(Re-)Narrating the Gigantic: Limits, Possibilities and Pedagogies

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Abstract: In this essay, I will be recollecting and engaging with significant bits and pieces of the ubiquitous ‘globalization’ hegemonic narrative, analyzing its key features, its spatial and temporal underpinnings, the events which brought it and the changes it brought about, mainly in relation to the nation-state. In a second moment, mirroring the first take on the dominant narrative, I shall go through an ‘imaginary’ re-narration of the globalization story, a story of the others, made up of resistances, struggles, movements, re-focusing on the relationship between globalization and education in the process.

Keywords: social movements; globalization of knowledge; counter-hegemonic narratives; the margins

Another world is not only possible; she is on her way.
On a quiet day, I can hear her breathing.
(Roy, 2003)

‘Multidimensional’, ‘fluid’, ‘chaotic’, ‘process’, ‘mobility’, ‘flows’, ‘out of control’, ‘ideology’, ‘rapture’, ‘speed’. These are some of the key articulations and discourses which I have come across in my attempt to engage with globalization. When trying to make sense of these processes and events, contextualized in a consciousness of the world as a whole, what comes to mind is the difficulty to identify and localize the nature of such processes and events. The need for such identification does not stem from a necessity to essentialise a phenomenon but rather from the need to deconstruct

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1 Mbembe, A., 2001, p. 22 “What Heidegger understood as ‘the gigantic’ was characterized by the elimination of great distances and the representation of daily life in unfamiliar and

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discourses, identify the centres of power and the dependent peripheries. This is a required starting point if one wants to engage critically and resist the resulting injustices and inequalities. For me, such an epistemological challenge got a deeper, more political meaning when engaging with particular authors such as Arjun Appadurai. In his paper *Grassroots Globalization and the Research Imagination*, Appadurai argues:

> In the public spheres of many societies there is concern that policy debates occurring around world trade, copyright, environment, science and technology set the stage for life-and-death decisions for ordinary farmers, vendors, slum dwellers, merchants and urban populations. And running through these debates is the sense that social exclusion is ever more tied to epistemological exclusion. [...] The discourse of globalization is itself growing dangerously dispersed, with the language of epistemic communities, the discourse of states and interstate fora, and the everyday understanding of global forces by the poor is growing steadily apart. (Appadurai, 2001, p. 2)

This essay is mainly catalyzed by this epistemological challenge, the gap between the ‘globalization of knowledge and knowledge of globalization’ (Appadurai, 2001, p. 4). To anchor my exploration in a horizon of possibilities, which would also allow me to explore the limits, I shall structure my essay around a post-colonial ‘re-narration’ as articulated by Leon Tikly, basing it on Homi Bhabha’s work on narration and Appadurai’s notion of ‘imagination’. Tikly refers to ‘a post-colonial mode’ of reading globalization characterized by a “concern to ‘re-narrativise’ the globalization story in a way that places historically marginalised parts of the world at the centre, rather than at the periphery of the education and globalization debate.” (Tikly, 2001, p. 152) The act of looking at globalization as a story with the intent of re-narrating it drives wedges in the ‘totalitarian’ dominant discourse of neo-liberal globalization, making it a pluralistic experience of worldviews, yet contextualized in the struggle between global capital power and populations living in local realities on the other. Appadurai enriches this epistemological act of resistance but also of agency by a notion which opens up the possibilities of re-narration, the capacity to imagine. He argues that:

> [Imagination] is a faculty that informs the daily lives of ordinary people in myriad ways: It allows people to consider migration, resist state violence, seek social redress and design new forms of civic association and collaboration, often across national boundaries. This view of the role of the imagination as a popular, social, collective fact in the era of globalization recognizes its split character. On the one hand, it is in and through the imagination that modern citizens are disciplined and controlled – by states, markets, and other powerful interests. But it is also the faculty through which collective patterns of dissent and new designs for new collective life emerge (Appadurai, 2001, p. 6).
This split character of the faculty of imagination parallels is also, from many perspectives, a good analogy of the duality of globalization as highlighted by sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos: hegemonic and counter-hegemonic globalization. The concept of ‘hegemony’ was often used by Antonio Gramsci. His notion of cultural hegemony might be defined as:

prevailing consciousness [which] is internalized by the population […] so that the philosophy, culture and morality of the ruling elite comes to appear as the natural order of things (Burke, 2005).

The effect of this interplay between knowledge and power is ‘domination by consent’ (Ruggero, 2012), whereby the subaltern consents to her/his own subordinate position and to the authority of the ruling classes. In a pedagogical process referred to by Michel Foucault and Gayatri Spivak as ‘epistemic violence’, the world is presented in such a way that the oppressed are alienated from their own world, while western interests are projected as the world’s interests. For Santos, ‘hegemonic globalization’ is “the form of globalization that is assumed by lots of people – including its victims – as the only one.”(Dale & Robertson, 2004, p. 150) On the other hand, ‘counter-hegemonic globalization’ is:

resistance against hegemonic globalization organized (through local/global linkages) by movements, initiatives and NGOs, on behalf of classes, social groups and regions victimised by the unequal exchanges produced on a global scale by neoliberal globalization (Dale & Robertson, 2004, p. 151).

Owing to the limits of this essay, what follows is a rather restricted gaze on the ubiquitous story of globalization. I shall recollecting significant bits and pieces of the hegemonic narrative, analyzing its key features, its spatial and temporal underpinnings, the events which brought it and the changes it brought about, mainly in relation to the nation-state. I will also explore the relationship between this new hegemonic order and education. From my perspective, the focus will be on the ‘how it came to be’. In the second part of the essay, mirroring the first take on the dominant narrative, I shall go through an ‘imaginary’ re-narration of the globalization story, a story of the others, made up of resistances, struggles, movements. In the latter part of this re-narration, I shall be re-focusing on the relationship between globalization and education by concentrating on epistemologies of the south. This time, my focus will be on the ‘how it can be’.

1. The Narration: A new Imperial

In their famous and much disputed work, ‘Empire’, Toni Negri and Michael Hardt talk about the emergence of a new world order (or dis-order as Bauman argues owing to its lack of centre) which (de-)regulates the ‘global
market and the global circuits of production’, in which information technology is not just a means of circulating production, as in the case of Roman roads and imperial railways, but intrinsically part of the new production processes. (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 298). They maintain that:

[contrary] to imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial centre of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers. Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command. (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. xii – xiii) (emphasis in text)

On the other hand, other authors such as Spivak and Amin, while still talking of a globalized Empire, criticise Negri and Hardt’s work since it is not grounded in specific location, that is, a particular centre dominating a particular periphery. In a critical assessment of Negri’s and Hardt’s work, Amin, who talks of a third wave of devastation by imperialist expansion (Amin, 2001), argues that:

The dominant segments of capital indeed operate in the transnational space of world capitalism, but control of these segments remains in the hands of financial groups still strongly “national” (i.e., based in the United States, or Great Britain or Germany […]). (Amin, 2005)

I shall take cue from the perspective of this apparent metaphorical-material aporia to start from a necessity to encapsulate hegemonic globalization, the empire, in something which is less abstract. In my search for a possible definition, I shall anchor myself, at least for the time being, to Leon Tikly’s choice of a working definition as articulated by Held et al:

A process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions—assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact—generating transcontinental or interregional flows (‘the movements of physical artefacts, people, symbols, tokens and information across space and time’) and networks (‘regularized or patterned interactions between independent agents, nodes of activity, or sites of power’) of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power. (Tikly, 2001, p. 154)

In his take on ‘new imperialism’, Tikly argues that apart from material aspects, this ‘new’ form of governmentality also has discursive aspects. He identifies the nodal point of ‘development’ (“The new binary of developed/underdeveloped provided a mechanism for re-inscribing the old north/south relations […] the re-invention of the Third World as part of a continuity in the West.” Tikly, 2004, p. 181) and the emergence of a specific subject, homo economicus (“the individual economic agent unfettered by the state, free to pursue his own economic interest.” Tikly, 2004, p. 183) as ways in which the economics of the new empire are also a cultural discourse.
1.1 Where? A geographical discourse of the Whole

The concept of Empire is characterized fundamentally by a lack of boundaries: Empire’s rule has no limits. First and foremost, then, the concept of Empire posits a regime that effectively encompasses the spatial totality, or really that rules over the entire “civilized” world. No territorial boundaries limit its reign. Second, the concept of Empire presents itself not as a historical regime originating in conquest, but rather as an order that effectively suspends history and thereby fixes the existing state of affairs for eternity. From the perspective of Empire, this is the way things will always be and the way they were always meant to be. (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. xiv)

A main consideration at this point would be, which spatial images and other discursive imaginaries of the world underpin hegemonic globalization and how are these different from modernist articulation of the international?

The ‘blue marble’ photograph, the 1972 picture of earth from space was not the first encapsulation of the whole globe in one picture. Different world-system events such as imperial ages, global religions, world wars had to different extents articulated discourses which would have been underpinned by a geographical articulation of the whole, in most cases such knowledge would have been portrayed as scientific facts.

In post-colonial analysis, authors such as Edward Said and Gregory Derek make use of the concept of ‘imagined geographies’(Imagined geographies, n.d.) to highlight the relationship between the dominant perception of space and hegemonic regimes of truth which depict space as a scientific homogeneous reality. From such a perspective, Appadurai claims:

The large regions that dominate our current maps […] are not permanent geographical facts. They are problematic heuristic devices for the study of global geographies and cultural processes. Regions are best viewed as initial contexts for themes that generate variable geographies.(Appadurai, 2001, p. 8)

When referring to the processes which brought about the ‘Empire’, Negri and Hardt trace a historical transformation in the dominant geographical imaginary, which homogenized the dominant view of the world into a consensual inclusion of everything, including its opposite:

The transformation of the modern imperialist geography of the globe and the realization of the world market signal a passage within the capitalist mode of production. Most significant, the spatial divisions of the three Worlds (First, Second, and Third) have been scrambled so that we continually find the First World in the Third, the Third in the First, and the Second almost nowhere at all. Capital seems to be faced with a smooth world—or really, a world defined by
new and complex regimes of differentiation and homogenization, deterritorialization and reterritorialization. (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. xiii)

Such historical perspectives of ‘variable geographies’ would make it clear that different dominant discourses in different eras are underpinned by different geographic assumptions and spatial imaginaries. Frederic Jameson narrates how such geographic discourses of the present times are often dictated by the dominance of technology and economy:

Instant information transfers suddenly suppress the space that held the colony apart from the metropolis in the modern period. Meanwhile, the economic interdependence of the world system today means that wherever one may find oneself on the globe, the position can henceforth always be coordinated with its other spaces. (Derek, 2004, p. 11-12)

de Sousa Santos argues that such imaginaries ultimately “refer to real or imaginary territories as much as to ways of life and social relationships, are based on face-to-face relationships, on closeness and belongingness.” (Dale & Robertson, 2004, p. 149) He argues that notwithstanding there is no original global condition, the historical project of globalization presupposes localization.(de Sousa Santos, 2006, p. 396) In this way, globalization continually stems out of one of the contradictions which according to sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos characterize this process, the relationship between the globalization and the localisation:

social relations in general seem to be increasingly more de-territorialised, opening up the way towards new rights to options, [yet] new regional, national and local identities are emerging, constructed around the new preeminence of the rights to roots. (Dale & Robertson, 2004, p. 149)

1.2 Fast-forwarding change: New solids?

A global economy is a new reality, different from processes of internationalization in previous times, for one simple reason: only at this point in history was a technological infrastructure available to make it possible. (Carnoy & Castells, 2001, p. 3)

In their essay Globalization, the Knowledge Society and the Network State, authors Martin Carnoy and Manuel Castells re-visit Nicos Poulantzas’ theoretical reading of the modern state. They claim that:

In State, Power, Socialism, Nicos Poulantzas conceptualized a state that materializes and concentrates power and displaces the class struggle from the economic to the political arena. In the past twenty years, much has changed. (Carnoy & Castells, 2001, p. 1)

In this section I shall be looking at aspects of this change, focusing mainly on the altering natures of the nation-state.
It is not clear when such changes started creeping in. De Sousa Santos talks in terms of ‘a rupture with previous forms of cross-border transactions’. (de Sousa Santos, 2006, p. 393) Carnoy and Castells (2001) maintain that the process of globalization was initiated by the state as a solution to the crisis of the welfare-state of the mid-1970s. In his essay *World Borders, Political Borders*, Etienne Balibar more convincingly argues that “globalization has appeared with such striking obviousness as a structurally irreversible process only in a determinate political conjuncture […] itself the result of heterogeneous events that have seemed to reinforce one another.” (Balibar, 2004, p. 104)

A first event he highlights, economic in nature, is “the appearance of multinational corporations whose financial power exceeds that of most states and which have thus gained the ability to delocalize and transport their activities towards whatever region offers the lowest production costs.” (Balibar, 2004, p. 104) This implied a changing relation between such economic institutions and the nation-state, the former overcoming the intrinsic borders of the latter. A second event Balibar identifies is the collapse of the Soviet socialist system, both political and ideological in nature. The end of such ideological antagonisms which had polarized the world into West and East, signified an ideological convergence to the centre, what Chantal Mouffe and others refer to as the ‘post-political age’, partly because such an event was not followed by other equally powerful demarcations. Finally Balibar sees a third such event in the confluence of “all processes that have both a technical and natural aspect, that prove that the earth […] has become a single ‘system’ in which flows of information, energy, and matter influence one another.” This other form of ‘erasure of borders’ placed each locality within ‘the whole’. (Balibar, 2004, p. 104-105) Thus, while the borders and antagonisms of the twentieth century provided the global ‘faultlines’ on which ‘globalization’ took its form, this seems to have paved the way for a hegemonic ‘end of history’ narrative whereby the global homogenized and monopolized the way to be in the world.

One continuous institutional presence in this ‘liquid’ postmodernity is the nation-state. Arguing from a conflict perspective, Spivak describes the state as a “minimal abstract structure which we must protect because it is our ally. It should be the instrument of redistribution. This definitive function has been curtailed in the global state.” (Butler & Spivak, 2007, p. 98) In what follows, basing my arguments mainly on Carnoy and Castells’ essay already quoted above, I shall trace the changes which the state is processually undergoing since a couple of decades ago. My main question in this sense, using Bauman’s language in the depiction of a liquid modernity (Bauman, 2006),

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Zygmunt Bauman explains this ‘postmodern condition’ in terms of a ‘liquid modernity’ or the project of liquidizing the old ‘solids’ by “disavowing and dethroning the past, and first and foremost ‘tradition’”. Bauman describes this process of liquefaction as “the radical
would be: is it a past solid which underwent a process of liquefication or is it in the process of creating a new solid?

Carnoy and Castells start their analysis by going through the reading of the modern state in the theoretical work of Marxist thinker Poulantzas:

Poulantzas conceptualized a state that materializes and concentrates power and displaces the class struggle from the economic to the political arena. [...] The state reintegration separated and individualized workers into the people-nation under a set of institutions that homogenize and normalize them, differentiating them under a new set of rules, norms, values, history, tradition, language, and concepts of knowledge that emanate from the dominant class and its fractions. On the other hand [...] this integration takes place in the context of class struggle, and all the institutions of society, including the state, are the product of that struggle. (Carnoy & Castells, 2001, p. 1)

Yet, Carnoy and Castells argue that since then, the nation state underwent radical changes, mainly catalysed by the hegemonic and neo-liberal ‘Washington consensus’ which signified a consensus of the liberal economy, the consensus of the weak state, the consensus of liberal democracy, and the consensus of the primacy of the rule of law. (de Sousa Santos, 2006, p. 394)

Zygmunt Bauman interestingly sees this as a Weberian ‘separation of business from the household: [...] the emancipation of business interests from all extant socio-cultural institutions of ethically inspired supervision and control.” (Bauman, 2011, p. 21) He describes the present situation as an emergent ‘no-man’s land’ characterized by “power free from politics, and politics devoid of power. Power is already global; politics stay pitifully local” (Bauman, 2011, p. 23). In this milieu, Carnoy and Castells maintain that:

What emerges is a new form of the state. It is a state made of shared institutions, and enacted by bargaining and interactive iteration all along the chain of decision making: national governments, co-national governments, supra-national bodies, international institutions, governments of nationalities, regional governments, local governments, and NGOs (in our conception: neo-governmental organizations). Decision-making and representation take place all along the chain, not necessarily in the hierarchical, pre-scripted order. This new state functions as a network, in which all nodes interact, and are equally necessary for the performance of the state’s functions. The state of the Information Age is a Network State. (Carnoy & Castells, 2001, p. 14)

The two authors look at this transformation as a multi-dimensional historical process. They focus on a number of such processes which came to characterize the present global economy: the global interdependence of financial markets (characterized by a number of ‘sources of integration such
as the deregulation of financial markets, the liberalization of cross-border transactions and market valuation firms), the trans-national production of goods and services (with multinational corporations at their core), the re-organization of work (workers gradually being socially defined, less by a particular long-term job than by the knowledge they have acquired by studying and working) and the re-organization of knowledge and power. Because of the nature(s) of this essay, I shall dwell with the latter a little longer.

1.3 Education and the new Imperialism

In the 1970s, Poulantzas’ insights illustrated the dynamics of how the state “uses knowledge to legitimize a particular ideology – the dominant bourgeois values and norms – by changing that juridical-political ideology into a set of technocratic ‘facts’ and decisions based on factors such as ‘scientific studies’ and ‘expertise’.” (Carnoy & Castells, 2001, p. 9) However, in the present globalized milieu, knowledge formation and power over knowledge is not controlled by the nation state any longer. According to Carnoy and Castells a first reason for this would be that information and knowledge are increasingly localized in global economy. This means that what was previously mainly a political issue, ‘whose knowledge’ is presently “increasingly defined in terms of economic value.” (Carnoy & Castells, 2001, p. 9) A second reason would be the decentralization of knowledge production and transmission away from the nation state, internet being a case in point. Thus, these newly redesigned relations between knowledge and power, imply that in the present, what is transmitted in the individual nation states’ educational systems is increasingly determined by the global markets. Nevertheless, Carnoy and Castells identify a third reason underpinning these relations which may provide space for counter-hegemonic agency. They argue that:

The industrial nation states have been unable to sustain the level of welfare characterizing the post-1945 world [...] This has decreased the influence of these states over those segments of the population already most marginalized in industrial capitalism. Global competition marginalizes these segments – namely those with the least formal education, the least socialization into the nation state, and the least capacity to increase the value of their human capital – even more than before. Because they have difficulty accessing knowledge deemed valuable by global markets, their members search for other forms of knowledge that reinforces their identity both outside global markets and outside the nation state knowledge system. (Carnoy & Castells, 2001, p. 10)

This brings me to look at the other side of the coin. My analysis has been a gaze from above. As Michel Foucault’s quips, there is “no power without resistance but this resistance is never external to the power structure itself” (Brighenti, 2011, p. 58). In what follows I shall explore counter-
h egemonic globalization and the globalization of the counter-hegemonic through the necessary lens of pedagogical practices.

2. The Re-Narration: Insurgents and plural pedagogies

I’m writing this as Kiev is on fire. (Quinn, Epstein & Davidson, 2014) The imperial narrative was quite a straightforward story of straight forward change with no great ruptures, almost a quiet natural evolution. Yet, as Hardt and Negri argue:

Empire rules over a global order that is not only fractured by internal divisions and hierarchies but also plagued by perpetual war. The state of war is inevitable in Empire and war functions as an instrument of rule. Today’s imperial peace […] is a false pretense of peace that really presides over a state of constant war. (Hardt & Negri, 2004, p. xiii)

Such a re-narration is necessarily a hybrid of struggle and imagination. In what follows I shall go again through the globalization story, trying to explore the possibilities of a re-narration by looking at it from many other angles. Thus, I shall go through the concept of ‘globalization from below’ as articulated by key authors such as de Sousa Santos, Appadurai, and others. I shall then take a quick dip in the action world of social and protest movements, having a look at the meaning of actions of resistance. As with the dominant narrative, I will consider what implications do such alternative standing points have for education and vice-versa.

2.1 Conceptualising ‘globalization from below’

Boaventura de Sousa Santos talks of globalization as a composite plural phenomenon (Brighenti, 2011, p. 64), including both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forms, thus necessitation the re-wording of the notion as ‘globalizations’ (de Sousa Santos, 2006). This goes hand in hand with Gramsci’s notion of hegemony as discussed above whereby the “intellectual and moral headship exercised by a dominant class, in a spontaneous, molecular and organic way, so as to generate a widely accepted framework of consent in which even conflict and dissent is accommodated.” (Brighenti, 2001, p. 62) This has brought some scholars to argue that the term counter-hegemony is a misnomer since the hegemonic globalization would have dissent already within it, opting instead for the term ‘globalization from below’.³


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Appadurai prefers the term ‘grassroots globalization’, “which strives for a democratic and autonomous standing in respect to the various forms by which global power further seeks to extend its dominion.” (Appadurai, 2001, p. 3) He maintains that describing contemporary globalization in terms of flows and things in motion is an understatement, since they are in ‘relations of disjuncture’:

Different speeds, axes, points of origin and termination and varied relationships to institutional structures in different regions, nations and societies. (Appadurai, 2001, p. 6)

As an example, Appadurai mentions how “media flows across national boundaries that produce images of well being that cannot be satisfied by national standards of living and consumer capabilities”. Such disjunctive flows which characterize this ‘world-in-motion’ produce “fundamental problems of livelihood, equity, suffering, justice and governance.” (Appadurai, 2001, p. 6) He concludes that “globalization (understood as a particular, contemporary configuration in the relationship between capital and the nation-state) is demonstrably creating increased inequalities both within and across societies, spiraling processes of ecological degradation and crisis.” (Appadurai, 2001, p. 17)

On a similar wavelength, de Sousa Santos describes counter-hegemonic globalization as:

resistance against hegemonic globalization organized (through local/global linkages) by movements, initiatives and NGOs, on behalf of classes, social groups and regions victimised by the unequal exchanges produced on a global scale by neoliberal globalization. They take advantage of the possibilities of transnational interaction created by hegemonic globalization, including those resulting from the revolution in information and communication technologies. [...] Local struggles or national struggles continue to be decisive, but we are in a new stage in which it is necessary to articulate these scales of struggle with the global scale. The movements cannot afford to concentrate themselves on a specific scale of struggles; they have to fight local, national and global struggles, because they are intertwined. (Dale & Robertson, 2004, p. 151)

In a way, this becomes a language game of sorts whereby signifiers and signified become sites of struggle which often results in having the same signifiers but very different meanings. (Dale, 2009, p. 870)4 As highlighted by English and Mayo, this clearly happens in the counter-hegemonic use of

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4 “Indeed, that existing forms and models of education continue apparently more or less unchanged does not alter the fact that their meanings have changed, and that new forms, located at different scales, are coming to exist beside them.”
information technology, invented as an instrument for the dominance of the Network State in the first place:

International networking, as a form of «globalization from below», often entails using technology for counter-hegemonic ends and might also involve learning ICT, public speaking and project promotion skills. [...] Some challenge NAFTA by making radically progressive use of the Internet for social justice ends, with all the educational and consciousness raising ramifications this has. They wage an «Internet war» as in the case of the Frente and Ejercito Zapatista in Chiapas or in the democracy uprising in Egypt and Tunisia in 2011. (English & Mayo, 2012)

At this stage, in order to understand better the ‘resistance to what’, it would be useful to rope in another theoretical perspectives in the form of Nancy Fraser’s elaboration of the struggle for ‘redistribution’ (Fraser, 1995 p. 73)\(^5\) and ‘recognition/ representation’ (Fraser, 1995 p. 73)\(^6\).

Fraser contextualizes the meaning of both ‘redistribution’ and ‘recognition’ in complexity of the present post-political situation to which many movements are reacting to:

With the decentring of class, diverse social movements are mobilized around cross-cutting axes of difference. Contesting a range of injustices, their claims overlap and at times conflict. Demands for cultural change intermingle with demands for economic change, both within and among social movements. (Fraser, 1995 p. 70)

Nevertheless, Fraser makes a very important observation in claiming that:

the politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution appear to have mutually contradictory aims. Whereas the first tends to promote group differentiation, the second tends to undermine it. The two kinds of claim thus stand in tension with each other; they can interfere with, or even work against, one another. (Fraser, 1995 p. 74)

As an example, Fraser mentions gender and race (as different from sexuality and social class) which have issues relatable to both redistribution and recognition. These issues “intertwine to re-inforce one another dialectically, as

\(^5\) “The remedy for economic injustice is political-economic restructuring of some sort. This might involve redistributing income, reorganizing the division of labour, subjecting investment to democratic decision-making, or transforming other basic economic structures.”

\(^6\) “The remedy for cultural injustice, in contrast, is some sort of cultural or symbolic change. This could involve upwardly revaluing disrespected identities and the cultural products of maligned groups. It could also involve recognizing and positively valorizing cultural diversity. More radically still, it could involve the wholesale transformation of societal patterns of representation, interpretation and communication in ways that would change everybody’s sense of self.”
sexist and androcentric cultural norms are institutionalized in the state and the economy [...] a vicious circle of cultural and economic subordination.” (Fraser, 1995 p. 79) To cut across such contradictions, Fraser introduces the concept of ‘transformative remedies for injustice’ for both redistribution and recognition:

aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the underlying generative framework. The nub of the contrast is end-state outcomes versus the processes that produce them. [Such] Transformative remedies, are currently associated with deconstruction. They would redress disrespect by transforming the underlying cultural-valuational structure. By destabilizing existing group identities and differentiations, these remedies would not only raise the self-esteem of members of currently disrespected groups. They would change everyone’s sense of belonging, affiliation, and self. (Fraser, 1995 p. 82-83).

Thus, in the example of gender mentioned above, this transformation would be translatable as “redress [of] gender injustice in the economy consisting of some form of socialist feminism or feminist social democracy. And transformative recognition to redress gender injustice in the culture consists in feminist deconstruction aimed at dismantling androcentrism by destabilizing gender dichotomies.” (Fraser, 1995 p. 89)

With these considerations of redistribution and recognition in mind, I shall have a rather fleeting glance at social movements as spaces of such potential transformations.

2.2 The narrative spaces of Social movements

In some counter-narrations of the globalization story, social movements are often portrayed as a thinly veiled *deus-ex-machina*, an alternative ‘sweet’ ending to the defeat of the left after the fall of the Berlin Wall. (English & Mayo, 2012) On the other hand, academic research, both on the conceptual level and on an anthropological/empirical level, portrays social movements as organic realities, often emerging from grassroots, replete with internal dissent, reactionary factions, representing different interests and having ambiguous relations with the political classes and political parties, often subject to violent opposition. (English & Mayo, 2012) de Sousa Santos describes social movements as

[including] transnational advocacy networks of South/South and North/South solidarity; articulations among workers’ organisations in countries integrated
into the different regional blocs or among workers of the same multinational corporation operating in different countries (the new labor internationalism); international networks of alternative legal aid; transnational human rights organizations; worldwide networks of feminist movements; networks of indigenous, ecological or alternative development movements and associations; literary, artistic and scientific movements on the periphery of the world system in search for alternative non-imperialist, anti-hegemonic cultural and educational values. From Chiapas, 1994, to Seattle, 1999, to Porto Alegre, 2001, 2002, 2003, and Mumbai, 2004, this very heterogeneous set of movements and organizations have gained momentum in showing that the world as such is today an important social field of struggle for progressive social transformation. (Dale & Robertson, 2004, p. 151)

Regretfully, I cannot explore more extensively these different kinds of movements. Nevertheless, in this context, two interesting perspectives worthwhile of some further exploration are the concepts of ‘the multitude’ as explored and articulated by Hardt and Negri and the concept of ‘resistance’ as revisited by Andrea Brighenti.

Hardt and Negri distinguish ‘the multitude’ both from the term ‘people’, since it ‘reduces diversity to a unity’ as well as the term ‘work class’ which ‘has come to be used as an exclusive concept’. (Hardt & Negri, 2004, p. xiv) ‘The multitude’ might be conceived “as an open and expansive network in which all differences can be expressed freely and equally, a network that provides the means to encounter so that we can work and live in common.” (Hardt & Negri, 2004, p. xiv) According to Hardt and Negri:

The internal differences of the multitude must discover the common that allows them to communicate and act together. The common we share, in fact, is not so much discovered as it is produced. (Hardt & Negri, 2004, p. xv)

A parallel use of the principle of ‘the crowd and transformation’ is explored by Andrea Brighenti in his analysis of the notion of resistance. Basing his arguments on the theoretical perspectives of Michel Foucault and Elias Canetti, Brighenti conceptualizes resistance “as […] an act which is not simply oppositional vis-à-vis power but rather transformative [this being not only] a political act but more generally a human act”. (Brighenti, 2011, p. 59) Therefore he concludes:

Resisting means transforming what is into what could be. It is a movement from being, not towards power, but towards ‘potency’. […] For Canetti, transformation refers to something different from the transformative power of man over nature: it is, in the first place, the transformation of the human being itself, which signifies her/his openness to becoming, […] The crowd retains the capacity to be a transformative moment because it represents the unstable state of undifferentiated differences, the unrestrained thriving of differences. (Brighenti, 2011, p. 74-75)
The following is an selection from an email conversation with a Greek activist participating in the ‘indignados’ protest movement, as recorded in Leona English’s and Peter Mayo’s paper Adult Education and Social Movements. This person’s voice of resistance inside the multitude/the crowd provides important insights into how this kind of participative action warrants difference, commonality and an imagination for ‘what could be’:

I think that there is a genuine desire for change that demands a new relation between the state and the individuals as well as the state and society at large. I think that the movement of the indignants adjusts itself with the movements in the south of Europe and Northern Africa that demand democratic reforms, the restoration of moral values in the political field and economic justice.(English & Mayo, 2012)

2.3 A Pedagogy of Plural Narratives

The world may consist of regions (seen processually) but regions also imagine their own worlds. Area studies must deliberate on this aspect of the relationship between regions as much as any discipline that takes subjectivity and ideology as something more than ephemera in the saga of capital and empire.(Appadurai, 2001, p. 14)

In the last section of this re-narration I shall focus on the epistemological implications for being on the side of the ‘other 98%’. Appadurai comments that “the single greatest obstacle to grassroots globalization – in relation to the global power of capital – is the lack of a clear picture among their key actors of the political, economic and pedagogic advantages of counter-globalization.”(Appadurai, 2001, p. 19) In an essay aptly titled The World Social Forum as epistemology of the South, de Sousa Santos highlights the pedagogic role of social movements in the struggle for a global cognitive justice as a cornerstone for the achievement of global social justice.

In his work, de Sousa Santos talks of two sociologies which re-narrate: the sociology of absences and the sociology of emergences. Owing to limits of this essay, I shall focus mainly on the former.

Santos explores the monolithic rationality of hegemonic globalization as it actively produces non-existence which is “produced whenever a certain entity is disqualified and rendered invisible, unintelligible or discardable”(de Sousa Santos, 2004, p. 16). He identifies five such logics of non-existence: the monoculture of knowledge (turning modern science and high culture into the sole criteria of truth and aesthetic quality), the monoculture of linear time (often formulated as progress, development, modernization), the

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7 Because of the limits of this essay, I will not go into the differences between Social Movements and Protest Movements.
monoculture of naturalization of differences (categorizing populations according to naturalized hierarchies), the monoculture of the universal and the global (entities or realities defined as particular or local are captured in scales that render them not credible alternatives to what exists globally or universally), the monoculture of the criteria of capitalist productivity and efficiency (privileges growth through market forces)." (de Sousa Santos, 2004, p. 16-17) He concludes that there are five principal forms of non-existence: “the ignorant, the residual, the inferior, the local and the non-productive”. "(de Sousa Santos, 2004, p. 18)

Santos re-narrates such monolithic logics by deconstructing them and pluralizing the epistemological possibilities. He identifies five corresponding ‘ecologies’ as the emerging epistemological forms of the World Social Forum.

The ‘ecology of knowledges’ is based on the premise that “all relationship practices between human beings and also between human beings and nature involve more than one form of knowledge and […] ignorance.” "(de Sousa Santos, 2004, p. 19) Thus de Santos claims that “the principle of incompleteness of all knowledges is the condition of the possibility of epistemological dialogue […] among the different knowledges.” "(de Sousa Santos, 2004, p. 20) Such a language of possibility is also reflected in the other ecologies: the ‘ecology of temporalities’, which invites the development of a different time literacy; the ‘ecology of recognitions’ which deconstructs both difference and hierarchy, thus paving the way for “an ecology of differences comprised of mutual recognition”; the ‘ecology of trans-scales’ highlights the facts that there are alternative universal aspirations and that there is no globalization without localization; and the ‘ecology of productivities’ which involves the ‘recuperating and valorizing alternative systems of production, such as workers’ cooperatives.

On the other hand the sociology of emergences focuses on what is ‘not yet’, on possibilities. de Sousa Santos argues that the discourse of possibility is counter-hegemonic since in “considering the three modal categories of existence – reality, necessity and possibility – hegemonic rationality and knowledge focus on the first two and neglect the third entirely” (de Sousa Santos, 2004, p. 30). This sociology is thus an exercise in the active research of possible future experiences.

3. Is there a conclusion?

Taking Leon Tikly’s suggestion I treated globalization as a story with a dominant narrative-line and evidence of spaces for alternative re-narrations. Despite the feeling of fictionality it sometimes emanates, one must constantly keep in mind ‘the brutality of common sense’ (Torres, 2009, p. 6) constantly bombarded by the media and in the schools on one hand, and the actions of
hope of a ‘democracy-to-come’ also to be found in the alternative media and alternative practices in schools on the other. Such mirror images may however remind us that things are not as clear cut, and resistance is first and foremost action and not discourse. This takes us back to the very beginning of this essay, the epistemological challenges to be able to read and react to globalization. Pablo Dávalos, Ecuadorian former Minister of the Economy observes:

we need to turn today to other much more complex theoretical models with a much more interdisciplinary epistemological framework. And what is happening on the Left? We are still criticizing the Washington Consensus when it has already been criticized by the IMF itself and even by the World Bank! (Dávalos, 2012, p. 168)

In the west, drenched as we are in the hegemonic bubble, this might even be more the case. Treating globalization as a narration with the possibility and the potency to be re-narrated might help us to view our struggles in a better perspective, overcoming the simplistic binary-opposition of the hegemonic and the counter-hegemonic in the on-going processes.

References


Other 98%. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://other98.com/about/


