The Dread of Violence and the Lure of Conflict
Contrasting Attitudes to Warfare: the Case of the Hospitaller Order of St John

Ivan Grech
University of Malta

Abstract

From the foundation of the Order of St John in 11th century Syria as a community of lay brethren intent on providing shelter, care and assistance to pilgrims visiting the Holy Land, the destiny of the Hospitaller Knights was irremediably moulded for most of the next millennium. Geography, circumstance, religious ideology, and the pursuit of wealth all conspired to transform the future of the Hospitallers into a violent one, in keeping with the surrounding environment of the Middle East and the rest of the Mediterranean.

The Order’s attitude to conflict changed, however, when the theatre of war shifted from the Mediterranean to mainland Europe. The acquisition of property in Latin Syria helped chart the course of the Order’s history, rendering the Hospitallers sensitive to events on the continent. Any land property in Europe was at risk of intrusion, occupation or exploitation by armies on the move, and the Hospital’s property was no exception.

This study is an analysis of the Order of St John’s contrasting attitudes to violence, and the geographical, political, religious and historical situations that generated such an approach.


From the foundation of the Order of St John in 11th century Syria as a community of lay brethren intent on providing shelter, care and assistance to pilgrims visiting the Holy Land, the destiny of the Knights of St John the Baptist was irremediably moulded for the next seven hundred years. Geography, circumstance, religious ideology, and the pursuit of wealth all conspired to transform the future of these Hospitallers into a violent one, in complete resonance with the surrounding world of the Middle East and the rest of the Mediterranean\(^1\). The momentous rise of Islam from the 7th century AD had altered the political geography of the Mediterranean, forcing the Byzantine Empire onto the defensive as a result of onslaughts from the Seljuk Turks\(^2\) and turning the region into a theatre of permanent conflict which saw Catholics and Muslims locked in a battle for territorial predominance that lasted well into the second millennium.

Shortly after settling in a Jerusalem hospice originally founded by a group of Amalfitan merchants and adopting the Augustinian rule\(^3\), the Hospitallers took up arms in the 12th century only to put them down again towards the end of the 1700s. By then the Order, eroded from within by French intellectual thought, nationalistic fervour, and Revolutionary impetus, succumbed like other European states, far greater in size and resources, to the Napoleonic march, which inequivocally and cruelly exposed the religious institution’s military ineptness, loss of purpose and structural insufficiency in an age of growing continental powers\(^4\).

The transition to a militant fighting unit, similar in composition and nature to that of the Templar and Teutonic military-religious orders\(^5\), resulted in the Hospitallers’ engagement in crusading warfare against the Infidel in Latin Syria. By the fall in 1291 of Acre, the last Christian stronghold in the Holy Land, the Knights Hospitallers’ fighting temperament had been fine-tuned and their efficiency and ruthlessness in combat were comparable to the best fighting corps of the age\(^6\). Throughout these dire years of conflict they had also established a commitment to the Christian cause which, whether for inescapable diplomatic duty, material gain, inevitable defence from aggression or genuine religious zeal, was to remain unwavering for the following centuries\(^7\).
Expulsion from the Holy Land ushered in the island phase of the Order. Sojourns in Cyprus first, after the loss of Acre, and much lengthier ones in Rhodes (1310-1522) and Malta (1530-1798), compelled the Order to review its approach to warfare. Existence within an island context during an age of diverse ideological confrontations, whether deep in enemy territory, as in Cyprus and Rhodes, or on the Christian-Muslim frontier as in the case of Malta, meant that the Order had to go through another conflict-related transformation. The Order's venture into systematic naval warfare is perhaps the most consistently successful, if not the most celebrated, chapter in the military history of this institution. While the sieges of Rhodes (1480 and 1522) and Malta (1565) have claimed a substantial share of historiography's attention, and of popular history in particular, certainly due in no small measure to the aura and fascination that siege drama usually holds on the popular psyche, it is the endeavours of the Order's galley squadron that have elicited the connoisseurs' more knowledgeable focus and admiration. Scholarship has not been short of praise on the Hospitallers' prowess at sea. Their constant harassment of Muslim trade in the Levant, especially in the channel between Rhodes and Asia Minor; their disruption (along with the Tuscan Knights of St Stephen) of enemy merchants along the Alexandria-Constantinople route; their amphibious operations on Greek and Turkish shores; their defiant depredations of Ottoman vessels in the Adriatic in the 17th century (not always sparing Christian and Venetian merchants in the process); their periodic participation in concerted Christian naval expeditions in the Maghreb and the Levant against the Infidel; their regular plying of Maltese waters to protect the island against Barbary pirates – were all activities which established their reputation as efficient fighters at sea. Molly Green calls them 'formidable.' According to John Julius Norwich, they were peerless at naval warfare in the Mediterranean, although he stigmatizes their growing piratical tendencies evident from the 1600s.

Above all, the Hospitallers' maritime exploits against the Turks epitomized the Order's readiness to indulge in conflicts of aggression whenever the opportunity arose. Perhaps another explanation for this behaviour, apart from motivations mentioned earlier, can be sought in the condition the Hospitallers had to endure from the very inception of the Order. Whether stationed in the heart of enemy territory, as in Latin Syria, or surrounded by waters infested with Ottoman vessels, as in Cyprus and Rhodes, or else lying on the fringe of Christendom, more than ever exposed to the raids of the Barbary corsairs, as in Malta, that of the warrior knights was always an uncomfortable life. They hardly ever experienced the luxury, enjoyed by other Christian militias, of a reassuring distance from the enemy. While other Catholic hierarchies, safe within the confines of their territory in the European hinterland, heard about the enemy and received news of its intentions and movements, only occasionally crossing swords with it, the Hospitallers were usually within sight of their foe. Throughout their sojourn in Malta, for example, sightings of enemy vessels in the channel between Sicily and Malta were a very frequent occurrence, as were the rumours and reports of Ottoman prepara-
tions for massive sorties in the Mediterranean, which, whether founded or not, almost unfailingly saw Malta as a potential target. The Hospitallers’ mindset was given no respite from similar reminders of the state of war they had to connive [live?] with.

Such uninterrupted exposure to the enemy meant that, for most of its existence, the Order was on the defensive, a potentially vulnerable situation which was particularly evident in the island phase, where relief from Christendom was always hard to come by. Notwithstanding the huge handicap of fighting the enemy on its own territory (the Muslims had active communication lines and reserves to draw upon), the crusading battles of the years in Syria had the one benefit of being predominantly joint ventures carried out in conjunction with other Christian forces. In Cyprus, Rhodes, and Malta, on the other hand, the Hospitallers were seldom guaranteed the support of other Christian forces. 1480 and 1565 were rightly considered by Christendom as glorious sieges and morale-sapping blows for the enemy, not least because of the heavy losses suffered by the besiegers, but similar victories only managed to repel the aggressor and preserve the stronghold subjected to the onslaught. During the island phase, it was mainly through systematic naval warfare and amphibious operations that the Hospitallers managed to perpetrate the ideal of an aggressive Holy War and to take the conflict into the enemy’s court, thus occasionally reversing their role from defenders to aggressors.

These naval exploits are well recorded in the official histories of the Order. The chronicles that emerge, at times presented also in pamphlet form with the intent of promoting the Order’s cause within Christendom, yield many insights into certain aspects of the Christian front’s attitude to war, violence, and the adversary. Feats like the taking in 1602 of the Muslim stronghold of Maometta, to the east of Tunis in Barbary, were reported with an enthusiasm verging on the gleeful, sparing no descriptive detail as to the number of slaves taken, how the town was breached, ransacked, and set on fire, and how the enemy was massacred. Even if allowance is made for exaggeration, one significant absence from such reports is the sign of any Christian mercy or human pity for the vanquished. These accounts reveal little trace of the spirit of those pioneer hospitaller brethren who in Jerusalem used to cure patients irrespective of their religion. In relating these victories, the chronicler, Dal Pozzo, presumably oblivious of the effect he was creating, conveyed an image of cynicism to posterity which is arduous to reconcile with the Christian ethos. Indeed, the rationale of war which is so pervasive in the Homeric battle sagas of the pre-Christian era, where the slaughter of the enemy was tantamount to glory, still prevailed.

Conversely, when recording the fall of La Goletta in Tunis to the Turks in 1574, the same writer expresses horror and contempt at the loss of Christian blood. While it would be naive on any scholar’s part to expect any form of objectivity from similar contemporary accounts written by victors in bygone eras, such abject bias still warrants a degree of comprehension and contextualization, if not condonation. This was a world of sharp contrasts, distinct religious ideologies, and deeply-rooted divisions. Centuries
of confrontation left little space for any sort of human regard for the foe. There was little room for hesitation or doubt about one’s cause, for defeat in battle more often than not meant death or slavery. Both sides could draw on memories of atrocities suffered at the hands of the enemy. Episodes like the massacre of the population of Jerusalem by the Christian forces in 1099, or the terrible tortures suffered by the Venetian captain Bragadin at the hands of his Turkish captors after the fall of Famagusta, Cyprus, in 1570, are most likely to have reverberated through the centuries, leaving a legacy of fear and hatred of the respective enemy in their wake.

Apart from the laments about the Christian victims of warfare, another scenario in which Hospitaller documents display dread of warfare is primarily when the Order’s property was involved. In fact, the Order’s attitude to conflict changed when the theatre of war shifted from the Mediterranean to mainland Europe. The acquisition of property in Latin Syria through purchase, bequests, or donations helped alter the Order’s course to a degree comparable to the earlier shift from hospital care-givers to a religious military order. More property was acquired in the first half of the 14th century when the Order of the Templars was suppressed and many of their possessions were handed over to the Order of St John. The resulting estates, divided into priories and commanderies throughout Europe, were to condition the life of the Order in many ways. Together with the booties from ongoing corsairing activity, the income from these estates in Europe constituted the main source of livelihood for the Order. The flow of currency to the Convent’s Treasury, largely generated by land produce and the lease of property, was essential for the livelihood of the Hospitaller community and the native populations of their respective base. The responsions, a fixed share of the income of these commanderies which every year had to be sent to the Order’s Convent, were also vital for sustaining the war effort against Islam, which implied the regular fitting out and manning of the galley squadron, the purchase of firearms and ammunition, the occasional recruitment and arming of troops from within local populations, and the building and repair of fortifications.

With these estates, the Order’s destiny attained a continental dimension, and the implications of events on the European stage inevitably increased in pertinence for the Religion. Consequently, the administration of the priories was a constant source of pre-occupation for the Hospitaller hierarchy. Although, as argued above, life in the Mediterranean meant peril on a regular basis for the Hospitallers and their Convent, having the bulk of their property at a reasonably safe distance from the maritime arena of conflict was by no means a guarantee of exemption from problems. Troubles caused by the elements, bad or corrupt administration, and the possibility of taxation or sequestration by local authorities were occurrences the Convent had to face frequently enough.

Apart from similar problems related to the collection of responsions, the Order’s administrative machine occasionally had to deal, often impotently, with another unpleasant and financially punishing situation. Any land property in Europe was at risk of
intrusion, occupation or exploitation by armies on the move, and the Hospital’s property was no exception. The impossibility by landowners of sparing their land from the ravages inflicted by sizeable armies in search of food, lodging, and supplies while on the march characterized all periods in pre-industrial society, but particularly so in the early modern era. A 16th-century observer comments, for example, on how France was being overwhelmed and plundered by an apparently incessant influx of soldiers.

The 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries saw an escalation in the war effort by most European states. According to the scholar Azar Gat, between 1500 and 1750, the major powers of Europe spent more than 50 per cent of their time waging war. It is not surprising that, in the 17th and 18th centuries, European intellectuals started theorizing man’s nature, pondering whether humans are born instinctively violent, as claimed by the political thinker Thomas Hobbes, or whether, as asserted by the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the corruption of the spirit is only consequential to living in a corrosive society which dissolves the natural harmony into which man is born. This was the age when the effects of the military revolution, which had originated in the 14th century, were transforming the dynamics of warfare and the very structure of the state. Firearms were introduced onto the battlefield and on warships, increasing the power of both armies and navies. Siege warfare changed, military fortifications had to be re-thought, and armies grew in size. The costs of financing larger standing armies solicited greater efficiency in tax collection, which could mostly be carried out by strong central governments. Greater wealth, generated by an economy more reliant on a flexible flow of capital and by trade on a global scale, sustained also through transoceanic voyages, permitted these states to increase their military powers and to wage longer wars with larger armies.

The Order itself had been caught in the vortex of military spending which, by the 17th century, saw states dedicating ever larger portions of their revenues to war-related expenses. Since the start of their military campaigns in Syria, the Hospitallers had to upgrade their war effort from one territory and island base to the next, investing consistently in military infrastructure and navy building. The ensuing need of a greater and more regular flow of capital from the European estates increased the strain on the commanderies to deliver and rendered any obstruction to such flow a source of frustration. Other states had problems collecting taxes. The Order had problems collecting its own capital.

More than one magistracy of the Hospitaller Order of St John expressed weariness at the havoc wrought by foreign soldiers on the commanderies. Examples abound. In April 1601, the Duke of Savoy was asked to free the commandery of Morello and its territory from troops lodged there, while later in the same year, the Order’s agent in Naples complained in person to the Viceroy of that kingdom against the dispatch of a battalion to reside on the grounds of the Hospital’s property in Melicucca, Calabria, in southern Italy. Two years later, the same agent, Aponte, again protested to the Viceroy against the “insufferable” presence of Spanish infantry on the Order’s
territory of Drosi, an act that Grand Master Alof de Wigncourt considered “one of the most welcome services” that could have been done for the Hospital. In 1640, the commandery of Casale in the north of Italy was damaged by Spanish troops. In 1649, an appeal was lodged with the authorities of Milan to spare the commandery of Inverno in Pavia from hosting troops, or at least not to increase the number of soldiers that usually resided on the estate, proof that the Order tried to anticipate and prevent the residence of troops on its property whenever it deemed possible. In 1656, damage to the commandery of Montecchio in the northeast of Italy, caused by the influx of Spanish troops, were estimated at around 1000 lire, and in 1702, wars were inhibiting necessary repairs on the commandery of San Giovanni del Cantone in Modena, in northern Italy. That same year, news reached the Convent of damage being inflicted on the commandery of Herrenstrunden in north-western Germany by Dutch and French troops, and in March 1703, it received reports from Cologne that the renting out of Herrenstrunden would not be possible because of severe damage suffered by the property a few months earlier.

The Order’s dread of war on the continent was further justified when local authorities used the pretext of war to impose taxes on Hospitaller property. In 1601, the Duke of Savoy was asked to exempt a Hospitaller property in his territory from certain fiscal impositions which were deemed ‘excessive’, and in 1602, the Prior of the Hospitaller property in Germany requested permission from the Convent to be exempted from delivering to the Treasury the annual share of the responsions due by his priory, the reason being that the Emperor was taxing the commanderies in Germany to finance his wars. A century later in, 1701, the Order appealed to Rome requesting the intervention of the Papal Nuntio in Cologne to try and block the imposition of further war taxes on the Order’s property in Germany decreed by various princes. The then Grand Master Perellos y Roccaful, lamenting the poor state of the Order’s coffers, complained that the German authorities were manipulating events, using them as an “excuse” to increase their revenue. In February 1702, the Order’s agent in Milan was negotiating to spare the Hospitaller estates in Lombardy from the “inevitable” taxes in times of war, and later on that year, the Order was hoping to be exempted from the Viceroy’s decree to tax foreigners in the Kingdom of Naples in order to fund the recruitment of an army. In July, the Neapolitan authorities informed the Order’s agent in the city of their intention to tax all foreigners, Hospitallers included, for one year. That same summer, the Order received some respite when the tax decree on the property of Herrenstrunden was lifted. However, the following year the Royal Court of Naples showed clear intentions of taxing the revenue from the Order’s property in the kingdom. Two years later, the Hospitaller agent in Vienna was to insist to the Emperor that the Order’s estates in the Empire, particularly those of Alsace, were to remain exempt from taxes imposed to finance the Imperial troops. In September 1707, the Hospitaller ambassador in Rome received complaints from the Convent that the “wars spread along all provinces” were
drastically reducing the regular flow of responsions to Malta\textsuperscript{55}, and that same month, in fact, the Order had been informed from Italy of the possibility of new taxes being imposed on its property in Sicily. The Order was also considering effecting a one-off payment to the Sicilian authorities in order to be granted a tax exemption, a ploy which apparently had already been carried out successfully in Naples\textsuperscript{54}.

Efforts to reduce financial losses similar to the one in Sicily betray the Order’s incapacity to defend its property in far-off territories. Distance from the estates and the sheer difference in size and diplomatic muscle between the Order and other European states were apparently insurmountable obstacles for the Hospitaller hierarchy and no amount of lobbying and protests in the main courts of Europe seemed to suffice to remedy the situation\textsuperscript{55}. More than one magistracy blatantly expressed this discomfort in the official outgoing correspondence. In October 1651, Grand Master Lascaris-Castellar spelt out his regrets to a Hospitaller, Spinola, for not being able to grant him the vacant commandery of Inverno because of an ongoing conflict. Spinola was reassured that the administration of the commandery would pass to him once the fighting was over\textsuperscript{56}, though four years later, Spinola was apparently still not in a position to enjoy his benefice. He was advised to be patient. While stating that there was no immediate remedy, the Grand Master explained that God permitted such situations as punishment for one’s sins\textsuperscript{57}. In 1701, notwithstanding the insistent diplomatic efforts of the Hospitaller agent Crivelli in Lombardy, the Order failed to spare its estates in the state of Milan from occupation by French troops which were passing through the state\textsuperscript{58}. In 1703, Commander Schasbergh earned the Convent’s praise for his efforts to save the Order’s estates in north-western Germany from the ravages of war, despite the fact that his attempts until then had proved fruitless\textsuperscript{59}.

Apart from physical damage and financial impositions, the ultimate price that the Order had to pay for war within Christendom was the loss of its commanderies. Between 1709 and 1710, for example, the Grand Master and Council of the Order appointed Baron de Menveldt to mastermind the recovery of its property in the state of Holland and the United Provinces\textsuperscript{60}. In the hope of ensuring success in the negotiations, the Order solicited the intervention of the Pope, the Emperor, the Kings of Spain and France, and the Doge of Venice\textsuperscript{61}, an imposing diplomatic operation for a small state like Hospitaller Malta, itself a measure of the financial relevance that these estates had for the island and the Order.

Although only a supposition, it is quite plausible that the aspiration expressed by various magistracies for the cessation of all conflicts within Christendom\textsuperscript{62} was as much due to vested Hospitaller interests as to a genuine wish for lasting peace between the great powers of Europe. Faced with the inevitability of systematic failure to safeguard the commanderies on the continent and exact the full responsions due to the Convent’s Treasury, the grand masters could do little more than pray for the wars to stop, in the hope that the Order’s property would be spared further tribulation. The Catholic-Protestant
Schism had added a new religious dimension to state conflict in Europe in the early modern period, creating further divisions and antagonisms both within the confines of states and between powers. The resulting turbulence, fighting, and general instability, which peaked during the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), further increased the demands on the Order’s communication network. The Convent in Malta had to be kept regularly updated on the events in Europe in order to monitor the situation of its priories as assiduously as pre-industrial communication standards permitted. Centres like Genoa, for example, a vital hinge between the western Mediterranean, the northern Italian hinterland and European heartlands, kept the Convent updated on the war situations, particularly those involving French and Spanish troops during the Thirty Years’ War.

Conclusion

Whether as predators, besieged defenders, or passive observers of events in far-off lands, the Hospitallers’ existence unfolded in a context of conflict and religious fundamentalism which imposed the taking up of arms on each side of the barricade. The transition to a military role in the 12th century was a statement of intent never to be retracted right up to the last decades of the early modern era. The official histories, chronicles, and documents of the Order bear witness to a single-minded commitment which rarely wavered from or shunned military engagement when elicited by circumstances. Ironically, a rare instance of helplessness when facing the enemy was also a reflection of that kind of violence dreaded by the Hospitaller hierarchy. Malta’s meek surrender to Bonaparte in 1798 was, in a way, an indirect consequence of violent events in the arena of conflict that was late 18th-century France. The nationalization of the French commanderies in 1792 in the wake of the Revolution deprived the Order of its prime assets, crippling it financially and suffocating any hope of resisting the French. By that time, any role that the Order had to play in a Mediterranean, which was in the course of being reshaped by the great powers of Europe, was too small and inconsequential. On leaving Malta, the Hospitallers laid down their swords for good. Whether sought or dreaded, the violence that had accompanied them for centuries was by then a phase of the past. A large part of their continental property had been lost and the old religious enemy had long lost its penetrating force and the credibility of posing any real military threat in the Mediterranean.

One enduring legacy of the Order and its violent past are the fortifications which the Hospitallers and the populations they governed built and repaired with relentless dedication and perseverance right up to the later years of the Hospital’s island phase. While contemporary tensions and concerns have rekindled the debate in historiography on the nexus between religious faith and violence, these imposing physical barriers, though they have long outlived their original purpose, are a testimony to a past of conflict, division, and confrontation, the seeds of which are apparently still latent in modern societies.


Jonathan Riley-Smith divides the military-religious orders into two main categories: the military orders, such as the Hospitaller Order of St John, and the Christian orders of chivalry, which emerged in the 14th century. Riley-Smith, *Towards a History* cit., pp. 269-270.


The occupation of Rhodes had started in 1306 with an attack launched from Cyprus but the Hospitallers only gained full control of the island in 1310. Luttrell, *Malta and Rhodies* cit., p. 258; Sire, *Knights of Malta* cit., pp. 27-28.


Bono, *Naval Exploits and Privateering* cit., passim.

Greene, *The Ottomans* cit., p. 105.

Norwich, *The Middle Sea* cit., pp. 287; 342.


23 For example, Archives of the Order, Malta (AOM) 1381, Alof de Wignacourt to Straticò (Messina), ff. 215v-216r, 18 August 1602; AOM 1381, Alof de Wignacourt to the Duke of Savoy, ff. 216-218, 18 August 1602, Relazione della Presa della Mahometta; Dal Pozzo, Historia cit., vol. 1, pp. 461-463.

24 Riley-Smith, Towards a History cit., p. 278.


26 Norwich, The Middle Sea cit., p. 319.


29 Ibid., pp. 204-205; For examples of problems related to sequestration of Hospitaller property by the Republic of Venice see Mallia-Milanes, Venice and Hospitaller Malta cit., passim.


32 Ibid., pp. 5-6, 11-12.


34 Grech, Flow of Capital cit., pp. 196, 204-205.

35 AOM 1380, Alof de Wignacourt to the Duke of Savoy, ff.70v – 71r, 10 April 1601.

36 AOM 1380, Alof de Wignacourt to Aponte (Naples), f.181, 25 July 1601.

37 AOM 1382, Alof de Wignacourt to Aponte (Naples), f.52v, 17 January 1603.

38 AOM 1419, Lascaris-Castellar to Spinola (Genoa), f.82v, 16 June 1640.


40 AOM 1646, Lascaris-Castellar to Spreti (Venice), ff.273v – 274r, 26 August 1656.

41 AOM 1463, Perellos y Roccaful to Rondinelli (Modena), ff.192v – 193r, 5 December 1702.

42 AOM 1463, Perellos y Roccaful to Bourscheid (Cologne), f.197v, 22 December 1702.

43 AOM 1464, Perellos y Roccaful to Bourscheid (Cologne), f.73, 16 June 1703.

44 AOM 1380, Alof de Wignacourt to the Duke of Savoy, ff.70v – 71r, 10 April 1601.

45 AOM 1381, Alof de Wignacourt to the Prior of Germany, ff.195v – 196r, 12 August 1602.

46 AOM 1462, Perellos y Roccaful to Prior Sacchetti, Hospitaller Ambassador in Rome, ff.113 – 114r, 19 August 1701.

47 AOM 1463, Perellos y Roccaful to Crivelli (Milan), f.42r, 10 February 1702.

48 AOM 1463, Perellos y Roccaful to Ceva Grimaldi (Naples), f.75r, 25 April 1702.

49 AOM 1463, Perellos y Roccaful to Ceva Grimaldi (Naples), f. 127r, 12 July 1702.

50 AOM 1463, Perellos y Roccaful, to Bourscheid (Cologne), f. 118, 26 June 1702.

51 AOM 1464, Perellos y Roccaful to Gallucci (Naples), f.51v, 28 April 1703.

52 AOM 1466, Perellos y Roccaful to Dietrechstein (Vienna), ff. 157v – 158r, 28 November 1705.
53 AOM 1468, Perellos y Roccaful to Prior Sacchetti, Hospitaller Ambassador in Rome, f.123, 7 September 1707.
54 AOM 1468, Perellos y Roccaful to Riggio (Palermo), f.125, 8 September 1707.
55 For a brief outline of the Order’s diplomatic network and lobbying in European courts see Grech, Struggling Against Isolation cit., p. 166.
56 AOM 1428, Lascaris-Castellar to Spinola (Genoa), f.173v, 31 October 1650; AOM 1429, Lascaris-Castellar to Spinola (Genoa), f.135v, 15 October 1651.
57 AOM 1432, Lascaris-Castellar to Spinola (Genoa), f.149, 11 September 1655.
58 AOM 1462, Perellos y Roccaful to Crivelli (Milan), f.52, 13 April 1701.
59 AOM 1464, Perellos y Roccaful to Schasbergh, ff.45v – 46r, 28 April 1703.
60 AOM 1470, Perellos y Roccaful to Gosvino Hermanno, Baron de Menveldt (Munster), f.190r, 31 December 1709.
61 AOM 1470, Perellos y Roccaful to Doge of Venice, f.53v, 22 April 1709; Perellos y Roccaful to Marino (Venice), ff. 53v – 54r, 22 April 1709.
62 Two examples: AOM 1417, Lascaris-Castellar to Spinola (Genoa), ff.196v – 197r, 13 October 1638; AOM 1470, Perellos y Roccaful to Dietrichstein (Vienna), f. 53, 22 April 1709.
63 Grech, Struggling Against Isolation cit., pp. 165-171.
64 Some examples: AOM 1416, Lascaris-Castellar to Spinola (Genoa), f.147r, 19 September 1637; AOM 1417, Lascaris-Castellar to Spinola (Genoa), f. 143v, 30 July 1638; Lascaris-Castellar to Spinola (Genoa), ff.196v – 197r, 13 October 1638; Lascaris-Castellar to Spinola (Genoa), f.204v, 4 November 1638; AOM 1418, Lascaris-Castellar to Spinola (Genoa), f.21v, 6 February 1639; Lascaris-Castellar to Spinola (Genoa), f.98, 24 May 1639; Lascaris-Castellar to Spinola (Genoa), f.111v, 16 June 1639; AOM 1421, Lascaris-Castellar to Spinola (Genoa), f.31v, 19 January 1643.
66 For the Hospitallers’ faith in the 19th century and how they relinquished their military role see Riley-Smith, Towards a History cit., pp. 282-284.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


