

The Role of the Southern African Development
Community in Conflict Resolution – The Case Study of
Mozambique

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Declaration

I hereby declare this dissertation is my own original work.

Ishmael Tsholofelo Dabutha

30 December 2024

Gaborone, Botswana

Acknowledgements

To the Lord Almighty, Your grace is sufficient for me, and for that I praise You and thank You for carrying me to this day.

To my departed father, this year we celebrated your memory and unveiled a tombstone in remembrance of the 30 years since you left us. You remain a guardian angel over all of us. I also thank my mother and family for their unwavering love and support.

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Dedication

Special dedication to my son, Atlile Loabo Dabutha, for you are the pillar that gives me the strength to keep going. The love we share is a profound inspiration to me.

Abstract

For the past seven years, Northern Mozambique has faced a deadly conflict which left millions of people displaced and many brutally killed. SADC as a regional bloc raised concerns about these terror attacks and human rights abuses in the region. This study examines the role played by SADC in Conflict Resolution in Mozambique. The specific objectives are to assess the root causes of the Mozambique Conflict; to analyse the mechanisms and methods adopted by SADC in resolving the Mozambique Conflict; to investigate the challenges faced by SADC in its efforts to resolve the Mozambique Conflict. The study uses a secondary data collection method, a document review and qualitative content data analysis to interpret the data. The findings reveal that the root causes of the Mozambique conflict are historical and mostly emanate from poor governance. The discovery and mismanagement of the dividends from the booming natural gas and rubie industry triggered the conflict. This resulted in the radicalisation of youth in the region. The historical injustices of marginalisation and discrimination resurfaced and fuelled the conflict. Responding to the conflict, SADC adopted a military intervention to fight terror, protect innocent citizens and restore law and order in the region. The SADC mission in Mozambique was not smooth, going into the conflict there were a lot of questions about their preparedness to face the insurgents, a lack of trust and diplomatic tensions with Rwanda, poor communication/ interoperability, financial constraints, and a lack of political from the Mozambican government.

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Acronyms

ASWJ:	Ahlu – Sunnah wal Jama`a
AU:	African Union
DRC:	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS:	Economic Community of West African States
EU:	European Union
FRELIMO:	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
HNT:	Human Needs Theory
HRW:	Human Rights Watch
ISIS:	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
LDF:	Lesotho Defence Force
MDM:	Mozambique Democratic Movement
MFS:	Médecins Sans Frontières
MNC:	Multinational Corporations
OAU:	Organisation for African Unity
OPDSC:	Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation
REC:	Regional Economic Community
RENAMO:	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana

RISDP: Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan

SADC: Southern African Development Community

SAMIM: SADC Mission in Mozambique

Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Background of Study

Over the years, African conflicts have been covered substantially in literature, however, the precarious peace in most African countries continuously makes the subject relevant. These conflicts have been argued by Benjamin et al, (2014) to be a major cause of poverty and unemployment. They significantly affect the human, economic, and social life of the citizens. Despite the abundance of resources (Oil, cocoa, diamonds, gold), the continent remains underdeveloped because of the continuous conflicts in the region over the years. International and regional organizations and African governments have all attempted to resolve these conflicts for years to no avail as most of the conflicts prevail or occur recurrently. Moe (2009) perceives that the causes of conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa are mainly related to issues of poor resource governance, abject poverty, ethnic rivalry, and declining economic conditions. These causes are perpetuated by the effects of colonialism and the Cold War, which created divide-and-rule policies that fostered favouritism, leading to a scarcity of resources and services in certain groups and ultimately sparking violent struggles among them. There is an urgent need to establish effective mechanisms to address these issues to end conflicts that continuously threaten the stability of African countries.

Southern Africa has been relatively peaceful for years however, the region still encounters some challenges to maintaining this peace. Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Madagascar, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique have had some security challenges in the last decade (Kapinga, 2015). SADC is committed to establishing peace in its region through the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and

Security Co-operation (SADC Organ), was established in 1996. After the Cold War and apartheid, the leaders in the region anticipated an era of stability. The SADC Organ was one of the efforts to promote peace and security through cooperation and the peaceful settlement of inter- and intra-state conflicts. The Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation was established to safeguard the region from instability within and outside national borders, mediate disputes and conflicts, and ensure sustainable peace and security (SADC, 2010). According to Delegise (2021), the role of SADC in conflict mediation implies it intervenes in the internal affairs of sovereign states. The Regional Economic Group (REC) can hold its member states accountable since it is mandated to resolve inter and intrastate conflicts. However, this does not mean SADC does not respect member states' sovereignty, whenever the lives of citizens are endangered, SADC must intervene.

Mozambique is a member of SADC, with a population of over 30 million citizens. It is a one-party dominant state, with Frelimo assuming power since independence. The country shares its borders with other six SADC member states including Malawi, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Eswatini, South Africa, and Zambia. Since independence in 1975, Mozambique has suffered internal instability. It is one of the countries that has faced the longest and deadliest conflicts post-independence (Darch, 2018). The Mozambique post-independence conflict that lasted for sixteen years destroyed the country's economic sector, and infrastructure, leading to a rise in poverty and socioeconomic issues. The post-independence challenges were overwhelming and hindered the ruling party Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo), from driving the country to prosperity. The government faced challenges of underdevelopment, ideological division, and the apartheid influence from South Africa on its national issues. The Mozambique civil war between the Frelimo and Resistência

Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo) which lasted for sixteen years, ended in 1992 with a peace accord in Rome. It is estimated that by the end of the sixteen years of conflict, a million lives were lost, and one-third of the population was displaced (Hanlon, 2010).

After the period of conflict, the country was able to obtain relative stability for almost twenty years. However, tensions rose in 2013 when there were protests related to the upcoming 2014 general elections. During the election year, the opposition party, Movement Democratic of Mozambique (MDM) disputed the election results and ended up attacking the FRELIMO supporters, clashing with the police and carrying unlawful demonstrations. The opposition complained about election fraud bringing disorder in the country. Additionally, the RENAMO opposition party also attacked some civilians as part of the protests. In June 2014, there were reports of attacks on civilians that left several people injured. Furthermore, it was reported that a day after this incident, RENAMO guerrillas attacked a military convoy resulting in the killing of 15 soldiers and leaving 26 others injured (Dali, 2014).

Against this backdrop, it is evident that the elections are one of the national events that can trigger violence because of the way they are conducted, with no transparency and fairness. During the 2014 national elections, SADC was one of the observers. The SADC electoral Observation Mission was invited as an effort by the government to demonstrate its commitment to promoting democracy in the county and the region. The SADC mission concluded that the elections were free, fair, peaceful, and transparent, therefore credible. However, SADC has been criticized over the years for lacking strong mechanisms that aim to promote peace and security in the region, it does not have adequate means to ensure that peace and security are attained and maintained procedurally (Lynge, 2022). Concerning the elections, SADC could have looked into the matter raised by the

MDM and RENAMO and offered a suitable solution that would satisfy both parties and citizens at large.

Deleglise (2021) argues that SADC has failed to lay the groundwork for managing conflict effectively in the region, the post-conflict recovery is typically overshadowed by the abuse of fundamental freedoms, and civil liberties and the deterioration of democratic institutions. Using Lesotho, Madagascar, and Zimbabwe to analyze SADC's conflict resolution, Deleglise (2021) notes that the REC has failed to find a balance between ending conflicts and fulfilling longer-term agendas for sustainable peace. This is the case with Mozambique as the country still faces unrest even though SADC has intervened on several occasions. During the 2019 national elections in Mozambique, SADC had an opportunity to ensure that Mozambique election institutions adhered to the national electoral procedures/guidelines and conform to the standards set by SADC to ensure that countries conduct free and fair elections. However, this did not happen resulting in the contestation of the results by the opposition parties and criticism from external observers such as the United States (US) and European Union (EU). A report by the European Union (2019) stated that the political playground was unlevel with the ruling party misusing state funds and widespread violence. Similarly, the United States Embassy in Mozambique cited inconsistencies which could affect people's perception of the integrity of the electoral process. Surprisingly, the AU and SADC seemed to differ from the two aforementioned perceptions, they noted that the elections were peaceful and well-organized. However, criticism extended to the AU and SADC for their hand in condoning the ruling party to continue partaking in unfair practices to maintain state power.

Though AU and SADC face endless criticisms, Albuquerque & Wiklund (2015) note that SADC has for a long time been engaging with countries such as the DRC to find solutions for the prolonged conflict through both military interventions and mediation initiatives. Isilow (2020)

states that apart from the aforementioned conflict, the region, which has been relatively peaceful for more than two decades is now faced with a new problem of terror in Mozambique. This new threat in the region has brought a major security setback and a national threat to the country. Ansar al-Sunna, known locally as Al-Shabaab, emerged in the northern province of Cabo Delgado in 2015 as a non-violent Islamist organization. They launched their first attack in October 2017 (Stanyard et al., 2022). Mozambique has been struggling with the RENAMO military group in the central region, and the Ansar al-Shabaab brought the most significant threat to the country's national security. Evidence from the Tony Blair Institute's Global Extremism Monitor (GEM) indicates that the terror group has been responsible for almost 70 per cent of all violent activities in the country since 2018 and has gradually intensified its campaign as months passed. Al-Shabaab's first year as a violent actor targeted civilians and diversified to include harder targets from 2019 onwards, the group started engaging with the military and state forces. Its main objectives are to undermine the state, create civilian fear, and establish territory across Cabo Delgado (Bukarti & Munasignhe, 2020).

The terrorist attacks in Cabo Delgado province worsened the humanitarian situation in the area, there were a lot of abductions and destruction of homes by the armed group. In the early stages of the conflict, thousands of people were already displaced, with more than 946,000 internally displaced (Morier-Genoud, 2020). As the conflict prevailed, the group staged a series of attacks in the Ancuabe district, 45 kilometres from the provincial capital, Pemba, an area previously considered safe, killing at least seven people, four of whom were beheaded, and forcing thousands to flee their homes (Hassan, 2023). The humanitarian situation in Mozambique's Northern Province of Cabo Delgado continued deteriorating. The escalation of the Cabo Delgado violence has now displaced over a million people and an estimation of almost 2 million people require immediate

humanitarian assistance and protection in the neighbouring provinces of Niassa and Nampula. Millions of people face food insecurity because of several factors, including the security situation, armed violence, and climate shocks (European Commission, 2023).

The social and economic marginalization of ordinary citizens has been cited as the main trigger for the current conflict in Cabo Delgado. The government has not made enough effort to ensure that the conflict is managed and that measures are taken to ensure that there is inclusive growth in the country. Mozambique is rich in natural resources, however, the government has failed to manage those resources well to benefit every citizen regardless of their social status (Ewi, et al., 2022). This is evident as the gap between the rich and poor keeps on widening. Over 65% of the Mozambican population lives in abject poverty, and most citizens do not have access to proper water, sanitation, and electricity. The issue of resource governance is imperative as resources have caused conflicts and wars whenever they are not distributed fairly and equally (Chingotuane & Sidumo, 2023). Further, there was a lot of hope from the Mozambiquans when gas and oil were discovered. This discovery was perceived as an opportunity for economic growth, development, and improved access to essential services and infrastructure.

Despite the discovery of oil in Cabo Delgado, there remains a huge gap in access to proper education, health care, housing, agricultural activities, etc. When people are not offered enough access to services to fulfil their basic needs, they become frustrated, and their frustrations can often turn into violent unrest. This is the case with Mozambique; a number of their conflicts are driven by the frustration of civilians towards the government's failure to provide their basic needs. The politically, and economically disadvantaged population in the province of Cabo Delgado is central to the rise of Al-Shabab. The province has been marginalized by the Mozambican government for the last decades and it is one of the poorest provinces in the country, it lacks basic healthcare,

education, and jobs, with food insecurity being one of the most pressing issues. Over the years the ruling Frelimo party has privileged the Christian population in the country and the capital Maputo, overlooking the Muslim-dominated Cabo Delgado and coastal regions of other Northern provinces. Severe feelings of collective discontent among the Northern locals have served as a fertile recruitment base for the extremist group (Centro para Democracia e Desenvolvimento, 2022).

When the Cabo Delgado Conflict started and escalated in 2017, SADC did not move with the required urgency towards resolving the conflict. There were delays in deciding to intervene in Mozambique, which indicated how conflict management and resolution in the region remain challenging for the organization (Deleglise & Khadiagala, 2020). The lack of early intervention by SADC resulted in the country going into crisis, citizens displaced and their lives at a higher risk. This study focuses on examining the role of SADC in conflict resolution in Mozambique from 2014 – 2024. The REC has been associated with silence diplomacy when it comes to resolving conflict in the region and it is time it moves with urgency and intervenes in conflict situations. Various obstacles hindering the REC from being an effective key player in resolving conflict in the region include the absence of shared values, the lack of unity to promote democratic principles, mistrust induced by these differences, and the lack of respect for human rights (Nathan, 2013).

1.2 Statement of the problem

SADC's conflict resolution role in Mozambique exposes the challenges regional organizations in Africa face in intervening and addressing the internal crisis in their member states. This study traces how Mozambique is still deep into conflict and suffers from underdevelopment. Citizens in Cabo Delgado face a serious challenge to access services such as proper education, good healthcare, housing, and other amenities. These are part of the root causes of the conflict in the Cabo Delgado region, which left unsolved will prolong the conflict. Since the conflict began, most people remain

displaced with no proper access to basic needs. The study intends to examine the root causes of the Cabo Delgado conflict, reoccurrences of conflicts have been attributed to the fact that the root causes are not usually solved. The study further investigates the methods and approaches employed by SADC in resolving the conflict in Mozambique. SADC with its Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security has been passive in its approach to promoting conflict resolution in Mozambique. Further, the methods adopted have not been entirely effective due to various constraints. This conflict not only threatens peace and security in the region but also hinders the economic progression of the region. Therefore, the study intends to identify the different challenges faced by SADC in resolving the conflict in Mozambique and establishing sustainable peace.

1.3 Research Questions

To elaborate on the research problem and objectives, the study uses the following questions:

1.3.1 Main Research Question:

What role does SADC play in resolving the conflict in Mozambique?

1.3.2 Sub-research questions:

1. What are the root causes of the Mozambique Conflict?
2. Which mechanisms and methods have been adopted by SADC in resolving the Mozambique Conflict?
3. What are the challenges faced by SADC in its efforts to resolve the Mozambique Conflict?

1.4 Research Objectives

1.4.1 General Research Objective:

To examine the role played by SADC in resolving conflict in Mozambique.

1.4.2 Specific Research Objectives

1. To assess the root causes of the Mozambique Conflict.
2. To analyze the mechanisms and methods adopted by SADC in resolving the Mozambique Conflict.
3. To investigate the challenges faced by SADC in its efforts to resolve the Mozambique Conflict.

1.5 Hypothesis

1. The root causes of the conflict in Mozambique are mainly attributed to poor resource governance, marginalisation, poverty and underdevelopment in Cabo Delgado.
2. SADC adopted mainly military intervention to neutralise the militant group in Cabo Delgado region.
3. The challenges faced by SADC in resolving conflict in Mozambique are mostly influenced by politics around the conflict, SADC's sluggish tendencies and poor financing.

1.6 Significance of the study

The Southern African region is currently facing security challenges that need to be addressed because they ultimately affect the stability of the whole region. Conflicts in Africa tend to spill over to their neighbouring countries and cause destabilization in their respective regions. These patterns of conflict lead to an increased role for action, mediation, and intervention at the regional level by the affected neighbouring countries and regional organizations. Although Southern African countries have been relatively peaceful and stable for the past two decades, there have been challenges of an armed insurgency, a crisis of governance, and a lack of socioeconomic development. SADC is ill-prepared to manage such issues effectively (Mlambo & Masuku, 2021).

Therefore, it is pertinent that SADC adopt methods and mechanisms that can be deployed to ensure that peace and security are restored in the region.

Mozambique has witnessed several conflicts ever since it gained its independence. The conflicts have negatively impacted the country's social, economic, and political development, causing threats to human security. With this, the country must receive external help from its neighbouring countries through the regional bloc (SADC) channel. The mediation of SADC will ensure that its mandate of promoting and restoring peace in the region is met. Article 11 of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation under conflict prevention, management, and resolution states that the organ seeks to manage and resolve inter- and intrastate conflict. Furthermore, it has the responsibility to intervene in conflicts that threaten peace and security in the region (SADC, 2010).

This study is significant because it will contribute towards the attainment of the fourth Aspiration of Agenda 2063 of the African Union, which has a goal of preserving peace, security, and stability in Africa. Equally, SADC will benefit from the study because it will contribute to the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) 2020-2030 vision of attaining peace and security in the region. Furthermore, the significance of this study is to provide knowledge on the important role the SADC institution plays in promoting conflict resolution in Mozambique. The knowledge provided in this study can be used to challenge the ongoing conflict issues that are currently present in Mozambique. The study can also be used to highlight the significance of promoting peace in the SADC countries that are currently faced with conflict situations.

This study will assist the SADC region in finding sustainable means of promoting conflict resolution in the region and thus establishing peace that will impact human security. Furthermore, the knowledge about conflict resolution in the region of Southern Africa in this study will assist

stakeholders and policymakers in formulating policies that will benefit the SADC region, especially the policy actors in the peace and security sector. In addition, this study will also be of great significance to the local authorities and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). They will be applied to formulate their policies, supporting and promoting conflict resolution in the region. The study also significantly serves great importance in the academic space in conflict resolution institutions. It will expand knowledge on the impacts of conflict resolution in Southern Africa and how it can play a crucial role in reducing the current conflict issues in most parts of the region. The study will also provide knowledge to the various actors on conflict resolution issues in SADC.

1.7 Scope of the Study

1.7.1 Thematic Scope

The study focuses on identifying the role of SADC in resolving conflict in Mozambique. In answering the general objective specifically, the researcher examines the causes of conflict in Mozambique, the underlying causes of conflict in Mozambique will provide the institution with the appropriate tools to resolve conflict and ensure that it does not reoccur. Secondly, the study analyses methods used by SADC to resolve conflict in Mozambique because the methods used to resolve conflict will determine the longevity of peace and its impact on the regional security of Southern Africa. Finally, the study evaluates the challenges faced by SADC to resolve conflict in Mozambique. It is however important to note that the driving motivation for looking at conflict resolution in Mozambique is that the conflict has affected a large majority of people and that studies have not focused on the role SADC could potentially play in restoring peace in the country.

1.7.2 Temporal scope

The period covered in the study is from 2014-2024. The year 2014 provided knowledge about the political problems caused during the elections. Since the year 2014, Mozambique has experienced

an increase in election-related riots. Mozambique experienced an increase in protests that were associated with the local elections involving the ruling party FRELIMO and the opposition party MDM. In 2017 the security situation in the country got aggravated by an Islamist militia group and has gained traction in Northern Mozambique. In 2019 there was a general election in Mozambique and once again the ruling party won, and this spiked conflict. The election caused a major threat to the country's peace because RENAMO wanted re-election due to the alleged existence of violence and electoral fraud by the ruling party.

Moreover, in 2020 insurgency increased in the Northern part of the country, particularly in Cabo Delgado. More than 3,000 people died, and nearly a million have been displaced due to grave violence (Sheehy, 2021). The period of 2014-2024 witnessed several conflict breakouts in Mozambique and has seen the security of the country and region become threatened. This paper acknowledges the conflict in Mozambique dates to pre-colonial times but chooses the period of 2014-2024 because it is recent in the history of conflicts in Mozambique.

1.8 Definition of Key Terms

1.8.1 Conflict

The term conflict can be used to refer to a clash of interests, values, ideologies, and struggle between the haves and have-nots, that is competition over scarce resources among others. A conflict that happens between states is defined as a political phenomenon that exists when states have different/clashing systems, ideologies, or values (Effendi, 2017). Further, Effendi, (2017) elaborates that conflict can occur within the boundaries of an existing political arrangement, which is referred to as intra-state conflict. Eiseman (2003) further elaborates that conflict can take the form of intra-state war or it can occur within the boundaries of an existing political arrangement. In the same vein, a conflict is defined by Al-Rawashdeh and Al-Majali (2017) as a concept that

involves two or more parties with opposing goals, activities, and ideas. This entails that each of the concerned parties wants to fulfil their demands at the expense of the other parties' demands not being met. Pule (1997) further posits that the nature of conflicts is that there is competition over the control and use of resources, as well as the incompatible values and interests of the contestants.

Against this backdrop, the researcher's perception of conflict covers three parts. A conflict is a situation where two or more parties have incompatible interests and one party decides to restrict/suppress the interests of the other, which leads to frustration, anger, or fear that may lead to action and further reaction.

1.8.2 Conflict resolution

Conflict resolution is the process that parties use to find peaceful solutions to their disputes. Burton and Mason (1993) argue that conflict resolution means eliminating conflict by using methods that can analyse the root cause of the problem. Therefore, conflict resolution provides insight into the nature of the problem and helps eliminate the source of the problem while preventing future issues. Hove & Ndawana (2017) posit that the SADC organ in its efforts to resolve conflicts adopts different strategies. The organ mostly relies on mediation if the parties are willing to negotiate the terms, and in cases where the conflict escalates, the organ opts for a military intervention. Therefore, conflict resolution by the organ includes the use of the military as a final resort to protect the citizens and their country against instability and to resolve intra and interstate belligerence and aggression. Hence in the context of this study, conflict resolution focuses on all the methods SADC adopted to tackle the conflicts in the Northern region of Mozambique.

1.9 Organization of the Study

Chapter One introduces the analysis of the topic. It consists of the background of the study, the problem statement, the research questions, and the methods that will be applied in this study. Moreover, the researcher also highlights the significance of the study conducted for this research.

Chapter two provides a framework for the role of SADC in conflict resolution in Mozambique. It broadly discusses the institution's role in promoting peace and stability in the country. The researcher introduces the theories that will be employed in this study. In addition, the researcher will also describe theories, which will explain the existence of the research problem under this study. This chapter will provide a background on the theories that will be applied to the role of SADC in Mozambique. Furthermore, it will describe the concepts of conflict resolution in conflict-prone countries such as Mozambique.

In chapter three the researcher will thoroughly evaluate how the data collection methods and the analyses of the collected data. For this research, the researcher employs a secondary data collection method to gain a deeper understanding of the impact of the conflict and how SADC has promoted peace in the country.

Chapter four analyses the data that has been collected from the data obtained in chapter three. The data will then be represented in the study in a textual form.

Chapter five evaluates the findings and summarizes the arguments put forth by the researcher. The researcher will also give recommendations to address the issues that are presented in this study.

Chapter Two

Literature Review

2.1 Theoretical Framework

2.1.1 The Human Needs Theory

The central idea in the Human Needs Theory (HNT) is that certain essentials are needed for survival. These needs are not only shelter, food, and clothing but they include both physical and non-physical elements (Walsh, 2016). Hence humans are spontaneously driven to attain these needs. Advocates of the HNT theory differentiate between human interests and needs with the belief that the frustration of people's efforts to attain their basic needs breeds conflict. Further, conflict and violence are inevitable because human needs are non-negotiable while human interests can be negotiated and compromised. The boundary between the two is blurry and naturally controversial, the needs include amongst others, security/safety, belongingness/love, identity, self-esteem, freedom, personal fulfilment, cultural security, distributive justice, participation, and liberty (Marker, 2003; Walsh, 2016). Against this background, the unequal distribution of resources resulting in the alienation of human needs perpetuates conflicts in Africa. It has been argued that the causes of conflict in Mozambique relate to issues of governance, mismanagement of resources, and political, economic, and social exclusion of the citizens. The identification of the root causes of conflicts is imperative in conflict analysis because it significantly contributes to the understanding of the complexity of conflicts (Moyo, 2017). The HNT is key to this study because it assists with analysing the root causes of conflict in Mozambique related to the failure to satisfy human needs.

Advocates of the HNT such as Rosenberg (2003); and Gert (2005) perceive that when particular groups of individuals are deprived of their needs, feeling disrespected and disregarded, they resort

to the use of violence. Gert (2005) views that with the application of the HNT, there can be a deeper understanding of the root causes of conflicts and possible solutions. In the same vein, Rosenberg (2003) states that violence can sometimes be understood as a tragic expression of unmet human needs. Thus, it can be understood that the actions human beings take are motivated by their desire to fulfil their needs. Usually, conflicts begin because of the competing interests of states or social groups; therefore different scholars have attributed the causes of conflict to the unsatisfied basic human needs and the clash of individual interests. A framework provided by Abraham Maslow assists in understanding human needs about conflicts, Maslow highlights the importance of social and personal human needs in the formation and development of societies (Aram et al, 2020). HNT has been used by different scholars in conflict resolution to unfold the root causes of conflict and determine which factors could hamper the process and the ones that can result in a conflict situation. Prothrow–Stith & Weissman (1993), argue that conflicts in human societies are inevitable, hence to resolve conflicts, we must consider the satisfaction of all the parties involved. Conflict resolution is a process that facilitates the assessment of the root causes of the conflict together with the options that can be explored to meet the demands of all parties. In Motsamai (2018), Burton (1997) asserts that conflict resolution is an analytical and problem-solving process, and in the long run, a process of change in the political, social, and economic systems. In this regard, conflict resolution can be perceived as being more valuable than the settlement of the conflict. Nonetheless, according to Bercovitch & Jackson (2006), conflict resolution does not only mean ending the direct conflict because it is complex it takes a long time it takes to resolve.

In Motsamai (2018), Burton (1990) argues that there is a set of needs that can be used to understand human behaviour and be useful for policymakers in arriving at decisions to control and resolve conflicts. Hence, governance institutions must satisfy the needs of all segments of society as a way

of creating sustainable peace. Moreover, these institutions can be the actors involved in conflict resolution such as the government, development partners, and civil society organizations amongst others. The concept of identifying these needs offers a possible method of resolving and analyzing conflict according to Burton. The needs are key to understanding social conflicts triggered by identity, security, recognition, and personal development. Additionally, Walsh (2016) argues to resolve conflicts, society must be radically restructured to satisfy human needs as there cannot be peace without satisfying those needs. Walsh (2016) suggests that the means to meet the basic needs of humans are not scarce but are, in fact, unlimited. Burton (1997) elaborates that there is a need for appropriate institutions in societies to fulfil these needs for all parties and create sustainable peace. The important advantages of the basic human needs theory from the perspective of conflict resolution are: that the individuals who are partaking in the process of conflict resolution can make a distinction between struggles that can be dealt with by employing the law, powerbased negotiation, and those which need conflict resolution measures, Rubenstein (2018). Moreover, Burton (1990) distinguishes between needs-based conflicts, and the conflict resolution processes, from interest-based disputes and the processes of the characteristic of strategic studies, conventional diplomacy, and alternative dispute resolution. Furthermore, conflict resolvers can understand the difference between "negotiation" and "dispute resolution" This allows them to design resolution processes that correspond to the root causes of the conflicts.

HNT provides an essential theoretical framework that helps guide the study to assess SADC's role in promoting conflict resolution in Mozambique and draw lessons from this process. Furthermore, the theory will also help analyze the role of other regional actors in this conflict. The theory emphasizes that conflict is brought by a quest of individuals or groups to fulfil their needs; therefore, to resolve any conflict based on the HNT, the parties involved in the process of conflict

resolution should look at the root causes that are impacted by the negligence of not fulfilling basic human needs for members of the community. This theory is pertinent for analyzing SADC's role in the promotion of conflict resolution in Mozambique. The ongoing conflict in Mozambique has called for the sub-regional organization to intervene and bring about a resolution to ensure peace and stability in the country and thus to keep the region stable. Although the human needs theory has its weaknesses, it will assist the researcher in analyzing mechanisms that SADC can employ to resolve conflict in Mozambique by looking at the root causes perpetuated by the unmet needs of civilians in the country.

2.1.2 The Systems Theory

A system approach can be adopted to handle complex conflicts particularly when applied with the active participation of the local people. The approach allows the practitioners to identify the key drivers of the conflict, understand how their relationship, and determine the feasible and transformative entry points to reduce violence and resolve disputes (Tabaja & Al Khameri, 2021). To solve a conflict with measurable outcomes, the efforts to promote peace should be designed based on a good understanding of the complex conflict system with interventions that emanate locally and are inclusive, strategic, and conflict-sensitive. The General Systems Theory was developed by the Austrian biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy in 1928, who suggested a need to consider the whole when studying all the parts. According to Luwdig (1928), a system is characterised by the interaction of the different elements in a system. Therefore, the success or failure of a system largely focuses on how well the sub-systems are integrated. In his work, he cites that all things are interconnected, and they interfere with each other, just like the human body each cell affects the entire body and is affected by it, each of the clusters of cells with specific functions affecting the other groups and so on (Von Bertalanffy, 1972).

Although this theory was originally proposed in the medical field it can nonetheless be applied in other sectors such as economics and social sciences. In conflict resolution, a systems theory entails looking at a conflict as a system that has an interconnected set of factors that interact to maintain the conflict itself (Tabaja & Al Khameri, 2021). These factors can be political, economic, regional, or international. Therefore, interventions seeking to resolve conflict should change the relations between these factors to sustain peace. Using the systemic theory, this study, therefore, argues that it is important to note that a country is an integrated social system that consists of individuals who consistently interact with each other. The individuals and the state are in exchange with one another. Thus, should the state fail to meet the needs of the individuals then there will be a conflict breakout. This approach should guide the way conflict resolution is being carried out and also analyze the sources of conflict. This study further adopted the system theory to understand how different individuals, communities, and countries are when they do not live in harmony and there is frequent conflict.

Scholars such as Hocker & Wilmot (2018) use systems theory as a tool that analyses conflicts in terms of the different roles, processes, and patterns within them. Conflict resolved using the systems theory approach not only focuses on securing short-term peace but also appreciates the factors that drive conflict in the first place. To them, this approach attempts to discover the rules that govern the system's behaviour and the function the conflict performs within that system (Hocker & Wilmot, 2018). The power and influence of these systems are determined in multiple ways and substantial change is thought to occur only through transformative shifts in the deep structure or pattern of the system (Motsamai, 2018). Furthermore, Diamond & McDonald (2013) use systems theory to analyze the various diplomatic tracks in conflict resolution, arguing that to resolve extensive conflicts, they need to be addressed on several tracks of engagement at the same

time. This is because the tracks could balance each other's activities. Vallacher et al (2006); and Coleman (2006) add that systems theory provides a dynamic approach to addressing extensive conflicts comprehensively. For instance, Coleman (2006) argues that the key goal of conflict intervention should not be to foster a particular outcome, such as a peace agreement, but to alter the overall patterns of interaction among the parties. Only such changes in interactive patterns could ensure that social change becomes sustainable (Coleman, 2006).

Systems theory is applicable in this research because it assists the researcher in analyzing how stakeholders in Mozambique map out conflict in the country and how they implement ways of resolving conflict. The theory helps one to understand the conflict in Mozambique does not only affect a certain group of people who are fighting but affects the whole system of Mozambique and further implicates the Southern African region and other African regions. Therefore, if individuals are satisfied with a system and the system serves them well there will be no need for conflict. With this, the Mozambican government and SADC should engage the conflicting parties and resolve conflict based on solutions that are realistic and have achievable outcomes. Practitioners who have been assigned to resolve the conflict have to consider the feedback loops between the political, economic, social, and security factors driving the conflict. Moreover, Tabaja, et al. (2021) argue that a systems theory allows actors to avoid the risks of failing to address the conflict and creating unintended consequences that will exacerbate the grievances of the conflicting parties. Therefore, it creates strategic solutions that resolve conflicts from within hence impacting the overall system.

2.2 Conflicts In the African Continent

The African continent has faced several conflicts since the end of the Cold War to the present, with most of them being intrastate. These intrastate conflicts have been referred to as ``new wars`` by Kaldor (2001) in the book ``Old and New Wars`` (Mot'kova, 2003). Kaldor's (2001) argument is

that even though wars have moved from geopolitical interests and ideology (mainly democracy and socialism) to identities (ethnicity, religion, and tribe), there are also drivers of conflict such as social inequality, economic underdevelopment, and the mismanagement of resources. The African conflicts mostly affect innocent civilians as they bear the consequences including but not limited to hunger, conflict-induced migration, diseases, and other socioeconomic issues (Mot`kova, 2003). The African continent was ranked as the highest in non-state conflicts in 2018 (Bakan & Rustad, 2018). Afolabi (2009) adds that these conflicts have destroyed lives and property, increased poverty and diseases, facilitated easy access to small and light weapons, and increased human and drug trafficking. From 2000 to 2010, the African continent was faced with a wave of violent conflicts that affected 24 countries and resulted in over a million people losing their lives (Binns et al., 2012). The aftermath of conflicts in Africa has caused loss of human life and extended to displacement, underdevelopment, and insecurity.

The continent's development is primarily affected by the current conflict trend. According to DFI (2001), armed conflict has become one of the crucial causes of poverty in Africa, leading to the displacement of people, the destruction of communities, and the destruction of community livelihoods. War in Africa has a direct and immediate economic impact on the continent because it creates physical disruption and denies access to land, essential resources, and markets. All these have the potential to negatively impact the stability and the progress of countries. As previously mentioned one of the causes of conflict in Africa is inequality. Inequality, as cited in DFI (2001), exists on three levels: economic, social, and political. Countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda had to deal with the misuse of power by one group. The unequal distribution of power in these nations led to limited access to resources and power, and therefore, the gap for conflict was created.

The causes of conflict have been said by scholars to be influenced by a multiplicity of factors, and these include:

- creation of artificial borders by the colonial powers- As noted by Emilo & Omer (2023), colonization caused ethnic division and forcefully combined rival groups through the creation of artificial borders. When dividing the continent, the Europeans did not consider ethics and cultural affinities, the impact of this has seen conflict break out in the continent. For instance, the Cameroon Anglophone crisis is currently happening due to some Anglophones fighting for an independent state. One of the causes of this conflict is based on the fact that the French and British colonial territories were merged into four unitary states (Ekah, 2019). Therefore, looking at Emilo & Omer's (2023) work, one can see how conflict is aggravated by the forceful integration of people from different ethnic groups, cultures, and geographic settings.
- Heterogeneous ethnic composition of African States- Ethnic tension, according to Ryan (1990) and Instituto Del Tercer (1997), as cited by Olaosebikan (2010), is a threat not only to Africa but to the rest of the world because only a small number of states are ethnically homogenous. Therefore, the ethnic division has fostered hatred and suspicion among members of different communities in Africa. Some of the significant ethnic tension in Africa include Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, to name a few. Olaosebikan (2010) argues that ethnic tensions have promoted discrimination against minority groups in Africa. These internal conflicts in sub-Saharan states can be traced to the divide-and-rule policies that fuelled and intensified the interethnic animosities.

- Corruption- According to Olaosebikan (2010), corruption is the major contributing factor to internal conflict in Africa. A majority of states in the continent face the issues of misuse of state resources, fraud, bribes, and nepotism, amongst others. African countries have an abundance of resources, but they have been poorly managed by those in power. The mismanagement of resources exasperates conflict in the continent. Looking at the regional level in Africa it can be argued that conflicts in West Africa are fuelled by interrelated factors, which include poverty, human rights violations, bad governance and corruption, ethnic marginalization, and small arms proliferation. Obi (2012) further elaborates that the root causes of conflict in West Africa are deeply connected to historical factors, socioeconomic crisis, legacies of authoritarianism, the politics of exclusion, and local struggles. West African countries such as Mali, Niger, and Mauritania have had signals of internal violent conflicts (Annan, 2014). Furthermore, there has been a spillover of conflicts in the more stable countries of West Africa, such as the Casamance conflict in Senegal, the intermittent Dagbon chieftaincy crisis in Ghana, and the Niger Delta conflict in Nigeria, as noted (Olonisakin, 2011).

2.3 Conflicts in SADC

The Southern Africa region, as described by Albuquerque and Wiklund (2015), is a region of remarkable contrast because it has relatively high levels of human development compared to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. However, there are also high levels of inequity in the region. SADC countries are a heterogeneous group meaning that the member states have cultural, language, and ethnic differences, although most of them share historical commonalities. Southern Africa was the last region in Africa to gain independence from colonization. According to Aeby (2018), most countries in SADC have been peaceful and stable for the past two decades; however, the region

still has problems of an armed insurgency, poor governance, and lack of socio-economic development. The roots of these conflicts could be traced back to the violent colonial and post-colonial past. Moreover, Aeby argues that the lack of development can pose a long-term risk to regional stability. Nonetheless, although SADC has gradually established a peace and security infrastructure in line with the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), its institutions lack both material and political support, with member states reluctant to cede authority to supranational structures and to enforce SADC principles; thus the institution has been unable to respond effectively to intrastate crises. Aeby (2018) further adds that the organization's poor record of managing and resolving conflict may cause the development of the Southern African region to be static.

Although countries in Southern Africa have emerged from the large-scale wars that date back to the Cold War and the apartheid era, the region continues to be plagued by isolated armed conflicts that have roots in the region's violent colonial and post-colonial past. According to Aeby (2018), contemporary conflicts in Southern Africa are overwhelmingly national rather than international compared to the intertwined anti-colonial wars against white minority regimes in the Cold War era and the Congo wars that involved external belligerents. The region has been faced with armed groups in areas such as Angola, as part of a long-standing separatist struggle, in 2016 armed insurgents launched a series of attacks on government troops in the country's oil-rich Cabinda province and disrupted extractive activities. The enduring low-level insurgency arguably does not have the potential to destabilize the central state, but it has led the Angolan government to maintain tight security in Cabinda and the country.

Moreover, in Lesotho 1998, the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) temporarily overthrew the government, detained high ranking Government officials including the Prime Minister, and seized

and captured key state institutions such as broadcasting stations. The outbreak that caused the conflict was the opposition parties' allegations that the Lesotho parliament was fraudulently elected and illegitimate, leading to demands that King Letsie III dissolve it and call for a re-election. For the opposition, the dissolution of parliament and a new election was the only intervention to resolve the conflict and prevent it from escalating. The rebellious side of the LDF exploited the political instability and temporarily overthrew the Government. The conflict was ended by the military intervention of SADC, led by South Africa and Botswana, that stabilized the situation, reinstated the Government, and paved the way for a return to (relative) normality. In this instance, since diplomatic initiatives had failed, SADC used military intervention to manage the conflict (Matlosa, 1999).

Binns et al. (2012) elaborates on the topic of conflict in Southern Africa by analyzing the conflict in the DRC. The work explains how the DRC has experienced one of Africa's and SADC's longest ongoing and most complex post-Cold War, violent intra-state conflicts. The so-called First Congo War of 1997 led to the rule of Laurent Kabila and the subsequent Second Congo War claimed the lives of more than five million people. Furthermore, the Second Congo War also took on an inter-state nature when Kabila's forces clashed with Rwandan and Ugandan troops occupying the eastern part of the DRC for purported security reasons. The underlying causes of the Second Congo War, according to Kapinga (2015), were the marginalization of other ethnic groups which was identified as a predominant feature that has worsened under the Kabila rule. As cited in Kapinga's (2015) work titled *The Role of Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Conflict Resolution in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 1998-2003: 'An appraisal,'* Kisangani (2010) argues that the anti-Kabila war was Kabila's decision to prevent a coup by excluding the Banyamulenge and other Tutsi from power. Their exclusion from the government or access to power was

equivalent to being denied the Congolese nationality. Therefore, the Rwandan and Ugandan governments supported the Banyamulenge rebels who sought to overthrow Kabila's Government, resulting in Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia (also SADC member states), sending troops to the DRC in support of Kabila.

The underlying causes of the destruction in the Eastern Congo were attributed to the underlying communal problems that were building up in the years leading up to 1996. Nevertheless, the long-term causes of the conflict, as argued by Kapinga (2015), can be traced back to the post-independence history of the DRC. Indeed, the DRC has experienced a long period of authoritarian rule. Moreover, the country has not had leaders who have promoted effective governance. In response to the conflict, the selected SADC community members, the then OAU, and the UN intervened by holding negotiations with the parties to the conflict and a ceasefire. However, despite the multi-group Agreement that included the cessation of military operations by the conflict parties as one of its conditions, the conflict continued and culminated in 2001 with the assassination of Laurent Kabila and the instalment of his son Joseph Kabila as his successor (Kapinga, 2015).

2.4 Factors behind conflict in Mozambique

Mozambique has faced a devastating armed conflict for sixteen years in the mid-1970s after their independence. The war between the FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) government and the rebel group RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana), began shortly after independence and eventually ended in 1992 when a General Peace Accord (GPA) was signed between the involved parties. Subsequently, by the mid-1990s, Mozambique was widely regarded as a role model for a successful, economically and socially stabilizing post-conflict society (Phiri, 2012). Nonetheless, the country has lost this beacon of hope in the region due to internal conflicts, especially those observed in the second decade. The history of armed conflict and violent unrest in

Mozambique goes back a long way and is part of the inheritance of colonialism. This study, therefore, attributes much of the conflicts to the colonial relationship as a critical factor behind the present conflict in Mozambique. During most of the colonial period, Portugal was generally not strong enough to impose unitary and organized rule over the whole territory of what was to become Mozambique. However, that lasted until the early twentieth century when the powerful local polities started their fight against the colonisers. Portugal became weak in the late nineteenth century and leased most areas to foreign concern companies (the Company of Niassa and the Company of Mozambique) (Darch, 2018).

One of the factors contributing to the recurrence of conflicts in Mozambique is internal factors of power-sharing. For example, the current conflict can be traced as far as 2012. When Afonso Dhlakama was frustrated by what he labelled as intransigence by the then-President Armando Guebuza, returned to the bush headquarters in the Gorongosa Mountains. Dhlakama remained there as he reported serious attempts by the army to capture or kill him. Darch (2018) indicates that the so-called "return to the bush was not driven primarily by electoral calculation problems but was probably linked to natural resource discoveries. This is also another factor leading to the recurrence of conflicts in the country as leaders only see the lucrative natural gas contracts. Darch (2018) further argues that when Dhlakama returned to the bush to re-strategize his movements towards power-sharing, the seating government got international support in defence of the lucrative natural resources from countries such as the United States of America.

In 2016 USA strengthened the 'forces of defence and security' through the notorious undeclared loans of around 2 billion US dollars that were revealed to the public in April 2016. This brought tension between leaders and the reemergence of rebels in the country. Mozambique's conflict outbreak can be divided into three parts. First, the FRELIMO government has refused to share

power with the opposition RENAMO even though they have been encouraged to do so after the 1994 elections. Because of this, the RENAMO opposition has created a perception that even though they have widespread electoral support, they stand to gain nothing. Frelimo has dominated the country's political, economic, and social setup since the country's first democratic elections in 1994 (Dzinesa & Motsamai, 2013). Subsequently, this has served as one of the root causes of the recurring conflict in Mozambique. Moreover, FRELIMO's tight grip on the state's resources and RENAMO's greater demands to have a more significant say in decision-making and alleged electoral fraud or rigging are also factors that contribute to the ongoing chaos that is present in the country (Moyo, 2017).

Second, Frelimo has been hesitant to transfer power from the central government to the local administration; this in return, has deprived the Renamo opposition of the benefits in the regions in which they appear to be dominating. Mukwakwa (2020) perceives that the FRELIMO-led government has held power nationally since independence in 1975, and its continued firm grip on power has permitted it to gain significant control over state institutions. This resulted in the country's central government becoming weak, contributing to instability. Moreover, the result of the centralized power is demonstrated through the winner-takes-all system that allowed FRELIMO to have a significant advantage politically and financially over the opposition. Power centralization enabled FRELIMO to ensure its political base and overcome its unpopularity in areas of RENAMO strongholds (Ouassif & Kitenge, 2021). The National Assembly has not given RENAMO support to challenge the government. The opposition is not given a platform in which they can challenge the ruling government. This thus serves as an indication that the National Assembly does not function as an independent entity but is rather controlled by the ruling government and serves the interests of Frelimo. According to Azevedo (2009), the Mozambican National Assembly exists

within a robust presidential system with stringent checks and balances, a bi-party system composed of political parties representing two former war movements with authoritarian legacies. The Assembly also operates within one of the poorest states in the world. The National Assembly is influenced mainly by the ruling party and therefore does not serve the interest of those who are not part of Frelimo. Furthermore elaborates the National Assembly is controlled and financed by the FRELIMO government. Consequently, RENAMO has come to realize that it is not well integrated into the country's systems. RENAMO already considers the government to be determined to exclude it from national decision-making and to deny it any influence in shaping economic policy. The realization that it may not gain power where it sees itself as having a popular mandate, that is, at the local level, further perpetuates the need for the opposition to fight against the government (Ouassif & Kitenge, 2021). Moreover, the potential for heightened regional or ethnic conflict is tied to RENAMO's perception that, despite periodic elections, it has no chance of ever getting a significant share of political power. Elections in Mozambique have been held regularly, but they have been won just as regularly by the same party Frelimo, which has been in power since independence in 1975. For instance, during the 2009 elections, Dhlakama, the former Renamo leader, accused Frelimo of pushing his party to war, particularly following the events of the elections (Regalia, 2017).

Conflicts in Mozambique, as seen above, were previously rooted in the country's history and the colonial residue that is still present to date. However, the breakouts are concentrated not only on the political parties and their activities but also on non-state actors such as militant groups. The terrorist attacks in Cabo Delgado province worsened the humanitarian situation, the armed group targeted innocent civilians evidenced by many abductions and destruction of property. When the terrorist attacks began, more than 946,000 people were internally displaced (Morier-Genoud,

2020). The ISIS-linked group claimed responsibility for attacks on several villages in northern Mozambique. The humanitarian situation in Mozambique's Northern Province of Cabo Delgado continued to deteriorate (Ewi, et al., 2022); (Hassan, 2023).

2.5 Conflict Resolution Methods in SADC

According to Ramsbotham et al. (2016), the meaning and process of conflict resolution are broad because it explains how the underlying causes of conflict are addressed and transformed in the post-conflict stage. Therefore, the ability to achieve a situation where conflict has ended or terminated through conflict resolution as argued by Ramsbotham et al. (2016) can be obtained when the underlying factors are critically investigated and addressed. In essence, conflict resolution refers to the actual process of addressing and resolving conflict.

Moreover, Mashimbye's (2017) perspective is that conflict resolution aims to broker a compromise solution that is generally acceptable to the parties involved in a conflict. Conflict resolution solutions must be self-supporting to last longer and be broadly accepted by the conflict parties. Additionally, conflict resolution should target the three components of conflict: conflict situation, conflict attitudes and perceptions, and conflict behaviour. By doing so, there is a high chance that the causes of conflict will be addressed and future conflict breakouts caused by the same issues. The study and focus of conflict resolution started after the Second World War and was characterized by the study of conflict. According to Bercovitch and Jackson (2009), the experiences of the First and Second World Wars have shaped and influenced the approaches of conflict resolution to promote order and security that allows states to pursue their national interests. Conflict resolution has a normative concern to transform society from a state of war (violent conflict) into a state of negative peace (the absence of violent conflict) and transform a state of negative peace into a state of positive peace (the absence of violent conflict and existence of social injustice).

The approaches and methods of conflict resolution can be divided into traditional and new approaches. The traditional approaches include 'legal methods, peacekeeping, mediation and negotiations frameworks'. This approach is state-centric, the ultimate objective is to serve the state's interest. For conflict to be resolved, states rely on a combination of tools such as coercive diplomacy and defensive alliances' and supplement these tools with a mixture of negotiation and mediation. The new approaches to and methods of conflict resolution work hand in hand with the traditional ones. The approaches and methods address the underlying root causes and structural factors that contribute to conflict and involve official and unofficial state and non-state actors. This approach has also seen several international, non-governmental organizations become involved in promoting and facilitating conflict resolution, as with the case of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and Human Rights Watch (HRW)(Bercovitch and Jackson, 2009).

Nevertheless, this study focuses on the role of multilateral institutions in promoting conflict resolution in their respective region, focusing on SADC. Mashimbye (2017) argues that regional organizations perform the duty of expressing and combining members' positions on the conflict in their regions. For instance, the regional organization can be used as an actor that expresses a common concern that the member states might have regarding managing and peacefully resolving conflict. Furthermore, regional organizations promote norms in the region that will stop any potential conflict, they can do this by interacting with the member states on the need for conflict resolution. They can make provisions of organs that can ensure the application of the rules regarding conflict resolution in their regions. Therefore, the purpose of regional organizations is not only to promote regional peace and security, but they are also collective actors in conflict resolution. Drawing a comparison from a regional body such as ECOWAS, one can note in Jaye et al. (2011) that the regional body has done remarkably well in resolving and ending violent conflicts

in the West African region. For instance, in 1989 and 1991, ECOWAS successfully responded to the violent civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone by deploying the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Olonisakin (2011) also notes that the deployment of peacekeepers through the ECOMOG helped restore peace and stability by ending the violent conflicts in the region concerning Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Côte d'Ivoire. However, ECOWAS does indeed have limitations to promoting conflict resolution in the region, according to Afolabi (2009), the lack of resources of states, financial, human, and material resources has hindered the process of conflict resolution in the West African region.

Furthermore, the lack of political will of governments of West African states to create transparent and accountable governance institutions, address human rights issues, and implement signed peace agreements and resolutions is also a challenge hindering the resolution of violent conflicts in the sub-region. The lack of adequate expertise and skills of mediators also accounts for this persisting challenge. In addition, Onwaku (2009) notes that the region does not have suitable mediation and facilitation skills within the member states and therefore weakens the conflict resolution strategies set by ECOWAS. It is worth noting that even though this study focuses on the region of Southern Africa, references from other regional bodies will be taken into account due to how conflict tends to affect the rest of the continent even though it is not overtly noticed in most cases. Therefore, looking at how ECOWAS has been prompt in reacting to conflicts and any unconstitutional change of power in the region, the SADC body might draw parallels from the successful conflict resolution methods employed by ECOWAS.

Nevertheless, SADC has in place measures that are meant to promote peace and security in the region. For example, The Organ for Politics Defence and Security (OPDS) is SADC's primary mechanism that focuses on peace and security issues in the region. The Organ must deal with

intrastate and interstate conflict through diplomacy, negotiation, conciliation, mediation, arbitration, and force. It is worth noting that the OPDS is equivalent to the UN's Security Council or AU's Peace and Security Council. It was formally established in its present form by the SADC Treaty and is now clearly an institution of SADC. Interestingly, this Organ has been endowed with objectives, principles, structure, and functions in its Protocol adopted in 2001 (Aeby, 2018). As per Article 2 of the Protocol, the overall objective of the Organ is to promote peace and security in the region. However, the specific objectives are to:

- Protect the region against instability which may be a result of lawlessness and disorder, intra- and inter-state conflict and aggression;
- promote political cooperation among state parties and the evolution of shared political values and institutions;
- advance regional coordination and cooperation on security and defence issues, and develop relations;
- prevent, contain, and resolve intra - and inter-state conflict by peaceful means;
- adopt enforcement action as stated by per international law as a matter of last resort where peaceful means have failed;
- prioritise the development of collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact to respond to external military threats; and
- strengthen peacemaking capabilities of national defence forces and coordinate the participation of state parties in international and regional peacekeeping operations.

The Organ is given direction by the Protocol (Article 11) on the types of conflict it can address. These include conflict over natural resources, acts of military aggression, large-scale violence (e.g., genocide, ethnic cleansing, and gross violation of human rights), civil war insurgency, military

coups, or any threat that undermines the state's authority. In addition, the methods include soft instruments like preventive diplomacy, negotiations, mediation, good offices, and enforcement as a matter of last resort. SADC's role in conflict resolution is identified as a third-party intervener, as elaborated by Kapinga (2015) who claims that SADC's role can be classified as a peacemaker, peacekeeper, and peacebuilder. SADC uses peacekeeping as one of the methods of dealing with a crisis that happens to emerge in the region. According to Hartmann (2013), the institution has made progress in dealing with and responding to conflicts in the Southern African region, mainly through mediation. SADC's evident mediation activities can be seen in its involvement in Zimbabwe, Madagascar, and Lesotho.

Furthermore, the Organisation has facilitated peacekeeping initiatives such as negotiating and signing the ceasefire agreement in Lesotho, DRC, Madagascar, and Zimbabwe. Kapinga (2015) notes that although SADC has facilitated mediation in the region, it is still yet to establish a mediation unit to strengthen its peacemaking capacity. When it comes to facilitating mediation, the organization uses former heads of state to oversee the process. For instance, the then South African president Thabo Mbeki was deployed to mediate the postelection crisis in Zimbabwe in September 2008, which led to the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA). Although the former presidents might have experience in negotiating due to their experience in politics, they do not have experience in mediation. As seen in the previous years, most institutions in the African continent have failed to effectively promote conflict resolution due to the lack of human resources that are trained in that area and the limited infrastructural support to sustain the settlement process. Despite how attractive and idealistic the idea might appear to be, its success might be relatively low, as seen with the deployment of Sir Ketumile Masire to mediate in the DRC conflict on behalf of SADC, but the mediation process did not yield any progressive results.

In addition to SADC's peacekeeping activities, the regional body also partakes in peacemaking because it is also an effective and essential conflict resolution mechanism. Lineham (2015) believes that peacemaking is necessary because it helps identify activities and methods that are reliable to help restore peace in a conflict situation. Peacemaking can involve the process of finding a resolution to a conflict while it is ongoing and can also involve arbitration of issues after the conflict has ceased. Therefore, peacemaking as a process can be overseen by agents, individuals, corporations, and national who have been assigned to lead nations and communities to cease armed conflict.

The nature of conflicts in the SADC region and the lack of financial resources have limited the organization's peacebuilding efforts in the DRC, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho. SADC is aware of the need to establish institutional structures that will promote peacebuilding and reconstruction in the DRC. To get help with implementing Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, it has established joint institutional structures with the African Union to engage in peacebuilding and reconstruction in the DRC. Peacebuilding as SADC's activity can be defined as the process of looking for the root cause of the problem and using that to prevent future occurrences of the conflict. Peacebuilding has elements of conflict prevention, conflict management, and conflict transformation and these help to prevent, address, and transform potential conflict situations (Muvumba & Pharoah, 2013). Although SADC has played a part in promoting conflict resolution within the region, some analysts believe that the organization has had little success in effectively promoting peacekeeping in the Southern African region. SADC has had few contributions to stability and security in the region. However, it has rarely been able to resolve matters collectively, and in most cases, it has had to delegate its diplomatic processes and negotiations to its member

states. For instance, the Lesotho crisis was intervened by South Africa, Botswana, and Mozambique instead of executing the intervention as a collective institution (Maseko, 2019).

With the above analysis of the conflict resolution methods in SADC, it is pretty clear that the regional institution in Southern Africa has employed different mechanisms to ensure that the promotion of peace and stability in conflicting states is met. However, authors such as Kapinga (2015); and Aeby (2019) noted with concern that SADC appears to be hesitant in seeking military solutions to conflict in its member states. Nevertheless, SADC has made progress in its response to conflict in the region.

Chapter Three

Research Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This is an empirical study hence it adopts a particular methodology to collect and analyze data. According to Mishra & Alok (2017), a research methodology is a systematic way of solving a problem. It is a set of procedures by which a researcher goes about doing the work of describing, explaining, and predicting phenomena. It is the blueprint or work plan of the entire research. Pandey & Pandey (2015) perceive that a research methodology is concerned with explaining why a particular research study is undertaken; how a research problem was formulated; the types of data to be collected; the methods to be used; and why a particular technique is used for data analysis.

There are two approaches to research namely qualitative and quantitative, Pandey & Pandey (2015), this study adopts the qualitative approach. Denzin & Lincoln (2011) argue that the qualitative approach is a multi-method in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter, qualitative researchers studies phenomena in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of and interpret them. Further, Mishra & Alok (2017) state that the qualitative approach is used to approach the world, to understand, describe, and explain social phenomena using descriptive, explanatory, and interpretative techniques. This research will discuss and analyze SADC's role in Conflict Resolution in Mozambique using descriptive techniques.

3.2 Research Design

Research design has been defined in various ways by different social scientists. Starman (2013) defines research design as the 'glue' that sticks together the relevant elements in research, it is a brief plan on how to collect and analyze the needed information. As mentioned above, this study

adopts a qualitative research design. Qualitative research involves understanding the underlying reasons and motives; as asserted by Kothari (2004), it helps discover the underlying motives of human behaviour. Hancock et. al (2009) add that qualitative research helps us understand why things are the way they are and considers complexity by including the real-world context. This study will use qualitative research by accessing secondary data such as books, journals, newspaper articles, government and organizational reports, and internet sources.

Qualitative research involves methods of data collection that are non-quantitative or non-numerical (Miles & Huberman, 1994). This approach is suitable to answer the research questions and further provide the research with an opportunity to provide information on how effective the SADC organization is in resolving the conflict in Mozambique. Therefore, the researcher adopts document review as a means of collecting secondary data.

3.3 Data Collection Tools

A research instrument or tool can be defined as the means that a researcher may use to collect or obtain data, measure, and analyze such data that is relevant to the subject of the research. These include but are not limited to observation forms, interview schedules, questionnaires, and interview guides (Sapthami, 2020). It is crucial to collect relevant information for the work when carrying out research. In some cases, the information already exists and in other cases, the researcher must collect the information from the start. Therefore, this implies that data can be classified into primary and secondary data (Sapthami, 2020). For this study, the researcher will use secondary data.

Secondary data is the data already produced by other scholars on the topic of interest. Secondary data helps in giving the study direction and focus (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Secondary data collection involves retrieving already available data from sources other than the target audience.

When working with secondary data, the researcher does not collect data; instead, the researcher consults secondary data sources. Secondary data offers the foundation for the research through the already available information on the topic. This study uses different sources of secondary data, including; data from renowned international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), and European Union (EU), relevant textbooks and journal articles, government policy documents, publications from local and regional organizations, SADC Protocols together with publications on peace and security, both masters and PhD dissertations. Secondary data is necessary for this study as it provides the basis for the research through the already available information on the topic, which gives insights into what has been done and what is being done on issues of regional integration and security in the Southern African Region. However, this method is limited because it is based on secondary data and as such, is likely to have some errors. The analysis is also a laborious one and requires a certain level of expertise.

3.3.1 Desktop Study: Document Review

To define the desktop study/document review method of data collection, Esiri, et al (2017) argue that it is based on the material that can be found in different reports and other documents that are mostly found in libraries, data from various surveys that have been previously carried out, and websites among others. This method assists the researcher in exploring existing secondary data and previous research on the role of SADC in conflict resolution in Mozambique. This method is cost-effective because through it the researchers can delve into the vast knowledge that already exists without having to go into the field to collect data.

A broad definition of a document is a 'written text'. For this method, the document must be studied as a socially situated product. A document can also be defined as any written material other than a record that was not specifically prepared in response to some requests from the investigator (Scott,

1990). This research adopts this method and uses secondary sources of academic papers, and official documents as mentioned above, to assess the role of SADC in Conflict Resolution in Mozambique.

3.4 Data Analysis

Data analysis is the process of searching for patterns and regularities in the data collected, through this process, researchers can make sense of the information collected and find trends and features within the information. The overall process of data analysis involves data reduction, organization, and interpretation. Similar responses are identified to generate a general overview of the respondents (Davidson, 2004). This study uses a method of content analysis, which is part of the broader qualitative research paradigm.

3.4.1 Qualitative Analysis

Qualitative data analysis involves identifying, examining, and interpreting patterns and themes in textual data and discovering how they help answer the research questions at hand. It entails reading large amounts of transcripts, looking for similarities or differences, and subsequently drawing meaning from data and building a logical chain of evidence (Ugwu & Eze Val, 2023). Qualitative data can be analyzed either using the deductive or inductive approach. This study employed the deductive approach. In the deductive approach, the analysis begins with a question and examines the data subjectively in the context of the question using the scientific method. In this approach, the research questions act as a guide for analyzing the data. Thus, the analysis of data is based on a predetermined structure designed by the researcher. This study adopted content analysis to extract data from the many documents on SADC regional arrangements and national security. Content analysis involves collecting data from a set of texts, which can be written, oral, or visual such as books, newspapers, speeches, and interviews amongst others. It can be both qualitative when the

focus is on interpreting and understanding, and quantitative when the focus is on counting and measuring (Esiri, et al, 2017).

According to Esiri, et al (2017), the primary goal of the qualitative content analysis method is to systematically convert a substantial quantity of data into a clear, summary of the important findings. In describing how this method is employed, Erlingsson & Brysiewicz (2017) propose that data is analyzed by organizing it into classifications based on themes, concepts, and similarity of features.

3.5 Ethical Considerations

Resnik (2020) points out that the existence of ethical standards helps to achieve the objectives of scientific research-knowledge, honesty, and error avoidance. For example, prohibiting falsification or misinterpretation of research data can promote fairness and help prevent errors. The basic definition of scientific misconduct is forgery and plagiarism. Furthermore, since the implementation of scientific research generally requires close cooperation and coordination between many different people and institutions, ethics promotes the values necessary to work together: trust, responsibility, mutual respect, and fairness. The researcher must present their findings and interpretation honestly and objectively. Moreover, this study does not involve human subjects and as such did not satisfy the ethical clearance process.

Chapter Four

Discussion of Findings

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the study's findings on the role played by SADC in resolving the conflict in Mozambique. The data was collected using the desktop review method. To begin with, the chapter addresses the first research question: What are the root causes of the Mozambique Conflict?

4.2 The Root Causes of Conflict in Mozambique

4.2.1 Poor Governance of Natural Resources

Extensive field research by the Institute for Security Studies and Judicial Training Institute of Mozambique shows that the escalation of terrorism in the province can be associated with the discovery and bad governance of resources (natural gas and rubies). Most of the respondents in the survey stated that the mismanagement of natural resources escalated the conflict in the region. The huge investments in those resources provided an opportunity for the country, however, those in the region felt marginalized because they did not benefit from those investments. Moreover, some of the locals lost their land and livelihoods to make way for the gas infrastructure. The locals did not see any benefit and doubted that the discovery of resources would reduce poverty and improve service delivery (Louw-Vaudran, 2022); (Ouassif & Kitenge, 2021); (Bonate et al, 2024). In the same vein, Brincat (2020) perceives that the people in the northern region have been marginalized since the country got its independence in 1975. Though the northern region is rich in resources, the region remains underdeveloped while there have been a lot of investments made by Multinational Corporations (MNCs) such as TotalEnergies from France and ExxonMobil from the United States amongst others. The Mozambiquan government's business interests in the work of these MNCs made the government more concerned with the security needs of the companies while ignoring

those of the locals. The locals felt ignorance and marginalization by the government because of a lack of economic opportunities in the region driving them to rebel with some youths joining the militant group (Ouassif & Kitenge, 2021).

Ngoenha et al (2020) reiterate that the situation in Cabo Delgado can be understood by unpacking the discovery and governance of natural resources since the political, social, ethnic, and religious factors have always existed. It can be concluded that these factors long existed and had no room for expression and only found that space in the middle of the transformations made by the discovery of resources in the province. Eventually, with all these factors contributing to the beginning of the violent conflict in place, the conflict was able to emerge mainly because of a widespread weak intelligence and political leadership. The intelligence services failed to provide the government with the relevant information necessary for timely decision-making, limiting the government from accurately assessing the situation that was unfolding in Cabo Delgado. As a result of this vacuum left by government institutions, it was easy for poor unemployed frustrated youth to mobilize and begin the violent attacks. According to Esman (1994), the fundamental element of turning privation into organized violence is mobilization. It is defined as a process by which society becomes politicized on behalf of its collective interests and aspirations. For Mobilisation to occur, there has to be widespread awareness which is usually promoted by local leadership, to influence the community into believing that it is necessary to promote and defend their imperative collective interests. Awareness of the community`s collective interests results in the recruitment of individuals into movements or into the extremist organization who are ready to defend what the organization stands for.

4.2.1.1 Poor Governance of Resources and Radicalisation

The recruitment of the militants and the growth of the small radical group called the Ahlu-Sunnah wal Jama`a (ASWJ) were motivated by the issue of resources. Against this backdrop, the results reveal that the issue of radicalization and extremist ideology must not be overlooked when discussing the escalation of the conflict in the region. Religion in the region has a role in the violence considering the group`s way of communicating and carrying out their operations when recruiting young people. The eyewitness argues that the way the group carries itself resembles any violent extremist group anywhere in the world. Moreover, the three provinces in the northern part of the country are made up of over sixty per cent of people who identify as Muslims. With the teachings of the Kenyan cleric Aboud Rogo Mohammed, there was an increase of radicalization in the region and the rise of the ASWJ militant group can be seen as part of a global wave of Islamic revivalism. This radicalization of people is mostly dominant in mosques and to a lesser extent in the marketplaces (Louw-Vaudran, 2022); (Bonate et al, 2024). Similarly, Morier-Genoud (2020) adds that radicalization in the northern region is a result of the importation of radical Islamist ideas from other Mozambiquan Muslims. Those Muslims tried to copy those practices and adapt them to their locality as far as 2007 in Balama District. This movement has been growing over the years with mostly the youth in the forefront. In 2016, the group shifted from Islamist sectarianism to armed jihadism.

Morier-Genoud (2020) postulates that radicalization should not be overlooked as one of the causes of terrorist attacks in Cabo Delgado. The radicalization might have occurred through the introduction of jihadist ideology by young Mozambicans who were trained abroad in Islamic schools and once they returned they were not happy with the local reality. Furthermore, as mentioned above, it might have been through the importation of the ideology from neighbouring

Tanzania (Stanyard et al, 2022). However, Morier Genoud (2020) argues that this radicalization experienced in the region could not be the primary cause of the violence, therefore, it is important to assess the primary causes that played a major role in the eruption of the violence in 2017. Against this backdrop, Ngoenha et al (2020) claim that for a community to be mobilized for a certain cause, there must be a common element such as religion, ethnicity, or tribe which motivates them to collectively pursue their interests. In the case of Cabo Delgado, it can be argued that if religion (Islam) was the mobilizing element for the youth to organize political violence, the factor behind this mobilization is the discovery and poor governance of natural resources in the region. Hence, the main cause of the conflict.

Likewise, Bissada (2020) argues that the emergence of the recent terror can be compared to the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria, where marginalized groups took advantage of people's grievances. The terror group in Mozambique has adopted the same strategy in which they offer the unemployed youth an option for employment as militants. This becomes easy for them to be recruited because the government has neglected them, and out of frustration they join the militant group. Bissada (2020) further states that the current conflict was not exacerbated by an external actor, however, it started and spread because of the marginalization, alienation, and limited opportunities in the region bringing a feeling of negligence particularly among the youths. Additionally, Louw–Vaudran (2022) mentions that the survey by the Institute for Security Studies and Judicial Training Institute of Mozambique concludes that the huge inequality between the regions significantly played a role in driving the conflict. In general, the Northern province of Cabo Delgado is characterized by abject poverty, high unemployment and illiteracy rates, and poor access to amenities such as electricity and water amongst other resources.

4.2.2 Ethnic Marginalisation and Discrimination

Ouassif & Kitenge (2021) perceive that ethnic marginalisation is one of the causes of the conflict in Cabo Delgado, the issue of ethnic marginalization is old in Mozambique politics and dates back to the times of colonialism. Ethnic marginalization today is more noticeable in the Cabo Delgado region, which is an inhabitant of various ethnic groups. The region's main groups are the Macuas, Muanis, and Maconde. Feigo (2023) adds that the minority groups of interest are the Muanis and Macuas who occupy the section of the Indian Ocean in Eastern Cabo Delgado, these two groups are mostly comprised of Muslim traders, fishermen, and farmers along the coast linking to Tanzania. The Makonde majority group is mainly a Christian society and occupies the Western Cabo Delgado. The Makonde are well represented within the government and the ruling FRELIMO, with President Filipe Nyusi being the president, they continue to live a much better life as compared to other ethnic groups in the region.

When analyzing the conflict in Cabo Delgado, it can be realized that it is not only an issue of grievances, however, it is imperative to understand who is aggrieved. This assists in understanding the struggle between the FRELIMO-led Makonde government and other minority ethnic groups, particularly the Muanis which remain excluded by the ruling elites. Matsinhle & Valoi (2019) reported that former generals and liberation fighters dominate the political sphere in the country. There are the ones who occupy positions in strategic government structures and institutions. Therefore, if individuals from one ethnic group dominate in key positions, the decisions that the government arrives at are not representative of the other ethnic groups. Such decisions only benefit the Makonde, the decision-making remains centralized in Maputo while the government institutions such as the police in the Cabo province are dominated by the Makonde. Dangazela (2023) adds that this is an effort to control and oppress other ethnic groups, hence, the Muanis

group feels they are being overlooked when it comes to power positions, consequently resorting to violence to struggle for change (Dangazela, 2023).

This marginalization has led to high poverty, unemployment and illiteracy rates, amongst the other groups, which has perpetuated anger and resentment towards the Makonde group. The Makonde liberation fighters have grabbed businesses and strategic coastal land making them the rich business people in Cabo Delgado region (Ehiane et al, 2023). The situation is that there is a huge disparity between the privileged regions such as Maputo in Mozambique`s far south and the northerners who remain marginalized. The extraction of mineral resources without enough compensation for the people living in the Northern part of Mozambique and the historical grievances dating back to the civil war continue to spread the conflict in Mozambique. The northern part of the country faces a huge unemployment crisis and despite this, the mining companies prioritized external workers over the locals. This was one of the major drivers of the conflict in the region. This has pushed the militant group in the region to keep on recruiting the disenchanting youth through the use of social media platforms such as WhatsApp and TikTok (Davey, 2023).

Furthermore, the government of Mozambique grabbed vast land from the local communities in Palma without proper consultation and compensation. This grabbed land was then allocated to the multinational companies under concession for gas exploration. Further, the land was allocated to the elites (Makonde) to enable them to invest in real estate to benefit from the booming gas industry in the region. To make matters worse, the government went to the extent of denying the community access to the sea for fishing. They did so without any compensation to the fishermen, and they blocked their access to enable the multinational companies to conduct their gas exploration studies (Mimbire & Nhamirre, 2015). All the aforementioned events contribute to the frustration of the locals because their livelihoods are dependent on both the sea and land. The sudden denial of access

to these two fundamental sources of income brought feelings of relative deprivation and frustration from the community. The Centro para Democracia e Desenvolvimento (2022) reported that the same situation transpired in Montepuez District in 2009 when the ruby deposits were discovered. About 36000 hectares of land were given to Montepuez Ruby Mining in 2011, the mining company was with British investment and worked with top and influential FRELIMO veterans of the national liberation struggle. Consequently, the people`s land was taken, the land which was used by the community for agriculture, and those who engaged in artisanal mining. Some of the artisanal miners who were chased out of the land in Montepuez are reported to have ended up joining the violent extremist groups that launched attacks in Cabo Delgado (Centro para Democracia e Desenvolvimento, 2022).

4.2.2.1 Centralization of Power

Since independence, the FRELIMO government has managed to maintain power and control of state institutions. This is further perpetuated by the country`s electoral system, a winner-takes-all system that benefits FRELIMO more than other political parties. This has allowed FRELIMO to be politically and financially stable as compared to other opposition parties consequently facilitating FRELIMO`s grip of power in RENAMO`s strongholds. However, there have been many calls for decentralization based on the arguments that it would offer the main opposition, RENAMO an opportunity to redistribute power and the local population an opportunity to select their local leaders/provincial governors through direct elections rather than appointment by the ruling FRELIMO. The reform of the electoral process is anticipated to have the potential to bring stability to the country, level the political playground for competing parties, and go to the extent of the sound management and distribution, ownership, and control of natural resources, among the population and other political players. Decentralisation is hoped to bring an inclusive government

and equal distribution of power which currently the ruling FRELIMO enjoys solely, leaving other key political players out. Unfortunately, this has not been achieved because of the reluctance of FRELIMO in fear of losing power to other parties (Mukwakwa, 2020).

4.3 The Mechanisms and Methods Adopted by SADC in Resolving the Mozambique Conflict

On the 19th of May 2020 in Harare, Zimbabwe, Mozambique officially requested the assistance of SADC to fight against terrorist insurgency in Northern Mozambique. This request was made during the SADC Extra-Ordinary Organ Troika Summit of Heads of State and Government. The Zimbabwe Summit was followed by the 40th Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government in August 2020 where the organ proclaimed their mutual support and commitment to supporting Mozambique in finding solutions to the problem of terror and violence in the Cabo Delgado region. Furthermore, on the 27th of November 2020 in Botswana, the SADC Extra-Ordinary Organ Troika Summit noted its concern about the ongoing terrorism activities in Cabo Delgado and continued to show its support and commitment to assisting Mozambique in addressing the conflict. As guided by Article 5 of the SADC Treaty of 1992 which aims at promoting peace and security, the summit was about finalizing a robust regional response and support to Mozambique. The focus of the Summit was on assessing the need, rationale, justification, nature, and forms of interventions together with the implications of such interventions nationally and regionally (Vhumbunu, 2021).

The SADC's justification to intervene in Mozambique comprises a variety of factors including the rise in human rights abuses, deaths, and displacement. Furthermore, the conflict was continuously deteriorating the economy and had further affected the economic project in the Cabo Delgado region. The SADC Secretariat (2019) highlights some of the fundamental instruments to adopt for intervention in its member states. These instruments include the SADC Treaty of 1992, the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security of 2001, and the SADC Common Agenda (as amended

in 2009); the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Defence, Politics, and Security (SIPO); and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact of 2003. Furthermore, the intervention is facilitated by structures and institutions such as the Summit of Heads of States or Government; Council of Ministers; Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC); and the Troika.

SADC intervention in Mozambique was justifiable under the provisions of the aforementioned instruments. To begin with, the SADC member states are obliged both morally and legally to help one another during times of instability and security crisis. The SADC treaty provides that the organ should endeavour to promote peace and security. Moreover, the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDSC) Article 2 provides that it exists to protect people, and strengthen regional stability which may arise from the deterioration in the rule of law and order as well as intra-state conflicts. Further, OPDSC strives to “prevent, contain and resolve inter and intra state conflict by peaceful means” and also adopt a community-based approach to domestic security by promoting the participation of police and state security in conflict resolution. As aforementioned, the insurgency in northern Mozambique had risen to an uncontrollable level displacing many hundreds of civilians, leaving thousands dead, and disrupting economic activities. The dire humanitarian situation in the northern part of the country justified and satisfied the conditions for SADC OPDSC to intervene in Mozambique. The legal basis of the intervention was based on Article 11 (2) (b) of the protocol which states that the OPDSC shall try to resolve widespread violence within its member states, between the people or the people and their government, or in times of civil wars or insurgency.

Furthermore, SADC member states are signatories to some of the continental commitments under various African Union (AU) instruments. Most pronounced, the SADC member states which are part of the AU are part of the consensus made in 2013 to work together with other African countries

to 'silence the gun in Africa by 2020', implying countries must cooperate to end all war and conflicts which perpetuate human rights abuses in the continent. Additionally, SADC's intervention was to control the spread of the conflict in the region. The nature and intensity of the violence in Mozambique were a concern with fears that the conflict might spread to the neighbouring countries if not swiftly addressed, countries such as Malawi, Tanzania, Eswatini, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Zambia. The South African government had already expressed concerns and the possibility of the conflict reversing the peace gains made over the years in the region, impacting the economic relations between countries and resulting in an influx of displaced persons into South Africa and other neighboring countries.

In 2015, a counter-terrorism strategy was established by SADC member states which aligns with the United Nations (UN) global strategy, further, they highlighted factors that limit effective counter-terrorism. These factors are mostly common in countries experiencing violent extremism, they include the lack of laws and institutions for addressing the problem of terrorism, high corruption and social exclusion, lack of interagency, poor cooperation between the government and civil society, permeable borders, and high illegal migration amongst others (SADC, 2022). Most counter-terrorism strategies include the hard measures (the use of force to restore law and order) with the soft measures (social and economic reconstruction and development, deradicalization, and reintegration). Soft measures depend on expertise, capacity, and infrastructure, however, most countries in the region lack those. On the other hand, when the hard measures are used haphazardly, they may increase the level of conflict, radicalization, recruitment, and territorial gains. Hence, in any conflict resolution, these two approaches must be balanced, considering the context of the particular conflict, and well-planned and executed (Institute for Security Studies, 2020).

After so many months of reflection on the conflicts, disagreements, and hesitation, SADC finally decided to deploy a standby force to Mozambique. This was agreed on the 23rd of June 2021 in a SADC Extraordinary Summit for Heads of State and Government in Maputo (Zamfir, 2022). The SADC combined force which was initially deployed to Mozambique was dominated by South Africa with a corps of 1,495 soldiers and other troops from Lesotho, Botswana, Tanzania, Namibia, and Angola. This force was deployed with the primary objective of eliminating the Al-Sunnah and gaining back the territory they had gained (Bussotti & Coimbra, 2023); (Mandrup, 2024).

4.3 What are the challenges faced by SADC in its efforts to resolve the Mozambique Conflict?

4.3.1 SADC's Preparedness

There is a significant dissimilarity between the capabilities of the forces deployed as part of SAMIM and its mandated tasks and the complex security and political situation on the ground. This raised questions was the actual capability and operational preparedness of SADC to deploy such a force considering that the mission is so demanding. Indeed, the SADC standby forces do not have vast experience in dealing with enemies of such nature. The SADC Standby Forces have been previously deployed to Lesotho, however, the mission was different and less demanding than the current one. The mission builds on past experiences such as when Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe intervened in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1998 and Tanzania, South Africa, and Malawi intervention in DRC in 2013. However, this does not dispute the fact that despite having established a counter-terrorism strategy in 2015, SADC has little experience in countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism. Usually, the implementation of global and continental counterterrorism frameworks that have been developed before, faced challenges of haphazard institutional arrangements, inadequate resources, and severe trust deficit. In the SADC region, Mozambique included, it is evident that the establishment and implementation of national

and regional counter-terrorism legal instruments have not been the primary priority. This includes the practical standards aimed at robust intelligence gathering, multi-agency collaboration, inter-agency, and inter-state cooperation (Delegise, 2021a).

4.3.2 Lack of Trust and Tensions Between Rwanda and SAMIM Troops

It is a fact that from the beginning, there were a lot of hiccups leading to the deployment of SAMIM, the strained relations between the SADC countries and Mozambique were a limitation to the effectiveness of the mission. To add to this, was the Rwandan deployment which complicated the operational environment for the SAMIM because it was the preferred partner to the host nation. The Rwandan forces even arrived briefly before the arrival of the SADC forces resulting in another diplomatic tension between SADC and the host nation. Mozambique defended its decision to seek Rwanda's assistance by stating that it has a right to freely choose who it partners with, which some analysts saw as a clear lack of a common spirit of SADCnesses (Bussotti & Coimbra, 2023); (Mugabi, 2021). A memorandum of understanding which was signed between Mozambique and Rwanda in 2018 legitimized the latter's intervention in Cabo Delgado. In 2022, this agreement was strengthened when the two Chiefs of Army Staff from two nations signed a new deal. However, Nhamirre (2024) argues that the bilateral agreement between the two countries was and remains a secret. The two countries' top leadership are the only ones aware of this agreement as it was never submitted to the Mozambique parliament. The agreement has brought a lot of contestation by the country's defence and security watchdogs including the media, civil society organizations and the opposition parties in parliament. In general, the relations between Rwanda and SADC have always had tensions because of the alleged assassinations carried out by Rwanda in Southern Africa, and recently in Mozambique and also the bigheadedness of Rwanda towards the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). President Paul Kagame has been accused of offering military assistance to the

M23 rebel group to destabilize DRC in the eastern part, so Rwanda can easily continue to exploit DRC's natural resources (SAIIA, 2024).

Louw-Vaudran (2022) argues that the tensions between the two armies were evident, taking an example of the levels of communication between the two. Communication was very low if there was any, which revealed that Rwanda and SADC's deployment had different objectives. It seemed like Kagame was more interested in having an opportunity to persecute opposition political leaders in exile in the host country such as the journalist Ntamuhanga Cassien and the ex-military Karemangingo Revocat. On the other side, SADC's objective was to prevent the spread of terrorism to other countries as it has already happened in Tanzania and South Africa to some extent (LUSA, 2021). Contrary to this, Issufo (2021) perceives that Rwanda has a great desire to position itself as a global African player, considering its decision to intervene in the Central African Republic in December 2020. Rwanda adopted bilateral cooperation with the country instead of a multilateral intervention (through the African Union), hence, its intervention in Mozambique is a reassurance that Rwanda is a great player in the continent.

Initially, the Mozambique government contracted private military companies to fight against the terrorists. However, these private military companies failed to prevent the attacks which led to the host nation resorting to the SADC intervention, Hence, SADC's intervention was 'plan B', the Mozambique government looked at both Rwanda and SADC for assistance. Rwanda was more favored as mentioned above which brought tensions between the two armies. Bussotti & Coimbra (2023) argue that the tensions were evident in the poor coordination of the armies, as well as the intelligence services between SADC and Rwanda contributing to the partial failure of the military mission. This mission can be defined as a parallel intervention of two different armies that never integrated into a common strategy. The two armies both received funding from the European

Union, with Rwanda being the favourite probably because of the French influence as France has the same interests in the energy game played in Mozambique (Bussoti & Nhaueleque, 2022).

Moreover, the SAMIM mission faced coordination challenges between itself, the Rwandan Defence Forces, and the host nation's forces. There were serious challenges in establishing joint operational planning, making the operation problematic. There was no interconnectedness between the armies, they operated with varying communication equipment, and the personnel spoke varying languages, making effective communication difficult on the ground. There was a lack of trust between the armies affecting information or intelligence sharing because of the fear that some of the vital information would be leaked to insurgents as had previously happened. In addition, the control of local authorities by politicians for their ends posed a problem as they had to delay some operations without a clear explanation, reflecting the political willingness of the host nation to solve the conflicts. All the above factors limited the interconnectedness of the armies and their operations in the field (Mandrup, 2024); (Nhamirre, 2024).

Pounding more on the issue of Mozambique's lack of trust in the regional bloc, the deployment of 1000 Rwandan troops in Mozambique happened before SADC's interventions were fully considered (Zamfir, 2022). The Rwandan troops were authorized to carry out their operations in gas-rich areas of Cabo Delgado while a whole regional force was deployed in less strategic areas in the provinces (Cannon & Donelli, 2022). Authors such as Lawal (2021) perceive that France might be the main actor in driving Rwanda's presence in Mozambique as a way of protecting the \$20 billion gas field investments made by Total, a French company. When the Rwandan army made progress in the area, Total Energies awarded a contract to the Rwandan construction company. In the same vein, Nhamirre (2004) argue that the Rwandan troops were deployed in the Palma and Mocimba da Praia districts which host billion-dollar natural gas projects. These projects are under

Western multinational companies, mainly ExxonMobil, Eni, and TotalEnergies. This is a clear indication of the French and Rwanda's deep interests in the areas which were affected by the conflict. Furthermore, the deployment of Rwandan forces to these strategic areas brought an impression that their mandate in Mozambique was only to protect the booming natural gas industry rather than striving to achieve their official mission objectives. On the other hand, SAMIM's deployment in Cabo Delgado was focused on supporting the Mozambique government in the fight against the militant group by restoring order to the Northern region, the SAMIM's mandate in Cabo Delgado ended in mid-2024.

4.3.2.1 Interoperability

The SAMIM mission faced the challenge of interoperability. The major challenges in this regard are the incompatible communication equipment and the differences in language. This is a challenge for the SAMIM deployed forces and externally when they have to cooperate with the local security forces. This extends to their interactions with the local civilians, affecting interoperability. Elias & Bax (2024) also mention the poor communication between the forces, they argue that the Mozambique forces were poorly trained and underpaid. They expected the foreign troops, Rwanda and SADC to lead in the fight against the insurgents. The unhealthy reliance on local forces (militia) to provide security for many communities is also a problem. It is reported that the SADC officials were very unhappy about the poor communication and lack of cooperation from the Mozambique force. The officials complained that it made all efforts of intelligence sharing difficult and impossible. This was the case for other non-military activities which SAMIM planned to do as part of peacebuilding in the region. In September 2022, SAMIM had planned to construct facilities for women who have experienced sexual violence, however, this faced many challenges because of poor logistics and lack of cooperation from local authorities. A member of the SAMIM's civilian

department was quoted saying, ``What can we do when the host country does not want our help?`` when asked about the progress of the facilities (Elias & Bax, 2024)

4.3.3 Financial Constraints

There have been calls for Africans to be more involved in peace and security processes of the continent to bring African solutions to African problems. However, the problem of institutional capacity continues to limit SADC to restoring peace and stability whenever there are threats. This challenge is not faced by SADC only, it is also been experienced by other continental and regional organizations. The processes of conflict prevention, peacemaking, and peacebuilding are very costly and it is always difficult for African institutions to effectively implement their policies and strategies because of limited funds and overreliance on foreign funders (SADC, 2024). This raises questions on the possibility of SADC and other regional bodies' ownership of the peace and security processes because, in reality, he who pays the piper calls the tune. Given this fact, it is clear that the peace and security processes will likely remain meaningless if those who should drive such processes do not have control of the resources to fully operationalize the processes.

SAMIM was not an exception to the financial challenges. Initially, the member states provided funds on a cost-sharing arrangement through the SADC Peace Fund. This was a sign of commitment to crushing insurgency in Cabo Delgado. South Africa was the main funder of the mission. However, as time passed, the funding ran low and SAMIM had to resort to foreign assistance (Campbell, 2022). The funding quickly ran low, however, leading SAMIM to seek external assistance. The COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with the current global economic crisis that is attributed to the war between Ukraine and Russia, has put SAMIM into a predicament of sustaining the mission that has been extended indefinitely. Additionally, some member states of SADC are overstretched as they are also participating in another peacekeeping mission in the DRC

under the banner of the UN. Disasters have also limited funding to the force as countries worst hit by floods in 2022 and 2023 had trouble addressing such environmentally induced catastrophes. (Fabricius, 2022). Inadequate funding undermines the commitment of resources even when states may have the political will to quell the insurgency. Thus, inadequate funding is preventing SAMIM from increasing its forces and operations to secure the recaptured territories, which leads to a failure to achieve a complete victory over the Ansar Al Sunna insurgents (Hawara, 2024).

Elias & Bax (2024) add that the SAMIM faced funding challenges, it relied mostly on the member states contributions which are always running at a deficit. The South African government contributed almost 45 million US dollars yearly, other funders included the European Peace Facility which had a 15 million euro for non-lethal equipment, which was however inadequate to sustain large-scale ground operations or peacebuilding projects. Moreover, the African Union provided equipment and 2 million dollars through the Africa Peace Facility for the mission. However, in March, Mozambique's foreign minister stated that the SADC mission in Mozambique would end, citing financial problems. Minister Macamo noted that the troop contributors were unable to generate money for the mission and the priority of SADC will shift to the Eastern DRC. SADC had already begun preparing for a military operation in the eastern DRC to replace the departing United Nations mission.

4.3.4 Lack of political will

Carl Von Clausewitz argued in his book on War, that; Will is an integral part of military operations. If one wants to defeat the enemy, their efforts must equal the power of the enemy's resistance. This can be seen in the intertwined factors namely the amount of available means and the strength of the will, these two are essential for a nation to defeat its enemy (Clausewitz, 1968). In the context of Mozambique, the SAMIM and SADC member states have shown a higher political will to end

the violence in Mozambique. This is evident in their call for intervention even before Mozambique acknowledged that it was failing to neutralize insurgency in 2019 (Campbell, 2022). To show their willingness to end the insurgency, the regional intervention deployed 3000 troops from their member states.

Contrary, it has been indicated that there was a lack of political will from the host nation, Mozambique. This has been seen as an obstacle impeding SAMIM from being successful in its missions/objectives. The lack of political will from the Mozambican authorities to effectively address and counter the violence in Cabo Delgado had a lot of impact on SAMIM's ability to carry out successful counter-insurgency operations. This has undermined the efforts to restore peace and security in the region demonstrated in various ways. One sign is the reluctance of the host government to acknowledge the severity and complexity of the insurgency for many years. The government took it lightly and labelled the insurgents as mere criminals rather than identifying them as an organized militant group connected to international jihadist networks. Underestimating the militant group caused a lot of delays and impeded the timely establishment and implementation of an effective counterstrategy (Alfiado, 2023). On the other hand, the insurgents were gaining ground, strength and momentum allowing them to expand their operations. Despite this, the government continued to be hesitant to fully engage with international partners and accept external assistance to fight the insurgents. However, with the arrival of the regional force, the cooperation between the Mozambican authorities and SAMIM was not optimal. The local forces wanted to maintain sovereignty and control over the response and they limited the effectiveness of SAMIM's operations because they allowed the mission access to crucial areas and information (Hawara, 2024).

Furthermore, there were allegations that the government was not interested in solving the conflict because it wanted access to the land and resources that it would not otherwise control. The manner the government was handling affairs concerning land and the internally displaced people (IDPs) showed a lack of political willingness. The Mozambique regulations stipulate that for any land transfer greater than 12 000 ha, there must be consent from the locals, however, in May 2022, the Council of Ministers allocated 12 000 ha to an unknown agency without any consultations with the locals(Hanlon, 2022). The government allocated the customary land without following the right procedure as the locals had fled the unbearable violent situation. Cook (2022) argues that to maintain their grip on the resource-rich land, the government did not want to see the IDPs returning to their rightful locations.

The SAMIM member states have shown a greater political will as SADC`s mandate is to promote cooperation and security. SADC has pressured Mozambique to instil a sense of political will in the leaders to demonstrate their willingness by addressing the root causes of insurgency which have been identified by the bloc as key to the conflict. SAMIM acknowledges that to end the conflict, a military approach will not solely be effective however, the government should also strive to address systematic causes of the insurgency (Ntaka, 2023). Therefore the EU pledged millions of dollars to assist the government in addressing the root causes of the conflict. All these approaches are in contrast with how President Nyusi perceives the conflict, he believes it is caused by external forces. The insurgency has been politicised to a point where the government and SAMIM have different approaches to the conflict which leads to poor coordination among the different stakeholders.

This is in contrast with President Nyusi`s belief that the conflict is influenced by exogenic factors. The insurgency in Mozambique has been politicized such that the way SAMIM sees and plans to address the conflict is different from the way the government sees and wants to address the

insurgency. This is likely to lead to poor cooperation and coordination among stakeholders. (Hawara, 2024). In the same manner, Bussoti & Nhauelque (2022) argue that the reason why Mozambique was not quick to invite SADC for assistance but chose a rather incomprehensible manner of handling the conflict was that they had adopted the international conspiracy theory. They wanted to cover up the obvious ethnic, economic and political root causes of the conflict.

4.4 Theoretical Underpinnings and the Findings

According to the Human Needs Theory, there is a difference between human needs and interests. People are naturally driven to satisfy their needs and when denied such needs it can lead to frustration and further reaction. The needs are non-negotiable; hence conflict and violence are inevitable when people are denied such needs. According to Marker (2003); and Walsh (2016), these needs comprise security/safety, belongingness/love, identity, self-esteem, freedom, personal fulfilment, cultural security, distributive justice, participation, and freedom amongst others. This theoretical framework informs this research by explaining that the failure of the government to manage the resources contributed to the situation in Cabo Delgado. The results show that the main causes of the conflict are centred around resources and bad governance. Bad governance is revealed in the failure to address people's grievances, unequal distribution of resources or the failure to develop the institutions, and infrastructure and investing in projects which could have brought a better life in the region.

Moreover, ill governance is shown in the lack of consultations, caused by the lack of decentralization. Decisions are taken without informing the people, their resources such as land are taken without any consultation and they are forced to vacate their land without any compensation. The HNT theory unpacks the root causes of the conflict by explaining that when a group of people are denied their needs, and feel disregarded and respected, they may use violence to show their

discomfort Rosenberg (2003); Gert (2005). Applying this not only helps in understanding the root causes, but, it also assists in coming up with solutions for the conflict. It can be said that human beings are motivated by the desire to fulfil their needs and when anything stands in their way or disadvantages them, it can prompt them to resort to any other means including violence. Hence, conflict resolution in this case must focus on the root causes of the conflict and take into consideration the human needs.

Furthermore, the system theory as used in this research gives a broad understanding of a conflict and the process of conflict resolution. The theory unpacks all the various factors that interface to maintain a conflict. These factors range from political, economic, and regional to international. Hence, the interventions proposed to resolve the conflict must change the relations among these factors to sustain peace. Hocker & Wilmot (2008) perceive that the System Theory can be adopted as a tool to critically analyze conflicts in terms of the different roles, processes and patterns within them. An analysis of a conflict using this theory not only brings short-term peace but also studies the role of various factors in causing and exacerbating the conflict. Coleman (2006) adds that the main goal of intervening in a conflict is not to only achieve a peace agreement, however, it is to go to the extent of changing the various patterns or behaviours that may cause that conflict to reemerge. Therefore, the system theory assists in unpacking all the factors in a conflict, to ensure that every challenge, cause or driver of the conflict is addressed so there can be sustainable change or resolution.

Applying this theory guides the stakeholders to come up with the relevant measures that can be implemented to resolve the conflict without leaving any other factors behind. Those involved in the conflict would appreciate the role played by the social, economic, political and other relevant factors in the conflict. The results show that SADC's approach to the conflict appreciates the

importance of the System Theory. SADC did not only adopt a military intervention in Mozambique, it also pressured the government of Mozambique to address the problem of governance in the region and to tackle issues of development and poverty. SADC went to the extent of coming up with some projects that could assist those who have been affected by the conflict with shelter. Furthermore, SADC had a program of capacity building in which Mozambique's local forces would be trained, to strengthen their capabilities in their day-to-day duties.

Chapter Five:

Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1 Conclusion

The study investigated the role played by the Southern African Development Community in resolving the conflict in Mozambique. The study addressed three research objectives which read as follows:

1. To assess the root causes of the Mozambique Conflict.
2. To analyse the mechanisms and methods adopted by SADC in resolving the Mozambique Conflict.
3. To investigate the challenges faced by SADC in its efforts to resolve the Mozambique Conflict.

The study reveals that the root causes of Mozambique's conflict are historical and mainly emanate from governance issues. Amongst others are issues of poor institutions to deliver goods and services, lack of development, and regional inequality. To understand the root causes of the conflict, the study reflected on the discovery and bad governance of the resources in the Cabo Delgado region. The study notes that the discovery of resources cannot cause conflicts, however, if they are mismanaged and fail to reflect on the lives of the people, which is the case in the Cabo Delgado region, it then becomes a problem. The region is one of the poorest in the country, with high unemployment, low literacy rate, and abject poverty amongst other social ills. The discovery of resources in the region brought a lot of hope to the locals, however, because of bad governance the people did not benefit from this discovery. This bad governance of resources triggered all the political, social, ethnic and religious injustices which have long existed and had no room for

expression. This caused the militant groups in the region to further react and use violence as a way of carrying out their operations.

Moreover, the lack of strong institutions resulted in the easy recruitment of poor and unemployed frustrated youth who began and spread the violence. The ASWJ militant group grew in size as it continued to radicalise the youth using the issue of mismanagement and inequality in the distribution of resources. The way the militant group carried itself resembled an extremist group, with religion playing a major part in the radicalisation. Some of those young boys were introduced to jihadist ideology when they went for training abroad, upon their return, they did not accept the reality of their locality. Therefore, it was easy to recruit such individuals, this radicalisation of the youth drove the escalation of the conflict in the fight against the injustices in resource governance.

Another factor that cannot be overlooked is the issue of ethnic marginalisation and discrimination which dates back to colonialism. With three main ethnic groups being Macuas, Muanis and Maconde, the government which is led by the Makonde marginalises the other tribes which are mostly fishermen, Muslim traders and farmers. The Makonde who are mostly Christians hold higher positions in government and the ruling FRELIMO, live a better life as compared to other groups in the region. The liberation fighters hold strategic positions in government institutions and at a local level. This has brought a lot of frustration against the Makondes who continue to control businesses, strategic coastal land, and most of the wealth in the region. In addition, the government has grabbed large land and reallocated it to the MNCs and the Makonde elites to invest in real estate and benefit from the booming gas industry. The lack of decentralisation of power continues to keep the Makonde at the top of the hierarchy whilst other groups are marginalised which has over the years brought a lot of discomfort. The violence experienced is a manifestation of the historical injustices that were never solved. The bad governance around the issue of natural

resources has triggered all these injustices and caused the rise of violent groups such as the one being discussed.

The role of SADC in addressing the conflict was expressed through the Extra-Ordinary Organ Troika Summit Heads of State and Government when they had a mutual agreement to assist Mozambique in addressing the terror in Cabo Delgado. SADC's intervention in Mozambique was justified by the loss of life, the suffering of people and a further deterioration of the economy. The SADC intervention was mainly guided by the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and the Troika. SADC used its basic instruments such as the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security of 2001, the SADC Common Agenda of 2009, the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Defence, Politics, and Security (SIPO); and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact of 2003 to justify their intervention in Mozambique. SADC has a moral and legal obligation to intervene in times of instability and security crisis, it does so to protect the citizens and regional instability. The mandate of SAMIM in Cabo Delgado was to prevent the spread of the conflict internally and to other neighbouring nations and restore the rule of law.

However, SADC deployment was not smooth, the organ faced some challenges. Some authors questioned the preparedness and experience of the SADC in tackling a conflict of such a nature. Comparing the mission to other missions in Lesotho, DRC, the Mozambique mission was more demanding, however, it built up on other missions which were deployed more than 10 years ago. This raised questions on the capability of SADC forces to tackle the insurgents because SADC has little experience in counterterrorism and violent extremism prevention. In addition to this challenge, Mozambique showed that it does not trust other SADC members by delaying the intervention of SAMIM. Mozambique went on and brought in Rwanda troops to Cabo Delgado through its bilateral agreement, these troops arrived before the SAMIM troops could land in

Mozambique. Furthermore, Rwandan troops were given jurisdiction in more strategic areas where there are resources, which was labelled as a 'resource game being played between Rwanda, Mozambique and MNCs from France and the USA'. The Rwandan deployment came at a time in which SADC countries particularly the leader, South Africa, and Rwanda had shaky relations. Rwanda has been condemned for the assassination of opposition political leaders who are in exile in Southern Africa and its alleged sponsorship of terrorists who are threatening security and undermining the authority of the DRC government.

Against this backdrop, SAMIM and Rwanda's operations in Mozambique were parallel. It was the presence of two different armies fighting the same enemy, with two different strategies. However, communication between the two armies was very poor if ever they did communicate. It seems each army has its mandate in the region, one for the protection of natural resources and the other for the protection of the citizens. Moreover, this problem of communication extended to the local forces, there was no connection between the three armies, and they used different communication equipment with their officers speaking different languages. The armies lacked trust amongst themselves which affected information and intelligence sharing.

In addition, military interventions require a lot of funds. The funds which were provided by the member states on a cost-sharing arrangement were not enough. SADC had to look elsewhere for more funding and concurrently had other commitments in the DRC before the SADC mission was completed. This meant that they were in a need for more funds to sponsor the two missions. This is a challenge because African countries have committed themselves to funding their operations so that they take ownership of the peacekeeping missions. Lack of adequate finances impacts the effectiveness of military interventions because the equipment needed and other supplies are costly but mostly needed for the progress of the mission.

Lastly, the lack of political will from the host nation has been noted as one of the main barriers to solving the conflict. The leadership of the country was not proactive in fighting the insurgents, which made it a bit difficult for SAMIM to carry out its mandate smoothly. The government took the insurgents lightly by labelling them as mere criminals, this blinded them from seeing the dangers of the militant group and coming up with a better counterterrorism strategy. Allegations were made that the government wishes to prolong the conflict so that it keeps on taking over people's land to make way for MNCs and businesses in the area. When SADC pressured the government to address the root causes of conflicts and invest more in solving the people's political, social and economic grievances, there was no urgency because the government believed in a different approach to solving the conflict.

5.2 Recommendations

- a. The government must adopt a collaborative approach to resolve the conflict. An approach which will bring together all parties to the conflict, the ideological groups, residents and citizens, and civil society, amongst others so that there is a dialogue about the grievances and how they can be addressed amicably. Furthermore, the government must develop a framework to assess human security threats and ensure they are addressed on time. Overall, SADC must hold its members accountable at all times, to ensure that they pursue regional interests of respect for human rights, peace and security over the incumbents' interests.
- b. Mozambique government must establish a robust decentralization plan to allow institutions and the people at the grassroots level to be active in governance, policy-making and decision-making. A robust decentralization process will ensure that people have ownership over the policies proposed and adopted as those policies reflect the major concerns and

challenges faced. This will improve governance, accountability and transparency and promote inclusive development, access and equitable distribution of resources.

- c. For SADC to be always prepared to resolve any arising conflict, the member states must strengthen their regional organ by granting it supranational powers. This will allow SADC to have the capacity to dictate and implement policies. With the supranational status, the organ must strive towards harmonising the security sector policies to facilitate the identification and tackling of the rising security threats on time.
- d. SADC countries must establish a common effective security framework and policies to improve collaborative international partnerships and enhance collective engagement. This will improve the level of trust amongst the member states and their relations with other countries and partners in peace and security issues.
- e. One of the main contributors to SADC's financial crisis is the failure of states to respect their obligations. The member states must respect their obligations to finance the institution to allow it to effectively conduct its conflict resolution operations. In carrying out missions, SADC must ensure that they allocate their funds appropriately, looking at the intensity of the missions.

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