European Security in the 1990s and Beyond: The Implications of the Accession of Cyprus and Malta to the European Union[1]

JOHN REDMOND and RODERICK PACE

For the last decade, the dramatic events in eastern and central Europe have (rightly) dominated the security debate in Europe and, indeed, the wider world. One of the consequences of this has been that the traditional neglect of the Mediterranean region has been compounded. However, there are now signs – notably the recent Barcelona conference at which the European Union's Mediterranean policy was relaunched and extended (to incorporate the grand design of a Mediterranean free trade area) – that the Mediterranean is, at last, receiving some of the attention it deserves and justifies.

More specifically, Malta and Cyprus are due to begin accession negotiations with the EU six months after the end of the EU's 1996–97 intergovernmental conference.[2] This will raise a number of important security issues which will have to be addressed. First of all, as regards Cyprus, the *de facto* division of the island – the 'Cyprus problem' – continues to determine further progress on its membership quest even though officially it has been claimed that the two problems have effectively been separated. Malta's main challenge lies in adapting its neutrality, enshrined in the Constitution, with the requirements of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). These major problems apart, there are a number of broader issues related to these two small states' participation in a larger Union which need closer examination. For example, both states have in the past been active members of the non-aligned movement. Both worked closely within the neutral and non-aligned group in the heyday of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and would therefore not find it difficult to reactivate such collaboration with Austria, Ireland, Sweden and Finland. Furthermore, Cyprus and Malta enjoy special bilateral relations with two of the present EU and NATO member states: Cyprus with Greece, with which it has a defence agreement, and Malta with

John Redmond is in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TH; Roderick Pace is in the European Research and Documentation Centre, University of Malta.

Italy, which is the only country which offers Malta military guarantees of its neutrality. Moreover, Cyprus and Malta occupy a geostrategic position in the Mediterranean of some importance to the security of the European Union itself.

A number of problems are related to their participation in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In the first place, what shape is the CFSP likely to have in a European Union of more than twenty members? What are the security and foreign policy concerns which are likely to dominate the enlarged Union? What security and foreign policy concerns do Cyprus and Malta have, and how do they envisage addressing these by their participation in the process of European integration? A corollary question is whether the EU's and the applicants' security and foreign policy aims pull in the same direction. If they do, then membership has negligible political problems for the Union. If they do not, then it is important to examine what their likely impact on the Union will be.

The Background: Malta and Cyprus's Relations with the European Union

From the early 1960s, when the two island states first approached the European Community to establish a relationship with it, in the aftermath of the United Kingdom's first application to join the EU, security questions hardly featured at all, but economic ones did prominently, primarily the need to safeguard their fragile position in the UK market. Cyprus had just become independent and Malta was on the way to achieving its independence but still their state of economic dependence on the United Kingdom was virtually absolute. However, when they eventually signed association agreements with the EU in the early 1970s, the question of UK membership actually featured much less, if at all in the case of Malta.[3] Both countries sought closer ties with the EU as one of a number of factors in their overall economic development strategy, especially the need for greater market access and diversification, in the last analysis in an attempt to transform dependence into interdependence. To a large degree, both succeeded in achieving these aims. In the case of Malta, the impact on the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) and economic growth attributed to the association agreement have been well documented.[4] As for Cyprus, the agreement did not have a similar impact in its first decade for several reasons, primarily the economic devastation caused by the Turkish invasion, the magnetic pull of the Middle Eastern markets following the first oil shock, the re-opening of the Suez Canal, and last, but not least, the Lebanese civil war which bestowed on Cyprus some of Lebanon's characteristics as the 'gateway to the Middle East'. However, when the Near East markets lost

their pull following the fall in oil prices in the mid-1980s, Cyprus was compelled to shift its attentions westwards, and the EU–Cyprus Association Agreement became extremely useful.[5]

Economic imperatives are still a major factor in the Maltese and Cypriot applications to join the EU. Their present association agreements have been devalued by certain developments, especially the EU's internal market programme, enlargement, the prospects of further enlargement, the proliferation of similar association agreements, and further trade liberalization as a result of the recent Uruguay Round. Their competitive edge in the EU is also eroded by the fact that structural funds flow to the Union's own Mediterranean backward regions, but not to them. These considerations alone make EU membership or, at the very least, participation in the EU's internal market extremely attractive to Cyprus and Malta. Furthermore, as outsiders with extensive links with the EU, they are constrained more and more to adapt most of the Union's legislation, or socio-economic structures, more so in the case of Cyprus which has a customs union agreement with the EU, without participating in its decision-making process. Their membership bids are thus driven by economic considerations and, to that extent, political and security issues are secondary.

However, there remain some serious political and security issues which have to be taken into account. First, there are 'general' issues common to both, such as the declining importance of non-alignment and neutrality in the post-Cold War era as well as growing instability in the Mediterranean region itself. Such problems are magnified when confronted by micro-states, although the specific problem of non-alignment can actually be dismissed rather easily: the movement never guaranteed any real security to the two states but served them both to underline their freedom from superpower rivalry during the Cold War. It was clearly not a certificate of innocence in a world corrupted by superpower rivalry. Both island states sought to extract dividends by exploiting this rivalry: Cyprus tried to strengthen its hand in international diplomacy against Turkey over the 'Cyprus Question' while Malta attempted to extract financial guarantees for its peculiarly defined 'neutrality based on non-alignment'. The end of the Cold War has pulled the rug from underneath the non-aligned movement and there are no more superpower rivalries to exploit. Hence, both Cyprus and Malta face no big problems in jettisoning non-alignment; in fact, it is the EU which sees non-alignment as problematical because of the difficulties that adhering to such a policy may imply for the CFSP. Nevertheless, even if this issue can be easily resolved, there remain others which will have to be clarified before the two applicants participate in the CFSP, in particular their approach to the general question of (in)stability in

the Mediterranean region and the question of Malta's neutrality and its compatibility with the CFSP, matters which cannot be dismissed easily.

The Cyprus Question and Membership

The treatment of the 'Cyprus problem' has gone through an interesting series of ups and downs in the European Union. The Commission had initially linked the issue of membership and the *de facto* division of the island closely in a document[6] presented to the Lisbon Council in June 1992. Up to that point there appeared to have been a broad consensus on this issue.[7] This was the position subsequently reiterated in the Commission's Opinion on the application of Cyprus.[8] However, on the insistence of Greece, the European Council meeting in Corfu established that the next EU enlargement will involve Cyprus and Malta.[9] This part of the Corfu European Council Declaration was interpreted by Greece and Cyprus as having effectively separated the issue of Cypriot membership from the question of the prior resolution of the 'Cyprus problem'.[10] However, it was not clear that this view was shared by the rest of the EU. It was not until Greece blocked further progress on the EU–Turkey Customs Union Agreement in 1995 that the rest of the Union apparently came round to this position when, in June 1995, the European Council meeting in Cannes reaffirmed that 'negotiations on the accession of Malta and Cyprus to the Union will begin on the basis of Commission proposals, six months after the conclusion of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and taking the outcome of that Conference into account'.[11] That is where the legal position stands at present.

In its international dealings, the (Greek) Cypriot government speaks for the whole of Cyprus including the north, even though it exercises no control over it. The EU has always accepted this and dealt with the authorities in Nicosia as representing the whole territory of the island. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is recognized only by Turkey. The European Court's July 1994 decision, whereby agricultural products from the TRNC were not to be allowed into the EU unless accompanied by the proper phytosanitary certificates issued by the competent Cypriot authorities,[12] effectively makes the solution of the 'Cyprus problem' an internal Cypriot issue.

However, the accession of Cyprus before a solution of the 'Cyprus problem' will in fact mean that only the southern, Greek Cypriot part will form part of the EU. The Turkish Cypriots have stated that if negotiations commence with Cyprus the northern part of Cyprus may become an autonomous region of Turkey. Indeed, Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktash has suggested that accession of the Greek Cyprus to the EU would

effectively solve the 'Cyprus problem' 'on the basis of two separate republics' and went on to describe such a move as 'Enosis[13] through the EC'.[14] However, an alternative scenario would be to draw a parallel with Germany, where the West was a member for many years before being joined by the East. Similarly for Cyprus, the south could join first and the Turkish North later. This comparison may be crude but it does suggest that a divided country may be able to join the EU without inflicting damage on itself or on the process of European integration.

However, a better rationale for believing that the 'Cyprus problem' would not cause difficulties after the Cypriot accession can be put forward on the basis of three reasons:

- The EU and its institutions will strenuously avoid direct involvement in internal Cypriot disputes. The past attitude of Brussels to events in Northern Ireland and, more specifically, in Cyprus itself strongly suggest this.

- The Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots do not want to renew hostilities as both sides perceive advantages in the present situation. Events in Nicosia in August 1996 indicate the depth of feeling in both Cypriot communities but there is very little support for a return to the excesses of the past.[15]

- In the wider context the Cypriot problem is loosing its importance as it becomes one of many potential and, in the case of ex-Yugoslavia in particular, actual flashpoints in the Mediterranean region.

Clearly, these arguments presume the existence of a certain amount of rationality which has not always been apparent in Cyprus and the 'Cyprus problem' could escalate very quickly. However, this remains the least likely scenario.

Somewhat paradoxically, the crisis in Cyprus caused by the Turkish invasion in 1974 was one of the first real tests of the EU's then newly established European Political Cooperation (EPC) procedure, of which the CFSP is a development. Initially, consultations proceeded quickly and efficiently and a common position was reached, in part because of the strong leadership of France which then held the Presidency of the Council. However, in the longer term, very little was achieved.[16] The root causes of this failure were the different views of EU member states and the unwillingness of those member states with potential influence to exert it. Ultimately, the EU adopted a neutral position, caught between a desire to support the newly democratic Greece and the need to avoid alienating Turkey, which played a vital role within NATO, and the 'common policy' was reduced to no more than the issuing of statements.[17] The EU was

equally powerless when the Turks intervened for a second time in August 1974. Its policy then and since has essentially been to fall in line behind the Americans and the United Nations.

The second reason, highlighted above, why a divided Cyprus may not necessarily hold back the Cypriot membership bid, was the apparent acceptance of the current *de facto* division of the island and disinclination to renew active hostilities. Since 1974 Greek Cypriots have rebuilt their economy on the basis of tourism, the influx of foreign banks, offshore companies, and world merchant marines. Renewed hostilities would undermine the confidence on which prosperity has been built and lead to another economic collapse. Similarly, the Turkish Cypriots are seeking to promote economic development through tourism, albeit on a smaller scale, and Turkey itself is pursuing its interests elsewhere in the region and finds a peaceful Cyprus convenient. More generally, the Turkish Cypriots have a much valued sense of security and behind a Turkish military shield have established a comparatively comfortable milieu in which there is underemployment but little unemployment, adequate housing, medical and educational provision and much state feather bedding. There is thus little incentive to restart hostilities. As regards Cyprus, Turkey is a contented power. The 'Cyprus problem' has, as Cypriot President Clerides claimed in August 1995, settled into a stalemate.[18] The proposal to start confidence-building measures under UN auspices has not made any headway. Similarly, the Greek Cypriot proposal for a demilitarization of the island – involving a Turkish withdrawal and the dismantlement of the Greek Cypriot national guard – have been ignored by Turkey. Ex-Turkish Prime Minister Çiller had said that Turkey would be ready for a solution of the 'Cyprus problem' only after Turkey joins the EU.

It might be expected that Cypriot EU membership would promote the continuation of this peaceful coexistence. However, an aggressively anti-Turk or anti-Turkish Cypriot policy stance within the EU by the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots would endanger it, especially if Turkey had been further disenchanted by the Greek Cypriot accession. Much will depend on Greece's behaviour. Recent history suggests that Greece may use its advantage of EU membership to condition Turkey's behaviour. Accordingly, 'the road to normalization and eventual accession of Turkey to the EC passes through Athens ... Greece's conditionality policy seeks to increase the cost associated with some Turkish policies ... and to modify through indirect pressure, Turkey's behaviour on issues considered vital to Greece'.[19] Alternatively, Greece could cultivate opportunities for reconciliation, paying special attention to the utility of confidence-building measures in Cyprus and the Aegean.[20] For a while during 1995, Greece appeared to mellow only for relations with Turkey to worsen once again

over the Aegean; indeed, antagonism towards Turkey caused Greece to
continue to block EU financial aid to the Mediterranean non-member
countries under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Furthermore, recent
Greek behaviour in the Balkans has been such that Greece was considered
part of the Balkan problem and not its solution.[21] Mutual suspicion
continues. For example, the Turkish view that the 'declared Greek
Government policy [is] that they have to take up the protection of the
Hellens abroad'[22] is matched by a Greek perception that 'Ankara's grand
strategy aims at boosting the world role of Turkic and Islamic nations
stretching from Central Asia to central Yugoslavia.'[23]

Greece's pan-Hellenic policy has found its echo in Cyprus. In 1994
Cyprus and Greece concluded a new defence pact which would lead in
stages to the unification of the two countries' defence plans. Following a
meeting in Athens between the Cyprus National Council and the Greek
Government, the two sides promised close co-operation and a joint struggle
'against all adversaries'.[24] Cyprus has been engaged in a rearmament
programme of its own, acquiring the French MM-40 surface-to-surface
Exocet missile.[25] The Greek defence minister, Geraasimos Arsenis, was
reported to have said during a visit to Cyprus in July 1995, that 'the
Common Defence dogma between Cyprus and Greece will be the magnet
that will unite Hellenism and will not divide it. He stressed that the joint
defence dogma is an integral aspect of Greece's defence strategy and thus
when defence matters are discussed, that will inevitably be discussed too.
The strengthening of Cyprus's defence is a necessary precondition for the
security of the island.'[26] Taking advantage of NATO's ability to reduce
conventional forces under the CFE Treaty by 'cascading' them into alliance
partners, Greece and Turkey each received hundreds of tanks and other
pieces of equipment mostly from the United States and Germany during
1993. Turkey alone received 1,017 tanks and Greece accepted delivery of
725 tanks. By the end of 1995, both countries were to achieve lower CFE
ceilings[27] which means that most of the equipment received would be used
to modernize the armed forces. Hence, while both sides may continue to
exhibit restraint, the situation could easily explode.

One important consideration is that many EU member states are
increasingly becoming impatient with Greece's attitude in the Union and
might not easily condone a Greek return to hostilities against Turkey. These
same factors operate as well *vis-à-vis* Cyprus which will find it difficult to
use its EU membership to apply pressure on Turkey. This lack of patience
with the Cypriots has become increasingly apparent generally. In late 1994,
in the face of continued lack of progress towards a settlement in Cyprus, the
UN Secretary-General raised the possibility of reallocating scarce UN
resources to tackle disputes elsewhere.[28] The frustration which this reflected

had been graphically stated much earlier by the Foreign Minister of one of the contributing countries to the peacekeeping operation (UNFICYP) in 1992: 'I cannot explain to our tax payers that they are financing the peaceful development of the economy of Cyprus by paying for our troops there while the Cypriot leaders have the luxury to reject every settlement proposal they do not embrace one hundred per cent ... to hell with them.'[29]

The Danes and the Canadians duly left UNFICYP in 1992 and 1993 respectively (to be replaced eventually by the Argentineans) and this was followed by a temporary Russian veto on the UN element of the funding of the UNFICYP. Obviously, the interest and the patience of the international community is approaching its limits. This partly reflects the fact that the 'Cyprus problem' is being pushed down the agenda by the (actual and potential) much more violent ethnic disputes elsewhere in the region or nearby, notably in ex-Yugoslavia. This growing concern with other parts of the region also influences Greek and Turkish policies and, therefore, increases the chances of continued peaceful coexistence of the two communities in Cyprus. Indeed, the Cyprus 'solution' has actually been put forward as a model for settling disputes elsewhere.[30] Inversely, pacification in the Balkans and the reimposition of Russian control in Central Asia would have the opposite effects.

Thus, while there would seem to be good reasons for supposing that a settlement of the 'Cyprus problem' is no longer a prerequisite for Cypriot membership of the EU, the forces which could make the Cypriot accession problematic may not be easily contained and may manifest themselves through other channels. Accession by Cyprus with the north joining later – on the German model – is a possibility and, indeed, (Greek) Cypriots argue that membership itself will have a positive effect on the solution of the 'Cyprus problem'. The demonstration effect of membership might convince Turkish Cypriots that some compromise on the 'Cyprus problem' is a price worth paying for the benefits of joining the EU. More important than this though, would be the Turkish reaction if the Greek Cypriots are allowed into the EU while Turkey and the TRNC are left out. This is because, although the division of Cyprus has commanded centre-stage in the debate over Cypriot accession to the EU, it is the impact which the Cypriot membership would have on Greece's relationship with its partners and, in particular, Turkey's relations with the EU, that is most important, particularly from a security perspective. Indeed, Turkey has already reacted very negatively to the way Greece has linked its customs union agreement to the fixing of a definite date for the start of negotiations with Cyprus and Malta. Moreover, the expressions of Turkish displeasure prompted, in turn, a predictably furious Greek response.[31]

The EU's relationship with Turkey has indeed been a troubled one. The

'Cyprus problem' has always been a factor, but the difficulties run much deeper. Turkey has pursued a European identity since the time of Atatürk and arguably even earlier and has always sought a close relationship of some kind with the EU. It has had an association agreement with the EU since 1963 and applied for membership in 1987, receiving a negative opinion in 1989.[32] In its view the Commission singled out the 'Cyprus problem', various other political problems, the poor state of relations with Greece and the economic unpreparedness of Turkey to join the EU as the main reasons for not opening negotiations. In some quarters there are also religious and cultural concerns regarding Turkey eligibility for membership. . With hindsight, Turkey's greatest mistake was not applying at the same time as Greece had done in the late 1970s. This failure was due to domestic difficulties and the military coup of 1980 which did not permit an application to the EU until democracy was restored in Turkey.[33] However, the one positive aspect relates to Turkey's strategic position and the pivotal role it plays in the western security system. This creates a dilemma for the European Union, as it feels a need to accommodate Turkey but is unwilling to offer full membership of the Union in the foreseeable future.

During the Cold War, both due to its membership of NATO and its geostrategic position, Turkey had a key role 'as a pillar against the threat of Soviet expansion out of the Black Sea, and against that of Arab and Iranian turmoil in the Middle East.'[34] Bordering the USSR, Turkey constituted an essential part of the exposed south-eastern flank of NATO and therefore the EU had every reason to keep good relations with Turkey. Indeed EU relations with Turkey ebbed and flowed with the degree of perception of the Soviet threat. Thus following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the EU was ready to offer concessions and to try to rescue the association agreement. When the Cold War ended, Turkey's position became pivotal again as demonstrated during the Gulf crisis and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In fact Turkey's strategic position has increased in importance as it is virtually surrounded by areas of high risk to western and world security: the Balkans, the Transcaucasian region of the former USSR, the former Soviet republics in Central Asia as well as the Near and Middle East, especially Iraq. Turkey is, in fact, at the centre of a crescent-shaped wedge of territory stretching from Kazakhstan to the Gulf and Suez and finally to the North African coast, containing the most volatile collection of states in the world. Turkey can play two roles: first, as a staging post for any future allied force required in the Middle East; secondly, as a model to other Islamic states in the region that they too can construct a secular, democratic and prosperous nation. If it is accepted that the whole focus of security concerns and of NATO has swung from East–West to North–South, then Turkey and the Mediterranean region are of critical importance.[35]

Hence, it has become of utmost importance that Turkey be integrated with the West and therefore good relations between Greece and Turkey have become essential. Unfortunately, the Greco-Turkish relationship remains as volatile as ever, as witnessed by the events surrounding the conclusion of the customs union agreement with Turkey and recent developments in the Aegean; these were triggered by Greece's insistence on extending its territorial sea as part of a new Law of the Sea agreement signed by the EU, and flared up when Turkey threatened military force against a few islands in the region. Disputes in the Aegean involve not only the delimitation of the territorial sea but also the militarization of certain Aegean islands, delimitation of the continental shelf and airspace limits.

The impact of Greek Cypriot accession may well be the final straw that drives the Turks to renewed, open conflict with Greece and the curtailment of its pro-European line. The pressure exerted by the Islamic party, now in government, make this more likely. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Mutaz Soysal, had said, 'NATO is no more the backbone of Turkish policy ... our interest may not coincide point by point with our traditional allies.'[36] The message appears clear: Turkey should not be taken for granted any more. Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the argument, because, realistically, Turkey's options are limited. Leaving aside the unlikely policy of armed neutrality,[37] Turkey has three genuine options: pursuing the project of a Black Sea Cooperation Zone; the establishment of a Turkic commonwealth centred around Turkey and involving the former central Asian republics with significant Turkic populations; and stronger ties with the Arab countries of the Middle East through more extensive Turkish participation in the Islamic Conference Organization, and, perhaps, eventually through the creation of a Middle East common market.

The security implications of all the three options are at best uncertain. The last of these would be an aggressively Islamic shift which is regarded as extremely undesirable in the EU, although the lukewarm reception of Turkish advances to the Arab world since the entry into government of the Welfare party makes this an unlikely scenario. However, whilst Turkey may well not abandon its European orientation, it may become a much more difficult partner for the EU. Consequently, the EU will have to tread carefully if it is to ensure that it does not pay a high price for accommodating the Greek Cypriots, in the shape of a highly detrimental effect on security in the south east Mediterranean and surrounding areas by alienating the Turks. Ultimately, the major implication of Cypriot accession to the Union may have little to do with Cyprus and rather more to do with the triangular relationship between Turkey, Greece and the rest of the European Union.

Malta's Neutrality and EU Membership

In its opinion on Malta's membership of the European Union, the European Commission stated that, 'the Maltese Government's statement that it is in the country's interest to subscribe to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) does not alter the fact that it might be necessary to amend the Constitution if Malta is to participate fully in that policy as it develops over the next few years.'[38] The accession of three neutral states in the last enlargement brings to four the neutral club within the Union. The addition of Malta will increase the number to five.

Neutrality has been described as an elastic concept because of the differing meanings which it has been given by states claiming to adhere to such a policy. Malta's definition of neutrality was inserted in the Constitution in 1987 and requires a two-thirds majority in Parliament to be amended.[39] The former prime minister of Malta, Dr Eddie Fenech Adami has described the definition of neutrality as being *sui generis*. While addressing the WEU Assembly in June 1994, Guido de Marco, the former Maltese foreign minister, followed the same line taken by the EFTA neutrals prior to their EU membership, declaring that Malta's neutral status would not stand in the way of its full participation in the CFSP, which is Europe's declared *finalités politiques*.[40] In April 1995 Malta joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) while a dialogue was started with the WEU in line with 'the development of links between Cyprus and Malta and the European Union'.[41] In October 1996 Malta left the PfP, the first act of the new Labour government in office. However, the dialogue with the WEU may continue given that Malta intends seeking security guarantees with the EU. In the event of membership of the EU, Malta would probably join the WEU as an observer like the rest of Europe's neutrals. The participation of Europe's neutrals in the EU and WEU has been seen as making the merger of the two institutions even more difficult.[42]

The evolution of the concept of neutrality in the post-Cold War era is another factor which has important implications for Malta. Neutral states are finding it very hard to establish a role for themselves in a world free from the traditional antagonisms of the Cold War. Moreover, neutrality is seen as a serious obstacle in their participation in regional integration efforts both at the economic and political level. European neutrals cannot partake of the benefits of economic integration while at the same time maintain an aloofness from Europe's security structures. A further complication is that neutrality has not been defined in the same way by all states. Finland maintained a policy of neutrality because it shared a common frontier with the Soviet Union.[43] Austria followed a policy of neutrality in the post-Second World War period in return for the removal of Soviet occupation

forces from its territory. Switzerland's perpetual neutrality was guaranteed in international law in 1815 and traditionally goes back much further, but it is also capable of defending itself. Besides, during the Cold War, Switzerland lay well inside the perimeter of NATO's defence, so that the very deterrent which protected Western democracies also protected the Swiss.[44] Much the same argument could be made for Sweden.

At the multilateral level, the neutral states have also lost their importance. For example, in the CSCE, they had participated and coordinated their efforts as the 'Neutral and Non-Aligned' group and played an important mediating role between East and West. The end of the Cold War put an end to this role. European neutrals have therefore modified their concept of neutrality, limiting it only to the defence field but not in the area of foreign policy where they intend to continue to take a very active role, especially in peacekeeping efforts where they all enjoy extensive experience. This policy of dividing defence from foreign policy has also been made easier by European Union membership which provides them with an additional collective security dividend. Yet in the longer run, it is also likely that the divisions which have separated the defence, economic and foreign policy components of the EU's external action become more blurred in which case the European neutrals will either find it harder to integrate in all aspects of the CFSP or will have to modify further their own policies.

It is in this general framework in which Malta's neutrality should be discussed. The backdrop of such a discussion of Malta's foreign policy and neutrality must be the change in government which occurred in 1987, which brought to an end the anti-western socialist administration of Dom Mintoff and his successor and ushered in the pro-western Christian Democratic government (Nationalist Party) of Edward Fenech Adami, committed to Malta's membership of the European Union. In the context of EU membership it was not only the European Commission which raised the issue of compatibility between neutrality and membership, but also the then opposition socialist party which opposed membership of the EU. The opposition declared the PfP membership to be contrary to the Maltese Constitution but stopped short of challenging the move in the courts. It has since been elected to power and has left the PfP. When in opposition the Labour Party proposed that a future Labour government, while keeping Malta out of the EU, would seek security guarantees from the Union.[45] Since the Union has not developed a defence arm yet, such an arrangement with the EU, if it came into effect, would either be void of essential meaning or would amount to a situation where the defence of Malta would be entrusted to the WEU, but relying on NATO.

Malta's neutrality and security have come to depend solely on Italy. Past

attempts at diversification by enticing more countries to pledge guarantees have failed. Had they succeeded the efficiency of such guarantees would also have been in doubt as is amply clear by what happened to Cyprus whose territorial inviolability was also guaranteed by three powers. The other consideration is that although neutrality was inserted in the Maltese Constitution only in 1987, the definition given in the Constitution was the same as that obtaining in the 1980 Italo-Maltese neutrality agreement. Hence the 1987 amendment made constitutionally binding only what was accepted in practice in the period 1980–87. Far from following a passive foreign policy, in the period 1980–87, Malta signed two secret treaties with North Korea,[46] and a Friendship Treaty with Libya in 1984, comprising a protocol on security committing both sides to a 'continuous exchange of information on matters of special interest to the mutual security and defense purposes of the other side'.[47]

Lastly, the socialist administration had linked the definition of Maltese neutrality with non-alignment. The bill by which the constitutional amendments were proposed to Parliament included in its title that the aim was to include in the constitution 'the status of neutrality based on non-alignment'. Whilst piloting the bill in Parliament in 1986, the Socialist Prime Minister Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici, who had succeeded Dom Mintoff, elaborated the concept further: 'The policy and status of neutrality are qualified by the principles of non-alignment; they do not exist in a vacuum or in the abstract but it is specifically stated that the status of neutrality is based on the principle of non-alignment. And the principles of non-alignment are very simple because they refer to the two most powerful powers on earth, to America and Russia and the blocs that are bound to America and Russia. Therefore there can be no difficulty or doubts as to the true meaning of neutrality based on the principles of non-alignment.'[48]

The end of the Cold War has also thrown the non-aligned movement into disarray, since it has removed the very basis of its existence. In the brand of socialism practised in Malta during the 1970s and 1980s, non-alignment was as much a domestic necessity as a foreign policy choice. Maltese leaders sought to use membership of the movement as a means to show their public that following the end of the British military bases in Malta they had not only become 'independent' but could also steer an independent course from the West. Similarly, non-alignment became a cover-up in their attempt to exploit superpower rivalries in order to obtain financial aid from the West. This was the ploy used in the neutrality agreement concluded with Italy which was also accompanied by a financial protocol providing financial aid to Malta.

The uncertainties now surrounding the status of neutrality and non-alignment described above, together with the unstable situation in the

Mediterranean region – especially the vulnerabilities derived from Malta's size and its strategic position – may well lead Malta to conclude that membership of the European Union provides its best guarantee of future security. From an EU perspective this increases the probability that Maltese accession to the Union will not cause problems for the development of the CFSP.

Malta, Cyprus and the CFSP

Thus far, the focus has been mainly on 'internal' (to Malta and Cyprus) aspects of the impact of further Mediterranean enlargement of the EU. However, whilst Malta and Cyprus clearly raise very specific matters, there are also 'external' issues – that is, the likely impact of their accession on the broader question of the development of the EU's CFSP and any future common defence policy. There are three fundamental strands to this issue.

Firstly, there is the question of the worth of non-alignment and neutrality in a world which has moved on in such a way as to make them increasingly meaningless and devalued concepts. This has to be set against the clear benefits of EU membership, not only in terms of economic advantage but (less tangibly) political and arguably also security interests. The presumption has to be, perhaps more so in the Cypriot case, that any rational calculation would lead Malta and Cyprus to put aside their neutrality and non-alignment if it were to threaten the gains from EU accession. In any case, their current status has done little to prevent military intervention in Cyprus while, in the case of Malta, its security and neutrality are guaranteed by Italy which may pick and choose whether to use military force in case of serious violation of Malta's sovereignty.

Secondly, the CFSP (and certainly the 'common defence policy' of the EU), as they currently stand, are so undeveloped as to be quite compatible with neutrality and non-alignment. The CFSP is very minimal and all the Treaty of European Union really does is to set out a number of broad objectives which are clearly acceptable to a group of essentially similar western democratic nations. Moreover, it is likely that policy will develop only very slowly and in relatively flexible ways. WEU is a particular problem. For example, it is far from clear how it can be absorbed by the EU as its 'defence arm' when the membership of the two organizations does not even overlap.

This leads to the third and final point, Malta and Cyprus will not be alone – there are already four neutral states within the EU (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden); and the case of Denmark which, in accordance with Section C of the decision adopted by the European Council in Edinburgh on 11–12 December 1992, does not participate in the elaboration and

implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications (without preventing the adaptation of such Council decisions). Consequently, Malta and Cyprus do not raise new issues in this respect. There are precedents to follow – observer status is already available for neutral countries where appropriate – and the EU will continue to take into account the position of its neutral members as it develops its security and defence dimension. Indeed, the micro-state status of Malta and Cyprus means that it other the other four neutrals that comprise the much bigger problem. Thus whatever accommodations the existing EU neutral members negotiate will be offered to Malta and Cyprus.

In the light of all this, it is difficult to see how Cyprus and Malta create a particular problem for the CFSP. It is even harder to imagine that the larger EU members will allow two small island states to prevent them pushing forward on the security front, even if this means some kind of flexibility in the EU or 'consensus minus two (or even six or seven)'.

In fact, flexibility may well hold the key to the development of the CFSP. 'Variable geometry' is being widely discussed within the EU and may be ideal for the security sphere. In any case, it is probably true that it is not the accession of two small Mediterranean neutral/non-aligned countries but rather the accession of the formerly Soviet, central and eastern Europeans that creates the biggest dilemma for the CFSP and the WEU. Ultimately, the main contribution of Malta and Cyprus to the EU may come not from their status but from their geographical position: they will press for more focus on Mediterranean security issues in EU policy and their very membership will make this inevitable.

Conclusion

The central concern of this article has been the impact on the European Union of the accession of Cyprus and Malta and, more specifically, the security implications of this. When (and if) the two Mediterranean applicants eventually join the Union, it will almost certainly be in the company of some of the other nine or ten applicants from central and eastern Europe (and the timing of accessions may be phased). They will be joining a Europe which has taken increasingly northern and central European characteristics, a Europe which will view the world through the prism of the main concerns of central and eastern Europe, primarily the place of Germany and relations with Russia. The Mediterranean, already low in the Union's concerns, will even be lower in priority. It has not the object of this article to dwell on the dangers and challenges which the Union faces in the Mediterranean region. However, there is a broad consensus that these problems could destabilize Europe itself if left to run out of hand.

Malta and Cyprus, being wholly Mediterranean states whose prosperity depends to a large degree on the maintenance of stability in the region will, to the extent that they will be able to unmoor themselves from particular issues and move to more general and far reaching ones, partly redress the imbalance of focus in the enlarged European Union of over twenty members.

The EU has already started refocusing on the Mediterranean region and on the problems with which everyone is familiar through the launching of the so-called Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The partnership has been launched, but it is well short of being reality. It may stall as many other well-intended but ill-conceived initiatives in the Mediterranean region in the past such as the Euro-Arab Dialogue, the proposed Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean Region (CSCM), the Council of the Mediterranean, the Five + Five and the Mediterranean Forum. There is always the danger, on the EU side, that the member states on the Mediterranean littoral who, prima facie, might be expected to take the greatest interest in their region, might for one reason or other abdicate this responsibility. This is understandable considering that these member states – Spain, France, Italy, Greece and to an extent Portugal – have in a sense a double personality. For a long time in their contemporary history they have been more interested in affairs in central Europe than in what happens in the Mediterranean region. They have only periodically returned to the region in times of crisis (Suez, the war of independence in Algeria, successive Middle Eastern crises, and so on). Once the emergency passes, interest wanes.

Or worse, they become embroiled in purely sub-regional affairs, in their 'near abroad', neglecting the wider issues. Thus France and Spain have concentrated on developments in the Maghreb, Greece on its relations with Turkey, the Cyprus issue and recently the Balkans, whilst Italy, bedevilled by domestic instability, has had a minimum impact on the region. Cyprus and Malta, being at the farthest periphery of the European Union in the Mediterranean, have a stronger interest in region-wide developments – such as the rise of militant Islam, demographic changes, economic growth, migratory pressures and instability in general. They will be expected to bring these concerns to the attention of the Union, in so far as they themselves do not become bogged down by single 'national' issues such as the 'Cyprus problem' in the case of Cyprus, or some dispute on the delimitation of the territorial sea and the Continental shelve in the central Mediterranean in the case of Malta. (In fact, Malta has unsettled disputes of this kind with Libya, Italy and Tunisia.)

The two Mediterranean applicant states have some common features of relevance to the discussion. Both are ex-colonies of Britain with relations to

the Commonwealth, an additional minor but not wholly insignificant element to the Union's external action, especially in its relations with developing countries. Both island states believe that they can serve as a bridge between the European Union and the Arab world. Cyprus has developed trading relations in the Mashrek while Malta has a trade surplus with Libya, which is also the source of its oil. It is important to note that both countries have engaged in peaceful transactions with their Arab neighbours and value this. The two prospective member states enjoy special ties with two other EU Mediterranean states – Malta with Italy by virtue of the neutrality guarantees and Cyprus with Greece by virtue of their joint defence alliance and common culture.

Both have a direct stake in the maintenance of stability in the Mediterranean region. A serious conflict in the Mediterranean could damage their tourism industry on which their economic prosperity has grown. Gross earnings from tourism for Malta during 1994 amounted to 33 per cent of manufactured output, while for Cyprus gross earnings from tourism amounted to 64 per cent of manufactured output. Cyprus suffered reductions in tourist arrivals and earnings as a result of the Gulf War. The effect on Malta was less marked because of geographic distance from the area of conflict. Both states are then expected to exercise caution on the use of military force in the region, both have a direct interest in the cause of general disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean. Because they risk higher stakes, and given their experiences in the non-aligned movement and neutrality in the case of Malta, not to mention their obvious military weakness, both will be expected to stand up for the peaceful settlement of disputes, preventive diplomacy and confidence-building measures. Both countries, being small, will work on a wider concept of security that is not limited to the traditional definition.

As members of the European Union, both states are expected to support closely proposals for enhancing security and stability in the Mediterranean region. Malta's proposal for the setting up of the 'Council of the Mediterranean' may not be the right remedy for the region – in any case it has been overtaken by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership commenced in November 1995 – but it shows what importance the country attaches to dialogue rather than confrontation. Malta has now proposed a Stability Pact for the Mediterranean modelled on the Baladur initiative but possessing unique characteristics which take into consideration the specialities of the situation in the Mediterranean region. The idea was first put forward by Malta's then foreign minister, Guido de Marco, at the final conference on the Pact of Stability in Europe, held in Paris in March 1995.[49] The issue was pursued within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiated by the

European Union at the Barcelona Conference in November 1995 and the
Mediterranean Forum introduced by France and Egypt and involving a
number of Mediterranean coastal states. The proposal for the Stability Pact
for the Mediterranean region is based on eight principles:

1. Refraining from the threat or use of force;

2. Peaceful settlement of international disputes;

3. Inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity of states;

4. Right of peoples to self-determination and to live in peace on their own
   territory within internationally recognised and guaranteed frontiers;

5. Sovereign equality of states and non-intervention in internal affairs;

6. Respect for human rights;

7. Co-operation between states; and

8. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations assumed under international law.

The initial proposal was defined in more detail in April 1996 in a
communication from the Maltese foreign minister to the 27 countries which
had participated in the Barcelona Conference.[50]

The two applicant states have a sense of vulnerability, being surrounded
as they are by more powerful states. They are also the furthest southwards
on the Union's stability frontier. Membership of the European Union is one
of many ways by which they seek to enhance their security in a sea of
turmoil. The overall EU military strength (taken as the sum of its individual
member states since the EU does not encompass security) will not change
by the addition of the two Mediterranean mini-states. Nor will the EU's or
the individual member states' overall strategic position in the Mediterranean.
Britain and through it NATO, already has military bases in Cyprus, while in
the case of Malta it will certainly deny the installation of foreign military
bases on its soil. However, the two island states may become crucial in the
Union's efforts to contain the growing illegal migration and the narcotics
trade.

On membership, Malta and Cyprus will have to leave the non-aligned
movement. This is something both countries have been willing to do.
Meanwhile, the transformations which have occurred in the world have in
fact devalued the importance of the movement which is searching for a
raison d'être. Whatever happens to the non-aligned movement, Cyprus and
Malta will serve as interlocutors of the EU with it.

As far as neutrality is concerned, this policy stance is not a feasible

project for either. Malta's peculiar neutrality has, as shown, not served as an obstacle to it joining NATO's Partnership for Peace, even though the latter is not an alliance nor a half-way house to it, but is largely confined to peaceful collaborative exercises. Cyprus and Malta will in all probability model their behaviour in the area of foreign and security policy on the behaviour of the neutral EU member states – Finland, Sweden, Ireland and Austria (and Denmark) – and, in as far as the policy stance of these changes, the policy stance of the Mediterranean applicants will be expected to change as well. To that extent, the accession of Malta and Cyprus to the EU should not create any 'new' difficulties for the development of the CFSP beyond those introduced by the 1995 enlargement.

NOTES

1. We are indebted to an anonymous referee for numerous helpful comments. Any remaining errors are, of course, our own.
2. In fact, following the recent election in Malta which returned the Labour party to power, Malta's official policy line has become that it will pursue closer relations with the Union, including a security protocol, but will no longer seek full membership. However, this position may still change to one where the Labour government would pursue membership and it is significant that it has not immediately retracted the membership application and has maintained the structured dialogue with the EU, commenced in preparation for accession.
3. Following the run down of the United Kingdom's military facilities in Malta (partly for economic reasons), the imperative for Malta in the second half of the 1960s became to seek alternative markets and sources of investment and to accelerate its economic progress. Hence, the Maltese approaches to the EU were not dictated by the need to preserve its foothold in the UK should the latter join the EU but, in a sense, precisely the opposite; that is, as a means of diversification.
4. Richard Pomfret, *Mediterranean Policy of the European Community: A Study of Discrimination in Trade* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1986), pp.68ff.
5. Rodney Wilson, *Cyprus and The International Economy* (London: St Martin's Press, 1992), pp.50–5, pp.70–3.
6. 'Europe and The Challenge of Enlargement', *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 3/92, point 30, p.17.
7. See, for example, *The Report by the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the European Communities*, HMSO, 9 June 1992, point 160, p.35; and 7.22 *Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee* 'On the Future Enlargement of the Community', Brussels, 23 September 1992, point 2.2.2, p.4.
8. European Commission, 'Opinion on The Application made by Cyprus to Join the European Community', COM (93) 313 final, Brussels, 30 June 1993, points 47 and 48.
9. Conclusions of the Presidency of the Corfu European Council, 24–5 June 1994, *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No.6 (1994), point 1.11, p.13.
10. Greek Minister Pangalos was reported to have said at a press conference after the Corfu Summit that 'the question of the admission of Cyprus, was disassociated from the political problem of Cyprus', *Agence Europe*, Special Edition No 6260, Brussels, 26 June 1994, p.4.
11. Conclusions of the Cannes European Council, *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No.6 (1995) point 1.12, p.13.
12. Case C-432/92 of 5 July 1994 *The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex Parte: S.P. Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd., and Others*.
13. 'Enosis' is unification (of Cyprus) with Greece, the widely perceived objective of the Greek

Cypriots. The preferred Turkish Cypriot alternative is referred to as 'taksim' – partition of the island.

14. *New Cyprus*, Vol.VII, No.1 (Jan. 1991), p.11.
15. The Greek Cypriots have been calling for the demilitarization of Cyprus and offering to disband the national guard (if Turkish troops are withdrawn); also they have turned to peaceful demonstrations – and not military action – to try to unlock the stalemate in the intercommunal negotiations. On the other side, Turkish Cypriot reactions have been restrained with no full scale military mobilization, although two Greek Cypriots have been shot by Turkish forces recently, as suggested in the text.
16. See, for example, A. Evin and G. Denton (eds.), *Turkey and The European Community* (Hamburg: Schriften des Deutschen Orient-Instituts, 1990); D. Constas (ed.), *The Greek Turkish Conflict in the 1990s* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1991); R. MacDonald, *The Problem of Cyprus* (London: Brassey's for the International Institute of Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper 234, 1988/89); P. Tsakaloyannis, 'The European Community and The Greek–Turkish Dispute', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.XIX, No.1, September, 1980; and C. Tsardanidis, 'The EC–Cyprus Association Agreement: Ten Years of a Troubled Relationship, 1973–83', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.XXII, No.4, June, 1984.
17. The EU did claim some credit for the cease-fire of 22 July 1974 since they had issued a statement to that effect on that same day. However, the Americans had already obtained pledges for a cease-fire from Athens and Ankara earlier in the day and the combatants no doubt were heavily influenced by a UN Security Council resolution also calling for a cease-fire.
18. *Cyprus Bulletin*, Vol.XXXIII, No.16, 7 August 1995.
19. P. Yannas, 'The Greek Factor In EC–Turkey Relations' in P. Kazakos and P. C. Ioakimidis (eds.), *Greece and EC Membership Evaluated* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), p.216.
20. S. Manos, 'Security Interests Viewed From Athens', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol.6, No.1 (Winter 1995), p.15.
21. Ibid., p.15.
22. Evidence of G. Aybet to 'NATO's Southern Flank', *Defence Committee*, House of Commons, Session 1995–96, 13 March 1996, p.36.
23. N. A. Stavrou, 'The Dismantling of the Balkan System: Consequences for Greece, Europe and NATO', *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol.6, No.1 (Winter 1995), p.32.
24. *Cyprus Bulletin*, Vol.XXXIII, No.10, 15 May 1995.
25. *Cyprus Bulletin*, Vol.XXXIII, No.7, 3 April 1995.
26. *Cyprus Bulletin*, Vol.XXXIII, No.16, 7 August 1995.
27. Document 1458, *Assembly of the Western European Union*, 6 November 1995, pp.24–5.
28. *Independent*, 9 Sept. 1994, p.8.
29. Reported in T. Szulc, *Peacekeeping and Diplomacy in Cyprus: 1964–93*, No.16.
30. This is discussed in S.S. Rosenfeld, 'Looking For Rules In The Ethnic Jungle', *International Herald and Tribune*, 26 July 1994.
31. *Agence Europe*, Daily Bulletin No.6435, 8 March 1995, pp.4–6.
32. European Commission, *Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to The Community*, SEC (89) 2290 final/2 , Brussels 20 December 1989.
33. For a more detailed examination of Turkey's relationship with the EU and its membership prospects see J. Redmond, *The Next Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Community: Turkey, Cyprus and Malta* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993), pp.17–61, and W. Hale 'Turkey: A Crucial But Problematic Applicant' in J.Redmond (ed.), *Prospective Europeans: New Members for the European Union* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), pp.113–32.
34. Deutsches Orient-Institut, *Turkey and the European Community* (Hamburg and London, Summary Report, 1984) p.2.
35. See, for example, M. Stenhouse and B. George, *NATO and Mediterranean Security: The New Central Region* (London Centre For Defence Studies, 1994, London Defence Studies No.22).
36. Quoted in *The Independent*, 22 Sept. 1995, p.14.
37. E. Manisali, 'Turkey's Place in Europe', *Middle East Business and Banking Magazine*, Istanbul, 1989, pp.62–3.
38. European Commission, 'Opinion on the Maltese Application to join the Community', COM

(93) 312 final, Brussels, 30 June, 1993, point 19, p.10.

39. Abridged definition of Neutrality as found in the Constitution of Malta, *Department of Information*, Valletta, 1992, Chapter 1, article 1, pp.1–2: 'Malta is a neutral state actively pursuing peace, security and social progress among all nations and adhering to a policy of non-alignment and refusing to participate in any military alliance. Such a status, will in particular imply that (a) no foreign military bases will be permitted on Maltese territory; (b) no military facilities in Malta will be allowed to be used by any foreign military forces except at the request of the Maltese Government...(c)...'

40. Speech by the former Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Guido de Marco to the WEU Assembly, published in *The Sunday Times* (Malta), 19 June 1994.

41. *Lisbon Declaration of the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of the WEU*, 15 May 1995, point 39.

42. 'The External Policy Of The EU After Enlargement To EFTA Countries' (conclusions of the collective efforts of a group of scholars of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, headed by the Director, Gianni Bonvicini), *The International Spectator*, Vol.XXX, No.1 (Jan.–March 1995).

43. Finland could not have joined NATO as Turkey did. The armistice of 1944 between Finland and the USSR led to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the two countries (1948). The Soviets safeguarded their security aims by Finland's espousal of neutrality in return for which Finland was not incorporated into the Soviet empire. Hence, membership of NATO was not a viable alternative for Finland.

44. See, for example, David E. Bohn, 'Neutrality – Switzerland's Policy Dilemma: Options in the New Europe', *Orbis*, Vol.21, No.2 (Summer 1977), pp.335ff.

45. Report to The Leader of the Opposition: 'Proposals For Updating The Foreign Policy Of The Malta Labour Party In Sectors Concerning National Security' prepared by an informal group for the consideration of the National Executive and the General Conference of the Malta Labour Party, published by the MLP, 1994, p.32.

46. One was signed in Valletta in March 1982 and one signed in Pyongyang in July 1982 to re-place the first and was entitled 'Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Malta and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the Offer of Free Military Assistance to the Republic of Malta by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea'.

47. The security protocol was subsequently abandoned in 1990.

48. Debates of the House of Representatives, Sitting of the 30 December 1986, p.93.

49. The text of the speech in which the proposal is made is published in *Malta Review of Foreign Affairs* No.7 (May 1995), pp.92ff.

50. The text is reproduced in *Malta Review of Foreign Affairs* No.9 (May 1996), pp.47–8.