


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SCHÖNINGHS
ENGLISCHE SCHULAUSGABEN



Nr. 116

BRITAIN
GOES TO WAR

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BRITAIN GOES TO WAR

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Mit 6 Bildern

Verlegt bei Ferdinand Schöningh - Paderborn 1940

Auslief.: Wien / F. Beck — Zürich / B. Götschmann

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THE ROLE OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

In his speech in the House of Commons on March 11, 1938, the Secretary of State defined the role of the Army. He started by emphasizing the importance of Home Defence, especially against air attack, and placed this first in order of importance among the duties which the Government has allotted to the Army. He placed the "discharge of British commitments overseas" second in order of importance, and the organization of a strategic reserve last in the scale of duties.

The British Empire is geographically so situated that its defence depends primarily on the keeping open of the sea communications between its constituent ports. On the Royal Navy, therefore, falls the prime duty of keeping these communications open. But its ships cannot perform their duties without adequately defended and suitably located bases from which to draw their fuel, supplies and ammunition, and to which they can go for periodical refits. The safeguarding of these bases or defended ports falls to the lot of the Army, generally in co-operation with the Royal Air Force. The distribution of the Army, and to some extent its organization, is largely governed by the nature of these duties.

The British system of military defence is founded on the five following factors:—

(a) The security of the British Isles is of paramount importance.

(b) The Self-Governing Dominions have accepted the responsibility for their own military defence, until such time as reinforcements can reach them from other parts of the Empire.

5 (c) India, with the help of the British elements of the Army in India, is responsible for her own defence.

(d) The Colonies, Fortresses and Protectorates are held by British regular garrisons, in some cases reinforced by regular native troops or by Colonial volunteer
10 forces; in a few cases, these possessions are protected by native troops alone.

(e) The Expeditionary Force in England forms the Strategic Reserve.

In einem Land mit Wehrpflicht wie ist starke der
canal
In a conscriptional country like France, the strength of
15 the Army is limited only by the manpower of the country, and it is also based on the strength of its most probable
Swiss auch abhangig von wehrmacht
Opferung
opponent. The problem of military strength and organization is therefore in such cases, pretty clear-cut.

The British military problem is different; it is based on
20 the prime importance of safeguarding India, Britain's naval bases, and Britain's lines of sea communication, such, for instance, as the Suez Canal; this is essentially a defensive role. Since any of these strategic points may be attacked
Strategischer Punkt
anbuchen wesentlich
in war, it is obviously essential that some reserves should
25 be available in Great Britain which can be sent to the threatened point. These reserves, in point of fact, are
in Europa
bedachten Punkt
anbuchen
approximately equal in strength to the forces maintained overseas, and they perform the dual duty of forming a reservoir of men from which the foreign garrisons are
30 kept up to strength in peace-time, and of producing a small expeditionary force which can be sent overseas in war-time to reinforce those garrisons, or to protect any
verstärken

British possessions which are threatened with attack by a foreign power or by internal disorder.

Without going into great detail one may say that, of Britain's 136 battalions of regular infantry, some 68 are normally absorbed in the garrisons of India, Gibraltar, 5 Malta, Egypt, Palestine, Singapore, Hongkong, North China, Bermuda, and the West Indies. There are, of course, in addition, units of all the other arms, chiefly artillery and engineers, in these foreign garrisons. At the moment there are 72 battalions serving outside the United 10 Kingdom because the situation in Palestine and in China has demanded a temporary increase in the local garrisons. This means that more than half of Britain's infantry battalions are serving abroad, or that four units who should be enjoying the amenities of Home Service are stationed 15 in foreign garrisons, and that Britain's Strategic Reserve is temporarily denuded to that extent.

It will be seen that, of Britain's regular army, one half or even more is tied down to the defence of India, the pacification of Palestine, the protection of our nationals 20 in North China, the protection of the Suez Canal, and the passive defence of our naval ports abroad. That is a very high proportion of one's resources to tie down to a purely defensive role. It is true that Britain has, in addition, in the United Kingdom the Territorial Army, most of which 25 is organized on a basis which should enable it eventually to take its place in war-time beside the regular Army, as it did with such distinction in the Great War. But this force has limited time and opportunities for training in peace, and it would be a matter of four to six months 30 after the outbreak of war before the leading echelon of Territorial Army divisions would be fit to take the field.

It remains to consider how the Regular Expeditionary Force might be employed should hostilities unfortunately be forced upon us. This force, which would certainly be smaller than that which left England for France in August 5 and September, 1914, could achieve little more than the provision of a reinforcement for a threatened area. It is trained to a high degree of mobility, and would be wasted in merely strengthening the garrisons of naval bases such as Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, or Hongkong; indeed the gar- 10 risons of these places, though for the moment depleted on account of the disturbances in Palestine and China, are calculated on a scale which permits of their manning their local defence against sea-borne attack and to some extent against air attack. endlose Aufgeben

15 But there are other areas where their presence might well be required. If we leave India out of the question, we have had a very recent experience of what might hap- müssen verbannung gehalten werden Bachan pen in the Mediterranean basin and especially in Egypt, where England has the treaty liability of helping that 20 country to resist invasion. A similar liability faces her in Iraq, though the danger is not at the moment very appar- ent. The Imperial interests that are behind these two liabilities are the protection of the Suez Canal and of the British oil supplies at the head of the Persian Gulf and 25 in Iraq.

The Communal troubles in Palestine are with us to- day, so that we need not enlarge upon them. It is signifi- cant, however, that there are some six battalions of infan- 30 talions. Should any foreign power wish to exploit or to aggravate the present unhappy situation by active inter- vention, Britain's military forces in Palestine would need to be very considerably increased.

Further east we are faced by an almost unprecedented state of affairs in China. Large British commercial interests, and large numbers of British subjects have to be protected in a comparatively small zone in the centre of a theatre of war. For the third time in twelve years 5 have reinforcements had to be sent to Shanghai. It is not hard to envisage a situation in which considerably larger military reinforcements might have to be sent to provide the minimum of protection to British nationals against the irruption into the International Settlement of hordes of 10 defeated foreign soldiery.

Although the Secretary of State has placed Home Defence first among the various duties allotted to the Army, its consideration has been left to the end of this article, because the factors involved are complicated by the fact 15 that both the Territorial and the Regular Army are to participate in its assurance.

From the foregoing résumé of the duties of the Regular Army it will be seen that our overseas commitments absorb more than half its strength in peace-time, and that, 20 in war-time, the remaining half may quite possibly be required to proceed abroad as well. What then of our defence in Great Britain against sea-borne or air attack? These duties have had to be handed over to the Territorial Army, since these are the only forces whose presence in 25 England can be ensured at any given time. Moreover, anti-aircraft defence involves highly specialized training and special equipment, such as would not be found among the troops who constitute the Strategic Reserve, which is trained for a mobile role. It is apparent from the Secretary 30 of State's speech that, if the Strategic Reserve has not actually left our shores, it will be employed on "internal security" duties; but the fact remains that the burden of


defence against air attack will be borne mainly by two divisions of the Territorial Army, specially trained and equipped for the purpose.

Should we be dragged into a European war, these 5 forces will certainly be the first to become engaged, both in defending our ports and in driving off hostile aircraft. What has hitherto been regarded as our second line of military defence has thus, paradoxically, become our first line, and we must see to it that these coast defence and 10 anti-aircraft units are kept short neither of the men nor of the war material without which it will be impossible for them to carry out their all-important duties of protecting our wives, our children and our families from the horrors of invasion.

15 (Lieut.-General Sir Ronald Charles in 'Rising Strength', April 1938.)

HOME DEFENCE BY THE TERRITORIAL ARMY.

The new forms of attack to which the development of aircraft has exposed the British Isles have altered the whole character of the responsibilities of the army in 20 home defence. The possibility of the invasion of these islands in a major European war has often been given more prominence than it deserved; certainly a greater number of troops than could be justified on purely military grounds were retained for home defence during 25 1914-18; but man will always be more chary of accepting a risk to his neck than one to a limb, and a successful invasion of the British Isles would be the end of the British Empire. Land forces have, however, never been our first line of defence against invasion; for invasion 30 would be an impracticable operation while British naval forces controlled our home waters. With powerful air



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forces in the British Isles the difficulty of invasion would be enhanced; and against invasion to-day our land forces are no more than a third line of defence, only likely to be needed in serious action if our naval and air forces had been crippled or were engaged in another theatre of war.

X Against air attack, however, the duties of the army are in quite a different category. If we were ever again engaged in a European war, no branch of the army would be more certain to be engaged, or more liable to be engaged from the very outbreak of war, than our anti-aircraft defences in Great Britain. The anti-aircraft guns and searchlights are not our whole defence. Fighter aircraft are no less important; and the ability of our own bombers to retaliate against the enemy is the strongest deterrent that we can offer to attack. None the less, A.A. guns and lights are an essential part of our first line of defence against a form of attack upon this country which is more likely than any other to be made if we are ever at war with a neighbouring European power.

X 20 It might be expected that a role of such vital importance as the manning of the anti-aircraft guns and lights of Great Britain would be undertaken by the regular army; it is, however, being undertaken by the Territorial Army, which thus becomes in this respect a part of our first line of land defence. Never before has so important a part in our defence organisation been entrusted to troops whose period of training is perforce so limited. There is, however, no other branch of the army whose job is so definite and cut-and-dried as that of the anti-aircraft units; efficiency may therefore be attained in spite of limited time for training. The keenness shown and the standard of efficiency already attained by the territorial formations which have undertaken so heavy a responsibility give

every encouragement to the belief that the organisation now being developed will become a thoroughly effective defence.

While anti-aircraft defence has been added to the army's liabilities in home defence, its former liabilities for coast 5 defence and defence against raids and invasion have not been eliminated. The risks of these forms of attack vary with the relative strengths of naval forces and are smaller to-day than they were in 1914. Our naval strength to-day is greatly superior to that of any other European 10 power, and we need have no apprehension of attack on our shores by the United States or Japan. There is, therefore, no real danger at the present time that any enemy would attempt an invasion of the British Isles, and our defence need only be designed to defeat raids on a limited 15 scale. Naval bombardment of our home ports would still be possible, though an enemy who was in a position to attack them by air would be less likely than formerly to risk his ships in a bombardment from the sea, particularly when he would be exposing his ships to the 20 additional risk of bombing by shore-based aircraft. Sea-borne raids aiming at landing small parties to destroy important installations, to shake our morale, or to make us retain a disproportionate number of troops at home, also remain possible, though they, too, have become less 25 probable now that air raids might achieve similar results and the risk entailed for sea-borne raids has been increased. Against these possible risks coast defences are maintained at our defended ports, and a certain proportion of mobile troops would be retained at home in war 30 so disposed as to be able to deal quickly with any enemy who might be landed as a raiding party.

These latter troops would, in addition, be ready to deal

equally quickly with any enemy raiding parties landed from the air with similar objects to those with which sea-borne raids might be made. At the present time it is highly improbable that parachute raids on this country would
5 be attempted by any European enemy except on a very small scale, though it would be rash to assume that future developments will not enable this form of attack to grow into a more serious danger.

One other duty might fall upon the army in home
10 defence. It is now ^{well} widely appreciated that in any major European war in which this country might be involved enemy air attacks, whether aimed directly at our civil population or concentrated upon ports, munition factories, communications and other military objectives, would
15 inevitably cause heavy casualties and widespread disorganisation and distress among our civil population. Although preparations to meet these conditions are being made by the Home Office, the difficulty of maintaining the services and administration of the country and re-
20 distributing the population to decrease their exposure to attack might prove even greater than is anticipated. It is difficult to doubt that, should this be so, there would be a demand for the assistance of the army, the organisation and particularly the engineering and transport services
25 of which might prove invaluable. During the first few days of war this assistance would probably have to be given by units of the regular army, but it would clearly be uneconomical to employ troops highly trained for war upon duties in aid of the civil power for a day longer than
30 might prove essential. The regular units would have to be relieved by territorial units as soon as the latter had been embodied; and within a few weeks, when the special difficulties created by the first intense air attacks had been

overcome, the territorial units would in turn have to be relieved by purely civil organisations.

The primary duty of the Territorial Army is home defence; and in pursuance of the policy that the Territorial Army should relieve the regular army of home defence duties entirely and so leave the latter free to fulfil its many overseas calls, the former has in recent years taken over the manning of all the coast defences in the United Kingdom. As soon as they could be fully mobilised and sufficiently trained, Territorial Army units would certainly take the place of the regular units, which must initially provide the mobile troops required for home defence.

The Territorial Army has thus assumed duties and responsibilities in home defence far beyond those it bore in 1914. It provides to-day a very important part of our first line defence. It mans the coast defences at home as the regular army mans those at overseas bases; and it would in due course provide the mobile home defence formations ready to round up rapidly any enemy detachment which might be landed on our shores, and would be able, if need be, to assist in the maintenance of the services of the country in the face of air attack. These duties constitute only the primary and home defence role of the Territorial Army, but they serve to show how great a responsibility it now bears. Appreciation of the reality and importance of this responsibility has probably been one of the chief reasons for the recent great improvement in Territorial Army recruiting.

The announcement of the reorganization of the Territorial Army has been warmly welcomed by its officers and men, enhancing, as it undoubtedly does, the status of the citizen forces.

In announcing the complete reorganization of the Territorial Field Army the Minister for War stated that it must, with modifications appropriate to its peculiar character, be put on the same footing in every respect as the
 5 Regular Army. Thus types of unit which do not at present exist will be formed, and Cavalry Light Tank Regiments, Anti-Tank Regiments, Light Anti-Aircraft Regiments and Tank Battalions are now to be provided.

The creation of three Motor-Cycle Battalions—a unit
 10 non-existent in the Regular Army, but peculiarly suitable to the citizen soldier, is likely to prove unusually popular.

(R. H. Dewing, *The Army*. W. Hodge & Co., London 1938.)

BRITAIN'S GREATEST PERIL—FOOD SUPPLIES.

It is not necessary to emphasise the importance to this
 15 country of sure supplies of food in the event of war. There can be no two views on that question. It is a matter of fact, and not one of opinion.

We cannot ignore the experience and lessons of the last war.

20 When this country entered the Great War in 1914, our stocks of food, taken as a whole, represented a reserve of somewhere in the neighbourhood of six or seven months.

Nevertheless, three years later, we were within a very
 25 few weeks of exhaustion.

How does our position compare with 1914?

In June, 1936, Sir Samuel Hoare, who was then First Lord of the Admiralty, declared that we had only six weeks' supply in this country. This was probably an ex-
 30 aggeration. But reliable estimates would suggest that, be-



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Sammlung Seiler

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fore the Government's recent purchases of food, we had, at the most, enough for three months.

Thus our supplies of food had fallen to less than half of what they were in 1914.

5 . There are, however, further important considerations which make the policy of food storage imperative.

Since 1914 our population has greatly increased. We have now 4,000,000 more mouths to feed. At the same time we have 3,000,000 less acres under cultivation to-day
10 than in 1914.

On the top of that there has been a very serious decline in the strength of our Mercantile Marine. Not only have we some 2,000,000 tons less merchant shipping than we had at the beginning of the Great War, but the average
15 size of our individual ships is greater.

This, of course, means that every torpedo or aerial bomb which finds its mark inflicts a proportionately greater loss.

All our defence plans are based, and are rightly based,
20 upon the assumption that we are going to maintain our naval supremacy.

But that assumption does not alter the fact that we may in another war, as we did in the last, go through a period in which our merchant shipping may suffer crippling
25 losses through the attacks of enemy submarines or aircraft.

In the last 20 years the methods of defence against submarines have undoubtedly made great strides. But, from the point of view of our food supply, the advantage
30 has, I think, been more than offset by the increase in range and power of the air bomber.

Not only can the bomber intercept our food ships before they reach our shores, but it can destroy or con-

contaminate the stores which we already have in the great silos and granaries at most of our ports.

There are many who place their faith in increased home production.

The Government's agricultural policy in regard to defence is, by increasing the fertility of the soil and by other methods, to put our agriculture in a position in which it can quickly expand its output in the event of an emergency.

The steps which the Minister of Agriculture is taking in that direction are necessary and desirable. But, of course, they do not in any way constitute an alternative to a policy of food storage.

Apart from all other considerations, there is the question of the time-lag.

15

The Minister of Agriculture himself explained only the other day that, in a policy of agricultural expansion, a considerable period must elapse before any tangible results in increased food supplies can be obtained.

To increase the output of wheat would take nine months, that of bacon one year, that of mutton two years, and that of beef three years.

From that it is evident that it would be quite hopeless to rely upon any sudden or rapid expansion of our home production during the early stages of war.

25

A policy of food storage undoubtedly raises certain practical difficulties.

But the fact that Germany has in the last few years increased her food storage capacity by as much as 50 per cent. shows that these difficulties are by no means insuperable. It shows also the importance which Germany attaches to this aspect of defence.

Food storage on an effective scale can only be achieved through the combination of a number of different methods.

The farmers, the millers, the bakers, the caterers, and other trading interests who already possess considerable storage accommodation will, no doubt, have to receive some financial inducement from the Government to maintain increased stocks of grain and other non-perishable foodstuffs.

But, in addition to this, it will, I think, undoubtedly be necessary for the Government to construct increased storage accommodation on a considerable scale, dispersed for safety's sake in different parts of the country.


Much has been made of the difficulty of buying grain for storage without upsetting the market. The Government's recent experience has shown these fears to be unfounded.

Provided they are made discreetly and gradually and at propitious moments when the price of grain is low, these purchases do not present any greater difficulties than do the very similar transactions of the Government's Exchange Equalisation Fund, which has worked so successfully for a number of years.

In conclusion, let me emphasise that food storage, like air-raid precautions, is one of those aspects of passive defence which, if neglected, can easily undo all the effects of spending hundreds of millions of pounds upon the expansion and reequipment of our fighting forces.

The advantages of a policy of food storage are many and important.

It would relieve the Royal Navy of some of the strain of its convoying duties. It would, to some extent, make up for the present weakness of our Mercantile Marine. It



Sammlung Seiler.

They're in the Army now! Recruits in Training at Headquarters of the Royal Artillery.

would give the farmers time in which to increase our home production.

In time of peace, moreover, it would be a definite advantage both to the farmers and to the consumers, in that it would tend to reduce the fluctuations in food prices between good and bad years.

It would be a source of strength to the Government and a source of security to the people. The cost is comparatively small, while the advantages are enormous.

10 (Duncan Sandys in 'Rising Strength', September 1938.)

OIL IN WAR-TIME.


The Royal Navy is completely dependent for its power to perform its functions upon the free supply of oil fuel fit for burning under boilers. One-half of the whole Merchant Navy is also oil-driven, and much of it by Diesel engines for which not all oil fuels are suitable. The dependence of the Air Force upon liquid fuel, again of a highly specialized description, is as complete as is that of the Navy. That of the Army is rapidly approaching the same degree, and the same is true of almost every activity of the common life of the country to-day. Large sections of the population, for instance, now live in localities which their daily occupations would forbid to them but for the road transport made possible by a plentiful supply of liquid fuel. It is admitted that the country's requirements during a war might reach 15,000,000 tons, the bulk of which would have to be imported from oversea. Even the lesser total of average requirements during peace-time has caused concern to those who do not believe that the economic effects of imports on such a scale are offset by reciprocal exports or by the prosperity which radiates

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30

from those employed in the oil industry; and the problem of maintaining even greater imports in time of war has caused the concern of these critics to deepen into alarm.

Those who regard with equanimity the complete dependence of Western civilization upon adequate supplies 5 of liquid fuel minimize the danger of interruption to fuel supplies on the grounds that oil comes to us from all quarters of the globe, that the late War showed our ability to keep enemy depredations on our shipping down to no more than 1 per cent., and that we possess oil tankers 10 with a total dead-weight capacity of over 4,250,000 tons. But against this it has been urged by Admiral Sir Howard Kelly that in time of war titular ownership of assets in foreign lands does not necessarily carry with it effective physical control; and that the degree of protection that 15 could be given to seaborne supplies by the Royal Navy in 1918 against an enemy situated across the North Sea will not necessarily be available against an enemy placed less conveniently for this country from a Royal Navy reduced by twenty years of economies. Moreover, the very size of 20 the British tanker fleet, though superficially comforting if oil-carrying capacity alone is regarded, may well justify apprehension on other grounds. Tank vessels are useless for general service as cargo-carriers. Their only possible employment is to carry inward cargoes of oil and to make 25 outward voyages in ballast. The tanker tonnage must therefore be deducted from the grand total of British merchant shipping in a calculation of what is available for the general service of the country in time of war—a total which, it should be remembered, is less than that of 30 1914 by some 2,000 ships of over 2,000,000 tons gross, and is held by many good authorities to be seriously inadequate to Imperial needs in war.

Thus the situation cannot be regarded as other than disquieting. Yet there is no panacea, no easy solution which can be adopted by a courageous stroke of the pen. Some urge that the Royal Navy should return to coal as
5 its fuel, or at least make provision for dual firing, so that it, at all events, will not be immobilized for lack of oil. That expedient has been steadily rejected by successive Governments, presumably because of the undoubted technical advantages which the use of oil instead of coal makes
10 it possible to embody in a man-of-war. Though it may be remarked that all these advantages vanish if due supplies are not available, yet it must be remembered that to provide against the Navy's lack would touch only a part of the problem. It would little avail the country to-day for
15 its men-of-war to maintain their mobility if the other defence Services were paralysed. There is no hope, moreover, in attempts to put the clock back by resuming, on any large scale, the use of raw coal for purposes in which it has been superseded by modern applications of oil fuel,
20 though something can no doubt be achieved by the evolution of modern methods of coal utilization. Transport vehicles, for instance, consuming solid fuel through the medium of producer gas may perhaps reduce the demand for imported fuel, but there would not seem to be any
25 hope of the same expedient being applied to aircraft. Though substantial progress has been made of late years in the development of more than one process for the extraction of oil from coal, or for the transformation of certain varieties of coal into liquid fuel, there would seem
30 to be no present prospect of more than a small fraction of the national consumption being provided by such means, and, in any case, the Navy requires fuel depôts in distant as well as in home waters. The problem is indeed so large



The 35,000-Ton Battleship "King George V".

that no one branch of industry or of national defence can contribute more than a small share to its solution. In the year 1903 the Government of the day deemed it expedient to appoint a Royal Commission to inquire into the problem of food supplies in time of war. The present question of oil supplies in time of war is of equal if not greater gravity; but to-day there is an organization which did not exist in 1903, in the shape of the Committee of Imperial Defence, available for the study of just such large-scale problems. There can be few if any which call more urgently for its close and unremitting attention.

(Times 31/12/37.)

SPEED IN WAR.

The dramatic shrinkage of the world's spaces, changing old conceptions of distance, has a meaning beyond the sphere of normal aviation. It has given an electric shock to those who are still inclined to survey the problem of security through pre-war spectacles, and has powerfully reinforced the arguments of the modern school of thought.

India reached in less than twenty-four hours; Singapore, the gateway to the Far East, brought within barely forty hours of London; the coast of Australia crossed in just over two days of flying; the 11,300 miles from London to Melbourne covered in less than three. And missiles as well as missives can be delivered by air. The normal day bombers of the present time carry a bomb-load of 500 pounds. Double this bomb-load, ally it to a range of a thousand miles—and you can begin to estimate the menace to which the countries of Europe and Asia are now exposed.

Even if one divides the range by half—since bombers must usually return to their base unless they can fly on

to land in an ally's territory or are dedicated to a deliberate sacrifice—it has a formidable span. Take a map, draw circles of 500 miles' radius from the coast or frontier aerodromes of the various countries, and of their colonies—you can measure the menace for yourself. There are not 5 many places in the civilized world that do not lie under the shadow of the wings of the Angel of Death.

One of the most ominous changes now in progress lies in the reconciliation of speed and size. For size spells bigger bomb-load, or, alternatively, longer range. The 10 large bombers of the war were slow and clumsy machines; to diminish the risk of attack by diminutive pursuit machines, they had to confine their raids to the night. But the big machines that are being born to-day have a high performance. Many of those designed for passenger 15 service can be easily adapted to war use.

Have we yet grasped, or even conceived, the many-sided effect on war itself when the operations of war can be carried out at 200, or even 300, miles an hour? The gulf between this and anything in past experience is so 20 vast that the military mind, or perhaps any mind, can hardly be relied on to span it. And if it falls short, what an abyss it may fall into!

It was Colonel Lawrence (of Arabia) who remarked—
“With two thousand years of examples behind us we have 25 no excuse, when fighting, for not fighting well.” Yet the history of the last war bears overwhelming proof that this store of experience did not succeed in making us fight well in the mental sense.

For thousands of years, since war began, war has been 30 waged at walking pace. Man's feet have been the basis of military movements. That statement is not affected by the fact that at an early stage in history he learned to

use animals to assist his movements. Cavalry armies have been rare. Save under special conditions or during a few exceptional periods, the horse-mounted soldier and the horse-drawn vehicle have only been auxiliary limbs of the 5 foot-marching body.

Man's means of hitting gradually developed. Very gradually, it is true—shock weapons remained predominant until the eighteenth century, and even then it is a question whether the smooth-bore musket was much 10 superior to the long-bow in the hands of the Black Prince's archers. It was only with the nineteenth century and after the Napoleonic Wars that firearms began to transform the battlefield.

Although weapons might change, walking remained 15 constant. Even unto 1914. In the American Civil War, as in the wars in Europe that followed, the railway certainly began to play an important part, although mainly in the initial concentration of armies.

In 1914, a century after mechanical movement had 20 begun, the armies marched forward on foot from the line where their initial assembly was complete.

The French trudged forward to the Belgian frontier, whereas a dozen divisions despatched by rail from the tail of their columns to support the isolated Belgians 25 would almost certainly have sufficed to hold the Germans on the short and strong Antwerp-Namur line and have prevented them from even reaching the threshold of France. The Germans, their path thus smoothed by the foe, outflanked the French on the frontier and poured triumph- 30 antly down the roads into France. Yet by the time they reached the outskirts of Paris they bore the air of a beaten army—beaten by hard marches on an empty stomach. No great battle of history saw less hard fighting than the

so-called Battle of the Marne which turned the tide of the World War. General Hunger and General Exhaustion had done their work when General Joffre took his opportunity to penetrate the crack.

The German marching mass had imposed too heavy a strain on its own means of supply, which in turn were strained to breaking point by the Belgians' destruction of the bridges over the Meuse as well as by the demolitions carried out by their retreating allies. No trains could run past Liège until August 24, and then only by an awkward deviation. Even when the German marching columns had reached the Marne, the supplies of all three armies on the decisive right wing had to pass along this one half-strangled artery. The block was also the decisive factor in making it impossible for the Germans to reinforce their right wing, according to the original plan—although it would have been useless to multiply numbers unless they could have been fed. Thus we can see that in this supreme crisis of the war a handful of Belgian engineers on the Meuse counted for more than several army corps on the Marne.

Apart from a few *franc-tireurs*, working behind the German front without hope of quarter if caught, these demolitions were carried out before the enemy arrived. In the future they may be executed, at any moment, behind the advancing masses—by heavy bombs dropped from aircraft, or even by demolition detachments transported by air. The effect may be not merely embarrassing, but disastrous.

Here is one aspect of "the new mobility." But not the only one. For it affects every side of war. In the past, the power of movement by armies was limited strictly by leg power. Mobility varied only in degree, not in kind. Yet

even a slight variation of pace often had far-reaching results; it accounts for some of the most significant changes in the course of history.

When the Macedonian phalanx met the Roman legion, [5 weight and strength as well as reputation were on the side of the phalanx. The legion broke the phalanx because it had the mobility and the flexibility—which is simply internal mobility—to probe the weak joint in the phalanx, which was the fact that the men composing it could not 10 face about singly and defend themselves. The legion, by contrast, was a grouping of separate maniples instead of a solid body. Moreover, the legionaries who composed the maniple fought in open order, and so could move more quickly and more nimbly. Thus while the forward 15 maniples temporarily held the phalanx in play, the reserve maniples slipped round the phalanx and charged it in rear.

But when the legions met Hannibal, the tables were turned on them at first; they were beaten by the superior 20 mobility which Hannibal enjoyed through the ability of his infantry to give ground without breaking and the capacity of his cavalry wings to strike the legion in rear when it was momentarily disordered. The situation was eventually saved by Scipio's reforms; he developed the 25 legion into a still more mobile and flexible body, and created cavalry to vie with the Carthaginians.

In the centuries that followed, the success of the legion in maintaining the Roman dominion so long against many-sided pressure owed much to the development of a 30 network of strategic roads. Science did not enable the Romans to produce mechanical legs, but they gave their soldiers roads on which they could use their legs to the best advantage.

Then, in the Middle Ages, came the most striking of all past examples of the power of superior mobility—when the Mongol horsemen swept across Asia and Europe, overthrowing every army they met between the Yellow Sea and the Baltic. Their mobility arose from perfect assimilation to their means of movement—they were bred in the saddle and hoped to die in it—and from ability to live sparsely in order to travel light. Each trooper had spare mounts and carried his own subsistence, so that the Mongol army was unencumbered by masses of transport. 10 The Mongols proved that lightly armed troops can beat more heavily armed ones if their mobility is sufficiently superior. Theirs was an all-cavalry army, which dispensed with the need of any infantry mass, solid and slow, as a pivot. 15

The story of the phalanx and legion was repeated at the dawn of modern times, when the mobile and flexible Swedish formation produced by Gustavus Adolphus overthrew the massive formation, resembling a slow-motion fortress, upon which Spain and the Empire had built 20 their domination of Europe. Gustavus enhanced the effect of his reforms by initiating a revival of cavalry mobility, both on and off the battlefield. Cavalry, hampered by its dense formation, had sunk into the habit of trotting up to the enemy's piked array, when each rank would 25 feebly discharge its pistols and wheel off to reload. Gustavus reduced the depth of his cavalry to three ranks and made them charge—with shattering effect.

In the English Civil War, less than a generation later, mobility became even more the decisive factor. Crom- 30 well's "Ironsides" were cavalry—and the infantry scarcely counted. He put more impetus into the cavalry charge than Gustavus even had attained, and relied on it more.

Moreover, he developed such a control over the speed that he could turn his cavalry from one target to another in the heat of battle. By such means he turned the scales of Marston Moor and Naseby. Then, to the tactical
5 mobility with which he won these battles, he added a strategic mobility so high that his "crowning mercy," the Worcester campaign of 1651, was virtually decided by sheer speed of movement before battle was joined. Faced with the difficulty of direct attack on the Scottish royal
10 army on its own ground, he deliberately opened to it a path into England. He gave it a start down the West Coast and then moved down the East Coast, sending his cavalry ahead under Lambert. Covering 200 miles in ten days over bad roads, Lambert headed off the Scots by the
15 time they were half-way to London, and shepherded them into the bag at Worcester, which was drawn tight as soon as Cromwell came up.

The startling success of the armies of the French Revolution, and of Napoleon's subsequently, was still more a
20 triumph of superior mobility. The revolutionary troops were too ardent and undrilled to conform to the orthodox slow step, and the quick step became normal for marching and fighting—a sacrifice of solidity and symmetry to speed. The quickened rate of movement enabled the
25 French to outmanœuvre their opponents on the battlefield, and for their reinforcements to appear on the battlefield when their opponents assumed them to be miles away. The Revolutionary armies suffered another disadvantage which increased their advantage. Their chaotic
30 supply system compelled them to spread widely over the countryside in order to find food—which the other armies obtained from a complex system of magazines and cumbersome supply trains. The French forces were thus scat-

tered in what seemed reckless style—in the young Napoleon Bonaparte's first campaign his army of less than 50,000 men were spread over as much as 100 miles of front. The fact lulled his opponents into a false security. Such dispersion mattered little when the French troops 5 could concentrate at any point with what seemed incredible swiftness. The weakness became a strength—through the power of surprise it conferred.

Half a century later, the American Civil War taught a fresh lesson in mobility—that was not learnt. The 10 lesson was the more significant because this conflict became the first modern war. One might say that it opened in the old era and ended in the new. It was marked by the appearance of a new power of strategic mobility—due to the railway. The effect, however, was 15 to reduce mobility rather than increase it. The railway fostered the expansion of armies—it could forward more men, and feed them, than could fight effectively. It fostered their wants, and they became tied to the end of the railway line. 20

Another significant symptom of the American Civil War was the decline of tactical mobility—due to the development of firearms. The advance on the battlefield in face of fire became terribly difficult, and the opposing sides sank into trenches. Immobility became a normal 25 state as the war went on. The Northern armies, being accustomed to better feeding, were more subject to paralysis than their rivals. In the West, especially, the dangers of a railway-fed mass were exposed by the mobile raids of Forrest and Morgan. It was a faint foreshadowing 30 of what may happen in the future to mass armies whose communications can be reached by aircraft, airborne engineers, or tanks. Eventually the North found in Sherman

a strategist who diagnosed these symptoms more clearly than any of his time or since. The enemy had struck at him through his railways; he would strike at them through theirs, while immunizing himself. Science had 5 not yet provided any alternative mechanized means of movement to the railway, so he found a solution in reviving the old mobility. To move fast, he saw, troops must move light—freed from fixed lines of supply and from their own desire for encumbering comforts. Having 10 cut down his impedimenta to the minimum, he cut loose from his railway communications—to march through Georgia and the Carolinas, cutting the lines which fed the main Confederate army and wrecking its supply system at the source. The effect was dramatic and 15 decisive.

But the portents of this war were missed in Europe. Filled with dreams of Napoleonic victories, the General Staffs multiplied their masses to overthrow the enemy in this clash, but did not pause to reflect on the difficulties 20 of keeping them supplied without losing the power of manœuvre. Still less attention did they pay to the tactical problem of covering the last few hundred yards. They tended to picture the attack as a glorious headlong rush.

When the war came, it was the problem of that last 25 few hundred yards that beat them. And in the rare instances when they overcame it, or found a way round, their hopes were bankrupted by the difficulty of maintaining on the move the masses they were trying to move—as in the German advance of 1914. Mobility soon 30 crystallized into immobility, along the entrenched fronts.

Their disregard of the foundations of sustained mobility could not have been more clearly shown than by the solution they long persisted in trying—that of ever more

voluminous artillery bombardments. For although this storm of shells might crush the defenders, it broke up the ground so thoroughly as to check continued advance and block pursuit.

At last, more effective means of overcoming the defence 5
were found, in tanks, gas, and the chance cloak of fog. Even then, the problem of continuous advance was never solved before the war ended — mainly through exhaustion. In the last phase the difficulty of supply across the devastated areas became a greater obstacle than German resist- 10
ance. And after the Armistice, the Allied armies were forced to pause before a fraction of them could advance, unopposed, into Germany.

Are we wiser now? Have we any clearer understanding 15
of the question of mobility?

So far as recent developments in equipment have gone, the armies are becoming motorized but not bullet-proof. They have far more mobility — until they meet opposition. To retain mobility when one comes under fire one needs armoured mobility. 20

A few stray machine gunners may suffice to bring unarmoured troops to a halt. The best hope of rapid progress lies in armoured vehicles, if there are enough of them. No army as yet has enough to warrant much hope. 25

There is, however, an alternative possibility. If mechanized troops cannot make a way through, they may find a way round — where frontiers are long and spaces wide.

The aim of such moves, if wisely directed, will not be to strike the enemy troops in the back — unlike the mem- 30
bers of the ancient phalanx, they can turn about and fight — but to cut the communications on which they de-

pend. The object will be to dislocate their organization by destroying headquarters and signal centres; to cut off supplies by destroying railways and road transport; even, if possible, to reach and attack the sources of supply. The
5 back areas of a modern army are littered with targets that are difficult to defend; still more so is the interior of an industrialized country. And while modern conditions have increased the target, modern speed gives mechanized forces more scope for striking it than cavalry forces ever
10 enjoyed in the past.

Such an aim will be similar, if supplementary, to that of the air forces. The speed and range that are possible in the air undoubtedly give aircraft far more chance than the fastest landcraft of attaining their aim, and evading
15 opposition. For this reason the mechanized land forces will probably be reserved for the shorter-range objectives in the immediate rear of the hostile army. Another function of theirs will be to strike at the enemy's aerodromes; to reduce the effectiveness of his air operations by forcing
20 them to start farther back. The large ground organization of a modern air force is its Achilles heel.

But the rear organization of modern armies forms a still weaker spot. By its increasing complexity it has become more vulnerable just as modern speed has made it
25 more accessible to an assailant. The old proverb "unity is strength" no longer holds good. The more concentrated a modern army is, the more vulnerable it will be; and the larger it is, the more liable to paralysis.

(L. Hart, When Britain goes to War.)

BRITISH TANK DOCTRINE OF TO-DAY.

General Smith, the commander of the recently formed and newly armed 2nd British Mobile Division,¹ has had a difficult job given him by the commander of the small British army which landed a few days ago on an unde- 5 fended strip of the coast of Ruritania. The fighting part of the army has got ashore, but not its transport and impedimenta, and a strong Ruritanian force is known to be hurrying up hot foot from the south "to catch us," as the army commander put it to General Smith, "before 10 we've got our bathing togs quite off, or our town suitings more than half on."

In the course of their subsequent talk, which we need not follow in detail, the Chief had given General Smith his orders. 15

"Get out in front and meet these birds and keep them off us here till we all get ashore — say for four days from now. Slow them up, worry them, hit them where you can — only don't get caught yourself and don't get cut up, because I shall want you and your people for a real job 20 later."

This is the Division's second day out. Much has been happening, and much more is about to happen soon. Its co-operating air squadrons got sight of the Ruritanians yesterday — a whole division of them; they were then 25 thirty miles off and advancing fast. They have not been


¹ This consists entirely of mechanized or motorized troops, the fighting units comprising a tank brigade (1 battalion of lights and 3 mixed battalions of lights and mediums), 2 brigades of mechanized cavalry (each of 3 light-tank regiments), an armoured 30 car regiment, and motorized infantry, artillery, and engineers in proportion.

keeping up that pace since; a little judicious machine-gunning from the air has helped to slow them up, but the main brake has been the activities of the Mobile Division.

The first of its ground troops to get touch with the
5 enemy were the patrol cars of its armoured car regiment, which were speeding down all the roads to its front and wide to its flanks by breakfast-time. The flank patrols had cast around widely, but found nothing—it was useful to know that the lone Ruritanian division was the only
10 one in the area at present, though there would certainly be others before long.

The forward patrol of the Division had soon run into the enemy. Some had bickered with them—hidden round corners, shot at their first troops as they came swinging
15 or stealing round, and then whipped off to play the same trick farther on. Some had lain up in woods or hollows off the roads, waiting for a chance to dash down a side road upon the flank of some unwary enemy column, or loose off a burst of fire into it at short range. The enemy
20 had been worried all morning in this way, but by afternoon the game had become too dangerous, and the armoured cars had all been called in.

The light tanks of the two mechanized cavalry brigades, working one to the west and one to the east of the two
25 roads by which the Ruritanians are pushing up to the north, had taken up the running in the afternoon and evening. They had made their presence felt all right! On the front and outer flanks of both the Ruritanian columns, these fast little machines had appeared at half-a-
30 dozen places at once, shooting up a party at long range here, darting in for a quick volley and a scuttle back to cover there, lying hidden somewhere else until a good target offered itself, and then a burst of fire and away



Sammlung Seiler

British Tank climbing a Hill-Slope.
Tank-drivers are trained to manœuvre their Machines over
every Type of Obstacle.

before the enemy could know where they were, much less catch them.

By tea-time the Ruritanian commander had evidently concluded, as General Smith had meant him to conclude, 5 that there was a formidable British tank force at large, somewhere just over the distant horizon, and that he might be attacked by it at any moment. He had therefore taken the best measures he could to secure his command's safety, while still continuing its advance.

10 A thick screen of anti-tank guns, of which the Ruritanians seemed to have plenty, had been put out in front; they moved forward in two halves, one half bounding up from one ridge to the next half a mile ahead, then waiting for the other to follow and take position to cover its next 15 bound before it went forward again. Well behind, bunched close, each with half-a-dozen more reserve anti-tank guns at its head, came the two marching columns; each had a second screen of anti-tank guns moving along high ground on its outer flank, and half-a-dozen more bringing 20 up its rear. The Ruritanian division, in fact, finished the day's march enclosed in a sort of moving anti-tank gun box; its rate of advance had been badly slowed up, and its gait had rather resembled that of a cat on hot bricks, but it had kept moving still, and settled down for the 25 night in a densely wooded anti-tank area, with all the approaches well guarded.

General Smith might have been well satisfied with his division's first day's work if he had not been so preoccupied with something else that was just about to begin. 30 The Ruritanian division had set out at blush of dawn in the same formation as the day before; little — he hoped! — did they suspect what was coming to them! Just ahead of them now was a light tank screen, and behind some

close-support tanks with smoke mortars, ready to put out a screen on the enemy front and right flank. Lying up in a wood away on that flank was the whole of the British Tank Brigade. As soon as the smoke screen came down, it was to issue forth and make for the enemy's rear. The 5 light battalion would wheel up as soon as it got well behind the Ruritanian right column, to attract the attention of the bunch of anti-tank guns at its tail; then the three medium battalions, two up in front and one in second line, swinging farther round still and then turning 10 to head north, would break in and attack the right column from the west, when it had no protection screen out at all. A few guns left with the column itself might get into action, if they were lucky and quick, before the tanks' fire struck their crews down; the rest of the force would be 15 helpless before this attack from a totally unexpected direction, believed to be safe and secure.

General Smith had a vivid—perhaps a too vivid—imagination. He could see the picture now, as he sat in his headquarters car, parked on a village green, waiting 20 for the first report of the attack—the sudden roar of a hundred engines—the sleet of bullets at short range—the rattle of the tracks of the oncoming tanks, the sun gleaming on their metal as they thundered forward—the bellowed orders of surprised officers hardly heard above 25 the din—horses rearing and neighing, men falling—groans, cries, panic...

"Beg pardon, sir—your tea, sir!"

The General yawned, rolled over and opened a sleepy eye on the unlovely barracks of dear, dirty old Tidworth. 30

* * *

General Brown's 2nd British Tank Brigade forms part of the Expeditionary Force sent across Channel to co-

operate with the Neustrian Army in its duel with the larger and more formidable forces of her eastern neighbour, Austrasia. The fortified barrier guarding her eastern frontier had caved in before the first Austrasian attack, 5 but the exploiting force, fanning out in pursuit through the gap, has been checked and thrown on the defensive. It is now standing to fight on a thirty-mile front, and though its flanks are open, it is known that Austrasian reinforcements are hurrying forward to prolong them on 10 either side, so as to form a huge, hostile peninsula, jutting right out in the heart of Neustria—a most awkward and undesirable situation for that country. The Neustrian Commander-in-Chief, with the full approval of the General commanding the British Expeditionary Force, has 15 determined to attack at once, before these enemy reinforcements can put in an appearance. A frontal attack alone would certainly be slow and possibly unsuccessful; he has decided, again with the hearty concurrence of his British colleague, to use the British Tank Brigade to press 20 round the enemy's flank and break suddenly into their rear by surprise, while the main body of the Allied armies presses hard and heavily on their front.

So far—it is very early on the morning of the second day of the battle—the move seems, General Brown thinks, 25 to have gone well. During the last two nights the Tank Brigade has been moving from one concealed area well behind the Allied lines, by way of a second one far out to their flank, to a third one within striking distance of the rear of the enemy's front. Here they all are—the light 30 battalion and the three mixed battalions of the brigade—ready to strike out, as soon as it is light enough to see, against the area up on the plateau ten miles off to the east, where the right flank of the Austrasian gun line rests.

General Brown has been fully informed by air reconnaissance of their dispositions here, of which the most interesting, from his point of view, is that the area is guarded by a wide semicircle of anti-tank guns, five miles from end to end, against any attack from north-west, west 5 or south-west.

"A nasty looking nut to crack, sir," respectfully remarks Colonel Harris, commanding the 12th Battalion, as the four colonels and the General bend together over the lantern-lit map laid out on an improvised table amid the 10 trees screening the halted Brigade from prying airmen.

"Oh, not too bad, Harris, surely. We've often tried it before on the Plain. Now we've got to put into practice what we learnt there."

"What's the programme, sir?" asks Colonel James, the 15 13th Battalion commander.

"Quite simple; quite normal — nothing new. Maxwell, your lights will go ahead and get up as close as you can to the north tip of this anti-tank gun line. Then halt and wait for me there to come and have a look-see. Wilson," 20 to the 14th Battalion commander, "you'll come up with me, so stand by for a call. So far as I can foresee, I shall want to use your lot for a diversion to mop up the north part of the screen. If there's a way in to its rear, round by the north here, you'll take that, and run right along to the 25 south behind it. Send your mediums by companies to smash back through the line from behind, one by one, and use your lights for a frontal diversion if you can get them there. It'll all want rather careful timing, if you aren't to get rather heavily hammered, but..." 30

"I can manage it all right, sir," says Colonel Wilson, confidently. "Anyhow, it's really **only** a cover for the real

push, I take it, so it doesn't matter if we do get hotted up."

"I'd rather you didn't, but of course, you're right. Harris, James, you'll go for the real target—the mass of the Austrasian guns. Maxwell will go ahead of you, and I want a heavy smoke cloud put down all along our south flank as we go, so as to prevent any interference from that side from any anti-tank guns Wilson can't or doesn't mop up. All three battalions will drive due east straight for the batteries; go all out as far as that line," the General scores with his fingernail a railway line, running for the most part in a cutting several miles away to the east of their wood—"and then, I expect, swing south to rally in that valley here—don't forget to piquet it, first man to get there. But I'll let you know that by wireless later. All clear? No questions?"

"No, sir," "O.K., sir," "I understand, sir," "Quite clear, sir," comes the chorus of replies.

"You see, gentlemen," says the General, suddenly beginning, he could not himself quite make out why, to embark on a tactical lecture, which he can see by his subordinates' faces they feel to be quite unnecessary, "the idea in all these sorts of jobs must be to approach from an unexpected quarter, so that the anti-tank guns have to shift and show themselves—make the main attack at one place after feinting at another—put only just what we can spare against the enemy anti-tank guns lying doggo for us, and all we've got else against the enemy artillery they're covering. The artillery, that's our real objective, that's the mainstay of their defence; and once it's out of the way there'll be nothing much to stop our frontal attack getting to grips with them..."

And then, just as he is wondering how on earth he is

to get out of this interminable and somewhat ungrammatical sentence, he suddenly finds his young and pretty wife's face gazing disdainfully at him from her pillow.

"If I'd known," she said, "you talked in your sleep as well as snored..."

5

* * *

Colonel Jones, commanding the 9th Army Tank Battalion, co-operating with the 9th Division of the British Expeditionary Force in Neustria, was watching his big infantry machines just lumbering forward to the frontal attack of the Austrasian defensive position. They had come up last night under cover of a couple of air squadrons droning noisily overhead to cover the rattle of their tracks and the hum and splutter of their engines, and had lain up in a fold of the ground half a mile back from the British outposts till just before the break of day. Now they were off.

Colonel Jones was not an easy man to please, but he thought that on the whole the arrangements he, and all those concerned, had made for the attack had been reasonably complete. A mass of artillery was backing him up—the opening of the barrage a few seconds ago had almost deafened him with its din, and surprised him, as he watched the shells fall, by its accuracy and density; he was particularly gratified with the smoke screen he had asked the chief gunner, somewhat to the latter's surprise, to put down on the left of his tanks—if the Austrasians hadn't got a pocket of their big anti-tank guns there, even though the air photos had shown no sign of it, they weren't the soldiers he'd always taken them to be! But now, even if the guns were there, they'd see nothing to fire at until his tanks had got safely by, and the accompanying infantry

following close behind ought to be on to them and gobble them before they had time to do any damage.

On the whole, the attack seemed to be going well; all along the mile of front his battalion was covering, tanks 5 were going forward, quartering to and fro over the ground, lumbering off at a tangent to deal with some well-hidden enemy machine-gun nest that had suddenly come to desperate and hopeless life, or nosing along a hedge or ditch that looked as if it might, or ought to, 10 hold a few low-lying riflemen. The infantry were keeping up excellently — so they should, for this sort of combined attack had been practised time and time again by both arms together, and everything that could be arranged beforehand had been fixed up and laid down in orders — 15 how far the tanks should go in each short bound, before they halted to let the slower infantry finish mopping up all the ground behind that they had just overrun, and come up level with them — how each arm should let the other know it was in momentary difficulties and ask for 20 help — the general timing of the whole attack — all these points had been dealt with and all concerned knew all about them. If anything unforeseen should happen, he himself was in close touch with the brigadier in command of the attack in this sector, and he still had a company of 25 his own tanks in reserve, and its major squatting on the turret roof of his command tank just outside, watching and waiting for any emergency and any orders.

Hullo! there was a bit of trouble over there! One tank suddenly stopped — another one on fire too! Where was 30 the anti-tank gun? Ah! there it was — spotted its flash — but had the rest of the stricken tank section seen it? He couldn't be sure — they were banging off more or less in its direction, but, he thought, only at random in a spasm

of optimism. But it seemed to have shut down all of a sudden — Ah yes, that was why! A stalking knot of infantry had risen up within a few yards of it — out of the earth, it seemed; there were some puffs of smoke — bombs, he supposed — and a few prostrate figures round a 5 wrecked gun were all that was left of piece and crew. Good work!

Everywhere else the attack was proceeding unchecked. Away to the far left there had been a pause for a few moments, when one section had — quite rightly — fought 10 shy of a nasty-looking exposed sky line and had to look for a way round. But the British machine-gun barrage, which could drop its fire right among the tanks without any danger to their ironclad sides, must have accounted for any enemy there had been, for the second wave and 15 the following infantry had swept over the crest quite unharmed.

So far as he could see, in fact, it was all over, bar the shouting. The leading tanks were up, or almost up, to their final objective — that long, hog-backed wooded ridge 20 in the middle distance — all along the allotted mile of front. In ten minutes — well, say fifteen at most — the foremost infantry would be up too, and the tanks could rally back under cover half a mile down the slope. Other troops were to take up the attack from there on, but that, 25 thank the Lord, was not his job. However, he ought, he supposed, to move his reserve company a bit farther up, and go up with it just in case...

He poked his head through the manhole in the turret to pass the word to the major sitting just above him, and 30 found himself, to his bewilderment, looking into the large, soulful eyes of his cocker spaniel which was lying — as usual — full stretch on the bed by his left shoulder.

“A dream, old boy!” he yawned sleepily, “a damned fine dream too, but only a dream.”

* * *

General Sir William Robinson, K.C.B. (just decorated at Buckingham Palace that day) was meditating, as he sipped his vintage port, on the victorious campaign just concluded, which had won him his knighthood and modicum of fame.

His view, perhaps an unduly modest one, was that he didn't really deserve it. The little tribe of Arabs that he had just so swiftly and painlessly reduced to begging for terms would have given a capful of trouble thirty years ago, but now, what with the air, and tanks, and all that—they hadn't had even a dog's chance. They had no anti-aircraft guns and no anti-tank guns, of course, but they could—in fact, often had—put up a sturdy resistance against infantry and artillery, even in pretty considerable numbers, in their home country, and always made such thorough nuisances of themselves on our long line of communication, that before we could really get at them we had been compelled to scatter as many troops along it to defend it as we had in the striking forces up in front. Last time we had even had to build a railway and run a pipe-line up—Lord knew at what cost!

This show of his, just over, must have come as a nasty surprise to them! He had asked only for three air squadrons, a mixed and a light tank battalion, a mechanized artillery brigade, and a brigade of motorized infantry. He knew the ground was good enough to use these almost anywhere, but his idea had been not to fight and kill Arabs, but to bring them cheaply and quickly to terms. And he had done it—so neatly and easily and rapidly that he doubted if there would be any more trouble there

while there were any Arabs left alive and old enough to remember it.

It had been quite simple. The air and the ground troops had worked together all the time. There were very few areas where the enemy could lie up without being found and made highly uncomfortable by the air. When they had managed to hide, the motorized infantry had been set to dig them out, and when they broke out of their covert they had had both the air force and the tanks to deal with, and they were helpless before either of them; they had been kept on the run, chivvied from pillar to post, shedding footsore and disheartened warriors every mile or so, until at last they had come to a standstill and let themselves be quietly surrounded and offered good terms of surrender. They had, of course, tried their old game of getting at our lines of communication, only to find to their surprise and dismay that there were none to be got at. Everything we wanted for the first hundred miles or so of the advance had gone with us in lorries, and from the time those ran empty we had been supplied by air—50 tons of stuff of all kinds in twice-daily trips of one of the bomber squadrons, delivered just when and where required. No wonder when the Arabs had found all their aces being trumped they had thrown their hand in. But without land and air mechanisation, they'd still have been as awkward to tackle as ever—and he'd probably now be a plain colonel on half-pay, with no prospects...

"Please, sir," said the maid, opening the study door, "the Vicar has called."

30

* * *

British tank doctrine of to-day, it will be seen, envisages two possible forms of employment of the arm in the

offensive. (*a*) Tank brigades, acting independently, may be used to strike the enemy in flank, to assail his reserve in movement so as to prevent their intervening in the battle; or to break into and sow confusion among his gun positions and headquarters and supply organisation, so as to assist the forces simultaneously carrying out the forward attack. If there is already an open flank, such missions can be carried out by means of a wide turning movement, executed swiftly and coming as a surprise to the enemy; if no such flank exists, the tank brigades can be employed in these independent roles only after a gap for them to pass through has been made in the enemy line by a frontal attack carried out by the other arms. In pursuit, of course, tank brigades will find a wide scope of useful and indeed invaluable service. (*b*) Army tank battalions will be used in the initial stages of a frontal attack on an enemy position to break through his forward defences, or in the later stages to confirm or extend success already gained. Concealment of their approach, full support by artillery and machine-guns, close co-operation with infantry, who must follow them up closely and take over from them quickly, so as to avoid the necessity of exposing them too long to hostile fire while holding on to the captured position, quick rallying and re-organisation—all these will be necessary if the attack is to go through to success quickly, cheaply and with certainty.

In the defence tanks will be used mainly for counter-attack purposes, particularly against enemy tanks which have broken into or through the forward positions. They will also be called on to play a leading role in the large-scale counter offensive, which should in theory be the crown and completion of every successful defensive battle, to inflict a decisive defeat on the shattered and staggering

assailant. In this case again surprise and swiftness will be the keys to success. It is perhaps a fair criticism of present-day British tank doctrine to say that it gives insufficient weight to the high value of the tank as a defensive weapon — in which role it may well be even more formidable and 5 potent than in the offensive.

* * *

“Your young men shall see visions and your old men shall dream dreams.” These visions may be said to be those of the young men who are now rising to the higher ranks of the British Army. But no one can touch even 10 briefly on British tank doctrine without some mention of the dreams of one older man, without whom we should probably have had neither tanks nor a doctrine for them to-day.

General Fuller, though not yet an old man, even less 15 so in intellect than in years, has been, ever since the tank's first appearance, its most potent and prolific advocate. He may be described as a military H. G. Wells, so active in mind, so fertile in thought, so tireless of pen, as to make it difficult for the more pedestrian and less 20 single-minded to keep pace with him. Sometimes, indeed, like Mr. Wells, he seems to be finding a new and fairer military Utopia every day, leaving the path behind him littered with outworn and discarded dreams. Many of his claims on behalf of the possibilities of the tank, even to- 25 day, may appear extravagant and even absurd — though many, since fulfilled in fact, appeared no less so when he first put them forward. Many, as he has frankly admitted, were of set purpose exaggerated for advertisement and publicity purposes; for just after the War, when the 30 British Army was being remodelled for the expected long

era of peace, the Tank Corps, despite its pre-eminent achievements, was in dire peril of total abolition, and only advertisement and publicity availed to save it alive. But General Fuller still has, and still propagates, his visions of the future of the tank in war, which no writer on the subject can or dare neglect.

He sees the armies of the future, small, professional, fully mobile, highly trained and skilled, divided into two parts with separate yet joint functions. The non-tank arms will form mobile anti-tank forts, supplied by fast-moving armoured convoys from the rear, or by air; they will advance into and establish themselves solidly in the hostile territory to serve as jumping-off and rallying places for the tank fleets and the air squadrons which will range far afield to seek out and destroy the enemy. Infantry, cavalry, and artillery—all the old arms, all the old mechanism of war as we know it to-day and as our forefathers for centuries back have known it, will henceforth be outworn and demoded. These new model armies, children of the aeroplane and the tank, will wage a new form of war—a war not of lines and positions, but of areas, where attack may be delivered from, and defence must guard, any and every side—from the air above; from front, flank or rear; where nothing is impossible and nothing too bold to attempt or achieve. In these new armies waging their new war, every officer must be a skilled artist, every soldier a craftsman, and the general a man of scientific genius for war.

(Tanks in the next War; G. Bles, London.)



Sammlung Seiler.

A Detachment of the Auxiliary Territorial Force for Women,
parading in London.

THE AUXILIARY TERRITORIAL FORCE FOR WOMEN.

Women who lived through the days of the Great War will not have forgotten what it meant for them. The comfortable certainties of life as they had known it vanished almost in a night. Then came the long strain of ever-increasing anxieties. There were losses which it seemed impossible to mourn inertly. The only hope of respite was to do something active and worth while. Thus it was that the womanhood of our country came forward in hundreds of thousands and did what it could.

The nation still looks back with pride and gratitude to the services rendered by its women at that time. Largely as a result of the part they played in those days women have been welcomed almost unanimously to full citizenship. Their enfranchisement has, however, entailed responsibilities as well as rights. Of this they are well aware.

It is one of the many reasons why women faced the recent crisis with very different conceptions of its demands upon them from those that were current in August, 1914. They knew well also that if war had come they would have found themselves in the front line. Men, women and children would have stood in almost equal peril. In such a community of danger it would be only natural that women should seek at least a measure of community service.

Since the last war, moreover, they have acquired much additional experience of acting together as organized beings. How many women's societies and associations have not sprung up and prospered in the intervening years? They are consequently, as a sex, more susceptible to discipline and training, while the progress of what is called emancipation has immensely widened the sphere

of their potential usefulness. If war came they would justly demand a share in national defence, as active, and if need be, as perilous, as could be accorded to them.

The Auxiliary Territorial Force for Women, instituted by the War Office at the end of September, meets therefore a truly national requirement. It offers to the young and healthy woman between 18 and 43 the opportunity, or, shall I say, the privilege, of serving her country honourably, actively and to good purpose. She will, in fact, be a Territorial, albeit in a non-combatant capacity. She will be uniformed, drilled, trained under canvas, and subject, in emergency, to embodiment as one of a force in the full service of the Crown. The personnel of this new Service is being enrolled to perform duties of three kinds (*a*) motor driving, (*b*) clerical and (*c*) general, such as cooking or acting as orderlies and store-women. The period of enrolment for members will be four years, which, with approval, can be extended. The training will consist of attendance at drills—a minimum of ten a year—and in camp for a period of not less than eight days a year, or 15 days in alternate years. In peace-time there will be no pay or allowances, though there will be grants for attendance at camp. In time of war the Auxiliary Service will form part of the organization of the Army or the Royal Air Force.

25

From a military point of view the Auxiliary Territorial Service will fulfil a vital, indeed, an essential need, in promoting the economy of manpower. Few civilians realize the enormous drain on the fighting strength of a regiment caused by the demand for clerks, store-men, cooks, lorry drivers and the rest. In peace as well as in war, a large proportion of men are withdrawn to type orders, issue clothing, check stores and generally attend to the “domes-

tic" side of the fighting man's life. In the old days these duties were performed simply enough by a handful of commissaries, but army life, like civil life, has become more complicated, until the machinery required to maintain a unit in the field might be likened to that of a vast departmental store. It is a problem which, I believe, has been causing increasing anxiety to military experts, for it is as acute in peace-time, especially in the Territorial Army, as it is in war. Territorial soldiers have all too little time to render themselves proficient in the exercise of arms. If the short period of their summer camp is to be wasted in non-combatant duties, the task of training our citizen soldiers becomes indeed a hard one. To meet this problem the Auxiliary Territorial Service will, in peace, assist the fighting Services by performing these duties as and where it is practicable. If the greater emergency of a European War should arise, the Services will know that every man in their ranks will be an effective, and that men will not have to be released to look after the civil problems of a unit. If the Territorial Auxiliary Service receives from the women of the country the support that it should, there will be at hand a competent and efficient force ready immediately to take over such duties.

Although the Auxiliary Territorial Service is designed to serve in war with all branches of the land and air Forces, a particularly sensible innovation is that its companies will normally be affiliated for their training in peace to local Territorial units. The Territorial Army has gained immeasurably from the closer co-operation with the Regular Army which has developed in recent years. In the same way it is hoped the Territorial Army will take its new sister Service under its wing, afford it facilities for training where practicable, and communicate to it

some of its regimental and local *esprit de corps*. Such a partnership will be of inestimable service to both, and in war will provide that basis of co-operation that will ensure a smooth working of combatant and non-combatant personnel.

(Lady Violet Astor in 'Rising Strength', Nov. 1938.)

5

ANMERKUNGEN UND WÖRTERVERZEICHNIS.

(Die fetten Ziffern bezeichnen die Seiten, die mageren die Zeilen. Die Benutzung eines englisch-deutschen Handwörterbuchs, wie ein solches in unserm Verlag erschienen ist (M 1,80, geb. M 2,20), wird vorausgesetzt)
s. o. = some one, s. t. = something.

Näheres über die Wehrmacht Großbritanniens findet man in dem gleichnamigen Werke von G. Graefer (Diesterweg, Frankfurt a. M.).

THE ROLE OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

3. 3. *Secretary of State* (Kabinetts-)Minister; hier ~ *for War*, Kriegsminister. — 7. *discharge* [dis'tʃɑ:dʒ] (Ausladen), „Erfüllung“. — 8. *commitment* Verpflichtung. — 9. *strategic* [strə'tidʒik] strategisch. Strategie ist die Kriegskunst im großen zum Unterschied von der Taktik, der Kriegskunst im kleinen; es ist die Kunst der Führung in die Schlacht zum Unterschied von der Taktik als der Kunst der Führung in der Schlacht. — 10. *scale* Stufenleiter. — 13. *constituent* [kən'stitjuənt] einen Teil (von etwas) ausmachend, „einzeln“. — 17. *bases* Stützpunkte, Mehrzahl von *basis* ['beisiz], dann = ['beisiz]; oder von *base* [beis], dann = ['beisiz]. — *fuel* ['fjuəl] Brennstoff. — *supply* Vorrat. — 19. *refit* ['ri:fɪt] Ausgebessertwerden, Ausbesserung. — 20. *lot* Los, (durchs Los) zugefallener Anteil; *it fall's to s. o.'s* ~ es fällt ihm zu (zu tun). — 21. *Royal Air Force* (britische) Luftwaffe. — 26. *paramount* ['pærəmaʊnt] (oberst), höchst.

4. 1. *self-governing*: nur schmückendes Beiwort! Die Selbstverwaltung unterscheidet ja gerade die „Gliederstaaten“ — Canada, Neufundland (bis 1933, jetzt finanziell dem Mutterland unterstellt), die Union von Südafrika, Australien, Neuseeland, dazu Eire ['eərə] = (Süd-)Irland — von den Kolonien. — 7. *protectorate* [prə'tektərɪt] Schutzgebiet. Bei diesen besorgt der Schützerstaat vornehmlich nur die Verwaltung der auswärtigen Angelegenheiten. Die Abhängigkeit der Schutzgebiete ist also loser als bei den eigentlichen Kolonien. Beispiel: Sansibar (wo ein Sultan „regiert“). — 14. *conscriptional* mit Wehrpflicht (*conscription*). — 15. *manpower* (Menschenkraft), „Menschenreserve“. — 18. *clear-cut* „klar umrissen“. — 22. *Suez* ['su:z]. — 26. *in point of fact* tatsächlich. — 29. *reservoir* ['rezəvwa:] Sammelbecken. — *garrison* ['gærɪsn] Standort.

5. 4. *regular*: = *of the Regular Army* (zum Unterschied von der *Territorial Army*; über diese vgl. den nächsten Absatz!). — *some* (einige), „etwa“. — 5. *Gibraltar* [dʒɪˈbrɔːltə]. — 6. *Malta* [ˈmɔːltə]. — *Singapore* [sɪŋəˈpɔː]. — *Hongkong* [ˈhɒŋˈkɒŋ]. — 7. *Bermuda* [bəˈmɜːdə]. — 8. *unit* Einheit, Verband, Truppenteil. — *arm* (Waffe), Waffengattung. — 9. *engineer* (militärisch =) Pionier. — 15. *amenity* [əˈmɪnɪti] Annehmlichkeit. — 16. *Strategic Reserve*: s. 4, 13. — 19. *to tie down* (Hund: fest an den Boden) binden; fesseln, festlegen. — 20. *pacification* Befriedung. — *nationals* Landsleute. — 25. *Territorial Army*: vgl. darüber S. 8 ff. Es ist eine sehr kurzfristig übende Freiwilligentruppe, mit der Verpflichtung, im Kriegsfall (nötigenfalls auch außerhalb des Mutterlandes) vollen Dienst zu tun. Die Dienstverpflichtung erfolgt auf vier Jahre; doch kann der Betreffende gegen Zahlung einer Gebühr (bis £ 5) vor Ablauf seiner Verpflichtung ausscheiden. Die Ausbildung erfolgt im Heimatort oder in der Nähe, durch — aktive und verabschiedete — Offiziere der *Regular Army*. Die gesamte Verwaltung aber liegt in der Hand der Grafschaften, d. h. von Zivilisten, führenden Persönlichkeiten wie Universitätsprofessoren, Direktoren der *public schools*, Fabrikanten und Vertretern der Gewerkschaften. Geübt wird allwöchentlich an einem freien Nachmittag oder Abend. Jeder *drill* (Exerzierdienst und Schießübungen) dauert eine Stunde; nur drei solche *drills* dürfen am selben Tage erfolgen. Im ersten Jahr sind es insgesamt 40, in jedem der drei folgenden Jahre sogar bloß 10 solche *drills*! Dazu kommt noch alljährlich ein Lager von (1—) 2 Wochen. In Anbetracht dieser kurzen Übungszeit wird erstaunlich viel geleistet. Der *Director* der *Territorial Army* gehört neuerdings dem „*Committee of Imperial Defence*“ an. — 26. *eventually* gegebenenfalls später einmal. — 30. *it would be a matter of 4 to 6 months* es würde etwa 4 bis 6 Monate dauern. — 31. *echelon* [ˈeʃələn] Staffel. — 32. *to take the field* ins Feld rücken.

6. 6. *provision* (hier:) Beschaffung. — 9. *Aden* [ˈeɪdn]. — 10. *to deplete* leeren. — 12. *scale* (hier:) Größenverhältnis, Maßstab. — *to permit of s. t.* etwas zulassen. — *to man* bemannen, (Stellung:) besetzen. — 13. *defence* (hier:) Verteidigungsanlage. — *sea-borne* von der See her. — 17. *experience*: der Verfasser denkt an die Geschehnisse, die mit dem spanischen Bürgerkrieg in Zusammenhang standen. — 18. *basin* [s!] Becken. — 19. *liability* [laɪəˈbɪlɪti] Verbindlichkeit. — 21. *Iraq* [ɪˈrɑːk]. — 24. *head* (hier:) oberes Ende. — 26. *communal* [ˈkɒmjʊnl]: in den einzelnen Gemeinden (*communes* [ˈkɒmjʊnz]). — 27. *to enlarge upon s. t.* sich über etwas verbreiten.

7. 1. *unprecedented* noch nicht dagewesen. — 5. *theatre of war* Kriegsschauplatz. — 6. *Shanghai* [ʃæŋˈhaɪ]. — 7. *to envisage* [ɪnˈvɪzɪdʒ] ins Auge sehen (s. t. einer Sache, einer Gefahr). — 10. *irruption* Einbruch, (feindlicher) Einfall. — 17. *assurance* (Sicherheit), Sicherstellung. — 18. *resumé* [ˈrezjuːmeɪ] Zusammenfassung. — 26. *to ensure* sichern, gewährleisten. — 27. *anti-aircraft defence* Flugzeugabwehr.

8. 8. *paradoxically* [pærəˈdɒksɪkəli] (alles umkehrend), „verblüffenderweise“. — 15. *Lieut.-General* = *Lieutenant-General*, Generalleutnant. — *Ronald* [ˈrɒnld].

HOME DEFENCE BY THE TERRITORIAL ARMY.

8. 16. *Territorial Army*: vgl. Anm. 5,25. — 25. *chary* ['tʃɛəri] sorgfältig; ~ *of doing* s. t. abgeneigt, etwas zu tun. — 31. *to control* (nicht „kontrollieren“, sondern:) beherrschen.

10. 2. *to enhance* [in'hɑ:ns] steigern. — 5. *to cripple* (zum Krüppel machen), lähmen, lahmlegen. — 7. *category* ['kætigəri] (Kategorie), Klasse, Ordnung. — 9. *liable* ausgesetzt (*to* s. t. einer Sache); *to be* ~ *to do* s. t. (in Gefahr, etwas tun zu müssen), wahrscheinlich etwas tun. — 12. *searchlight* Scheinwerfer. — *fighter aircraft* Jagdflugzeuge. — 14. *to retaliate* [ri'tælieit] (*against*) Vergeltungsmaßnahmen treffen (gegen). — 15. *deterrent* [di'terənt] Abschreckungsmittel. — A. A. = *anti-aircraft*, Flak; ~ *lights* = *anti-aircraft searchlights* Flakscheinwerfer. — 17. *this country* „unser (Vater-)Land“. — 20. *vital* (lebenswichtig), hochwichtig. — 21. *to man* bemannen, „bedienen“. — 27. *perforce* zwangsläufig, notgedrungen. — 28. *job* [dʒɒb] (Stück) Arbeit, (bestimmte) Aufgabe. — 29. *cut-and-dried* schablonenhaft, sich im ausgefahrenen Geleise bewegend.

11. 5. *liability* Verantwortlichkeit, Verbindlichkeit, (pflichtmäßige) Aufgabe. — 21. *shore-based*: ihre Flugbasis (*base*) befindet sich an der Küste (*shore*). — *sea-borne*: vgl. 6, 13. — 23. *morale* [mɔ'ra:l] Moral (innerer Halt). — 27. *to entail* (s. t. etwas) mit sich bringen.

12. 4. *parachute* ['pærəʃu:t] Fallschirm. — 10. *to appreciate* (würdigen), einsehen, erkennen. — 15. *casualties* ['kæʒjuəltiz] (pl.) Verluste (= Tote und Verwundete). — 18. *Home Office* Innenministerium. — 24. *engineering*: s. 5, 9. — *service* (hier:) Truppengattung. — *transport services* Fahrtruppen. — 28. *uneconomical* unwirtschaftlich. — 32. *to embody* (verkörpern), (Formationen:) aufstellen.

13. 4. *pursuance* [pə'sju:əns] Verfolg. — *policy* (Politik), (dem eignen Vorteil dienendes) Verfahren. — 7. *call* (Ruf), Inanspruchnahme. — 12. *initial* anfänglich, im Anfang. — *mobile* ['moubail] beweglich. — 19. *in due course* zu gehöriger Zeit, zu seiner Zeit. — 20. *to round up* umzingeln. — 32. *to enhance* steigern, (Ruf:) erhöhen. — *status* (Zustand), (gesellschaftliche) Stellung.

14. 3. *appropriate to* s. t. einer Sache angemessen. — 6. *tank* Panzerkampfwagen. — 7. *anti-tank* Panzerabwehr.

BRITAIN'S GREATEST PERIL — FOOD SUPPLIES.

14. 22. *somewhere* irgendwo; ~ *about* annähernd, etwa. — *neighbourhood* (Nachbarschaft), Nähe; (*somewhere*) *in the* ~ *of* ungefähr. — 27. *Hoare* [hɔ:]. — *First Lord of the Admiralty* Marineminister.

16. 2. *at the most* höchstens. — 6. *policy* s. 13, 4. — 9. *acre* Morgen (Landes) (= 40,467 Ar). — 11. *on the top of that* obendrein. — 12. *mercantile* ['mɜ:kəntail] (kaufmännisch), Handels-. — 13. *shipping* Schiffsbestand, „Schiffe“. — 16. *aerial* ['ɛəriəl] *bomb* Fliegerbombe. — 24. *to cripple* (zum Krüppel machen), schwächen, lähmen; vgl. 10, 5. — 30. *to offset* [ɔ:f'set] ausgleichen. — *increase* ['inkri:s] Zunahme. — 31. *range* (Bewegungsfläche), Flugbereich. — *power* (Kraft), „Leistungs-

fähigkeit“. — *air bomber* ['bɒmə] Bombenflugzeug. — 33. *to contaminate* [kən'tæmineɪt] (verseuchen), vergiften.

17. 2. *silo* ['saɪlə] (Getreide- und Futter-)Speicher. — *granary* ['grænəri] Kornkammer, Kornspeicher. — 8. *output* (Förderung), Ertrag. — 12. *alternative* [ɔ:l'tə:nətɪv] (Alternative, Wahl zwischen zwei Dingen), ~ *to* andere Möglichkeit für. — 15. *time-lag* Zeitverzögerung, lange Zwischenzeit. — 26. *to raise* (aufrichten), schaffen. — 32. *aspect* ['æspekt] (Anblick), Seite.

18. 1. *scale* (Stufenleiter), Maßstab; *on a . . .* ~ in einem . . . Maßstab. — 4. *caterer* ['keɪtərə] Lebensmittellieferant. — 5. *interest* (Interesse), „Wirtschaftsgruppe“. — 6. *accommodation* Unterbringung, (Unterbringungs-)Möglichkeit. — 7. *inducement* Anreiz. — 8. *non* [nɒn] -*perishable* nicht verderblich. — 10. *in addition to this* außerdem. — 14. *to make much of* viel Wesens machen um. — 15. *to upset* (umwerfen), verwirren, beunruhigen. — 18. *discreet* vorsichtig. — 19. *propitious* günstig. — 21. *transaction* „Geschäft“. — *exchange* Wertunterschied zwischen zwei Währungen; Währungs-. — 22. *equalisation* Ausgleichs-. — 25. *air-raid-precautions* (gewöhnlich A. R. P. abgekürzt) Luftschutz. — 28. *reequip-ment* Neuausrüstung. — 32. *to convoy* [kən'vɔɪ] geleiten; ~*ing* Geleit(s)-.

20. 4. *in that* insofern als. — 5. *fluctuation* Schwankung.

OIL IN WARTIME.

20. 14. *boiler* (Schiffs-) Kessel. — 18. *description* (Beschreibung), Art. — 26. *bulk* (Masse), Hauptmasse. — 29. *concern* Beunruhigung, Sorge. — 30. *to offset*: s. 16, 30. — 31. *reciprocal* [ri'sɪprəkəl] „entsprechend“.

21. 9. *depredation* Plünderung, „Beeinträchtigung“. — *shipping*: s. 16, 13. — 10. *tanker* Tankschiff. — 11. *dead-weight* (totes Gewicht), Ladung. — Die tatsächlichen Verluste der englischen Handelsschifffahrt während des Weltkriegs waren erheblich höher und erreichten 1917 einen Umfang, daß Englands Versorgung von Übersee ernstlich gefährdet wurde! — 12. *to urge* (vortreiben), (Beweisgrund:) vorbringen. — *Howard* ['haʊəd]. — 13. *titular* ['tɪtjʊlə] dem Namen nach. — *asset* ['æset] Posten auf der Aktivseite, Besitz. — 15. *physical* (körperlich, leibhaftig), „tatsächlich“. — *control* (nicht „Kontrolle“, sondern:) Macht(ausübung). — 16. *seaborne* auf dem Seeweg befördert. — 24. *cargo-carrier* Frachenträger, Frachtschiff. — 26. *in ballast* „in Ballast“ (ohne Nutzladung). — 27. *grand total* Gesamtsumme. — 31. *ton* [tʌn] *gross* [ɡrɒs] Bruttoregister-tonne. — 33. *Imperial* das britische Weltreich betreffend, Reichs-.

22. 2. *panacea* [pænə'siə] Allheilmittel. — 5. *provision* Vorkehrung. — *dual* Doppel-. — 6. *to immobilize* stilllegen. — 7. *expedient* Ausweg. — 16. (*defence*) *Service* Wehrmachtsteil. — 19. *to supersede* [sɜ:pə'si:d] verdrängen. — 21. *utilization* Nutzbarmachung, Verwertung. — 23. *producer gas* Generatorgas. — 32. *depôt* ['depou] Lager.

24. 10. *large-scale* umfangreich, weitreichend. — 11. *unremitting* unablässig, unermüdlich.

SPEED IN WAR.

24. 17. *to survey* [sə:'veɪ] (besichtigen), prüfen. — *Singapore* s. 5, 6. — 24. *Melbourne* ['melbən]. — *missile* ['misail] Wurfgeschöß. — 25. *mis-*

live ['misiv] Sendschreiben (es ist an den Abwurf von Flugblättern zur Propaganda gedacht). — 27. *to ally* [ə'lai] (verbünden), vereinigen. — 32. *base* Stützpunkt (vgl. 3, 17).

25. 2. *span* Spannweite. — 3. Der Verlust der Marneschlacht war freilich nicht nur auf den „General Hunger“ und den „General Erschöpfung“ zurückzuführen! — 9. *to spell* (buchstabieren), als Folge ergeben, bedeuten. — 10. *alternatively* [ɔ:l'tə:nətɪvli] (adv.) (frei) nach Wahl; *or*, ~, oder sonst. — 12. *diminutive* (winzig) klein. — *pursuit* (Verfolgungs-), Jagd-. — 15. *performance* (Vollbringung), Leistung. — 22. *to span* überspannen, „begreifen“. — *to fall short* nicht reichen, (hier:) nicht hinüberreichen (nämlich über den *gulf*). — 24. *Colonel Lawrence* ['lɒrəns]: der berühmte Führer des Araberaufstandes im Weltkrieg (1888—1935).

26. 3. *horse-mounted* beritten. — 6. *to hit* „drauflosschlagen“. — 7. *shock weapons*: im Gegensatz zu *firearms* Z. 12. — 9. *smooth-bore* mit glattem Lauf (*bore* Bohrung, „Seele“). — 10. *long-bow* Langbogen. — *Black Prince*: (nach seiner Rüstung) Eduard, Prinz von Wales (1330—1376), der in den Kriegen seines Vaters Eduard III. gegen Frankreich ruhmreich kämpfte. — 18. *concentration* Zusammenziehung; *initial* ~ „Aufmarsch“. — 21. *assembly* (Versammlung), Sammeln; *initial* ~ „Aufmarsch“. — 24. *tail* (Schwanz), (Heeressäule:) Ende. — 29. *to outflank* umgehen, überflügeln.

27. 1. *to turn the tide* „die Wendung bringen“. — 4. *crack* Spalt, Lücke. — 6. *strain* Inanspruchnahme; *to impose too heavy a ~ on* zu große Anforderungen stellen an. — 6. *supply* Nachschub. — 8. *Meuse* (franz.) Maas. — 10. *Liège* [li'eiz] Lüttich. — *awkward* (ungeschickt), unangenehm. — 11. *deviation* Umleitung. — 14. *artery* (Pulsader), Verkehrsader. — *block* (Hindernis), (Verkehrs-) Stockung. — 19. *engineer*: s. 5, 9. — 22. *franc-tireur* (franz.) Freischärler. — 23. *quarter* Pardon.

28. 4. *Macedonian* [mæsi'dʒɒnjən] mazedonisch. — *phalanx* ['fælæŋks] Phalanx, Schlachtreihe. — 7. *flexibility* Geschmeidigkeit. — 8. *to probe* sondieren, aufspüren. — 10. *to face about* kehrtmachen. — 11. *maniple* ['mænipl]: Unterabteilung ($\frac{1}{30}$) der römischen Legion, etwa der heutigen Kompanie entsprechend. — 15. *play* (Spiel), Tätigkeit; *in* ~ „beschäftigt“. — 17. *in (the) rear* im Rücken. — 18. *Hannibal* ['hæniβəl]. — *to turn the tables* den Spieß umdrehen (*on s. o.* gegen jd.) — 21. *to give ground* zurückweichen. — *to break* (zerbrechen), sich in Teile auflösen. — 24. *eventually* später (vgl. 5, 26). — *Scipio* ['sɪpiou]: (235—183 v. Chr.); bei Zama gewann er 202 die Entscheidungsschlacht gegen Hannibal. — 26. *to vie with* es aufnehmen mit. — *Carthaginian* [kɑ:θə'dʒɪniən] Karthager.

29. 3. *Mongol* ['mɒŋɡɒl]. — 8. *sparse* (spärlich), „bescheiden“. — *trooper* Reiter. — *spare* Ersatz-, zum Wechseln. — 9. *mount* Reitpferd. — *subsistence* Lebensunterhalt, „Verpflegung“. — 10. *unencumbered* unbeschwert. — *transport* „Troß“. — 13. *all-cavalry* „reine Reiter“. — 15. *pivot* ['pɪvət] Drehpunkt, Anklammerungspunkt. — 18. *Gustavus* [ɡus'tavəs]. — ~ *Adolphus* [ə'dɒlfəs] Gustav Adolf. — 22. *to initiate* anfangen, einführen. — 25. *piked* spießbewehrt (*spike* Spieß). — *array* [ə'rei] Schlachtordnung. — 26. *to wheel* schwenken. — 31. *Ironsides*: Name von Cromwells Reitertruppen. — 32. *impetus* ['ɪmpɪtəs] Stoßkraft. —

30. 3. *heat* (Hitze), „Getümmel“. — *scale*. Waagschale; *to turn the ~ of* „siegen bei“. — 6. *mercy* (Gnade), göttliche Fügung; *crowning* (krönende) ~: die Schlacht bei Worcester [ˈwʊrstə], in der Karl II. völlig geschlagen wurde. — 8. *to join battle* handgemein werden, die Schlacht beginnen. — 11. *gave it a start*: = *he let it advance to draw it on*, „ließ es herankommen“. — 13. *Lambert* [ˈlæmbət]: John (1619—1683), Offizier Cromwells. Nach dessen Tod war er Führer der Armee in ihrem Konflikt mit dem Parlament. Er unterlag den Parlamentstruppen und wurde nach der Restauration der Stuarts bis an sein Lebensende gefangengehalten. — 14. *to head off* ablenken. — 15. *to shepherd* (Schafe:) hüten, führen, treiben. — 21. *to conform to* sich richten nach, sich schicken in. — *orthodox* anerkannt, hergebracht. — 25. *to outmanoeuvre* [autməˈnu:və] *an opponent* dem Gegner in der Führung überlegen sein, den Gegner überlisten. — 29. *chaotic* [keiˈɒtɪk] verworren. — 32. *magazine* Speicher, Lager.

31. 10. *not learnt*: nämlich von den Generalstäblern Europas (vgl. 32, 16). — 17. *to foster* (nähern), befördern, begünstigen; (Zeile 19 f.) „sorgen für“. — 28. *paralysis* [pəˈrælɪsɪs] Lahmlegung. — 30. *Morgan*: Führer von Truppen der Südstaaten. — 32. *airborne* „auf dem Luftwege herangeschafft“. — 33. *eventually*: s. 28, 24. — *Sherman* [ˈʃə:mən] (1820—1891): erhielt 1864 den Oberbefehl auf dem südlichen Kriegsschauplatz und trat alsbald den für den Ausgang des Kriegs entscheidenden Marsch durch Georgia zur Küste an; er zwang Savannah zur Übergabe und zog unter ständiger Verwüstung des feindlichen Landes von dort nordwärts, um sich mit Grant in Virginien zu vereinigen; 1869 wurde er an Stelle Grants Höchstkommandierender der Nordstaatenarmee.

32. 1. *strategist* [ˈstrætɪdʒɪst] Stratege. — *to diagnose* [ˈdaɪəgnəʊs] (Krankheit) bestimmen, erkennen. — 4. *to immunize* [ˈɪmjunaɪz] immunisieren, feien. — 5. *alternative* (die Wahl zwischen zwei Dingen lassend), „ander“. — 9. *comfort* Bequemlichkeit. — 10. *impedimenta* [ɪmpɪdɪˈmentə] (pl.) Gepäck, „Troß“. — *to cut loose* [s!] *from* sich frei machen von. — 12. *Georgia* [ˈdʒɔ:dʒɪə] ... *North Carolina* [kærəˈlaɪnə] ... *South Carolina*: Südstaaten der Union. — 13. *Confederate* südstaatlich. — 16. *portent* [ˈpɔ:tent] Vorbedeutung, Wunder; ~s (pl.) (wunderbare) Errungenschaften. — 19. *clash* Zusammenstoß. — 21. *of manœuvre* Manövrier-. — 23. *headlong* ungestüm. — 27. *to bankrupt* zugrunde richten, betrügen. — 30. *entrenched* „im Schützengraben (*trench*) erstarrt“.

33. 6. *chance* (adj.) zufällig. — 17. *to motorize*: „motorisiert“ sind Einheiten, die für ihre Fortbewegung mittels Kraftzug besonders organisiert sind, am Ziel angekommen aber wie die andern Verbände kämpfen; „mechanisiert“ sind jene Verbände, die mit bewaffneten und gepanzerten Fahrzeugen ausgestattet sind und auch damit kämpfen. — *bullet-proof* schußsicher, kugelsicher. — 20. *armoured* gepanzert.

34. 1. *to dislocate* in Verwirrung bringen. — 2. *headquarters* Stab (hier Mehrzahl!). — *signal centre* Nachrichtensammelstelle. — 9. *scope* Wirkungskreis, Spielraum, Möglichkeiten. — 11. *if* (hier:) wenn auch, wie wohl. — 14. *landcraft* Erdtruppen (als Gegensatz zu *aircraft* (Z. 13) gebildet). — 16. *shorter-range* „weniger weit entfernt“. — 21. *Achilles* [əˈkɪlɪz]. — 28. *liable* (to) ausgesetzt.

BRITISH TANK DOCTRINE OF TO-DAY.

35. 2. *General Smith*: der Verfasser will es vermeiden, den Stoff auf die übliche trockene Weise zu behandeln, indem er etwa die Ausbildungsvorschriften u. ä. bespricht. Er wählt einen andern Weg, indem er uns gleichsam ein Traumgesicht miterleben läßt, in dem er eine Schlacht der Zukunft schaut. Die Namen der beteiligten Länder — *Ruritania* (35, 6), *Neustria* (40, 1), *Austrasia* (40, 3) — und Personen sind also nur erdacht. — 3. *mobile* s. S. 13, 12. — 7. *transport* Fahrtruppen. — 8. *impedimenta* (pl.) Troß. — 9. *hot foot* schnellen Schritts. — 10. *to put* (hier:) ausdrücken. — 11. *tog* Rock; *~s* (pl.) Kleider. — *suitings* = *togs*. — 16. *bird* (Slang) = *fellow*. — 17. *say* sagen wir; etwa. — 18. *to slow s. o. up* jds Tempo verlangsamen; „aufhalten“. — *to worry* [Δ] belästigen. — 19. *to cut up* (zerschneiden), vernichten. — 24. *to co-operate* zusammenarbeiten. — *squadron* (Luftwaffe:) Staffel. — 27. *mechanized . . . motorized*: s. 33, 17. — 28. *lights* = *light tanks*. Es handelt sich um den 1931 eingeführten Vickers Light Tank, 6 tons schwer, mit einer Straßengeschwindigkeit von 30 englischen Meilen in der Stunde. — 29. *mediums* = *medium tanks*. Es handelt sich um den 1923 eingeführten Vickers Medium mit einer Straßengeschwindigkeit von 20 englischen Meilen in der Stunde. — 30. *armoured car* Panzerwagen. — 31. *engineers* s. 5, 9. — 32. *proportion* (richtiges) Verhältnis.

36. 1. *judicious* klug, umsichtig. — 4. *ground troops* Erdtruppen. — 5. *patrol* Spähtrupp, Späh-. — 7. *flank patrols* „Seitensicherungen“. — *wide* (adv., Gegensatz zu *down* Z. 6) weit auseinander. — 8. *to cast* (die Angelleine auswerfen), *~ around* umherschauen. — 12. *forward patrol* „Spitzenspähtrupp“. — 13. *to bicker* streiten, „plänkeln“. — 14. *to swing* schwenken (also offen im Gegensatz zum *stealing* Z. 15). — 15. *to whip* flitzen; *~ off* schnell ausreißen. — 16. *to lie up* „versteckt liegen“. — *hol-low* (Boden-) Senke. — 19. *to loose* [s!] *off* loslassen. — *burst* plötzlicher Ausbruch, *~ of fire* plötzliches Feuer; *to loose a ~ of fire* einen Feuerüberfall machen. — *at short range* auf kurze Entfernung. — 22. *to call in* (her-einrufen), hinzuziehen. — 25. *to push up* vorstoßen. — 26. *to take up the running* die Führung übernehmen. — 27. *all right* ganz richtig, „schon“. — 30. *to shoot up s. o.* einen Feuerüberfall machen auf. — 31. *scuttle* eiliger Rückzug. — *to cover* in Deckung.

38. 5. *at large* frei, ungehindert, „da“. — 8. *command* Kommando. — 10. *screen* (Schirm, „Vorhang“), „Wand“. — *anti-tank* Panzerabwehr, *~ gun* „Pak“. — 12. *to bound* springen. — 14. *to take position* in Stellung gehen. — 15. *to bunch* (zusammen)häufen, zusammenschließen. — 17. *head* „Spitze“. — 19. *to bring up the rear* die Nachhut bilden. — 22. *rate* Tempo, Geschwindigkeit. — 23. *gait* Gangart. — 26. *approach* Zugangsweg. — 30. *blush* (erster Anblick), erster Anfang.

39. 1. *close-support* Infanterieunterstützungs-. — *smoke mortar* Nebelwerfer. — 2. *screen* = *smoke screen* Z. 4. — 3. *away* (weg), entfernt. — 5. *it: the British Tank Brigade*. — *to issue* ['isju:] (*forth*) herauskommen. — *to make for* sich nach einer Richtung zu bewegen. — 6. *to wheel* schwenken. — 8. *tail* Schwanz, (Kolonne:) Ende. — 9. *up* oben. — 11. *to head* eine Richtung nehmen, sich bewegen. — 13. *to get into action*

ins Gefecht kommen, „eingreifen“. — 15. *crew* (Mannschaft); (Geschütz:) Bedienungsmannschaft. — 20. *green* (Hauptwort!) grüner Rasen, „Platz“. — 22. *sleet* Schloße(n), „Hagel“. — 23. *track* Gleiskette. — 26. *to rear* (Pferd:) sich bäumen. — 29. *to roll over* sich umdrehen. — 30. *unlovely* unschön, häßlich. — *barracks* Kaserne. — *Tidworth*: im Osten von Salisbury [*ˈsɔ:lzbəri*] Plain (vgl. 41, 13).

40. 1. *Neustrian* [*ˈnju:striən*]: nur erdachter Name! — 4. *to cave in* einstürzen. — 5. *to exploit* (ausbeuten), (einen militärischen Vorteil) ausnutzen. — *to fan out* sich fächerförmig ausbreiten. — 10. *to jut* [*dʒʌt*] vorspringen. — 16. *to put in an appearance* sich zeigen, erscheinen. — 19. *to press* drücken, drängen. — 24. *move* Maßnahme. — 27. *by way of* (auf dem Wege) über. — 28. *striking distance* Treffweite, Wirkungsbereich (im militärischen Sinne, = Feuerbereich). — 31. *to strike out* losschlagen.

41. 1. *reconnaissance* [*riˈkɒnɪsnz*] Aufklärung. — 2. *disposition* (Anordnung), *s* (pl.) Vorkehrungen. — 11. *to pry* spähen. — 13. *Plain*: = *Salisbury* [*ˈsɔ:lzbəri*] Plain, Truppenübungsplatz in Südengland. — 18. *lights* = *light tanks*. — 20. *to have a look-see* sich umsehen, sich orientieren. — 22. *to stand by* bereitstehen. — *call* (Ruf), Befehl. — 23. *lot* (die durch das Schicksal („Los“) vereinte) Menge, „Truppe“. — *diversion* Ablenkungsangriff, Täuschungsunternehmen. — *to mop up* „säubern“. — 26. *it: the screen*. — 27. *smash* (Fahrzeug:) (krachend) rasen. — 29. *to time* die Zeit abpassen. — 30. *to hammer* (hämmern), eine (schwere) Niederlage beibringen.

42. 1. *push* Vorstoß. — *I take it* „so fasse ich es auf“. — *to get hotted up* in einen schweren Kampf verwickelt werden. — 7. *interference* Störung. — 9. *due* (adv.) genau. — 11. *to score* (einkerben), (durch Striche) einzeichnen. — 12. *cutting* (Eisenbahn:) Durchstich. — 14. *to rally* sich sammeln. — *to piquet* (= *picket*) (Wach-) Posten ausstellen. — *first man to . . .* der erste, der . . . — 17. *O. K.* (= phonetische Schreibung für *all correct*) in Ordnung, schön. — 21. *to embark on* (sich einschiffen nach), sich einlassen in, beginnen. — 25. *to shift* einen Stellungswechsel vornehmen. — 26. *to feint* einen Scheinangriff machen. — 27. *to lie doggo* [*ˈdɒɡou*] regungslos liegen, sich versteckt halten. — 29. *to cover* decken. — 30. *mainstay* [*ˈmeɪnstɛɪ*] Hauptstütze. — *out of the way* aus dem Weg geräumt, „erledigt“. — 32. *to get to grips with* handgemein werden mit, „zu fassen bekommen“.

43. 9. *to lumber* sich schwerfällig fortbewegen, rumpeln. — 12. *to drone* summen, dröhnen. — *overhead* (dr)oben. — 13. *track*: s. 39, 23. — *hum* Brummen. — *splutter* (Motor:) Kotzen. — 14. *fold* (Boden-) Falte, Senke. — 15. *outpost* Vorposten. — 20. *to back (up)* unterstützen. — 21. *barrage* [*ˈbæra:ʒ*] Sperrfeuer. — 25. *chief gunner* Geschützführer. — 27. *pocket* (Tasche), Nest.

44. 1. *to gobble* (verschlingen), „vernichten“. — 5. *to quarter* streifen. — 6. *tangent* Tangente. — *to deal with* (hier:) kämpfen mit. — 8. *to nose* schnüffeln. — 10. *to keep up* Schritt halten. — 12. *time and time again* zu wiederholten Malen. — 13. *arm* Truppengattung. — 14. *to fix up* festsetzen. — 15. *bound* Sprung. — 18. *level* auf die gleiche Höhe. — 20. *timing* Zeitansetzung, Starten im rechten Augenblick. — 24. *sector* (beim Angriff:) „Streifen“. — 26. *turret* Geschützturm. — 29. *on fire* in Brand

(geschossen). — 30. *spotted* = *he spotted (to spot)* entdecken. — 31. *stricken* in Mitleidenschaft gezogen, betroffen. — *section* Abteilung. — 32. *to bang off* losballern. — 33. *spasm* [spæzm] (Krampf), Anfall, Anwendung.

45. 1. *to shut down* „verstummen“. — 2. *to stalk* sich anschleichen. — *knot* (Knoten), Gruppe. — 6. *piece* Geschütz. — 10. *to fight shy of* vorsichtig meiden. — 11. *exposed* exponiert. — *sky line* Horizont(linie). — 14. *ironclad* gepanzert. — *to account for* (Sport:) erledigen. — 15. *enemy there had been* = *enemy that had been there*. — 18. *bar* abgesehen von. — 20. *hog-backed* (Schweinsrücken-), zu beiden Seiten scharf abfallend. — 24. *to rally* sich sammeln. — 29. *manhole* Mannloch (= enges Einsteigloch). — 30. *word* (Wort), Befehl. — 32. *cocker spaniel* kleiner langhaariger Stöberhund. — 33. *full stretch* langausgestreckt.

46. 3. *K. C. B.* = *Knight Commander of the Bath Order* Komtur des Bath-Ordens (den Namen erhielt er von der Sitte, den neu aufgenommenen Ritter zu baden). Das Komturkreuz ist mit der Würde eines *K. C. B.* verbunden. — 5. *vintage* (Weinlese, Qualitätswein), „erlesen“. — *port* Portwein. — 6. *modicum* [ɔ] kleine Menge, bißchen. — 11. *terms* Bedingungen, (hier:) Friedensbedingungen. — 11. *a capful (of)* eine Mütze voll, allerhand. — *whatwith . . . and* teils infolge . . . teils infolge. — 13. *not a dog's chance* nicht die geringste Aussicht. — 17. *to make a nuisance of oneself* sich lästig machen. — 18. *line of communication* Verbindungslinie. — 21. *to strike* (hier:) kämpfen. — 23. *pipe-line* Rohrleitung. — 24. *show* Leistung, „Film“.

47. 8. *to set* (an einen bestimmten Ort) setzen, ansetzen. — 9. *covert* [ˈkʌvət] Versteck. — 11. *to chivvy* hetzen. — *from pillar to post* (vom Pfeiler zum Pfahl), „von Pontius zu Pilatus“. — 12. *to shed* (vergießen, fallen lassen), abstoßen. — 19. *lorry* Lastkraftwagen. — 24. *to trump an ace* ein As (= höchste Karte im Spiel) trumpfen. — *to throw one's hand in* klein begeben. — 26. *to tackle* (anpacken), überwältigen. — 30. *vicar* Pfarrer (der — im Gegensatz zum *rector* — nicht die großen Fruchtzehnten erhält).

48. 5. *headquarters* s. 34, 2. — *supply* Nachschub. — 14. *scope* (Gesichtskreis), Wirkungskreis. — 18. *to confirm* festigen. — 21. *to take over from* den Auftrag (übernehmen) aufnehmen von, „ablösen“. — 23. *to hold on to* aushalten an. — 30. *called on* „berufen“.

49. 10. *to touch on* (berühren), behandeln, zu sprechen kommen auf. — 15. *Fuller*: der Vater der englischen Panzerwaffe. — 17. *potent* [ou] (stark), mächtig (vgl. 49, 6), (durchschlagend) überzeugend. — *prolific* produktiv (er schrieb viele Bücher und Aufsätze darüber). — 18. *H. G. Wells*: (noch lebender) Verfasser von naturwissenschaftlichen Zukunftsromanen, geb. 1866. — 20. *pedestrian* (Fußgänger), „schwerfällig denkend“. — 21. *single-minded* zielbewußt. — 24. *outworn* abgenutzt, „überholt“. — 26. *extravagant* übertrieben. — 29. *of set purpose* mit voller Absicht. — 30. *publicity* Reklame, Werbung.

50. 3. *to avail* (nützen), helfen. — 10. *to supply* versorgen. — 11. *convoy* „Kolonne“. — 13. *jumping-off place* Ausgangspunkt. — 15. *to range* sich ausdehnen, „vorfühlen“. — *afield* (ins Feld), hinaus, „vor“. — 19. *demoded* außer Mode.

THE AUXILIARY TERRITORIAL FORCE FOR WOMEN.

52. 9. *respite* ['respait] (Frist), Ruhe(pause), „seelischer Friede“. — 16. *enfranchisement* [æ] Erlangung des Wahlrechts. — 19. *crisis*: September 1938 (Sudetenland!). — 25. *measure* Maß, (abgemessener) Teil.

53. 10. *albeit* [ɔ:l'birit] obschon. — *non-combatant* ['nɒn'kɒmbə-tənt] Nichtkämpfer. — *capacity* (Fähigkeit), Eigenschaft. — 11. *under canvas* (unter Segeltuch), in Zelten. — 12. *embodiment* (Einverleibung), Einstellung. — 14. *to enrol* anwerben, „einstellen“. — 15. *clerical* Schreib-. — 16. *orderly* Ordonnanz. — *store-woman*: fem. zu *store-man* Kammerunteroffizier. — 17. *approval* Genehmigung. — 22. *allowance* ausgesetzte Summe, Vergütung. — 28. *economy* Sparsamkeit, Ausnutzung. — 29. *drain* Abfließen; ~ *on* Inanspruchnahme von, Schwächung von. — 30. *lorry* Lastkraftwagen. — 32. *to type* tippen. — 33. *to check* kontrollieren, „ordnungsgemäß buchen“.

54. 3. *commissary* ['kɒmisəri] Intendanturbeamter. — 6. *departmental store* Warenhaus. — 8. *acute* (scharf), (Frage:) brennend. — 9. *all too* allzu. — 10. *proficient in* geübt in, bewandert in. — 13. *to meet* (einem Übel) entgegentreten; ~ *a problem* eine Sorge beheben. — 15. *fighting services* kämpfende (Wehrmachtsteile), „Kampfverbände“. — 18. *effective* (wirklich), „für den Kriegsdienst bereitgestellter Soldat“. — 22. *at hand* bei der Hand, zur Verfügung. — 27. *to affiliate* [ə'filieit] angliedern.

55. 1. *esprit de corps* (franz.) Standesgeist.

Während der Drucklegung erschien das hübsch bebilderte Buch von J. K. Dunlop (*Assistant Adjutant-General of the Territorial Army*) über die Territorial Army, auf das besonders deshalb verwiesen sei, weil es die allerneueste Entwicklung behandelt. (Zu beziehen für Mk. 2,40 bei der Auslandsbuchhandlung Rohmkopf in Leipzig.)

NACHWORT.

Dies Bändchen wurde kurz vor Kriegsausbruch zusammengestellt. Auf die Geschehnisse im Kriege ist daher in den Anmerkungen nicht eingegangen, die darum aber unveraltet sind!

Im Felde, Frühjahr 1940.

Dr. Müller.

