4
THE MISSING AS A SET OF REPRESENTATIONS

It's vile; and I can tell you what I wouldn't tell anybody else: it's stupid, monstrously stupid. But the people of Thebes have got to have their noses rubbed into it a little longer. My God! If it was up to me, I should have had them bury your brother long ago as a matter of public hygiene. I admit what I am doing is childish. But if the featherheaded rabble I govern are to understand what's what, the stench has to fill the town for a month!

Creon in Anouilh's *Antigone* (1960: 48)

Introduction

The Turkish invasion and partitioned occupation of Cyprus was the single most cataclysmic event in modern Cypriot history. It was a collective trauma for Greek Cypriot society, though not for Turkish Cypriots – at least then. It shook the economy, family relations, politics, and forcefully uprooted a third of the population turning them into refugees. The economy collapsed, but subsequently made a remarkable recovery. In the long run the society became urbanised and Cyprus was transformed from a largely rural-based economy to a modern, thriving service economy with all its attendant problems. The invasion re-formed the actual space, the geography and the landscape of the island, inserting a dangerous no-go area between the two communities. It affected time: how Turkish and Greek Cypriots visualise their past, present, and future. Something similar seems to have occurred in Latvia. In her study of people's testimonies in Latvia, Skultans noted that the 1940 Soviet occupation of Latvia came to play a leading role in defining national identity. Cypriots similarly talk about the 1974 events as the central reference point of their history, space, and identity.

Michel de Certeau has perhaps rather grandly claimed that the quest for historical meaning 'aims at calming the dead who still haunt the present, and at offering them scriptural tombs' (1988: 2) This statement is useful in setting the aims of this

chapter: how the missing still haunt the present in Cyprus, and how they are used by the state and society as a means to talk about the past. This complements two approaches to memory: as a strategy to cope with the traumatic experiences of the past (Antze and Lambek, 1996), and as a means to deal with ancestors and with death (Battaglia, 1992; Davies, 1994; Taylor, 1993). In his study of responses to the trauma of the First World War, Winter concentrates on war memorials 'as foci of the rituals, rhetoric, and ceremonies of bereavement' (1995: 78). I shall be looking at the memorialisation of the missing by the state as well as by political representatives of their relatives as foci not so much of bereavement, but rather of attempted recovery. It is worthwhile to visualize this within the context of *Antigone*. We shall look at how modern Creon memorialises the body of Eteocles – except that the body of Eteocles is missing. The concern here is with the missing as presences, as a series of representations. In a subsequent chapter I examine the converse: how the state and individuals represent the missing as losses and as absences.

Memory, Mourning, and Recovery: Narratives of the State

In the previous chapter we discussed how in the early years after 1974 relatives came to believe, or hope, that their missing persons might still be alive. I now wish to examine why such beliefs are still maintained at least officially on the level of institutions. This involves a study of how continuing inter-ethnic contestations over the interpretation of the past interrelate with internal Greek Cypriot politics to structure the institutionalisation of memories. In Cyprus, memory as a set of images and as process has not just been kept alive. It has been progressively manufactured, managed, and elaborated to reflect, and adjust to, the changing political programmes of the state, and the evolving complex emotional exigencies of individuals. I begin by concentrating on the former.

It is important to begin by noting that in Cyprus generally the state or political authorities on both sides of the ethnic divide does not have a programme of attempting to erase or oppress private memories, although both sides certainly want to suggest *how the past should be remembered*. Thus makes the politics of memory very different to that found in, for example, Central America. Zur notes that 'the distance between private memory and public representations is particularly wide in repressive regimes such as that ruling Guatemala during *la violencia* (1998: 170). By contrast the political authorities on both sides of the ethnic divide in Cyprus actively attempt to represent private memories through public representations in various forms, although there are significant differences in terms of the political appropriation, forming, and expression of these private memories.

Following the invasion, the Republic of Cyprus became actively involved in giving expression to, and harnessing, complex feelings of material, spiritual, and personal loss. The invasion resulted in the creation of three social categories: *the Missing, the Refugees,* and *the Enclaved*.[1] These are not just individual social iden-

tities, 'sociological' or 'political' groups, or merely political actors. They are also symbolic groups having a semiological identity as political signifiers and subjective signifieds.[2] Through their double role as political signifiers of loss and recovery, and specular signifieds of mourning and recuperation, the state harnesses individual and collective emotions articulating them in mutually reinforcing discourses about the past, the present, and the future. It is not just the past that has to be redefined, it is also memories.

The issue of the Missing and the Dead is both an internal and an international matter. The Republic of Cyprus appears to group the two, by which it means the dead as a result of the coup and the invasion, and the missing as a result of the invasion. As noted, the Missing have a greater facticity and symbolism than the Dead. Their numbers are known and, since 1995, their names published. They are evoked regularly at meetings, demonstrations, etc. The dead by contrast, that is the actual casualties, have never had their names published in lists, and there is no official statistic of their numbers. There are no official memorial services specifically for them, as they are grouped together with the fallen of 1955–59. In popular Greek Cypriot consciousness, the Missing have become the murdered casualties of the Turkish army and Turkish Cypriot irregulars, subject to a greater degree of active public evocation that the actual casualties of the resistance to the Turkish invasion. To the Greek Cypriots, the invasion was a shameful period and established an unacceptable state of affairs. Having boasted for years how one Greek could vanquish ten Turks in battle, etc, were defeated. 'Protecting Mother Greece' betrayed Cyprus, and Greek Cypriot soldiers were routed and their women raped. The Missing by contrast are seen as victims of the invasion, and therefore legitimate subjects to mourn. Indeed as I hope to show, in spite of the fact that the Missing have not been recovered, they are in a very real sense the 'mourned' of this society. This is because perhaps the only way Greek Cypriot society has been able grapple with an unacceptable state of affairs has been through the representation of the Missing as a category of liminality. One could therefore suggest that for many years the society remained stuck in what has been called the first stage of mourning, i.e., shock, anger, denial.

The coup unleashed violence against both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and the Republic of Cyprus in the interests of 'ethnic unity' has been reluctant to investigate this period. Consequently, no coupists have been prosecuted for murder either of Greek or, *a fortiori*, of Turkish Cypriots. This angers those on the Greek Cypriot left who have long insisted on justice for the memory of those, particularly leftists, killed by the coupists. In the week between the coup and the invasion there was much confusion and fighting between Greek Cypriots, and there were some anonymous collective burials in Nicosia. The bulldozer moves from being a secular instrument of building and reconstruction, and becomes a sacrilegious symbol of the concealment of bodies and crimes, the mechanical collectivisation of death, the travesty of burial rituals, the disassembly of bodies, and the permanent denial of identity.

Turkish Cypriots have long claimed that an unspecified large number of the Greek Cypriot missing were killed during the coup period, suggesting that most if not all of the 1619 claimed Greek Cypriot missing persons were killed during this fighting. AKEL (the Communist Party) originally subscribed to this view because leftists led the resistance against the coup, but later, in the interests of national unity, toned down this interpretation.[3] Until 1999, the Greek Cypriot side claimed that the 1619 missing were distinct from coup casualties and that only 19 died during the coup.[4] Powerful inducements sustained such claims and beliefs. Some men were murdered by coupists who hid their bodies. Others died in the fighting. Relatives of the missing not only gain social benefits and become symbols of national suffering because of their lost ones, but achieve little except social reprobation if they insist their relatives were killed as a result of internecine fighting. Claiming that one's loved ones were killed by fellow Greeks could also commit the descendants of the missing to dangerous and risky partisan political allegiances, when all political parties (leftists included) wish to remember ethnic oppression rather than political murders. The secretary of the Committee of Relatives of Missing Persons claimed that 84 people were killed in the coup and not one of these was included in the list of missing persons. The state is reluctant even to investigate this period, much less to prosecute because it would then be obliged to investigate the killings of Turkish Cypriots during the coup period. This created many contradictions, which I examine in another chapter. As one man explained to me: 'Why should Fivos admit that he killed Pavlos?' Better, therefore, to let such killings remain *agnoumeni*, of unknown origin, and therefore by implication killed by the Turks, thus directing aggression and suffering outwards. One reporter who investigated the matter in the mid-1990s noted that the dates of deaths of some of the fallen had subsequently been changed from the coup to the invasion. Better to be a hero protecting the island from the Turks than a shameful victim of an internecine tragedy; better an Eteocles than a Polynices. Finally, many survivors of fighting would be reluctant to tell relatives that their missing ones were killed whilst they survived, a guilt-inducing admission. Some witnesses have claimed they were asked by relatives of the missing not to get involved. The Communist Party, whilst eager to blame the right for the coup and the invasion, is reluctant to insist on proper judicial enquiries which would expose it to accusations that it is playing into Turkey's hands, and thus vitiating Greek Cypriot unity. There have thus been inducements to remember and forget this period in certain ways. In addition, as I show below, there was great uncertainty about what happened during the coup. By 1999 personal accounts were surfacing which threatened the hegemony of official depictions of reality. I examine this in a later chapter.

The relatives of the Missing also constitute an important electoral segment, accustomed to, and solicitous of, media exposure and manipulation. They are strongly supported by the Church and by DiKo (Democratic Party). Both take a hard anti-rapprochment line on the inter-ethnic level. As the Missing have become signifiers and signified of ethnic suffering, no political party was likely until the time of writ-

ing (2000–1) openly to question the validity of the 1619 missing, after the state has so long made use of them in its internationally oriented efforts to expel Turkey from Cyprus. By 2001, this simulation of certainty was beginning to be seriously questioned. The demands of relatives of the missing have become institutionalised and reflected in party programmes. The failure of the individuals elected to leadership positions in the Committee to satisfy demands means that they have to be seen to give something back to their constituents and keep hopes alive. Their leaders form temporary alliances with hard-line politicians, who sponsor their activities to further their careers. Many activities are expressed through ritual activism: vigils outside embassies, in public places, torch-lit processions, etc. Since Christmas 1996, weekend demonstrations have been held outside the Ledra Palace Hotel, the only recognised checkpoint to the Turkish side. The aim is to publicise the issue, discourage tourists from visiting the Turkish Cypriot side, and further re-enforce the blockade of the North.[5] Yellow ribbons with the name of a missing person were tied to a Christmas tree (Figure 3). Clearly, the act of writing symbolised that they were not forgotten, as well as perhaps a reminder to the state, as relatives were worried that some names may be dropped by the Government from the official list of missing persons, as indeed I show happened. The holding of photographs, tied by a string round the neck or holding up a frame, is a critical part of demonstrating (Figure 4).

The Committee of the Relatives of the Missing (CRM), until recently an independent powerful pressure group skilfully run by Father Christoforos a priest whose son is one of the missing, not only receives Government support and funds, but until the late 1990s actively sponsored the belief that the missing may well be alive. It has acted more as a group focussing international pressure on Turkey and keeping the issue publicly alive, than as a body concerned with representing the interests of the relatives to the state. Right-wing interests dominated it and there have been suggestions that individuals have hijacked leadership positions for access to benefits (travel, etc) and national prominence. The journalist Drousiotis noted 'hristoforos made some 200 journeys to every corner of the globe, he was met at airports by embassy cars and his expenses were met by the state and he stayed at luxury hotels' (2000: 44). He suggests that partly because of the guilty conscience of society, until the early 1990s 'the power Father Christoforos had then was so great that no one could refuse him anything' (ibid: 40). Indeed he explicitly states 'the Committee of the Relatives, which was established with the highest aim of discovering the fate of the missing, quickly became a closed organization which fell under the complete control of Father Christoforos and the brothers Nikos and Georgiou Serghidis' … 'Thus was created a *nomenklatura* in the group of the relatives of the missing. The leadership enjoyed all the advantages of power, exploiting the pain of thousands of relatives' (ibid: 43–45). More ominously, it has also been suggested that some individuals dominated this Committee to prevent investigations into deaths of the Missing during the coup. There has been, thus, a passive and active complicity in what this society wished to remember and forget. By 1996 tensions emerged between the government and the CRM which I explore below.

Figure 3 Tying Yellow Ribbons, symbolising Hope.

Figure 4 'The Body as Billboard'.

In addition, there is also the natural desire by the mourners, in the face of official connivance to imagine that such men may well be alive. One man, whose photograph as a prisoner in Turkey was printed in the papers, said that many parents swore he was their son. Even after 22 years, when society 'expects' a degree of 'realism' in official Greek Cypriot calculations, relatives of the missing require proof that their loved ones are dead. As one man said: 'if you don't have information, he is (still) a Missing Person *(ean dhen ehete stihia ine agnoumenos)*. There is always the hope that some may be alive. It is a human right to know what happened.' Rather than presuming such men to be dead unless proved to be alive, relatives normally presume these men to be living unless demonstrated to be dead. That this interpretation is a cultural one is brought out more clearly when one compares this to the Turkish Cypriot position. Logically one would have expected the latter to believe that their missing were alive because they disappeared sporadically and individually in contexts phenomenologically resembling kidnappings, of which there were some in the 1960s. By contrast the Greek Cypriots disappeared often collectively in groups, in a short period, and following mass hostilities and major dislocation.

A final consequence is the investment and elaboration of memories, as interiorised explorations and as collective representations. With the passage of time, memories have to be scripted and narrated by those expected to have them. In so doing, individuals can continue to make sense of their experiences, adjust them to their present situations, and confabulate them in their futures with others. Since 1974 and the population swap-over, the possibilities of an independently negotiated settlement between the Republic of Cyprus and the internationally unrecognised Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have receded even further. The enclaved Greek population in the North is likely to disappear within some 10 years due to natural wastage (children above the age of 18 being prohibited from remaining there), and the active memories by refugees of the loss of their homes, of their past, and of their identities, is progressively being replaced by a different set of memories. These are not so much the directly painful experiences of specific images and of specific detail which wound the heart that retells in order to symbolically recover (Loizos, 1981), but they have become more imagined memories, memories of a different sort. These are the stories that children of refugees, brought up in the South, have heard from their parents about their homes, and their villages, seen in photographs, but now part of family lore as lost patrimony and thus as denied rights. They are also officially encouraged memories of villages in the North when children were encouraged (as indeed they still are) to draw pictures of their village by school authorities to be displayed, published, or put on stamps, even if they have no direct experience of their 'paternal' (*patrigoniko* – which also means ancestral) village.[6]

Here it is worthwhile to try to relate the actions of recollection and recounting, the practice of memory, to emplotments by individuals in the past and the future. In her excellent study of narratives in Latvia, Skultans (1998) concentrates on the transformation of memory into narrative. She suggests that when individual memories are expressed in narratives, then the anthropologist should also be sensitive to the con-

cerns of narratology. This requires a consideration of the narrative structure, and the groping around for experience. 'The transformation of memory into narrative loosens the ties with original experience and opens the way for the substitution for schematized images. Like literary texts breaking free of their authors' intentions, Latvian narratives possess commonalities of structure and theme which override individual experience' (ibid: xi). Skultans emphasises that "as memories are cast into a narrative mould so they must of necessity conform to the conventions of story telling" (ibid: xii). She discovered this was particularly the case in the narratives of older people. She gives importance to the notion of coherence as 'central to an exegesis of narrative', but criticises Bruner's individualistic and potentially solipsistic version of narrative coherence (Bruner and Feldman, 1996). Instead, she supports the notion of an inter-narrative coherence, a type of inter-textuality practiced in literary analysis: 'allegiances are not towards the past but towards other narratives. It seeks for connections and where it succeeds in making these we as listeners and readers recognize coherence. Coherence is thus about belonging' (ibid: xiii). In the case of older Latvians, this coherence was supplied through commonalities through shared conventions in literary paradigms. Skultans was struck by the similarities between Latvian literary themes and structures, and autobiographical frames. The younger generation who lacked such common conventions experienced semantic collapse.

There are similarities to Cyprus. Individuals employ themes from classical mythology. Many talk of the 'Penelopes of modern Cyprus' (after Penelope, Ulysses' wife who waited twenty years for his return from the Trojan war, the theme of Homer's *Odyssey*, see Roussou, 1986). Alternatively, they refer to Euripides' tragedy, *The Trojan Women* (*Troades*), one of the most poignant of the Euripidean dramas which is not a narrative but a tragic situation: the fate of the Trojan women after their men have been killed and they are at the mercy of their captors, to be sold into captivity. In Cyprus, political authorities also employ Greek literary themes. These themes are employed not so much for solace or to create inter-narrative coherence, but also by political authorities as a means to explain the 'Greekness' of the national predicament and to situate it within a common European cultural framework. Indeed, and herein lies the irony, 'coherence' *as belonging* is *supplied by the state* in Cyprus. This is precisely what was absent in the Latvian case where the state was the cause of oppression and suffering. In Cyprus, the state has intervened to provide meta-(i.e., post) narratives, or master-narratives, based on a mixture of classical Greek themes and Christian symbolism. In spite of the lability of literary themes, and indeed because of it, it is an argument of this book that the similarity between peoples' experiences and literary themes can also be a subversive one, that literature can help subvert the state's emplotment of the past, present and future by providing different scenarios for individuals to enact out their predicaments. As I explore in this book, the linkage of people's predicaments to *Antigone* on the structural (i.e., the plot) level (i.e. the tension between women *qua* kinswomen of the dead in war and internecine strive, and Creon *qua* political leaders in the modern state), does take place. However, different workings-out can (and do) take place.

Memory is as much the recollection of the past through personalised narratives, as the anticipatory emplotment of the future. Ricoeur suggests that narratives do not just establish human actions 'in' time. They also 'bring us back from within-time-ness to historicality, from a "reckoning with" time to "recollecting" it' (1981: 174). He notes 'the priority given to the past in the structure of care that under-lies the unity of the three dimensions of time … may no longer be taken for granted … the past is not the primary direction of care … *The primary direction of care is towards the future*. Through care, we are always already "ahead of" ourselves' (1981: 177 emphasis in original). The authorities often use the term *'I Thisies tou Evdominda Tessera '* (The Sacrifices of 1974). The vocabulary of sacrifice, a barely concealed statist secular theodicy, with its semi-religious associations of redemption and recovery, thus becomes particularly important for individuals *qua* citizens (rather than as private persons) to interiorise and conceptualise their pasts and futures in collective terms, uniting expectation, memory, and attention. Individuals as citizens navigate their future selves through voyages of recovery imagined by the state.

An example of the State collectivisation and articulation of memory, anticipation, and recovery is provided by exhibitions of children's art. The Education Ministry organises yearly exhibitions on specific themes. Most years this has been 'I won't Forget' (*Dhen Ksehno*). Consider a picture (Figure 5) from an exhibition of Children's Art held at Nicosia in February 1996, 'portraying the drama of the 1974 invasion and the agony of those who are still missing'.[7] The illustration indicates the state's sponsorship of reveries/nostalgias of loss, inhabited by inherited images. The picture is almost over-determined in its symbolism that has been refracted through countless reproduced images. Its theme is orphanage, or denied filiation. The Greek coup was not just a betrayal by *Mitera Ellada*, and the deposition of the legitimate government, but the deposing of filiation. The picture illustrates a mother and a young boy/girl each holding a photograph.[8] The pose adopted is similar to the black and white photographs from the 1974 period reproduced countless times, showing mothers and children holding up pictures of missing loved ones. The mother is actually a widow, not a grieving mother (the bottom photograph shown in the picture depicts her and her husband as a young couple), and she holds up a photograph of her lost (missing or dead) husband as a young soldier, frozen in time. The contrast between the aged widow/wife and the young husband could not be stronger: the wife becomes the mother holding up a picture of her dead son. So emblematic have these images become that the imagery of women holding up photographs is immediately interpretable in Cyprus as depicting relatives of the *agnoumeni*.

The State has also reconfigured memory as a series of collective representations. Here the indeterminate referentiality of the concept of *The Sacrifices of '74'* is critical. It includes three categories: the Refugees in the south, the 1619 Missing Persons after the invasion, and the Enclaved in the north. These three constitute a power field, articulated by the state and the media out of individual experiences of

Figure 5 'Navigated Representations'. *Dhen Ksehno*
(I won't forget). Example of Children's Art.

loss and interrupted mourning, for the production, consumption, and circulation of memories as (i) political signifiers of ethnic/religious oppression, (ii) political imperatives for territorial recovery , and (iii) signifieds of pain. Each of these three categories has become a vehicle for collective ethnic imagining, both in the past and in the future, 'meta-narratives' between history and individual experiences. Taken together these categories enable individuals as members of an ethnic group to experience their pain and their loss through collective symbols (or to appreciate the pain of others if they were not directly affected), and to navigate the resolution, or mourning of this loss, along the axis of time through collectively shared values.

Refugees (*prosfighes*) and the Missing must be treated as metaphors for return, unity through recovery of self/past, and the utopian discovery of the past in the future. Through them discourses are elaborated around key themes of displacement, return, unity/separation. The Missing are a significant and painful plank in the Greek Cypriot campaign to retain world opinion focussed on Cyprus, and embarrass the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. For the Turkish Cypriots it would be deeply embarrassing if the 'Peace Operation' (as they call the Turkish invasion) which established their State were publicly demonstrated as having been founded upon a prototypical act of massacre. For the Greek Cypriots the dilemma runs deeper. The campaign to keep the issue, and hence the *agnoumeni*, alive risks preventing healing and therapy, and channels aggression outwards towards the Turks. Such a sustained, almost schismogenic, campaign may be due to the risk that a public acceptance of the probabilities of their deaths could symbolically represent an acknowledgement that the North has been lost forever.

THE MISSING/*Agnoumeni*
Marginality through liminality

REFUGEES/*Prosfighes*
Marginality through displacement

ENCLAVED/*Enclovismeni*
Marginality through oppression

The Enclaved (in Turkish occupied north)**.**
Signifies: Ethnic/religious oppression of Greeks as enslaved.
Tense: Recurrent re-run of the past when Cyprus was under Turkish (ottoman) oppression.
Emotive associations: Represents both the fear that Hellenism will be extinguished in the North and unspeakable apprehension that this will be a portent of the future if the rest of the island were to be overrun by the Turks.

The Refugees (In 'Free areas'/*eleftheres peryohes*)
Signifies: Occupation of Cyprus by a foreign power; political oppression of Cypriot citizens by the denial of their human rights to return to (i.e., regain) their homes. International illegality of Turkish occupation, and the illegal occupation of Greek homes/land by settlers from Turkey, citizens of another country.
Tense: Future: We will return to our homes/recapture our past (*Tha epistrepsoume sta spitia mas*).
Emotive associations: Resistance.

The Missing (Beyond Time and Place)
Signifies: Ethnic limbo for both living and dead.
Interchangeability of 'mourners'/'mourned'
Tense: Liminality/suspension of time
Emotive associations: We can neither mourn a past that is unacceptable, nor accept a future that is unimaginable.

Figure 6 The Symbolic Relationship between the Categories
of the Missing, the Refugees and the Enclaved.

The *agnoumeni* thus function on a double level as both signifier and signified. As *the Missing* they function as a signifier of the invasion. As *the not socially dead/not buried/not socially mourned,* or more precisely as 'the unknown', they function as a displaced symbol of the non-extinguishable hope, both of their own return south, i.e., their recovery by their loved ones (the 'South'/Republic of Cyprus), and their recovery 'as temporarily occupied North' by the South. The *agnoumeni* thus represent the hope of an eventual reunification, not just of split families, but of a split land. They promise the possibility of unification yet symbolise separation. Something similar seems to have occurred in post dirty-war Argentina when mothers refused to accept that their children had been killed stating 'They took them away alive. We want them back alive' (Suarez-Orozco, 1992: 247). Suarez-Orozco notes that mothers are opposed to the state giving them any form of monetary remuneration for the disappearance: 'mothers argue that any such bureaucratic intervention requires them to psychologically become their children's executioners: they would first need to psychologically kill and bury their children before proceeding with the legal route. And this is too costly, too guilt-inducing. It is as if giving up hope is betraying their children' (ibid: 247).

On the national level the state has appropriated an interrupted mourning process, or more precisely inserted itself in the mourning process, and fabricated a simulacrum of mourning into a discourse of resistance to the occupation of the north.[9] It has done so both by a process of double transference (*the missing and refugees* are looking-glass images of each other- the latter move from in front of the mirror to behind it returning to their past selves/homes, whilst the former return from behind the mirror of their past selves/homes to unite with their loved ones), and by an double inversion of identity (the transfiguration of the state as grieving motherhood, and the objectification/alterity of refugees/*agnoumeni* as signifiers of pain).[10] Refugees and the missing have become strategies of simulation, which dangerously risk becoming simulacra and hence denials of the real. Simulation, as Baudrillard points out, is not simply to feign to have what one has not, to imply an absence (1988). To dissimulate/simulate still leaves the principle of truth and falsity intact, that the-what-is-simulated/dissimulated is nevertheless real or true, and that they are signs for, and of, reality, either in terms of concealment or display. But where one hollows out the signified as progressively unlikely to be made real or pragmatised (e.g. return of the refugees to their homes, or the hope that the missing will be returned), then the sign becomes disembedded/disembodied from its referent: 'the whole system becomes weightless; it is no longer anything but a gigantic simulacrum: not unreal but a simulacrum, never again exchanging for what is real, but exchanging in itself, in an uninterrupted circuit without reference or circumference' (Baudrillard, 1988: 171).

If simulacra symbolically 'murder' the real (i.e. prevent a recognition of one's situation), the dilemma is even more poignant for the Greek Cypriots because 'realism' (i.e. a recognition of the seductive *maleficium* of simulacra, or recognising that subscribing to this position can prevent one from accepting that such

missing may in fact be dead) represents the symbolic 'murder' of their loved ones (as the missing), of their selves and pasts (as refugees), and thus a shattering of the utopic imagined community through the recapture/unification of the north. 'Realism' as 'pragmatism' is equally a murdering of the real, a denial of the past, and an abandonment of the future as constantly imagined – even potentially more dangerous. Of course, everybody recognises that the refugees will probably not return to their homes, or that the missing will never appear. Indeed, the Turkish Cypriot leadership is almost involved in a joint, quasi-perverse 'conspiracy' with the Greek Cypriot government to fabricate a mutually integrating system of signs: either as a signifier with no verifiable signified (for the Turkish Cypriots) (i.e., the absent unrecalled bodies of disappeared Turkish Cypriots indicates that we cannot live together with the Greeks), or as a signified with no signifier (for the Greek Cypriots). But to officially admit the impossibility of return or recovery is to disembowel the struggle, suicidal, uncontemplatable. It is the only strategy we have, Greek Cypriots say – the strategy of simulacra.[11]

In stories, 'rather than being *predictable*, a conclusion must be *acceptable*' (Ricoeur, 1981: 277 emphasis in original). But as these conclusions (i.e., the death of the Missing or the permanent loss of the north) would be unacceptable, so the stories of the refugees or the missing have to be told with different 'endings' that are acceptable, or even told with no endings, which is preferable as it corresponds to desire (of union with the missing), or fear (that they may still be imprisoned). Otherwise, the story would be too horrible to narrate. Or rather, if it were narrated it would require a different morality to render it acceptable, to re-emplot it, which may well imply a reapportioning of agency and culpability. It is therefore almost 'necessary' that it is *imaginable* some of the missing are still possibly alive (even if improbable), not so much for the mourners (whose torture is inevitably re-inscribed), but *for the State*. Stories occasionally circulate about how someone was seen in a recent photograph, that he is now in Turkey, that 'he has lost his memory', that he is prevented from returning, or even that he does not want to, or that he has now settled down and (re)married, etc. Many of these stories are further hostages to the seductive illusion of the rumours of simulation, metaphors of 'reality' (photographs) elevated to symbols of hope, or even projections of anxious desire ('even if *they* have lost their memory, i.e., have forgotten us, *we* still remember *them*'). And it is necessary that such stories should circulate as stories, even offered in discourse as *mpellares* (idiocies, illusions) to be refuted, but are nevertheless said just the same; and it is equally necessary that the authorities say they will 'investigate' such stories, because in the back-handed rejection of such stories that are recounted to be dismissed but with a hidden question-mark, the positional relationship between the sign and what it purports to represent is again rhetorically established, even if it is to be denied. The real as concealed is reconjured. It is not veracity (i.e., true or false), that is at issue here, but that 'the sign and the real are equivalent (even if this equivalence is Utopian)' (Baudrillard, 1988: 170).

Such stories plumb historical mythologies. And they tend to circulate on the anniversaries of the coup-invasion. The sister of a murdered pro-Kurdish activist Theophilos Georgiadis gunned down outside his home in March 1994 (by Turkish agents) claimed that he had information on the missing Costakis (see below), and that 13 of the missing were still alive. Another story was that a missing woman was apparently found married to a Turk in a military area but was too afraid to leave. As in the past, women become prizes between the two groups. One of the most well known stories is that of Little Costakis, a five-year-old who disappeared and who is a metaphor for a nationally denied filiation. Some stories say that a Turkish army doctor adopted, raised, and educated him (*to anayose ke to spoudase*), adopted him, and that his mother still occasionally receives telephone calls from him speaking in broken Greek. A common theme is that the missing were taken to become special soldiers, and that they were married off to Turkish girls *(Turkalles)*. 'When you cross a Greek and a Turk' a villager said, 'you have the intelligence of the Greek and the coldness *(psychrotita)* of the Turk. That makes them excellent soldiers. They don't have any families and have therefore no obligation', he concluded referring to the Ottoman Janissaries. As yet few dare to state categorically and openly that the *agnoumeni* are dead, and all political parties condemned the Government for recently suggesting that some of the *agnoumeni* were dead. The political costs are too great. It is as if Greek Cypriot society cannot as yet come to terms with the loss not just of the North, but of the Missing, who are a metaphor for the north, for unity, return and wholeness, rather than division and loss. Of course, many of those not affected privately admit that the *agnoumeni* are likely to be dead, but few express such beliefs openly, and the circulation of stories guarantees that the possibility can always exist. In short, investigating the Missing in Cyprus is like investigating witchcraft beliefs in modern society. Of course we know it is not true, but there are some people who believe, and yet there may be some incidents that defy explanation. As even a member of the diplomatic corps pointed out 'we need only one case of an individual having been kept in Turkey in spite of official denials to prove our case, or at least the principle'. She continued by claiming 'you do not kill a prisoner of war – you keep them as a counter', and referred to some examples of individuals who disappeared in 1964 and surfaced years later, having been kidnapped by the Turkish Cypriots.

The State as Scripting Agent

Do you know what 'missing person' means?
A mother of a missing person says:
'A missing person is a human being without a body, a voice which cannot be heard, but is always there, a memory which refuses to go away'
> Quotation from leaflet published by the Pancyprian Committee of Relatives of Undeclared Prisoners and Missing Persons, Nicosia, Republic of Cyprus.

If the Missing had become symbolic vehicles for an ethnic recovery both of the North and by their loved ones, the former 'piggy-backed' on the latter, they also soon became legal characters. By 1975 the Missing had become a bureaucratic category recognised by the state and by the international community as requiring relief and representation. A Government Departmental Service for Missing Persons was established to provide relief to the relatives. Dependants of missing persons (wives and fiancées who were pregnant at the time of the disappearances, or parents) received a monthly allowance similar to that received by refugees. In 2000 this amounted to some £240 CYP per month. In 1979 the status of the Missing also became a judicial and legal category through *The Missing Persons (Temporary Provisions) Law No. 77 of 1979*. The law passed by the Republic of Cyprus represented the legal interests of Greek Cypriot Missing Persons, particularly with respect to their property through the establishment of a Statutory Special Committee of State officials.[12] It is important to note that this law was specifically targeted at Greek Cypriots, not all Cypriots, which weakens the claim of the Republic of Cyprus to represent *all* its citizens irrespective of their ethnic identity. The Committee has the right to appoint two administrators of the property of the Missing Person.[13] Dependants are to receive payment from the administrators (section 5.5) who are expected to 'administer the immovable property in a way which is most advantageous to the missing persons' (section 5). The Law specifies that 'No movable or immovable property shall be sold, donated, pawned or in any other way transferred or encumbered, except subject to such terms and conditions as the Committee may approve' (section 8). The Law does not deal directly with the declaration of death, except to say that it is 'subject to the relevant provisions of the Administration of Estates Law' (Cap 189). There are differences in perception of this law. A prominent human rights lawyer suggested this law was to pre-empt the legal presumption of death that would normally follow after a seven-year disappearance. If this legal presumption were to have been followed, the Missing would therefore have been considered dead, a situation the authorities were keen to prevent. By contrast, Justice Ministry officials claim it was implemented to protect the legal interests of the missing themselves, and still has a valid function. However, not surprisingly, representatives of missing persons have a different view as the law restricts the disposal of property. According to the President of the Relatives of the Missing Committee it was designed to protect the rights of under-age children of whom there were then some 1000, and should now be scrapped.[14]

The Law does not indicate the terms and conditions that the Committee may apply to the disposal of property, nor does it specify any rights or means of appeal.[15] The Committee meets approximately once a month. Previously, it appointed administrators. Now, it deals with cases where the administrators themselves have needs as heirs, or as potential donors (e.g., wives of missing men whose children are now of marriageable age). Increasingly, administrators may have conflicting roles: as representatives of the missing person or potential heirs.

In both cases, especially when there is a desire to have access to the property of the missing person, they have to have recourse to the (Ministry of Justice) Committee. Formally, therefore, the Committee has immense power, and the economic stakes have increased. Government employees who are Missing have continued receiving their salaries as if they were still alive. Usually only about a half of the salaries has been paid to dependants, the rest remaining in bank accounts. After 22 years the sums involved can be substantial. The committee is liberal in allowing heirs access to the bank accounts of the Missing especially for health and education reasons, but does not consider that the law gives it the right to authorise sales of property. The Attorney General's representative was adamant: 'the law speaks about the benefit of the missing persons, not dependants'. Immovable property is more problematic. There are no problems when heirs wish to exploit the property, coming to some informal agreement among themselves on the division, although the missing person remains the legal owner. The situation is more fraught when the heirs cannot agree, or if they wish or need to sell the property. Agreements and consensus may be easy to forge in one generation but more difficult to sustain in subsequent ones. The Attorney General's representative claimed that there was a legal solution through *afania* (non-appearance) when individuals ask the courts to declare a person dead.[16] In practice it is almost impossible to have that person declared dead. The Attorney-General's representative claimed that 'relatives say that they don't want to do so for sentimental reasons', and that she 'could not understand why they don't use such a recourse'. Quite apart from the emotional and social traumas involved in such recourse, such statements beg the question of the state's management of the issue since 1974 until roughly 1996 as a national issue that the missing are not dead but recoverable.

The situation is more complex and less mystifying than is presented by the legal representatives and the bureaucracy. A previous Attorney General, Criton Tornaritis, expressed a 'Legal Opinion' that the law did not give the relatives the right to transfer property. His argument was that it was impossible to ascertain whether such people were dead or alive, and that there was still a *de facto* state of war between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey as Turkey was still occupying the Republic's territory. Furthermore, legal officers lacked access to the North to investigate such cases. As a 'Legal Opinion' it was taken as a guiding principle by the Committee members as an indication of the line Government would take if contested in the courts. Consequently there has only been one case contesting the Committee's decision and the appellant lost, further discouraging any other appeals. Few individuals would wish to openly take on the state, no civil rights group has taken up the issue, and there is no legal aid.

It would be naive not to recognise that the committee does not have political implications, on the micro and macro level. Some committee members appear to view their role as imposing some degree of moral control over relatives of the missing. One committee member mentioned a mother cohabiting with a lover as

an example of those cases they would disapprove of in terms of support. The committee's decisions and role give it an overwhelming legal importance in the lives of the relatives of the missing. Relatives are enmeshed in a complex articulation of overlapping institutions for civil representation, political representation, and access to Government resources. They are dependent upon the Justice Ministry's Committee for legal access to their relatives' property, upon the Service for Missing Persons for Government financial assistance, and upon their pressure group (Committee of Relatives of Missing Persons) for political representation. These three bodies are far from distinct, with the consequent dangers of re-enforcing the dependency and clientage of relatives upon the state, and becoming hostage to national and political considerations. For example, at one time the head of the Government Service for Missing Persons and the President of the Committee of the Relatives of Missing Persons were brothers. This could have made it difficult for the latter body to represent the interests of the relatives to the state as individuals meriting individual consideration. At the very least such overlapping relationships can make it difficult for this committee to openly contest the decisions of a Government Department, quite apart from the fact that it receives Government financial support. As one sympathetic centrally-placed official noted 'officials manipulate the chances these people get to exploit these laws'. The Committee of the Relatives of the Missing acts more as a political pressure group to remind the society about the national problem of the Missing and primarily to direct pressure against Turkey, rather than to represent the interests and resolve the problems of individual relatives in negotiating and dealing with the legal and other problems that relatives, as relatives of the Missing, inevitably experience in organising their lives. This does not mean that members of the Committee of the Relatives of the Missing do not act on their behalf to resolve problems, but they do so more on an informal patronage basis, rather than orienting their committee as a body to these ends. This further re-enforces the dependency of the relatives on the state and its various agencies. They are in a relationship of clientage to it and its representatives.

On a macro-political level the ramifications of the Committee agreeing to declare a missing person dead are far from singular, or even just a matter of assertion of rights to property disposal. To declare a missing person dead through the courts could open the floodgates to similar claims, and focus judicial interest on the evidence collected by the state and its agencies in declaring individuals missing rather than dead. The files are secret, but judicial interest would focus on the process whereby individuals were legally assumed to be missing rather than dead.[17] But by far the most important disincentive is posed by the workings of the CMP and the official position of the Turkish Cypriots, which is that the Greek Cypriot missing have long been dead and that this has been known to the government. Indeed the Turkish Cypriots made a claim that the missing husbands of women who subsequently remarried should be considered dead. The Greek Cypriots countered that these remarriages were permitted through divorces granted under

Canon Law in cases of disappearance (*afania*). Women had to ask for a divorce based upon *afania* to remarry; their husbands were not assumed to be dead but rather should be considered as unable to perform their matrimonial roles due to their disappearance.[18] Acknowledgement of death through the civil courts for inheritance purposes would therefore be tantamount to acknowledgement of the Turkish Cypriot claim and a puncturing of the fabric of certainty that has been built up. It would question the whole monolithic statist edifice of The Missing.

A number of processes are occurring concurrently. First, the state has legally reinforced the individual uncertainty of relatives regarding the fate of their missing and institutionally maintained that uncertainty. Second, it has done so by ensuring the continuing presence of the Missing as legal individuals, through salaries, pensions, and representation of their legal rights as property-holding individuals. The Missing are therefore *legally constituted characters* by the state, rather than socially active individuals as characters: legally present but familially absent. This generates a tension, an aporia, which I explore in a subsequent chapter. Their facticity as legal characters is both countered and sustained by the uncertainty of their physical fate. As legally constituted characters they have an existential validity that can only be negotiated and apprehended through those officials who legally represent them. Relatives of the missing are thus inevitably implicated in, and conniving with, the statist representation of the Missing as legally present actors. Third, by collectivising and nationalising the very natural feelings of individual loss, the state has cast a resolution of the emotional and social problem of mourning, and the legal problems of heirs, in the hands of the workings of the CMP, and the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey who are assumed to hold the key to the issue. It is not just that the Missing have to be 'put to rest', for their bones to be returned, to be reburied, etc. It is also that the Missing as legally constituted and represented characters have to be similarly dealt with. This may seem like a trivial point, but the 'naturalness' of the emotions of the relatives, is accompanied and sustained by their legal fabulation as persons. The legal fiction that there is no legal fiction, in short that they cannot be pronounced dead until the due process of law runs its course, is the scaffolding over which emotions are progressively elaborated.

To a certain extent, this officially abetted- fabulation of certainty conjured out of uncertainty, as well as the official presentation of uncertainty as to the fate of the missing to the outside world, is partly a function of the poverty of information available to the authorities. Many witnesses' statements appear unreliable, or are uncorroborated. The authorities only permit relatives' lawyers to see the files, not the relatives themselves, further reinforcing the climate of secrecy (as well as of suspicion). The unreliability of witness statements, or even their subsequent retraction, can reinforce the Government position that until the bones are returned and identified, such men cannot be presumed to be dead. Yet the same information also appears in the files of the UN Committee for Missing Persons (CMP), some of which I examined. Here, matters look far less certain. The files indicate disappointment, which contrast with people's expectations.

It is difficult to discover detailed quotable evidence demonstrating the statist construction of reality. One woman confided that officials told her husband would remain a missing person, as there was no evidence he was dead. Yet there is a witness's statement on file that her husband was killed. According to her, a Greek official, gave her an official death certificate in order to help her receive a widow's pension, 'but he told me not to believe it – your husband is missing, he said'. She later confronted the witness who denied ever having made that statement, and that he did not remember the event. She now has two official documents: one that her husband is dead, another that her husband is missing. She asked me which is one to believe: the man's original statement or his more recent denial? Taken aback, I said that I thought I would prefer to believe the earlier version because memory plays tricks. 'I went to everyone, but there were no other witnesses. Why didn't they tell me then that they had witness statements that he was dead? These officials are not trustworthy', she concluded. I felt that it would have been indiscreet to ask her whether she thus received two pensions – as a widow and as a wife of a missing person (the amounts are identical). One would expect the bureaucracy to have based its modus operandi on one official definition of her status, as either widow or wife. This is an extreme but good example of how officials sometimes believe one set of witness statements (e.g., that a prisoner was last seen in a Turkish jail), and at others disbelieve them when they appear to be retracted. In the concluding chapter I discuss the political implications of public secrets, including the role of the anthropologist in inadvertently and unavoidably contributing to the potency of such fabulations.

Another example of the statist construction of reality is a (confidential) case that involved a Limassol woman previously married to a missing person. In 1983 she remarried and the Social Services stopped her pension. She wrote to the Minister accepting this for herself, but pointing out that it was unfair that her children would as a consequence also not receive their grant, and hoped that similar cases would not be treated in the same way. She added that she had information that her husband had been killed. The letter was then passed on to the Service for Missing Persons who wrote back saying they conducted their own investigation and had found some witnesses who testified that her ex-husband was not dead but missing, and was therefore presumed to have last been seen alive. This was one case (I have been told there are others) where the state appears to have officially created an *agnoumenos* where the closest relative accepted death. It is clear therefore that the state has an interest in the official maintenance of collective suffering and remembering.

The statist representation of the missing as legally present actors cannot be seen as a complete fiction, for it is anchored in stories that circulate independently in society. Such stories circulate doubt, which thus necessitate a statist recognition. Take the following story. A young soldier was killed in Kyrenia during the invasion, and his friends saw him dead. The news was conveyed to his family who conducted a memorial service (*mnimosino*) although his body was never returned.

Some time later two young soldiers stop by the house as their jeep suffered a flat tyre. They see the young man's photograph on the wall and ask who he is. The grandfather tells them the story. They then tell him that he was next to them in a Turkish army hospital ward as he was wounded. They were then released but he remained in hospital. To them he was alive. The family ceased conducting the *mnimosina*. 'So who are you to believe?', the woman who told the story, asked me. The point about this story, which can be seen as part of the mythology surrounding the issue, is that by being told it circulates doubt and uncertainty. It is not so much the content of uncertainty that is important. It is rather *the very act of being told as a marker of uncertainty* that is important. There are often many common features to these stories: a stranger, a chance encounter, an accident (a flat tyre), and the photograph. The hospital also figures prominently in the cultural iconography of fear. I explore this later. Here too the hegemonic seduction of the photograph as the ultimate verifier of 'reality' is reinforced. It is not the recognition of the soldier through the photograph that is questioned. It is rather the experience of an event by others. What is distinctive however is that through the weaving of these stories with the orthodoxy of officially imposed uncertainty, the state can thus appear to justify its stance on popular notions of evidence, on the synapses between experience and expectation which are far from Weberian bureaucratic-rational. In short, officials themselves rely on such uncertainties and rumours to justify what they would undoubtedly see as their adoption of a caring attitude required of political representatives. One could see this as an attempt to resist the social production of indifference that Herzfeld (1992) identifies as the heritage of the modern state. This could be attributed to the smallness of Cyprus, and the social origins and experiences of officials who may themselves have kin of missing persons and thus inhibited from adopting criteria which could seem hard and bureaucratically indifferent.

The situation is thus much more complex than that presented by Turkish Cypriot propaganda which interprets the Greek Cypriot Government's position in 'Anouilhian' terms, of cynically using the (missing) bodies of Greek Cypriots to blame the Turkish Cypriots for their disappearance, whereas they knew all along where they are. In this more contemporary *mise en scene* that I have described, Creon does not quite know whether Eteocles, the defender of the city, is alive or dead. Or at least he seems to foster this doubt, not by commemorating a tomb of the unknown soldier (*agnostos*) the modern way of creating an imagined community through sacrifice (Anderson 1991), nor through the 'Sophokelean' Durkheimian way by identifying the guilty betrayer through the shame of non-burial (*atapsia*), but rather through the legalisation of *agnorimia*: the inability to know. The woman who told me the story was resourceful enough to question whether these two men had been planted by the Government to sow doubt. She was uncertain and the question was too serpentine to pursue. Perhaps the only difference between her interpretation and the anthropologist's is that her world was full of conscious calculating actors, whereas the anthropologist may be more

ready to give some autonomy to the unintended effects of social forces and actions. One has to interpret the situation as a fabrication, perhaps much like religious beliefs, and not as a fiction.

The authorities' fabrication began to take a definitive shape around 1981 when for the first time the number of 1,619 was mentioned. Drousiotis (2000) notes the Service for Missing Persons has stuck to that number since 1981, but the various (unofficial) lists had differing names, even if the number remained the same. A situation was thus created whereby individuals and officials pointed to 'lists' (*katalogi*) as 'official' statements and legitimations of reality, but which were inscrutable, unavailable to relatives or journalists and, it gradually emerged, inconsistent with one another or even with evidence that was increasingly dredged up. The number 1,619 became what Bourdieu calls an 'officializing strategy'.

In November 1995 the journalist Andreas Paraskos discovered that some twenty-seven persons who were buried in the cemetery of Lakatameia were on the Missing List. Of these seventeen reappeared also on the list of the Fallen which was issued by the General Office of the National Guard. Nevertheless, the authorities did not remove the names. There was much resistance initially by the authorities (both Government and the Committee of the Relatives of the Missing) to puncture the façade of certainty they had constructed. In 1998 the Service for Missing Persons and the Committee of Relatives of Missing Persons (CRM) in 1998 removed five names from their list but the latter added five others in their place. Four of these had been born between 1895 and 1918. This meant that these people would have been aged between 56 and 81 in 1974 and in 1998 they would have been between 80 and 103 years old – clearly an absurd situation (Drusiotis, ibid: 25) According to the reply by the new Head of the Committee, Nikos Sergides, and by the government spokesman, the excision of names could only be effected after exhaustive inquiries were made that these people were dead, but the government refused to divulge the criteria it adopted to excise the names (Drousiotis, ibid: 24). In the face of increasing journalistic skepticism and pressure by the UN to complete the submission of names, a rift began to appear between the government and the CRM. The latter stuck to the official line that only with the recognition and recovery of their remains could it be recognized that these people are dead. In 1996, when the government decided to make over to the CMP the files on all the missing persons, both the Service for the Missing and the Representatives of the Relatives (CRM) 'fought tooth and nail to prevent this happening' (Drusiotis, ibid: 26) because they feared that the case would be closed. The Presidential Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs, Leandros Zahariadis, admitted that there were not many files with trustworthy or credible information, and the majority of files only contained the names of the missing, which were often mistaken (ibid: 26). He noted that witness statements regarding the situations in which they disappeared were not available for all cases, and in the case of soldiers there were no statements or depositions by their officers or their colleagues. This was an amazing admission and set the leaders of the Committee of the Relatives

of Missing Persons (CRM) on a collision course with the government. The effort of bringing the files up to date took three years and by March 1998 the work of presenting the names was completed. There were 1,493 files.

With this presentation of these 1,493 files to the UN CMP, the government adopted an official position, which could not be changed. There were many calls for the list to be published but the Services for Missing Persons considered this a secret. The Parliamentary Committee of Missing and the Fallen also refused to publish it. Drousiotis observes dryly:

> From whom was this a secret? From the UN, or from the Turks who themselves had the list? Except for these, the details of the list interested only Cypriot society and particularly the relatives of the missing. The preservation of secrecy, therefore, affected those immediately concerned, by those whose job it was to inform responsibly as to whether the government considered their relatives to be missing or not. (ibid: 26–27)

One can thus appreciate how the situation in Cyprus is more complex, and perhaps generates more cynicism, than is encountered in places where individuals disappeared as a result of state-abetted violence, such as in Guatemala. There, Zur notes, 'the entire history of *la violencia* can be read as a war against memory, an Orwellian falsification of memory, a falsification of reality' (ibid: 159). In Cyprus a simulation of reality became progressively a partial falsification of reality, although this was not a falsification of memory. Rather it was the state's cunning sponsorship of certain narrative themes, embedded in a culture, scaffolded on an entire legal framework that bureaucratized uncertainty. If in Guatemala it was Creon's henchmen who secretly made people disappear, in Cyprus it was Creon's bureaucrats and politicians who represented the disappeared as Eteocles, even if in many cases they held empty files. Rather than being a war on memory, this could be seen as a war on the acquiescence of 'common sense' to retain certain ethnic memories, such as the recovery of the North, even at the cost of sustaining many Antigones searching for hidden bodies.

Conclusion

The demand for the return of refugees, or for information on the fate of the *agnoumeni*, is therefore more than a surface political struggle between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Nor is it just a struggle over the definition of reality, or even over territory. It is rather a struggle to shore up simulation through simulacra. 'Behind the baroque of images hides the grey eminence of politics' (Baudrillard, 1988: 70). The 'politics' here is how the state harnesses, collectivises, and fetishises the pain of mourning, transforming individual real experiences into a collective wound to produce discourses on symbolic separation, unity, return. By harnessing individual pain to collective political programmes ('All the refugees must return to their

homes', etc.), the state manufactures the imaginability of a society having healed itself outside time, characterised by the return of refugees or by information on the missing. By collectivising private pain, appropriating it into a simulacrum of signs about return and unity, the state fabricates a double through the mirror, an imaginary/spectral society, fetishising the refugees/missing into an imaginable alterity of free-floating self-referential signs. In so doing, however, it fetishises pain, reinscribing it back into the lives of individuals, symbolically representing that pain on to, and condensing it into, the image of Cyprus as grieving mother, *i mana mas*. Refugees/*agnoumeni* become the orphaned (because they exist outside real time) children of a suffering mother (an image often used to represent Cyprus after the invasion), homologies of the Panayia holding up her dead son, Christ, whose ultimate sacrifice is *afto-thiseia* (self-sacrifice). If the refugees/*agnoumeni* are signified as sacrifice, the signifier is *pain,* personified by the mother as a double symbol (as reflective sign: all the refugees/*agnoumeni* have mothers, and as symbol: Cyprus as grieving mother). As Feldman has observed 'The production of bodies is the mechanism by which the state apparatus detaches ideological parts of itself, reassembles itself in alterity, and then recuperates itself in this alterity through the extraction of narratives and artefacts of power. *The state (m)others bodies in order to engender itself. The production of bodies-political subjects-is the self-production of the state'* (1992: 115, emphasis in original). In Cyprus, through the narratives of return, unity and wholeness, the state (m)others its own subjects to transfigure itself as an expression of its own subjects' pain. Inevitably, its subjects connive in maintaining such illusions to shore up the only reality they know, to stave off deeper realities which may be more threatening.

NOTES

1. There are two additional categories: the Coupists, and the Fallen, but I leave these temporarily aside.
2. In contrast to other observers (e.g., Constantinou, 1995), who has written a legitimately elegiac interpretation of the Dead and Missing through an analysis of Efthymiou's poetry, I do not see the Dead and the Missing in isolation, but rather as part of a triangulation of memories incorporating The Missing, the Refugees, the Enclaved. All three are mourned and mourners, signifiers and signified.
3. In particular through its book (AKEL: 1975) which was subsequently withdrawn from circulation.
4. Indeed in July 1996 Kate Clerides a DiSy MP and daughter of Glavkos Clerides, the then President, suggested that the twenty-two National Guard soldiers killed in the assault on the Presidential Palace were only obeying orders. This was criticised by D. Christofias, the Communist Party leader who criticised a commemoration service and asked sarcastically whether 'the next step is to tell us that they were defending the motherland?' *(Cyprus Weekly* 29 July 1996).

5. The Republic of Cyprus maintains a boycott on the Turkish-occupied north and tourists are only permitted by the Greek Cypriots to visit for day trips and not to return with any purchases.

6. Freud himself suggested 'It may indeed be questioned whether we have any memories at all from our childhood: memories relating to our childhood may be all that we possess' (3:322).

7. *The Cyprus Weekly, Lifestyle* supplement (9–15 February 1996, p.1).

8. If it is a girl, then the symbolism may even be more powerful.

9. A socially recognised mourning would imply recognition of the death of the missing and, symbolically, an abandonment of any idea of the reunification of the island.

10. Freud called a 'screen memory', a 'memory' of unity, plenitude manufactured and mapped on to the past in order to disguise a present anxiety.

11. The Graeco-Turkish Cypriot complicity in mutually constructing a system of memories that reciprocally remember that which each side wishes to be forgotten is brought out even further by recent developments. In the 12 October 1995 issue of *Fileleftheros* (p.3) it was admitted that the missing might very well be dead: 'something everyone knew but no one dared say'. In February 1996 Denktash admitted that such men were 'probably dead', though he disingenuously abstained from allocating responsibility. By March 1996 Greek Euro MPs had taken the issue to the European Parliament. The European Parliament condemned the statements by Denktash. According to the Republic of Cyprus official *Cyprus Bulletin* the European Parliament condemnation stated that these men 'were killed by Turkish Cypriot paramilitaries' (1 April 1996. Vol. XXXIV, No 7), and linked this up with the enclaved. It is believed that some were killed by Turkish Cypriot paramilitaries between 14–20 August 1974 in Mesaoria.

12. Consisting of the Attorney General, Director of the Welfare Services Department, and the Head of Services for the Missing Persons, and the Chief Registrar of the Courts.

13. Usually relatives of the Missing: spouses, parents, children.

14. The number has of course decreased, and there are no children of *agnoumeni* younger than twenty-four in 1998). Yet children also qualify for grants on attaining adulthood. Daughters received a grant for a dowry house (in 2000 it stood at CYP £7,000), but have no rights to loans at low rate similar to the refugees unless they are refugees themselves.

15. There does not appear to be a Manual for dealing with cases, or any specific guidelines.

16. The Wills and Succession Act allows someone to be declared dead by an order of the court 10 years after the disappearance (Art. 14). It even applies in the case of the armed forces. Declaration can be made three years after peace has been declared. Section 14.5 also allows for those cases where a person as been in peril of his life, he may be declared dead if three years have elapsed. The law therefore permits such declarations to be made. However, in terms of international law, Cyprus is under illegal partial occupation, and this legal problem would have to be resolved.

17. A court ruling in favour of declaring a person dead could encourage other relatives to take the government to court if it emerged that the state suppressed evidence (such as testimonials) even subsequently after the disappearance, to maintain the semblance of certainty that it perceived its political struggle required. The government would then be open to prosecution from its own citizens for mental hardship. Although this is an unlikely possibility, citizens have increasing tended to take the government to the European Court of Human Rights (over discrimination against homosexuals or over police brutality).

18. This claim was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots. Maria Roussou (1986) has written very thoughtfully about how the wives of missing persons were obliged by society and the state to become Penelopes of Cyprus and enter a state of unending waiting.