The Capacity for Sub-National Island Jurisdictions to Increase Autonomy: The Example of Prince Edward Island

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Introduction

This paper will attempt to explain how the Canadian Province of Prince Edward Island (PEI) can better use its jurisdictional capacity in relation to the policy area of jurisdictional autonomy. First of all, it is important to define what is meant by jurisdictional capacity and jurisdictional autonomy. Capacity refers to the ability to do something whereas autonomy refers to the ability to act alone or without interference or help from another power. Both concepts are important for the Sub-National Island Jurisdictions (SNIJs) of the international community. All jurisdictions, SNIJ or otherwise, have the capacity to act but are also affected by other entities. Sovereign jurisdictions have the most power to act alone, but many work with other entities to achieve goals across a spectrum ranging in diversity from North Korea to EU member states (Bartmann, 2000; Connell, 1993; Hache, 2001). A SNIJ’s pursuit of autonomy may relate to the goals its citizens have for the SNIJ society; it may not have an interest in a great amount of autonomy, or it may require autonomy to act in key policy areas in order to achieve certain aims (Kersell, 1992; Lim, 1997; Locke & Tomblin, 2003). Its capacity to act may help it to achieve autonomy in these areas which will lead to the achievement of its societal goals.

Prince Edward Island joined the federal nation of Canada in 1873, becoming its seventh province. The territories that made Canada had themselves been sub-national jurisdictions evolving from dependent colonies by acquiring aspects of jurisdictional autonomy from the parent state, Great Britain, over time. By uniting together into a federation, they replaced the parent state with a federal government and were able to continue the transition toward full sovereignty. The advantage of federalism was that it allowed the colonies to negotiate with each other the terms of the union. Of course, any negotiation involves bargaining, and PEI, like all the Canadian provinces, gave up certain parts of its (albeit limited) independence, but maintained authority in other areas of its society. The main characteristic of federalism is the dual affinity a citizen must acquire to both the federal state and the sub-national political unit.
The story of PEI’s relationship to the Canadian federation is fascinating for students of Canadian history. From an Island Studies perspective, it is an intriguing tale involving colonialism, development, remoteness, isolation, identity, linkage, peripherality and dependence. Since cutting the colonial cord to Great Britain and connecting to the Canadian federation, PEI has benefited from giving parts of its powers to act to the federal government and has been deeply affected by the actions of the federal government. Its dependence is now profound — some 30% of PEI’s revenue is funded directly by the federal government (Province of Prince Edward Island, 2005) — so that its viability as a jurisdiction, without the support of the federal government, is in question. This level of dependency may be eroding PEI’s ability to operate autonomously in those areas where it has autonomy, as well as its confidence in operating as an equal and separate sub-national jurisdictional component of Canada. Ultimately, its identity as a unique and separate place may be at stake. By reviewing the situations of other SNIJs around the world, PEI may be able to learn lessons about its autonomy and capacity.

Definitions

Sub-National Island Jurisdiction: A territory existing in whole or in part on an island or group of islands that has not been recognized by the international community as a sovereign state, but has the capacity to govern some or all of its affairs without formal deference to any other jurisdictions.

Jurisdiction: (1) A political unit usually associated with a territory. (2) The extent or area within which a government acts.

Autonomy: The power, right or ability of a government to act of its sole volition without formal constraints within or on behalf of its jurisdiction.

Capacity: The ability or the extent of a government’s ability to govern affairs within or on behalf of its jurisdiction, often in relation to specific policy areas.

Federalism: A system of government that uses at least two levels of authority.

Branches of Government

It is important to gain an understanding of what political capacities a Sub-National Island Jurisdiction (SNIJ) has at its disposal. It is important to ascertain where the concepts of autonomy and capacity overlap, and why it is possible to have capacity in the policy area of autonomy. To do all of that involves understanding the components that make up governmental
authority and looking at the many forms of governmental authority in the sub-national realm.

In political science, it is generally agreed that, even considering the many democratic and non-democratic forms known, there are three functions or branches of government. These are Legislative, Executive and Judicial. The first relates to the creation of laws; the second to the carrying out of action within these laws, and the third to the interpretation of the laws and the interpretation of the actions in relation to the laws. A nation-state has complete autonomous authority to design, develop and alter these functions of state within its borders without input from any external body. This is known as sovereignty. While a nation-state has full sovereignty, a SNJJ lacks a measure of authority over one or more aspects of one or more of the three branches of government, deferring to a national power with which it has affiliation. Even while it lacks a measure of authority in one way or more, it possesses a measure of authority in one or more other areas of government.

PEI has capacity in the three branches of government — legislative, executive and judicial. For the most part, these powers are shared with the national or Federal government of Canada. In some aspects, though, PEI can act exclusively, and in others, it cannot act at all. If we assume that PEI has certain aims and requires autonomous authority in some policy areas to get to these ends, what capacities of the three branches of government can it use? Is it using its full range of powers? Can PEI learn from other, similar, SNJJJs about how best to use its capacities? Looking at other SNJJJs should help determine if SNJJJs can be categorized and in what category PEI fits.

Categories of Sub-National Island Jurisdictions (SNJJJs)

A trait of SNJJJs relates to their role in the metropolitan state government. Some SNJJJs merely function as an administrative unit whose scope is outlined by a higher power. Others have a full range of legislative, executive and judicial powers except, say, national defence or foreign affairs, but have no formal representation in the national government. And yet others have capacities in all functions of government and also a say in the national government. This is known as federalism. PEI is a part of the Canadian federation, and there are many other island examples of this form of government.

By categorizing SNJJJs, better comparisons might be possible. From good comparative cases, better lessons for PEI can be learned. PEI has unique economic and political capacities; discerning where it fits into
the pantheon of existing sub-national forms of autonomy will assist it in assessing and accessing its full range of jurisdictional authority.

I differentiate my SNIJ categories from those listed by Ronald Watts (Watts, 2000). One reason I argue for doing this is that his categories are general to all types of jurisdictions of the World and not specifically island-based. While Watts’ categories are very useful, my main interest is highlighting SNIJs that have capacities in the three areas of government and using these to compare to PEI. Watts’ categories are useful in categorizing PEI as a unit of a federal state but I wonder if this is too limited to the political (i.e. legislative & executive) realm and discounts the capacities involved in the judicial branch. Moreover, while the ideas of shared capacities are interesting, I think abilities to act on some settings in concert or at the same time that another actor is acting in the same setting is far different than the ability to act alone or autonomously.

Watts (and subsequently Baldacchino and Milne, 2006) discusses a taxonomy of six varieties of sub-national manifestation: Unions, Constitutionally Decentralized Unions, Federations, Confederations, Federacies and Associated States. He counts twenty island-states within sovereign federations, ten in federacy relationships, eighteen that have some form of home rule and three that are associated states of larger sovereign nations. It is interesting to note, though, the high number of islands involved in non-unitary states. These federal or federal-type polities emerged as a political method of bringing together divergent groups or regions within one territory. By creating two or more levels of government, geographic (or other) cleavages could be overcome. The federal structure provided the necessary balance that bridged the cleavages with a national government but allowed some autonomy in the local jurisdictions.

Both the Watts and the Baldacchino & Milne taxonomies work satisfactorily to describe the various kinds of affiliations that are possible for sub-national relationships, whether federal or quasi-federal, and my recapitulating them would neither advance an understanding of these various forms nor advance what PEI can learn from other SNIJs. Suffice it to say that there are differences among the types, and it is my own contention that PEI can best learn from others within its own type. Watts lists Tierra del Fuego/Argentina, Tasmania/Australia, Newfoundland/Canada, PEI/Canada, Hawaii/USA, Balearics/Spain, Canaries/Spain, Nevis/St. Kitts, Comoros, Malaysia and Micronesia as the examples of island-states in federations.

In thinking about the best way to compare PEI among SNIJs, I think it is useful to draw a further distinction between island federations and
islands that are in federations because there is a difference between relating as islands to each other and relating as islands to a mainland power; islands share a geographical commonality but islands and mainlands do not. Many island nations (whether fully sovereign or not) are archipelagoes. Although the system of government of these archipelagoes is systemically similar to mainland federal states like the United States, the fact of their islandness, or indeed, their archipelagic nature, creates significant differences in the way that the federal state can operate, particularly in the area of public administration and the delivery of public services (Wettenhall, 1992). In other words, federal states that are composed of only islands are different from federal states that are composed of only or mostly mainland units. We can thus whittle Watts’ list down to Tierra del Fuego, Tasmania, Newfoundland, PEI, Hawaii, Balearics, Canaries and Malaysia. It could be further argued that Tierra del Fuego (as it is an island divided between Chile and Argentina), Newfoundland (as it is a jurisdiction composed of an island and a mainland area), and Sabah and Sarawak, the two island-based provinces of Malaysia (as they occupy only a portion of the island of Borneo), also make for poor comparisons to PEI. In short, I think the best comparisons for PEI are the exclusively island jurisdictions that are subordinate to a mainland federal power.

A more important distinction between the type of SNIJ PEI is and other kinds of SNIJs relates to capacities around the three branches of government mentioned above. Most political jurisdictions, whether island based or not, have some capacity to act; this is almost the very qualification that makes them jurisdictions. Any kind of municipality or county has the ability to administer or act in certain areas, and, generally speaking, this is under the Executive branch of government. However, executive powers do not necessarily correlate to any legislative powers in a jurisdiction. Some administrations or executive branches are answerable to authority outside the jurisdiction. On the other hand, some are responsible to legislative authority within the jurisdiction which gives the jurisdiction the decision-making ability over what it will administer and how. Thus, we have already divided the world’s islands into those that can make decisions and those that can merely carry out instructions. The Jurisdiction Project has made a choice that it is concerned with island jurisdictions and autonomy. Those places that have only executive powers have no autonomy whereas those that have legislative authority have, in varying forms and degrees, some autonomy. SNIJs that have both executive and legislative powers are sometimes referred to as possessing “self-government”.

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Prior to the idea of self-government, there arose the notion of “responsible government” toward the end of the colonial era. Colonies themselves were a form of sub-national jurisdiction, and responsible government was a method to make colonial governments more accountable to the residents of the colony rather than to the metropolitan power. This had the consequent effect of giving such colonies more independence from the parent-state. The Dominion of Canada itself is an example of a colony that, beginning with the attainment of responsible government, over its history became more independent from its colonial parent, culminating in complete substantial and symbolic sovereignty in 1982 with the repatriation of its constitution. PEI was also involved in this process. Interestingly, the progress toward full sovereignty was accompanied by a progressive increase in democratic rights. It could be argued, then, that, as far as they are responsible to their internal constituencies rather than to a parent-state, SNIJs that possess more autonomy are more democratic than those that do not. If this is so, then that gives the actions of the more autonomous island governments in the area of legislative and executive power a considerable amount of credibility and legitimacy, especially compared to less autonomous (less democratic) SNIJs. Interestingly, many of the most autonomous SNIJs have exercised the democratic choice not to secure full sovereignty.

Existing (at least in theory) outside the political realm of the other two branches of government, the third branch, the judiciary, is perhaps the least understood aspect in relation to SNIJs. If a jurisdiction has an internal judicial branch along with executive and legislative powers, it can not only administer and decide on its own affairs but it can interpret the appropriateness of its own actions for itself. In many SNIJs, the judiciary interprets and applies laws from the metropolitan power. In the case of some others, including PEI, the judiciary also applies and interprets laws that are homegrown and intended only for home use. While the courts of many SNIJs have a great deal of independent authority (not only from the other branches of government but also from the metropolitan power), there appears to be no SNIJ where the judiciary is not subject to appeal to a higher continental court (Baldacchino, 2006b). Indeed, one may deduce that one of the main advantages of SNIJs is the protection of their citizens by metropolitan courts with all the history and reputation that comes along. At the same time, as long as a right of appeal to a court outside the jurisdiction exists, full autonomy in a SNIJ cannot be said to be present.
When PEI was a separate colony, Islanders could pursue legal action to the ultimate authority of the UK government’s Privy Council; now, as a province of Canada, the final judicial authority is the Supreme Court of Canada. However, it does have independent judicial capacity to a point. Thus, another way to categorize SNIJs is as between those that have practically full judicial capacity and those that have none.

Finally, a key difference among the federal kind of SNIJs and others is that entities within federal systems have some kind of representation in the authority of the larger federal framework, usually through some kind of elected chamber, giving the SNIJ residents affiliation at two levels and conferring responsibility for the citizens on not just the island level but also on the federal level. This gives these kinds of SNIJ citizens two kinds of power unlike other islands who, either by choice or through the operation of history, have no voice in the metropolitan government. Again, this is advantageous to such islands because, aside from autonomy to act within their own jurisdiction, they have a presence in the government of the metropolitan power that is the limiter of its autonomy. PEI, for example, sends eight representatives to the two chambers in the federal parliament of Canada while the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico sends no representatives to the USA Congress even though it is subject to its authority.

In sum, PEI can be characterized as a SNIJ that: (a) has some capacity in all three branches of government; it has some independent capacity in the executive and legislative functions, some shared capacity in some areas of these functions and must relinquish total capacity to the federal authorities in some other areas. (b) Its judiciary has some independent capacity in some areas but is subordinate to a higher metropolitan court. (c) It is not part of an archipelagic federation but rather is an island associated with a metropolitan federal power that is continentally based. (d) PEI is exclusively an island jurisdiction with no subject territory on a mainland. (e) The jurisdiction covers the entire geographic area of the island. (f) PEI has representation in the federal government of the metropolitan mainland.

Of course, no two islands are alike and many islands that do not possess these six traits have similarities to PEI. However, in relation to jurisdictional capacity, it is the other Sub-National Island Jurisdictions that also have these traits that, I suggest, make the best points of comparison from which PEI may draw lessons for maximizing its potential autonomy. This group would include Hawaii, Tasmania and the autono-
mous archipelagoes of Spain, the Balearic Islands and Canary Islands. For my purposes, the island of Tasmania, whose cultural history is so similar to that of PEI's, is the most preferred comparison.

**Powers of the Province of Prince Edward Island**

As mentioned, PEI has autonomous capacity in some areas of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government but also has some shared capacities in some areas and no capacity in yet other areas. As also mentioned, PEI had been a colony of the British Empire. When it gave up this status to join Canada as a provincial partner in the federation, it negotiated entry with the government of Canada. The form of this contract is its agreement to an amended *British North America Act* (which subsequently became the *Constitution Act of Canada*). This document is the basis for PEI's capacities and provides an extensive list of powers that are provincial and powers that are federal, and hints at those that may be shared (Elazar, 1994).

Sections 91 to 95 of the constitution specifically assign jurisdiction as between federal and provincial governments. The provincial government of PEI has power to directly tax within the province and borrow money on the sole credit of the province. It can establish the framework of its own government. It is responsible for municipal government. Also, the system of education is under the exclusive authority of the province. Other areas of exclusive provincial authority include inter-provincial trade; public lands belonging to the province; forestry resources and the taxation thereof; non-renewable natural resources and the taxation thereof; energy production, regulation and the taxation thereof; hospitals, asylums and charities; shops, taverns and other retailers; local works and undertakings; incorporations, property rights and civil rights; and, finally, matters merely local in nature.

There is concurrent federal/provincial jurisdiction in the areas of old age pensions, agriculture and immigration. The federal government has authority for - but there are provisions for provincial input - in the areas of marriage and divorce, treaty implementation, foreign loans, external trade, inland waterways, railways and telecommunications. As well, while certain segments of the justice system are assigned to provincial jurisdiction, the overall legal and justice framework, from administration to judicial appointment to punishment, is a patchwork of shared responsibility between both federal and provincial level. Tellingly though, where provincial laws and federal laws clash, it was agreed that federal law should prevail.
The federal government has sole power in matters of national security and defence, foreign policy, citizenship, communications, intellectual property, shipping, navigation and maritime and oceanic affairs, transportation, trade and commerce, currency and coinage, banking and affairs related to Indian reserves and relations with First Nations. Of most significance is the provision that for any matter not specifically mentioned, the federal government shall have the authority and responsibility to deal with it. Not only has this given the federal government its “residual power” over a number of unforeseen aspects of society that have arisen since the British North America Act terms were first drafted, but also the very notion that the federal government should be the default authority slants the constitutional dialectic in Canada in favour of federal supremacy.

Some Prince Edward Islanders have found this extremely problematic. A former PEI Premier, the late J. Angus MacLean, held that PEI had had a strong independent character as a colony which was in danger of being overwhelmed within the larger identity of emerging Canadian identity. To prevent this, he called for the constitution to have clearly defined areas of jurisdiction with neither level of government being superior or inferior to other, but totally sovereign within those specific areas. Moreover, he called for the autonomy of the provincial level of government to be protected from any unilateral action by the federal government (MacLean, 1981). Similarly, PEI political scientist David Milne saw constitutionalism as not only assigning local powers and capacities but also as crafting the nature of sub-national identity. In adopting federation with Canada, PEI accepted a dual affiliation (as mentioned above) that eroded its independent identity (mentioned by MacLean). Federation, said Milne, scripts both separation of powers and integration into a larger whole (Milne, 2000). In Canada, where the integration meant (along with many other things) subordination in a constitutional sense, this script may have contributed to a stereotype of political dependence (arising from the constitutional arrangements) that has had a chronic negative impact on the Island psyche (Milne, 1992).

The Tasmania Comparison

Kenneth Wiltshire suggests that, as the smallest part of the Australian federation, the island state of Tasmania has a strong resemblance to the small provinces of Canada such as PEI (Wiltshire, 1986: 89). The two islands have many jurisdictional similarities as discussed above. However, the nature of their federal relationships is somewhat different.
The main technical difference between Australian and Canadian federalism is that in Australia, residual powers fall to the provinces. The theory is that elements of government or society that were unspecified in the constitution could form a vast jurisdictional landscape in which the Australian state would be the authority and would tip the balance of Australian federalism toward the states. However, if a state law is found to be inconsistent with federal law, then the federal law prevails.

Of the powers mentioned in the Australian constitution, the federal government is responsible for interstate and external trade, commerce and shipping, currency and coinage, defence, external affairs, trading and financial corporations, communications, old age pensions and unemployment benefits. The states, such as Tasmania, have responsibility for education, health, hospitals, law, order and public safety, railways and transport, and public utilities. Each state has a court system that may adjudicate matters within state jurisdiction but a federal court system deals with federal matters. The Australian High Court is the last resort of appeal from all state or federal venues (Elazar, 1994).

The main practical difference between Tasmania and PEI appears only slight in considering their federal constitutions technically. As mentioned, Canadian provinces have the power to levy taxes and raise revenue. By contrast, Australian states do not. This led, over the course of the last half-century, to substantial centralization in Australia and the ascendancy of the national government in affairs (Elazar, 1994: 20). Interestingly, over the same period, the government in Canada also became more centralized and made substantial intrusions into provincial affairs despite the relative financial independence of the Canadian provinces. What this meant for both PEI and Tasmania was dependence on federal funding. This also shows the importance of revenue as an ingredient in jurisdictional autonomy whether or not it is a constitutionally-specified power.

**Fiscal Powers**

All things considered, Prince Edward Island appears to have many technical advantages in governance compared to other SNIJs. Its government has at least some capacity in all three branches of government plus its residents have representation in the metropolitan government with which the province shares capacity in a number of policy areas. Even more important, from a practical standpoint, the province of PEI has the power to generate revenue.
In the areas of personal income tax, corporate income tax, sales tax, property tax and taxes on resources, PEI can levy and receive tax and set the tax rates. Most economists assume that one purpose of tax in a society is to redistribute revenue or income for a variety of societal reasons and goals. In Canada, the federal government also has jurisdiction in the area of tax and, due to the country’s economic size and strength, generates substantial revenues that allows it to pursue redistributive goals, taxing heavily here or funding particular programs there (Boadway and Flatters, 1982). An example of taxing to achieve a policy goal may be seen in the area of tobacco sales. In an effort to decrease smoking for the sake of better community health, the federal government makes increased taxes a disincentive to the purchase of tobacco products. As an example of funding of programs, the federal government may expend its funds in the area of higher education through an extensive system of research grants involving universities, faculty and students in order to improve the overall system of higher education throughout the nation, whether or not education is technically a federal power under the Constitution.

If the provincial government strongly agrees with these goals, it can tax and/or spend in the same policy areas. If it feels neutral, it may simply formally agree to taxing/spending in areas where jurisdiction is shared or provincial in nature. If the provincial and federal goals are in conflict, PEI has substantial freedom to tax and/or spend within its jurisdiction to achieve its own goals. By contrast, as mentioned, Tasmania does not have this fiscal freedom; yet, both island polities have substantial problems of dependency on the federal government. In Tasmania’s case, it is more understandable because of the lack of redistributive power. However, in the case of PEI, it may indicate a failure to fully flex its taxing and spending muscles.

In some areas, PEI does exercise its fiscal powers, for example, by requiring non-residents to pay twice the property tax of resident property owners. This limits the encroachment of off-Island interests into the landscape and economy of the province, bolstering local businesses and tourism values and allaying deep-seated island-specific fears of subjection to off-island control. However, due to the real benefits of federal spending in the province, combined with the imposing power of the federal government’s financial strength, PEI has generally lacked the will and/or the need to aggressively and creatively access its fiscal capabilities. Perhaps, the fear that the pursuit of independent goals would conflict with federal aims has also been a boundary. Interestingly, though, a number of writers
(see Buker, 2005; Seidle, 1991; Wiltshire, 1986; Boadway and Flatters, 1982; Simeon, 1972) suggest that the levels of taxing and spending as well the goals of same are a matter of federal-provincial discussion and negotiation. Indeed, the terms of PEI’s entry into the Canadian Confederation can be seen as an independent colony giving up much of its autonomy for a monetary bail-out. While this may have given the federal government the historical negotiation leverage, leading to a culture of dependency, it did not remove the fiscal tools available that many SNIJs (including Tasmania) never had the benefit of; nor did it remove the technical fact that negotiations between levels of government are a feature of federal systems. This fact has prompted some PEI observers to call for a renewed spirit of bargaining position assertiveness on the part of the province (see Carroll, 2000; MacLauchlan, 1992).

**Informal Powers**

In exploring the range and limits of the technical powers of PEI found in the constitutional framework of the Canadian federation and the extent of PEI’s fiscal powers, we were led to the gap between these capabilities and the inability of PEI to break patterns of dependence. While federalism is a formal structure of governance that balances local and national interests, the Canadian reality is that a variety of factors have given more weight to the federal side of the balance and, in the case of island jurisdictions like PEI and Tasmania, is exacerbated by their relative size and isolation. In spite of these supposed weaknesses and the consequent history of reliance on federal benevolence, the federal system inevitably and ultimately allows for the maintenance of full sub-national jurisdictional status that provides a number of political resources useable in the on-going roundtable that is federalism. We now turn to the question of whether these political resources can fill the above-mentioned gap.

Canadian federalism scholar Richard Simeon contends that such political resources are not tangible (unlike those listed in a constitution) but are dependent on the beliefs of the participants in federal conversations. Consequently, the extent of political resources may vary greatly from issue to issue. While some political resources derive from powers found in documents, they are mostly perception-based. In discussing federal-provincial relationships and interplay, he enumerates the following resources that the players may draw upon (Simeon, 1972: 201-220):
1. **Legal Authority** is a resource derived from the constitution and other laws. It arises when an initiative involves the constitutional rights of the other level of government or requires its cooperation. In such a case, the party responding to the initiative controls actions within its legal limits and hence has resources. Where more cooperation is required, the resources are greater.

2. **Public Support** is a political resource that involves not only assessing and capitalizing on the mood of the public but also a measurement of the influence the respective governments hold over their electorates. Public support for its goals gives a province the resources to achieve these goals; but these resources are diminished if the public also supports competing federal goals.

3. **Technical Skills** among government officials about how to achieve policy goals, how to utilize the policy tools available and indeed how to manage the federal-provincial relationship is a resource that is less capricious than public support and less fixed than legal authority; it can be built up and built upon.

4. **Political Skills**: Related to technical skills is the resource of the political skills of politicians and government officials associated with the ability to persuade others, manage situations and strategically exploit resources.

5. **Objective Information**, from statistical reports, scholarly publications or other types of research is a political resource.

6. **Population Size**: A province’s population size is a resource that can be used as leverage in negotiating with the federal government because population size usually translates into votes.

7. **Relative Wealth** is both a positive for wealthy provinces allowing them to contribute financial resources to a situation or issue and also a strength-in-weakness for poorer provinces that get more attention in negotiating with the federal government due to their more dire need.

8. **Procedures and Rules of the Game** are resources that can be used as processual tools in gaining control of the agenda of federal-provincial negotiations or creating a new set of procedures by which a player may hope negotiations ensue.
That Simeon sees many of such political factors as both a resource as well as a constraint is particularly interesting for islands which are increasingly known for finding advantage in supposed vulnerability (Bal dacchino, 2006a). Certainly, a lack of economic strength has been an advantage for PEI in receiving fiscal transfers from the federal government. As well, its small size and relative isolation may be advantageous in solidifying public sentiment for a provincial endeavour, such as the construction of the Confederation Bridge. However, one must wonder whether all the possible political resources have been fully maximized since, as in relation to the fiscal powers mentioned above, dependence on federal benevolence continues. If federal-provincial relations are a negotiation, the bargaining positions are still lopsided in favour of the federal government.

Of course, this assumes that PEI wants to end its history of dependence. In fact, no such goal has been evident and it could be argued that, despite any proclamations to the contrary, PEI has been quite adept at federal-provincial negotiations in obtaining federal munificence. This is partly due to the relative weight of PEI's representation in the federal government. It has four members in the House of Commons, and in the upper parliamentary chamber, the Senate, it has four members, both of which are well beyond norms of representation by population given PEI's small number of citizens. In addition, there is a federal government convention that calls for each province to have representation in the cabinet, the federal executive branch. Again, this is disproportionate to its size compared to the other provinces. With such relatively large representation in the federal halls of power, PEI has excellent access to the federal agenda and the benefits flowing from involvement in controlling the federal agenda. If the goal is to receive federal generosity and maintain the federal connection, PEI is politically better placed than any other province and indeed any other SNlJ.

Connected to the relative weight of PEI's federal representation is another factor that contributes to PEI's proficiency in the realm of Canadian federal-provincial relations. The Island's unique political culture, which is a function of its island character, is a resource that has enabled its access to federal largesse. While the structure of government in Canada has facilitated PEI's access to federal resources, it is the traits found within its political culture that has maximized the access.

Due to its small size, PEI was not able to develop an internal government structure that could be elevated beyond the personal. This meant that, rather than technical expertise, PEI bureaucrats and politicians
gained proficiency at linking personal relationships to policy goals and vice versa. In PEI, ministers of the crown may get personally involved in issues in ways not practical or expected in any other province. Peter Buker discusses some of the pitfalls of this situation but also notes personal ministerial involvement has been effective for PEI in intergovernmental affairs (Buker, 2005). Tying this proficiency back to Simeon’s listing, it can be said that PEI’s political culture gives it political resources from its Political Skills, Small Size and Relative Wealth. As mentioned, it is debatable, at least, as to whether PEI uses these resources for anything more than getting federal largesse. If we have other goals as a province, including self-sufficiency, then better use of all resources may be required.

Conclusion
Indeed, Island Studies Professor Godfrey Baldacchino has identified key policy areas where islands should strengthen their capabilities to increase their prospects for development (Baldacchino, 2004). Among these is the capacity for increased political autonomy in any policy areas available to SNIs. PEI has a comparatively large set of capacities. It has extensive formal powers and powerful fiscal capacity. As a province of Canada, it is involved in ongoing intra-national diplomacy which involves accessing informal powers to improve its self-sufficiency and obtain benefits from the metropolis. It has been argued that it is quite adept at the latter. In order to improve its self-sufficiency, it must more fully access the other under-utilized informal capabilities to, at least, increase its proficiency in accessing its full range of resources whether political, fiscal or constitutional. The ability to increase the above jurisdictional capacities can serve as a foundation for developing abilities to increase proficiency and self-sufficiency in the other policy areas that are part of the Jurisdiction Project.
References


