

EDITORIAL

THE SYRIAN CRISIS

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1. The Syrian crisis creates a number of reflections which relate not only to the humanitarian crisis which is the result of the very harsh repression which has been ordered by Assad to suppress the riots, but also the peculiarity of the conflict in the context of the revolutions produced by “the Arab Springs”.

One of the characteristics of this conflict is that it has been long drawn-out without there being the emergence of a political order which is shared and approved to by all the oppositions to the regime. There has not even been a compromise solution around which the opposing factions can work to negotiate a ceasefire. The civil war which sees on opposing sides the dictator with his military dictatorship, which is registering numerous defections, and the revolutionary army (LES), supported by the civil populations, is unfolding through an escalation of violence, the end of which is very difficult to foretell.

The Syrian crisis constitutes, hence, a test of extraordinary importance which should also shed light on how the international community intends to face crises which can suddenly erupt in the Arab Muslim world at the moment when the pact - between power and society, which had produced dictatorships, even modern dictatorships, but which have, gradually and increasingly, assumed the nature and characteristics of a dynastic regime – is broken. These are dictatorships which, even when they have promoted reforms which were inclined towards secularisation, were nevertheless founded on the indissoluble relationship

between the regime and the Islamic nation. The religious factor, hence, constitutes a not insignificant element to garner social consent every time the regime appears to be threatened.

This notwithstanding, these regimes have frequently established strong collaboration with western states which saw in their authoritative regimes a way of controlling fundamentalism. The facts, however, are showing that this has proved to be a wrong consideration.

From the developments which have followed the, so-called, Arab Spring, it has emerged that it is possible to conciliate the initiation of a democratic process, which will certainly be long and difficult, with the establishment of a popular Islam which is participating in politics also by distancing itself at every available opportunity from the fundamentalist movements. This, therefore, is an Islamist policy which is finally able to accept the idea of a public sphere which is neutral to religious affiliation and to political opinion, also in the presence of Constitutions which identify in Islamic law the main source of law. This constitutes the real challenge of the revolution in progress, that is, giving birth to legal orders which, even though they are inspired by Shari'a, they accept, by way of principle, the possibility that the rules of the Coran Law may, gradually, become historized. The international community has aligned itself in an unequivocal manner with regards to the facts relative to the Arab Spring as soon as it became evident that the popular riots in Tunisia and Egypt could degenerate into a long civil war. Hence, the international community has, through various instruments, exerted pressure on the dictators in order to force them to succumb and abandon power without having recourse to violent retaliation against the people which was demanding more freedom and more well-being. This has been, really, an achievement of the international community, or, rather, of those countries which have actively committed themselves to take action to guarantee a peaceful evolution of the riots, by also using the power of

dissuasion in relation to the old regimes without conceding any compromises, not even by way of undertakings of immunity for the crimes they have committed.

Military intervention has been necessary only in those cases where there were no conditions for a painless change in the regime. Certain countries have resorted to armed conflict, in certain territories, such as Libya where there was a civil war in progress, to sustain, militarily, the populations which were at war for their own freedom and to bring about the collapse of the regime, the leader of which, Ghaddafi, enjoyed great prestige amongst almost all the peoples of the African country.

2. When the events in Syria are considered against this background, one thing becomes glaringly obvious: the immobility of the international community which is not depriving its solidarity to the population at war which has to submit to the massacres ordered by Assad but is undecided on the way forward whilst the number of civil victims is increasing from day to day. Even the UN is inert, which, through its envoys, is making known to the world that in that country there are being committed serious crimes against humanity, that the world is facing a humanitarian emergency of gargantuan proportions, also as a direct consequence of the exodus of the civil population which is ever-increasing. The troops which are loyal to the regime have been ordered to massacre whole populations in order to avoid that certain territories fall under the control of the rebels. The truth is right in front of the international community but this notwithstanding, the action of monitoring which had been initiated by the United Nations has not been renewed and this as willed by the Security Council.

Hence, in relation to Syria, the Security Council has returned to the age of vetoes, even though it is very well known that the regime is, on a daily basis, carrying out massacres of innocent civilians. These are vetoes resorted to by an ex communist sta-

te, Russia, and a state which is still communist, China, which render powerless the UN and which take us back to the dark years of the Cold War.

It would also appear that even Europe is powerless, which once again is resorting to the policy of two weights and two measures, as though there were a difference between the humanitarian crisis in Libya and the crisis which is experienced on a daily basis in Syria. Hence, all that has been said and done by certain European States to free Libya from the Ghaddafi regime, chiefly amongst which France, is not being repeated to deal with the situation in Syria. Public opinion is asking why, chiefly amongst which public opinion in France which, at the time of the Libyan crisis had approved without any reserve the military action ordered by Sarkozy.

Today's Aleppo is yesterday's Benghazi. The crimes committed in Syria are the same crimes which were being committed by Ghaddafi against his own people. Hence, the world has managed to stop one dictator in time, invoking the principle of inviolable human rights. However, nowadays, the dictator Assad seems to have free reign, given the manifest indecision of the various rulers.

The difficulties which are being faced to create adequate forms of reaction to the violent repression ordered by Assad should not prejudice in any way the principles on the basis of which the necessity of a new international order based on the supremacy of human rights has been hypothesised since the end of the Cold War. The setting aside of these principles which is being witnessed in Syria constitutes a perilous principle and it risks to take us back to the years in which human rights were merely words on Charters, on-paper rights, as it were, whilst the real politique reigned supreme.

When viewed from this point of view, it becomes clear that the Islamic world which has banned Assad has manifested more coherence in the face of the Syrian crisis, as also it had shown

when it had banned Ghaddafi, as it also had aligned itself with the rebel populations against the dictatorial regimes as soon as the Arab Spring riots had erupted. Even this time, the choice of the international organisations which represent the varied Islamic world has appeared clearly. In the case of the Libyan civil war, the Arab League had moved with great determination, and in the case of Syria, it was the Organisation for the Islamic Cooperation (the OIC) which has taken action by suspending Syria's membership in the Organisation.

Hence, when faced with the violence perpetrated against the Syrian people, the Arab States have unanimously condemned the dictator Assad and in distancing themselves from Assad's accomplice, Assad.

With the condemnation expressed against the dictators who order their armies to open fire on the crowds, which condemnation has been clearly sounded by the governments of the Arab States, the said governments change around the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of the State which policy has been followed by some of the organisations through which the Islamic worlds relates with the international community.

This is a totally new concept. By considering intolerable the violation of human rights and ignoring the historic differences of opinions relative to the universality of same human rights, the Arab world is opening up to a comparison with the West on these themes which dialogue could have surprising developments.

In the hope, then, that international intervention in this sphere, that is that when faced with the violation of human rights claims to sovereignty have to be put aside, defeats yet another prejudice, that according to which in the matters which relate to Islamic territories, which are only subject to the law of Allah, there cannot be tolerated external interventions, interventions carried out therefore, by the unfaithful, because since these are matters relative to peoples who are also brothers and hence have to be decided only by themselves.

On the other hand, this time, given the riots, the women and men who have taken to the streets to protest have made their voices heard to elicit the solidarity of the Western governments whose help was being sought to destabilise the regimes and to achieve auto-determination. And even on this point, the international organisations of the Arab world have aligned themselves in favour of the populations in the throes of conflict.

If this fact does not open a dialogue on matters in relation to which it appeared it was impossible to open a dialogue upon by way of principle, certainly shows that the Arab Islamic countries are looking upon the Western constitutionalism differently. A dialogue on the concrete matters in this sphere may seem to be more important than the actual ratification of international Charters which embody declarations of rights and the measures to promote and protect same.

3. Hence, at this point it is a matter of isolating, within the Islamic nation, those governments which, in matters relative to human rights, turn against the people who request more rights, which hold that the violation of human rights can be justified on the basis of the power of State, and that the governments responsible for crimes against humanity cannot be tried on a national or an international level.

The attitude assumed in these cases by the Islamic Arab states in favour of the rebels renders inconceivable that line of defence of enacting exceptional laws for an indeterminate time as has happened in the past years in some countries which enactment would be in open violation of what is prescribed in the Constitutions and which enactment would be based on the excuse of the danger of the spread of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. The suspension of the Constitutions for reasons of national security has represented an instrument which has frequently been resorted to in order to halt budding political opposition or to discriminate against religious minorities which are hostile to the regime.

The fact that Assad has been expelled from the UMMA, that is, from the community of Islamic nations, considered the unequivocal judgement expressed both by the Arab League and the OIC, the fact that he has been unanimously declared, by the community of Islamic States an Islamic “outlaw” at Riyadh during a meeting of the IOC, because of the violent acts perpetrated against his people, gives prestige, on an international level, to these organisations. It would be desirable that these organisations may, ever-frequently, be involved in the mediation process of peace initiatives which are undertaken by the international community, particularly in view of the impossibility of intervention on the part of the UN due to a veto in the Security Council of the UN. Indeed, the formal value of the decisions adopted by these organisations is not being challenged. Beyond that which these organisations can represent on the political plane, there seems to be no doubt that their convictions, in matters relating to human rights and the self-government of their people, reflect the Islamic ideals of a single community (Umma). When these ideals are betrayed, the intervention of an organisation such as the OIC, in defence of Islamic values, may not have great political relevance. From this point of view, the suspension of Syria from the IOC seems to be very significant and constitutes a good precedent, even because objectively, it seems to be a sort of giving notice of default to the West which, with its indecisiveness – and this applies in particular to Europe which should have some role to play in the political stability of the Mediterranean region – objectively aids and abets the dictators’ actions.

Moreover, the choice of the IOC isolates, and politically this is very onerous, Iran by accentuating the distance between this country and the entire Sunni world.

4. Even for this reason, the inability to manage these humanitarian crises appear singularly grave and serious, and this with parti-

cular reference to the Mediterranean region, particularly when taken in the context of an organisation of States, such as the EU, which is keen to become a global player.

The surrender of the United Nations, forced to withdraw its own envoys from Syria, constitutes a clear defeat of the international community in this same conflict which, in a year and half, has cost the lives of 20,000 victims, both civil and military, and this creates a dangerous precedent.

The United Nations had sent their observers. The decision to withdraw them at the moment when the conditions necessary for the continuation of the UN mission ceased to exist, since these conditions were not being observed by the Assad government itself, excluded, on the political plane, the possibility to adopt very concrete decisions to reintegrate the legality in that territory torn apart by civil war.

In a certain manner, the United Nations had to register the same failure which had already been registered by the operations attempted by the Arab League three months before the withdrawal of the UN observers. There had been an attempt to guarantee the "ceasefire" on the one hand, with the end of the actions of the revolutionary guerrilla, on the other, with the cessation of the indiscriminate bombings on the civil population by the loyalist army. Through the ceasefire, there was the clear attempt to implement the plan which had been devised by the UN special envoy to Syria Kofi Annan and hence to promote the process of negotiation. Even Kofi Annan has been, however, forced to give up holding that his work was becoming impossible due to the lack of unity of the UN Security Members. That is why the vetoes expressed by China and Russia appear to be particularly serious as precedents in the cases of such humanitarian emergencies.

5. The difficulties which have been encountered to stop the civil war in Syria, even due to the divisions within the international

community and which showed up in the Security Council, require that there be a reflection on the measures which, in these cases, could be deemed as adequate to counter humanitarian crises which last over a period of time and on the institutions which involve the implementation of such measures.

Syria can, in this sense, become an interesting laboratory in which to experiment the ability to test the regional organisations as soon as this is delegated by the United Nations. In relation to the Mediterranean situation, also considering that this area is riddled by recent conflict but also by very ancient conflicts which seem to have very few solutions, if any, there needs to put to the test organisations such as the Arab League and the African Union by delegating to them peace operations which would be very demanding from the political point of view. In substance, it would consist in empowering organisations which would be able to face eventual ethnic and religious conflicts with a sensitivity which originates from a culture and interests shared with the populations of the territories when the conflict is unfolding.

This involves delegating normative activities to these organisations, delegating these organisations to evaluate responsibilities and rights, without having to face vetoes of the Security Council, to consent to all those countries which decide to intervene to impose a ceasefire legitimately which legitimacy would be guaranteed by the actions carried out by international organisations in which the conflicting sides identify themselves. The countries external to the area, in a certain sense, would act in accordance with the instructions which are given to them by these regional organisations.

In this present case, in view of the failure of the action undertaken by the Arab League, as well as the plan devised by Kofi Annan on behalf of the United Nations, perhaps involving the regional institutions in military intervention would have led the various foreign countries which are playing an obscure role

in the conflict to adopt a more responsible approach and behaviour. Had this been the case, perhaps less time would have been wasted, thus rendering Assad even more powerful and the rebels even weaker.

Through the forms of consultation and decision carried out by the regional organisations which are more representative of the Islamic Arab world, and also considering how much more was achieved in Libya, it would have been possible to enforce a no-fly zone in Syria, using perhaps the NATO bases in Turkey, to prevent that the forces of Assad could continue undisturbed the bombardment of the civil populations. And hence, through the deployment of aircraft, it would have been possible to set up a no drive zone of the armoured vehicles belonging to Assad, which make it possible for the state forces to move freely within the territory. It would also have been possible to organise protected zones to ensure that the fleeing civil populations could have refuge from the war-torn areas.

It would have been possible to carry out all this, as has been possible to do all this in Benghazi, also considering that whilst Ghaddafi could count on a vast solidarity in the regione, even due to his generous African policies, Assad is hated by his neighbours and, above all, by the varied Sunni world.

6. It has been observed, to explain the difficulties which are being encountered in Syria to impose a ceasefire, that Aleppo is not Damascus. In other words, the civil war in Syria is different to the other uprising which have taken place in Tunisia and Egypt, and by the conflict which has been the subject of combat between Ghaddafi's army and the rebel armies. And this for many reasons. In this sense, there has been written that "the Syrian civil war has become the mother of all the battles" (Gilles Kepel). In Syria there are also ulterior interests with respect to those which have already characterised the riots before the Arab Spring. The objective of these riots was to establish the rule of

law and affirm the value of national independence, which has frequently been the subject of bartering by the dictator with the Western powers to ensure the advantageous exploitation of the vast energy resources of these same countries. The Spring riots, beyond the movements frequently in contradiction amongst themselves produced by the conflict not always quite explicitly existent between the different ruling groups nostalgic of the old regime and the street movements, are also producing concrete results with reference to the democratic process which has been underway. Even where it was the religious parties which won the day, there is a political civil dialogue, both in the occasion of the elections, absolutely regular, and also when the government was being formed. It can be said that the popular sovereignty has substituted the sovereignty of Allah. Islamic and lay movements have realised a common effort to build the rule of law.

In Syria, the situation is totally different, being a country at the crossroads of a complex system of equilibria which underlies the whole Arab world. The international positioning which Syria will assume following the outcomes of the civil war, will influence, to a large extent, on the future political regions of the regions, considering that the Assad regime, which is close to the alawi religious tendency, which leads back to the Shiite family, enjoys the protection of the Teheran government, a power of reference of the Islamic Shiites. Saudi Arabia, a point of reference to the Islam Sunni, is understandably interested in the destabilisation and the collapse of the Assad regime.

In other words, this is a match in which the various denominations of the Islamic Arab world, the Sunnis, the Shiites, the Alawis, are contrasting each other for reasons which relate to not only the political control of the region but also the colossal interests which put against each other the various monarchies of petroleum.

The consolidation of the Teheran Regime is understandably perceived as a threat by the United States and Israel, but the re-

dimensioning of its political power in the region, which would favour the Saudi monarchy, is prejudicial to China and Russia. In this sense, the destiny of Syria might impinge on the political balances of a vast region which are even more important than those produced by the end of the Mubarak regime.

7. From this point of view, the Syrian conflict, more than resembling the conflicts of the Arab spring, becomes a conflict akin to the post-Cold War era, capable of unleashing the escalating tensions between the great powers, which could be expressed even in the form of delegated wars, unleashed in reality to enable the exercise a strong power of influences on the region, in a world less foreseeable than that in which there reigned bipolar balance because characterised by a strong polycentrism, given the sheer number of powers which have relevance both on the global and regional level.

There is certainly at the heart of the conflict a clash between the power bloc which derives its power from the Assad family – a power bloc consisting in strong economic and public administrations powers, of the Baath party and the Alawi minority, that even though belonging to the Shiite family is less radical than the Iranian Shiite – and a part consisting in the civil society which requests more freedom and a great respect of fundamental human rights, and also the initiation of a real democratic process. If, there are similarities between the immediate reasons of the conflict, that is, its underlying causes, and conflicts between the populations and the dictators who have held onto power in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia for a considerable time, it does not appear to be dubious that this conflict is also a religious context if the external players who influence the conflict are also taken into consideration given that the Sunnite majority cannot agree that a minority of the population, that is, the Alawi population, consisting in less than 20% of the entire population, may have in its hands all the real reigns of power. And behind the scenes of the religious conflict, which in many aspects recalls the Iraqi events but with the inversion of

the parties, because it was the Sunnite minority there that ruled the day, there are the calculations of global powers and of some local powers which want to take advantage of the adjustment of power relationships between the different religious components to achieve an advantageous position within the country and hence to strengthen its own position within the region.

As has already been submitted, Syria is an important country because there is the passage of crude oil from its territory. However, Russia and Iran support Assad's regime also because this constitutes an outpost in the Mediterranean of extraordinary strategic importance to resist American influence in the region.

The United States, on the other hand, are interested in having a regime-ally because this would strengthen its position not only to defend Israel but also to be able to dialogue more efficiently within the region in a more efficient manner, both with Russia and with Saudi Arabia.

These external interferences play an important role in the same structure of the conflict. It is the calculations of the great powers which have not assisted the forces which are battling Assad in constituting a unitary front which would bring about a political situation similar to that where the rebels have prevailed, not in an inordinately long time.

This risk in Syria is that the opposition becomes increasingly fragmented due to external pressures. There does not seem to be a ruling class which is capable of speaking to the international community and preparing an institutional order which has the capability of rebuilding the country.

All this lengthens the crisis, and also furnishes Assad with an objective advantage, apart from increasing the human costs of the conflict.

8. The West and Europe in particular intervening together with the international organisations of the Arab World could give a positive democratic direction to the evolution of a civil-war-torn

country, whilst at the same time preventing the Islamic fundamentalists who have infiltrated the rebels from having a decisive role in the construction of a new Syria.

This would involve the carrying out of an operation akin to that carried out in Libya, with the aim of preventing, after the collapse of the dictator, the eruption of a civil war amongst the tribes which would have determined the disappearance of the Libyan state. The States which have intervened to free Libya from dictatorship have performed and are performing an important role in this sense, favouring the formation of a moderate group which could direct the country towards stable government.

Syria also requires such process of pacification, particularly with regard to the possibility of cohabitation, as it were, of the various religious confessions. There needs to be the creation of the right conditions in order for all the minorities to be participant in the creation of a new regime. The external intervention needs to be not only to facilitate the negotiation of a truce, but also to create the conditions to reach the stage of long-term peace which would not be based on the type of reduced democracy which, traditionally, was tolerated by the tyrants but on the free participation in politics and the pluralism of ideas.

9. It is noteworthy that it is not only Western public opinion and the Arab states, bar Iran, to condemn Assad but also the non-aligned countries which, traditionally, have never interfered in matters which relate to the unfolding of civil war. In the recent summit of the "non-aligned", which has taken place in Teheran, an almost-unanimous position in relation to the events in Syria has emerged very clearly. Assad's behaviour has been judged indefensible. It had never happened in the past that these countries shared fully the positions adopted by the United Nations. The United Nations was, in fact, considered to be an or-

ganization which had given rise to an unjust dictatorial system because it had questioned the freedom of Palestine and the right of peoples to peacefully have nuclear resources.

Up till the very last moment, it was appearing that the Teheran Summit would want to align the non-aligned States in favour of the Syrian dictator, in view of the venue of the meeting, Iran; a country which has many ongoing conflicts with the international community and the subject of sanctions imposed by the international community as well as being a state harshly criticized by the Security Council, a State which is also strictly subject to constant monitoring due to its nuclear ambitions which could justify a military intervention. And yet, the “non-aligned” at Teheran have aligned themselves, as it were, in favour of the rioting populations.

The presence of the Egyptian President Morsi was worrisome because he was the man who should guarantee discontinuity in Egypt between the old and the new regime. However, Morsi has gone to Teheran not to show any solidarity with the Iranian government but to deliver a great speech on the rights of the peoples to freedom and auto-determination; a speech which has galvanised the participants of the conference. Morsi has explained that “the revolution in Syria against an oppressive regime is part of the Arab Spring which has in Egypt its own milestone” and added “Egyptian solidarity with the Syrians against an oppressive regime which has lost every legitimacy is a moral duty and a political and strategic necessity. Our hearts bleed for those massacres. It is the responsibility of all to sustain the fight for freedom and human dignity if the fight for freedom is to have any chances to succeed”. He has compared the Syrian people to the Palestine people explaining that both fight for freedom and justice.

This is an extraordinarily important speech because it contains a reassuring message in relation to the vision which the Islamic Brothers have of the order to guarantee the Southern re-

gion in the Mediterranean, an order founded on a very precise relationship between political stability and respect for human rights.

There emerges a clear position of the organisation of the Muslim Brothers with reference to the relationships which should be formed between the States of the region and the international community, a position which rejects the theory of non-intervention of international organisations in the internal affairs of a State which is grappling with a serious political crisis and with dramatic humanitarian emergencies. The prohibition against intervention had always been beyond discussion for the movement of the non-aligned for many decades. It would now seem that the time is ripe for those States can recognise in the United Nations the role of an organisation which is really representative of the international community, within which international disputes and controversies can be discussed, faced and decided upon.

With his speech, Morsi went even beyond this because he has proposed a joint initiative between the States of the region to find a political solution to the civil war which would also involve the States which are competitors between themselves such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The new Egypt, therefore, expresses an interesting compromise position which could keep together both those States which are more in favour of the United States, as was Mubarak's regime, and also those States which invoke the Pan-Arab ideal to counter any undue interest expressed by the international community and which unfolds in their own territory, particularly with reference to the protection of human rights.

The new Egyptian president holds that Egypt has to satisfy the great responsibility of promoting democracy in the States on the Southern shores of the Mediterranean. Through this affirmation, the role which Egypt can and should play in the Arab-Isralite conflict becomes clearer and this dissolves many doubts which

had been created following the collapse of Mubarak's regime in the fact of some decisions taken by the armies of the provisional government which seemed to value above others relations with Iran and question the policy of dialogue which Egypt had promised in relation to Israel.

At the Teheran summit Morsi has not proposed military action to solve the Syrian crisis but a political plan, subscribed to by the States of the area, which favours the transition to democracy by giving to Assad the opportunity to negotiate his way out. This political plan consists in an attempt to "self-govern" the regional matters which self-government seems to be very near with reference to the objectives pursued, but also in situations of crisis, the deployment of regional organisations which operate in the southern area of the Mediterranean, referred to above. It is a fact that, after Morsi's speech, the American President Barack Obama has invited the new Egyptian President to the White House declaring him to be akin to an spokesman of the United States with reference to the rounds which will open on the Mediterranean chess-board. After the end of Mubarak's regime, this is the first real acknowledgement of the United States, considered to be extremely close to the old regime and hence regarded with suspicion by the rioting crowds, towards the new Egyptian ruling class. It is quite realistic to think that from now the United States can carry out the role of guarantor which would ensure that the international economic institution, chiefly amongst which the international Monetary Fund, open up towards Egypt

The candidature of Egypt to favour the democratic transition within Islam and not against Islam, and hence in full respect of the identities, represents the most convincing of the successes perused by the Arab Spring. If we had to consider that this policy is also shared by the Muslim Brothers, then it would be possible to hold that the outlook of a democratic transition which would be in line with the developments brought about by the

people of the Arab Spring seems to be really within reach. Political positions which can be objectively collateral to Islamic fundamentalism, such as those of the salafites, appear to be destined to be isolated and defeated.

If this will be the policy adopted by the moderate political religious parties, it is foreseeable that they can be the guarantors of national cohesion, and to bring democracy even to those States where there are no conditions to fully realise it. After Morsi's declarations, it can be said that the Arab Springs are linked to each other, not in the name of the Islamic nation, but in the name of a change process which relates to the society and the religious fundamentalists, which is also the result of underdevelopment. By basing economic development on the creation of a vital bourgeoisie one is effectively preventing humanitarian crises. This involves a challenge which should also be faced by the international community which cannot leave the new democratic regimes to their own devices during this establishment of the rule of law in the truest sense of the term. From this point of view, the Syrian events may become an extraordinary testing laboratory, as it were, not only to test the ability of the Arab States to adopt common positions to stop the massacres but also of the long-term vision of the international community which cannot act sparsely when faced with a crisis which becomes increasingly complex and which risks to create new crises and to destabilise the region.