebalance'). It has been easily distracted by the Middle East and Europe, and it has struggled to implement any administrative, force structure or financial changes that might lock in the policy long term. Just as worryingly, by failing to pause

and rebuild at home, the pivot prevents the US gaining the economic strength and social resilience which it would need should it find itself forced to participate in a bloody full scale conflict in Asia.

A new approach is therefore needed. One which accepts the current challenges to US power, works to prevent conflict in Asia while better preparing for the risk should it one day occur. Instead of trying to simply accelerate through the difficulties as many are calling for, the US should steer into the skid and use the moment to conceive a long term structure. A strategic policy and culture which assumes that 'more US leadership' is always and everywhere the answer is unsustainable and in Asia's case, unnecessary. Unlike Europe in 1949, US allies are strong. Or at least could be if the US requires them to be.

Conclusion

This essay is not a call for US isolationism or abandonment of Asia. But it is an argument that the US's fundamental problem in Asia is not China but the unwillingness of the US's Asian allies to provide the regions' public goods in the security and diplomatic spheres. This unwillingness is not a matter of capacity but a weakness of will that has been created and indulged by the US. While US dominance created half a century of peace in Asia, today it is leading to three major problems. First, while it continues great power tension in Asia will continue to rise. Second, regional military and diplomatic solutions to the current situation will not be pursued as effectively as they could so long as it continues. Finally, so long as this is continued the US is prevented from adequately re-building at home and preparing in case there is a future conflict.

Like 1949, the US has a problem with its allies when facing an assertive great power. But this time when its allies are strong and the threat far less significant, the US should reconsider George Kennan's approach and work to substantially share the burden of responding to China. Not only can the US's allies in Asia do so, it represents the best hope for the successful management of China's rise this century.

ⁱ For example, Robert Kagan and Ted Piccone, *Reassert U.S. Leadership of a Liberal Global Order* Brookings Institute, 2014 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/us-leadership-liberal-global-order-kagan-piccone>; Bruce Jones, *Still ours to Lead*, Washington, Brookings Institution Press, 2014.

ⁱⁱ Michael Beckley, 'China's Century? Why America's edge will endure', *International Security*, 36(3), 2011, 41-78, p.41.

ⁱⁱⁱ Wei Lingling, 'China allows wider currency fluctuation', *The Wall Street Journal*, 15 March 2014, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303546204579440813396189476>

^{iv} Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, *China, the United States, and Global Order*, New York, Cambridge, 2011.

^v Ben Blanchard and John Rutwich, 'China hikes defence budget, to spend more on internal security', *Reuters* Beijing, March 5 2013, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/05/us-china-parliament-defence-idUSBRE92403620130305>

^{vi} Evelyn Goh, *Rising China's influence in Developing Asia*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Forthcoming.

^{vii} Christopher Joye, 'Richard Armitage: Why the free ride on US must stop' *The Australian Financial Review*, 19 August 2013 http://www.afr.com/p/national/richard_armitage_why_the_free_ride_Ls2RbuicUlrdrvWzJgKcM8H

^{viii} Geoffrey Till, *Asia's Naval Expansion: An arms race in the making?*, Adelphi 432-433, 2012



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THE U.S. IN ASEAN'S PERSPECTIVE UNDER THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

Abstract

The past few years have witnessed the flourished development of ASEAN - U.S. relations, from "being neglected" in the 1990s to being elevated to a new level of strategic partnership. Since the first Obama Administration, due to the risk of changing the security architecture in the region, the U.S. has implemented the policy of "Pivot to Asia", mainly focusing on the East/South Asia regions. In general, ASEAN wants more rather than less U.S. engagement in the region; however, ASEAN is wise enough to not apply the traditional balance-of-power theory of balancing against or bandwagoning with a great power in this context. As an association of ten small to medium sized countries, ASEAN's perspective towards the U.S. has been influenced by the U.S.'s foreign policy regarding the region, ASEAN's desire for relations with the U.S. and ASEAN's attempts to balance their relations with all the great powers, particularly the U.S. and China.

President Barack Obama himself has made Asia-Pacific the top U.S. foreign policy priority. In the speech delivered at the Australian Parliament on 17 November 2011, President Obama said: "I have made a deliberate

and strategic decision: as a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our allies and friends".¹ In the whole region, Southeast Asia has become the place of increasing influence competition between the two giants of the U.S. and China. Geographically, Southeast Asia is China's neighboring region and also the easiest way for China to expand its influence since China is surrounded by Japan, Russia and India at the East, North and West directions.

ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asia Nations) has really mattered for America since the first Obama Administration. While some regions such as Latin America and the Middle East claim that the U.S. has reduced its attention to them, Southeast Asia now plays a more important role in the U.S.'s foreign policy. *Firstly*, ASEAN is a part of the U.S.'s strategy of rebalancing Asia. The world power has shifted from the West to the East. China is rising very fast economically as well as militarily and has become more and more aggressive in expanding its territories in the South China Sea and its influence in the Southeast Asia region. David Shambaugh pointed two out of four dimensions of the U.S. providing security and stability to the region: "Preventing the rise of a regional hegemon hostile to U.S. interests" and "preventing major power rivalry and polarization of the region".² *Secondly*, ASEAN is located right at the center of the whole dynamic Asia-Pacific region and is therefore in a convenient position in international sea lanes. \$5,3 trillion of global trade passes through ASEAN waterways each year, of which around \$1.2 trillion is U.S. trade. 15 million barrels of oil transit through the Malacca Strait daily.³

Thirdly, the ASEAN Economic Community (one of the three pillars of the ASEAN Community) will be established at the end of 2015 with a large market of over 600 million people. Bilateral trade between the U.S. – ASEAN has been much increased. The U.S. exported nearly \$100 billion to ASEAN in 2012, the third highest in the Asia-Pacific. *Fourthly*, ASEAN has played a more and more active role in multilateral organizations in the Asia-Pacific region. ASEAN has been considered a "driver seat" in economic and political multilateral organizations, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), East Asia Summit (EAS), and ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM+). *Finally*, ASEAN has been very successful in creating an environment in which they can engage all major powers

¹ John West, *President Obama's Pivot to Asia is All About China*, Asian Century Institute, 24 May 2014, <http://asiancenturyinstitute.com/international/628-president-obama-s-pivot-to-asia-is-all-about-china>

² David Shambaugh, *Assessing the US "pivot" to Asia*, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Summer 2013, p.16.

³ US – ASEAN, East – West Center, <http://www.asiamattersforamerica.org/asean/what-is-asean>

in the region, including the U.S., China, Japan, Russia and India. ASEAN tries to keep balance in its relations with all the major powers, especially the two giants – the U.S. and China – in the context of their accelerating competition and cooperation.

Conversely, America matters for ASEAN. In the fast changing context of the Asia-Pacific region, ASEAN realizes the increasing necessity of engaging the U.S. When China is expanding its influence both in “continental” and “maritime” Southeast Asia, the appearance of the U.S. in the region and stronger ties with its traditional allies will partly help balance the power in the security architecture. Evelyn Goh, in her paper “Evaluating Southeast Asian Strategies for Managing Great Power Resurgence”, sees Southeast Asia as facing a parallel U.S.-China “resurgence” in the region, requiring adaptive responses that neither fit within the International Relations template of bandwagoning nor help balance behaviours.⁴ In the environment of the 21st century of economic interdependence and democratic peace, ASEAN will try to engage all great powers in the region and not take sides. Given its importance to both the U.S. and China, ASEAN finds that this is a really precious opportunity to improve its position in the international arena. However, this objective will only be obtained if ASEAN can strengthen its unification, maintain its role as a “driver seat” in multilateral organizations and not take side with any major powers.

Due to its perspective towards the U.S., ASEAN has positively changed its external relations with the giant since the beginning of the Obama Administration. From the end of the Cold War until 2001, Southeast Asia was “neglected” by the U.S., and therefore ASEAN-U.S. relations did not develop. After the Vietnam War in 1973, the U.S. troops withdrew from Southeast Asia in general and Vietnam in particular. In 1991, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the two naval bases in the Philippines meant no more U.S. military presence in the region. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, countries in the region were no longer divided into the two main blocs, and the threat of the “domino theory” and the focus on containing Communism was diminished. In the 1990s, ASEAN tried to develop and expand from ASEAN-6 to ASEAN-10. Meanwhile, the U.S. changed its foreign policy priorities to the Middle East and took part in the Gulf wars.

From 2001 to 2008, ASEAN-U.S. relations were slightly enhanced, but mostly on the aspect of counterterrorism.

After 9/11, the Bush Administration considered Southeast Asia as “the second front” in the fight against terrorism all over the world. There existed terrorist groups in the Philippines and South Thailand, and Indonesia was the world’s largest Muslim country. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice missed two out of the four annual ASEAN Regional Forums held during her tenure, in 2005 and 2007 respectively.

Since the beginning of the Obama Administration, ASEAN-U.S. relations have rapidly changed. As an association of 10 small countries, ASEAN’s external relations are largely affected by major powers’ strategies concerning the region. Since the U.S. “pivot to Asia” and China’s rise to power, both powers have paid much more attention to the Southeast Asia, and ASEAN’s external relations with the U.S. as well as China have been much improved. ASEAN-U.S. relations have developed both multilaterally and bilaterally. Multilaterally, ASEAN and the U.S. have strengthened ties politically and economically. The U.S. participated in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC – the core principles of ASEAN) in 2009. Also in 2009, the ASEAN-U.S. relationship underwent a “seismic” change, when the Leaders of ASEAN and the U.S. met at the first ASEAN-U.S. Leaders’ Meeting in Singapore on 15 November 2009. The Meeting provided the Leaders with the opportunity to exchange views on regional and global issues of common interest. As a follow up from the First ASEAN-U.S. Leaders’ Meeting in Singapore, ASEAN and the U.S. convened its Second Leaders’ Meeting on 24 September 2010 in New York.⁵ In 2010, the U.S. was the first non-ASEAN country to appoint an Ambassador to ASEAN, then a permanent mission. As the first US President to participate in the East Asia Summit (EAS), which convened in Bali in 2011, Obama reiterated the US commitment to ensuring freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and stressed the need to settle sovereignty disputes in accordance with international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The flourishing relations between ASEAN and the U.S. led to a strategic partnership in 2012.

In the economic domain, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, in a speech delivered at George Washington University before his visit to Singapore in July 2013, noted that the United States has a bigger investment profile than China in Southeast Asia, hence “President Obama has put particular focus on Southeast Asia: ASEAN now represents a US\$2 trillion economy of 600 million

⁴ Evelyn Goh, “Evaluating Southeast Asian Strategies for Managing Great Power Resurgence”, paper presented at the Conference: “The Growth of Chinese Power and Changing Security Dynamics in Asia”, S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 22 February 2013, pp.1-13.

⁵ Overview of ASEAN - US relations, June 2013, <http://www.asean.org/news/item/overview-of-asean-us-dialogue-relations>

people".⁶ In recent years, the economic relationship between ASEAN and the U.S. has expanded beyond trade and investment, energy, food security and ASEAN connectivity. Both ASEAN and the U.S. utilize the ASEAN Economic Ministers-US Trade Representative (AEM-USTR) Consultations and the Senior Economic Officials-Assistant USTR (SEOM-USTR) Consultations to promote trade and investment flows between ASEAN and the U.S., as well as to exchange views on a range of economic issues. ASEAN-U.S. trade and investment cooperation has focused on trade facilitation, standards and conformance, intellectual property rights (IPR), and public-private sector engagement (PPE). On 19 November 2012, at the 4th ASEAN-U.S. Leaders' Meeting, both ASEAN and the U.S. welcomed the launch of the ASEAN-U.S. Expanded Economic Engagement (E3) initiative – a new framework for economic cooperation designed to expand trade and investment ties between ASEAN and the U.S., creating new business opportunities and jobs in all eleven countries.⁷

Bilaterally, ASEAN member countries were divided into three main groups: The U.S. strengthened ties with its traditional allies in the Southeast Asia (the Philippines and Thailand) and its strategic partnership (Singapore). The second group comprises the U.S. comprehensive partnerships (Vietnam and Indonesia) and a new partnership (Malaysia). The third group includes Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar – those who lean slightly towards China's side. Laos and Cambodia have received massive support from China politically and economically in the past few years. Myanmar was China's traditional ally in the Cold War, but recently Myanmar has become much more open and democratic due to the regime change from military to civilian. Therefore, the U.S. has adjusted its foreign policy towards Myanmar from isolation to engagement. We should keep in mind that in the post-Cold War era, no country in Southeast Asia will bandwagon with one major power against another power, due to lessons learnt from the Cold War period. Geographically, they are next to the giant China, and therefore even if an ASEAN member country is an ally with the U.S., she still engages with China.

If ASEAN wants to see the U.S. increase its engagement to the region within the framework of keeping balance "approximately" among all the great powers, the Association should take into account some potential risks of this strategy. As an emerging power in the Asia-Pacific region, China, of course, does not want to witness a

greater U.S. presence in Southeast Asia, her neighboring region. "The U.S.'s Asia "pivot" has prompted Chinese anxiety about U.S. containment and heightened regional worries about intensified U.S.-China strategic competition".⁸ Thus, China may respond to the strategy in different ways. The first scenario is that China will attract ASEAN member countries more and more, especially "continental" countries, through economic aid and political influence. We should note that the Chinese communities overseas have been very united and successful in doing business and finance all over Southeast Asian countries. This is one of many important factors that can help China fulfill her desire. According to this scenario, ASEAN member countries will be torn apart. Secondly, China may behave more aggressively in the region to test the U.S.'s commitment to its allies as well as warn her neighboring countries not to move closer to an outside great power in opposition with China. The recent territorial disputes in the South China Sea have been very clear proof of this. Thirdly, China may seek alignment with Russia and elevate the BRICS (Brazil – Russia – India – China) group in order to create a new power to balance out the Western power.

At the last part of the paper, I would like to draw up a prospect for ASEAN's perspective towards the U.S. in the coming future and some suggestions for ASEAN. *Firstly*, if ASEAN still sees the U.S. as an important power in dealing with the emerging and more aggressive China, ASEAN should try its best to improve the association's unity, so that ASEAN will have a common voice in relations with the U.S. and China. Recent years have witnessed fragmentation among the ten ASEAN members as the U.S. and China have attempted to attract individual nations and have divided them as a result. The 45th ASEAN Summit held in July 2012, in which Cambodia played the role of ASEAN Chairman, is an example. It was the first time in the history of ASEAN that an ASEAN Summit could not release a joint statement. The reason was that the territorial disputes in the South China Sea among China and some ASEAN members were brought into the agenda of the Summit but finally, due to the influence of China, the Cambodian Foreign Minister did not announce any conclusion for the Summit. However, all ten ASEAN members have the desire to successfully build an ASEAN Community starting at the end of 2015. Although each member, on the way to build up the Community, has laid its national interests higher than the Association's interests, the ten ASEAN countries still share this desire. They perceive that there will be more benefits

⁶ Euan Graham, *Southeast Asia in the U.S Rebalance: Perceptions from a Divided Region*, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.35, No.3 (2013), pp.305-32.

⁷ *Overview of ASEAN - US relations*, June 2013, <http://www.asean.org/news/item/overview-of-asean-us-dialogue-relations>

⁸ Bonnie S. Glaser, *Pivot to Asia: Prepare for Unintended Consequences*, csis.org/files/publication/120413_gf_glaser.pdf

for their own countries if they can found a common community rather than being torn apart and influenced by a great power either inside or outside the region.

Secondly, ASEAN should try to maintain its balance in terms of its relations with the U.S. and China. After being established at the end of 2015, the ASEAN Community will have a much clearer roadmap and more stable stance on global security issues as well as in relations with major powers. It is a challenge for ASEAN to maintain its "driver seat" in many multilateral organizations in the Asia-Pacific region in the context of rising competition between the U.S. and China. In 2011, at the APEC Summit held in Hawaii, President Barack Obama made a big push for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a multilateral free trade agreement that seeks to reduce and eventually eliminate trade tariffs among member countries, and for which the bar for joining is set so high that China would not likely be able to qualify for many years. *Thirdly*, in the coming time, ASEAN's perspective towards the U.S. will also be heavily affected by the U.S. strategy regarding the Asia-Pacific region in general and Southeast Asia in particular. The strategy will be changed if the U.S.'s global priorities change due to an increase in other important issues such as Russia's comeback, the war on terror in the Middle East or domestic problems. In this case, the U.S. engagement with the region would be reduced. Meanwhile, China keeps rising very fast economically and militarily.



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INDONESIA'S SEARCH FOR THE DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. HEGEMONY

How Indonesia sees the US hegemony

It is very interesting to learn and understand how US scholars and policymakers look at the same issue, in this case the US hegemony, but come to different conclusions. They offer different assessments of the current position and future trajectories of the US in international relations, desirability and effects of the US hegemony, as well as policy recommendations related to maintaining the US hegemony. Some of them argue that the multipolar moment is fast approaching and call the US government to scale back various global commitments to prevent further decline. A couple US scholars reject the idea of US hegemony, because they perceive that not only is the world not threatening to the US, but also that the US's global presence and involvement will only attract trouble.¹

¹ The books with alarmist argument are Mark Steyn, *After America: Get Ready for Armageddon* (Washington DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc, 2011), Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008), Moises Naim, *The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being In Charge Isn't What It Used To Be* (New York: Basic Books, 2013). Article with similar sentiments are Michael J. Mazarr, "The Risk of Ignoring Strategic Insolvency", *The Washington Quarterly* 35:4, (Fall, 2012): 7-22. Articles on grand strategy vision are Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (1996/1997): 6.

² On Indonesia's sense of regional entitlement see Rizal Sukma, "Indonesia and the Emerging Sino-US Rivalry in Southeast Asia", <http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR015/SR015-SEAsia-Sukma-.pdf>

As far as the US hegemony discourse is concerned, many US scholars are interested in how other countries perceive them. The questions now are: How compatible is the US strategic security vision with Indonesia's? What does it mean for US-Indonesia bilateral relations? Understanding Indonesia's perspective regarding this matter is important not only because Indonesia considers herself a leading country in the formation of security architecture in the East Asia, but also because the future of the US in the East Asia will depend partly on this important regional state's foreign policies.² While much has been written about Indonesia's perception of US power, the existing literature has not taken into account Indonesia's foreign policy under the current Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa, and what the Natalegawa Doctrine means for the US hegemony.

The word "hegemony" here means a hierarchical interstate system in which one state sits at the top of the system. This is made possible by a preponderance of material power and may be sustained by a hegemonic transnational culture that legitimates the rules and norms of a hierarchical interstate system.³

According to a study by Daniel Novotny, Ernest Bower, and Rizal Sukma on Indonesian political elites' perceptions of US and Chinese power and presence, Indonesia perceives the United States as the strongest power in the world.⁴ Indonesia sees the US as a country like no other. Its power stems from its military, economic power, statecraft, and culture. And as Rizal Sukma put it, "The US Pivot to Asia is seen as a move to maintain and ensure the US political primacy, economic interests, and military preponderance in the Asia Pacific, especially in the East Asia".

Sukma further explains that moves to strengthen its security and defence relationships with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam demonstrate the US's commitment to match such policy declarations with actions. The Pentagon has reinforced its military presence in the region by stationing 2,500

³ On definition of hegemony see Martin Griffiths, Terry O'Callaghan, and Steven C. Roach, *International Relations The Key Concepts Second Edition* (New York: Routledge, 2002), p 140.

⁴ See for example Sukma, as well as Ernest Z. Bower, "Great , but Unfocussed, Indonesian Assessments of US Power", *CSIS Report Capacity and Resolve Foreign Assessments of US Power*, June, 2011, http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_Cohen_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf, and Daniel Novotny, *Torn Between America and China: Elites Perception and Indonesian Foreign Policy* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010).

marines in Australia and two littoral combat ships in Singapore, and it is planning to station 60 percent of its naval fleet in the Asia-Pacific by 2020. Equally important, the US has also taken some initiatives to deepen its economic role in the region, demonstrated most markedly by its decision to push for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) fair trade agreement. Indonesia sees, however, that US influence is increasingly limited by the rise of China.⁵

As far as culture is concerned, American cultural products such as movies, educational institutions, social media, language, foods, and a liberal vision and tradition of an open, peaceful, and democratic world continue to have a strong appeal among Indonesian people and political elites. On the matter of statecraft, it is also important to recognize that Indonesians believe that the US is very influential in world affairs, including on the questions of Israel and Palestine. However, the US seems unwilling or unable to use its leverage to support a long-lasting resolution there.⁶

From the explanation above, clearly there is no doubt that the US remains the world's superpower. Furthermore, Indonesian policymakers believe that US involvement in the region has been seen as pivotal to maintaining regional stability.⁷ Nevertheless, Indonesians' perceptions of the US are also subject to change. The positive perception and opinion about the US historically oscillated between positive and negative. The ups and downs in the relationship between the two countries are not only determined by the US's tangible and intangible capabilities, but also by the US's behavior.

Indonesian attitudes and approaches towards the US hegemony are shaped by US power, but also in part by what the US does with its power. To illustrate this point, for a long time Indonesia perceived the US as a benevolent hegemonic power. The extensive US presence in the region has helped Indonesia and the other Southeast Asian and East Asian countries direct their money towards development projects, instead of military build-up to balance Japan or China. However, the US policy post 9/11 altered this perception. Since then, the majority of Indonesian officials have raised the question of whether US will continue to be a benevolent superpower. The elites generally do not view the US as a

military threat that will invade Indonesia. Instead, they worry about the violation of sovereignty, such as illegal intrusion onto Indonesian territory. This view changed again after tsunami Aceh in 2004. The level of assistance and aid from these countries to the victims generated a favorable view among Indonesians towards the US.⁸ Thus, the US should not assume that 9/11 and the US military adventure that ensued will create resistance to the US hegemony.

US-Indonesia: the feeling is not really mutual

Since the mid-1990s, the discussion about the US hegemony has stimulated a lively debate within Indonesia. The continued preoccupation with the US hegemony seems to be related to the changing external and internal conditions within which policymakers and scholars operate to achieve national security goals. These conditions include the behavior of external states, the worldviews of key policymakers, and outcomes of past actions, among others.

In terms of security, since the country's independence in August 1945, Indonesia has been preoccupied primarily with problems of secession, communal and religious violence, ideological tension and political conflict among the elite that threatened territorial integrity, national unity, internal order and political stability. Although Indonesia's national security concerns, defense policies and posture remain primarily internal in nature, it does not ignore the external threats, including the implication of the prevalence of US involvement in East Asia.⁹

When Marty Natalegawa became the Indonesian foreign minister in 2010, he introduced a new concept called dynamic equilibrium. To quote Marty Natalegawa, "That is an approach that put forward the principle of security, common interest and partnership. A regional order that not only can "manage" the dynamic changes in the region, but also embrace it as a factor that can be developed for common interest."¹⁰ Accordingly, he envisions a region in which there is not one predominant country.¹¹ This concept also entails a hope for the adoption of a new kind of mindset among states. The idea of common security calls for states to take into consideration how their opponents might respond to whatever step they are thinking of taking,

⁵ Sukma, 43.

⁶ Bower.

⁷ Novotny.

⁸ Sukma, and Novotny.

⁹ Rizal Sukma, "Indonesia's Security Outlook, Defence Policy and Regional Cooperation", *Asia-Pacific Countries' Security Outlook and Its Implications for the Defense Sector*, http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/joint_research/series5/pdf/5-1.pdf.

¹⁰ Marty Natalegawa, "2013 Annual Press Statement Dr. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa Minister For Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia Jakarta, 4 Januari ,2013", <http://kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name2=Menteri&IDP=791&l=en>.

¹¹ Marty Natalegawa, "Statement By H.E. D.R. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa Minister For Foreign Affairs Republic Of Indonesia At The General Debate Of The 66th Session Of The United Nations General Assembly" September 26,2011, http://gadefate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/66/ID_en.pdf.

show restraint in their pursuit of security, and abandon the mindset that security policies undertaken by certain states are designed to antagonize others.¹²

This concept was developed out of the need to manage 3 key challenges. It is essentially an attempt to accommodate the emerging powers, primarily China and Russia. The other reason why Marty invokes this concept is a lack of trust in the East Asian countries. He observes that the recurring tension in the region, including the conflict in the South China Sea, stems in part from the security dilemma.¹³

Based on this conception, Indonesia wishes to see a regional hierarchy. Under this system, the US and other major powers such as China and Russia will constitute the first tier of the order, and beneath that will be middle power countries, such as Indonesia.¹⁴ In this system, Indonesia imagines that there will be a balance of power or multipolarity among major countries, i.e. the US, China, Russia.

Contrary to Indonesia, the US under the Obama administration has committed itself to reclaiming the global leadership that the US held for decades in the past. The terms global leadership, primacy, hegemony, and indispensable nation are often used interchangeably in describing the US's place in international relations.¹⁵ The ideas that global security depends on American leadership and that conventional US economic and ideological superiority are necessary to preserve the global commons testify to this ambition.¹⁶ As Michael Mazarr and Barry Posen have said, "The debate in post-Cold War US grand strategy has been over what form of hegemony to seek, not whether to seek it."¹⁷

From the explanation above, Indonesia's vision of a pattern or method to establish security and stability in the region, especially regarding the power structure, cannot coexist with the American vision. The question now is: What does the incompatibility of these visions mean for US hegemony?

Implications for the US hegemony

While the facts about Indonesia's and the US's visions can be interpreted in many ways, what follows are some possible implications of US hegemony:

- The US will still enjoy its hegemonic position. Although Indonesia embraces the rise of China and the influence of Russia, this does not mean that the US must scale back its commitment to the region or abandon East Asia altogether. The dynamic equilibrium should be understood as an attempt on the part of Indonesia to give China and Russia an opportunity to keep up with the US. This has been proven by the decision of the President Yudhoyono and Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa to warmly welcome the Obama administration's decision to rebalance US policy towards Asia.¹⁸
- The US must prepare some justifications for its future decision to limit the expanding influence of major powers like China or Russia within Indonesia, as well as supporters of this concept, who have had to position themselves as regulators of regional security who have tried to create a level playing field for all major powers. Both the US and Indonesia are embracing change in East Asia as demonstrated by their willingness to accommodate the rising powers, primarily China and Russia. However, these two countries differ in the level of power that they can acquire in the future. Judging from the language used in the National Security Strategy 2010, US national interests as well as global prosperity and security depend on US superiority. To put it differently, the US will not let China share its position as the hegemon. The US hegemony in the region, including the heavy commitments of the American treasures for such a long time, has been driven by the idea that material and non-material threats and opportunities to the attainment of US basic interests such as liberty, prosperity, and security are linked to East Asia. As argued by Michael J. Green, nuclear weapons and the expansion of overseas investment and trade ended an isolationist option.¹⁹ In addition, there is

¹² Marty Natalegawa, "Dynamic Equilibrium in the Asia Pacific", ABC *Interview with Marty Natalegawa, Indonesia's Foreign Affairs Minister*, <http://www.abc.net.au/australianetwork/focus/s3440427.htm>.

¹³ Asean newsletter, pidato marty tahunan

¹⁴ Dr. H. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, "An Architecture for Durable Peace in the Asia-Pacific: Dr. H. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono", *Shangri-La Dialogue The IISS Asia Security Summit*, June 1, 2012, <http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/sld12-43d9/opening-remarks-and-keynote-address-9e17>.

¹⁵ Posen and Ross.

¹⁶ "National Security Strategy of the United States of America," May 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.

¹⁷ Mazarr, p 9.

¹⁸ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Indonesia's foreign relations: policy shaped by the ideal of 'dynamic equilibrium'", *East Asia Forum*, February 4, 2014, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/02/04/indonesias-foreign-relations-policy-shaped-by-the-ideal-of-dynamic-equilibrium/>.

¹⁹ Michael J. Green, "The United States and East Asia in the Unipolar Era", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 24:4 (2001), p 21-46

a tendency among some states, including the United States, to assume the worst of others' intentions. This tendency compels states to overcome fear of future aggression by trying to maximizing their power.²⁰ Should the post-Obama US share this view or at some point feel that China and Russia have become too strong, and wish to limit their influence, the US must justify and negotiate with Indonesia and her supporters.

- Indonesia's current foreign policy design is in line with the US security strategy of cooperative primacy. Despite the dissimilarities of the US's vision and Indonesia's vision of the power structure in the region, both the US and Indonesia want the future regional politics to be characterized by higher degree of mutual respect, cooperation, restraint in resolving conflict, trust, respect of sovereignty, sense of community, and transparency. Indonesia has facilitated this process, and the US should help Indonesia in this regard. The future challenge for the two countries is to implement the guiding principles that they have agreed to abide by, such as the Bali Principles and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. The US and Indonesia should also join hands in bringing together countries in the Asia-Pacific to discuss and negotiate the Indo-Pacific treaty, which was proposed initially by Indonesia.
- The US's faith in East Asia will be largely shaped by the ability of Indonesia's leadership to ensure that the two main elements of dynamic equilibrium, namely norm and principle building and military development and partnership, go hand in hand. Under the scheme of dynamic equilibrium, Indonesia will not try to stop all kinds of military cooperation in the region. Marty Natalegawa, in an interview with the Australian media, said that each country can still enjoy military alliance or partnership with the US and China. He further noted that military buildup is a natural development in the region. He warned, however, that defense relations must not be seen to be at the expense of any other country. The challenge for Indonesia as a proponent of dynamic equilibrium is to make sure that the states in the region do not only focus on maintaining or

expanding defense relations, but also agree to abide by the norms and principles that would lessen the negative impacts of defense cooperation.²¹

- The role and place of the US in East Asia will be determined in part by the outcome of the 2014 presidential election. As far as foreign policy is concerned, the presidential election in 2014 might introduce new ideas. According to Act No. 37/1999 on Foreign Relations, the target and direction of foreign policy must be consistent with the national medium-term development plan. The new plan will be issued in 2015. The new president will have a chance to incorporate his vision, mission, and priorities during his campaign into the medium-term national development plan 2015-2019. Election, however, is not the only factor that will determine the continuation of the current foreign policy blueprint. The 9-page vision, mission, and program statement of the president hopeful Prabowo, which was submitted to the Commission of National Election, only includes a three-line statement about foreign policy on the last page. He pledges to uphold the main principles of Free and Active foreign policy and to promote national interests as mandated in the constitution, which are the protection of Indonesian citizens all over the world and the improvement of Indonesia's active participation in the promotion of world peace and stability.²² Based on his official campaign statement, it is difficult to determine whether dynamic equilibrium will be used as a foreign policy guide in the next 5 years. The presidential hopeful Joko Widodo also shares this vision, although he provides a more detailed explanation than Prabowo about the key foreign security issues in the region that deserve serious attention in the next 5 years. ²³In addition to the president, the person who holds the position of foreign minister will also influence the direction of the country's foreign policy. Under Hassan Wirajuda, the predecessor of Marty Natalegawa, Indonesia should put less emphasis on the regional power structure while paying more attention to issues of human security.

²⁰ Green.

²¹ Natalegawa, ABC Interview with Marty Natalegawa.

²² "Visi, Misi dan Program Bakal Pasangan Calon Presiden dan Wakil Presiden", 2014, http://www.kpu.go.id/koleksigambar/VISI_MISI_prabowo-Hatta.pdf, p.9

²³ "Jalan Perubahan Untuk Indonesia Yang Berdaulat, Mandiri, dan Berkepribadian, Visi, Misi, dan Aksi Jokowi Jusuf Kalla 2014", May, 2014, Natalegawa, ABC Interview with Marty Natalegawa., p 1-15.



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WATER SCARCITY IN THE CASE OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN: A POTENTIAL SECURITY THREAT

INTRODUCTION

The dynamics of security have witnessed a considerable change in the Post-Cold War era. In order to conceptualize this change, scholars like Robert D. Kaplan and Barry Buzan have advocated a broader and more comprehensive approach to understanding national and inter-state security in holistic terms rather than understanding it solely in traditional and military terms. It is believed that the boundaries between traditional threats and non-traditional threats have become blurred in the contemporary time. This implies that it has become difficult to completely de-link the issues of high politics from soft politics. This essay is an attempt to substantiate the comprehensive security approach by analyzing the increasing water scarcity between India and Pakistan as an emerging inter-state security threat in the South Asian region.

BACKGROUND

After gaining their independence from British colonial rule, the newly independent states of India and Pakistan had to share all their resources, including water resources. India and Pakistan share the six rivers that make up the Indus Basin system. During the colonial era, the Indus Basin system was used as an integrated river system to cater the needs of the region. When dividing the subcontinent, the British paid little attention to the question of water resources. As a result, the partition bisected the Indus Basin system, resulting in the disruption

of the existing irrigation systems. Thus, these newly demarcated geographical boundaries between India and Pakistan introduced new dimensions of inter-state water interactions in the Indo-Pakistan region.

As a result, in a short span of time, it became evident that the unsettled question of water resources would add to the already existing hostility between India and Pakistan. The issue of Kashmir, among other issues, was mainly responsible for keeping both states at loggerheads with one another. The Kashmir dispute and the water issue are interlinked because the headwork of the rivers flowing into Pakistan are located in those areas of Kashmir that were under Indian control. Within this context, sharing water resources between India and Pakistan was a challenging task because at that time both the countries had strained, hostile and acrimonious relations governed by a severe trust deficit. Eventually, given the transnational nature of their water resources, India and Pakistan signed a bi-lateral agreement known as the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in 1960 through the efforts of the World Bank. The main aim of the IWT is to provide a water-sharing mechanism for the Indus Basin system. According to this treaty, the three western rivers of the Indus Basin system are given to Pakistan, and India has been granted the right to use the three eastern rivers of the system.

The Indus Water Treaty has been regarded as a classic model of conflict resolution. This treaty regulates and governs the issue of water resources between India and Pakistan, two states that have had hostile relations with each other ever since their independence. Furthermore, this treaty has stood the test of time. For the last half century, even in times of full-fledged war, it has remained intact and functional. However, in recent times, some new challenges such as climate change, global warming, and increasing energy needs have intensified. These factors are regarded as the fundamental drivers of the increasing water depletion. Keeping in consideration these new trends, some experts believe that the competition among India and Pakistan will increase, creating new challenges for existing water sharing mechanisms in the region generally and the IWT specifically.

INCREASING WATER SCARCITY

The phenomenon of water scarcity has become a global challenge in the twenty-first century. The basic drivers said to be responsible for water scarcity, at a global level, are rapid population growth, increasing energy needs, industrialization and climate change, among others. According to one study, the world's freshwater resources are finite since 97.5% of the world's water is salt water and only 2.5% is fresh water. Roughly 99% of that freshwater is either trapped in glaciers or

located in water tables which are too deep to access.¹ According to another study, rapid global population growth, which is currently at about 80 million a year, will result in increased demand for freshwater resources.² This means that the phenomenon of water scarcity is a global challenge, but in the case of South Asia, the issue of transnational water management and water scarcity is especially critical, urgent and serious.

In the case of South Asia, the gap between the demand and supply of freshwater is multiplying with each passing day. Michael Kugleman's study "Safeguarding South Asia's Water Security" suggests that South Asia is home to one-fourth of the world's population, but only 15% of the world's water resources, and that the per capita water availability in the region has decreased by 70% between 1960 and 2005.³ This discussion suggests that the demand and supply gap for water resources will increase in the coming years and that the region is going to be faced with an immense water shortage. It implies that in the near future, having access to enough water resources will become the priority of the South Asian states. To tackle this situation in the future, it is important for these states to manage their water resources both at the transnational and the national level. However, some recently conducted research shows that the South Asian states are the worst mis-managers of their water resources at the national level. Because of this fact, the transnational water sharing mechanisms – the Indus Waters Treaty, the Ganges Treaty and the Mahakali Treaty – are faced with new challenges.

In the context of the ongoing discussion, it can be argued that if the South Asian states do not pay considerable attention to the management of their water resources, both at national and inter-state level, then increasing water scarcity has the potential to become a security threat that can have negative consequences for inter-state relations as well as for regional stability. In this regard, the case of water issues between India and Pakistan is very important because both states share transnational resources but have historically had strained political relations.

¹ Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia, *Water Security: Issues and Challenges in Sea*, A Fortnightly Bulletin of Current NTS Issues Confronting Asia, Centre for NTS Studies, S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU, Singapore, September 2008, 2.

² "World Water Assessment Programme," *The United Nations World Water Development Report 3: Water in a Changing World*, 2009, www.unesco.org.

³ Michael Kugleman, "Safeguarding South Asia's water security", *Shades of Blue*, a symposium on emerging conflicts and challenges around water, No 626. , (October 2011). <http://www.india-seminar.com/2011/626.htm>.

⁴ *Economic Survey of Pakistan*, (2009-10), 13. www.finance.gov

⁵ Toufiq A. Siddiqi and Shirin Tahirkheli, *Water Needs in South Asia: Closing the Demand-Supply Gap*

WATER SCARCITY IN THE CASE OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Pakistan, as an agrarian economy, is very dependent on a consistent flow of water from India into Pakistan. Agriculture constitutes 21% of the total GDP, and the life of 65% of the population is directly or indirectly linked with the agricultural sector.⁴ This means that water resources constitute the lifeline of the country's economy. The increasing gap between the demand and supply of water resources shows that in the near future managing the phenomenon of water scarcity will become an important challenge for Pakistan. According to a study, Pakistan's water demand in 2025 will be 338 billion cubic meters, and the supply will be 236 billion cubic meters, which suggests that there will be a shortage of 100 billion cubic meters.⁵ Similarly, a report by the Asian Development Bank presented in 2007 says that Pakistan is at the threshold of water scarcity, which is 1000 cubic meters of water per person per year.⁶ The World Bank study on Pakistan's water resources tells the same story. It says, "Pakistan is already one of the most water-stressed countries in the world, a situation which is going to degrade into outright water scarcity."⁷ These indicators clarify that, in the near future, Pakistan will be faced with increasing water scarcity.

India's position in terms of water resources is comparatively better than Pakistan's. However, this does not mean that India is a water secure state. A study shows that the overall per-capita water availability in India has decreased from 5000 cubic meters in 1950 to 1800 cubic meters in 2005, and it might reach the threshold of 1000 cubic meters by 2025.⁸ Along with water depletion due to the mismanagement of available water resources, a large amount of water is wasted every day. Michael Spector suggests in his study that New Delhi supplies 700 million gallons of water to its residents each day and that one third of this supply is lost due to leaks within ten thousand kilometers of decrepit pipes.⁹ Thus, India is also faced with the challenge of water scarcity and management.

(Honolulu: Global Environment and Energy in the 21st Century, 2004), 88. www.gee-21.org.

⁶ *Country Paper: Pakistan*, Asian Development Bank Outlook 2007 (Tokyo: Asia Pacific Water Forum, 2007), p.3. www.adb.org/documents

⁷ John Briscoe, Usman Qamar, *Pakistan's Water Economy Running Dry*, the World Bank, Oxford University Press, (2005),.xiv. www.hec.gov.pk.

⁸ Sundip Waslekar, *The Final Settlement: Restructuring India-Pakistan Relations*, (Mumbai: Strategic Foresight Group, 2005). www.strategicforesight.com.

⁹ Michael Spector, *The Last Drop: Confronting the Possibility of a Global Catastrophe*, *The New Yorker*, October 23, 2006

The following section will discuss the link between water resources and inter-state security.

WATER SCARCITY: AN EMERGING SECURITY THREAT

Keeping in consideration the increasing water scarcity and the historically acrimonious relationship between India and Pakistan, it can be suggested that the phenomenon of water scarcity may have negative impacts for the bi-lateral relationship between these two states, both of which have nuclear weapons. This issue of water scarcity cannot be strictly confined to the bi-lateral relationship of India and Pakistan; rather, it may also have broader regional implications. The water issues between India-Bangladesh, India-China, and India-Pakistan clearly show that water scarcity is one of the important factors affecting inter-state relations in the South Asian region. The following lines will briefly explain how water issues can contribute to a bi-lateral security threat for India and Pakistan specifically, and for the rest of the member states of the region.

The Kashmir Dispute between India and Pakistan is one of the basic factors responsible for the acrimonious relationship between India and Pakistan since their independence. This dispute is still an outstanding issue for both states. Now, it should be kept in mind that the Kashmir Dispute cannot be de-linked from the water issue under discussion. As mentioned above, Pakistan is the lower-riparian of the Indus Basin system, and it has been given control over the three western rivers of the Indus Basin system. These western rivers flow from the Indian-held Kashmir into Pakistan. This upper-lower riparian relationship has created two different perspectives.

Pakistan's perception is that India has control over the rivers flowing into Pakistan and that Indian interference with the waters of these western rivers is responsible for the water shortage inside Pakistan. Indian perception is totally different. It is believed in India that water scarcity is climate based and that climatic factors like global warming are contributing to the increasing water scarcity. If the water issue is seen from both angles simultaneously, then the broader picture of the issue becomes clear.

India is working on the construction of various hydrological projects in the Indian-held Kashmir on the western rivers of the Indus Basin system. India maintains that these projects are run of the river projects and according to the letter and spirit of Indus Waters Treaty. Some Indian experts on water security like Uttam Kumar

Sinha believe that Pakistan is using water as a political weapon to portray India as an aggressor and as having regional hegemonic designs. Uttam Kumar Sinha maintains that "Judging by recent political statements from Pakistan, water issues are being pitched politically and couched increasingly in the language of security vis-à-vis India."¹⁰

Pakistan believes that these projects will allow India to control the water flowing into Pakistan and, as a result, put India in a position to threaten Pakistan's vital agricultural and energy interests. The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report "Avoiding Water Wars: Water Scarcity and Central Asia's Growing Importance for Stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan" magnifies Pakistan's fears and concerns. The report says,

Studies show that no single dam along the waters controlled by the Indus Waters Treaty will affect Pakistan's access to water, (but) the cumulative effect of these projects could give India the ability to store enough water to limit the supply to Pakistan at crucial moments in the sowing season,. Others question (is) whether the IWT can address India's growing use of the shared waters and Pakistan's increasing demand for these waters for agricultural purpose. A breakdown in the treaty's utility in resolving water conflicts could have serious ramifications for regional stability. Any perceived reduction in water flows magnifies this distrust, whether caused by India's activities in the Indus Basin or climate change.¹¹

This ongoing discussion shows that these two neighbors, both of them important, nuclear-weapons-holding states, are looking at this issue from two divergent perspectives. The issues of the Baglihar hydroelectric project and the Kishanganga dam dispute show that in the near future, both states will have more water related disputes.

The importance of non-state actors has tremendously increased in the post-Cold War era. Pakistan has been badly affected as a result of the ongoing war on terror. As a result, different militant groups, with different names and objectives, have developed and become strong. Some of these groups, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, are specifically known for their anti-Indian stance. It is

¹⁰ Uttam Kumar Sinha, "Water and Energy: A Flashpoint in Pakistan-India Relations?", 14 December 2010, available at www.ensec.org.

¹¹ US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report, "Avoiding Water

Wars: Water Scarcity and Central Asia's Growing Importance for Stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan", 22february,2011. Available at <
http://foreign.senate.gov/reports/index.cfm?PageNum_rs=1>.

believed in India that the same organization was instrumental in organizing and master-minding the Mumbai Terrorist attacks in 2008, which resulted in the killing of many Indian citizens. Now, in the context of water scarcity in Pakistan, some media reports suggest that some militant groups based inside Pakistan believe that they should wage a holy war to take Pakistan's due share of its water from India. For instance, according to the Economic Times, "Only jihad can help get water released to Pakistan, so people should rise up," said Jammāt-ud-Dawā, a charity seen as a front for Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group blamed for the Mumbai attacks."¹² These kinds of threats from non-state actors add a new and more dangerous dimension to the issue of water scarcity specifically in the context of India and Pakistan. China must also be given importance while analyzing the water security of South Asia. Though China is not technically a part of South Asia, its water management efforts have an important impact on the downstream states such as India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. China controls Tibet, where most of the major rivers of South Asia emerge, and this control over Tibet brings China into the position of a supreme upper-riparian state vis-à-vis the South Asian states. The fact that China controls Tibet does not imply that China is a water secure country. China is the most populous state in the world, and it has enormous water needs. An important point that deserves consideration is that the water availability in the northern part of China has decreased. In order to tackle this water insecurity in the north, there is an idea in China that water from the southern part ought to be diverted to the northern part. These diversions of the Tibetan rivers magnify the fears of those in the lower riparian states. The amount of water flowing into South Asia would be decreased by a considerable level, which would have negative ramifications for the downstream states of South Asia already facing water stress conditions. It can be argued that the nature of Chinese water management will have an important impact on water security in South Asia.

Other factors that contribute to an emerging water security threat for the region include:

- 1) Rapid Population growth
- 2) Increasing energy needs
- 3) Climate change and melting glaciers
- 4) Internal water mismanagement

Conclusion

In nutshell, it can be said that the phenomenon of water scarcity is an important challenge for India and Pakistan specifically and for the South Asian region in general. The ideal approach to deal with this challenge is to tackle it through a regional and comprehensive approach. But if states like India and Pakistan are not ready to cooperate over their water resources, then this emerging security threat, it is believed, can become a real security threat for both states. Water scarcity has the potential to negatively affect the bilateral relationship of India and Pakistan, and it may also impact the security of the entire region.

¹² "Water row key to India-Pakistan rivalry", The Economic Times, July 15, 2010.

***AFRICAN
SECURITY***



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HUMAN SECURITY DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

Introduction

By the end of the Cold War, there was enormous optimism that the international community would turn its attention to global problems, such as poverty, the environment, population growth, and so on, as many countries had benefited from the end of the Cold War. However, the income gap between the industrialized and developing worlds has continued to widen. Most of the Global South continues to have development difficulties and an increasing rate of absolute poverty, which turned out to be an insecurity phenomenon that started as an interstate level and then became an international issue. Why did the end of the Cold War fail to enhance global stability? The Cold War conception of security emphasized the prevention of interstate conflict in order to avoid the perennial danger of escalation.

The two powers had divided Europe and Asia, and no one, except in the Korean War, crossed a mutual balance of power or terror lines. Proxy wars were carried out in Asia, Africa and Central America, in Vietnam and Afghanistan with fully subsidized military aid, but the two powers never came into direct conflict. Hot lines, summit conferences and SALT treaties kept things under control. For the rest of the world, especially the Third World, states' security systems were overdeveloped, in the form of internal security systems, bloated military budgets, and competition for state power – state monopolies of force.

The end of the Cold War was marked by the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), two measures meant to ensure global security. However, these approaches to security were inadequate in fostering stability and peace in some parts of the world, especially the Global South, where states are not the sole actors, national borders are permeable, rates of security threats (for example, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) are increasing, internal conflict and state failure are prevalent, and national sovereignty is no longer a sufficient justification to avoid international scrutiny and action.

Hence, many writers and professionals have turned their attention to the reassessment of the traditional concept of security in order to identify those variables beyond the typical approaches. If security refers to power, in a globalized world, power is increasingly diffuse and malleable. Many aspects of the human environment can affect peace and stability. In this context, states are no longer the exclusive determinants of security, a reconsideration that necessitated the emergence of the concept of 'human security' and rekindled the debate over what 'security' means and how best to achieve it. Human security had been presented as a global template on which to fundamentally recast the security philosophies and policies of countries to reflect the changing conditions and principles of the world order, and as an instrument of national strategic priorities.

The 'human security' approach has become increasingly popular in academic and policy debates and practices since the 1990s, and it is now used as a framework to accommodate new security perspectives and referents.

It has been operationalized through 'development' institutions and actors, human security research and policies that focus on security concerns that occur at the global scale and result in security strategies that concentrate on collective human needs and state-led responses. Therefore, the concept remains a broad framework, which can be used to express a set of disparate agendas that typically have been excluded from national security debates, rather than a precise idea or approach.

Africa and human security

The paper will focus on human security in Africa: poverty and security as factors that complicate development, the effect of insecurity on Africa, international engagement in the development of Africa, and finally, the U.S.'s role in human security development in Africa.


Africa is the world's second largest continent; nearly 15% of the world population lives in Africa. It is described as the youngest population in the world, with an average age of 19 years old. Africa's development architecture had always been hindered by security challenges, such as human insecurity and poverty, which in turn shape the present and future of this large population.

International involvement in African development and poverty problems usually takes the form of international and regional organizations and institutions, mainly the United Nations. Two-thirds of the UN's 'least developed countries' (classified as those at risk of remaining poor) are in Africa, and African countries have experienced great upheavals in recent decades.

In the last two decades, 28 sub-Saharan African countries underwent periods of violence. In many cases, the incidence of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa is increasing faster than the population growth; 218 million people live in extreme poverty, 90 million of them in western and middle Africa, 130 million in eastern and southern Africa. In northern Africa, the percentage of rural poor people living below the national poverty line varies dramatically, from 6 percent in Tunisia to 90 percent in Somalia and 87 per cent in the Sudan.

If the global community wishes to focus on the world's urgent needs, then a greater focus on Africa is surely justified. The rise in Africa's share of global poverty expected over the next two decades is startling, as is the distance from the international poverty line at which most of the region's extreme poor currently stand. The pie chart below illustrates how the 300 million Africans that are expected to remain in poverty in 2030 are classified across three categories.

Figure 1: Composition of Africa's Poor in 2030




Africa has, for the past 25 years, provided a clear demonstration of the dislocation between economic growth and the provision of basic human needs. Although the UN used many mechanisms to deal with poverty in Africa, two concepts were specifically important in dealing with the African issues: human development and human security development. The "human development" concept has an upward-

oriented quality, expanding opportunities for people so that progress will be fair to everyone. On the other hand, "human security" deliberately focuses on "downside risks" and takes into account a variety of elements that inhibit human development. Over the last 60 years, some progress has been made in reducing poverty. Many countries have seen gains in health, education and living standards as their economies grow. But at the same time many of the countries have been struggling with the legacy of colonial rule, and war has been common as systems of government have developed.

Security is an essential prerequisite for the UN to attain the Millennium Development Goals and to develop human capacity to its greatest potential, two things that are necessary for the development of sustainable peace in the region. The UNDP sought to shift attention from states to people as the key referent of a security concept that was previously defined in relation to the territorial state. It saw threats to security as primarily external in source, and by implication, relied on military might to respond to such threats. The obsession with protecting the borders of the state against external aggression overshadowed the vast array of threats – social, economic, political and environmental – faced by people within the territorial state. The thrust of human security is to shift the focus from the state to the people and to make the latter the main referent of security. The concept of human security covers a multi-dimensional reality. Thus, the concept refers to economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security from the local level to the global level.

International involvement in African development and poverty problems is remarkable in terms of the magnitude of funds and assistance, yet Africa has continually absorbed much of this aid without sound progress. The chart below shows the fluctuation of international aid and assistance, where Africa had a reputable share, and whether it is declining or increasing.



The debt crisis in Africa is a case in point for Africa in general. Taking Nigeria as example: it borrowed US\$3 billion between 1978 and 1983. That debt had become a US\$32 billion albatross by 2000, even after about US\$10 billion has been used in servicing the debt in the intervening period. Servicing this debt annually in current terms requires about the same amount as the principal sum originally borrowed. Repeatedly, the same occurred among most African countries in varying degrees, resulting in a kind of constant economic deterioration.

The imposition of structural adjustment programs by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are so severe in their impact that they have tended to undermine the basis of the nation-state project, compounding the weakness of the state, engendering mass hostility to it and undermining its legitimacy. These became an integral part of the dynamic of crisis in Africa, and increasingly complicated the economic problems of the continent, causing sharp drops in living standards. Privatization, denationalization and an uncontrolled reliance on market forces invariably compounded the concentration of wealth in a few hands, expanding the range of poverty and contributing to the tensions, violence and conflict within countries.

Insecurity in Africa:

The countries of Africa have experienced great upheavals in recent decades, specifically related to violence. These situations have helped to expose weaknesses in the state-centric concept of security, highlight the importance of interconnectivity for development, security and human rights, and expose weaknesses that have underscored the need to understand and deal more fully with the variety of issues relevant to the root causes of conflict, conflict prevention and peace building.

Armed conflict has a strong negative correlation with human development.

Several factors account for conflict in Africa: the colonial heritage of authoritarian governance and artificial boundaries; conditions of widespread and extreme poverty; scarcity of basic necessities of life; competition for land, oil or other natural resources; and support for internal conflicts by outside actors, frequently neighboring countries. The root causes of insecurity can be classified as: first, internal causes, such as poverty, conflicts, environmental degradation, food, health, and educational insecurities; secondly, external causes, such as the international trade system, which disadvantages Africa; and thirdly, globalization, which has had negative as well as positive impacts. By integrating the African economies into the bigger global economy, it has opened up Africa's economies to a global competition in which African economies are too fragile to successfully compete. Fourthly, terrorism has emerged as a new source of insecurity following the U.S. proliferation of anti-terror legislations, and after 9/11, the U.S. developed a punishing policy towards those who opposed the war. Most of the time, those anti-terror laws, instead of securing citizens, violate human rights and are used to suppress governments' political opposition. Yet sub-national terror and even state terror have been longstanding features of Africa. Finally, climate change has thrown off the balance between man and nature, with repeated droughts and other results of climate change creating population displacements towards more fertile land.

Therefore, a human security perspective on the subject of security enables us to understand threats to human livelihood, access to basic social services, access to employment and inputs, and fair redistribution of income, wealth and fruits of growth. The focus on human security helps in recognizing the fact that fundamental and enduring threats to security may have less to do with any challenges to the territorial integrity of states, but more with the well being of individuals and groups within such states. Most threats to security in the sub-region are not specific to states but transcend the boundaries of several countries. The human security approach, subsequently, offers greater opportunities for the development of regional approaches to these transnational security threats. What is the states' point of view on human security development? The problem of state centrism in Africa means that states are more often part of the problem than the source of the solution. Also, their militarist approach to security dominates their budgets, more so than individual security or even basic human needs at

times. Due to potentially unmanageable policy consequences of human security, labeling all potential harms to the individual as security threats makes prioritizing political action impossible. Through many readings on the states' point of view on human security development, some of the state actors believe that the humanitarian action program doesn't consider any sense of common unity and morality towards state sovereignty. Thus, there is suspicion about human security among some countries, who believe it to be a new ideological tool or pretext of humanitarian action. Also, there are some worries that human security development may lead to a new debt cycle. Others believe that the contemporary international system is shaped by globalization, which de-emphasizes state borders, and that human security development favors armed interventions in any region of the world in which the interests of the most powerful are involved, or gives more space to non-state actors to influence states' actions.

The U.S. and Human Security in Africa

Human security development and American values: "Freedom from want and freedom from fear" is president Franklin Roosevelt's famous phrase; It has also been said that "soft power influences the nature of the solution." It blurs, even counters, the perception of traditional power assets, such as military force, economic might, resources, and population. "A country's image is a key to the use of soft power"; an attractive set of values and an image as a trustworthy partner encourage other countries to consider and weigh one's views. Thus, the U.S. contribution to human security should consider Africa as part of their values. But what is happening on the ground? African policy is an area that has traditionally not been a top priority for U.S. administrations; African issues tested the administrations' strategies in multi-lateral diplomacy.

During the Cold War, United States foreign policy had little to do with Africa. As with other developing regions, African countries were first and foremost pawns in the great global chess game. Republican and Democratic administrations alike supported American clients and sought to undermine Soviet ones. Economic and military assistance was directed to key allies, such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, and anticommunist rebel organizations, such as Jonas Savimbi's in Angola. The U.S. engagement with the region was largely defined by Cold War logic from the late 1950s until the late 1980s, and remained relatively limited. In the post-Cold War period, remarkable progress was made during the presidency

of George Bush, who launched a number of new development aid initiatives in Africa.

U.S. development aid in Africa has been connected to U.S. foreign policy in Africa, and either implemented directly or through U.S. shares in international organizations and financial institutions, but still conditioned upon democratization.

U.S. assistance to Africa had been declining since the late 1980s, largely as a result of the virtual elimination of Security Assistance and Economic Support Funds to former Cold War allies. In 1995, Congress moved to restructure and significantly reduce U.S. foreign assistance programs. Many questioned the rationale for assisting Africa in the post-Cold War era, where three decades of aid had achieved little, either in terms of growth and democratization or promoting U.S. interests. Congressional supporters of aid to Africa rallied against the initiative and succeeded in preempting significant new cuts. Aid declined in 1996 marginally.

"African Solutions to African Problems" had been announced in the first year of Clinton's second term, and it shaped U.S. indirect engagement in African instability, political reforms and economic growth. During the George W. Bush administration, through U.S.-European cooperation, the U.S. spent \$121 million on peacekeeping and enforcement programs in different African countries.

However, Africa had already been growing in importance to the U.S., partially due to the growing threats to U.S. security in fighting terrorism in certain African regions. Taking the Sahel as an example, the Sahel is one of the poorest regions of the world. It faces simultaneously the challenges of extreme poverty, the effects of climate change, frequent food crises, rapid population growth, fragile governance, corruption, unresolved internal tensions, the risk of violent extremism and radicalization, illicit trafficking and terrorist-linked security threats, some threats of terrorist activity by Al-Qaida, and the emergence of new groups. The security threats in the Sahel – as well as their solution – are of a transnational nature, due to a similar set of reasons generated in the other regions of Africa and due to the political changes witnessed in these areas.

U.S. aid to Africa has been observed to be increasingly militarized; America's military involvement in Africa includes sales of arms, military training and advice, and establishment of security commands and intelligence. Specifically with Nigeria and other oil-producing West and Central African states, U.S. aid includes bilateral military assistance.

U.S. AFRICOM, which claims to promote a stable and secure African environment in support of U.S. foreign

policy, is not completely welcomed, evidently; no African nation has agreed to host the full U.S. command given all the security headaches that this would entail. This is why the organization's headquarters is in Germany.

An emphasis on issues such as human rights, good governance, and conflicts has often been observed in framing U.S. relations in Africa. Recently, both the Bush and Obama administrations have noted that the spread of democracy to foreign countries benefits the U.S. foreign policy.

On the other hand, Africans describe U.S. foreign policy as being inconsistent. U.S. foreign policy makers attribute this inconsistency of the American policy towards African countries to the universality of the African regimes. What is the solution for this debate? We should consider here two facts. The first one is that state centrality in the security discourse in Africa may remain protracted and unchallenged for a long time, yet development is an inevitable factor in bringing about change, taking into account that human security is an auxiliary factor of development. The second fact is that the U.S. tends to overcome its listed preservation towards some issues for the sake of its national interest. For example, in Kenya, Secretary Clinton was asked by a journalist during her August trip to Kenya if the U.S. would consider withholding aid to Kenya in order to put pressure on the government to fight corruption. Clinton emphasized that the U.S. did not want to punish the people of Kenya and would prefer to target individuals. Another incident was when President Obama publicly recognized that "our security interests will sometimes require that we work with regimes with which we have fundamental disagreements" in relation to countries important to U.S. energy or security interests.

Alongside these arguments from many actors, one remaining fact is important in crafting the solution. The violent behavior of people in the majority of African countries is distinctly derived from the continent's material poverty.

The U.S. is aware of the cost of chaos in Africa and the strategic realities of the region. Whatever the effectiveness of any kind of peace forces, the complex situation in Africa will never change unless the human conditions change for the better. Somalia and other areas prove this argument; despite some increased deployments in Somalia and in West Africa, the problems are daunting.

What is future of human security in Africa?
Human security is a new value called upon to enable the emergence of a collaborative system based on

true multilateral cooperation between international institutions and states.

The UN had been the initiator and the coordinator of the application of human security at the universal level. Its approach to human security is centered on the person and the community, and it focuses on threats and conditions to peoples' security that are not normally seen as threats to the state. Although the UN avoids critiquing state policies, the attention and the focus given to human security unifies domestic policy with foreign policy.

Canada, Norway, the Netherlands, Japan and other countries create grounds for broadening the concept of human security and addressing basic human needs, whether in Africa or the rest of the developing world, but the U.S. is still expected to play a leading role in Africa by:

- Enhancing the international and national efforts in achieving HSD in Africa
- Improving African trade policy. African trade policy is binding by numerous economic, social, and political reforms that fit within the framework of neoliberal open markets. However, many countries simply do not have the basic infrastructure needed to take advantage of it, although there has been an increase in U.S. imports of African oil. In 2008, African oil accounted for 24% of U.S. oil imports, and in 2007 19% of U.S. African oil imports were from sub-Saharan Africa. The largest source of U.S. oil imports in Africa, Nigeria alone provides 8% of U.S. petroleum imports. Because Nigeria is a country whose security is unsure, HSD will increase stability as well as reliability on African state partnership investments.
- Creating mechanisms for supervising, coordinating and mentoring the fragmented efforts of humanitarian action, development projects, and so on. The World Bank's 2006 Global Economic Prospects report indicates that world remittances totaled US\$232 billion in 2005, of which US\$167 billion went to developing countries in order to reduce poverty. However, the MDG report on poverty eradication revealed that not a single country in sub-Saharan Africa is on track to achieve the internationally agreed upon target for halving extreme poverty by 2015. Hence, international aid and economy still fail in Africa. Such mechanisms will control and support the huge efforts and costs that seek to enlarge people's opportunities to create an enabling environment to maximize their capabilities, and

absolutely will sort out the coordination of these huge resources within the African national institutions.

- o Focusing on cultural diplomacy and education. This will make a difference in violent culture, since 50% of the African populations are below the age of 19 years old.

Conclusion

Since the end of the Cold War, a rapid decline in conflicts between states was seen in international politics, while in the opposite direction, a rapid rise in disputes, conflicts and "emergencies" within states increased. Africa is considered the main playground for such conflicts and disputes. Such conflicts have been encouraged and increased by the nature of the international economic system, which has created stress by shrinking the state while enlarging the market scene. Such political mechanisms removed state subsidies from various social and productive sectors (education, health and agriculture), leading to privatization, denationalization, public sector down-sizing, and so forth, all of which may not be directly connected to human insecurity, but which undermine every conceivable idea of a meaningful life.

Across Africa, policies as such exacerbated people's insecurity, through the over-exploitation of state resources and unbalanced development and growth, all of which lead to a prevalence of chronic human threats and situations.

Human security has been presented in many different ways as a means of reducing the human costs of violent conflict, as a strategy to enable governments to address basic human needs and offset the inequities of globalization, and as a framework for providing international social safety nets.

As mentioned by Duffield, the political use of 'security' has recently shifted from a focus on the interstate, military problem of maintaining territorial borders to the social and global problem of maintaining 'life' across borders.

Therefore, understanding and mastering the causes of multi-relations problems enhances opportunities for effectively addressing human insecurity in Africa. The continuation of the collective action between international communities and states will contribute towards a positive change in pursuing human security, through integrated and interconnected projects.

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AMERICAN ENGAGEMENT IN IGAD AFRICAN COUNTRIES

1. Introduction

Access to African markets has become one area of competition among the global powers in the twenty-first century. Many international corporations, mainly those from BRICK countries, are coming to Africa to invest in the energy, agriculture and telecom sectors. However, many African countries are poor, and their democratic institutions are not yet well established. This makes the continent vulnerable for different security related problems such as religious extremism, identity-based conflicts, human trafficking, and terrorism, which not only affect the security of the countries themselves but also impact US security interests on the continent. Therefore, choosing right security policies and instruments becomes relevant to addressing the above peace and development issues.

This essay outlines the relevance of American engagement in human development through academic research and think tank institutions (ARTTI) in the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) region of Africa. The paper summarizes the common features of the region, the relevance of ARTTI in human development, and the reasons and mechanisms for American engagement. Finally, it concludes that American engagement in ARTTI in the IGAD region not only contributes to long-term human development but also expands American influence on the continent.

2. Common features of IGAD countries

The IGAD region, which comprises Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Kenya, Djibouti and Uganda, is home to more than 230 million people (World population, review.com, 2014). The countries share common history and identity groups. For example, most of the IGAD countries share a common colonial history, except for Ethiopia, which was never colonized. Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya not only share common boundaries but also share the Somali people across their borders. Moreover, Ethiopia, as a land locked country, depends on the ports of Djibouti for imports and exports, and Djibouti in turn depends on Ethiopia for agricultural products and energy. Similarly, Uganda relies on Kenyan ports for its imports and exports.

The geographical location of the IGAD region makes it relevant to different regional and international power interests. The region is bounded by the Red Sea, which makes it important to American security interests due to its role in maintaining the oil flow through the Red Sea from the Middle East. Moreover, Islam is the second largest religion next to Christianity in the region. For instance, around 40% of Ethiopia's population of 95 million is Muslim (World, population review.com, 2014). Sudan and Djibouti are also predominantly Muslim countries. Therefore, the geographical closeness to Middle East, cultural ties and religious relationships make the countries susceptible to cross-national security problems such as human trafficking, illegal immigration, and religious extremism. Ethiopia is also relevant to Africa since Addis Ababa is the political capital of the African Union and a center for around 100 diplomatic missions, international and regional organizations (Ministry of foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, 2012).

The IGAD countries are least developed countries. GDP per capita ranges between \$455 for Ethiopia and \$1580 for Sudan (The World Bank, 2012). Infrastructural development and economic interdependence between the countries is at an infant stage. There is no road connection between Ethiopia and Kenya, except for one recent attempt to construct a road that goes from Addis Ababa to Mombasa, Kenya's largest port. There is no train connection between the countries to facilitate transnational trade, which means that the IGAD countries do not have substantial trading relationships with one another. For example, despite sharing a sizeable border, Kenya and Ethiopia had a bilateral trade worth of \$50 million in 2013 (African review.com July 30, 2013). Ethiopia and Sudan also have a small trade relationship, despite the oil

imports to Ethiopia from Sudan. Ethiopia and Eritrea have not had any trade relationship since the war that erupted between them in 1998.

Conflict in the region is rooted in historical context and has intra- and inter- state dimensions. Two of the member states (Ethiopia and Somalia) had conventional war in 1967 and 1978. Ethiopia experienced a civil war that endured for 30 years and ended up with a secession of Eritrea in the subsequent years after downfall of the military regime in 1991 (Berhe, 2014). Ethiopia had another war with Eritrea from 1998 until 2000 due to unresolved border related issues. Sudan had a protracted civil war with South Sudan until South Sudan seceded in 2011. Violence between government forces and armed opposition parties has continued in Darfur. This conflict has taken millions of lives and led to the displacement of residents from their homes. Somalia has still not fully recovered from the consequences of state failure that started in 1991.

A protracted conflict has become a major contributing factor for state failure and expansion of religious radicalism in the region. The state collapse in Somalia contributed to a proliferation of religious radical groups that have become a challenge for AMISOM and the security forces of the government. The Eritrean government is at a verge of collapse, which has resulted in the migration of more than 3000 citizens every month due to humanitarian violation and lack of employment opportunities at home (Relief Web, 2013). The South Sudan violence has also caused more than 10,000 deaths (New York Times, January 9, 2014) and more than a million displacements (ICG, 2014) since the eruption in December 2013. All together, the above problems have created a danger for the emergence of additional failed states in the region.

However, the recent economic growth has become promising to alleviate the above problems. For example, the Sub-Saharan economy has risen to 5.3% in 2012 and 5.6% in 2013 in comparison to the average level of 5% before the global economic crisis. The Kenyan economy has been rising by around 6% over the last several years, and the Ugandan economy grew in the same fashion. The Ethiopian economy has been rising around 10.6% on average per annum over the last 10 years (World Bank, 2014). As a result, two and half million people have been lifted out of poverty in Ethiopia alone over the past five years (Belay, 2014). The economic growth brought down the poverty in

Ethiopia from 38.7% to 29.6% between 2004/05 and 2010/11 (ibid, 2014). As a result, the Ethiopian credit rating was increased to "B," which encourages foreign direct investment (FDI) (Capital, May 18, 2014). Two out of the ten most growing cities in the world, Addis Ababa and Nairobi, are in this sub-region (A.T. Kearney consulting firm, released on 14 April 2014).

The above common economic and security features of the IGAD region have attracted the global powers' interests. The economic development has attracted FDI from countries such as China, India and Turkey. China has become involved in oil drilling in South Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda to satisfy its growing demand for oil. It has significantly engaged in infrastructural development including connecting the region by cross-country train network. America is also interested in addressing the evolving security challenges in the region. It has supported AMISOM by providing training and by using drones in military operations against Alshabaab leaders. It has established strong partnerships with countries like Ethiopia and Kenya to reinforce the fight against Alshabaab.

3. Why academic, research and think thank institutions?

ARTTI are institutions that directly contribute to the development of human capital. Human capital is a stock of competencies, social knowledge and personality attributes that enable labor to produce economic value. It has four pillars, which are access to education, health and wellness, workforce and employment and an enabling environment (World, economic forum, 2013). Therefore, human capital is one of the most important factors that contributes to human development indicators. Human development indicator (HDI) is a way of measuring development using education component, life expectancy, creation of wealth and a decent standard of living (UNDP, 2013). 'The education component of the HDI is measured by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age' (ibid, 2013). Therefore, there is a direct relationship between investing in the ARTTI institutions and increasing human capital, which in turn contributes to human development.

There are several reasons why an attention should be given to ARTTI in the context of African countries in general and IGAD countries in particular. First, the institutions play a role in making the public sector responsive and strengthen the private sector, which is at

an infant stage. For example, in Ethiopia there are around 33 public universities, most of which were established in the last ten years. As a result, the annual registration capacity of the universities has reached hundreds of thousands of students in 2012, for example (MOE, 2012). Therefore, attention to the quality of education in these institutions will have a multiplier effect in expediting the evolution of the public and the private sectors. This is because many university graduates either join the work force in the public sector, because the public sector is still the most significant employer in Ethiopia, or they are required to create self-employment opportunities by being organized in micro enterprises and small enterprises, which will serve as embryos to the emerging private sector.

Second, ARTTI are also institutions that prepare countries for risk management associated with globalization and economic development. In the context of Africa, ARTTI are the primary institutions that enable the young generation to access information and create global connections. Over the last 25 years, unprecedented changes have occurred around the world, including international integration, economic reform, technological modernization and democratic participation (World Bank, 2014). Hence, working on ARTTI enables the young generation to mitigate the negative impacts of the above changes and to prepare itself for the knowledge-based socio-economic phenomenon of the 21 century.

However, the above analysis does not necessarily nullify the reasons to give attention to the other aspects of human development in the IGAD region. I have argued elsewhere that state failure, humanitarian crisis and lack of food security are still threats for human security in many states including South Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia. Therefore, attention to humanitarian intervention, food security and conflict management practices becomes relevant in maintaining human security in the region.

4. Reasons for American engagement in ARTTI

The American intervention has been focused primarily on humanitarian intervention in Africa in general and in the IGAD region in particular. However, since the last term of the George Bush administration and particularly in the Obama administration, the American security strategy has become more comprehensive and has focused on four strategic pillars, which are strengthening democratic institutions; spurring economic growth, trade and investment; advancing peace and security; and

promoting opportunities for development (White House, 2012).

American engagement in ARTTI can be an effective way to implement America's strategic security pillars in Africa. For example, democratic institutions can be strengthened by enhancing the research capacities of universities and think tank engagements so that they can generate and disseminate knowledge, which in turn influences the policy decision-making process and promotes accountability and transparency of public institutions. Working on ARTTI is also an effective way to promote opportunities for development. ARTTI focus on human capital, which is a fundamental element of development. The Eastern African countries are the lowest human development performers; their index varies between 145 for Kenya, 181 for Eritrea and undefined for Somalia¹ (UNDP, 2013). Therefore, focusing on ARTTI can play a role in promoting the human development index of the countries as the institutions enhance citizens' access to knowledge and information.

Engagement in ARTTI advances peace and security in the region. The region is highly exposed to human trafficking, identity-based conflicts and terrorist activities. ARTTI contribute to addressing these problems by training scholars who can contribute to mediation and reconciliation between conflicting parties. The institutions can also conduct independent studies that can provide strategic solutions and early warnings before the eruption of violence. For example, no credible local or regional research or think tank institution provided early warning before the eruption of violence in South Sudan on 15 December 2013. There were similar problems in the conflicts between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Engaging in ARTTI also promotes economic growth, trade and investment in the sub-region. One of the mechanisms for American engagement in the sub-region is the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which provides tax exemption in American markets to some commodities produced in Africa. Nevertheless, African countries have not benefited much from the process due to low infrastructural development and a wrong image of the investment opportunities in Africa. Therefore, American engagement with ARTTI can enhance the capacities of African countries to use the AGOA opportunity by conducting studies where the output can be accessible by both American and African enterprises.

¹ The World development report of 2013 ranked Kenya:145, Tanzania:152,Uganda:161, Sudan:171,Ethiopia:173, Eritera181 and Somalia undefined in Human development index

American engagement in ARTTI becomes relevant because it is an instrument for influence. ARTTI are instruments of soft power and hard power, which influence the behavior and actions of states. Soft power is the 'ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes' (Aye, 2011:20-21). 'Hard power is defined as the ability through threats and rewards to get others to do what otherwise would not do' (Aye, 2005). Therefore, ARTTI are relevant because they are located at the crossroads of both hard power and soft power, so their resources can be effectively used to promote influence. Historically, the use of power has been associated with states. States attempted using their military or economic power to influence others. However, it is argued that the nature of power has significantly changed due to the information technology revolution. Such universal development gives a greater advantage to institutions such as ARTTI that focus on knowledge generation, knowledge distribution and training. The use of IT gives the institutions better access to information so that they can generate local knowledge and integrate it into the global stream of knowledge. In a similar manner, they can domesticate the global knowledge to the regional, national and local knowledge stream with greater speed and create trust in different levels of audience. ARTTI also train experts who can influence policy decision making and the implementation of policies by state institutions.

ARTTI in Africa are relatively autonomous institutions with little state intervention. ARTTI use publications produced by Western academic and research institutions. For example, the Addis Ababa University accesses thousands American and European journals with a nominal subscription fee. ARTTI also organize joint studies and workshops with many American academic and research institutions. For example, Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE), a Ugandan think tank institution, organizes an annual workshop focused on security in collaboration with the Institute for Strategic Studies from the University of Defense in the United States. Therefore, working on ARTTI can reduce dependency on government institutions in generating and disseminating knowledge. In Africa, access to information is highly controlled by governments. Moreover, it seems that some governments have not distanced themselves from the legacy of the Cold War. Still, government data is highly classified, and getting access to information requires passing through different levels of scrutiny. As a result, public institutions are overburdened by unnecessary information, and this places them at risk of losing sight of the most important aspect of information for decision

making. Therefore, enabling ARTTI institutions to generate and disseminate information not only enhances citizens' access to information but can encourage government institutions to open their doors to their citizens for better access to data and information.

However, working on ARTTI should not disrupt the balance that is required to focus on the other aspects of human development. This means America can focus at the same time on human capital to contribute to bringing the region up from a vicious cycle of poverty and humanitarian intervention and security measures, in order to address humanitarian crises and security threats in the region. For example, in countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, America can focus on human capital, as the countries are relatively doing better in their human development index. Hence, an increase in human capital in the countries will enhance the capacity of the private sector, which in turn will contribute to job creation and advance market integration in the region. On the other hand, America can still give more priority to conflict management and humanitarian intervention in countries such as South Sudan, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia to mitigate the danger of state failure. All together, America's involvement in the region will play a pivotal role in removing countries from a vicious cycle of poverty in the long run and preventing humanitarian crises in the short run.

5. Opportunities for American engagement in ARTTI

In using the above instruments, America has a lot of comparative advantages in comparison to other international actors in the region, including China. There are institutional, cultural and linguistic factors in this regard. If we look at the institutional factors, the ARTTI institutions in Africa are designed along the lines of the Western institutional systems, and many of them also have institutional collaborations. Many African countries also use English as a medium of instruction, which creates better advantages for American institutions to be engaged in Africa. The existence of AFRICOM is also another comparative advantage for America to expand its relationship with military academics and research institutions on the continent. The availability of USAID in many African countries also enables America to expand its influence to ARTTI by simply earmarking resources that focus on human development in Africa. Finally, most African senior scholars and academic leaders are educated in Western universities in general and America in particular. Hence, America can easily provide incentives to encourage institutional collaborations using Fulbright scholarships and other

programs that encourage student exchange and research collaborations.

The United States can also use its emerging multicultural society to enhance its influence across African countries. The United States is a home for many people of the African Diaspora, including more than 250,000 Ethiopians in and around Washington DC and more than 150,000 Somalis. There are more than 39.16 million people of the African Diaspora in North America alone (World Bank, 2014). This Diaspora population not only serves to send remittance but can also serve to transfer basic American values and establish cultural ties with ARTTI institutions back in their countries of origin. They can also compete with Chinese firms by investing back at home. For this reason, America has to provide incentives to its Diaspora population to invest back in their countries of birth.

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, it seems that the United States will take a relatively long time to be engaged in Africa through its business firms. This is related to weak infrastructural development in Africa and the nature of the private business system in America. However, the United States has institutional, language and cultural advantages to expand its influence using ARTTI institutions, which in turn, will contribute to both short term security benefits and long term development opportunities for African countries. This can also enhance local ownership as it focuses on human capital development and is also a good instrument to expand the American presence in Africa.

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***THE UNITED STATES:
IS THERE A NEW
DEFENSE STRATEGY?***



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LEADING THROUGH INTERVENTION OR EXAMPLE? AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

Introduction

American exceptionalism, one core element of American political culture, is rooted in a belief that the U.S. is qualitatively different from other nation states due to its moral purity and universal values, which entitles America to a unique position in the international system.¹ Such a belief has great implications for American attitudes towards international affairs and American foreign and security policy. Theoretically, there are three options for Americans to engage with the rest of the world within the framework of American exceptionalism: isolation, leading through intervention, and leading through example. Reviewing the historical evolution of American foreign and security policy shows that it has experienced two extremes: isolation and leading through intervention. Following the election of President Barack Obama in 2009, America now is approaching a more balanced and middle way: leading through example. However, such an adjustment, challenged by conservatives and suspected by the American public, is full of uncertainty:

¹ Deborah Madsen, *American Exceptionalism*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998, pp. 16-35.

² "It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world (...)." George Washington, "Washington's Farewell Address," 1796, <http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/farewell.html>, accessed on March 30, 2014.

even the long-term historical trend proves that normalization should be the way forward.

II. From Isolation to Intervention: Historical Evolution of American Exceptionalism

While all united under American exceptionalism, the ways Americans engage with the rest of the world have differed significantly in different times and under different presidents. Before former Senator Barack Obama was elected as the 44th American president in 2009, there were two stages of development of America's international engagement under the guidance of American exceptionalism.

The first stage, one extreme, was isolation, which spanned from President George Washington to the end of World War II (WWII). It was George Washington who laid down the tradition of isolationism. In his Farewell Address in 1796, President Washington famously cautioned his fellow Americans against entanglements abroad and foreign alliances.² After this important speech, isolationism became a basic principle for American foreign and security policy for more than 100 years. The founding fathers always reminded the American public that isolation was a natural choice because to proactively engage in international affairs was seen as a potential danger to America's uniqueness and moral purity.³ For example, the Secretary of State and later President John Quincy Adams warned in 1821 that the United States should not go 'abroad in search of monsters to destroy.'⁴ Because of its relative weakness compared to the old empires on the European continent, the U.S. had to protect its distinctiveness through a grand strategy of disengagement, or isolationism, staying aloof from the quarrels and wars of the European powers until America's implied greatness could be fully realized.

World War I (WWI) provided the first chance for the U.S. to shift away from isolated foreign policy under the guidance of American exceptionalism. However, President Woodrow Wilson failed to include the United States in the League of Nations due to strong domestic opposition. America was lucky that a second chance came after WWII. This time, under the leadership of President Franklin Roosevelt, the U.S. shifted to another extreme, leading through intervention. After WWII, with the establishment of an international liberal order under

³ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 56.

⁴ John Quincy Adams, "Speech to the U.S. House of Representatives on Foreign Policy," July 4, 1821, <http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3484>, accessed on March 30, 2014.

U.S. leadership, American exceptionalism was understood as America's supreme and proactive involvement in international affairs. The distinctiveness and uniqueness of America's role and position in world affairs was perhaps never as striking as in 1945, when the United States accounted for about 50% of global GDP, had alone among the great warring powers suffered no destruction and major loss of life on its homeland, and was the only state in possession of nuclear weapons. In short, the U.S. has abandoned the tradition of isolationism totally from then on, and adopted the approach of interventionism with the full support of an institutional hegemony.

However, with balancing from the Soviet Union side, the U.S. could not fully practice interventionism during the Cold War era. This created a strange combination of intervention within the Third World and the Soviet camp and leading by example within the liberal camp. The end of the Cold War allowed American exceptionalism to ultimately emerge as the ideational foundation for the global hegemony of the United States. It encapsulated the belief that the U.S., the sole superpower, was destined to provide global leadership in a unipolar age. Where exceptionalism had previously served as argument for isolationism, separation and neutrality, and later for Cold War containment and engagement with Western Europe and East Asia, it would now serve to advocate for an interventionist and activist foreign policy, as put forth by neo-conservative thinkers like Charles Krauthammer, Robert Kagan and William Kristol, or liberal-internationalist Democrats like Madeline Albright.⁵

Indeed, such an interventionism reached its height between the second term of President Bill Clinton and the presidency of President George W. Bush, from liberal interventionism in Kosovo in 1999 to preemptive attacks on Iraq in 2003. Then, American exceptionalism became the central guidance for American engagement in international affairs, based on its unique values and the unique resources at its disposal, especially its unparalleled global military supremacy.

III. From Intervention to Example: Obama's Change

President Obama took office at a very challenging time. With the onset of the global financial crisis, the

immense difficulties of the United States fighting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the mounting domestic challenges from providing affordable health care to public indebtedness, the equation of American exceptionalism and American global leadership has come under scrutiny. Under the slogan of "change," President Obama seems to undertake a transformation of American exceptionalism in order to adjust to America's changing role in the world, which calls for America to disentangle their belief in the nation's exceptionalism from a conviction in the wisdom of global military primacy and interventionism. In the words of Professor Andrew Bacevich, for example, the United States should "exemplify" and "illuminate" the world through its "self-mastery" instead of trying to "compel" and "enforce" others.⁶

American exceptionalism in the eyes of President Obama has two folds. The first fold is that America is as exceptional as others; as the President noted when answering a question about American exceptionalism, "I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism."⁷ The second fold is about American supremacy. In the same statement, President Obama also declared that the United States was objectively exceptional in several ways:

"If you think of our current situation, the United States remains the largest economy in the world. We have unmatched military capability. We have a core set of values that are enshrined in our Constitution, in our body of law, in our democratic practices, in our belief in free speech and equality, that, though imperfect, are exceptional (...). I see no contradiction between believing that America has a continued extraordinary role in leading the world towards peace and prosperity and recognizing that leadership is incumbent, depends on, our ability to create partnerships because we can't solve these problems alone."⁸

Here we find the differences between President Obama and his predecessors, in that the latter only recognized American supremacy but not what America had in common with the rest of the world. Emphasizing both of these things at the same time does not mean that President Obama deviates from the established

⁵ Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 1, 1990/1991, pp. 2-23; Robert Kagan and William Kristol eds., *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in America's Foreign and Defence Policy*, San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000.

⁶ Andrew Bacevich, *Washington Rules*, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010, p. 231.

⁷ "News Conference by President Obama," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, April 4, 2009,

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/news-conference-president-obama-4042009>, accessed on March 30, 2014.

⁸ "News Conference by President Obama," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, April 4, 2009, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/news-conference-president-obama-4042009>, accessed on March 30, 2014.

exceptionalist consensus, nor that he unanimously endorses American exceptionalism as a vision of American global primacy and unipolarity. Instead of focusing on the sole status of the U.S. as an "indispensable nation," he argues for an exceptionalism of America's role in the world that acknowledges the unique potential the U.S. has in establishing cooperation with others in order to achieve global outcomes.

Thus, American foreign and security policy under the guidance of President Obama's understanding of American exceptionalism is a policy combining a belief in the exemplary exceptionalism of the U.S. and its values with a careful appreciation of the scope and limitations of U.S. power. Both inform his ideas about American leadership in international relations, which emphasize cooperation and restraint over a missionary exceptionalism with a singular focus on hegemony and military primacy. A geopolitical vision of engagement and cooperation for the United States was hailed by President Obama from the very beginning. For example, in his 2009 State of the Union Address, Obama said, "In words and deeds, we are showing the world that a new era of engagement has begun. For we know that America cannot meet the threats of this century alone, but the world cannot meet them without America."⁹

Such an approach is significantly different than isolationism and interventionism. The author calls it "leading through example," or using the term of President Obama, "leading from behind." President Obama has also frequently acknowledged the universality of American values and the global reach of the American ideal of freedom that he describes as inspiring people across the world. In 2011 he stated: "America's moral example must always shine for all who yearn for freedom and justice and dignity. And because we've begun this work, tonight we can say that American leadership has been renewed and America's standing has been restored."¹⁰

The "leading through example" approach seems to be influenced by what Fareed Zakaria dubbed the "post-American world," in which the "rise of the rest" is shifting the global geopolitical balance of power into an increasingly multipolar order, while the United States still remains the most powerful and influential player in

global affairs for the foreseeable future.¹¹ It's important to note that President Obama does not believe in an American decline. While acknowledging increasing power limits, Obama believes that the U.S. remains an exceptional actor in international affairs in that it is willing and capable to undertake unilateral military action across the globe, when it is deemed necessary to safeguard its national security. During his presidency, Obama has frequently maintained a commitment to America's global leadership and military strength, such as in his State of the Union Address in 2012 when he proclaimed: "(...) America remains the one indispensable nation in world affairs – and as long as I'm President, I intend to keep it that way."¹²

In sum, the American exceptionalism that President Obama advocates therefore does not doubt the economic and military strength of the United States, nor does it discard America's historical achievements or seek to diminish America's role in the world. Rather, it seeks to develop the leadership role of the United States in a cooperative, multilateral context that does not exclusively emphasize the military dimension of America's exceptional status in the world. But it does not deny its potential influence either. It's an approach of "leading through example."

IV. Illusion of Leadership: Critics from Conservatives

Like other changes President Obama made, the transformation from interventionism to example under Obama's leadership is not always a welcome development within American society. President Obama's comparison between American exceptionalism and British or Greek exceptionalism drew heavy criticism from Republican circles.

Obama's understanding about the first fold mentioned above of American exceptionalism goes directly against the Jacksonian unilateralism that dominates foreign policy views in large parts of the Republican Party and the strong emphasis on outstanding military power that began under Ronald Reagan.¹³ Thus, American exceptionalism had become a contested issue in American domestic politics about which geopolitical vision would guide the nation into the future: President Obama's approach of cooperative

⁹ Barack Obama, "Remarks of President Barack Obama – As Prepared for Delivery Address to Joint Session of Congress," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, February 24, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-Address-to-Joint-Session-of-Congress, accessed on March 30, 2014.

¹⁰ Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, January 25, 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-unionaddress>, accessed on March 30, 2014.

¹¹ Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World*, New York: W.W. Norton, 2008.

¹² Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, January 24, 2012, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24/remarks-president-state-unionaddress>, accessed on March 30, 2014.

¹³ On discussion of Jacksonian unilateralism, see especially Russell Mead, *Special Providence*, New York: Routledge, 2009, pp. 218-263.

engagement, or the Republican vision of American primacy. The presidential candidate from Republican Party, Mitt Romney had publicly declared to be a firm believer in American exceptionalism, and he repeatedly criticized Obama for “apologizing for American values.”¹⁴ He declared that, “I believe we are an exceptional country with a unique destiny and role in the world. Not exceptional, as the President has derisively said, in the way that the British think Great Britain is exceptional or the Greeks think Greece is exceptional. In Barack Obama’s profoundly mistaken view, there is nothing unique about the United States.”¹⁵

For President Obama’s conservative critics, American exceptionalism represents an item of faith, defining America’s national greatness, and the ideational foundation that should animate the country’s grand strategy. A policy that is seen as moving away from the U.S. hegemony is therefore seen as antithetical to American exceptionalism. For example, Bill O’Reilly, multiple bestselling author and host of the conservative *Fox News Channel*’s top rated *The O’Reilly Factor*, explained: “(...) Barack Obama is an internationalist, which means he believes America does not have an ‘exceptional’ place in the world.”¹⁶ *The Obama Diaries*, which topped the *New York Times* non-fiction bestseller list in August 2010, devoted its entire opening chapter to the issue of American exceptionalism and its endangered status under the Obama Administration.¹⁷ Here, the conservative political commentator Laura Ingraham stated:

“His [Obama’s] recitation of America’s purported sins creates an equivalency between the United States and nations that do not begin to approach our economic, military, or cultural strength. [...] As described by the president, the United States seems like just another defective member of the League of Nations.”¹⁸

President Obama’s approach to international relations and foreign policy was and is seen as deeply flawed by conservative critics, because it is supposedly not rooted in a belief in American exceptionalism, but motivated by a negative view of the international role the United States has played in the past. A President who frequently

stresses international cooperation and multilateral approaches to global governance, and who has distanced himself from the unilateralism associated with the previous George W. Bush Administration, was repeatedly criticized for constantly “apologizing” for America, even going on an alleged “apology tour” around the world, when he first came to office.¹⁹

From the perspective of his conservative critics, Obama’s idea of cooperative engagement with countries that are seen as weaker than the United States, or even as enemies, such as Iran or North Korea, appears as a violation of the unique values exceptionalism is supposed to represent. Here, we can see how American exceptionalism remains entwined with the neo-conservative belief in American global primacy as the unchallenged leadership of the United States as the planet’s sole superpower. This ideological stance on American leadership echoes the agenda of the former Project for a New American Century, a neo-conservative group that would prove highly influential during the George W. Bush Administration.

Fears that President Obama, due to his “exotic” upbringing, multicultural background, and ideological disposition, is somehow “un-American,” are frequently raised on the American Right. Obama is seen as undermining or negating the exceptionalism of the United States, embracing America’s enemies, while simultaneously trying to make America more like others, especially socialist Europe, through the expansion of government programs, most notably the Affordable Care Act, or as it has become known, Obamacare. In addition, the Obama Administration’s alleged weak stance in the Iranian nuclear crisis, its management of the Arab Spring, and the strained relationship with Israel are frequently singled out for conservative criticism.

From the moment Barack Obama appeared on the national stage, conservatives have been searching for the best way to describe the danger he poses to America’s traditional way of life. Gradually, a unifying theme took hold. “At the heart of the debate over Obama’s program,” declared Rich Lowry and Ramesh Ponnuru in an influential 2010 *National Review* cover story, is “the survival of American exceptionalism”.²⁰ In

¹⁴ Scott Wilson, “Obama, Romney Differ on U.S. exceptionalism,” *Washington Post*, September 26, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-09-26/politics/35497342_1_obama-and-romney-exceptionalism-clinton-global-initiative, accessed on October 1, 2012.

¹⁵ Glenn Kessler, “Mitt Romney’s ‘apology’ fixation,” *The Washington Post*, October 7, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/romney-apology-fixation/2011/10/07/gIQA0I8ySL_blog.html, accessed on November 2, 2012.

¹⁶ Bill O’Reilly, *Pinheads and Patriots*, New York: Harper Collins, 2010, p. 87.

¹⁷ Laura Ingraham, *The Obama Diaries*, New York: Threshold, 2010, pp. 24-30.

¹⁸ Laura Ingraham, *The Obama Diaries*, New York: Threshold, 2010, p. 13.

¹⁹ Joe Sterling, “CNN Fact Check: Obama Went on An Apology Tour, Romney and Others Say,” *CNN*, October 23, 2012, <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/23/politics/fact-check-apology-tour/index.html>, accessed on October 24, 2012.

²⁰ Ramesh Ponnuru, “An Exceptional Debate,” *National Review*, March 8, 2010.

sum, President Obama's change in terms of American exceptionalism is scrutinized for being anti-exceptional, and therefore anti-American by its very design; even more, the election of President Obama has signaled a disruption to the established American identity.

V. Drifting Sands: Social Basis for Obama's Change

To liberals, the charge that Obama threatens American exceptionalism is daft. When conservatives say American exceptionalism is imperiled, they're onto something. In fundamental ways, America is becoming less exceptional. Where Republicans go wrong is in claiming that the Obama presidency is the cause of this decline. It's actually the result.²¹ In other words, the shift from intervention to example has a social basis.

Most significantly, this shift seems to reflect a certain generational change. A 2011 Pew poll found that only 32% of the current Millennial generation in the U.S. thought their country was "the greatest in the world" — compared to 72% of those between the ages of 76-83.²² An upgraded poll about American exceptionalism and patriotism was done in 2013, showing a similar trend. When Americans were asked if they think the United States is the greatest country in the world, there were sharp differences in the responses across generations. In total, 48% of Americans believe the United States is the greatest country in the world and 42% believe it is one of the greatest countries in the world, but a significant portion of the Millennial generation responded differently. Just 32% of Millennials believe the U.S. is the greatest country in the world. That number progressively increases among the Gen X (48%), Boomer (50%) and Silent generations (64%). Millennials were also the most likely generation to say America is not the greatest country in the world (11%).²³ The geopolitical vision of shared leadership and global engagement that President Obama seeks to implement seems to reflect the post-American future rather than the hegemonic past of America's role in world politics.

Meanwhile, the global financial crisis and the debate about American decline have also fundamentally not discredited the idea of American exceptionalism, or displaced it as a powerful myth about America's role in the world. In another 2011 Pew research poll, nine out of ten Americans, across party lines, said that the United States either stands above all other countries in the

world (38%) or is one of the greatest along with some others (53%).²⁴ A Gallup Poll series shows a trend of decreasing willingness of the American public to engage in world affairs (figure 1). Another series of polls by CBS News show a similar trend. Asked the question of "do you think the United States should or should not take the leading role among all other countries in the world in trying to solve international conflicts?", about 58% of reviewers responded "should not," 22 points more than those who responded "should"; the gap in 2002 was only 4 points (figure 2).




Figure 1: America's Role in World Affairs

Question: "Next we would like you to think about the role the U.S. should play in trying to solve international problems. Do you think the U.S. should take the leading role in world affairs, take a major role but not the leading role, take a minor role, or take no role at all in world affairs?"

Source: Gallup Poll, February 2-5, 2011, <http://www.pollingreport.com/defense.htm#Affairs>, accessed on March 30, 2014.

²¹ Peter Beinart, "The End of American Exceptionalism," *National Journal*, February 3, 2014, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-end-of-american-exceptionalism-20140203>, accessed on March 30, 2014.

²² "Generational Divide Over American Exceptionalism," *Pew Research Center*, November 18, 2011, <http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/generational-divide-over-american-exceptionalism/>, accessed 6 October 2013.

²³ Katie Reilly, "A Generational Gap in American Patriotism," *Pew Research Center*, July 3, 2013, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/07/03/a-generational-gap-in-american-patriotism/>, accessed on March 30, 2014.

²⁴ "Beyond Red vs. Blue: The Political Typology," *Pew Research Center*, May 4, 2011, <http://www.people-press.org/2011/05/04/section-5-views-of-government-constitution-american-exceptionalism/>, accessed on March 30, 2014.




Figure 2: America's Role in World Affairs

Question: "Do you think the United States should or should not take the leading role among all other countries in the world in trying to solve international conflicts?"

Source: CBS News Poll, March 20-23, 2014, <http://www.pollingreport.com/defense.htm#Affairs>, accessed on March 30, 2014.

However, it's important to note that there is a negative relationship between American declining power and willingness for leading through intervention, and the willingness of working through international organizations like UN for leading by example. A Gallup Poll in 2013 shows the American public's decreasing appreciation of UN performance (figure 3) and decreasing confidence in the necessity of the UN (figure 4). Such a paradox implies some kind of worry about the future of President Obama's change of the direction of American exceptionalism.




Figure 3: United Nations Performance

Question: "Do you think the United Nations is doing a good job or a poor job in trying to solve the problems it has had to face?"

Source: Gallup Poll. February 25-26, 2013, <http://www.pollingreport.com/defense.htm#Affairs>, accessed on March 30, 2014.




Figure 4: United Nations Necessity

Question: "In your view, does the United Nations play a necessary role in the world today, or not?"

Source: Gallup Poll. February 25-26, 2013, <http://www.pollingreport.com/defense.htm#Affairs>, accessed on March 30, 2014.

IV. To Be a Normal Country: Future of American Exceptionalism

The historical evolution of American exceptionalism, in regard to its impacts on American foreign and security policy, was a movement from one extreme (isolationism) to another extreme (interventionism). Under Barack Obama's administration, foreign and security policy under the guidance of American exceptionalism is moving to a more balanced approach, which is leading through example. While President Obama still believes in American exceptionalism, he realizes the limitations of American power and designs his grand strategy according to new realities, both domestic and international. However, there is significant opposition from the Republican or conservative camp; in the meantime, the social support that forms the basis of Obama's change seems not very concrete. The future trajectory of American exceptionalism seems full of uncertainty.

It's important to note that current thinking about the future of American exceptionalism is, to some extent, narrowly focused on American society's transformation and the economic power shift from the U.S. to emerging powers, such as China. It's important to note that there are still other power shifts that indicate the normalization of America, or end of American exceptionalism. The first is the power shift from sovereign states to non-state actors. The rise of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society groups (CSGs), multi-national companies (MNCs), intergovernmental organizations (INOs), and even prominent individuals, now makes power and political authority diffuse above, below and alongside (across/above) the state. Given the

diversification of international actors, the sovereign state is now just one actor, though possibly the most important one. Anyway, the U.S. is now just one member of the big family of sovereign states; no matter how exceptional it is, it's a sovereign state when facing non-state actors, which makes the U.S. a normal actor and the American exceptionalism lose weight.

Another power shift process is happening across issue areas, from political and security issues to economic, social, cultural and environmental issues. Such a power shift is sometimes referred to as the rise of non-traditional security issues. In other words, the proliferation of security concepts across non-political and non-security sectors, with the support of securitization theory advocated by the Copenhagen School, contributes a lot to the functional expansion of international relations. Given this context, the traditional understanding of power is under scrutiny. Various new concepts of power are emerging, such as the concepts of hard, soft and smart power advocated by Joseph Nye, Jr., and concepts of structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership coined by Oran Young²⁵, etc. The opening of the power "Pandora's Box" has many significant consequences for international life. One of the most important is that it highlights the power limits and comparative advantage of each individual country. With the increasing obviousness of American power limitations, American exceptionalism as a guiding factor in American foreign and security policy will gradually diminish.

Thus, from a long-term view, as the result of multiple power shift processes, the rising of non-traditional security issues and the public anxiety and antipathy toward extensive U.S. international engagement, it's inevitable that American exceptionalism will guide the U.S. to be an example for others to follow, which will cause the normalization of American foreign and security policy. The transformation launched by President Obama is just the beginning of this long-term historic process. Americans should prepare earlier for such a future.

²⁵ Oran P. Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in

International Society," *International Organization*, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 281–308.



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DELEGATING LEADERSHIP: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA

In the post-hegemonic world in which we live, the U.S. is confronted with many challenges, one of which regards the relative decline of its overall influence in Latin America. This raises the question of how this phenomenon came about in the first place, and what the U.S. should or could do about it. Another closely related question regards American leadership; is it possible for the United States to recover its past leadership in the region, and is it in its national interest to do so given the costs that it would imply? Or, if not, what would be the best way to manage the lessening of its leverage in Latin America? These are all questions that we intend to answer in the following paragraphs.

The Decline of American Influence

The debate about U.S. decline has been a recurrent one in American academia. During the 1970s, for example, the loss of the Vietnam War had brought many to believe that the United States was already a waning power; again during the late 80s, many thought Japan would surpass the U.S.'s economic output, signaling the precocious decadence of the United States. Today it's all about the rise of China, and yet a growing number of scholars tend to treat the question of America's decline with rising skepticism, while others still

do so, perhaps with some exaggeration. So why do we talk about it with regards to Latin America? And what do we mean by a relative decline of influence? To answer, we first need to make some useful distinctions. As Joseph Nye has pointed out, power can be understood in two fundamental ways: power as the possession of resources (that essentially implies the ability of a country to do something on its own), and power as capability to influence the behavior of others (the ability to make others do what one wants)¹. In Latin America's case the U.S. has obviously never ceased to have the first (it is still by far the major power in the region), yet it is in the latter sense that it has seen a reduction of leverage. This is why for the sake of clarity I prefer to talk of declining influence rather than decline in power. And this relates to another crucial aspect of this debate: America's willingness to exercise its influence and its willingness to assume the leadership of the region.

Perhaps the easiest way to appreciate America's relative declining influence in Latin America is to compare the ascendancy that it enjoyed in the past, especially during the greater part of the twentieth century, with the situation today, perceiving the increase in economic power and growing re-assertiveness of other states in the region. In this regard Michael Shifter has correctly pointed out that "over the past decade or so, Latin America has changed in profound ways. Many Latin American economies have performed well and have multiplied their global ties. Politically, they are increasingly confident on the world stage. More than in the recent past, the United States is now but one of many countries involved in the region's affairs"².

In broad terms, Latin America has benefited greatly from current trends in globalization. As former Foreign Minister of Bolivia, Gustavo Fernandez, has emphasized: in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the price of Latin America's raw materials has risen, total exports of the region have almost tripled, the weight of external debt has diminished by half, monetary reserves have risen, poverty has been reduced and the region as a whole has enjoyed high rates of GDP growth³. In this context the relative value of the U.S. as a source of financial capital and as a market for Latin American and Caribbean exports has shrunk. The U.S.'s share of total Latin American and Caribbean exports fell from 58% to 39% between 2000 and 2011, and its share

¹ Joseph Nye, Jr (2011). *The Future of Power*, Public Affairs, New York, p.5-10.

² Statement of Michael Shifter, President Inter-American Dialogue, at the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, "U.S. Disengagement from Latin America: Compromised Security and Economic Interests", March 25, 2014. In:

<http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20140325/101958/HHRG-113-FA07-Wstate-ShifterM-20140325.pdf> last access 5-20-2014.

³ Translation from the author. Gustavo Fernández (2013). *Espejos y Espejismos: las relaciones entre América Latina y Estados Unidos*. In: *Revista Nueva Sociedad*, No. 246, Julio-Agosto 2013, p.82, Buenos Aires. Also in: www.nuso.org

of imports fell from 49% to 32% between 2000 and 2010"⁴. Clearly countries in the region are finding new markets, and China stands out amongst them. In the past few years, the Chinese have overtaken the U.S. as the main trading partner of Brazil, Chile, and Peru, while being the second of many others. In most cases this all comes after a long period of U.S. economic dominance in the region of more than fifty years.

Economic growth and lower external debt ratios have also meant that Latin America has become less dependent on institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), traditional stages of American leverage. Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina have, for example, recently paid their debts to the IMF, and countries like Venezuela (who also paid its debt to the IMF) now find cheap credits elsewhere, mainly resorting to Chinese state funds. As Fernandez pointed out "South America does not depend any more on the help and financial flows of the World Bank and IDB. Brazil's National Bank of Economic and Social Development (BNDES) is bigger than both institutions; the Andean Development Corporation (CAF) has consolidated itself as a regional financial institution... If the IMF acts in the future, undoubtedly it will not be able to use the traditional mechanisms or recipes"⁵.

Evidently, globalization has brought more economic pluralism and autonomy to the region. The U.S. is still the main economic actor, but it's no longer the sole hegemon, and this has meant a loss of relative influence. Of course, the region's economic growth has nevertheless benefitted the U.S. too, to the point that even if its total share in Latin American trade has diminished, its net value has increased (between 2000 and 2012 total U.S. trade with Latin America and the Caribbean had more than doubled)⁶. In any case, the novelty now is that there is more and bigger economic competition in the region than before, where powers like China are contesting U.S. predominance. To address this, Mitt Romney's call for increased economic engagement with Latin America seems to point in the right direction, and Obama's recent Look South Policy is also an encouraging sign in this regard.

Economics aside, another big telltale sign of waning influence is the weakening of the American-led post-Second World War hemispheric order. The twin

pillars that the U.S. designed to channel inter-American dialogue and disseminate its own interests have seen better days, and America's inaction to defend them or propose any alternatives is a revealing fact of how little it prioritizes the region. True, the Rio Defense Treaty of 1947 (which incidentally was the first post-War regional collective security agreement ever created) had faded into almost complete irrelevance long before there was any talk of American decline in power. But in the case of the Organization of American States (OAS) the situation is quite different. In the last decade it has lost its predominant role as main regional forum to discuss and resolve political, economic and security matters. New organizations have crept up like the Union of South American States (UNASUR) and the Community for Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), with the specific although unannounced aim to exclude the U.S. from Latin American and South American affairs. These organizations are young and have yet to prove their resilience and efficacy; however, they pose potential limits to U.S. influence by splitting the region in two. Countries with differing agendas from the U.S. could potentially choose on a case-by-case basis whether to go to the OAS or UNASUR. Thus, the risk for the U.S. to be marginalized from Western Hemisphere affairs has become stronger, creating a strategic weakness that should be addressed in Washington.

To a great extent this situation has been brought about by the rise of anti-American parties in some key countries in the region. The Havana-Caracas axis, while benefitting from Washington's indifference, has actively pursued a policy of containing American influence. As CELAC, UNASUR, and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) attest, they have at least been partially successful.

Lastly, another area in which declining American influence can be observed (and actually has been the most pronounced of all), regards military-to-military relations. With the end of the Cold War, U.S. military cooperation with Latin American armed forces has been substantially scaled down, including military aid and training programs. As Professor J. Samuel Fitch has pointed out, "with few exceptions the present ability of the United States to influence the Latin American militaries is far removed from the dominant role it played

⁴ Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (Cepal): *Panorama de la inserción internacional de América Latina 2011-2012. Crisis duradera en el centro y nuevas oportunidades para las economías en desarrollo*, onu, Santiago de Chile, 2012, p.20, in: www.eclac.cl/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/publicaciones/xml/1/47981/P47981.xml&; Cepal: *Panorama de la inserción internacional de América Latina 2010-2011. La región en la década de las economías emergentes*, onu, Santiago de Chile, 2011, p.70, in: <http://www.cepal.org/cgi->

[bin/getProd.asp?xml=/publicaciones/xml/9/44349/P44349.xml&xml=/comercio/tpl/p9f.xml&base=/tpl/top-bottom_xslt](http://www.cepal.org/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/publicaciones/xml/9/44349/P44349.xml&xml=/comercio/tpl/p9f.xml&base=/tpl/top-bottom_xslt)

⁵ Gustavo Fernández, ob. cit., p.85.

⁶ From the U.S. stand point, in 2000 Latin American trade accounted for 19% of total U.S. trade, and by 2012 it had reached 22%. See: J.F. Hornbeck "U.S.-Latin America Trade and Investment in the 21st Century: What's Next for Deepening Integration?", p.3 in: <http://thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3487>

in the 1950s and 1960s⁷. And this loss concerns mainly the big players in the region, countries like Argentina, Chile and Brazil.

Benign Neglect: The U.S. a Reluctant Regional Power

The good news (or worrying news, depending on how one sees it) is that the decline of U.S. influence in the Americas is not wholly due to the process of globalization nor to external political events, but rather in a big way a consequence of Washington's own policy towards the region. Its unwillingness to lead, leaving the region to itself, has been all too evident since George W. Bush's administration. The truth is that historically the U.S. government has engaged actively in the region mainly when it has perceived an incoming national security threat, be it from outside the Western Hemisphere (approaching war in Europe – Good Neighbor Policy) or from within (Cuban Revolution – Alliance for Progress, support for counterinsurgency in Central America). After the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy lost its appeal to many of the Latin American countries; a halfhearted plan to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas drifted, and the war on drugs was seen as having little benefit to the Latin American countries. The alternative for the U.S. was to abandon a comprehensive strategy in favor of a minimalist, case-by-case approach, like Plan Colombia or individual bilateral Trade Agreements demonstrated. Then 9/11 signaled the death knell of George W. Bush's attempt to re-launch U.S. Latin American relations, placing the region definitively at the bottom of Washington's priority list.

It is true that a combination of crises in Asia and the Middle East, along with the perception of declining national security threats (besides the drug war), all contributed to American disengagement from the region. But from then on a self-defeating policy of "benign neglect" has been in order. Yet it must be said that notwithstanding Obama's retrenchment and "downsizing" of its foreign policy engagements due in part to budgetary constraints, there seem to be new and encouraging signs of change in his second term (mainly the already mentioned Look South Policy and the new rapprochement to Pacific Alliance countries). In any case only time will tell whether this new course will be sustained.

⁷ J. Samuel Fitch (1993). The Decline of US Military Influence in Latin America. In: *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Summer, 1993), pp. 1-49; also in: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/165943>

⁸ Luis Fleischman (2013): *Latin America in the Post-Chávez Era. The Security Threat to the United States*, Potomac Books, Washington, p.167.

Unwillingness to Lead: the Consequences of Delegating Leadership

Benign Neglect has essentially meant leaving the region to itself. U.S. unwillingness to lead has left a vacuum that has been filled by a more re-assertive Brazil and China. In the case of Brazil, its political and economic rise in the region has coincided with U.S. withdrawal from it. A kind of unintended delegation of leadership has operated, and the outcome has been to the detriment of overall U.S. political interests.

Policy makers in Washington should understand that U.S.-Brazilian interests in some cases coincide but in others overlap. For example, it's amusing to see how George W. Bush's Administration considered using Lula's government as a tool to counterbalance the anti-American chavista revolution in Venezuela. As former senior director for Western Hemisphere affairs on the National Security Council (2005-2009), Daniel Fisk, once exclaimed, "President Lula eventually never restrained Chavez's behavior but rather became an enabler of Chavez"⁸. One wonders if anyone in the U.S. Administration was ever surprised by this rather obvious outcome. The fact of the matter is that the Lula-Dilma governments have not only enabled chavismo in Venezuela, but have also helped foster and protect anti-American leftist governments in the region. At least that's been their intention, like in the case of Honduras when Lula tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to reinstate Zelaya in power, or in the case of Fernando Lugo in Paraguay. Showing scant regard for the defense of democratic values and human rights, Brazil has benefited economically and geopolitically from the hard left-wing governments of Central and South America. A recent example of this was Rousseff's inauguration of the expanded Mariel deep sea port, something that will undoubtedly benefit Cuba's dictatorship.

In this sense Obama's "Brazil-first" approach to Latin America affairs, enacted during his first term, yielded poor results. Metaphorically it was like entrusting U.S. interests in the European Union to France, a country that traditionally has wanted to see the reduction of American influence in Europe⁹. I contend that Brazil has been, and still is, an unreliable partner on whom to count for regional leadership, not only because it traditionally has pursued an autonomous foreign policy from the U.S., but also because in principle strong countries don't

⁹ It is true that under Sarkozy and Hollande France has taken a more pro-Atlantic stance compared with previous governments, yet it still remains to be seen if this policy will last. In the case of Brazil no similar proclivity to coincide with U.S. policy goals has been observed.

balance small ones, they aim instead to exercise hegemony over them.

Conclusions

Globalization as well as unchecked external political events in the region have left the United States with less relative influence than what it used to enjoy decades ago. The decline of a perceived security threat from the neighborhood, along with concurrent crises in the Middle East and Asia, have all contributed to a foreign policy of disengagement that essentially dates from 9/11. The outcome of all this has been a Latin America left to itself, drifting away from America's traditional hold. To a certain extent this vacuum has been filled by Brazil's growing re-assertiveness, a spread of anti-American governments, and an increasing presence of new extra-hemispheric actors like China, Russia and Iran. As Secretary of State Kerry mentioned last fall, the Monroe Doctrine seems truly dead.

Yet one must admit that given America's strength, its overall declining influence in the region is not as dramatic as it may seem. Of the three areas where real decline can be perceived (political, economic and military), the first is arguably the most worrisome. Brazil's expanding influence, the weakening of the OAS and rise of UNASUR-CELAC, the survival of the now struggling populist anti-American regimes, and the presence of hostile powers such as Russia and Iran, are the problems that potentially could have greater negative impacts on U.S. interests. In the economic field, the U.S. has benefitted anyway from the region's growth; it will mainly have to devise strategies to reassert its position in a much more competitive environment where it is no longer the sole actor. And lastly, even though it has lost influence over the military establishment of the Latin American armed forces, reestablishing them to the extent seen in the heydays of the Cold War is not only unnecessary but also, given past experience of coup d'etats, actually undesirable.

In times of strained budgets, policy makers in Washington will have to figure out how best to resolve the aforementioned challenges. Strategies in this regard are plentiful, like undermining hostile schemes such as Petrocaribe (a topic already discussed during the North American Leaders summit in Mexico earlier this year). The U.S. should do things to bolster the demand for its presence and guidance, like taking the lead in promoting democracy and human rights, defending and strengthening the OAS and its Democratic Charter. This will all appeal to influential social groups in countries that oppose their authoritarian hybrid regimes, and will prove particularly important at a time when a new wave of liberalism

seems to be at the doorsteps of the continent (a possible Caribbean-Andean Spring). The U.S. should of course do everything it can to make this happen. Finally, to pose as a balancer or alternative to Brazilian-Chinese influence also attracts the adherence of other countries. This has already happened to a certain extent with the Trans-Pacific Partnership, where countries look favorably at the prospect of America's participation.



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A NEW WORLD OF PLURALISM: THE ROLE OF THE USA

The first part of the title of this article conjures up the tone of an uncanny idealism or wishful liberalism or one may simply say normative naivety, which is rather imposing on the second part of the title. Acknowledging the apparent fluidity of the subject is meant to avoid unwarranted build-ups of value judgment while going through the arguments and analysis put forward.

When talking about the world we live in and the world orders that states tend to construct, the general tendency is to end up with a few alternative models of a polarized world. It is easier to see the world as uni-polar, bi-polar or multi-polar. In slightly flexible terms, the same models can be referred to as uni-lateral, bi-lateral and multi-lateral. However we describe the world using these terms, it is always portrayed as a rather disjointed confrontational territory where multiple actors, and of course in this case only states, are engaged in a competition of forming their respective poles and attracting as many fellows as possible. This is a center-peripheral motion mechanism that thickens the whole pole and hence, makes it stronger than others or suppresses the rise of 'others'. States' security concerns have always been the thematic driver of this motion, which fits perfectly in the Realist discourse of International Relations, even though Idealists often mask it over with their requirements of collective security.

The idea of a new world of pluralism is essentially based on mutual recognition and coexistence. Instead of trying to view the world as a confrontational system, it prefers

the concept of an international society where confrontation and cooperation exist as two omnipresent possibilities. It does not exclude the possibility of emergence and re-emergence of the aforementioned models of world order. But, on top of all of these possibilities, it emphasizes on the rationality of being independent and letting others be independent too. In this approach, hegemony of any state, nation, civilization or community over others is viewed as untenable considering the long-term security concerns of states. Especially in a world made up of diverse identities in terms of culture, values, ideologies, religions and systems, seeking security by practicing hegemonic power tends to result in insecurity. Therefore, the idea that has been advanced in this article deals with the following issues:

1. The background or context and rationale of this proposition
2. What the current global picture shows us
3. Why the United States is important in this discussion
4. Blazing the trail, as usual?

The Background or Context and Rationale

Rise of X and Fall of Y and their relationship on the ground: I would like to start with an idea that is reaching significant prevalence nowadays, that essentially views the United States of America (USA) as a declining power in the wake of an Asian giant, the People's Republic of China (PRC), even though these two countries have never been involved in a serious political or military rivalry. Rather, during the Cold War, despite being a communist country, China had always been a strategic ally of the US. Even after the collapse of Soviet Union, when the US pursued unilateralism in many aspects of international relations, China didn't appear to be a serious opponent of US policies. China's concerns over the two gulf wars and a few other instances can be viewed as a routine practice on the part of a permanent member state of the United Nations Security Council. In this period, China didn't try to expand her strategic interests in a way that would overlap those of the US. Similarly, Chinese interests in the Far East were also quietly respected by the US. Consequently, the two countries never needed to confront each other in a way that could jeopardize their continuing understanding since the Cold War.

Furthermore, China's continuing move towards market economy and participation in the global capitalist system developed a level of confidence among her Western counterparts. Even though China falls far short of being a democracy and of promoting individual freedom, the growing economic interdependence with

China has been an important post-Cold War international phenomenon.

Nevertheless, tensions between the US and China began to surface on the economic front, and there is no denying the fact that they have spilled over into other sectors too. Particularly, China's intention to strengthen her military has caused raised eyebrows among most analysts of international relations. The plain truth that has appeared to them is that China is heading towards the position of a global superpower and it may unseat the existing superpower: the US.

Though the West and China mutually collaborated in the rise of China and this collaboration is still continuing, many in the West treat China as a new Frankenstein. This 'Fear' factor affects the relationship between the West, especially the United States, and China.

The Fear factor: The fact of the matter is: 'Fear' of losing hegemony over others and being subject to some others' hegemony has always been an important issue in international relations. Starting from the time of Greek city-states up to the Cold War, this fear dominated much of international relations. Many times, it produces pre-emptive actions by some states and hence, a series of conflicts and wars as a manifestation of the domino effect. At the same time, nations tried different other strategies too, in order to overcome this fear. The strategy or policy of 'Balance of Power' is one of them. Whether this policy has ever produced substantial stability and peace is highly debatable. However, it is still as important as it was in the nineteenth-century world. Based on the Realist notion of security, nations tend to form different types of alliances to protect themselves in the face of any threat, especially a military one. During the Cold War era, this sort of balancing among states culminated in a highly polarized world. Arguably, it provided a prolonged period of quasi-peace and stability. But the number of proxy wars the super-powers fought and the number of casualties and above all the constant presence of the fear of being annihilated by an opponent's nuclear attack during the Cold War made that period one of the most undesired times in the history of mankind. Just consider the vocabulary that was invented and used in official documents and academia in the 1960s. The concepts of 'Massive Retaliation,' 'Mutual Assured Destruction,' and so on showed us how paranoid nations were about security issues. This concern has always been followed by massive arms races and inventions of more destructive weapons, the sheer presence of which has made the world more vulnerable than ever.

The End-Clash-hypotheses and the Ideational Winter: The unexpected and unforeseen collapse of the Soviet

Union contributed to a very strange form of euphoria across many groups of people, ranging from commoners to political leaders. Even scholars like Francis Fukuyama came up with the idea of the 'End of history' that focused on the triumphant liberal democracy. On the other hand, Samuel P. Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' hypothesis warned the world of an impending threat of somewhat inevitable clashes between different civilizations. Though these hypotheses captured the attention of policy makers and of people in general, they could not form a strong post-Cold War theoretical foundation. Rather, an 'ideational winter' loomed over the intellectual map of the world.

In the meantime, what remained unforeseen and unwarranted was the very complexity of the human notions of organization, system and different other spectrums of human life on earth, many of which are derived from their respective primordial and instrumental attachments to belief-systems, religions, sets of values, ways of life and so on. Trying to understand all these sources of differentiation among humans with a single theory or hypothesis, or suggesting some solution for all the confrontations, tensions, conflicts and wars caused by the aforementioned differences singlehandedly is an approach that is highly susceptible to naivety. What humans can do, at most, is figure out a way to minimize conflicts. In this regard, developing the attitude of coexisting with others, even though the 'Others' are very different in many respects of life, is a very pressing need, especially at this point in the history of civilizations, where we are caught up in a very paradoxical situation. This paradox guides us to further confusion and strife, and it heavily impacts the human notion of security. The developments, especially the technological ones, of the last century have brought the whole world closer together than ever before. We have seen increasing interdependence and multi-level cooperation among states, nations and peoples. At the same time, getting closer to each other has reshaped our perceptions of fear and security. Sometimes, the high level of fear and insecurity amounts to different 'hysterical' behaviors and measures that are taken to ensure security. The most counterproductive of all those measures could be new arms races that may result in a catastrophic event in history, which would contradict what the states want most passionately in their eternal search for security.

Without getting into the question of whether nations should opt for armament or disarmament, one can easily take a different route that leads us to the same destination: security. In this article, the term 'security' is being used as a highly relative concept that is fundamentally different from the traditional notion of security. Whereas the traditional notion of security is

based on the 'us-others' binary analysis and calculation, here security is viewed as a mutual state of human existence on earth, where fighting and winning wars does not ensure security. As long as 'others' are insecure, 'we' are not secure either. Lest the readers get misled, it should be mentioned here that seeking or advocating or conceptualizing 'security in absolute terms' is not a goal of this article at all. What I am proposing here is that no nation can achieve security without trying to ensure security for all. And this 'trying' includes forming a system where peoples co-exist with mutual differences. History says security won by winning wars does not last long; such is the case with imposing ideas, ideologies and systems. Hegemonic security of any form is nothing but a breeding ground of reactionary forces that conceive further insecurity.

At this point, I think I have already set the stage to talk about pluralism in practice. Pluralism as a phenomenon has existed all through the ages in different ways, but mostly in a small scale and within contexts. It has never been able to reach its peak in human history. Pluralism in practice has always lacked necessary universal components and thus, it remains as a concept which is still in the stages of development and experimentation.

What the current Global Picture shows us

Let's consider some twentieth-century developments and early twenty-first-century indications that may have constituted the global picture we might be interested in. The great pace and intensity with which the political map of the world changed in the first half of the twentieth century has had a profound impact on all subsequent global trends. The following two points are meant to reveal the global picture that has been drawn throughout this period:

1. A sudden upsurge in the number of states, formation of international (more correctly inter-state) organizations and emergence of politico-economic ideological confrontations among the states were the three major trends that had both converging and diverging effects. Cultural Nations opted for political nationalism and became Political Nations, often at the cost of their cultural boundaries. Nationalism transformed many disintegrated peoples into integrated wholes. However, ethnic nations like the Kurds suffered losses of territorial integrity and communal cohesion due to manipulative nationalism. Furthermore, domestic or internal convergence inevitably spawned international divergence and hence created the need to form international organizations. Nevertheless, the universal ethos of political nationalism has

never been fully realized. Rather, nationalist projects got significantly thwarted and complicated due to the advent of politico-economic ideologies like communism. Even religion to some extent played an important role in shaping and reshaping nations and states.

2. Information and communication technology (ICT) is probably the single most important factor that has changed the world at its very core. The global phenomenon that goes by the name of globalization owes a lot to ICT. Through ICT and globalization, people-to-people contact has become easier in revolutionary ways. It has facilitated economic interdependence and cultural exchange. International trade has become the cornerstone of the whole system. Unquestionably, ICT and globalization have been converging factors in the first place. But this global convergence has revealed another very important dimension of humanity, better than anything else that came before it. That dimension is diversity. In this age, people identify each other with all their similarities and dissimilarities. The more they intermingle using the tools of globalization, the better they know themselves. They compete with each other, and they cooperate too. Sometimes this competition and cooperation at the international level creates tension, too. The sweet and sour relationship between the US and China exemplifies this better than any other example. US-Venezuela and US-Brazil economic relations are mentionable as well. The fact of the matter is that despite having opposing ideals and worldviews, these nations do what globalization requires them to do.

So, it seems that despite many drastic, revolutionary and transformative changes in the last one century or so, the world remains as diverse as it has always been. Interestingly, in this age of convergence, diversity seems to have become more resilient than before. Additionally, it leads us to argue that the global system we are living in is inherently plural by nature.

Why the US is important in this discussion

The second part of the title of this article concerns the US directly, although any discussion of pluralism must include the country almost habitually. The very foundation of the US demography and formation of the polity make this political nation inevitable in the discourse of pluralism. The US is considered a nation of immigrants. Furthermore, it didn't set any criteria for immigrants on the basis of race, ethnicity, geography,

religion, class, political ideology and so on. This has made the US the single most pluralistic country on earth. The country has achieved strong cohesion among different groups of people of different racial, cultural, linguistic and religious backgrounds to form a political nation despite having a long history of racial tension and turbulence. But, gone are those days. Today, the US boasts a population that represents the whole world. Walking down the streets of New York or any other big cities of the US, one can easily experience one of the greatest feats of modern human history: unity in diversity. Many other countries are walking along the same line, but it is the US who pioneered the phenomenon and championed the cause. The formula is very simple: you obey the laws, and I don't care who you are. We coexist.

However, at the international level the US is yet to recognize, implement and support pluralism as a grand approach to transforming the world into a better and safer place to live in. After a long period of isolationism, since the First World War it has been engaging itself in world affairs, often with a professed messianic role, but this did not always match up with its actions on the ground, mostly due to the constant presence of Realist security concerns. Especially during the Cold War, US policies had largely been formulated in response to those of the Soviet Union or vice versa. The ideological conflict between the superpowers created a considerable amount of mistrust and suspicion among different groups, communities or nations of humanity. However, though it was thought to be largely a zero-sum game, the superpowers managed to restrain each other from resorting to annihilation. This proves, whether we recognize it or not, that to some extent they had to practice pluralism. Especially after the Cuban Missile Crisis during the period of *détente*, 'peaceful co-existence' was a policy accepted by both powers. The US's partnership with China was another strange mix of Realism and pluralism during cold war.

It seems to be that the actors of international relations adopt pluralism as a last resort to maintain and ensure their security. Had the case been otherwise, the world's security situation could have been significantly different. In a pluralistic world, actors co-exist first and then resolve problems. And the policy of co-existence makes it easier to reach a solution.

Blazing the Trail, as usual?

At present, the US is the most powerful nation in the world. However, maintaining this position is now their biggest concern. Scholars talk about the concept of power in different novel ways these days. Hard power, soft power and smart power are some of the ideas that were derived from the concern over the future of US

power. Some even go so far as to suggest the end of power. However rhetorical this sounds, it has significant implications for policy choices. Therefore, choosing the right idea and concept of power is another important task for the US and all powers in general. Sharing the views of Constructivism, it is the ideas, concepts and knowledge, and their transmission, that define reality. In short, inter-subjectivity is the key issue here. Building upon Habermasian dialogue, we can conclude that countries can engage in dialogue even with their arch enemies. And dialogue can change the nature of power dimensions within international society. Going back to Constructivism, if war and conflict are social constructions, cooperation is a social construction too, and so is co-existence.

Having been successful with a carefully chosen path to form a plural society domestically, the US has a degree of advantage over others. If the US can utilize its advantage, using the global reach of its population which has come from every corner of the world, the country can continue to blaze the trail, but in a different way.



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CONCEPTUALISING CYBER-PHYSICAL POWER IN THE EARLY 21ST CENTURY: IS THE UNITED STATES WINNING OR LOSING?

Introduction

Global power relations are reconfiguring themselves. Centres of power are believed to be shifting or losing importance (Nye 2011, 113; Naim 2013, 1), power resources are being revalued and their use now requires new skills and knowledge. Relations of power are complex, and many conventional truths utilised in ordering the world no longer hold true. Cyberspace heavily impacts this re-configuration, even if it is not the only influencing factor. It shakes our way of relating to such fundamental organising principles as time and space. It also forces us to think about how to live in a world in which one's counterparts are not necessarily identifiable. (For more detail, see Limnell et al. 2014, 63-71.)

Cyberspace is said to be inherently asymmetric. Those powerful in the physical world are not necessarily so (or to the same extent) in the digital world. Even small actors are capable of doing great things (or causing great harm). This, however, does not mean that in cyberspace everyone has equal capabilities to act or influence others' actions (Nye 2011, 116-117). Even if power relations are always reciprocal, one actor still has more influence over the other (Castells 2009, 11). Moreover, physical resources still matter in the contest

for power in cyberspace. Physical and digital worlds are intertwined and constitute the reality in which we live. Thus, cyber-physical power is the type of power that makes a difference.

In this essay, I designate the prevailing paradigms used in conceptualising cyberspace. Different conceptualisations produce diverse understandings of what power is and who is perceived as powerful. They also lead to varying policy choices. In a fascinating way, we try to apply concepts developed for and used in describing 'things' in the physical world to the digital world and hence to submit events in cyberspace to conventional policies. While it is only human to compare something new or unfamiliar with something familiar, this way of thinking may blind us to new structures, actors and trajectories that emerge and to operations that are unique to the cyber-physical reality (MIT and Harvard University have an excellent programme, Explorations in Cyber International Relations, addressing this question¹).

I concentrate in this essay on the latest paradigm shift towards securitised and strategised understandings of cyberspace. I claim that the current focus serves the interests of the United States in maintaining its position as the most powerful actor in world politics. The extent to which this trending way of conceptualising cyberspace is adapted around the world will strengthen the US's position but may not be enough to preserve it.

Paradigm shifts in conceptualising cyberspace

The first steps in the development of cyberspace were taken some forty-five years ago. The Advanced Research Projects Agency funded a research project on computer networks at UCLA and Stanford Research Institute, which eventually led to the development of the Internet (Singer & Friedman 2014, 16-18). This invention, which was intended to improve American military communications, spilled over to civilian society. After having properly kicked off in the 1990s (the first website, info.cern.ch, was put up in 1991, while the number of sites in 2013 was over 700 million²), the Net's user base multiplied in a short period of time (in 1993 there were about 14 million users in comparison to 2 756 million users in 2013³). This has primarily been due to a quick reduction in computing costs and only minimal restrictions to dissemination of computing technology (Nye 2011, 115; Singer & Friedman 2014, 19-20).

Cyberspace has quickly become omnipresent. It penetrates our societies to an extent difficult to

¹ <http://ecir.mit.edu>

² <http://www.internetlivestats.com/total-number-of-websites/>

³ *ibid.*

comprehend. The on-going development of the Internet of Things (defined as a direct connection of 'things' to the Net; information is produced by those 'things' and transmitted over networks without human interference in order to steer or reprogram items) is estimated to lead to a world in which around 32 billion items are online by 2020. These items will automatically create 10 percent of all data⁴. Cyberspace is becoming increasingly automatised, while the human being is recognised as the weakest link in cybersecurity.

Internet statistics, however, do not tell the whole truth. Cyberspace is wider than the Internet. It consists of all public and private computer networks in which information is stored, shared and communicated online (Singer & Friedman 2014, 13). It has a physical basis in hardware, yet software enables its operations. It includes all digital information created, as well as the users of this information. Its physical basis and effects on global events intertwine cyberspace closely with the physical world (For more detail, see Nye 2011, 123). We live in a cyber-physical reality.

Initially, cyberspace was conceptualised as a value-free technological space. It was created for research purposes, and its science was to be objective. Nonetheless, already by the 1990s cyberspace had become commercialised. According to Greenstein (2001, 151) this was due to the removal of restrictions over the commercial use of the Net; development of multiple, competing Internet browsers; and the entry of tens of thousands of companies into commercial online ventures. The aforementioned factors coincided with the creation of the World Wide Web (www), which enabled pleasant browsing.

WWW also introduced values (other than profit-making) to cyberspace. Openness is often mentioned as the prime one (e.g. Kiggins 2014, 169). According to Tim Berners-Lee ("inventor" of www), online openness has eight different forms, of which universality is the most important one. Universality means that anyone is able to publish anything without being restricted by technology, language or character sets. In addition, Net neutrality is meant to ensure online freedom without political or commercial discrimination.⁵

At the turn of the millennium, Internet freedom and the development of network society ("a [global] society whose social structure is made around networks activated by microelectronics-based, digitally processed information and communication technologies [ICT]" [Castells 2009, 24-25]) were expected to emancipate us from old power structures

and spatial restrictions. Cyberspace was to solve the problems of humanity, starting from inequality in access to information. Moreover, it was to enable the improved and wider exercise of democracy. If it was to create new problems, those were related to atomisation of society and were not directly related to issue of security. (Saco 2002, xv-xvi; Margolis & Moren-Riano 2009, 5.)

The new millennium has witnessed the socialisation of cyberspace (the development of Web 2.0 which enables www users to interact and collaborate with each other hence producing online content instead of just viewing it), which to a large extent pays respect to the concept of openness. It is said to make more voices heard, limit the censorship power of mass media and elites, and deconstruct global power structures by enabling, for example, civil movements across national borders. However, the millennium has also seen an extensive (national) securitisation and strategisation of cyberspace.

What is the impact of these paradigm shifts? They make us conceptualise the cyber-physical reality — actors and their power — differently in different contexts. Conceptualisations, again, guide our policy choices. They produce different power relations and structures. All of these paradigms currently exist and influence our thinking, but the one focused on security and strategy seems to be prevailing.

Securitisation and strategisation of cyberspace

According to Castells "[p]ower is the most fundamental process in society, since society is defined around values and institutions, and what is valued and institutionalized is defined by power relationships". Power can be exercised by means of coercion (or the threat of it) and/or through discursive constructions of meanings. (Castells 2009, 10.) The multifaceted nature of cyberspace is explained by the aforementioned paradigm shifts in conceptualisations. Whether cyberspace is seen as a technological, scientific, commercial, communication, social or strategic security space impacts in what kind of power relations, values and institutions are created in response. For instance, the establishment of voluntary based Internet governance institutions took place in a different discursive reality than the one that currently prevails.

Nye defines cyberpower in a rather strategic manner as "the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through use of the electronically interconnected information resources of the cyberdomain". Desired outcomes

⁴http://www.tietoviikko.fi/kaikki_uutiset/esineiden+internet+rajayttaa+datan+maan+44+biljoonaa+gigatavua+vuonna+2020/a980946

⁵<http://blog.digital.telefonica.com/2013/10/09/tim-berners-lee-telefonica-open-agenda/>

reside either inside or outside cyberspace, that is, in the cyber-physical reality. Cyberpower is based on a set of resources such as infrastructure, networks and human skills that are used to produce desired outcomes. (Nye 2011, 123.) Strategic conceptualisation guides the ongoing development of national cybersecurity strategies and their implementation programmes around the world. It is often advanced by both state administrations and by the cybersecurity industry since securitisation serves the interests of both groups.

When something is defined as a security question, it may first be politicised, but then quickly moved from conventional political agendas onto a security agenda. Once on a security agenda, the issue requires restrictions on the flow of information and legitimises the use of emergency measures when necessary. (For more detail, see Waeber 1995.) Thus, securitisation limits public discussion and strengthens the position of those already accepted into the circle of security actors.

Currently, the cyber-physical reality comprises primarily two security providers: states and private companies. International organisations and voluntary based, mainly technological governance structures exercise some additional power⁶. The main threat actors, again, are recognised as other states, terrorists, criminals and criminal organisations, companies resorting to commercial espionage and loose hacktivist networks. These conceptualisations also produce actors that are legitimised to act against cyber threats — military, intelligence, law enforcement, the judicial system and private corporations — and endow them with certain capabilities and powers. Individuals are known to be able to cause great harm, yet their ability to produce meaningful strategic damage is questionable.

The state has traditionally (in the Westphalian system and after the Napoleonic wars) been the primary provider of security. In cyberspace, however, where private companies often have the most skilled workforce and severe security threats target private and state actors alike, the state needs to form alliances. This is most commonly done through public-private partnerships tying national security and commercial interests tightly together. Currently, the biggest and most influential cybersecurity and ICT companies are American/transnational. They are also buying smaller start-ups around the world, which has raised concerns at least in Europe (e.g. Morin-Desailly 2014). Thanks to their transnational organisation and importance to many countries' economies, these

companies are able to exercise influence over less powerful governments (Nye 2011, 136-137). However, they are still unable to challenge governments that control major national markets, like China or the US.

There are plenty of examples of vocabulary and argumentation that securitise and strategise cyberspace. Even the technology jargon itself includes terms such as 'attack', 'counter-attack', 'defence', 'intelligence', 'weapon' and 'threat'. In addition, the probability of certain events to happen is estimated through risk calculations. In cyberspace, fortresses are built, deterrence carried out and war waged. Terrorism, crime and espionage require 'counter-action' and 'prevention', cyber attacks in general even 'preemption'. Precision of weapons is estimated against fears of friendly fire and unknown escalatory logic. A massive arms race is said to be taking place, which is countered by suggestions of limitations and disarmament. The dual-use problem exists in cyberspace too. Strategies, operations and tactics as well as their verbal expressions as doctrines are drawn from the physical world. This kind of vocabulary and the integrated logic of thinking securitise cyberspace in itself. (A good example of the use of such argumentation is found in Rattray & Healey 2010.)

Moreover, the military has recognised cyberspace as the fifth war-fighting domain alongside land, sea, air and space. The US has established a special Cyber Command⁷ to coordinate, direct and conduct military efforts. In an alternative conceptualisation, cyberspace is seen as a dimension that cuts across all war fighting domains, forcing services to adapt to it. The topic is also addressed within the NATO framework. In addition to traditional cooperative settings, the organisation's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence⁸ coordinates and develops NATO's strategic thinking. The idea is to produce credible defences and intelligence as well as offensive and deterring capabilities to enhance the security of the entire organisation and its member states.

However, contrary to traditional national security thinking, it is the entire society that is under attack in the cyber-physical reality. Therefore, everyone is expected to do his or her share. An individual participates in national security production. Cyberspace is often claimed to be a prime example of a realm requiring comprehensive security thinking in which collective security accumulates from the individual level all the way to the international level. Along the same lines,

⁶ IOs and voluntary based governing organisations refer to, for instance, International Telecommunications Union (ITU), European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers

(ICANN), World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).

⁷ http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/2/Cyber_Command/

⁸ <https://www.ccdcoe.org>

critical (information) infrastructure is perceived as the main object of protection. Technologicalisation of our societies has produced novel opportunities but also new vulnerabilities, and contemporary critical infrastructure either functions on the basis of or is controlled through cyberspace. Without it, our societies halt.

One more notion before turning to the impact of cyberspace on the US's power position. Strategisation has introduced covertness into the digital world. Openness has, to an extent, had to make room for concealment and, for example, national intelligence agencies have nested within that space. This has consequently raised concerns about privacy. Secrecy in defending open cyberspace has been justified by the need to learn about the planned actions of terrorist and criminal networks before they have an opportunity to execute their malicious intentions. Increased importance of and vulnerability embedded in cyberspace have empowered actors on both sides of the ever blurring division between good and bad. People who are used to relying on technology to retain their privacy in openness have become worried about their privacy in an increasingly covert digital world where technology has been shown to serve other purposes.

Is the US winning or losing?

What cyber-physical power consists of and how one can utilise it are the questions that remain. Answers to them depend on how cyberspace is conceptualised and, especially, which kinds of ontological and/or epistemological assumptions these conceptualisations build upon. There are no unquestionable truths about cyberspace and its intertwinedness with physical space, but the cyber-physical reality in which we live is under permanent (re)construction. Power struggles take place around values, institutions and related understandings, all of which guide policy choices that, again, create the structures within which we act.

In the strategic security framework, cyber-physical power seems to refer to the capability to destroy, disrupt, manipulate or control opponents' information and information flows; secure one's own; deceive and deface; and acquire and disseminate information effectively. Actions aimed at demonstrating and/or gaining power are conducted within the digital world, from cyberspace to physical space and vice versa. In this framework, the cyber-physical reality appears as something malleable and controllable, yet simultaneously capable of endangering our existence. Those powerful in the physical security sphere seem similarly powerful in the digital sphere — partially due to

prevailing secrecy (no one knows anyone's capabilities), partially because cyberspace is made sense of using similar conceptualisations as the physical world.

However, "power is not located in one particular social sphere or institution, but it is distributed throughout the entire realm of human action" (Castells 2009, 15). We live in a non-polar world which is characterised by diffusion of power (Nye 2011, 113). The ability to conceptualise cyberspace in a particular way and persuade others to accept this conceptualisation is both a power resource and a use of power, but it may not be enough. Challenging conceptualisations exist, and therefore concentrating solely on the strategic security framework is not enough to maintain US leadership in the cyber-physical reality. This framework should not be used to hide earlier policies meant to advance, for example, the global marketplace or the diffusion of American values (e.g. Kiggins 2014, 168-170). Carefulness is the most important principle to guide strategisation so that the delicate balance between hard and soft power is upheld and continues to serve the chosen purpose. All policies are based on a variety of assumptions that may not be correct, yet when building on differing grounds, the seeming incoherence of these policies may, in fact, best serve US interests.

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