SEX AND LOVE IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

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WHEN the title for this lecture was announced some people were intrigued by it, and wondered what I meant by it and why I made this distinction. It is a symptom of what is the current idea at the present about sex and love. I insist on this distinction, because it is precisely here where the origin of the confusion that exists in the connexion lies. In rejecting the non-Christian, but rather manichaean accretions, to genuine Christian interpretation of sex and the morality stemming therefrom, modern man has jettisoned the fundamental concept of sex as an expression of that genuine love which binds two intelligent and free individuals in the bond of marriage; reducing thus sex to a commodity to be traded as any other commodity on the market of entertainment to the satisfaction of man’s, or for that matter woman’s egoism, with all the well-known consequences for individual, domestic and social life.

It is therefore of vital importance for us Christians to reassess the traditional teaching and practice, to separate the chaff from the wheat; remove the first and store the latter.

This is precisely the purpose of this paper: it is an attempt to see what the Bible has to say on the matter. The vastness of the subject and the innumerable problems involved would not permit me to go all over the Biblical tradition; I limit myself to the O.T. period, because herein are the roots of the Christian concept of sex and love, which found its full development in the New Testament ideal of Christian Marriage.

It was not a concept that emerged only gradually and not without pain and struggle against the forces of man’s egoism and his strong tenden-
cy towards self-satisfaction at the expence of other human beings, especially women treated not as persons, but as instruments for one's own pleasure and interests.

Throughout our paper we shall see how the people of Israel, conscious of its own spiritual mission, gradually but steadily, notwithstanding its ups and downs, starting from the rather crude concept of sex as a cold means for procreation and pleasure, they arrived to a higher concept of sex as an expression of love between two persons bound together by love for all their lives, preparing the way for the uncompromising attitude of Jesus in this matter.

We start with the legal provisions defining the external relations between husband and wife — we limit ourselves to this only — going to consider their sexual relationship and ending with the love, or spiritual or moral relationship between the two.

The External — Legal or Customary — Relationship between Husband and Wife

The head of the family in Old Testament was obviously the father, on whose will depended the members of the whole household. A woman in such a household could have one of these three statuses, beginning with lowest: she may be just a slave captured in war or bought on the public market; she was at the disposal of her master, except that the law tried to lighten her burden Dt 21, 10-13. Next in order was the Hebrew concubine, who was sold to her master by her father to pay off his debts. This was not unusual; Exodus 21, 7-11 makes legal provisions to limit the rights of her master, who may have her as his own concubine, or give her to his sons. Under no circumstances he could sell her, unless to a Hebrew master. Then there was the wife with her own rights and duties. The man procured his wife, not by just purchase as in the case of the slave, but by arrangement with her parents and the payment of the compensation money, mohar; she enjoyed rights and privileges such as the others did not; she could live in her own tent, possess property, and have her own maid servants. We have perfect examples of this in the families of the Patriarchs: Genesis 29-30 Jacob had to work not less than 14 years to have his beloved Rachel, with her maid servant; and Leah, whom he did not like very much. One can here add another type of woman: the prostitute or harlot, who traded herself to all and sundry, without any dishonour to either side being attached.
This was the legal, so to say, arrangement of the Hebrew family; it is a neat order, on paper, but in actual fact, this arrangement caused a lot of inconvenience and disorder within the family: the wife may be reduced to a status of concubine and the concubine to the status of wife, as the patriarchal families, again, abundantly prove.

Two problems arise here. What was the purpose of so many women in the house, and what was the nature of the relationship between the man and his wives or concubines?

Various reasons have been adduced to explain polygamy: just lust, surplus of women, economic asset, prestige, political alliances, desire for an heir or offspring. All these may be true in individual cases, but obviously not in all. In the Biblical evidence the main object is offspring, especially in the Patriarchal period; political alliances and prestige in the monarchy period; the kings and the higher richer classes: Solomon had 700 wives and 300 concubines! – In between these two extremes we find that the ordinary man may have had two, and no more, 1 Sam 1, 2. This institution as we see further on went on declining, until it was only the rich that could permit themselves this luxury (Herod the Great had ten wives after the death of his first wife Marianné, who did not allow another woman in the palace.

What was the nature of the relationship of a man with his womenfolk? Was it a purely legal relation or a sentimental one? Obviously both of them could exist side by side, and the one may rise as the result of the other. It is quite clear that the relation between the man and his slave or concubine was simply a relation of property; in this case the girl was simply a chattel, which could be disposed of at will: Hagar was treated no better. Similar cases are Genesis 16 and the concubine of the Levite in Judges 19.

As to the wife the problem is not so clear cut. Some maintain, in view of the fact that in the decalogue she is bracketed with one's property: You shall not covet your neighbour's house: your neighbour's wife, his slave-girl, his ox, his ass, or anything that belongs to him, that he may displace her by another woman or sell her. But we have no evidence of any wife being sold; nor of a substitution of the wife by another one.

On the other hand the wife takes the name of her husband, (Is 4, 1ff.), which was not the case of the concubine; and he is not called adon, master in his relationship to his servant or slave, but ba'al, which does
not mean an absolute master. Hence one would conclude that the husband's 'property right' on his wife are limited to her in so far as her sexuality is concerned, for the rest she is mistress of herself, otherwise she was in no sense a chattel. She had however to acknowledge the authority of her husband in the household. The above mentioned provision in the decalogue should be interpreted in this sense. We have evidence, as in the case of Abigail, e.g. 1 Sam 25 where the wife asserted herself in virtue of her undoubted natural talents.

An important corollary from this follows: that infidelity on the part of the husband legally was non-existent; nor do we find any moral condemnation, except when the rights of another man over his wife were violated, either actively by a third party or passively by the wife herself in surrendering herself.

This was the legal set up of the Hebrew Family in which the male had the upper hand, and the last word in the running of the household. The Law provided checks to this overriding authority; and in this it was an advance on the situation prevailing amongst their pagan neighbours in this matter. But beside the law there were other forces working within the Hebrew Community.

The Use of Sex

The institution of marriage as we have just described it has as its origin the mutual attraction of the sexes leading to union of man and wife with the express purpose of bringing it under control. Ancient man felt awe in the presence of this impetuous force within himself and deified it, as indeed he did with other forces of nature.

Hence he attributed the principle of sexuality to the Gods themselves; whence the belief in Gods and Goddesses; creation itself is the result of divine sexual union: mother earth is fertilized by the father God. But since human experience shows that beside the purpose of procreation there is the attraction between man and woman even outside the institution of marriage, which they attributed to the Gods also, they believed that this holds good also in the divine sphere, hence the worship of Ishtar, Aphrocaute or Venus — Now these are three distinct aspects of sexuality, namely companionship, sex, progeny which were never integrated in one single ideal couple: each element was hallowed, but never united.

These beliefs were expressed in the fertility rites common in the per-
iod from the Mediterranean to India, Malta not excepted. These rites provide a dramatic reproduction of the sexual life of the gods rendering it possible for man to enter into the sphere of the divine, thereby stimulating fertility within himself, the animals and plants around him. Hence there is the institution of the sacred prostitution within their shrines; the chief among them is the sacred marriage of the king at the beginning of the New Year with the priestess in the temple. Through these sexual unions with the sacred priestesses, or even priests, they believed that their own reproductive powers are revitalized for the rest of the year.

These sacred rites, widely practised by the Canaanites amongst whom the Israelites lived, could not but exercise a strong attraction, if not infatuation on them, as the protests of their spiritual leaders amply prove. As in other cases, faced with the problem of the sacralization of sex leading to apostasy and idolatry, the spiritual leaders of the nation elaborated a positive theory of sex that opened the way to a higher concept of it.

The basic article of faith in Israel's Creed was that God is completely transcendant, ever-present in nature but not to be identified with any creature or natural force; hence there is no place for sexuality in God: He is one and unique, without any consort beside him. Creation, is not due to any divine sexual intercourse, but simply to his word. Sex itself is a creature of God.

'So God created man (adam הָיָֽם) in his own image; in the image of God created him male (וָֽאֶֽזְכָּר) and female (נְֽהַבֶּֽה) created them.

(Gen. 1, 26-27)

As a corollary of this any sexual practice with a religious connotation - such as sacred prostitution, Dt 23, 18-19 or sexual union with animals, Ex 22, 18; Dt 27, 21; Lev 18, 23 was strictly forbidden.

This is what we today call secularization, but a genuine one, which does not deny the religious function of creation in relation to God. The basic texts for this are the two texts the later one (5th century B.C.) in Genesis 1, 26-27 already quoted and the other, about the 10th century, in Genesis 2, 7, the well-known account of the formation of Eve:

'Thus the man gave names to all cattle, to the birds of heaven, and to every wild animal; but for the man himself no partner had yet been
found. And so the Lord God put the man into a trance, and while he slept, he took one of his ribs and closed the flesh over the place. The Lord God then built up the rib, which he had taken out of the man, into a woman. He brought her to the man, and the man said:

Now this, at last –
bone from my bones,
flesh (נ الشمال) from my flesh,
this shall be called woman,
for from man was this taken.

That is why a man leaves his father and mother and is united to his wife, and the two become one flesh. Now they were both naked the man and his wife, but they had no feeling of shame.' (Gen 2, 19-25).

This text, a masterpiece of its own kind presents us with a picture of two individuals of the same nature and dignity bound intimately together into one person, of the same nature, because Eve, was taken out of the flesh of the man, not simply the dust, out of which man was formed, but of the living flesh; before her creation man could not find a fitting partner for himself, now, he found it in Eve, the woman. God himself presents Eve to Adam, that they may become one flesh, one person; (about this further on). They were not ashamed of their nakedness; they were not yet corrupted by the fertility cults symbolised by the serpent: cults which reduced the woman as a subservient creature if not slave to man; yet her cravings are still after him, notwithstanding the inconveniences of pregnancy.

Sexuality then is a gift of God to man to make possible for him to procreate and, as we shall see later, to have companionship.

Both texts insist on the goodness of this physical union, blessed as it was by God himself; between them they represent a constant tradition for a half-millenium.

Hence throughout the Old Testament one does not find any negative attitude towards sexual union within the necessary bounds established either by custom or law; in setting these bounds the legislator, as we have seen, had in mind the religious and cultural environment in which they lived; custom and law provided for the sexual needs, craving as the texts puts it, of the wife, who is not simply a passive receptor; a man is bound to give her sexual rights even to a concubine (Ex 21, 10) when she desires it. Indeed it is encouraged except for certain periods for religious reasons or menstruation (Lev 15, 19-28; 18, 19; 20, 8).
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This physical union is not just a passing ephemeral experience, but creates between the partners a deeper bond, expressed by the formula they 'shall be one flesh, bashar'. This noun did not denote simply the physical body, but the whole persons, hence one would be quite justified to say: they would become one body, one individual or person. In other terms they need each other physically, and this need is implanted in their nature by God at the very act of creation. Indeed it is quite remarkable that at this point emphasis is placed on this bond, rather than on procreation.

Love as the basis of Marriage

So far we have seen the legal bond, the berith, as it was called between husband and wife, and their mutual sexual or physical attraction, leading to their becoming one flesh. Beyond these two kinds of bonds there is another one a deeper one, that based on love, the besed, which transcends both law and passion.

A century or so after the composition of Genesis 2, 7ff — Creation of Adam and Eve — we meet the prophet Hosea who introduced a new theme in theological thinking: the idea of the marriage between God and Israel. Time would not permit us to go into the details: we say only that he took the cue from his personal experience in marriage: he loved his wife, she left him, but he says that he is craving to receive her back if only she returns; so God also is ready to reaccept Israel who left him for other gods — sacred adultery — if she repents. The reference to sacred prostitution is quite unmistakeable.

What interests us here is what kind of marriage is to be this new and regenerated one?

Hosea writes: 'There I will make a covenant, berith, on behalf of Israel... I will betroth you נראות to myself forever, הבירל, betroth you in lawful wedlock ובא קל with unfailing devotion. רוח and love רעמה . I will betroth you to myself to have and to hold נראות (fidelity) and you shall know Yahweh!' Hos 2. 20-22 It is not simply a legal covenant berith, but a bond of steadfast love besed, affection rahamin.

This is the ideal marriage, based not on a legal setup, neither on simple passion, but on love, besed, and fidelity emunah for ever.

This term was taken up by the prophets Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel and the rest. It exerted a tremendous influence on the thought or theology if you like of marriage within Israel tradition.
In the post-exilic period we read an important text in Malaki, the prophet:

(The Lord) still refuses to look at the offering or receive an acceptable gift from you. You ask why. It is because the Lord has born witness against you on behalf of the wife of your youth יִרְעָדָה. You have been unfaithful to her though she is your partner רַבָּה] and the wife by solemn covenant רַבּוֹת. Did not the one God make her, both flesh and spirit רָאשַׁן? And what does one God required but godly children? Keep watch on your spirit, and do not be unfaithful to the wife of your youth. If a man divorces or puts away his spouse, he overthrows her with cruelty, says the Lord. Malachi 2, 14-16.

The trend started by Hosea in this text reaches its full development. The prophet is insisting on fidelity based on the covenant, on the personality of the wife, formed of flesh and spirit; in other words the wife is a person, and she must be treated as such.

In this same view we find a series of texts in the Wisdom literature in Proverbs Ben Sirach, Tobia and other literature, especially the Song of Songs.

The place of this book in the Canon of Sacred Books has been puzzling ever since the pre-Christian era. The most commonly held view today is that this book consists of a collection of songs celebrating a purely human love, perhaps songs which were sung during marriage celebration, which then were introduced into the canon as an expression of the theme of the mystical union of God and Israel.

This means then that we have here the full development of the prophetic idea that human love symbolises divine love, and this divine love in its turn can transform and influence human love. Thus the redemption of human love is complete.

This theology of marriage went beyond the narrow concept of a purely legal covenant or a passing physical union; it rendered divorce and polygamy impossible for one believing strongly in it. In fact in later Judaism both of them became less and less common. The concept of the happy marriage with the wife as the mistress of the house became a common theme for the wisdom literature: quote Sirach 26, 13-18.

This was the ideal Jewish home on the eve of the birth of Jesus Christ.
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CONCLUSION

We have traced the development of a doctrine of marriage starting with the idea of a bond to provide man with offspring, a base contract giving property rights on the woman, to go to develop then the idea of a deeper more solid link between husband and wife, as distinct from the concubine or the slave girl, and from here to the development of the vision of a marriage based on a steadfast love, which rendered polygamy and divorce meaningless and contemptible in the eyes of the believer. It is a marriage which integrates the three aspects implied in the text of Genesis: progeny, pleasure, and companionship based on fidelity and love. These three aspects indeed are fused.

It is still away from the full Christian marriage as delineated by St. Paul in his epistle to the Ephesians; it still misses the grace of Christ, to render it possible and give it a new meaning as the living symbol of Christ's union with his Church, into one whole physical union is the expression of their hesed, affection, between husband and wife, leading to procreation. The legal set up is the outward institutional sign of this basic human instinct; but we have a marriage based on such a prophetic vision which transcends law and custom, requiring from the partners mutual self-giving; indeed this hesed transcends even the physical mutual attraction, and remains there even when this withers away in advanced and old age: the wife of your youth.

This is perhaps an ideal picture; it is a vision difficult to be realised. Indeed it is; the disciples said so much to our Lord, when he rejected divorce, and returned to the original concept. But for the Christian, there is another aspect, and that is, that, this human love is raised above itself through the mystical, but no less real in the union of Christ and his Church: Ephes 5, 22-33

This is the Christian answer for redemption of sex and love from moral disintegration and commercial exploitation and violence.

C. Sant
WHETHER WE CAN SPEAK OF A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE HUMAN BEING AND THE HUMAN PERSON*

One of the major issues intimately involved in any serious consideration of abortion concerns the humanity of the fetus: specifically, whether or not in abortion we are dealing with one human being (the mother) or with two (the mother and the fetus). In stricter terms, the problem involved is: (a) whether or not the fetus is as much a human being as the mother; (b) consequently, with as much a right to life as the mother; and (c) in cases of conflict of rights (as are raised in most abortion cases), which right or set of rights may prevail. The problem is strictly a moral one but if a reasonably defensible solution is found on the moral level, then the problem of abortion as well as a number of related problems might conceivably become more amenable to a solution on the practical and legal levels.

In this essay, I shall bypass the problem of fetal and maternal rights and consider the humanity of the fetus from a different perspective. In so doing, I shall advance a theory, rather tentatively and possibly in rudimentary form as a basis for further discussion, even if in the process I shall raise more questions than I can possibly answer. For, in my discussion of the problem, I am not, of course, unaware of my severe limitations, particularly in that the theory I shall propose revolves round a number of unresolved issues.

Perhaps I should rephrase my concern to read that I will put forward not a thesis but a hypothesis, i.e., assuming that the premises I shall submit are correct, or at least philosophically and theologically plausible, what might the consequences drawn from these premises, as applied to abortion, be?

My proposition can, therefore, be stated briefly as follows: whether, in philosophical and theological terms (and possibly in social and le-

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...gal terms), we can speak of a difference — not a distinction but a difference — between the human being and the human person. In other words, whether or not the two terms are interchangeable to the extent that they are synonymous and, therefore, no question of a distinction, much less of a difference, arises. Or, again, whether or not one can say that there is a stage in the development of the human entity in the womb at which it is a human being but not a human person.

I — THE STATE OF THE QUESTION

I shall take my point of departure from the historical and doctrinal problem that gave rise to the difference in the first place, the revelation of the two great mysteries of the Christian faith: (a) the mystery of the Trinity; and (b) the mystery of the Incarnation.

With regard to the mystery of the Trinity, the theologian faces the problem of acknowledging the existence of one nature in three persons; with regard to the mystery of the Incarnation, a different problem arises, the problem of acknowledging the existence of two natures in one person: the divine and human natures hypostatically united in one person, Christ.

To elaborate a little further on the mystery of the Incarnation and express it in layman’s terminology: when the Son, as a divine person, became man, he carried with him, as it were, his divine personality and his divine nature. But while he assumed the nature of man he did not assume the personality of man. And yet the Church believes and proclaims, as a dogma of faith, that Christ, or the second person of the Trinity, is ‘true God and true man’: he was indeed divine; he was indeed human; or, in one phrase, he was indeed a divine person who had assumed human nature but not human personality.

In this case, the divine person existed on his own and on becoming man his divine personality also upheld in existence his human nature which did not have and could not possibly have independent existence — otherwise, besides his divine and human natures, Christ would also have had two personalities or would have been two persons, divine and...
human. Thus the position of the Church with regard to the personality and humanity of Christ permits a difference between the personality and the humanity of an intellectual being. How Christ's human nature or humanity was upheld in existence by his divine being is precisely where the mystery of the Incarnation lies, a mystery which has provoked no inconsiderable controversy in theology and philosophy.

Briefly, then, if we can speak of Christ as being 'true God and true man' without saying that the divine person was also a human person, can we not also say that as far as man is concerned there might possibly be a difference between the human being and the human person? It may well be found that even in man there is indeed a difference between his 'humanbeingness' on the one hand, and his 'personhood' on the other, a difference which must be as clearly and sharply defined as our philosophical and theological resources permit.

II — THE HUMAN BEING AND THE HUMAN PERSON AT DEATH

At a Special Convention held in Sydney, Australia, in July-August 1968, the World Medical Association in a statement known as The Declaration of Sydney proposed guidelines for establishing the determining factors of death. Though the participants themselves (212 members from 28 different countries) found it increasingly complex to agree on a precise definition and determination of death, they nonetheless reached a consensus to accept irreversible coma and related indications as the major criteria of death. At about the same time that the Sydney Convention was drawing up its criteria, an independent body of eminent doctors of the Harvard Medical School was also settling on the same criteria.

4 Besides being a heresy condemned by the Council of Ephesus held in 431, A.D., the acceptance of two personalities in Christ would morally and psychologically create irreconcilable situations and consequences. Cf. H. Denziger and K. Rahner, Enchiridion Symbolorum (Fribourg: Herder, 1952), §148; Louis Ott, Précis de Théologie Dogmatique (Fribourg: Herder, 1954), Bk. III, Chap. III.

These criteria may be summarized as follows:

(a) *Unreceptivity and Unresponsitivity*: A total unawareness to externally applied stimuli and inner need and complete unresponsiveness, even the most painful stimuli that can ethically be applied—a working definition of irreversible coma;

(b) *No Movements or Breathing*: A total absence of muscular movements or spontaneous respiration. If the patient is on a mechanical respirator, the total absence of spontaneous breathing may be established by turning off the respirator for three minutes to establish whether there is the slightest effort on the part of the patient to breathe spontaneously and independently;

(c) *No Reflexes*: Irreversible coma with abolition of central nervous system activity evidenced in part by the absence of elicitable reflexes: the fixed and dilated pupils will not respond to a direct source of bright light. (Since the establishment of fixed, dilated pupils is clear-cut in clinical practice, there should be no uncertainty as to its presence); absence of ocular movement (to head turning and to irrigation of the ears with ice water) and blinking; no evidence of postural activity (decerebrate or other); absence of corneal and pharyngeal reflexes; total absence of muscular reflexes after tapping the tendons of the biceps, triceps or quadriceps; and

(d) *Flat Electroencephalogram*: Certain evidence of total absence of brain activity.

The series of technical steps outlined above provide accurate indications of irreversible cerebral damage. However, to cover some very few special cases or any exceptions that might arise, the Harvard Committee also added that 'all of the above tests shall be repeated at least 24 hours later with no change'. When the patient's brain is hopelessly and irreversibly damaged as described above, 'death is to be declared and then the respirator turned off'.

'Death', said Cleveland's Dr. Charles L. Hudson, principal U.S. delegate at the Sydney Convention, 'is a gradual process at the cellular level, with tissues varying in their ability to withstand deprivation of oxygen. Medical interest, however, lies not in the preservation of isolated cells but in the fate of a person. Here the point of death is not so important as the certainty that the process has become irreversible'.

In their guidelines, neither Sydney nor Harvard paid any particular attention to the heart—the time-honoured organ which for centuries had provided clear aural and tactile evidence that death had indeed occurred. The heart has since been recognized for what it really is: a blood-pumping organ.

So the question arises: which is that organ or that last cell in man which when it 'dies'—or, better, when it ceases to function without any possibility of its functioning again—the whole being or the whole person has ceased to be? To answer this question, classroom format with blackboard, chalk, eraser and all would probably be necessary. In the absence of such visual aids, I can do no better than follow a somewhat cumbersome description. To this end, we shall assume that we are watching a patient on his deathbed, one whose illness is terminal and whose process of dying has reached the point of no return. We shall further assume that this patient is attached to an electroencephalogram (EEG) and to an electrocardiogram (ECG).

Since the time these electronic instruments have been in operation, it has been found that in non-cardiac cases brain activity invariably stops sooner than heart activity. And in any case, for heart transplantation purposes—which made the question of establishing the moment of death a very urgent problem in the first place—the attending physicians cannot wait until the heart has stopped its vital organic beats; on the contrary, it has to be removed when it is still active and undamaged. So it has to be removed when a more vital organ, other than the heart, has permanently stopped functioning. The brain, 'the master control, the guiding force behind all of man's actions', is now being considered to be this vital organ, which in turn raises a host of questions:

(a) Can it be said that death does indeed occur when the brain has

permanently ceased to function, despite the fact that the heart has continued to perform its organic blood-pumping function?

(b) If we, as a society, accept brain death as being a scientifically and medically reliable criterion of death (on the assurance that the medical criteria for determining death are settled and not in doubt among physicians), can we not then, as philosophers and theologians, have the courage not only to speculate but what is more important to make a practical value-judgment declaring that in the context of these criteria what constitutes the human person is the presence of a functioning brain and, therefore, the human person has ceased to be at a very specific point in the process of death, that point being when brain death occurs, despite the fact that — provided the use of the following terminology is not unacceptable — the human being (because of his beating heart) has gone on to live? With possibly one eye on the quality of life, can it not also be said that 'the human person ceases when awareness goes out and unawareness comes in, and awareness goes out when it becomes intolerable to itself'? Or when the human person has become incapable of reflecting upon himself as he reflects about himself and his ability to infinitely reflect upon himself? Or to use scholastic terminology, when the human person has irreversibly ceased to be 'an individual substance of rational nature'? At this stage of philosophical and theological research, very cautious qualified answers can be given. Nonetheless, such a theory has already been proposed by philosophers and theologians, Catholic and non-Catholic. To cite Richard A. McCormick, S.J.: 'At a certain point ... it is legitimate to say that 'this person is dead" or "there is here no longer a human person". What is that point? Since organs function but it is the person who lives and dies, the determination of this point involves not merely clinical knowledge, but also a grasp of the meaning of person upon or against which a definition of the absence of personhood can be made'.


10 Boethius, De Duabus Naturis, c. III. Cf. De Pot., q. 9, a. 4, Where St. Thomas formulates the same definition as follows: 'Distinctum subsistens in aliqua natura intellectuali' (a distinct subsisting being endowed with intellectual life); S. Th., I, q. 29, a. 3; III, q.16, a.12, ad 2.

11 Richard A. McCormick, S.J., 'Notes on Moral Theology', Theological Studies,
Firstly, McConnick does not specify at what stage in the process of death we can no longer speak of the human person or what constitutes the human person. His intention is simply to point out that there is such a stage, namely that in the absence of whatever element constitutes the human person, possibly in the absence of brain activity, no person is present.

(c) Finally, if such a value-judgment can be made with respect to the dying person (a value-judgment that has a scientific and medical basis), can one not also make a similar value-judgment with respect to the human being and the human person at the inception of life?

III - THE HUMAN BEING AND THE HUMAN PERSON AT CONCEPTION

When the fetus becomes in fact a human being, or is to be so considered, is probably the most crucial problem in the abortion debate. Though the answers provided range all the way from the moment of conception to the moment of birth, producing in the process three major schools of thought, it is fairly well acknowledged that what starts the human being on his way is the fertilization of the female egg by the male sperm.12


12 As classified by Callahan, op.cit., pp.377-401, the three schools of thought which concentrate their attention on the beginning of the human being or human life and the point at which that human being ought to be valued as such are the following:

(a) The Genetic School which draws both lines immediately at conception, when the sperm fertilizes the egg; thus fertilization marks the beginning of the human being and it is also at this point that it should be valued and protected with the full force of morality and the law;
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In the context of these considerations, the fertilized egg might not be a human person in the sense briefly outlined above. But, and this is a genetic fact, the fertilized egg contains in seed form the adult: whatever the adult will be, right down to the colour of his eyes and hair, the shape of his nose, etc., is determined the moment the sperm penetrates the nucleus of the egg, a moment (in time and in the process of fetal development) known as conception or fertilization. However, the fact has to be faced that the fertilized egg is not the adult. Whether or not it is an entity with full human rights is the contentious moral and

(b) The Development School which accepts fertilization as establishing the genetic basis for the human being, but assigns significant weight to the development process of the fetus, depending on the quality and stage or degree of fetal development: thus the human being might be said to begin (with value assigned accordingly), at 'quickening' or when the brain begins to function or later still at viability.

(c) The Social Consequences School which reinterprets, not necessarily denies, the genetic and biological constitution of the human being and concentrates its attention on the social consequences of abortion decisions. More often than not, in the view of its adherents the morality of abortion begs the question. In any case, it is argued that the biological data do not necessarily dictate a definition of who in fact is human and who is not. It is contended that 'humanness' should be defined in such a way as not to make abortion equivalent to destroying a human being: thus definitions of the human being would depend on a number of factors and so would the value to be assigned to the fetus; e.g., what women with an unwanted pregnancy think about their particular pregnancy, what an unwanted child means to them and their family, etc. Fetal rights, if any, are superseded by women's and families' rights.

13 Drawing the line at implantation (or impregnation) and not at fertilization as decisively marking the beginning of the human being are, among others, Paul Ramsey, Life or Death: Ethics and Options (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968), pp. 61-62; 'Points in Deciding about Abortion', in John T. Noonan, Jr., (Ed.), The Morality of Abortion (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 67; André Hellegers, 'A Look at Abortion', National Catholic Reporter, March 1, 1967, p. 4. This school of thought, which is really a variation of the genetic school, has a strong argument in its favour. Ramsey et al. argue that in the case of identical twins the egg splits on implantation (which occurs some seven days after fertilization, i.e., after the fertilized egg has travelled down the fallopian tubes and has nestled itself inside the womb) so that if fertilization cannot be said to mark the beginning of identical twins (as it does in the case of the single human being), implantation certainly does. Though splitting is completed at about the same time as implantation, it is existentially distinct from implantation as a process.
legal issue. No geneticist and biologist as such will commit himself to saying that it is, nor will they assist the philosopher and legislator in their arduous task of assigning such a value to the fertilized egg, now a zygote.

As the zygote develops by metabolism, the EEG instruments have been able to capture the brain activity of the embryo even as early as eight weeks after conception. This does not necessarily mean that the brain has not started functioning until the embryo is eight weeks old. It probably means that the EEG is not sensitive enough to capture the brain movements earlier. However, it could also well mean that though in the early stages of fetal development the brain, the material organ of the intellect — or what Plato calls 'the philosopher-king of the soul' — is present in the form of a developing cell or aggregate of cells, there is no brain activity at all. One might then further suggest that conceivably the brain starts functioning in response to the stirrings of the intellect at a given moment in the development of the fetus and that this moment occurs some eight weeks after conception. On the evidence available, the contrary is harder to demonstrate. In this case, at conception (or at implantation) and until such time as the brain begins to function, we would have the human being (or perhaps more accurately, an entity having human life and human nature); at eight weeks or the moment the brain begins to function we would have the human person. To this effect, distinguishing between 'a human life' and 'a human person' (the demarcation line being 'the existence of a living human brain in some form'), Rudolph Ehrensing observes that 'the presence of human life does not necessarily mean that a human person is present'.

Roy U. Schenk, who argues along the same lines, claims that the fetus changes from a potential to an actual human person when, following a continuous series of developmental stages, it ultimately passes through a level of complexity 'at which self-awareness becomes possible'. De Raeymaeker's own thinking on the problem is very close to this line of reasoning. In his discussion on subsistence or the formal constituent of person, De Raeymaeker makes the point that 'the subsistence of a human being is revealed by means of his conscious life. This activity is deliberate, free, and independent; it is sufficient unto itself. We call

14 Ehrensing, op. cit., p. 4.
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it a "personal" activity; every man is a person'. In support, he draws on contemporary philosophy and experimental psychology which link the notion of personality with that of consciousness.

If these hypotheses are acceptable (based as they are on the premises outlined so far they should appear plausible), then could we not possibly say that while abortion, performed in the first eight weeks of pregnancy or anyway before any brain activity can be detected, may indeed terminate the existence of a human being, it does not destroy a human person? If this could be the case, then could we not possibly admit a hierarchy of values and priorities when, morally and legally, we are confronted with serious conflicts of rights between the mother and the fetus?

IV - MEDiate AND IMMEDIATE ANIMATION

Some answers to the last set of questions are found in history. It was, in fact, an analogous theory that in the past had been proposed and somehow or other found workable, both in philosophy and theology as well as in canon and criminal law, the major difference being that the problem was viewed from a peculiarly different perspective and, consequently, a different terminology was used. At this stage, a brief, though sketchy, historical survey might be helpful.

Some 2500 years ago, both Plato and Aristotle repeatedly referred to abortion in clear and unmistakeable terms not only as a common practice of their times but also as something that should normally be allowed and even prescribed both for reasons of state as well as for eugenic purposes. In almost the same breath that Plato advocated euthanasia for 'those who are not naturally good in body and soul' and 'those of the inferior part, and anyone of the others who may be born defective, they will put away as is proper in some mysterious, unknown place', he did not hesitate to decree and demand that no child be allowed to be born when its parents had passed the age limit prescribed by law for procreative purposes. He did not deny the people of his Republic sexual intercourse, but he did decree that effective contraceptive measures should be used and abortion was considered one such

17 Ibid., pp. 17-20, 241.
means.\textsuperscript{18}

Carrying on the Greek practice with regard to abortion and the Platonic inadmissibility into the perfect state of imperfect children, Aristotle supported abortion but with a difference and he should be credited for having initiated speculation on the moral value of embryonic life on the basis of biological data. Despite the fact that he considered abortion to be justified when the parents had contributed the state-prescribed quota of children, he added that should it be procured at all, 'let abortion be procured before sense and life have begun. What may or may not be lawfully done in these cases depends on the state of life and sensation'.\textsuperscript{19} In Aristotle's philosophy, abortion was not a matter of indifference. It was rather a matter conditioned by the actual presence of 'life and sensation'.\textsuperscript{20}

Aristotle had advanced the theory of successive animation: at conception (and until some time after implantation), the soul of the embryo is vegetative only; as the embryo grows, the vegetative soul is informed by the sensitive or animal soul, eventually by the rational.\textsuperscript{21} In the process of this three-stage development of fetal formation and animation, a further distinction was made affecting the date of rational animation of the male and female embryos: the male fetus was said to have rational life within forty days following conception, while the period of pre-animation of the female fetus was thought to be twice as long. Aristotle's theory envisaged the male and female fetuses to be animated or endowed with a rational soul within these periods respec-


\textsuperscript{20} The Aristotelian phrase, 'before sense and life have begun', is not coextensive with conception or fertilization nor is it equivalent to viability and much less to birth. It is generally interchangeable with what is traditionally known as 'quickening'. Quickening referred to the child's movements inside the womb and was considered to occur some time from the eighth to the twelfth week of pregnancy. I shall come back to this phenomenon shortly.

\textsuperscript{21} What is here suggested is not that man has three souls but rather that man's soul manifests three operations: vegetation, sensation and rationality, with rationality, in the process of fetal development, manifested last.
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tively, just as soon as they were formed or ready to receive it.\textsuperscript{22}

Though the terms 'formed' and 'animate', and their respective contraries 'unformed' and 'inanimate', are to an extent interchangeable, there is a difference between them: the 'formed' fetus was one which had sufficiently developed with recognizable human features. When this point in fetal development was reached, the fetus was said to have become 'animate', i.e., once the fetus was 'formed', it received its rational soul and, as an immediate result of this reception, the fetus stirred, moved, kicked in the womb - or to use the popular term, 'quickened'! In other words, the unborn child quickened with joy, as it were, on receiving the rational soul, and it received the rational soul only when it was formed. It was thus that 'formation' and 'animation' came to be accepted as synonymous.

Whatever one might think of the theory, it was in any case a genuine attempt (which eventually proved workable) to establish some very sharp differences between the initial, later and intermittent stages in the development of the fetus, resulting in different values to be assigned to it.\textsuperscript{23}

In fact, the Aristoclean doctrine prevailed for centuries and was largely instrumental in shaping the Church's and Western society's policies towards abortion. Indeed, until just over a hundred years ago, 

\textsuperscript{22}History of Animals, 73.583b. Hippocrates fixed the two periods at 32 and 42 days respectively. The Roman jurists, for practical purposes, selected the 40th day as the date of animation for both sexes. The Stoics did not consider the fetus animate until it breathed at birth. Cf. Hippocrates, 'The Nature of the Child', in Francis Adams (Ed.), The Genuine Works of Hippocrates (London: Bailliere, Tindall & Cox, 1939); Plutarch, Morals, III:230; Digest of Justinian, 48.19.38.5; 48.8.8. Joseph Palazzini, Ius Fetus ad Vitam (Rome: Urbaniana, 1943), p.19.

\textsuperscript{23}Concerning this matter, John T. Noonan, Jr., 'An Almost Absolute Value in History', in Noonan, op.cit., pp.5-6, writes: 'This belief as to the time of formation of the fetus would suggest that there is no sensation before the fortieth day. Moreover, referring to growth in the early stages of the gestation of an animal, Aristotle speaks of its 'nutritive soul', a soul which would be like that of a plant (The Generation of Animals, 2.5.714a); and the original state of animals is not sleep, but something resembling sleep, a state which plants are in (5.1). On the other hand, this nutritive soul has the capacity for using heat and cold as its 'instruments' (ibid.). Where male and female are sentient, what the male contributes to generation is a 'sentient soul' (2.5.741b). The animal 'first and foremost lives because it can feel' (The Soul, 2.2.431b)\ldots\ldots'.
specifically until 1869, the Church had accepted the Aristotelian theory and some of her ablest theologians, including St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, had argued that the embryo received its rational soul not immediately on conception but only after the embryo had gone through its vegetative-sensitive process. To use technical language, they argued for mediate, not immediate, animation.

The theory also provided the basis for the English common law rule to the effect that the unborn child became a human being at 'quickening', the moment at which the pregnant woman felt life or movement within her, possibly because, as Glanville Williams puts it, not without a touch of sarcasm, 'it was easy to imagine that the animus, life or soul, entered the body of the unborn infant when it turned or moved in the womb'.

St. Augustine found some justification for it in the Septuagint translation of Exodus XXI: 22-23, on the basis of which he drew the distinction between the animate and inanimate fetus, applying it as follows:

The body is created before the soul. The embryo, before it is endowed with a soul, is informatus, and its destruction by human agency is to be punished with a fine. The embryo formatus is endowed with a soul; it is an animate being; its destruction is murder and is to be punished with death. Because the great question about the soul is not to be hastily decided by unargued and rash judgment, the law does not provide that the act pertains to homicide, for there cannot yet be said to be a live soul in a body that lacks sensation when it is not formed in flesh and so not yet endowed with sense.

Subsequently, mainly on the strength and authority of St. Augustine's and St. Jerome's interpretations of this biblical text, the distinction was canonically accepted by Pope Innocent III (1211), declaring abortion of the animate fetus to be punishable as homicide while no pun-

26 Epistles, 121.4; On Ecclesiastes, 2.5.
ishment was envisaged for aborting the inanimate fetus. He did not commit himself as to the time of animation. St. Thomas, a staunch supporter of Aristotelian philosophy, revived the theory and, though he considered abortion 'grave peccatum et inter maleficia computandum', he argued for mediate animation so strongly that he claimed that, before rational animation, abortion did not involve the same kind of sin as is involved after rational animation, for between 'what is seed and what is not seed is determined by sensation and movement'. In this respect, he even suggested that

27 Support for the distinction was also found in Canon Aliquando in Decretum Gratiani (1140), E. Friedberg (Ed.), Corpus juris canonici (Leipzig, 1879-1881), 2.32.2.7, which had incorporated Augustine's distinction between the animate and inanimate fetus, decreeing that abortion is not murder if the soul had not yet been infused.

The Decretum Gratiani was a compilation of the then existing legislative measures collected and arranged systematically by Gratian, a professor at Bologna. This compilation was eventually codified as Gratian's Decretals with addendas by St. Raymond of Pennafort. This new collection is known as the Decretals of Gregory IX who officially confirmed and promulgated it in 1234. Cf. Gregory IX, Decretals, whose Canon Sicut Ex, in Friedberg, op. cit., 5.12.20, corresponds to Gratian's Canon Aliquando. Gregory's Decretals, however, added another Canon, Si Aliquis, 5.12.5, derived from a tenth century penitential. Si Aliquis had specified that the penalty for homicide was applicable to contraception and abortion, regardless of the stage of fetal development. The implicit contradiction was interpreted to mean that while abortion is morally wrong, the canonical penalties should vary according to the stage of fetal development.

28 S. Th., I, q. 76, a. 3; q. 77, a. 7; q. 118, a. 2, ad 2.

30 Explaining why Aristotle, Politics, VII: 1334b6-1337a7, had accepted abortion as a lesser evil, St. Thomas's commentary, In Libros Politicorum Expositio, XII: 1241, states: 'Sed quia datum est pueros non reservari ad vitam, declarat, si necesse sit istud fieri, qualiter cum minori culpa fiet: dicens, quod si aliquibus coniugatis fiant plures quam sit determinatum a lege, et nescesse eos exterminari, magis procurandum est fieri abortum antequam sensus et vita insint quam cum infuerint, homicida a lege reputatur; et magis peccant; semen enim et non semen determinatur per sensum et motum. Sic igitur Aristoteles non dicit secundum intentionem suam, quod debeant exterminari aliqui nati; sed secundum legem gentium; nec quod procurandus sit abortus absolute, sed si interficiendi sunt ab aliquibus, magis faciendum est hoc ante sensum et vitam, non sicut bonum secundum se, sed sicut minus malum'. (Emphasis is mine).
'before the infusion of the rational soul, dead embryos will not rise again', and will not, consequently, enjoy the communion of saints. However, he was equally clear in stating that there was actual homicide when an ensouled embryo was killed.

Notwithstanding this theological support of Aristotle's theory and some justification for it in the Bible, some of the earlier Church Councils and Fathers had made no such distinctions — whether between the animate and inanimate fetus or whether between the moral and canon law — and had condemned all abortion as murder, regardless of the stage of fetal development. And so, in an attempt to bring to an end whatever uncertainties existed about the Church's position with regard to abortion (the distinction had made abortion relatively easier to justify canonically, if not morally), Sixtus V went back to the early Conciliar decrees and writings of the Fathers and through his Apostolic Constitution, Effraenatam (October 29, 1588), retracted the then prevailing distinctions and theories and condemned all abortion regardless of the day or week it took place and not only renewed all previous censures directed against procurers of abortion (including the mother) but also inflicted severer spiritual and temporal punishments (including excommunication reserved to the Holy See) on all who in any way

This passage is significant in that, in Aristotle's view, abortion was not a positive good; accepting it as a lesser evil further required that if it should be procured at all, it had better be procured during the course of the first trimester, before sense and life have begun. Though it does not necessarily follow that this commentary reflects St. Thomas's position on the problem (this part of the Commentary was actually completed by Peter of Alvernia), it is not inconsistent with St. Thomas's philosophy on abortion and the theory of mediate and immediate animation.

31 IV Sent, d. 44, q. 1, 4.
32 S. Th., II-II, q. 64, a. 8, ad 2.
33 Cf. J.D. Mansi, Amplissima Collectio Conciliorum (Paris, 1901-1927): Council of Elvira (313), Canon 53; Ancyra (314), Canon 21; Lerida (524) Canon 2; Constantinople (in Trullo, 706), Canon 91. Among the early Christian writings which condemned abortion are: the Didache (or Teaching of the Twelve Apostles), 2:2; the Epistle of Barnabas, 19:5; the Apocalypse of Peter. Among the writings of the Fathers are: Clement of Alexandria, Pedagogus, 2.10.96.1; Athenagoras, Embassy for the Christians, PG.6.919; Tertullian, Apologeticum ad nationes, 1:15; Basil of Cappadocia, Letters, 188, PG.32.672. See also R.J. Huser, The Crime of Abortion in Canon Law (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1942), pp. 33-39.
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advised, procured or helped to procure abortion for any reason whatever. Thus aborting even an embryo into which Medieval theology in concert with Greek biology and philosophy had not yet infused a soul was regarded as murder and carried the same penalties as abortion procured at a later stage.34

All too soon, however, the Sixtine Constitution gave rise to a number of practical problems, particularly in view of the penalty of excommunication which was reserved to the Holy See. Apart from that, it implicitly condemned the then prevailing theological opinion that abortion of the inanimate fetus to save the mother's life was permissible.35 Furthermore, there was the inescapable fact that public opinion and popular practice had been so strongly (and conveniently) impressed by the suggestion that in the first trimester of pregnancy the mother carried a 'soul-less' embryo that the culture had come to accept early abortion with impunity.

Mainly because of these reasons, the Sixtine position aroused such great dissension and misunderstandings that Sixtus' successor, Gregory XIV, through his milder Constitution, Sedes Apostolica (May 31, 1591), reversed the Sixtine prohibition and restored the original distinction between the earlier and later stages of fetal development, condemning abortion as murder only in the case of the animate fetus. The force of the Gregorian Constitution lay in its greatly renewed stress of the distinction between the animate and inanimate fetus. Furthermore, he lifted the reservation to the Holy See of the excommunication penalty and delegated it to the local bishops. As far as abortion of the inanimate fetus was concerned, all the penalties were revoked and the


35 Among the casuists and theologians who during this period (1450-1750) were attempting to strike a moral balance between fetal and maternal rights were: Tomas Sanchez, S.J., De sancto matrimonii sacramento (Antwerp, 1626), IX:20.9:224; Pedro de Ledesma, O.P., De magno matrimoniae sacramento (Venice, 1595), LX:1.4; Leonard Lessius, S.J., De justitia et jure (Lyons, 1653), II:9.2:58; Alphonsus de Liguori, Theologia Moralis, in Opera Omnia, L. Gaudé (Ed.), (Rome, 1905), III:394.
state of the question was remitted to what it had been before Sixtus, 'perinde ac si eadem constitutio in hujusmodi parte numquam emanasset'!  

At this point, it is well to recall that the Church's acceptance of this distinction did not make any difference to her moral position with regard to abortion. The moral worth of abortion did not exclusively depend on the theory of fetal ensoulment and the distinctions simply arose from it. Acceptance of the distinctions simply meant that, canonically, the Church saw some variation in the analysis of the act. It involved a sharp distinction between moral law (as the Church understood it and proclaimed it) and canon law and its penalties. But, of course, if this aspect of the problem had not been so nebulously and erratically handled, it is quite conceivable that the moral problem would have been considerably minimized.

Be that as it may, the whole debate was given the Gordian knot treatment by Pius IX whose Apostolicae Sedis (October 12, 1869) proclaimed the Church's position reiterating no less than the Sixtine position of 1588. By deleting the qualification animatus, he implicitly abolished the distinction between the animate and inanimate fetus and with it the highly controversial question, considered insoluble in practical terms, as to when the fetus is endowed with a rational soul. The penalty of excommunication was extended to all abortions, no matter what stage of gestation was involved, and to all who knowingly and freely render the necessary formal assistance and cooperation in the performance of the act, who delegate another to perform the operation and who order the act to be performed, not excluding the mother. These provisions were eventually incorporated in the Code of Canon Law (Canon 2350) which came into effect on May 19, 1918, under Benedict XV. Since then, the Church has restated her position on numerous occasions, in numerous forms.

With regard to the English common law rule concerning abortion, it


37 Cf. in particular: Casti Connubii, AAS, 22 (1930) 562; Gaudium et Spes (De Ecclesia in Mundo Huius Temporis), (1965) I.2.27; Humanae Vitae, AAS, 60 (1968) 481-503. For a comprehensive list of statements of the Holy See on abortion and closely related matters, see Gerald Kelly, S.J., Medico-Moral Problems (St. Louis: The Catholic Hospital Association, 1966), pp. 336-339.
should be interesting to note that the law in England evolved in an almost parallel fashion to the vicissitudes of canon law. Again, only the briefest of outlines can be attempted here and one hopes that no injustice to the multifaceted issues involved will be committed in the process.

Western society's attitude towards abortion has generally been inspired by what until the recent past had been the universal Christian moral consensus that abortion was as much a moral as a social wrong. Accordingly, the law particularly in such countries as were affected by Judaeo-Christian ethics — including England, the U.S., Canada and Continental Europe — had traditionally upheld the value of fetal life by seeking to reinforce its moral value through criminal sanctions. The prohibition was further strengthened by medical ethics and fear of social scandal.

Until 1803, the legal opposition to abortion in England had been founded on both common and canon law and was confined to the period after the fetus had quickened. Before quickening, however, it appears, to have been no crime at all. Actually, the law was silent with regard to abortion before quickening. The law's silence has been interpreted to mean that 'women enjoyed a common-law liberty to terminate at will an unwanted pregnancy', a situation that endured from 1327 to 1803.

The first reference to abortion in English criminal law is found in Bracton, judge, commentator of English criminal law and a contemporary of St. Thomas. Incorporating Gregory IX's Canon Sicut Ex (Gratian's Aliquando), Bracton specified that aborting a woman by blow or poison is homicide if the fetus is 'formed' and especially en-

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39 Like most of the lawyers of his time, Henry de Bracton (d.1268) was a priest and held several ecclesiastical appointments in the Diocese of Exeter. His best known works are Note Book, a collection of cases, edited by Frederic Maitland (London, 1887), and Treatise on the Laws of England, edited by George Woodbine (London, 1915-22), 2 vols. Cf. 'The Bracton Memorial', Law Times, 155 (1923) 302-303; W.S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law (London: Methuen, 1936), according to whom Bracton's works were without equal until Blackstone composed his Commentaries five centuries later.
40 See supra, note 27.
souled'.

Bracton's rule provided the foundation for the English common law rule and subsequent legislation to the effect that human life begins and the fetus becomes a human being in law at quickening. Five centuries later, in 1765, Blackstone would put it as follows: 'Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every individual and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb.

Though it was hardly enforced, such was the law in England until 1803 when, under George III, the law was put on a statutory basis and in the process lost the distinction between abortion before and after quickening. Consequently, all abortion was outlawed, the only penal provision that survived being that abortion before quickening was not punishable so severely as abortion after quickening. (In this respect, it paralleled Gregory XIV's Sedes Apostolica of 1591). Thus, administering poison to cause and procure miscarriage of any woman 'then quick with child' became a felony punishable by death; whereas attempting by drug or instrument to procure the miscarriage of any woman 'not being or not being proved to be quick with child' became a felony punishable by fine, imprisonment, pillory, whipping or transportation.

This change in attitude towards abortion was of great significance. It was probably the first time anywhere that abortion before quickening began to be legally considered as a criminal offence. And it was nineteenth century England that blazed the trail.

In actual practice, the moment at which quickening occurred varied, of course, from woman to woman and from pregnancy to another. It was at any rate the moment every pregnant woman looked forward to with joy ... or apprehension! The medical profession itself was divided over the time as to when a fetus is said to quicken but in at least one case (Rex v. Phillips, 1812), the court ruled that a fetus is quick when

43 George III c. 58.
44 So popular was this belief that it became a parlour game of sorts whenever a pregnant woman happened to be around. To cite one such instance: at a New Year's Eve party in 1662, Samuel Pepys, observing how Lady Castlemaine twitched, thought it quite amusing to report in his Diary: 'Lady Castlemaine quickened at my Lord Gerard's dinner!'
the mother feels it move, \textsuperscript{45} which was not much help anyway since some doctors questioned the medical significance of the event and others tended to interpret the statute so flexibly as to apply it to any stage of pregnancy or to whenever it pleased the mother to disclose that she had felt life within her! \textsuperscript{46} Quickening, in fact, has long since been recognised for what it really is: a mere psychological and physiological reaction on the part of the pregnant woman when she becomes aware of fetal movement within her.

It all too soon became clear that a change in the law was due and before too long, with the enactment of the \textit{Offences Against the Person Act (1861)}, \textsuperscript{47} the abortion law in England underwent further revision, in the course of which it lost the death penalty and the quickening distinction which had implicitly been retained by the 1803 statute and explicitly upheld by the courts. It is upon this Act that until recently the British, American and Canadian laws on abortion largely rested.

Among other things, this Act established that any unlawful interference with pregnancy is criminal regardless of the period of gestation. It further established a uniform maximum penalty of up to and including imprisonment for life. In particular, the Act covered two instances: (a) where a pregnant woman uses any means with intent to procure her own miscarriage; and (b) where anyone else unlawfully uses any means with such intent whether the woman was pregnant or not. The Act was particularly far-reaching in that it considered a crime not only the actual procuring of abortion (as eventually required by the canon law code), but also the mere attempt to procure abortion, making 'intent' a sufficient element for the offence. It was immaterial that both the attempt and the woman herself turned not to be 'fruitless', i.e., the attempt proved unsuccessful and, particularly where someone other than the woman herself was involved, the woman was not pregnant. \textsuperscript{48} In these respects, the 1861 Act provided clearer guidance that

\textsuperscript{47} Sections 58-59.
\textsuperscript{48} Among the means specified in the statute are: 'Any instrument' and 'poison or other noxious thing'. But in \textit{Rex v. Spicer} (1955), concerning an abortion attempted by the manipulation of the hand, the jury were charged that: 'Whether
abortion was unlawful, for whatever reason and whether or not it was performed by a skilled obstetrician, the knitting-needle abortionist or the woman herself.

The subsequent vicissitudes of the 1861 Act and its widely divergent interpretations by both the medical and legal professions as well as by the courts are not of immediate concern to us and I shall, therefore, not go into any further excursions in this area. 49

So perhaps at this time I should switch back to the Aristotelian doctrine on mediate and immediate animation. Though the distinction between abortion before and after quickening has since been recognized as being far too subjective to offer any realistic and reliable guidance, the closely-related problem of animation has not been completely abandoned.

Despite the fact that the theory of immediate animation had, after the ringing declarations of Pius IX's Apostolicae Sedis, become the commonly accepted theological opinion, Arthur Vermeersch, S.J., among others, remained an ardent advocate of the mediate animation theory, maintaining that 'no solid arguments' can support the immediate infusion of the soul. 50 After all, any commonly accepted opinion is not this act does or does not produce a miscarriage does not matter. Whether it was a method which could or could not produce a miscarriage does not matter. The question is, what did he intend to do when he did the acts which were admitted by him in the witness box? Cf. Martin's Criminal Code of Canada (Toronto: Canada Law Book, Ltd., 1969), p. 256.

49 The carefully-worded Act of 1861 contained the term 'unlawfully' ('Whoever shall unlawfully ...'). Its real significance was not specified in and by the Act and both the medical and legal professions understood it to imply that some abortions might be lawful after all. But which abortions were lawful and which unlawful were by no means spelled out. The very serious abuses that followed this substantial doubt were rectified 68 years later, when the Infant Life Preservation Act (1929) came into being. The 1861 and 1929 Acts were tested in the history-making Rex v. Bourne (1938). For the abortion law reform movement, the 'Bourne Principle', which the Court established, was a major landmark. Eventually, through the adoption of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill (1967) - in actual fact, this Bill consists of a series of subsections (i.e., exceptions) to Sections 58-59 of the 1861 Act - abortion became available to one and all for what someone called 'the price of a bus ticket!'

necessarily the right one, nor does it in any way nullify a contrary opinion. For all one knows, the truth may well lie with the dissidents.

Following the Venneersch line of thought today are two notable Jesuits, Joseph Donceel and Thomas Wassmer, who, among other things, suggest that the theory could well provide us with some practical guidelines.

On the basis of hylomorphism to which the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition (not excluding the Church) is committed, Donceel argues that the hylomorphic conception of man is inconsistent with immediate animation. He claims that it is a metaphysical incompatibility for the rational soul, as the substantial form of a real human body, to be present when the human body is not real but only virtually present in the cell or aggregate of cells. Since the soul can only animate an actual human body, Donceel argues that some degree of corporal organization and development is necessary before the embryo can receive a rational soul. And he concludes in somewhat solemn terms: 'With St. Thomas I teach that at the moment of conception there originates a vegetative organism that will slowly evolve into a sentient organism to become, at moment I cannot determine, a rational organism, a real human being'. However, he does suggest that the beginning of brain activity might be such a moment.51

In support of mediate animation, Wassmer closely follows Donceel's line of thought: He writes:

If we really understand the meaning of substantial form, we would more likely question its presence at the moment of conception and consider that it gives determination to this specific entity only when this entity has a real human body, an inchoative human body and not just a virtual human body ... The presence of the rational soul from the moment of conception is more compatible with a theory of Cartesian dualism in which the soul is present as a complete principle and operating more properly as an efficient cause. However, if the

soul is not the formal cause of the body but only the efficient cause in the cells, the question may be raised why it has to be a rational efficient cause. This speculation is congruous with a Cartesian dualism but hardly acceptable to a hylomorphic conception of man that was proclaimed by the Council of Vienne.  

Wassmer mentions further: (a) the phenomenon of identical twins resulting from one ovum, fertilized by one sperm — which would seem to exclude animation immediately on conception, though not immediately on implantation (in which case, the zygote as it travels down the fallopian tube is without a rational soul); and (b) the possibility that embryologists might yet succeed in splitting the fertilized ovum just as they have artificially divided the fertilized ova of lower organisms. 'If success is found in these experiments', he writes, 'What is to be said about the spirituality, the non-divisibility of the rational principle, present there from the very moment of conception as the substantial form of the body?'

V - CONCLUSION

To return, if I may, to my proposition and express it interrogatively as follows: if we can speak of a union, a hypostatic union, between the divine person and the human being without saying that the divine person was also a human person; if we could possibly speak, as has been suggested, of a difference between the human being and the human person during the process of death, may we not also speak, on the basis of mediate and immediate animation, of a difference between the human being and the human person at the beginning of life — the demarcation point being the moment the brain begins to function (which can be ascertained quite reliably by electronic instruments, prior to any approval of any abortion requests, and independently of the mother's disclosure of quickening) — in which case, can we not also say that abortion performed prior to the detection of brain activity does not destroy a human person?

There are no easy answers and before I bring my discussion to a close, I should perhaps point out what by this time should have become

53 Ibid., p. 417.
obvious, namely, that these considerations have by no means been submitted to settle the highly controversial question in the abortion debate as to whether or not the theory of mediate and immediate animation is a valid one, nor whether the fetus is an individually distinct entity having human life, nor indeed whether or not it is a human being or a human person. My main concern has rather been to provide a base from which to speculate and argue in good faith as to whether or not there might be a stage in fetal development at which it can be said that the product of conception need not, in its initial stages, be assigned the absolute or almost absolute value we have traditionally endowed it with.

Whichever view is upheld concerning these seemingly unanswerable questions, there would still remain one vital issue to be resolved: the fetus must never be denied its right to life arbitrarily. The fetus has acquired that right by gift and therefore, if fetal life should be taken, the burden of proof (that his or her values and rights have a greater claim to recognition and may, therefore, override those of the fetus) lies with him or her who would take life. It is not a decision that can be taken lightly. But it may well be a decision that could be taken with moral impunity. As Wassmer observes: 'Catholic moralists have not so absolutized and polarized life that, where there was doubt of its presence, other values have not permitted its forfeiture'. Consequently, one could make a firm but compassionate ethico-legal case for the mother in mortal or near-mortal conflict or in circumstances equivalent to it. In an area which is so shrouded in and clouded with uncertainty, speculation and value-judgments, it would not be an unwise choice to open the windows of one's mind and heart to let in a little fresh air. As in the past, that choice will be made no less wisely, no less responsibly.

P. J. MICALLEF

54 Ibid., p. 418.
HUMAN BEING OR HUMAN PERSON?

Some comments on Prof. Micallef's article

My friend Prof. P.J. Micallef is to be highly complemented for tackling the abortion question from a most interesting point of view, from an aspect which is, in my opinion, absolutely fundamental and most likely to lead to far-reaching conclusions.

When is the human fetus a person? There shouldn’t be any doubt in anybody’s mind that whatever new life results from the union of two humans must be human. But a more important question is: what does a human fetus need to be also a human person?

That the two things are not necessarily the same is, as Dr. Micallef points out, quite clear for a Christian, who believes with the absolute certainty of faith that the human nature of Christ is integrally human without being a human person. This is correct theologically. One should also develop the comparison, just mentioned by the author, with the mystery of the Blessed Trinity. Here again, as we learn from divine revelation, we have three distinct persons but only one nature. All of which proves that an intellectual nature and a person are not conceptually the same.

This leads the author to analyse the concept of personality as applied to a human being. While theologians speak in terms of animation (or infusion of the soul) when dealing with the beginning of the human person in the fetus, scientists and philosophers prefer to consider the moment at which the brain begins to function (around the eighth week) as a safe criterion for placing the beginning of the human person. This last conclusion is shared by a number of theologians who, following St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, consider the quickening signal in the womb occurring between the 6th and 8th week as the moment of animation and, therefore, of the beginning of the human person.

We know that this view is not in conformity with the official doctrine of the Magisterium and cannot therefore be followed in practice. Should it, however, later on be considered as a safe enough doctrine, it would still not follow that therefore abortion performed before the 6th week can be considered morally licit: such an abortion, in fact, if not equi-
valent to murder, is still the destruction of human life. But it could follow, as Prof. Micallef concludes, that, in case of mortal or near-mortal conflict of conscience, life should not be so absolutized as to exclude, when there is serious doubt about the presence of a human person, the possibility of other values being allowed to prevail. With this conclusion I agree.

M. EMINYAN
THE OFFERTORY RITE IN THE ORDINES ROMANI

The Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy of Vatican II, when it speaks on the general principles of liturgical renewal, says amongst other things, that, 'the rites should be distinguished by a noble simplicity; they should be short, clear and unencumbered by any useless repetitions; they should be within the people's power of comprehension, and normally should not require much explanation' (n. 34). Later on, in subsequent articles, the same Constitution speaks on more particular principles as it treats on more specific liturgical celebrations. Thus in chapter II, when it speaks on the Mystery of the Eucharist, it says that 'the rite of the Mass is to be revised in such a way that the intrinsic nature and purpose of its several parts, as also the connection between them, may be more clearly manifested, and that devout and active participation by the people may be more easily achieved' (n. 50). In the same article it then stresses the need of simplifying the rites with due consideration to the preservation of their substance; the discarding of those elements which are superfluous and of little advantage, and the reintroduction and restoring of those elements which have suffered injury through accidents of history.

Consequently, it is my intention in this paper to examine and seek the historical and theological evolution and make an evaluation of the principal elements of the offertory structure in the Ordines Romani, and then to try and evaluate the contemporary renewed offertory rite in the light of the same rite in the Ordines Romani. Thus we hope to come to a better understanding of the offertory in the new Ordo Missae.

The Offertory Rite in the Ordines Romani

To begin with, by taking a glance at the table of the principal elements of the offertory structure, given above, we notice that the offertory starts immediately after the OREMUS. Here we find the following elements:

- the chanting of the offertory hymn
- the collection of the gifts
- the washing of hands
- the placing of the offertories on the altar
THE OFFERTORY RITE IN THE ORDINES ROMANI

- incensation
- the Orate Fratres
- the Secreta.

Before treating each element separately, I would like to add that I have drawn this structure from a selection of the Roman Ordines because the other Ordines make only a passing reference to the offertory rite (ita cfr., Or. L, cap. XX, nn. 35-36), or else, as in most cases, they do not contain anything pertinent to the theme.

THE OFFERTORY HYMN

Generally we find a reference to this singing after the offertory rite is over (OR. nn. I, IV, V, VI); at other times just at the start of the rite (OR. V, X, XVII) or even in the middle (OR. n. V). All this leads to the conclusion that the singing accompanied the offertory actions, and it perdured throughout until the principal celebrant thought it fit to start the preface. Consequently, the singing here marks the duration of the rite. Besides, it was rather long since the offertory rite itself took quite some time. Righetti holds that it is of North African origin and exactly started during the episcopacy of S. Augustine (391-430) in Carthage, from where it reached Rome during the 5th century. It gradually evolved and reached its peak before the 8th century. Then it began to decline until already, in the 11th century we find it reduced to the antiphon. Earlier it was responsorial in nature, and was left exclusively to the schola to sing it alternately, that is, a group or soloist sang the verses, whilst the second group sang the antiphon (e.g., OR. I). Righetti adds that the exclusion of the verses in the offertory chant and its reduction to the antiphon might indicate that the offertories of the faithful had ceased by then or else, that it was enforced to save time and leave the people moments when they could prepare themselves in silent prayer for the sacrifice. Moreover, the wording of the chants, here, was always strictly connected with the presentation of the gifts and expressed the jubilance of the heart with which the faithful offered these same gifts since, as they quoted, 'God loves the cheerful giver'.

Collection of the Gifts

Here I have purposely stressed this action as a 'collection' instead of a 'presentation' or an 'offering', in order to mark the part played by the pontiff in descending from his throne and going down among the congregation to make himself the collection from among the people. In fact, we find that the Ordines which are of strong Roman tenor express this idea of collection (OR. I, IV, V, VI) as G.J. Booth rightly points out in his study on the Ordo Romanus Primus. Those that bear a Gallican influence, speak more of a presentation, or rather of a procession unto the altar where they handed the gifts to the pontiff (OR. XVII). Jungmann believes that the idea of the offertory procession in Gaul is coming from the Byzantine solemn offertory entrance which was also adapted by Rome but only on great feasts. The offertory oblations were directly connected with communion and originally the Church insisted that would-be communicants were to bring their offertories, and besides, she refused the gifts of penitents or of Christians at enmity amongst themselves. Jungmann also insists that undoubtedly not all the bread and wine collected were used for the sacrifice, but those which were not to be consecrated were probably placed on side altars, or behind the main altar, and then later distributed to the poor by deacons. However, we find the insistence that even those who were not to receive communion are not to appear before the Almighty empty handed at least on principal feast days, since as St. Cesarius of Arles would insist, they could bring other things such as oil and candles that would serve for worship. And by the eighth century, money was accepted as a substitute, as this was deemed necessary for the sustenance of the increasing number of the clergy. Yet even here, such offertories kept their sacred character as

5 Ibid., pp. 323-324, and Righetti, op. cit., in his reference to the Synod of Elvira in Spain in the year 303, p. 270. Besides, both OR. X, n. 44, and OR. L, c. XX, nn. 35-36, indicate directly and indirectly that the priest carries on the altar the oblations that were necessary for communion only.
6 Op. cit. pp. 318-9. Besides, in the excavations in the Lateran, Rome, altars have been found which were intended for the reception of gifts. E. Josi, R. Krauthmer, S. Corbett, Note Lateranensi, in Rivista di Archeologia Cristiana 33 (1957), 79-98.
they still expressed the closer participation of the community in the sacrifice because of their own oblation.\footnote{Righetti, op. cit. p. 273.} A very interesting note is found in Ordo L, c. XX, nn. 86-87, which says that parents are to leave their children outside the church 'in custodia' so as to return and offer oblations both in their name and in their children's name. Moreover, certain theologians consider such an action as the first exercise of the priesthood of the faithful.\footnote{A. Clark, The Origin and Development of the Offertory Rite and its Function in the Sacrifice of the Mass, (Typis Polyglottis Vat. - 1950) p. 311, excerpt from his Dissertation ad Lauream in Pontif. Univ. Gregoriana.} But undoubtedly, the change from natural goods to money that was brought about because of more practical economic considerations, as it has already been hinted at earlier, caused with the passing of time a decrease in the sacrificial notion of the oblations of the congregation.\footnote{Jungmann, op. cit. p. 323-4.}

**Washing of Hands**

The first remark that we are rightly bound to make is that certain Ordines (nn. IV, XV, XVII) speak of two washings of hands, one preceding the collection of the gifts and the other following it. Andrieu, while commenting on the first washing says that it is of Gallican origin. For the meaning behind it we have to enquire from others such as Righetti, who only sees in it a symbolic meaning, namely, the interior purification necessary before approaching the sacrificial act. It still survives in a way in a Pontifical Mass and curiously enough Righetti himself adds that the custom is very ancient, dating as far back as Tertullian (Apolog. 39, P.L., 1. 540), though here it rather bore a practical reason, since the Agape at this time used to precede the Eucharistic Celebration and consequently, the washing of one's hands was thought quite evidently and necessarily after a meal.\footnote{Op. cit. p. 284f.} The second washing of hands, after the collection of the gifts, shows more clearly the propriety and convenience of the act, as the pontiff would deem it necessary to clean his hands after collecting the gifts. However, with the decline of this collection, we find that the practice became also rare especially during the 11th-13th century. And where it survived it gained once more the symbolic meaning of spiritual cleansing. In actual fact it never lost this
meaning, which continued to remain as an undertone even when it was simply practical to follow it. For its real origin lies in Old Testament ablution rites, that perpetuated in Christianity under various forms and customs. Thus, in the Ethiopic Rite the priest sprinkles the congregation after he had watered his hands and before he dries them, whilst at the same time he warns those who approach the Lord’s table unworthily. The fount that is found in the atrium of Christian Basilicas expresses the same idea. We can say the same thing as regards the introduction of the Holy Water founts at the entrance of churches, and the inclusion of the Asperges rite at the start of the mass at Sunday High Masses during the Carolingian era. Perhaps we may also say the same with regards to the custom of the priest in washing his hands in the sacristy before commencing mass. Consequently, the washing of hands is not necessarily connected with the offertory, and it is rather found there since it is nearer to the Consecration, and, though it is still reminiscent of its practical nature, yet its purpose is very well expressed by the Lavabo psalm that was introduced in the eleventh century, to serve as a precaution for priests especially before handling the Sacred Host and Chalice during the Canon.\[11\]

**Placing of Offertories on the Altar**

The preparation of the altar which is then followed by the placing of those gifts on the altar that are to be used in the sacrifice was carried in Rome in a very simple and sobre way. We notice in the Ordinals that the acolytes, subdeacons and deacons first prepared the altar with the necessary candles, cloths and some of the gifts. Then the pontiff descended from his throne and made for the altar. Having saluted it, he then places upon it his offerings. Here we notice that the head of the choir brings the cruets with water and hands it to the deacon (OR. IX, n. 23), who prepares the chalice. Meanwhile, the pontiff prays over the oblation. It is only Ordo X that provides us with the formula ‘Veni Sanctificator...’ at the blessing of the host (n. 46). The others refer us to his actions, namely, ‘elevans oculos’ (OR. XV, n. 33-34, XVII, n. 42), whilst he elevates the host and prays in secret, and ‘inclinans se paululum...’ (OR. I, n. 85, VI, n. 51), which is also a reference to his silent prayers. These actions are also accompanied by the blessing, by means

\[11\] Ibid., cf. also Jungmann, op. cit., p. 350f.
of a cross, of the oblata. The fixed prayer formulae of these actions came later, around the eleventh century, and most probably they are of Gallican origin, since such silence was not very tolerated for long in Frankish liturgy.\(^\text{12}\) The 'Veni Sanctificator' formula derives from the Irish Stowe Missal (11th cent.), and it is an invocation to the Holy Spirit to bless the oblata. And though it seems to be of an epikletic nature, yet we cannot admit it fully since we are not here in the Canon. Besides, the prayers here are of a private and simple nature and have not the force of those found in the Canon.\(^\text{13}\) It is important to add that the carrying of the water was left to the head of the choir so as to include the singers in the sacrifice by letting them share in bringing the offertory gifts.\(^\text{14}\) Moreover, the mixing of the water with wine symbolizes the intimate union of the faithful with him to whom they had bound themselves in Faith. This union could not be severed just as water could not be separated from wine once they had been mixed. Jungmann affirms this doctrine by quoting S. Cyprian: 'when someone offers only wine, then the blood of Christ begins to exist without us; but when it is only water, then the people begin to exist without Christ' (Ep. 63, ad Caecilium). He adds that this theory which symbolizes Christ's union with his Church and which is very well expressed in the prayer, 'Deus, qui humanae substantiae mirabiliter condidisti...', that accompanied the mixing of water with wine, was repeated and extended in the Middle Ages and prevailed over a later theory that referred to the blood and water flowing from Christ's side on Calvary. It even prevailed against another theory coming from the East that referred to the water and wine as representing Christ's human and divine nature, whence it grew customary to put in the chalice equal portions, and consequently our few drops of water was a stumbling block to unity with some Ecclesial denominations.\(^\text{15}\)

As regards the blessing of the oblata (bread, wine and water), it is to be noted that this is a sign of dedicating the gifts to such a holy purpose, whilst at the same time invoking God to render the offerers holy. And here we also notice that the oblata is referred to as 'sacrificium'.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., p. 346.
\(^{14}\) Ibid., p. 329.
\(^{15}\) Ibid., p. 333f.
(cf. Veni Sanctificator-prayer). We are later to find this same word in the ORATE FRATRES and very often in the SECRETA. And since certain prayers are of an epikletic nature, as they are addressed to the Holy Spirit (ita, Veni Sanctificator), many scholars were led to consider the offertory rite as a 'petit canon'. However, the idea that it was a sort of an anticipation of the sacrifice proper soon gave way to a more sober and reasonable interpretation — the presenting of the sacrificial gifts on the altar of sacrifice, even because the prayer-formularies that included such terminology as 'immaculatam hostiam', and 'calicem salutaris', were of a later origin. Besides, here, very often the oblata are referred to as 'sacrificium' (S. Cyprian, De opere et eleemos., XV). Consequently, whenever we meet the term 'sacrificium' in the offertory context, we are to consider it as synonymous to 'oblationes'.

**THE INCENSATION**

The first instance that we meet with the incensation of the oblata, is in Ordo V and Ordo X. It is to be remembered that the latter has the former as its principal source. Ordo V belongs to the end of the ninth century and it is a re-edition of the previous ordinals with the addition of Gallican elements. As a matter of fact, the incensation at the offertory is a fruit of Carolingian liturgical development that in turn introduced it from the more solemn liturgical celebration of the offertory in the Byzantine rite. Its main inspiration is Scriptural, since for example, in the New Testament, we find incensation closely connected with sacrifice (cf. Lk. 1:11, 18ff., Apoc. 8:3-4, Eph. 5:2). Besides, the words that accompany it and which were introduced in the eleventh century, are drawn from these same and other Scriptural passages. But they were introduced in Rome itself rather with reluctance in the following century. The author of the Micrologue says in this regard, 'Romanus Ordo praecipit ut incensum semper praecedat evangelium.... non autem concedit ut oblatio in altari thurificetur... quamvis modo a pluribus, imo pene ab omnibus, usurpetur' (c. 9). But by this time it was almost practised everywhere, even in Rome where later, Pope Innocent III (+1216), adopted it officially, though, it must be admitted, only 'facultative', as Ordo

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XIV would say, 'prout videbitur faciendum' (n. 53). As to the meaning behind this incensation, we notice that this is clearly expressed in its actions and accompanying prayers. For the burning of the incense in charcoal is a sign of our debasement before the majesty of God, which makes our prayers worthy in a way to ascend graciously to him. In turn, after psalm 140, his mercy may come down to us. The incensation however, cannot be separated from our gifts at the altar, even because here they are incensed and blessed at the same time, whilst the prayer 'Veni Sanctificator' is said to enforce, as it were, their dedication and envelope them in a holy atmosphere of prayer. The same can be said for the incensation of the celebrant, ministers choir, and congregation that generally immediately follows.17

The Orate Fratres

This offertery element, the Orate Fratres, may be considered as the most ancient of the offertery apologies, and since we find it in the Ordinals that bear strong Gallican elements (i.e., nn. V, X, XVII), we may say that this too is of Frankish origin. However, not all scholars agree on this point, as M. Andrieu, in his comments on Ordo XVII, when he speaks precisely on the 'Orate pro me' (n. 45), quotes Edmund Bishop (Liturgia Historica, p. 7), and follows him in considering it as of Roman and not Gallican origin.18 Jungmann thinks otherwise. Besides, he adds that it is an instance which shows that the presiding priest feels very strongly that he is exalted above the people. The early Medieval Church was fully conscious of this, more still in the sacrificial prayer where he is considered as the people's mediator and stands alone between them and God. Consequently, he would turn to those around him to pray for him, here at the offertery, before he begins the Canon. This instance originally led to private spontaneous prayers. It was only later that the whole community was included and that a fixed prayer was set.19

The Secreta

There is no need to enter into detail as regards this prayer since it has been treated quite exhaustively in many scholarly works. However,

we shall be limiting ourselves to giving its evolution, or rather its impoverishment in the Ordinals, and its theological meaning. To start with, in the Leonine and Gregorian Sacramentaries it is known as the 'Oratio super Oblata', precisely because it was the official prayer said over the offertories that included not only the celebrant's prayers, but also those of the congregation whom he was officially representing. The name SECRETA was adopted by the Gelasian Sacramentary, since by then it was no longer said in a loud voice, and it had become very much a private prayer of the celebrant. The Ordo Romanus Primus does not mention it, though it may be referring to it indirectly when it speaks of the Pontiff's silent prayers at the altar immediately before the preface (n. 85), for undoubtedly, by then the texts for such prayers were not lacking. However, other subsequent Ordinals refer to it specifically, and add that it ought to be said in Secret (OR. nn. V, n. 58; VII, n. 2; XV, n. 35; XVII, n. 46). We see here that in its way of presentation it has become very much of an apology even though its formulae still belonged to the 'orationes' — the prayers of the people. One of the principal reasons for its decline undoubtedly is the offertory chant that continued throughout the offertory until the celebrant was about to start the preface, as it has been already hinted at earlier. For once there was singing the priest could not pray aloud, and there was no reason for the people to listen also to him. Consequently its decline came with the Gallican influence on Roman liturgy. And this continued even when the offertory chant was on the decline for the simple reason that by then it had become part and parcel of the Apologies which were private and secret in nature even when there were fixed formularies, and even because in this way they could give rise to spontaneous private prayers from the people's part. When we come then to the Secret's theological concept, we find that we build this theology in the Roman Ordinals, not from its liturgical practice but from its content, a content that, liturgically speaking, knew better and happier days. For it is a general prayer of petition made by the presiding priest in a loud voice so as to be expressive of the collective voice of the community at worship; and built in the same way as the other collective prayers in the Mass, that is, the Collect and the Postcommunion. But it is still characteristic of the offertory rite since the terms used belong to the offertory. Thus we find: 'accipe', 'hostia', 'sacrificium', 'oblatio', 'munera', and the like. In it we find a mystical exchange of gifts: our gifts that are bound to mount up to God, so that
in turn God's blessings may come down to us. The AMEN at the end that is asked from the congregation, is not only their affirmation in its message but also a sign that it is their own prayer. And it is authentically liturgical since it is directed to God the Father through the merits of the Son and the help of the Holy Spirit. It may also include a particular intercession to a Saint when it is his feast-day.

The Secret brings the offertory rite to a close, which is an indication of its communal and collective nature, in that, it denotes the people's share in the preceding actions.\(^{20}\)

**The New Ordo Missae**

In the introduction to this paper we have already expressed the mind of the Second Vatican Council as regards liturgical reform, and even as regards the reform of the Mass. These same principles are repeated once more by Pope Paul VI in his Apostolic Constitution by which he promulgated the New Ordo Missae on April 3rd., 1969.\(^{21}\) Later on, in the same Constitution, we come to the various renewed parts of the Mass amongst which we find the Offertory rite. Consequently, we shall be considering the latter in the light of the analysis of the various elements that have been examined earlier in the Roman Ordinals.

First we delineate the structure of the offertory rite, which is known as the 'preparatio donorum':

- preparation of the altar
- chanting of the offertory hymn
- procession with the gifts
- presentation on the altar
- incensation of the oblata
- washing of the hands
- the Orate Fratres
- the Oratio super Oblata.

The first element, 'the preparation of the altar', is carried on by the ministers that accompany the celebrant. Their task is to bring on the altar, the corporal, the purificator, the chalice, and the missal. These are not left to be carried in procession as gifts since the stress on the

\(^{20}\)Ibid., p. 355ff., and Righetti, op. cit., p. 296ff.


\(^{22}\)Ibid., p. 25, n. 49.
oblata is that they are gifts. Quite logically then, the corporal, purificator, chalice and missal may not be considered as gifts, as these would belong to the Church.22 More real gifts are the bread and wine even if these are not in fact brought by the congregation from their homes, for they still: 'viam et significationem servat'. The latter are brought unto the altar in a procession. Whereupon they are received by the celebrant or deacon and placed on the altar. Here we notice a departure from the strictly Roman Tradition, since as we have seen earlier, the Ordinals speak more of a collection of gifts than of a procession, for it was the pontiff himself who went among the congregation to receive the gifts from them. The procession with the gifts is rather of Gallican origin. However, the other idea of a 'collection', is still in a way preserved in the New Ordo, because it speaks of the: 'pecunia et alia dona pro pauperibus vel pro ecclesia a fidelibus allata vel in ecclesia collecta accepta habentur'. For here, undoubtedly it comes from the church's ministers who would go around and among the people to collect these second kind of gifts which are not directly connected with the Eucharistic celebration. Whence they are to be carried in the same procession but not to be placed on the altar of sacrifice.23 This is also a revival of a Middle Age's custom of having side altars for this purpose, as it has also been hinted at earlier.

Whilst the preparation of the altar and the procession is taking place there is to be singing, and when this is possible, then the offertory antiphon is to be dropped. The chant here is similar to that at the introit, that is, it is made up of the antiphon and an accompanying psalm, or else of a hymn that is congruous to the offertory or the particular liturgical season. The singing is to be carried alternately, between the schola itself and/or the people. Undoubtedly, it is intended to last even whilst the priest blesses the offertories until he reaches the Orate Fratres, since here he awaits their reply. In the offertory chant then, we see again a return to the Roman Tradition of the first Ordinals, that is, before the Gallican liturgy put an end to it.24

The incensation of the oblata, altar, ministers and people may follow. It has remained then facultative and it has thus preserved the Roman Tradition, once incensation was officially accepted by Rome at the

23 ibid.
24 ibid., n. 50.
offertory in the later Middle Ages. It has also kept its symbolic significance, in that it is to be considered, 'ut oblata Ecclesiae eiusque oratio sicut incensum in conspectum Dei ascendere'.

The 'lavabo' comes next. Here, one would like to note that although 'ritu desiderium internae purificationis exprimitur', yet it would at least have been closer to the Roman Tradition were it to precede the placing of the oblata on the altar. But it seems that it has been kept in the New Ordo for the sake of variety since the same Ordo already insists on purification in the penitential act at the beginning of the Mass. Consequently, one feels that the washing of hands at the offertory could have been eliminated, and it would be no wonder were it to fall into disuse in the near future!

The next element, the ORATE FRATRES, is an example that the priest has been accepted by the congregation in his presidential role in the sacrifice that is to ensue. It even indicates the major part that the people play in the Mass, since the celebrant may in no way be isolated from them. This is more evident in the subsequent prayer, the Oratio super Oblata. It is heartening to see it achieving once more its original name, and at the same time thus capturing the old spirit of the authentic ancient Roman Tradition, since its wording may be considered now to really mean what they say. It is quite logical then, that the New Ordo here reaches a fair compromise since it prolongs the offertory chant but not to the extent of hindering the people from expressing themselves together with the celebrant who is representing and leading them.

Before we move to our general conclusions, it is relevant to add a few words regarding the prayers that accompany the offertory rite in the New Ordo Missae. To start with, we find first the two prayers that accompany the official presentation of bread and wine respectively, on the altar. These prayers that are said in the plural await at the end the confirmation of the congregation, 'Benedictus Deus in saecula', which occurs if there is no offertory chant. In between, we find the prayer that accompanies the mixing of water with wine, which is a private prayer of the celebrant. Then comes another private prayer just before the 'lavabo', that is, 'In spiritu humilitatis..'. The psalm at the washing of

25 ibid., n. 51.
26 ibid., n. 52.
27 ibid., n. 53.
hands have been adapted from the one we used to recite earlier, and reduced to two verses. In a way, this is a mode of simplifying this offertory element in order to bring about more clearly the interior purification that it symbolizes. The other two elements, the 'Orate Fratres' and the 'Oratio super Oblata', have remained the same, though their community aspect has been more stressed. What is noteworthy in these offertory prayers is the fact that whilst the part of the people has been placed more into the limelight, however, the apologetic elements have survived in a way which still renders the rite rather pedantic, even because we have to take into consideration that we have other moments in the Mass where we find similar elements, such as, in the rite at the beginning of the Mass, and immediately before communion, although we must admit that at the beginning of the Mass the apologetic elements, like the 'Confiteor', have assumed a public aspect, which was not altogether officially admitted in Roman liturgy before.

But at the same time we have also to add that the new formulae of the prayers at the presentation of the bread and wine respectively on the altar, namely, 'Benedictus es, Domine, Deus...', express more clearly the real nature and meaning behind the offertory rite, that is, the 'preparatio donorum' for the sacrifice. For these help to water down the meaning of the term 'offerre', which has connotations of 'consecrete'. And in fact the official Italian translation of the New Ordo Missae stresses this point even more, as it has translated 'quem tibi offerimus', by 'lo presentiamo a te'.

Having analysed the offertory rite in the Roman Ordinals and in the New Ordo Missae, we can now draw some conclusions in the light of the norms required by Vatican II for the renewal of the Eucharistic Celebration. And to recall them once again, the offertory rite in our case is to be clear, short, and simple so as to lead easily to devout and active participation, without neglecting its substance. In fact the idea behind the offertory as belonging to the Eucharistic sacrifice but still distinct from it, is fairly insisted upon, since the New Ordo emphasises that the offertory is a preparation of the sacrificial gifts. For the words and actions behind the various offertory elements show man's haste with his earthly gifts to meet his Creator. In this light then, the offertory's sub-

\[\text{ibid., pp. 84-5, nn. 17-26.}\]
\[\text{ibid., pp. 79-80, nn. 1-3; p. 135, n. 101; p. 136, n. 103.}\]
stance is duly preserved and, even more, insisted upon. In this light too, it is within closer reach of the people's power of comprehension, whilst at the same time, it calls for their active participation.

Moreover, the Offertory rite in the New Ordo could have been simpler, had the prayers that are to be said exclusively by the celebrant, been eliminated, because these were introduced in the Roman liturgy in the later Middle Ages from the Gallican liturgy, and even because earlier tradition speaks of actions rather than words. Besides, the 'lavabo' could also be left out, as it seems useless to indulge in symbolic acts of purification that do not very much appeal to contemporary man. But, all in all, the offertory rite in the New Ordo Missae, as viewed in the light of the Ordines Romani, has managed to capture much of its primitive character and spirit, with the result that we have sincerely to admit that it has become for us more meaningful.

George Schembri
AN ANALYSIS OF THE OFFERTORY IN THE ORDINES ROMANI

TABLE OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFERTORY STRUCTURE

IN THE ORDINES ROMANI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORDO NUMBER</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
<th>VII</th>
<th>IX</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>XV</th>
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<tr>
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<td>8th</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>9-10</td>
<td>9th</td>
<td>8-9th</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td>8-9</td>
<td>end: 8th</td>
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<td>OREMUS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chanting of Offertory Hymn</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td>41*</td>
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<td>Washing of hands before collection of 'oblationes'.</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td></td>
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<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collection of offertories.</td>
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<td>44</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<td>Washing of hands after their reception</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>Placing of offertories on the altar: their blessing.</td>
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<td>Mixing water with the wine with cross.</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td>30*</td>
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<td>Elevation of Host. Pontiff's silent prayer at the altar.</td>
<td>85*</td>
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<td>51</td>
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<td>33*</td>
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<td>Incensation.</td>
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<td>55</td>
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<td>Orate Fratres (pro me).</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Secreta (Or. sp. Obl.).</td>
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Cf. Andrieu; *Les Ordines Romani du Haut Moyen Age, vv. II & III.*
RELIGIOUS PERSONALITY

'RELIGION is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real, and yet waiting to be realized; something which is remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach, something which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest.'

DIFFICULTY OF THE PROBLEM:

The extensive literature on both religion and personality suggest that it is extremely difficult if not humanly impossible to come to any definite definition of either of them. Moreover, because 'the frontier between psychology and the life of the spirit is hard to define', any definition of a religious personality is likely to come under the scrutiny of both the religious person and the psychologist. To avoid most of the misunderstanding, I think that it is necessary to keep in mind that both religion and personality are mental constructs to define certain human behaviours. Mental constructs are created to facilitate understanding but the opposite may also happen. The history of both the words personality and especially religion points it out. Religion had been used to label human behaviour ranging from specific mystic behaviour to great atrocities and wars. Then, since one is confronted with so much misunderstanding, one has to verify the statements by re-examining human behaviour whenever this is possible. However, this sounds hard because 'strictly speaking, there are no religious data, ready to take, just as little as there are any sexual data. Rather all data – events, processes, actions, objects, and object relations – may have either or both a religious and a sexual significance for the patient, or for the examiner, or for both. An excellent demonstration of such

polydimensionality of meanings is given in Erickson's masterful YOUNG MAN LUTHER. Hence, because of all this, the verification of the religious statements is extremely difficult.

The preceding paragraph leads to another extremely important problem, i.e., that of methodology. It is the duty of the psychologist to be scientific both in methods and language. In certain areas one can adopt scientific procedures more than in others. In the study of religion, the scientific procedures are very restricted still for different reasons. One of those reasons is because human behavior cannot be manipulated because of ethical rules. Moreover, to make things worse, certain mysteriousness has been imposed on behavior considered to be religious that scientific approach had to be excluded. Hence, one has to expect a lot of speculations in the psychology of religion with which this paper is involved.

Another problem involved with methodology is the choice of a criterion to assess human behavior as religious. Should it be an external or internal or both. If external, should it be affiliation to a church, attendance to church service or any other social activity. If one admits that the criterion should be internal, then the criterion itself would be an enigma as the behavior to be studied. There has been no way to answer such questions so far. However, when a person is involved in the study of religion and goes on through the descriptions of other people, i.e., personal documentations, one can easily find out what they are talking about. Then, he can match his personal experience and try to establish some common behavior and then make some plausible reason for it.

CRITERIA:

Despite of the said difficulties, Dr. Streng came out with four criteria by which a person is considered to be religious. These criteria are; (1) personally apprehending the Holy, (2) establishing the sacred through myth and sacrament, (3) living in harmony with eternal law as

preserved by seers and the learned tradition and (4) attaining freedom through spiritual insight. Here I add another after Otto\textsuperscript{6} namely, the category of value. Dr. Streng relied heavily on Otto's book THE IDEA OF THE HOLY. It seems to me that what Dr. Pruyser said about Otto could be applied to Dr. Streng, namely 'the emphasis is not on individual differences, although striking differences are portrayed, but on the "common good" of religion, on the generalities that govern religious experience'.\textsuperscript{7} These criteria should not be considered to be independent of one another, they are ways of looking at certain human behaviour. One may be more conspicuous than another at certain times and stages in one's life.

**PERSONAL APPREHENSION OF THE HOLY:**

When a person approaches life as isolated events or even try to isolate parts of an already isolated event, he may get the feeling that he is the master of that particular situation. However, when one sees all beings and events as all belonging to and participating from the same existence, then he feels that he is overwhelmed. Then, instead of considering himself as the master of the situation, he considers himself as one of the many things in the world around him yet in an integrated whole.\textsuperscript{8} Moreover, he sees that his existence and of others is dependent on someone or something else. This feeling is labelled by Otto as 'creature feeling'.\textsuperscript{9} It seems to me that Maslow gives the same description when he speaks of the peak experience, 'he can then more readily look upon nature as if it were there in itself and for itself, and not simply as if it were human playground put there for human purposes.'\textsuperscript{10} However, one must not misinterpret this feeling and extend it to mean the real existence of some objective being. Otto criticized Schleiermacher for jumping into such a conclusion. The feeling involves both the condition of the person as well as the object of man's apprehension


\textsuperscript{7}Paul W. Pruyser, op. cit. p. 17.


\textsuperscript{9}Rudolf Otto, op. cit., p. 8.

of existence, i.e. the way man conceives the world and himself at the same time. (It is in virtue of this that these criteria can be considered as pointing the individual differences). However, by the fact that the apprehension of existence is not comprehension, the apprehension or the lack of comprehension takes hold of the mind of the person involved with. Such a possession of one’s mind becomes another reality to the person. This new reality is different from the reality in the world and the person knows it. He continues to keep a dialectic knowledge of both the real world and the concept of the 'wholly other'. The new reality cannot even be neglected because it generates a dynamic power within the person which involves the whole personality. 'Its nature is such that it grips or stirs the human mind this and that determinate affective state'. A person in such a state of mind, unlike most of the people who see religious behaviour as being different from other behaviour, sees every human action as a result of that state of mind and the whole world as a sacred place where a sacred drama is played constantly. Yet, as Otto says, it is a mistake to assume that such an experience is always nice to have. Sometimes, it creates grisly horror.

The tensity of the horror depends on the grasp of the vastness of the 'wholly other' in relation to the smallness of the individual.

Through the relationship of the concept of the 'wholly other' and of himself, man defines himself in terms of worth. A category of value is developed. The highest value is ascribed to the 'wholly other' and sense of unworthiness to himself and the world around him. A moral duty is imposed on the person. Sometimes, the 'wholly other' manage to govern only the respect. In this case, it is not invested with the mighty power which compels though it is acknowledged by the person. Hence, it only attracts the admiration of the person. In either case, the person feels a sense of guilt and then a longing for atonement and the desire for the Summum Bonum (the greatest good). The earnest desire for the greatest good is to transcend the sense of unworthiness conceived by the person.

**FREEDOM THROUGH SPIRITUAL INSIGHT:**

Dr. Streng considers this criterium last. It seems to me that this criterium is intimately related to the first and consequently should be con-

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sidered immediately after it. The science of the numen (deity) as Dr. Pruyser put it is not separated from the science of homo religiosus (religious man). Lest there will be any confusion it is better to point out that the numen stands for the 'wholly other' invested with deity and that homo religiosus stands for man governed by the concept of the 'wholly other'. When the homo religiosus catches a glimpse of the numen he begins to see his weak spots of his life at the same time. He wants to eliminate them because he thinks that they are preventing him from becoming like the numen. The more a person gets involved with the numen the more he sees himself as something to be perfected. Thus life becomes a challenge of becoming or purifying one's self. The material which man considers during this process are his frustrations, anxieties and especially death.

At this point, one is likely to raise the question how is it possible for a person who feels bound and does not know what freedom is, to seek freedom and becomes free? From clearly points out that 'the beginning of liberation lies in man's capacity to suffer, and he suffers if he is oppressed, physically and spiritually'. The suffering moves him to act against his oppressors, to seek a freedom of which he knows nothing. If a man has lost the capacity to suffer, he also lost the capacity for change'. This idea is certainly hard for 'those who worship the superficial cult of success and obviously do not understand such conclusions'. The ability to suffer creates an interplay between the concepts one has of the numen and homo religiosus. Inspite of the fact that evil seems to be part of the world we live in, it continues to be repugnant to human nature. Because of this, the idea of the numen may appear to be of an arbitrary ruler of one's life. Sometimes, one does not begin to question the arbitrations of the numen though they may appear to be whimsical in early life. However, as time passes by and his suffering may perhaps become more tense, man challenges the concept of the numen. Man makes a sort of a covenant, a sort of compromise between the two concepts of the numen and homo religiosus. Each time man makes a compromise, he pushes forth for freedom even from the absolute numen

13 Paul W. Pruyser, op. cit. p.
itself. He then establish himself as coworker of his personal destiny. However, in spite of all the covenants man may make with the numen, he continues to look at it as the sole creator of the universe in which he lives. Out of such covenants the greatest principle emerge, namely the recognition of the right of all creatures to live or the appreciation of life. 16

The continuous dialect between the science of the numen and the science of homo religiosus was further developed by Paul Tillich. Tillich speaks of 'ultimate concern' though he never defines it and the search for it as the 'centred act of personality'. These terms have a strong appeal to dynamic psychologist. Thus, 'religion can now be seen as exploratory behaviour, driven, among other things, by man's curiosity and by his perpetual attempts to maximize contact with a maximal environment to the full deployment of his potentialities'. 17 For this reason, the study of religion is being fused with psychiatry.

Now, in view of what has been said about this criterium it could be summed up in a language of the man in the street by saying first in religious terms that man wants to become a saint or second that a person wants to become mature.

ESTABLISHING THE SACRED THROUGH MYTH AND SACRAMENT:

When a person encounters the numen he tries to define it. However, because the numen defies and definition 18 the person realizes soon that the definition given to the numen is not the right one. In spite of this realization, he continues to define the numen. This process is a consequence of the need in man to encode and represent the things he understands. The encoding and the organization of concepts are found in creedal formulations, doctrines and dogmas. Some hold such formulations made by other people as an absolute word by word others, reject them as myth especially in a scientific age in which we live. Such different approaches come from the misunderstanding of the myth itself. 19 Such a confusion could be avoided if one keeps in mind what Dr. Pruyser says. 'Biology divides reality in its way; theology does it different-

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16 Erich Fromm, op. cit. p. 23.
ly, and the myth-forming capacity of man does it still differently. Each discipline has its own practical divisions and coins its own conceptual formulations. The formulae and the references must be taken from the same system'.

Myths should be considered and understood as a human expression of his encounter with the numen and thus it expresses the relationship between the eternal and man himself as conceived in time and space. Rollo May considers the making of myth as an integral part of human nature. This idea has been even manifested by Mircea Eliade. Both of them went so far as to say that those who react to some myth are just substituting one for another.

One finds activities in the form of different rituals along with the organization of thought. These rituals may help to imitate the numen. Yet, 'the behaviour may easily slip into identification based on sympathetic magic. If the land is parched, a priestly sprinkling of water drops may compel the rain good to splash more lavishly upon the earth'. Sometimes, these rituals may placate the sense of guilt in a person by thinking that he is placating the numen. However, by such religious rituals one may feel invigorated because he may feel that his well being is increased. Yet, when the same rituals govern the life of the person they suppress, spontaneity and very often cause depression. Then it is likely that the person will try to create new rituals to keep himself stimulated. At this very point one would be inclined to condemn the former rituals. It seems to me that when a person does this he fails to see the value and meaning of rituals in one's life and their relation to the life of the spirit in man. The birth, life and death of every ritualistic behaviour cannot be understood independently from the life of the spirit both in a person or society.

In view of what it has been said, it seems to me that one can conclude by saying that when a person encounter the numen he has to organize his thought and manifest it in some activity.

20 P.W. Pruyser, op. cit. p. 86.
22 P.W. Pruyser, op. cit. pp. 89, 90, 175.
23 idem p. 177.
24 idem p. 177.
To be in Accordance with Tradition:

Dr. Streng points out that being in accordance with the traditions as preserved by the seers and learned as a sign of religion. This seems to me to be half truth. There are times when the individual under the spirit of the 'wholly other' has to react against such traditions of his society.

Religious community life is the outcome of the experience of the numen. Then, a custom becomes the crystallized definition of the numen. Then, in the socializing process 'the objective system is transformed into a subjective reality'. 26 But complete identification between the church or society and the sacred cosmos becomes unrealistic. This is because there can be no 'perfect socialization of an individual into the social order'. 27 The more a society or a church gets involved with so many things in order to sanctify them and create a sacred cosmos, it results paradoxically in the loss of the aura of mystery which she claimed to have in the beginning of the process. This could be also seen in the recent politics of our country. The aura of power of our country pushed the nation in extremely dangerous involvement which paradoxically took from her the mystery and power. The same thing is happening in most churches. In such situations, the individual resorts once more for search for meaning of the 'wholly other'. This will be a personal view made in an atmosphere of dissatisfaction with his church or country. Hence, at such a specific time in history, the religion of the individual results in an external reaction to the once established objectification of the 'numen'. This social interaction between society and the individual is rightly named as the invisible religion because it keeps alive the search for the 'wholly other'.

From what has been said, it seems to me that both the criterium of Dr. Streng and the reaction of the individual against his church or society as described by Dr. Luckman can be both considered as good criteria of religiosity in man but at different stages in both the individual and society's development.

After going through these criteria by which a person is considered to be religious or not, the reader is very likely and justly tempted to

27 idem p. 79.
raise the question about what makes a person religious. The religious sentiment as Allport points out is a very complex sentiment. It is so complex that he concluded the chapter on the 'origins of the religious quest' by saying 'that there are many varieties of religious experiences as there are religiously inclined mortals upon earth'.

In view of this, I conclude my paper by saying that if the religious sentiment is so unique, any of the said criteria either by itself or with others should be taken with a pitch of salt and be applied with extreme caution in every individual case.

FRANCIS LEONARD CHIRCOP

29 idem p. 27.