

Governmentality is All the Rage: The Strategy Games of Small Jurisdictions

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ABSTRACT *This paper discusses the contemporary sovereignty experience of small states and territories in the context of unfolding ‘strategy games’. This paper charts and illustrates some of the most salient issues over which this dynamic is played out, using binary (small state versus big state) relations as its analytic constituency. These practices are understood as part of the evolution of the conduct of government, or governmentality, as envisaged by Michel Foucault: states, no longer concerned with threats to their very existence, can flex their clout extra-territorially, and in so doing provide new and creative opportunities, but also raise threats, for the exercise of sovereignty.*

KEY WORDS: Foucault, governmentality, islands, paradiplomacy, small states, sovereignty, subnational jurisdictions, strategy games, citizenship rights, indigenous peoples, xenotopia

Introduction

States today are hardly preoccupied by concerns for their existence and survival *qua* states, even in the face of the expansionist ambitions of stronger neighbours. State extantism (see Schaffer, 1975, p. 25)—the 20th century exceptions here being Somaliland, South Yemen and Zanzibar—means that even ‘failed states’ do not risk their incorporation into the territory of an expansionist neighbour. Rather than being gripped by the fear of domination or invasion, the key concern for the likes of Nicolo Machiavelli (1515), states today are more disposed and prone busy to utilise that key capacity of sovereignty—the right and ability to make laws—with a view to ‘optimize the health and wealth of the state and its people’ (Braun, 2000, p. 12).

Such a politically rational reading of the exercise of territorial power is comparable to Michel Foucault’s concept of *gouvernementalité* (translated loosely as governmentality): this implies the right and smart deployment of actual and potentially available capacities to secure desirable resources, be they fiscal, human, material, legal, or geopolitical (Foucault, 1991a, p. 93; Kuehls, 1996, p. 67). This is a performative act of government-as-agency: referring to somewhat systematic modes and technologies of power that go beyond the spontaneous exercise of control power over others, and whose purpose is ‘the regulation of conduct by the more or less rational application of the appropriate technical means’ (Hindess, 1996, p. 106).

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Such a state capacity extends naturally and legitimately to its own territories, its own citizens and its own resources; indeed, these are often functions where the local state has a monopoly, and this reach would be expected and largely respected by other states. However, the regulation can also be deployed—indeed, perfected—in such ways as to include extra-territorial reach scope, and to affect the conduct of others beyond one's juridical scope; and the stakes get increasingly higher with decreasing size of territory and population. Foucault describes these behaviour patterns and relationships of power as 'strategic games between liberties' (Foucault, 1988a, p. 19); they do not necessarily mean that power is exercised against the interests of the other part of a power relationship, or that they result in a removal of liberty or options available to individuals. Indeed, in the sense ascribed by Foucault to these terms, they could, while somehow suggesting courses of action, actually result in an 'empowerment' of subjects, widening their decision-making options (also Lemke, 2001).

These possibilities thrust international relations into an arena of creative governance and strategy games within the 21st century. The scenario is not only a function of the large number of sovereign states that exist today, but also of the expanding number and significance of both subnational and supranational entities. The stage is therefore set for conventional (state-state) bilateral and multilateral deals, as well as for new forms of agreements and the para/proto-diplomacies that imbricate sub/non-state territories and which have evolved from the metropolitan-peripheral and colonial relationships of the 20th century. That such 'creative political economy' (Baldacchino and Milne, 2008) is also bountiful (in frequency, policy significance and research potential) is also related to the increasing presence of small, even micro, states, as well as of subnational (non-state, and mainly island) jurisdictions, on the world stage. Smallness, often accompanied by islandness, low/no populations and relative isolation, facilitates the room for imaginative and strategic manoeuvre.

Scope

This paper discusses the contemporary sovereignty experience of small states and territories in the context of unfolding 'strategy games' (see also Adler-Nissen and Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2008). Based on its original use by Wittgenstein (1953) in relation to language, the concept of a 'game' captures the messy amalgam of various transactions, decisions and actions among players, as they struggle, explicitly or surreptitiously, to flex, impose or tease out their version of meaning or preference on relational events, and not necessarily in rational ways. By defining sovereignty as the ability to do things and influence the conduct of others, we adopt an approach that is sensitive to creative governance practices and a political economy that typically pits a small state or territory with a larger, richer power.

This analysis is useful for various reasons. In applying the concept of governmentality to small (often island) states and territories, it proposes to make a conceptual and empirical contribution to existing knowledge and debates within the study of political geography and sovereignty in general, and of the study of both small states and subnational jurisdictions in particular. It also exposes the poverty of certain established doctrines—often developed subconsciously with large candidates in mind—when applied to small jurisdictions. Take Michael Porter and his diamond

model, which maintains a significant role for competition and rivalry between value chains or clusters at the domestic level (Porter, 1991). Yet, the size and scope of a small state's domestic economy can be severely limited: it is thus often impossible for small states and territories to create such a competitive milieu nationally. Instead, the secret for their success is to become insiders of external market niches (Cho and Moon, 2000).

The concept of governmentality helps us to better understand this predicament of small jurisdictions, and what has also been called 'the Singapore paradox' (Briguglio *et al.*, 2009). It was proposed on 1 February 1978 in a lecture by Michel Foucault at the Collège de France, and has spawned considerable social science scholarship since, particularly at the intersection of geography and politics (e.g. Burchell *et al.*, 1991; Walters and Larner, 2004; Crampton and Elden, 2007). With this concept, Foucault refined his earlier work to include an appreciation of power relations as the 'conduct of conduct' (Foucault, 2000, p. 341). *Tout court*, if power 'does' things to and with people, then the techniques of rule are invariably tied to 'technologies of the self'; they are 'processes by which the individual acts upon himself' (Foucault, 1988b; 1993, p. 203).

Based in turn on a larger project (Baldacchino, 2010), this paper goes on to chart and illustrate some of the most salient issues over which this dynamic is played out, whether instigated bottom up (by the smaller/weaker player) or top down (by the larger/more powerful player). Examples illustrating these dynamics have a global reach. The threat of secession and full sovereignty is itself part of the baggage that can be brought to bear in these dynamics, which can be fraught with drama, international opprobrium as well as 'development' opportunities. The discourse surrounding the subject matter—with references to small states and other small subnational jurisdictions—also lends itself to political design.

Origins of the Small State

Interestingly, the labels used to define our subjects—if they can be called subjects at all—are themselves highly charged and instrumentalised. Across disciplines and concerns, small states have been rendered synonymous to chronically vulnerable and problematic territories for which aid, assistance and especially favourable deals are legitimate. References to 'small states' started becoming more systematic in the 1960s after US-based political scientists in particular voiced concerns as to how these newly independent entities would be both unable to execute even minimally their international obligations, as well as being pesky and unreliable players in the context of strategic, big-stakes, cold war superpower politics (Baker Fox, 1959; Vital, 1967; Keohane, 1969; East, 1973; Plischke, 1977). Small states have been seen as synonymous with weak or failed states in the political studies/science literature, lumping them in the same category with many larger developing countries. Even today, the definition of a 'small state' in politics and international relations can include such countries that are, or have felt, threatened by much larger neighbours: Finland, Israel, Singapore and Taiwan (e.g. Gayle, 1986; Inbar and Shaffer, 1997; Ingebritsen *et al.*, 2006). Meanwhile, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development has developed a specific programme dedicated to small island developing states (SIDS) since 1994 (Hein, 2004). Most of these SIDS—the UN

currently recognises 38—are remote, small in land area and population (less than two million), with a very narrow resource base, fragile land and marine ecosystems that are highly vulnerable to natural disasters, and open economies that are heavily dependent on trade for national income. Finally, the 53-member Commonwealth was galvanised into action after the US military intervention in one of its members, Grenada, in 1983. Its concern with the vulnerability of a small but sovereign state to external intervention or invasion (Commonwealth Consultative Group, 1985; Diggines, 1985; Harden, 1985; Lyon, 1985; Bray, 1987; Bune, 1987; Charles et al., 1997) has not really abated since, but evolved to consider issues of economic and environmental sustainability (including climate change and sea level rise). This strident ‘deficit’ discourse surrounding small (and micro) states has found fertile ground both in the vocabulary of small state policy-makers (who tend to believe their own rhetoric), as well as among some mainstream neo-classical economic advisors (Briguglio and Kisanga, 2004; but see Easterly and Kraay, 2000; Shaw and Cooper, 2009, for an opposing view).

Such prejudices signal a tendency in the literature to consider ‘large states’ as ‘normal’, apart from preferable. Yet, this is hardly the case in practice. Out of 267 ‘countries, dependent areas and other entities’ listed in the 2011 edition of the *CIA World Factbook* (CIA, 2011), only 11 have populations exceeding 100 million, while 161 have populations of less than 10 million (of which 41 have a resident population of under 100,000). Wikipedia has a list of 225 ‘countries by population’, including subnational jurisdictions, which range in descending order from the People’s Republic of China to Pitcairn: the median (113th) position is occupied by Kyrgyzstan, with 5.4 million citizens (Wikipedia, 2011). Clearly, the so-called small state is the typical state size (as it has also been for most of recorded history). By contrast, therefore, it is the *large* state that is the quirk and the anomaly. Moreover, there is also ‘no widely accepted definition of a small state’ (Crowards, 2002, p. 143); nor is there a sharp or self-evident dichotomy between ‘small’ and ‘large’ states (Baehr, 1975, p. 466).

Ambiguous Relations

Presumed smallness of states also creates ambiguity in relation to sovereignty. Pitcairn (mentioned above) is not a sovereign state; it is, however, the world’s smallest recognised subnational jurisdiction, the only remaining UK Overseas Territory (UKOT) in the Pacific. Moreover, its citizens (around 40) were deemed fit to submit complex legal challenges to the United Kingdom’s administration of the island before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, in the context of widely reported child-sex abuse trials (e.g. Trenwith, 2003; Middleton, 2005). The three most recently independent states in the Pacific—the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau—have been defined as ‘hybrid jurisdictions’ (Levine and Roberts, 2005) because their status represents attempts to exploit the advantages of both sovereignty and an autonomy supported by a benign and affluent patron state (in this case, the US). The contemporary political map is strewn with cases of this second category of small jurisdictions: subnational (often island) autonomies; and these non-sovereign examples far exceed the sovereign ones. Watts has identified five categories of ‘forms of political relations which combine autonomy [read: self-

rule] and partnership [read: shared rule] within federal political systems' (Watts, 2000, pp. 23–29; 2008, pp. 33–38). Sovereignty is often treated as indivisible: you either are sovereign or you are not, with no room for dithering in between. Yet, this rule of thumb is increasingly found wanting in the 21st century. It maintains its grip only in matters of jurisprudence. Lake (2003, p. 310) suggests a gradation or 'a continuum of increasing hierarchy in international relations.' He adds that 'anomalies may be more commonplace than we often realise' (Lake, 2003, p. 314). When Krasner (2001) speaks of 'problematic sovereignty', he refers not only to the difficulty of classification—what to do with Taiwan, Northern Cyprus or the Palestinian Territories—but also to the nebulosity surrounding the workings of such jurisdictions in international relations.

This flexing of governmentality or the exploitation of jurisdiction offshore for strategic gain can be played with very different intentions in mind. Each set of actors would have its dynamics nested in a particular configuration of geography, history, culture and politics. Moreover, the contested jurisdictional terrain, ripe for 'strategy games', would appear differently, depending on the perspective of either party. Nevertheless, one can hypothesise that each set of such actors is likely to have unequal players: a smaller, less powerful, less populated entity on one hand; and a larger, richer, more populated entity on the other. The purposes for which such contemporary 'imaginative geographies' (Said, 1979) may be deployed can also be roughly generalised: they could deal with maximising tax revenue, increasing tourism, ensuring security, attracting international students or foreign skilled workers, or luring foreign investment.

Strategy Games Crafted by the Small

For the smaller player, the purpose of extra-territorial deals would be mainly to secure, for example, pecuniary gain, military protection, currency stability, and welfare supports via the drawing of rent and other surpluses from other jurisdictions directly, or from the citizens thereof (Palan, 1998, p. 630, 2002, p. 154, 2003, p. 59; Fabri and Baldacchino, 1999, p. 48). Also important is access to diplomatic channels via direct international representation; and access to the labour markets and citizenship rights of larger richer states. For those considering or boasting an offshore finance or electronic gam(bl)ing industry, extra-territorial links allow (at least a semblance of) international oversight and regulatory supervision. Autonomous governments 'choose' to use some of their sovereignty-derived regulatory powers in order to encourage non-local transnational actors—be they individuals, corporations or other governments—to make use of, or invest in, or simply to transfer funds to, their own regulatory environment (Hudson, 2000, p. 270). The smaller faction, of course, never completely relinquishes the potential resort to the metropole, if and when dire straits (such as budgetary shortfalls, economic recessions, environmental disasters, over-population, labour surpluses, or labour shortages) so determine or suggest. No wonder, therefore, that few of these smaller territories have struggled *for* independence; most have waged intense diplomatic struggles to maintain or extend benign colonial links with their overseas *patron*, at times going so far—as demonstrated by Mayotte in 2009—as to press for integration, the very antithesis of sovereignty (RFI, 2009). Various small states

and territories today may have not just deployed, but actually traded in, their sovereignty, or part thereof, in exchange for economic largesse, by exploiting this limbo granted by peripherality. Palan (2002, p. 172) argues that they have gone so far as to have prostituted their sovereign rights.

Non-sovereign, subnational units may have, and may exercise, their own right and ability to make laws—which, granted, *may* have been devolved or bestowed formally or constitutionally by sovereign states—in order to perform, or be crafted to perform, this task. Many ‘dependencies’ of sovereign states have resorted to their own agency or ‘actorness’ (e.g. Vlcek, 2008, p. 3) to develop strategy games, precisely because they *can* do so, given that they have the right to make their own laws within their territories: a crucial attribute of sovereignty that, however, can also be claimed by, or accorded to, such subnational non-independent units (Palan, 2003, p. 21). These candidates may have actually perfected the skill to a higher level, as their own, often fuzzy and ambiguous, political status allows them to exploit more nimbly, selectively and securely the spaces afforded by going after rents, or ‘jurisdictional shopping’, for other purposes. Many of these places embody the broad personalities of federal or confederal cultures: a combination of self-rule and shared rule; of ‘leave us alone’ along with ‘let us in’ on major decisions affecting the national or collective whole (Duchacek, 1986, p. 296).

Small subnational jurisdictions have managed to extract concessions, either *within* the ambit of a larger, sovereign state and/or (typically in alliance with their patron state) within the ambit of a confederate super-state, such as the European Union. Key areas where such unequal arrangements have been secured to date regard: (1) citizenship rights (with associated rights of residency, property purchase and work permit); (2) indigenous self-government; (3) paradiplomacy; and (4) economic sovereignty. All four areas question the strict definition of sovereignty and its imputed exclusive powers and obligations: regarding single citizenship; equal rights for all citizens; the rights of international representation; and local government transactions, respectively. Examples are provided for each of these highly contested policy areas.

Citizenship Rights

Many small subnational jurisdictions forcefully lobby for and, once secured, defend their right to maintain metropolitan passports and citizenship, which allows them to access the mainland at will and without encumbrance. Such rights are especially important in the face of very tight labour markets, as well as potential economic crises or total environmental disasters. Yet the same territories have no qualms in exercising very strict restrictions on who can work, settle, or purchase property on their island; there is not even a *quid pro quo*.

Bermuda. The British Overseas Territories Act (2002) has reaffirmed full British citizenship for the citizens of Britain’s remaining 15 small overseas territories. This Act also grants: automatic transmission of citizenship to offspring; the right of abode, including the right to live and work in the United Kingdom and the European Union; the right not to exercise or formally to renounce British citizenship; and the right to use the fast-track European Union/European Economic Area channel at the airport, free of UK immigration controls. In spite of these

concessions, within the UKOTs, perhaps the tightest and most one-sided arrangements for citizenship, residency and work permits are to be found in Bermuda. Property ownership is highly restricted: expatriates may purchase only one of some 312 homes listed as available for sale to non-Bermudians. Private houses in this category are very limited, and prices start at around US\$3.5 million (Global Property Guide, 2009). In general, single-family dwellings in Bermuda with price tags of less than US\$5.5 million cannot be sold to foreign nationals (Bermuda Online, 2010). Moreover, the Bermuda constitution protects Bermudians only: although human rights exist, they do not apply to non-Bermudian residents in the same ways as they do to Bermudians. The employment of non-Bermudians is severely restricted and they cannot change employment without official permission; any work permits stipulate a specific employer. The key explanatory factor for such 'very strict' (Forbes, 2012) policies is the strong dependence on immigrant labour in the Bermudian economy: the 2000 Census reported over 24% of all employees in the country as non-Bermudans (Fogg and Harrington, 2005, p. 366).

Sovereign Rights by Indigenous Peoples

A second expression of governance 'from below' relates to a concerted global movement for the recognition of aboriginal rights and their associated principles of self-government and self-determination *within* the parameters of a sovereign state. A United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted by the General Assembly in 2006. This provides for the protection of the collective human rights of indigenous peoples, including their rights to self-determination, culture, spirituality, language, lands, territories and natural resources. It applies to over 5,000 distinct indigenous peoples, numbering over 300 million worldwide, many of whom live on islands (UN, 2006).

Torres Strait Islanders, Australia. The right to ownership of land by Torres Strait Islanders according to their traditional customs was recognised in a landmark Australia High Court decision, *Mabo vs State of Queensland*, in 1992. This decision recognised for the first time native title rights and interests in common law. Torres Strait Islanders now deal in substantial areas of land, and usually these lands are held through some form of communal title (Aboriginal Law Bulletin, 1992; Russell, 2005). However, the recognition by common law of native title rights has highlighted the difficulties of these arrangements. Indigenous communities own land under customary law as self-regulating communities with distinct rights but cannot, under current Australian statutes, organise their political structures in relation to this land. There are also substantial difficulties even in identifying the 'community' that might organise such structures (Scott and Mulrennan, 2010).

Paradiplomacy

The affirmation of subnational territorial identity and jurisdictional competence can only induce the elaboration of paradiplomatic relationships and thus reinforce the blurring of distinctions of status and privilege that were once at the core of international diplomatic practice. Paradiplomacy is the outreach of non-sovereign

jurisdictions to actors beyond their own borders (Bartmann, 2006). Such paradiplomacy has involved subnational governments setting up offices in Brussels (especially if located in Europe) or in other countries, within and outside the EU. The (ambiguously named) 21-member Overseas Countries and Territories Association (OCTA) is one such active lobby, set up by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (European Commission, 2005).

The Faroes. The Faroe Islands have been a ‘self-governing community within the Danish Realm’ since 1948; they have laid out a detailed ‘road map’ for eventual full independence. Meanwhile, they currently maintain four representative offices in Brussels, Copenhagen, London and Reykjavik, with full diplomatic status. These offices ‘are located within the Danish embassies and the Faroese diplomats are formally accredited to the respective host nations as Danish diplomats working with Faroese affairs’ (Isfeld, 2006). Moreover, since July 2005 the Faroese government has been able—on its own—to enter into negotiations and conclude treaties with other states and international organisations without previous consent from Denmark regarding all areas that are under the Faroese authorities (Thomassen, 2011). There are plans to open three more embassies, and there are various consular offices in Torshavn, the Faroese capital, Brazil and Italy (vice consulates) as well as Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom (consulates) (Faroes Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010).

Economic Sovereignty

In some instances, the largesse associated with economic opportunity has been shrewdly translated into political mileage. It is much easier to flex jurisdictional muscle when there are the finances required to back up or support any contemplated initiatives.

Shetland, Scotland. The Shetland Islands were initially quite ambivalent about the late-1960s discovery of North Sea Oil and the subsequent plans to turn Sullom Voe into a major oil terminal facility, now owned by a consortium including British Petroleum and Shell. Luckily, some shrewd policy-making secured exceptional jurisdictional capacity for the local government. The Zetland County Council Act approved in 1974 enabled the Shetland Island Council (SIC) to acquire land, become a port authority, set up companies and establish a reserve fund (Blackadder, 1998, pp. 109–110). These led to the SIC receiving in time substantial payments from the oil industry, and profits that were saved up in trust funds have been used to promote tourism, knitwear, local enterprise and development (Butler and Fennell, 1994; Baldacchino, 2005; Shetland Island Council, 2007). Although these trusts are theoretically independent charitable organisations, they actually permit the SIC to fund initiatives by proxy, circumventing UK and EU regulations that pertain to local government transactions. Almost 10% of the Shetland labour force works directly for the SIC (Grydehøj, 2008). It would be fair to claim that, today, the SIC is not only the wealthiest but also the most autonomous local council in the United Kingdom.

Strategy Games Imposed on the Small

The view from the larger, richer, patron is markedly different. From there, small sovereign states, or autonomous sub-units within the purview of the state, could be seen simply as troublesome upstarts, to be suffered and perhaps occasionally appeased; but, they could also be seen as objects of design, regulatory spaces that can be crafted and deliberately engineered by central governments (or their elites), eager to exploit these spaces as distinctly (and preferably discreetly) ‘managed’ zones for economic, commercial, military, or security-related activities in a globalised economy—perhaps to the chagrin or despair of any local inhabitants. Small jurisdictions, often islands surrounded by large swathes of ocean territory that they can hardly patrol or exploit, make also ripe and willing targets for soft and ‘politically correct’ imperialism. Key areas where such unequal arrangements have been secured to date regard: (1) reducing residency rights (at times to the extent of evicting whole civilian populations); (2) excising spaces as non-jurisdictions; and (3) creating spaces with specific regulatory frameworks, typically to facilitate certain kinds of trade and business. As with the previous section, examples are provided for each of these contested policy fields.

Contending with Residents on Geo-strategic Islands

Betermier (2004, p. 64) has suggested that metropolitan powers sometimes ‘choose to retain’ territories in line with strategic self-interest and military expediency. The situation is made easier when these metropolitan powers deal with small and island spaces as *tabulae rasae* and do not, in particular, have to contend with civilian residents and civil law obligations. A measure that improves the ability to use an island for military or other geo-strategic purposes is to depopulate it completely and/or engineer its exclusive habitation by military personnel. There are thus islands, and island enclaves, in the world today that are populated by only ‘non-residents’ who operate under military discipline.

Ascension. Private ownership of land has not been permitted on Ascension, a UKOT; all residents are housed in employers’ quarters. Ascension has been operated like a classic company town throughout its economic history. Consequently it has never had a permanently settled population; labour on the island has been subject to short-term contracts. This trend is expected to change over time, however, as some devolution processes continue. The UK Government has asserted that no inhabitant of Ascension Island has a ‘right to abode’: this is a point now in dispute by local council members, long-time employees and their family members, as noted in the local newspaper *The Islander*. With the 2003 Wideawake Agreement between the UK and the US, Wideawake Airfield on Ascension Island was opened to some civilian charter traffic. Previously, only military traffic had been permitted. The introduction of tax, the setting up of an electoral roll and the introduction of the right to vote led to ‘certain expectations’, which were, however, quickly dashed (*The Economist*, 2010). A frustrated island council resigned *en bloc* in 2006, its members claiming that they ‘have been used as pawns by HMG [Her Majesty’s Government] to legitimize a regime that is

questionable, discriminatory, dishonest and unfavourable to the taxpayers of this island' (*St Helena Independent*, 2007, p. 7; also see; Royle, 2004; Jones, 2009).

Legal Limbos

In relation to such threats as global terrorism and illegal migration, large states have looked at small, subnational island spaces with creative governance practices in mind, using them to hold detainees that they would rather not have on their own territory. The relative distance from the mainland means that island detainees are more difficult to reach; are better hidden from the media, human-rights watchdogs and the general public; and hindered in accessing judicial processes (Mountz, 2009, p. 11).

Lampedusa, Italy. The southernmost point of Italy, the island of Lampedusa (land area of 20 km²) is situated 205 km from the island region of Sicily (of which it forms part administratively) but just 113 km from Tunisia. It is now best known as a key entry point to Europe for impoverished illegal immigrants from Africa. Thousands have been attempting the dangerous crossing across the Mediterranean Sea; survivors located by the Italian coast guard have been held temporarily in a detention centre on Lampedusa prior to being transferred elsewhere in Italy for processing and especially for examining their case for asylum status (Green, 2006). In 2008, Italy ranked as the fourth-highest asylum host country in the industrialised world, trailing only the United States, Canada and France. In August of that same year, however, Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi externalised Italy's borders to Libya. Following a US\$5 billion deal with the Libyan government, the international waters between the two countries are more vigorously policed by joint naval patrols; many immigrants rescued at sea are often returned to Libya, contrary to international refugee rights. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has expressed 'mounting concern' about this practice, as with the state of the detention facilities on the island (e.g. France 24, 2009). The number of migrants attempting the Mediterranean voyage had fallen dramatically since this Italy–Libya pact came into force (Human Rights Watch, 2009), but has risen again following the 'Arab Spring' insurgencies in Tunisia and then Libya: over 20,000 landed in Lampedusa in the first quarter of 2011 (Vogel, 2011).

Manageable Havens at Arm's Length for Trading and Interacting with the World

Export Processing Zones (EPZs) are clear examples of designated areas into which companies can import raw materials or semi-finished goods, which they can then finish and export (e.g. Palan, 1998, p. 634). Their legal regimen usually includes relaxed labour and environmental laws, with preferential customs duties on selected import items, thus presenting an attractive proposition to foreign export-oriented capital. The EPZ becomes an enclave protected from the typically more stringent regulatory framework of the rest of the country: in some exceptional cases, and to prevent accusations of 'two weights, two measures', a whole island jurisdiction can transform itself into an EPZ, as Mauritius has done, with a thriving garment industry (e.g. World Bank, 1992).

Small states or other subnational spaces can be fenced for other purposes, though. One of the most common contemporary forms is offshore finance and gaming. Most offshore finance centres are located on small and island territories. An exceedingly low-tax environment—via low corporate taxes and business rates, generous capital allowances, absence of capital gains tax, wealth tax, capital transfer tax, inheritance tax, and death or estate duties, along with low personal income tax rates—goes a long way towards attracting both manufacturing and service industries (Baldacchino and Milne, 2000, p. 232), to the dismay of large continental countries, which complain that such strategies do not constitute ‘fair competition’.

Macau. The smaller special autonomous region of China, Macau, is now the world’s biggest casino centre, taking over from Las Vegas. This city state, originally an island archipelago now largely turned peninsula, has 18,428 persons per square kilometre, making it the most densely populated jurisdiction in the world. It also received no less than 25 million visitors in 2010 (Macau Business, 2011). The gaming, tourism and hospitality industry is estimated to contribute more than 50% of Macau’s GDP and 70% of Macau government revenue. Macau is also an offshore finance centre, a tax haven and a free port without foreign-exchange-control regimes. Gambling revenue in Macau soared 42% in 2011 to a record US\$33.48 billion: more than five times what analysts forecast for the Las Vegas Strip (O’Keeffe, 2012).

Seeking Full Sovereign Status

What is evident from these dynamics is that subnational units can target specific functions and powers, which they then seek to secure: *de facto*, *de jure* or any which way in between. Although always dependent on context, all the functions and powers typically associated with sovereignty have been up for negotiation; but this is not to neglect the drive and achievement of full independence from the equation. Admittedly, the drive by former colonies pressing for, and achieving, full sovereignty has stalled somewhat since Brunei Darussalam achieved its independence in 1984. Were it not for Kosovo, Montenegro and East Timor – and excluding the three Pacific ‘hybrid jurisdictions’ referred to earlier – the latest quarter-century would have seen no examples of small, newly independent states. Yet, there is no shortage of potential candidates: the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation still monitors 16 ‘non-self-governing territories’ (all but two—Gibraltar and Western Sahara—being islands). Various other territories have decided that they would prefer to retain some aspects of autonomy while remaining or seeking integration with their colonial power, rather than seek to secede from it, at times after holding independence referenda. Indeed, various subnational jurisdictions have secured a broader autonomy in recent decades. These range from Canada’s province of Québec (perhaps the most glaring example) to Dutch Curaçao and Sint Maartin (since 2010, ‘countries’ within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, such as Aruba); and from Denmark’s Faroe Islands and Greenland, to France’s Mayotte (since 2011, France’s 101st *département*) and South Korea’s Jeju. All these territories have benefited from a larger measure of self-government while remaining lodged within the purview of a larger, richer, metropolitan state.

Such autonomy is also more likely to be gained and secured where there are movements or political parties agitating for full independence in these subnational

territories. Québec has had two dramatic ‘independence referenda’ (in 1980 and 1995). In some cases, territories are bracing for eventual independence referenda (Bougainville, New Caledonia, Scotland) or may entertain fresh referenda for the same purpose (Tokelau, Nevis). There are independentist leaning parties or movements in such diverse locales as Åland, Bermuda, Bougainville, Corsica, Balearics/Catalonia, the Basque country, Faroes, French Polynesia, Greenland, Guam, Hawaii, Nevis, New Caledonia, Okinawa, Puerto Rico, Québec, Rodrigues, Sardinia, Scotland, Sicily, Taiwan, Tobago, Wales and Zanzibar (Baldacchino and Hepburn, 2012).

Such initiatives may appear surprising at a time when there are clear economic and security advantages in being associated with a larger, richer, metropolitan patron. For all its benefits, sovereignty may prove powerless in stemming fiscal collapse: Greece may be Iceland a case in point. Yet, strong arguments—cultural, fiscal, economic and political—in favour of full independence remain. Many can arise out of sheer frustration with existing autonomy arrangements. The presence and activities of independence-leaning political parties and movements can also contribute significantly to the successful negotiation and securing of even more generous measures of autonomy from (sometimes hesitant, sometimes accommodating, otherwise indifferent) metropolitan powers. Peoples with a distinct history and culture, often a distinct language—and often facilitated by islandness—can claim an equally distinct ethnic/national identity, which then develops into what are seen as rightful claims towards self-government or decolonisation, as supported by the international community. This awareness and mobilisation can be facilitated by the existence of autonomy arrangements that enable the territory to flex its capacity, and potential for even more self-government, as a political entity.

Yet, for the very same reasons, identifiable ethnic, cultural or linguistic minorities *within* subnational units can become concerned with and militate against movements towards secession. The aboriginal people of Northern Québec (primarily the Cree and the Inuit) both vehemently resisted the possibility of having the province break away from Canada, organising their own referenda on independence (where the independence option was heavily rejected). The Shetland Islands are not supportive of an independent Scotland; the citizens of the Marquesas are not keen on an independent French Polynesia; and the citizens of the island of Suduroy are the least keen on an independent Faroes. The presumed divisibility of potential new states can become a major political issue in itself, liable to be exploited by the federalist camp. Unlike small and single island territories, sprawling archipelagos (just like large continental masses) are more likely to harbour a divergence of sentiments and views on the attraction or otherwise of full independence (e.g. Royle, 2001, *passim*). Such episodes have been played out in places such as Anguilla (which refused independence as part of St-Kitts and Nevis and remains a UKOT) and Tuvalu (which refused independence as part of larger Kiribati, and secured its own independence).

Special Jurisdictional Windows

Cameron (2010) does well to argue that, from the 16th to the 20th century, the political map of the world became increasingly consolidated and cluttered, full of

state spaces constituted as interiors; but, more recently, a new suite of spaces—extra-legal, fictive, excised, offshore—have been engineered, leading to tense debates as to whether they signify ‘the end of sovereignty’ (Camilleri and Falk, 1992) or rather, as this paper argues, the latest reincarnation of state power. Small territories—whether sovereign states or autonomous subnational/non-sovereign jurisdictions—comprise a constituency that allows a fairly clear exploration of these contemporary dynamics in search of ‘xenotopia’ (Cameron, 2010), or special jurisdictional windows bent on escaping regulation and convention (Prasad, 2004). Their size and associated islandness often gives them significant leverage and ‘room for manoeuvre’. We should not be surprised that the island republic of Utopia, Thomas More’s pioneering and quintessential special place, soon to celebrate its 500th anniversary, was itself ‘constructed’ out of a peninsula (More, 1516).

If the ultimate task of governments is to secure ‘the welfare of the population’ (Foucault, 1991a, p. 100), then the task at hand includes the inculcation of suitable desires, the configuration of the right beliefs; in short, ‘the right manner of disposing things’ (Foucault, 1991a, p. 95). This invisible hand of state rationality, or ‘governmental management’ (Elden, 2007, p. 30), is expansive; the ‘multiform tactics’ (*ibid.*) required to achieve this main goal know no bounds. While discipline needs to, and can only, be applied intra-territorially (in prisons, schools, hospitals), security necessitates bold extra-territorial adventures, especially for increasingly smaller states and territories.

Conclusion

This paper has taken its cue from Foucault’s concept of governmentality as a ‘strategy game’, looking at the ways in which small territories are playing out their international relations, especially with respect to either one particular, larger and richer country (typically, their current or former colonial power) or the federal entities of which they currently, willy-nilly, form part. The existence of an extra-territorial body and third party—such as the European Union—provides an additional layer to these interventionist ‘technologies’ (Murray Li, 2007, p. 276), as both sides use these tools to leverage and enhance their own negotiating position. Small states and territories are, in this context, both victims and actors of these ‘procedures, techniques and methods’ (Foucault, 1991b, p. 75). Their presumed ‘have or have not’ sovereign status masks a more complex scenario where specific capacities of government can be sought, and then defended and locked in constitutionally once obtained (by the small player); or else selectively and deliberately applied or withdrawn (by the larger player). Different spaces are thus constituted as policy fields, and different agents and target groups assembled as amenable to being ‘worked on’. Thus, even a mini-jurisdiction such as Pitcairn can survive, mainly by its successful claims and overtures—what Foucault would define as ‘bio-politics’—to British taxpayers, American stamp collectors and Filipino sailors: ‘the only cash economy of Pitcairn is the sale of stamps and the sale of handicrafts to passing ships’ (Ridgell, 1995, p. 149).

From these technologies of power, one jurisdiction could benefit; but, another could lose: there is no respect for territorial boundaries, national loyalties, or citizenship claims in these dynamics. In so privileging the smart resourcefulness of jurisdiction, autonomy and canny flexibility, small states and territories today play

out and expose a crisis of government in the context of the current ideological predominance, or ‘harmony’, of neo-liberalism (Lemke, 2001, p. 203). No wonder governmentality is all the rage.

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