# TRADE UNIONS IN THE MALTESE PRIVATE SECTOR

# Godfrey Baldacchino\*

**Abstract.** This paper builds a statistical profile of trade union density in the Maltese private sector. Its intention is to document the differing levels of union representation in the different sub-sectors of the Maltese economy. Only 200 firms, employing a third of full-time employees in the private sector were covered by a collective agreement in Spring 1995. Were it not for one partially privatised bank, two dozen hotels, some church and private schools and storage facilities, trade union presence in the local tertiary sector would have remained insignificant. In certain sub-sectors — real estate, personal sources, insurance — no collective agreement is currently in force. Some of the implications of these observations for labour and trade union policy are assessed.

### The Setting

A few metres' stretch of road down South Street, Valletta may be even a more important site for local labour policy formulation than the National Economic Development Council, Parliament or the Cabinet of Ministers. Literally within a stone's throw of each other lie the headquarters of the

Acknowledgements. The research questions which led to the writing of this paper were initially inspired by discussions carried out with participants following a Diploma course in Labour Studies at the University of Malta, to whom I delivered a credit course on 'Current Issues in Labour Relations' in spring 1995. Special thanks in particular to Dip.L.S. participants Francis Darmanin, Mario Falzon, Helen Mallia, Ivan Spiteri and Joseph Vella who carried out independent research and data collection on this subject. The Department of Labour, the Employment and Training Corporation, the General Workers' Union and the Unjon Haddiema Maghqudin kindly acceded to my appeal for collaboration and patiently made available the information requested. My sincere appreciation goes to Lino Cilia Debono, Director of Labour; Angelo Fenech, GWU Secretary General; Joe Fino, GWU Research & Education Officer; Robert Laurenti, ETC Chief Executive, Maurice Agius, UHM General Secretary and Gaetano Tanti, UHM Assistant General Secretary. Special thanks to Edwin Camilleri, ETC Labour Market Research Senior Executive, for handling the main statistical manipulations.

<sup>\*</sup> Dr Godfrey Baldacchino is Research Officer at the Workers' Participation Development Centre and Lecturer in Labour Relations at the University of Malta.

Confederation of Maltese Trade Unions (CMTU), the General Workers' Union (GWU), the Malta Employers' Association (MEA) and the Ministry of Finance, responsible for industrial relations. This rubbing of shoulders is no mere geographical coincidence. It is indicative of the pivotal role of social partnership in Malta, and an important barometer of a pluralist, democratic society.

The representation of employees within labour (or trade) union organisations in Malta has been described as impressive. Labour, the one and only readily available source of wealth creation in this small island state. is referred to as a significant lobby behind the union banner (Baldacchino, 1994: 574-5). For over half a century now, local trade unions continue to be respected as rightful participants in fora debating economic policy; they remain active protagonists of social, economic and political life, involved at different levels in decision making, from routine individual representation in dispute handling, to macro-economic development strategies. Except for a freak year in the mid-1970s, trade union membership figures in Malta have always increased from one year to the next. This is no doubt in part a function of an expanding labour force and of controlled unemployment levels; but to these must be added the legitimacy of membership and the pressures which exist to incentivise the adhesion by workers to a particular trade union. Among the latter, one must mention the rivalry between the two main political parties from which trade unions have benefited in terms of increased membership figures. The status of local trade unions as social movements is also reflected in their involvement in beyond-work issues (inflation, housing, education, taxation) as well as in their appeal to non-worker categories, particularly pensioners. The weighty presence of trade unions in Malta is succinctly evidenced in the observation that more than 20% of the current gross Maltese population are registered as trade union members.

Providing a more discriminatory analysis of the strength, infiltration and evolution of trade unions in different aspects of the Maltese economy is apparently both an unpopular and difficult venture. Unpopular, because only a handful of such analyses have been carried out and made available in the public domain (Attard, 1984; Baldacchino, 1990; Grixti, 1994); this in spite of the availability of updated trade union and employer association membership statistics, published every year, around November, in the Government Gazette by the Director of Labour, as

obliged by the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act (IRA) of 1976. Difficult because any attempt at contextualising published trade union statistical data in the wider economic framework is bound to run into problems of obtaining other necessary quantitative data. Such information may exist but be classified (for some mysterious reason) as confidential, or is otherwise incomplete and therefore faulty.

This paper builds the first ever statistical profile of trade union density in the Maltese private sector. Its intention is to document the differing levels of union representation (and indirectly of union affiliation) in the different sectors of the Maltese economy. The implications of this condition for labour and trade union policy are assessed.

#### The Context

This exercise is carried out at a time when the Conditions of Employment (Regulation) Act of 1952 (CERA) is going through some badly needed revisions, in anticipation of a white paper. The relevance of such a piece of legislation may be undervalued, if the basic and minimum conditions of work it establishes are superseded by other provisions. Among the latter, the most frequently accepted technique - although not recognised in the 1952 Act - is the collective agreement, a contract entered into by representatives of workers and owners establishing, after negotiation, various conditions of work for a definite time period, these conditions typically covering all full-time employees at a particular enterprise.

Were all employees in Malta covered by the provision of collective agreements, then such legislation as CERA would have a mainly symbolic value. It would set out the minimum tolerated conditions, these serving as the absolute bottom line for any negotiation round. In contrast, the provisions of the law become vital in establishing conditions, given the absence of any other, ulterior arrangement. In different words, the salience and impact of a revamped CERA would serve as the only set of principles setting out vacation leave, pregnancy leave, disciplinary procedures, terminal benefits, duration of probation, etc., for all those employees who are not covered by a collective agreement. How many such workers are there in Malta today?

## **Trade Union Representation**

Published trade union statistics do not reveal the extent to which employees in Malta are covered by collective agreements. Nor is there a simple and neat relationship between trade union membership and coverage by a collective agreement. The IRA demands that collective agreements can only be entered into by trade unions on behalf of workers; and to do so, such unions must command majority representation (50% + 1) of either the total labour force of an enterprise or (as is becoming more acceptable of late) of a recognised, naturally distinct, work section within that same enterprise (Baldacchino, 1995).

This leads to three diverse considerations. Firstly, an enterprise may have a number of unionised employees but not enough are unionised to enable their trade union to negotiate on their behalf. If, say, only 45% of employees in an enterprise are unionised, then there is no basis to initiate the negotiations leading eventually to a collective agreement. In contrast, the unionisation of 50% + 1 of a firm's employees in a particular trade union is enough to enable this same union to start negotiations on behalf of al1 the employees of that firm, including those who are members of no union or even of a different union.

Secondly, and given the strictures explained above, the right of trade unions to bargain on behalf of a particular workforce may at times only be secured if at least two unions present a claim for joint majority representation. Enterprise management may accept a common trade union front as its bargaining partner in situations where each union individually does not command majority representation but where both together do. The arrangement also avoids damaging and spiteful interunion rivalry from which enterprise management may be the only one to benefit on a divide and rule basis. This technique has led to joint collective agreements by the General Workers' Union (GWU) and the Unjon Haddiema Maghqudin (UHM) at Frey, Meditex and Medical Hospital Products; it has also served as the basis for negotiations in the context of the mammoth public service pay reform exercise of recent years.

Thirdly, it is also possible for more than one collective agreement to be concurrently in force within the same enterprise. There is a sizable minority of firms in Malta today where different sections of the labour

force are represented by different trade unions in their dealings with management, and each of these unions commands the necessary (50% + 1) membership on the basis of a sectoral work grouping. The two most common bases for establishing such distinction between work groupings are (a) the industrial versus non-industrial grades; and (b) the professional-salaried versus the line-waged grades. Worksites where such situations exist include Air Malta, Brandstatter, Central Bank, Farsons, Malta Freeport, the Malta Maritime Authority and Mid-Med Bank.

## **Collective Agreements in Force**

There is unfortunately no readily available source of information about the number of extant collective agreements in Malta. A copy of every new collective agreement, or its renewal, amendment or extension, is meant to be deposited and registered with the Department of Labour; but this provision is apparently not being scrupulously observed or enforced. Research carried out at the Department in Spring 1995 has identified 181 entries over the period July 1991 to January 1995. But a cursory look at this listing reveals that the collective agreements impacting on the conditions of work of at least 9,000 other full-time employees were not registered.

A more tortuous route was therefore adopted. The assistance of the respective senior officials of Malta's two general trade union organisations, the General Workers' Union (GWU) and the Unjon Haddiema Maghqudin (UHM) was solicited in June 1995. They kindly provided a comprehensive listing of those employers and firms with whom they had collective agreements in force. To these were added those few other collective agreements entered into by the remaining trade unions.

There are approximately 200 private sector enterprises where collective agreements were in force in the Maltese private sector as at Spring 1995. From the records made available, 158 collective agreements in force in the private sector have been entered into by the GWU; 42 by the UHM; and some 12 others by all the remaining unions, of which there were 36 as at June 1994. 60% (that is, 120) of collective agreements concern enterprises operating in manufacturing; the remaining 40% (that is, 80) involve firms operating in the services sector. That the number of

collective agreements (212) is marginally greater than the number of affected enterprises (200) is due to the observation that more than one collective agreement may be in force in the same enterprise.

Note also that, as at the end of May 1995, there were 6,740 private firms with employees, on a full time or part time basis, registered with the ETC. Only 200 of these employing units - less than 3% of the total - have collective agreements in force.

## **Sectoral Spread of Collective Agreements**

The next research question dealt with the distribution of such collective agreements in private industry. The idea was to identify whether the density of collective agreements in the private sector was at all an even affair and, if not (which was likely), which sectors exhibited higher or lower than average propensities towards collective agreement procedures. This discriminatory analysis should then permit a discussion on the reasons behind the extent and spread of such a condition.

To carry out this task, an updated breakdown of registered employees in Malta by economic sector was necessary. The assistance of the Employment & Training Corporation (ETC) was requested and obtained. The listings of 200 firms and employers where collective agreements are in force were broken down into the economic sub-sectors used by the ETC in compiling its national labour market database. The total number of employees in these enterprises by sector was provided, along with the corresponding total number of full-time employees in the unionised firms per sector.

Such a technique allows the derivation of cumulative results without exposing details of individual firms. The intention of the exercise is not, after all, to expose statistics pertaining to individual employers but to identify trends.

#### **General Results**

The general results indicate the extent of firms entering into collective

Table 1 Trade Union Infiltration						
Sector	Total F/T Employees*	F/T Employees covered by collective agreements	%			
Primary Secondary Tertiary	1,002 31,818 34,440		0.0% 45.0% 22.7%			
Total	67,260	22,128	32.9%			

<sup>\*</sup> Figures in this column must be added to the number of self-employed to match the official employment statistics published on a monthly basis by the Central Office of Statistics. As at March 1995, there were 2,647 self-employed in the primary sector, 4,055 self-employed in the secondary sector (including construction) and 9,535 in the tertiary sector. Adding these equals 16,237 self-employed. Together with 67,260 employees, the total labour force in these three categories reaches therefore the figure of 83,497. This is exactly equal to the official figure of 81,981, plus 1,516 Bank of Valletta employees not yet transferred to the private sector employment category.

agreements in the private sector. This is an indirect reflection of the strength and legitimacy of trade unionism in these sectors of the economy, since a collective agreement becomes likely once a trade union manages to achieve 50% + 1 representation of workers in a particular enterprise.

Table 1 provides a general overview of this indicator of trade union infiltration with regards to the three broad general sectors of the economy: the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors:

The most important observation is that just less than one third of full-time employees working in the Maltese private sector in Spring 1995 were covered by the provisions of a collective agreement. This percentage practically matches Grixti's (1994) estimate of the unionisation rate within the private sector.

Secondly, there are distinct sectoral differences in the spread of collective agreements in force. The primary sector (comprising agriculture, fisheries, stone quarrying and oil drilling) is practically trade union free. The

Table 2 Collective Agreements in Manufacturing Industry Sector							
Sub-Sector (& ETC Code)	Total full time employee (FTEs)	FTEs es covered by collective agreements	No. of firms involved	% FTEs			
200: Food	2,870	1,091	18	38.0			
210/220: Beverages/Tobacco	1,340	$1,\!247$	8	93.1			
230: Textiles	1,066	785	4	73.6			
240: Footwear/Clothing	5,186	2,971	26	57.3			
250/260: Furniture/Wood/Fixtu	res $2,036$	235	2	11.5			
270/280: Paper/Printing	1,783	958	10	53.7			
290/300: Rubber/Leather	1,306	1,041	4	79.7			
310/330: Chemicals/Non-Meta	als 2,669	505	8	18.9			
350: Metal Products	$1,\!234$	286	8	23.2			
360/370: Machinery/Applianc	es $4,675$	3,310	20	70.8			
380: Transport Equipment	1,676	224	5	13.4			
390: Misc. manufacturing	2,443	1,637	6	67.0			
400: Construction	3,532	15	1	0.4			
Total	31,818	14,305	120	45.0			

secondary sector (comprising manufacturing and construction) has the strongest density of collective agreements in force, with almost half of full-time employees covered by such provision. The tertiary (services) sector bears a low trade union presence, with just over a fifth of full-time employees benefiting from collective agreements.

#### **Intra-Sectoral Differences**

The Secondary Sector

Manufacturing industry is the historical cradle of organised trade unionism; but the industry has its own internal diversity of characteristics, some of which act to intensify, and others to diffuse, the orientation

Table 3 Collective Agreements in the Services Sector								
Sub-Sector (&ETC Code)	Total full time employee (FTEs)	FTEs es covered by collective agreements		% FTEs				
610: Wholesale/Retail Trades	10,351	616	14	5.9				
620: Banking/Finance	1,695	1,616	2	95.3				
630: Insurance	651	0	0	0				
640: Real Estate	883	0	0	0				
710: Transport	4,018	181	5	4.5				
720/730 Storage/Communication	a 205	142	5	69.3				
820: Community/Business	6,674	2,055	21	30.8				
830/840: Hotels/Catering/Recreation 8,739		3,213	33	36.8				
850: Other Personal Services	1,324	0	0	0				
Total	34,440	7,823	80	22.7				

towards trade union membership. The detail of the extent of collective agreements within manufacturing and construction is tabulated in Table 2.

## The Tertiary Sector

A similar exercise can be carried out with respect to the tertiary (services) sector of the economy, where the bulk of private sector employment is currently located. The breakdown by sub-sector is tabulated in Table 3 above.

## Commentary

Clearly, the level of trade union infiltration in both manufacturing and services in the local labour market is highly uneven and some striking observations can be made once the data is disaggregated as in tables 2 and 3 above.

Starting with manufacturing, employees in the beverages, tobacco, machinery, rubber and leather sub-sectors enjoy the highest level of union protection on the basis of collective agreements. Two-thirds or more of full-time employees in these sub-sectors have collective agreements in force. Employees in textiles, footwear, clothing, printing and paper occupy a middle-ground, where just over 50% on average of full-time employees have conditions of work secured on the basis of union-management negotiation. At the other end of the scale, it is furniture, wood and transport equipment which are amongst the least represented; but the construction industry proves itself as virtually trade union free.

Turning to the tertiary sector, the only, exceptionally strong sector of union representation is that of banking and finance. This condition is explained mainly by the presence of the Bank of Valletta (BOV), an institution with extant collective agreements and which has joined the private sector only following its partial privatisation in March 1995. BOV full-time employees now constitute 20% of total private tertiary sector employees covered by a collective agreement. Without BOV, trade union coverage as measured by collective agreements in the local services sector would be only 18.9%.

Otherwise, were it not for two dozen hotels, some church and private schools and storage facilities, trade union presence in the local tertiary sector remains insignificant. In certain sub-sectors - real estate, personal services, insurance - *no* collective agreement is currently in force.

#### **Discussion**

After the description, some analysis is in order. How can one explain these internal differences within the various economic sub-sectors? Why is there such a large distinction in terms of trade union membership and mobilisation between the private and public sectors? After all, the unionisation rate within the public and parastatal sectors in Malta today stands at around 90% (Grixti, 1994); and practically all full-time state employees are covered by collective agreements.

The reasons are various, and it is possible to draw upon international comparative studies in order to suggest valid explanations for the extent of

trade union mobilisation in the local private sector and its ramifications.

Scale of operation: The larger the workforce, the greater the likelihood of the emergence of trade union consciousness. This is also a function of the propensity towards active attempts at unionisation by union organisers. This is one of the reasons why mass machino-facture in factory units is an economic policy which will naturally spawn trade union consciousness. Paternalistic Management: This is a corollary to (a) above; the smaller the scale of operations, the more likely that labour-management relationships will be dominated by person-specific criteria of loyalty, allegiance and commitment to the firm and/or to the 'boss'. There will be difficulty to differentiate between ownership and control, given that the owner, general manager and the employer could easily be one and the same person. Trade unions are considered alien to such an 'extended family' culture and attempts at union membership can be construed as acts of defiance or of disloyalty, leading to discriminatory treatment. Such employer strategies may be real or imagined, but even if they never really occur, the (false) impression that they could is enough to dissuade or frighten employees away from anything trade unionistic. This is especially so if one's employment situation is somewhat precarious (e.g. on a part-time basis, or without a written contract, or operating on a shady, semi-legal or illegal basis - say, without a proper work book or work permit). We must remember here that:

"Malta is a small economy, in which the great majority (more than 75%) of its industrial companies employ fewer than five people. Of the 2,300 companies registered, only 61 (less than 3%) employ more than 100 staff and only 12 more than 300".

(Coopers and Lybrand 1991, Appendix A1).

Gender Differences: For a variety of reasons, (largely short term work horizons, operation in more precarious jobs, preference for part-time work) female employees are less disposed to join trade unions than their male counterparts. The feminisation of the Maltese workplace and the upturn in 'pink collar' employees may spell a further erosion in local trade union membership levels.

Family Business: The ultimate form of person specificity and loyalty to the boss or firm is the engagement of family labour, with next of kin being registered as employees. In these situations, very common in Maltese small enterprises, the disposition to consider trade union membership is negligible; it amounts to a breach of privacy and the intrusion of 'aliens' in internal affairs.

Human Resource Management Strategies: Alarming to trade unions should be the fact that today in Malta there are relatively large enterprises who engage professional managers and whose employees - not blood related - demonstrate no particular enthusiasm to affiliate in a trade union and eventually seek to clinch a collective agreement. HRM could effectively act as an alternative to trade union affiliation if management adopts an 'open door' policy and seriously considers worker grievances on both an individual or collective level. It remains up to trade unions to seek to impress on employees in such enterprises that trade union membership is still an important and relevant option.

Extent of exploitation: Social inequality and social justice in industrialised economies is today more a matter of (ideological and cultural) domination than sheer economic exploitation. Decent levels of remuneration, welfarism and labour legislation have produced affluent workers whose quality of life, paradoxically, is often historically to the credit of trade union activity. The soul-less capitalist fleecing employees out of every ounce of strength in 'dark satanic mills' may be, for many employees, a funny caricature of the past. These conditions reduce the disposition to join trade unions (Baldacchino, 1991).

Tertiarisation of the economy: This disposition is even further reduced in the services sector. With reduced levels of technological pace and control, larger levels of employee discretion obtain in the services industry. There are real niches of employee empowerment, necessitated by the imperative to serve and satisfy a discerning client in real time.

#### Limitations

Numbers have a habit of inspiring authoritative respect and scientific mathematical manipulations may just as well act to mesmerise readers into accepting arguments as facts. I am only too much aware of these temptations, and would rather openly and self-critically declare some of the weaknesses of the approach to which I have resorted.

The basis of trade union affiliation: Trade unions are defined by law as associations consisting wholly or mainly of workers. Hence union membership may include non-workers, contract employees and certainly part-timers. No such considerations have been made in this essay where figures are limited strictly to those of full-time employees. Statistics concerning part-time employment remain fairly dubious in Malta; and part-time workers show a lower readiness towards joining trade unions. Still, certain employers accept or insist on incorporating the conditions of non-full time employees in the provisions of collective agreements.

The status of the Maltese private sector: The long arm of the state is everywhere in the Maltese economy. There is no clear distinction between what is private and public in Malta. Only those firms having no or minority public or parastatal shareholding have been included in this paper's analysis. But companies own companies and are owned by others; hence a neat distinction between where the public stops and the private begins is not a realistic concept.

The time basis of this study: ETC data relates to March 1995; while trade union collective agreements in force relate to June 1995. There may be some slight difference between these two populations.

Overall these limitations, while real, are not likely to severely distort or weaken the analysis and its main arguments; although readers are invited to be the better judges of this.

## Conclusion

Therefore, there is clearly no room for complacency on the status of contemporary trade unionism in Malta. In spite of ranking among the top ten unionised workforces of the world, for Maltese workers unionism remains mainly a localised, public sector phenomenon (Baldacchino, 1990; 1993; Grixti, 1994). Some 45,000 full-time employees - one-third of the total gainfully occupied population - still effectively depend on CERA to define and formulate their basic working conditions.

If one may permit a level-headed look into the future, current trends would suggest that the level of trade unionism in the private sector could

contract further. This if employment levels in the manufacturing sector continue to drop, employment in the services sector continues to increase, while the attraction of non-stable working conditions - subcontracting, part-time working, piece rates - also builds up momentum.

It would be interesting to return to this theme say, in 10 years time, and identify any trends on the basis of a comparative quantitative study. Such research has been undertaken abroad (e.g. Brown 1993). Possibly, by that time, trade union organisations, particularly the two local general trade unions, the GWU and the UHM, would have carried out an evaluation of their recruitment and representation strategies. On the basis of this exercise, they may seek to revise the manner in which they seek to recruit new members; or in which they provide support, defence and representation services to their worker members.

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