Chapter III

PARTY POLITICS UNDER REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 1888–1898

Representative government ushered in a different range of opportunities by providing a new background for the evolution of political activity. A different set of men, or the same men in different guises, came forward: dramatic leadership changes took place in 1888–1889. Mizzi retired from active politics; he had been saying that, for personal reasons, he would retire, but he only did so after he had served for about a year as an unofficial member of the executive and the new constitution had been installed and somewhat improved. Strickland became chief secretary – 'the only Maltese gentleman', wrote General Torrens, who could fill that office 'to the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government' – under the constitution for which he himself had worked. Savona made a triumphant return to the legislature, clearly intending to win back power through a different channel. The bishop of Gozo, Mgr. (and later Sir) Pietro Pace (1831–1914) became bishop of Malta: in 1888 Simmons obtained credentials from Salisbury for Strickland to negotiate with the Vatican about the vetoing of Bishop Buhagiar's succession; in this way Simmons was responsible for Pace's appointment, while Strickland was instrumental in laying the groundwork for future Anglo-Vatican consultations with regard to episcopal nominations in Malta. Simmons, like Mizzi, only relinquished his governorship after representative government had been effectively introduced.

Mizzi's withdrawal from the Council left a vacuum which could not be easily filled by another politician. Still highly respected as a father figure and influential through his daily Malta newspaper, Mizzi was nevertheless absent from the Council. No one man was able to fill the role that he had; in nine years there were three or four different 'leaders' of the P.N.: Baron Alessandro Chapelle (1889–1891), a lawyer who was then made a judge; the fiery representative from Vittoriosa, Evaristo Castaldi, a devout Mizzian who practically dominated the parliamentary P.N. from 1890 to 1894; Mgr. Alfredo Mifsud (1893–1896), a liberal ecclesiastic and historian, who befriended Strickland, and was later appointed head of the national library; and Dr. Salvatore Grech (1896–1898), formerly a Savonian, never quite a Mizzian nationalist, who most tended to support Strickland's administration. Gradually the parliamentary P.N. lost...
Mizzi's confidence as an increasingly unpopular minority continued to assist the government, or some members acted independently, and still others voted with, or joined, Savona's opposition party. By contrast the R.P., which later changed names, was constantly under Savona's dynamic leadership and whip; a formidable debater, Savona became a demagogue. In the 1890s, on the whole, Savona's party was in the ascendant, certainly on the offensive, in a way comparable to Mizzi's P.N. in the preceding decade: there was an alternating succession in the changing distribution of power between the two parties. In the 1880s, Savona was in office as an administrator-politician and patron of the otherwise weakly-led R.P., whereas Mizzi vigorously opposed Savona's language reforms and the Crown Colony constitution by means of which these were imposed; in the 1890s, the P.N. were intent on trying to make their constitution work by collaborating as far as possible with the government, especially through the unofficial executive members, whereas Savona, on the contrary, was attacking the constitution and demanding self-government.

Savona quoted Lord Knutsford who, speaking on the West Australia self-government bill, admitted that representative government placed

an insuperable power of obstructing and delaying measures in the hands of the colonial legislature, which is not responsible for the conduct of affairs ... when burning questions arise, and there are matters of difference between the Executive and the Legislature, it leads to complications, and a considerable amount of friction.8

'So long as the elected members concur with the Government', said Savona, 'then of course everything will go on smoothly; but when that is not the case, the majority of the elected members have not the power of controlling the action of the Government'.9

As Lord Durham noted in 1839 with regard to the affairs of British North America, 'the natural state of government' was that of 'collision between the executive and representative body' because of 'the combining of apparently popular institutions with an utter absence of all efficient control of the people over their rulers'.10 In a 'mixed constitution', to quote Pares, where the bounds of respective powers were not precisely and effectively fixed, their actual relations at any time would be determined by the accident of personalities and the advantage which the need of surmounting emergencies, or the prestige of emergencies already surmounted, might give to one institution or to another.11 In Jamaica in the 1860s the constitution was so differently interpreted by opposing sides that a majority of deputies actually asked for its suppression.12 In any period, distance and economy have inevitably provided that the product finally delivered at the frontier is different from the blueprint devised in the department: 'distance has blurred the exactness of the copy, has aided the normal erosion of convention upon law and has permitted variants unsuspected at the centre or unknown in the prototype'.13
Mizzi's absence and Savona's antagonism facilitated Strickland's rise to power: keeping Savona at arm's length, Strickland could ride roughshod over many of the elected members, none of whom enjoyed Mizzi's stature; in this he was simultaneously aided and hampered by the constitution. In an obtuse recognition of the party system, the 1887 constitution provided that the governor had to select and appoint us unofficial members of the executive three 'gentlemen duly qualified by character and capacity' who appeared to him to possess 'the confidence of the majority of the elected members'.

In 1889 voting by scrutin de liste was abolished in favour of nine single-membered constituencies in Malta (Gozo to remain a separate constituency as before). As 'central political organizations would from time to time endeavour to control the Elections, whatever might be the system of Electorates finally adopted', noted a royal commission instituted to report on the voting system, the introduction of electoral districts would counter-act such pressures through 'local influence and local knowledge', especially as 'the difficulty and expense of controlling so large a number of districts in any single interest should prevent the absolute supremacy of any one central organization'.

Both these innovations encouraged the role of political parties, making it possible for the administration to play one party against the other; it was by means of the latter reform that Savona, profiting from Mizzi's departure and the temporary P.N. split that accompanied it, managed in 1889 to be elected at the head of the poll for what now were the two electoral districts of his hometown Valletta.

Close and intimate contact between the official and unofficial members of the executive deprived either of the power to act independently and an atmosphere of mutual assistance and goodwill was hoped for, but, in view of what the Donoughmore Commission in 1928 called 'the divorce of power from responsibility',

it appeared that if the elected members acknowledged their co-partnership they might be regarded as having abandoned the claim to manage their own affairs. If they refused to co-operate they lost all chance of education and training; yet to accept an 'instalment' even under protest might weaken their case in the public estimation.

The three unofficial members were constrained to walk a tight-rope balancing, if possible, the business of the administration with the expectations of their own party, and with the pretensions of the opposition: having access to prior and sometimes secret information but theoretically entitled to vote in the legislature as elected members, they could only resort to disruptive tactics when in disagreement with the government if their party was strong enough not to split in the manoeuvre and so forfeit its very majority. Henceforth it would be in the interest of the majority party to work as closely as possible with the government without, however, if possible, disappointing partisan and popular requirements. It was mostly in connection with his inability to work out this tricky device that Strick-
land was charged with ‘the miserable mismanagement of the government’.18 The P.N., in a majority for most of the time, generally desired to co-operate with Strickland, hoping that if the constitution worked it might be further improved; but Strickland alienated most of Mizzi’s supporters and drove them unwillingly into Savona’s open arms. The P.N. tended to see unofficial executive members as quasi-ministers – the party apparently even allocated ‘special departments’ to each of the three unofficial members, one of them being entrusted with the care of ‘general politics’.19 But Strickland strongly objected to any use of the term ‘Ministry’.20 

As an unofficial member of the executive, Evaristo Castaldi acted as a liaison, keeping his elected colleagues informed of what went on behind closed doors; Strickland saw him as an ‘undesirable’, ‘running with the hares and hunting with the hounds’, ‘an enemy within the camp’: the first opportunity was taken to get rid of him.21 Strickland saw as functionaries those whom Mizzi and Savona would have liked to consider representatives. To join the executive, protested Castaldi, was ‘to be a servant or to be turned out’: the least ‘signs of independence’ in the interest of the elected members were adverse to ‘the wishes of the young count’. In a renewed attempt to secure further reforms, Castaldi appealed for unity: ‘What has happened should bind us firmly together to free Malta from military government’.22 Antagonizing Castaldi, Strickland further incurred the displeasure of Mizzi, who was still referred to as ‘capo del partito’;23 in 1892 Castaldi described the P.N. as ‘il gran partito capitanato dal patriotta Dr. Mizzi’;24 and Malta was considered ‘the organ of the political party still under the powerful influence’ of Mizzi’s ‘numerous friends’.25 Castaldi and Mizzi were beginning to speak the same language as Savona, who had denounced the 1887 constitution as a sham from the start.26

Eager to consolidate his position further in view of the growing challenge to his authority – although differences, so far, apart from some social engineering on Strickland’s part, had not been too pronounced – Strickland insisted with the C.O. for a curtailment of certain important provisions of the constitution. By 1890 he was already requesting that a portion of the elected members should be substituted by a number of ‘nominated’ members; that there should be no doubt as to the legality of ‘carrying on business without the elected members’ in the Executive Council; that the number of members elected by the general electors (the majority of voters) should be decreased and the number of those by the special electors (by whom Strickland as a nobleman had been returned in 1888) increased.27 As the constitution had only very recently been granted, the C.O. blamed much of the trouble on Strickland’s tactlessness and inexperience. ‘Count Strickland should be replaced by as good a Chief Secretary as can be found entirely unconnected with Malta’, advised one official; ‘unless this is done, there cannot be peace’.28 Knutsford agreed that the substitution
of 'an able and experienced Englishman' would greatly assist the working of the machine 'but it would not be easy' to find a place for Strickland 'elsewhere'. The elected members may at times have been unpractical, but Strickland was seen in London as being 'too fond of diplomacy', 'too wanting in conciliatory power', 'too much given to attach importance to backstairs influence'.

In becoming de facto governor of Malta, Strickland was lucky in that he had to work with governors whose stay in Malta was limited: General Torrens (1888–1890) died; General Smyth (1890–1893) left after a few years; by the time General Fremantle (1893–1899) arrived, Strickland had an inside knowledge of men and things which no newly-arrived, ageing English general could hope to match or even question. Governors have to depend on local advisers and managers, as the liberal leader from Nova Scotia, Joseph Howe, once noted figuratively:

It is mere mockery to tell us that the Governor himself is responsible. He must carry on the government by and with the few officials whom he finds in possession when he arrives. He may flutter and struggle in the net, as some well-meaning Governors have done, but he must at last resign himself to his fate; and like a snared bird be content with the narrow limits assigned to him by his keepers.

When Smyth was about to replace Torrens, it was suggested that the former had better be warned about Strickland as the government was 'getting too high-handed'. In conversation with Knutsford and others, Smyth virtually admitted that he was 'under pressure from Count Strickland'; so he was 'inclined to shirk the responsibility of forming an opinion'. Fremantle, similarly, seemed to have 'no views of his own', signing 'any rubbish' that Strickland wrote. As a student Sir Arturo Mercieca was impressed by Fremantle who, presiding over Council sittings not understanding a word of Italian, would have 'a little nap on his own with his feet wrapped in a rug against the cold'. It was suspected that despatches, though signed by governors, were in fact written by Strickland – there was one despatch signed by the governor on the chief secretary's letter-head – or that a despatch read 'as if half of it was written by the Governor and the other half by Count Strickland', hence the phrase 'Stricklandian English'.

Having family and property connections in the colony over which he ruled, Strickland had inherited the title Conte della Catena from his mother's side; he had a base in the local aristocracy whom Viscount Sidmouth once described as 'a body who were so thoroughly attached to the English rule', partly because for many of them British-sponsored balls, dinners and tea parties were a raison d'être. Strickland spoke Italian almost as fluently as English and he understood Maltese and was a Catholic; his supporters went out of their way to picture him as 'the first Maltese chief secretary'. Schooled and educated mostly in Britain, however, Strickland vacationed periodically at his family's castle in Westmorland,
twice married an English lady, and his children could hardly speak Maltese. An American lady who met Strickland on the world tour in Hawaii, before he went up to Cambridge, recalled how this gentlemanly jesuit-educated young man was expected to enjoy great riches and wield much power. At twenty-seven, Strickland was one of the youngest persons to become colonial secretary – not an honour usually bestowed upon a native. Malta was his stepping-stone and his retreat: by 1887 he already intended ‘to make way in the world and if necessary to leave Malta’. Knowing two worlds, belonging entirely to neither of them, Strickland used the personal pronoun ‘we’ interchangeably, depending on whether he was addressing a Maltese or British audience, trying to act a double role as a colonial administrator and a local politician; Mizzi described him as ‘one half of an Englishman’.

Clever, forceful, persevering, tireless, Strickland was well poised to become, as Savona had once said of Dingli, the ‘one man’ who could bring to nought the legitimate influence of the elected members. Desiring to avert obstructionist tactics when the opinions of the elected members clashed with his, Strickland sought to rally a personal following and could be seen by his placemen and others as the indispensable link between Valletta and London: surrounded by the aura of high office, the ‘Maltese’ chief secretary could foster the idea of Britain as the supreme dispenser of material well-being, social advancement and economic progress, making the identification of personal authority with government conspicuous. Not lacking in financial acumen, Strickland desired to court the goodwill of the business community, patronizing influential individuals, such as the vice-president of the Chamber of Commerce Edward Ciantar, and holding out prospects to potential collaborators, such as Dr. Alfredo Naudi, who eventually became crown advocate. Both Ciantar and Naudi were soon in league with Strickland against Mizzi’s politics. Naudi in 1889 tried starting a ‘new’ P.N. which was called ‘the party of order’ (Partito dell’Ordine) – an interesting name, considering that many years later Strickland described himself with regard to Maltese politics as the leader of ‘the pro-British party of order and co-operation’. Ciantar, a friend of Naudi, also had political ambitions; disagreements over granting a contract to Ciantar for building a new competitive market outside Valletta had been the immediate cause of Mizzi’s retirement from politics in 1889. A pro-Strickland, anti-Mizzi paper, subsidized by the Chamber of Commerce, Politica e Commercio, was started to further the ideal of closer co-operation with the government in the interests of material prosperity, stability and security: Malta was seen as a fit application of the principle that ‘the economic life of nations is intimately connected with their political status’. Criticizing ‘the hot-heads’ of the P.N. who followed ‘sommo duce’, the new party sought to encourage ‘the accumulation of capital’ and ‘the development of industry’. Following a harsh attack on Ciantar, when he
was awarded the C.M.G., Mizzi’s *Malta* was banned from the Chamber of Commerce’s social club.  

Strickland became, said Savona, ‘the one and only person’ from whom government employees and the people in general expected ‘favours and preference in their dealings with the Government’. Every free manifestation of public feeling was suppressed, wrote Mizzi, because corruption was raised into ‘a system of government’: this ‘degraded the nation, debased its character, impaired its strength’; there was an ‘all-pervading terrorism under which the most insignificant act, the slightest omission might bring down upon a citizen the implacable wrath of an omnipotent bureaucracy’. One of Savona’s sons was placed first in the civil service examination: he was sent to work in the more remote island of Gozo; through the agency of a friend in the service, his father managed to have him transferred back to Malta: the teenage lad was posted as a clerk in the lower criminal courts in Valletta ‘where he had to listen to all the compliments exchanged between public prostitutes and other persons in those Courts’.

Strickland had no notion, let alone vision, of Malta as a nation-state. He wanted absolutely to elevate the Maltese to Anglo-Saxon standards which he believed to be the best: ‘I certainly would strain every effort in my power towards rendering the Maltese as English as possible’, he said. ‘We should henceforth be as thoroughly British as possible in speech and in thought as well as in fact’, he said. It was mostly within the ‘defence’ frame of mind that he was a modernizer. ‘Why do we hold Malta?’ he once asked Earl Crewe. ‘Because it is the key to our Eastern trade, an emblem of sea power held by the strongest from time immemorial’. In a cruel but, if seen in an historical perspective, plausible prediction, Strickland saw Malta as inevitably an outpost of empire: ‘No servant of the Crown should forget that, in the interest of the liberty and prosperity of the Maltese, defence is the principal justification for his existence’; as the Maltese had always been ‘prone to throw in their lot with a new invader’, he thought, this possibility could not be ‘left to chance or to the whim of local parties’. Strickland therefore wanted to entrench his power, ‘to grasp the nettle firmly’, as he would say, in order to implement such changes as he projected (whether for the British or the Maltese interest or for both at the same time), and to ensure the security of the fortress. Was it not a pertinent series of coincidences that the first commissioned use of the truncheon as a police weapon (1891), the disruption of an opposition meeting through *agents provocateurs* (1894), the prohibition of political meetings in the cities (1897) should all date to Strickland’s time?

By 1891 Strickland had succeeded in having the constitution considerably amended so as to lessen the influence of elected members; moreover, by a despatch of 20 March 1890, which was not made public in Malta until thirteen months later, it was laid down that the Executive Council could lawfully meet and transact business ‘notwithstanding that there may be
for the time being no unofficial members or less than three unofficial members'. In an elaborate protest, almost all the fourteen elected members held that the repeated prorogations of the Council 'on the most futile of pretexts' and the unjustifiable withdrawal of 'the most important concessions made in 1887' were linked directly to Strickland's ascendancy.\(^{59}\)

In 1891 the crescendo of discontent culminated in violent scenes. After successfully setting up a Maltese militia (which provided a good number of jobs) and re-organizing the police force (on more efficient lines), Strickland proposed a revised customs tariff to pay for increased expenditure on public works, including an increase in the grain duties. Only one elected member, Baron Chapelle – probably not knowing that the measures were chiefly intended 'to increase the principal store of food supply to be relied on in case of siege' – signed the report advocating the new tax scheme.\(^{60}\) Apart from the fact that bread was the population's staple food, Strickland's tariff was made worse by the abrasive handling of the elected members who were hardly consulted;\(^{61}\) yet the tariff was directly opposed to the 'no taxation' principle upheld by both the P.N. and the R.P.

In a spectacular show of strength, Mizzi and Savona combined to oppose the proposed taxes. At a monster meeting in Valletta on 26 April 1891 Mizzi dramatically ascended Savona's platform and the two shook hands in a gesture of public reconciliation;\(^{62}\) Castaldi kissed Mizzi's cheek.\(^{63}\) Excitement reached a pitch as cries of 'Death to Strickland! Death to Chapelle!' mixed with shouts of 'Viva Savona! Viva Mizzi!'\(^{64}\)

The elected councillors resigned \textit{en masse}, calling for the withdrawal of the taxation ordinance and the dissolution of the Council.\(^{65}\) The ordinance was withdrawn; but the Council was not dissolved: on the contrary, the administration was prepared to pass even the estimates in the absence of the representatives.\(^{66}\) At this stage, the ministerial despatch which empowered the government to do without the unofficial members of the executive if necessary, was revealed.\(^{67}\) As the constitution now was in the balance, the Mizzi-Savona alignment became stronger. On 3 May a second big meeting was held, Mizzi again sharing the platform with Savona. Mizzi had no intention to present himself as a candidate for election, but he would 'do all in his power to back up the candidates led by Mr. Savona'.\(^{68}\) As broad a spectrum of political opinion was apparently represented in the audience, as on the platform, judging by references to certain grievances. For example, archpriest Paolo Xuereb brought up a case of land expropriation in favour of 'the pet of the Government' Edward Ciantar. The government, he said, had 'taken off the hands of many field labourers' the lands called \textit{Ta' Ghajn Żnuber}, lands which had been reclaimed 'by the sweating of the labourers' and had been made into fields from barren rocks.\(^{69}\)

Castaldi took charge of the fund-raising on behalf of several youths who, on the previous day, had been convicted for having jeered at Count Strickland as he passed by in his carriage.\(^{70}\)
The government intended to carry on with a postal ordinance, that was before the Council, at the next sitting; but according to certain clauses in the Letters Patent of 1887, the governor and six official members could not, by themselves, pass votes of public money: therefore the Council as constituted on 6 May 1891 was 'not competent' to pass the ordinance in question.

The sixth of May was a bloody and portentous day. A large demonstration was called. When Savona appeared on the scene, and attempted unsuccessfully to enter the palace where the Council was sitting, there was a crush. The police promptly brandished their truncheons and retaliated mercilessly against the unarmed crowd. Several persons were injured. Away from the scene of the fighting, some of the prisoners were wantonly beaten and ill-treated by a handful of Maltese policemen. ‘The scrimmage was comic’, recalled Strickland, who came out onto the palace balcony to watch the fighting. ‘Cette scène de brutalité’, reported *La Dépêche Tunisienne*, ‘ne provoque en lui qu’une douce hilarité’.

The *Sei Maggio*, as the event became known, resulted in the formation of a *Partito Unionista* (P.U.). Savona was to be the party leader, or at least the parliamentary leader, while Mizzi would continue to act as the watchdog of public feeling through *Malta*; the R.P. was hardly ever mentioned again, the P.N. was in abeyance. But could Savona rally the bulk of the electorate behind him as Mizzi had done earlier? Mizzi’s ‘influence as an agitator’ was considered ‘likely at any time to show itself superior to that of Mr. Savona’. In 1891, as at the time of Mifsud’s Reform Committee in 1879 and Mizzi’s *Assemblea di Cittadini* in 1887, the colonial system tended to produce a fusion movement – the coming together of rival or hitherto unmotivated elements behind a common cause – in the effort to pierce the seemingly impenetrable power structure of the ‘common enemy’; but as party divisions had been rather firmly established by the 1880s, the need to defuse partisan separatness and to present a co-ordinated alignment was coupled with the underlying desire not to relinquish the identity and leadership of the respective party. In the inter-mixing that ensued, hidden behind a veneer of unity, one party absorbed certain qualities from the other appropriating these usefully without acknowledging the inheritance, but there remained two levels of consciousness at work, the national and the partisan, until old enmities and piques were renewed with undiminished vigour when the front collapsed. The P.U., which barely lasted two years, was in effect such a transitional regrouping from which later on a new party emerged.

Savona fought, and won, the 1891 and 1892 elections as P.U. leader, but he immediately gave cause for mistrust by the Mizzi camp. In their 1891 manifesto the P.U. promised that they would not accept seats in the executive unless the constitution were reformed, but once Savona was, for the first time, at the head of an elected majority, he and many of his
colleagues changed their minds and decided to accept seats in the executive 'with the view of facilitating the despatch of public business'. Strickland, however, was 'very vehement' on the subject of not appointing Savona to the executive. Apart from personal animosity between the two dating back to 1882 (when Savona as university rector had refused to discriminate in Strickland's favour as a student), Savona had already been in the executive and had forfeited the government's trust by resigning and sourly turning against his former employer. In refusing to take Savona back, Strickland could claim that the government was 'only supporting the rights of the electors' who had voted P.U. 'on the distinct understanding that it was not to accept office'. Mizzi called Savona 'the most dishonest and deceitful man on the face of the earth' having 'no idea of constitutional principles'. Those who had thought that 'a meeting could settle everything' were badly mistaken: Savona had 'an arsenal of expedients for every emergency'.

The P.U.'s shakiness was evident in Mizzi's suggestion that henceforth there should be two leaders, Castaldi and Savona, one at the head of each section, thus implying that the P.U. was not a fusion but a coalition of parties. But the elected members now had to consider 'the constitutional relations to be maintained between a member of a party, the party as a whole, and the head of the party', explained Castaldi. The Stricklandian Standard, however, enthusiastically approved Mizzi's suggestion for a dual leadership, saying that the constitution's success depended on 'the system of party government': the 'two parties' had to have 'different leaders'. 'Whilst union means strength and success to the popular cause', declared Savona, 'disunion would lead to the ruin of the popular cause and the triumph of the common enemy'; in whose interest, except that of Strickland, could Mizzi's proposal have been made, he asked. Thus glazed over, the P.U. continued for some time, with Savona more or less accepted as the majority leader, but never in the executive.

Unionismo came about in the wake of – and was probably influenced by – a serious and prolonged patriotic-religious agitation that coincided with Strickland's ascendancy.

In 1889 the British government appointed Malta's former governor General Lintorn Simmons as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Vatican on a special mission. When Simmons, through Strickland's agency, had sought to prevent Bishop Buhagiar's succession, the Vatican had 'endeavoured to resist in the strongest possible way' the setting aside of a bishop entitled to succeed. Britain wanted to ensure that another Buhagiar case would not arise, while Leo XIII was at this time eager for diplomatic recognition. The primary object of Simmons' mission was to come to an understanding with Leo XIII as to 'the course to be followed on the occurrence of a vacancy in Malta and Gozo bishoprics, and in certain other high ecclesiastical offices'. Simmons also had to see
how the canon and civil law might be altered to remove questions relating to the validity of marriages involving non-Catholics and to try to secure 'some definite provisions for the education in the English language' of the Maltese clergy.  

The negotiations indicate that everything was done on the basis of a *quid pro quo*. The Pope, while reserving to himself the right and the liberty to nominate bishops, accepted to consult Britain before making episcopal appointments. Britain was expected to declare 'by a legislative act' that in Malta mixed marriages would be invalid unless celebrated in accordance with Tridentine decrees: non-Catholics could marry validly without going through the Catholic form, but the ecclesiastical laws expressly forbade the Catholic party from renewing the consent before the minister of the non-Catholic party to the marriage. An arrangement was reached whereby English would be 'made to prevail' in the education of Maltese clergy; and the governor was to surrender some small benefices transferring these revenues to the local seminary.

The agreement reached between Simmons, on behalf of Britain, and Cardinal Mariano Rampolla, on behalf of the Holy See, raised a storm of protest in Malta and Britain for different reasons.

In Britain, Protestants of all denominations were indignant that in a British colony any Pope-sanctioned law should, in the words of the Archbishop of Canterbury Edward Benson, 'fix the yoke of the Canon Law and the Decrees of the Council of Trent together upon marriage for the first time'. Non-conformists too were interested, seeing the Catholic church in Malta given a recognition such as Britain denied to them. The question of an established church was a heated one in Ireland, and Irish parliamentarians tended to interest themselves in Catholic Malta's affairs. An important precedent in Anglo-Vatican diplomacy, the Simmons-Rampolla protocol coincided with the rise of Ulster unionism. Just as Malta had suffered from British preoccupations with the rise of Italian irredentism in the late 1870s, so, possibly, she was now bearing the repercussions of the effect of Irish troubles on British public opinion and decision-making: episcopal nominations and mixed marriages were problematic throughout the Catholic British empire, notably Ireland, so that the Simmons-Rampolla protocol may have been, as some supposed, a test-case intended to establish principles for a much wider application. English diplomacy at the Vatican became most active in the 1880s, through the agency of English Catholics in Rome, both clerical and lay. In 1883 and in 1888 Rome intervened with condemnations and instructions directed against the tactics of the Irish nationalist movement: admonitions that had been ignored or attacked in Ireland, and even in Britain, for being what Protestants had always denounced – Roman and clerical intervention in Irish political affairs. Gladstone saw the Simmons mission as a reciprocal gesture by the Tory government to the Pope for the latter’s timely intervention against the
Irish nationalists' plan of campaign. Tim Healy, the anti-Parnellite leader, saw it as 'an attempt by a side wind to bring the authority of the Government to bear on Rome, via Malta'. As the expenses of the mission were paid out of Malta's reserve fund of £1,000, debate on this question in the British parliament was restricted.

In Malta, the Simmons affair was an issue of principle but it was also full of personalities. Bishop Pace, disliked by the P.N. for ousting Bishop Buhagiar, owed his appointment to General Simmons — and Simmons proclaimed Pace's 'well-known desire to support Her Majesty's Government'. Simmons also was the governor with whom Savona had quarreled bitterly in 1887. Announcing to the supreme pontiff 'the sadly ignorant state of the Maltese priesthood, Simmons went so far to allege that Maltese parish priests were so ignorant that they scarcely knew of the existence of the Council of Government'. Pace, whose position now was secure, denied these allegations; the Pope believed his bishop. And Simmons hoped the agreement with the Vatican would strengthen 'the bond of union' between the Maltese and the empire 'by the spread of the English language, and by the dissemination of English ideas among them'. Thus Simmons touched the heart and soul of Maltese nationality: the very idea of promoting assimilation and loyalty through linguistic and ecclesiastical pressures could not but have sparked off a tremendous backlash.

Both Mizzi and Savona were offended by the pretensions and remarks of Simmons, described by Savona as 'a general officer on the retired list and a staunch Protestant'. In July 1890 Pace excommunicated Malta (which had long regarded Pace as a sycophant and careerist). Undaunted, Mizzi immediately changed the paper's name to Gazzetta di Malta and continued his campaign against Pace and Simmons together. A large crowd of nationalist supporters walked the streets of Valletta defiantly with the Malta newspaper in hand. Addressing a 'densely packed crowd' at a public meeting in Valletta, Mizzi declared that he was determined to re-enter political life; he would not permit the British to administer Malta 'for their own advantage'. The study of English had to be voluntary, not compulsory; the governor had no right to control ecclesiastical nominations or benefices. Mizzi then left the platform to Dr. Enrico Zammit who concluded the meeting by asking that a petition be sent to the Pope for Pace's deposition or transfer:

When I speak the truth I fear nothing. The bishop does not represent our interests and therefore we do not want him. He supports the interests of the imperial government that wants to trample upon us. . . . Let the bishop make use of his censures in religious matters, and when he exceeds his limits, we men, are not afraid of his censures, although it is unpleasant that the women in our family bewail over the anathemas which are launched against us.

The excommunication of Malta not having silenced the P.N., pressure was brought to bear on Mizzi in another way. In a letter to Pace, Leo XIII propounded a Maltese version of his Irish rescript, condemning 'the wicked
men' who incited 'the hatred of the common people' against him who merited special honour (presumably Pace). In concluding conventions with civil powers, said the Pope, the Vatican had always kept in mind the advantages of the peoples concerned. The Pope twice referred indirectly to Mizzi as 'l'uomo inimico' (the enemy).112 'When the Pope speaks', Arch-priest Xuereb told the Council, 'the Catholic only has to bow his head and pay his respects. No question is licit when Rome has spoken. It is wrong to think, to speak, to go against what the Holy See has decided'.113 This however was not the view of Castaldi, who saw the Irish clergy as his model: the scheme to educate the clergy in English, he said, was 'a means to sever the Maltese clergy from the people'; he would not bow his head to the Holy See's opinion if that opinion, whatever it was, referred to political not to religious matters. The Simmons mission was not religious but political.114

Meanwhile Savona gave notice of a resolution — expunged from the Council's notice book115 — that no portion of Simmons' expenses (about £900) should be charged upon Malta's revenue.116 In a subsequent resolution for the refund of these expenses, Savona carried the majority with him, but was defeated as Chapelle and five others sided with Strickland.117

Thus by 1891 — the year of unionismo — Savona had been petitioning the Queen for 'the removal of Count Strickland',118 and the P.N. petitioning the Pope for Pace's transfer. Subjected to episcopal and papal censures Mizzi might have been destroyed politically had he not been outstanding in his own right; but in view of such pressures, added to those caused by Strickland's changed role, and not wanting fully to re-enter politics so soon after he had retired, Mizzi may well have decided, patriotically and expediently, to try delegating authority to his competent rival, Savona, and so to endorse the formation of the P.U. If so, Simmons and Strickland had made possible what up to a few months earlier would have been inconceivable.

When it came to implementing that part of the Anglo-Vatican agreement relating to mixed marriages there was a stumbling block. Savona immediately, in consultation with Pace,119 produced a draft ordinance to regulate the civil effects of marriages 'celebrated and to be celebrated' in Malta, more or less in accordance with what the Vatican expected. But Archbishop Benson, a strong Tory who vigorously upheld the Establishment, renewed his protests on behalf of Protestants, objecting particularly to the draft ordinance's article whereby marriage between persons who allegedly abandoned Catholicism in fraudem legis would also be invalid. This article threatened 'an inquisition into motives of a painful and maybe of a destructive character'.120 Although this 'inquisition' article was not written into the Anglo-Vatican agreement, Pace, probably with Vatican concurrence, would 'never consent to give up his claim to inquire into and judge of the sincerity of the declaration of the Roman Catholic party to a marriage to the effect
that he (or she) was no longer a Roman Catholic'. Considering the British Protestant protests, this added precaution could have been a trump card to give away when and if the desired 'legislative act' would have been passed and assented to. As Savona’s ordinance was backed by the bishop, public criticism of it was not as explicit as it might otherwise have been; however the inquisition clause and other technicalities did give rise to criticism on the part of liberal Catholics (led after 1892 by the P.N. parliamentary leader Mgr. Alfredo Mifsud) against the ultramontanist standpoint taken by Savona. The chief justice, Dingli, suggested simply the insertion of a clause to the effect that mixed marriages might be celebrated by non-Catholic ministers provided that the party supposed to be a Catholic declared that he or she was not; but Pace and Savona were agreed that they should not offer such ‘a golden bridge’ to Britain. Archbishop Benson insisted that the marriage question should be referred to the judicial committee of the Privy Council, as had already been promised. Knutsford announced that an order-in-council would soon be passed to this effect, adding that Savona’s ordinance was unlikely to get a second reading; anyway he said that it would not receive Her Majesty’s Assent. When the ordinance was about to receive its third reading, the Malta Council was abruptly dissolved: all ordinances under discussion would thus have to be introduced de novo.

Restating their plea for constitutional reform, the P.U. promised not to consent to any amendment to the marriage ordinance not ‘previously sanctioned by the Holy See’ and to petition the Queen to refund to Malta Simmons’ expenses. The Marquess of Ripon, Knutsford’s successor who was a Catholic, could say that he could not reverse his predecessor’s decision with regard to Simmons’ expenses, but the marriage question was more difficult: it directly concerned the Vatican and Britain, the Maltese church and people, Protestants in Britain, in Malta and elsewhere.

Reference to the Privy Council merely accentuated ill-feeling on the Maltese and Vatican side, although it rather shelved the outcome for some years. In a petition signed by over 27,000 inhabitants, Pace asked Queen Victoria not to allow any law contrary to Catholic principles. The Cathedral Chapter more pointedly demanded the immediate enactment of the law promised in Her Majesty’s name to the Pope. The ecclesiastical representative, Canon Ignazio Panzavecchia (1855–1925), resigned ‘in view of the absolute impossibility of being of any utility to the community, in the Council, under the Constitution by which the Country is at present governed’. Again interrupting his self-imposed retirement, Mizzi called a public meeting specifically on the marriage question.

Suitably timed to coincide with the ending of a numerously attended votive procession in honour of the Immaculate Conception, Mizzi’s meeting heralded and symbolized ‘the politics of religion’. This was not ‘a question of parties’, declared Mizzi, but one which affected ‘all Maltese without
distinction'; he had moved 'not for political purposes, but for the sake of
my Religion which is the Religion of you all'. They believed they were
threatened by a Privy Council decision which would be 'against us, against
what the Pope, the Head of our Religion, has declared, and against Catholic
principles'. 'We must move', continued Mizzi in a different strain, 'to
show that we have not sold ourselves to England, but only asked her protec-
tion'; to defend religion the Maltese would be ready to expose their chests.
Should the Maltese submit to the 'arbitrary measures of their masters' on
this question, the government would become bolder; there was nothing
that it would not dare to impose afterwards. On 'firmness' depended 'not
only the right of their religion, but also the political prospects of their
Country'.

This marriage meeting was given further colour by a partisan incident.
When some time earlier the Union Club had held a reception for a visiting
French squadron, and there had been shouts of 'Vive la République' from
the nationalist crowd outside, Savona had called for the arrest of the
demonstrators as these had insulted the esteemed British naval officers at
the club. Now, when Mizzi's meeting ended, the crowd again stopped
before the Union Club shouting, and hissing, louder than before.

As the Privy Council was a British and a Protestant body, Maltese
feared that it would alter or cause the alteration of the Maltese marriage
laws, which were identical to the Canon Law, possibly by legalizing marri-
ages celebrated before a non-Catholic minister, or by a governor's licence,
or else, at worst, by introducing civil marriage. Dr. Alfredo Mattei, a
Maltese barrister with offices in London who was a devout Catholic, wrote
to the Colonial Office informing them that in countries where civil marriage
had been introduced, until the matrimonial declaration was made before
the parish priest and two witnesses, the Catholic church, according to the
authorities, held 'the woman, though civilly married, to be a "concubine",
and her children bastards'. 'Marriage', Canon Panzavecchia told a
meeting, 'is the foundation of our religion. Without marriage, no other
sacrament could be exercised. On marriage rests the human family;
what would the priesthood be without the human family? You are the
family of the Church'. The Catholic church sometimes encouraged
inter-racial marriages, as in Cuba between mulattos, Mexicans and
others, but a mixed marriage in colonial Malta – in common parlance,
a wedding between a Catholic girl and a sojourning Protestant serviceman –
could have a displacing effect on the couple's life: the marriages of some of
these servicemen were 'consummated' before they were 'celebrated'.

At a different social level, the Anglo-Maltese marriage had another con-
notation. Announcing Marchese Cassar Desain's forthcoming marriage to
an English lady in London, the English-owned Malta News trusted that
other members of the aristocracy would imitate his example: nothing more
could 'give greater stimulus to the progress of the English language amongst
us' than such unions. Strickland once gladly noted the increasing frequency of inter-marriages 'without physical deterioration'.

In a Catholic British colony, the classical truth that religious homogeneity was a condition of political stability was double-edged: so long as the colonial regime had the ecclesiastical hierarchy on its side, the faithful could hardly pose any serious threat to it; but so far as the entire community was united by a characteristic religious belief, it was distinct from and alien to the colonial regime. The religious undercurrent moulded national sentiment: 'L'uomo non ha che la religione e la patria'. In his dignified rebuttal of Anglo-Saxon racism, a Maltese author referred not so much to Alexander Pope's *Essay on Man* as to 'the Christian morality' and the Old Testament: 'et creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam; ad imaginem Dei creavit illum'.

The marriage question was a question of marriages in the same unreal way that the language question was a question of languages; political grievances and social constraints underlay these seemingly monocular issues. The imagery changed – it was no longer Shakespeare against Dante but the Archbishop of Canterbury against the Pope – yet the rhetoric and much of the reasoning was the same. The clash of wills asked an old question: who was to be the master, the local or the foreign, tradition or change, the representative or the centralized power? More profoundly than the language question, the marriage question represented a clash as to ultimate values and realities but, equally, it was a problem of culture, of civilization. It was a more 'national' issue however since Maltese life was very firmly based on the family unit. Matrimony had an instant, moving appeal to men and women from all walks of life: whereas to be a Maltese was to be a Catholic, to know Italian was only to be an educated person. A patriotic-religious question could serve to diffuse political consciousness, or at least to mobilise the masses, much better than one about language or education, as the politicians undoubtedly realized.

Announcing a grand meeting to be held later on in Valletta, inviting signatures for the bishop's petition to the Queen, Mizzi embarked on a pace-setting village campaign, going to Zebbug, Siggiewi, Birkirkara, Qormi, Zejtun, Zabbar. The centre of attraction as a politician, the man from the city went to the village folk, greeted by parish priests, cheered by parishioners, entertained by band clubs, accompanied by P.N. stalwarts such as Castaldi and Cachia Zammit. This flamboyant performance was too much for Savona, who complained that Mizzi had not invited him to these meetings nor had he mentioned what Savona had been doing in the Council on the marriage question. Against the advice of Mizzi's adherents, Savona called a meeting of his own 'by placards posted widely in Valletta and its suburbs' while Mizzi was continuing his village campaign.

This finally marked the breakdown of *unionismo*. Savona's meeting was attended by only three of the elected members. The place set for the meeting
was made to stink, obviously by Mizziani. When a heckler by the name of Bondin, whom Savona identified as 'an employee of Dr. Mizzi's printing office', blew a whistle, Savona's front-liners rushed at their adversaries shouting 'beat them'. A number of Savoniani were arrested, including Savona's brother Vincenzo, and a rough carrying a dagger. Savona's chief target was Strickland – 'the real Governor of Malta' – with whom everybody opposed to Savona was allegedly collaborating. Should the colonial minister veto his marriage ordinance, Savona announced he would follow Panzavecchia's example and resign.

The P.N., in an uneasy position, could only choose between an exasperating administrator and an errant politician. A £34,500 vote for electric lighting power stations in harbour areas received more support in the Council than Savona (or even, it seems, Mgr. Mifsud) had expected. A meeting about this question planned by De Cesare, in which Savona had originally intended to participate, was disrupted by a gang of police-hired thugs: 'we were to break up the platform', said one of the thugs, 'prevent the orators from speaking, and beat anybody who remonstrated'. Offended by accusations that he was servile to Strickland, Castaldi announced his retirement, describing Savona as 'God' of 'the religion of Opportunism': 'Those who do not vote with him, vote against their Country and are traitors. Country and Savona are synonymous'.

Savona, however, earned the valuable patronage of the bishop. In 1893, when Dr. Goffredo Adami moved a radical ordinance to control the 'scandalous abuses' that went on in the curia’s administration of marriage legacies (property bequeathed for dowries to poor girls), Savona took the bishop's side. After persisting for some time with the backing of Castaldi, Mifsud and others, Adami was silenced, but Ripon warned Pace that such episcopal interference with the legislature was intolerable: Pace had actually threatened with excommunication those elected members who would support Adami. But Savona, aided by the popular Senglean ecclesiastic Panzavecchia, formed a lobby to support Pace against Ripon's despatch. 'The Bishop cannot exercise his sacred ministry', Savona told a meeting attended mostly by people from the Three Cities, 'unless he is absolutely free to instruct the faithful subject to him, including the members of the Council of Government, with reference to any question that may be before the Council of Government regarding the rights of the Roman Catholic Church'.

In an effort to dislodge the Council from its doldrums and force some scheme equivalent to self-government, Savona resorted to the Mizzian strategy by which earlier he had been so appalled: resigning and promising to resign again on re-election, Savona left the Council in protest at the 'deceitful' constitution, adopting the policy of foolish elections; he was followed by three of the fourteen elected members. The 'leader of the elected bench', as Savona had been called, became only 'the leader of
the opposition’, as he was known until 1891 and after 1893.164 ‘The people’, he wrote, ‘want ridiculous representatives in order to overthrow the Council of those who have sold themselves’.165 Two of Savona’s three candidates – a semi-literate meat-seller and a ‘communist’ goldsmith – were returned,166 leading eventually to a dissolution of the Council and the general election of 1895.

1895 saw the foundation of a new and lasting party, the Partito Popolare (P.P.), and the beginning of the movement for self-government; there was also a noteworthy shift in the distribution of power among the parties.

The P.P. was formed on 2 June 1895 at a Valletta public meeting that was called upon to assent, by the usual raising of hands, to the proposition that Savona would be ‘the leader of the party of the people’ and to affirm the principle that the office of chief secretary should be filled by popular election from among the Maltese.167 Savona was popularly acknowledged as the leader,168 but the P.P., like the P.U., though under the same leader, owed much to the patronage accorded to it by another personality having a different base of support, Canon Panzavecchia, formerly a Mizzian, who had associated with Savona in 1893 against Adami’s ordinance and Ripon’s despatch. Like the P.U., the P.P. was a mixed assortment, with some well-known Savoniani – Giuseppe Bonavia, Cesare Darmanin, Giovanni Vassallo – and some newcomers – including Antonio Dalli and Dr. Andrea Pullicino, both destined to have long political careers – together with, also, the conspicuously anti-Savonian Dr. Ernesto Manara, former editor of Diritto. Announcing the P.P.’s formation, Panzavecchia referred to the ‘handshake’ meeting of 1891 in that same square (Piazza Regina): the existing parties, he said, had thus been united into one; when Mizzi withdrew from politics, Savona became ‘the sole chief’. Panzavecchia explained that Savona had accepted the directorship of education to carry out a scheme of education suggested from time to time by Savona himself. Panzavecchia intended to follow Savona so long as the latter continued to be honest and independent, or else he would abandon him as he had abandoned Mizzi.169

Panzavecchia’s influence was conspicuous not only by the presence of ecclesiastics on the platform but by the fact that Savona on more than one occasion raised three cheers for the canon.170 More telling was the regular presence of the Senglea brass band La Vincitrice, often with bands from other localities. Indeed the liberal use of brass bands was itself a characteristic feature of this party’s meetings, perhaps because, according to the governor, the population ‘at the other side of the harbour’ (the Three Cities) were ‘less educated and far more excitable’.171 Savona in 1895 was being acclaimed as a hero: in a libel case against him, the judgement on appeal had been changed from imprisonment to a fine. Savona was, one poster proclaimed, ‘The Man of Steel’ (L’Uomo d’Acciajo).172

At a subsequent meeting, the P.P. formally requested self-government
in a colourful public ceremony, Panzavecchia holding a crucifix in his hand and the party’s candidates swearing before God that they would be faithful to the programme that they had signed, chiefly requesting self-government.173

The request for responsible government, impossible to hold back once representative government had been granted, was the main dividing issue of principle from 1895 until 1897-1898. Savona, frustrated in his efforts to improve the existing constitution and angered by Strickland’s treatment, endeavoured to have the constitution replaced altogether; but the P.N., who had worked for that constitution, mistrusted Savona intensely and were very cautious. ‘It is a question in substance between Responsible Government and government on garrison principles’, said Savona.174 ‘Those who demand further liberties are those who never want to respect the opinions of others who do not think like them’, replied Mifsud.175 As the majority party the P.N. had to consider the likely consequence of a demand for self-government: at the C.O. the idea was dismissed as ‘intensely ludicrous’;176 and Chamberlain spelt out his message bluntly:

if the elected members of the Council of Government persist in agitating for a change of Constitution which would impair the control now held by Her Majesty’s Government over its administration, it may become necessary for them to consider the question of a revision of the Constitution in an opposite sense.177

Thus the P.N. suffered from what Duverger calls ‘enslavement to reality’:

A party with a majority bent is necessarily realistic. Its programme may be put to the test of realization. Any demagogy on its part may one day recoil upon it; by giving it power the elector can corner it and compel it to keep its promises... one cannot govern by theories.178

But the status quo was neither inspiring nor reassuring: the higher ideal was worth fighting for, even if it seemed impossible to achieve. ‘We must be recognized as a nation with our parliament and all our institutions’, declared Dr. Alfredo Mattei. Fear and individualistic attitudes were ‘the consequences of doing away with local self-government, with national aspirations, with the spirit of independence, of political manliness’.179 Under responsible government, said Giuseppe Bonavia, ‘double weights and measures would be done away with’ as people ‘fond of oppressive measures and autocratic ways of governing’ were, like minors, in a state of irresponsibility.180

At the 1895 election the P.N. had a parliamentary majority because it won all four special electorate seats (with Mifsud defeating Panzavecchia as ecclesiastical representative) and still retained a majority of all the votes cast; but the P.P. was beginning seriously to upset the P.N.’s traditional position of dominance among the common electors, winning four to six out of the ten seats in this poll, which Savona led by a large margin.181. There were about six times as many votes cast for the general as for the special members, although many of the latter’s electors were entitled to plural
voting. Although, due to the workings of personality politics, geographical areas of party preference are almost impossible to determine, it would seem that the cities (Valletta, Senglea, Vittoriosa, Cospicua) more than the countryside were inclined to support the P.P. rather than the P.N.; but there were exceptions. Some of the country towns, such as Birkirkara and Qormi, returned candidates who showed themselves to be loyal to Savona; more exclusively agricultural areas (such as Rabat, Siggiewi, Żejtun, Gozo) returned P.N. or anti-P.P. candidates, yet the immediate suburbs of the capital (Floriana, Hamrun, Pietà, Msida) elected an independent Mizzian.

Apart from the attractive ideal of self-government, the P.P. had three powerful instruments with which to fight the P.N. These were: the charismatic leadership of Savona; the patronage of Panzavecchia and a section of the lower clergy; and the regular Maltese language Savonian broadsheet Malta Tagħna.

The systematic use of Maltese language journalism by a political party was a significant innovation: scurrilous and widely read, Malta Tagħna's message was readily intelligible to anybody who had been to school for a few years and learned to read Maltese; by contrast, Mizzi's Malta, more serious, somewhat sophisticated, and in Italian, did not 'permeate very far down'. Malta Tagħna was 'widely circulated amongst the lower classes'. 'We are not in the days when one paper alone was read', said Savona, 'there is a Maltese Public Opinion now'. Maltese language journalism indicated regard for the usefulness of the native idiom in public life; the class or party interest could be combined with the 'authentic' nationalist ideal. An excellent opportunity for this presented itself: before the Council there was an ordinance, proposed by Roberto De Cesare, and supported by the P.N., to re-introduce the educational qualification for voters instead of the 1883 £6 franchise which, said De Cesare, an Englishman had once called 'the greatest blunder committed by the British Government since their occupation of Malta'; illiterates were 'dragged to the ballot box like so many sheep', there were cases when, instead of their electoral certificates, they had produced a vernacular newspaper (Malta Tagħna) and said they wanted to vote for it. The 'great mass of illiterate electors' were known to be 'monopolized' by Savona's party. But in making a target of De Cesare's ordinance, Savona could rally the support of all those who stood to lose their vote. Taxes on food and drink, said Savona, were paid by those who did not know English or Italian as much as by those who did; it was iniquitous to disfranchise 7,000 electors because they did not know English or Italian: Maltese, he said, was 'the language of the nation'. Savona's identification of the native tongue with Maltese nationhood was a new departure of considerable significance. This was a different and, ideologically, purer nationalism than that postulated by the P.N. Apart from being an excellent propaganda tool, Maltese in Malta was a common factor, a measure of equality. Attitudes to language appear to be consistently
the most revealing indicators of partisan leanings. Thus in 1896–97, when there was the problem whether or not to sanction the extended use of Maltese in the law courts, Savona held that ‘the language of Malta’ had a right to be spoken in the courts just as it was spoken in all the churches and in every house. The Chamber of Advocates objected on the ground that this innovation was undignified; Savona retorted that those who objected were ‘the same party’ who in 1880 had opposed his language reforms. ‘Justice ought to be one for all,’ he declared; ‘and if the Courts of Law are made to administer justice, they cannot do so properly, if the Court speaks a language which the prisoner does not understand’. To check Mizzi’s influence further, the P.P. were thinking of starting ‘a new Italian language newspaper to destroy the Gazzetta di Malta’ which (since the Pope’s lampoon was not forgotten) was said to be published by ‘the enemy’.

Savona’s ‘mass’ party was greatly assisted by patriotic-religious questions that were kept on the boil and, most of all, by the marriage question which finally came to a head in 1896. The long-awaited Privy Council judgement, made in July and sanctioned by order-in-council in August 1895, was only made public in Malta in February 1896, probably due to the Malta government’s request not to have it published before the election was over. The judgement said that unmixed and mixed marriages celebrated in Malta by non-Catholic ministers were valid, although admittedly the latter question involved ‘many considerations attended with great difficulty’: where persons had contracted marriage in good faith, but in such circumstances that the validity of the ceremony might be open to question, it was expedient that the matter should be set at rest by legislative declaration.

A breach of faith with the Vatican with regard to the Simmons-Rampolla agreement of 1890, the judgement entailed a rejection of local marriage laws, vindicating Savona’s unsuccessfull attempts to pass his marriage ordinance. Earlier suspicions of Britain’s wish to protestantize and laicize the Maltese seemed to req uire no further justification. The stunning news, which reached Malta in the aftermath of an anti-freemasonry campaign, offended the sentiment of the whole population who were ‘strong and unanimous in considering that this is a question which should not be dealt with otherwise than in accordance with the deep religious feelings of the population’.

Announcing another petition to Queen Victoria as in 1892, Pace emphasized how the marriage crisis involved ‘religion and country’, urging subordinates and ‘all your parishioners who care for their religion and country’ to set aside ‘all differences and disunions’ in support of his peti tion.

Three monster meetings, held one Sunday after another in Malta’s largest square (Piazza Fosse, Floriana), were the highlights of the ensuing agitation in an atmosphere of processions, sermons and vigils. All this
accompanied in time Savona’s high-powered and, in the circumstances, successful drive to pass the controversial marriage ordinance, all the elected members voting with him, with the official members abstaining.\textsuperscript{198} The first meeting was held as the ordinance was being introduced, the second when it had been passed, the third as it awaited the royal assent (which it never got).

The mixed marriage agitation – variously described as the ‘Union for Religion and Country’\textsuperscript{199} and ‘the Catholic Cause’\textsuperscript{200} – was outwardly led by Savona; but its mainstay was Bishop Pace, with Vatican encouragement, and hence the clergy, both urban and rural. Addressing the first meeting, Dean Vassallo, head of the Cathedral Chapter, thanked the crowds for responding to ‘the call of our Pastor’ – although Savona, president of the so-called \textit{Gran Comizio Nazionale}, was standing right beside him. ‘The Cross shall be our banner’, said Canon Panzavecchia, ‘and under the shadow of the Cross we shall claim our rights’. The meeting’s resolution began: ‘We, the Clergy and People of Malta’. Townsmen and villagers of all classes from all over the islands came to these meetings with their parish priests and civic bands, armed with posters and banners, as well as large statues of Leo XIII and of ‘Malta embracing the Cross’. When Savona declared that they would not accept the decision of Protestant judges, there were ‘loud and prolonged cheers, waving of hats and handkerchiefs’.\textsuperscript{201} The whole population of Malta, said Savona, was ‘united – clergy and people, town and country, Gozitans and Maltese, rich and poor, learned and ignorant – in support of the Pope’.\textsuperscript{202}

Pace, anxious not to let it appear as if only Savona’s party and the clergy were supporting him, sent a high-placed emissary to Mizzi asking him to break his silence and participate. Mizzi accepted to do so, but Mgr. Mifsud, when approached by Mizzi and the bishop’s nephew, refused to take part, considering Savona to be too intent on making a party issue out of a religious question.\textsuperscript{203} Mifsud, an unofficial member of the Executive Council, had been threatened with physical violence by ‘two persons from Senglea’; his presence, he thought, would give rise to ‘manifestations on the part of political parties’ and would be harmful at a moment when ‘unity and harmony’ among ‘all Maltese’ were desirable.\textsuperscript{204}

Savona was clearly eager to assert his bearing as P.P. leader over the whole patriotic-religious movement. Mizzi spoke soberly and briefly, as if performing an inescapable duty in an ungenial atmosphere: ‘we are all here united performing an act which betokens a people who have the interests of religion and of country at heart’. Savona, who had already spoken, immediately interposed to add that as Dr. Mizzi had stated the agitation had to be carried on to the end: ‘You are well aware that every time I took upon myself a serious question, I was the man to go on with my task. You know very well how long we have been working for the Constitution’.\textsuperscript{205} A snub to Mizzi, who absented himself from the remaining
meetings, this mood betrayed Savona’s typically domineering and exalted manner; moreover, as other persons were speaking, Savona took it upon himself to address people on the other side of the platform. Governor Fremantle had once remarked that Savona, being ‘completely unscrupulous’, could still be ‘formidable’ if he found ‘a real grievance’; he had also noted the ‘colossal’ credulity of Malta’s lower classes, wondering what their gullibility would be should a so-called attack on their religion take place ‘in which we should have the whole clergy against us’. The marriage question was Savona’s cause célèbre. As the efforts of the P.P. and the clergy for ‘the Catholic Cause’ continued – the bishop ‘influencing an increasing agitation among the lower classes’ – the second marriage meeting was better attended than the first. Estimates of attendances varied wildly but there were probably more than 30,000 or so people at each meeting; these meetings were the most crowded and enthusiastic within living memory, with the country people present in great numbers. Savona and his followers became ‘all-powerful’: the police were afraid of trouble ‘in spite of what might be but half-hearted opposition from the clergy’. The third meeting, the least religious of all, saw Savona at the height of his oratorical powers, making a show of his partisan spirit and – if it was that – his religious fanaticism: castigating all those who were absent or in any other way critical of his party. His chief target for the occasion was F. S. De Cesare, whose paper La Voce Del Popolo had accused Savona of irresponsible vote-catching tactics and bigotry, an accusation hardly contradicted by Savona who prided himself on the fact that he had told the crown advocate: ‘I would rather be an ignoramus and a fanatic like the Bishop than a learned and liberal man like you!’ (shouts of bravo). There was great commotion every time Savona, seething with scorn, mentioned De Cesare’s name until, finally, he set a copy of La Voce Del Popolo on fire. ‘This’, he said, ‘is a symbol of the fire of hell’. ‘This man who is engaged in this sacred fight’, stated the Dominican prior Enrico Vella, ‘has been described as a man of steel. I would rather call him a man of gold’. Bouquets were then presented to Savona as ‘the Leader of the Maltese People’; and the meeting came to a conclusion amidst shouts of ‘Viva il Papa! Viva Malta! Viva Savona!’ Afterwards, Savona was placed, seated, on a sort of platform, and carried through Valletta’s streets, the St. Paul collegiate church archpriest Paolo Agius standing on the platform on his right, and the Dominican prior Enrico Vella brandishing a crucifix on his left; thus attended, Savona was carried to the palace square where, under the flare of bengal lights, the extraordinary spectacle excited the populace to frenzy.

Narrating trivial stories (‘I shall now tell you...’), carefully pausing for laughter, hisses or applause, displaying a theatrical but nonetheless ceremonious air, mindful of the parochial attachments of his listeners, the larger the audience the better was Savona’s talent. In his new role as defender of the church, Savona somewhat transferred the blind faith of the
clerical masses into a hasty worship for the party leader: Christ was the heavenly king, Savona the earthly saviour. In a classic exposition of this theme, the Siggiewi parish priest Salvatore Chircop was reported to have said that

the people should repose the greatest trust in Mr. Savona's words, which were to be considered as uttered by the Bishop, who is the representative of the Pope, who in his turn is the representative of Jesus Christ.212

Meanwhile, various people connected with government were accorded police protection.213 There were a number of minor incidents involving conflicts or clashes between Maltese and British servicemen – at Żejtun, Mosta, Żabbar, Senglea – the worst scene being that at Cospicua where seven sailors were attacked and locked up in a house for nearly three hours by a furious mob of about two thousand.214

Partisan animosities were more acute than ever. The messianic was opposed to the intellectual; the populist to the elitist, the demagogue to the caucus. The legalistic and sophisticated element was as conspicuously absent from Savona's party as it was overabundant in Mizzi's. Savona saw the P.N. as the party of 'physicians and lawyers',215 whereas he was seen as the leader of 'bare-footed people and beggars,'216 of plebeans 'in shirt sleeves' who behaved 'with the intolerance that characterizes ignorant fanatics',217 as 'truly the representative in Council of the lowest class of society'.218 But the representative of nobility and property holders, Marchese Saverio De Piro, was still a diehard Savonian.219 And people attending meetings addressed by foremost Mizziani were also liable to be described as 'lowest class': at such a Vittoriosa meeting, there were men, women and children of this class 'carrying red and white flags'.220 Certain descriptions levelled at Savona were as much a reflection of those who made them as they were of the party at whom they were directed; but it seems that when Mizzi withdrew his tenuous patronage of Savona's party in 1893 a substantial middle class following of the P.U. evaporated and so Savona may have had to rely increasingly on a lower class audience. This became easier after the association with Pace began, first in 1890 through the marriage ordinance, then in 1893 against Ripon's despatch, then in 1896 in connection with the Privy Council judgement: in addressing their 'anti-Pace' meeting of 1890 both the P.N. speakers (Mizzi and Enrico Zammit) had revealed the social class of their listeners by speaking in Italian.221 It was the lower classes who were the more devotedly attached to the clergy, irrepressibly dedicated to their religion and to the festive folklore associated with it; it was among these elements, far the majority of the population, that Savona came to find the greatest admiration. Most had no vote. The P.N., by contrast, could bestow patronage by means of respectable professionisti and village notables attracted to it; the professionista's clientele however may have comprised less zealots than the clergyman's flock.
There were always differences in the base, composition and style of the two parties. Ever since 1880 the P.N. had been predominantly a party of lawyer-politicians of which Mizzi himself was the prototype. The P.U., by contrast, had only one lawyer in 1892 (Dr. Goffredo Adami): most of its members had no degrees or qualifications. Mizzi the lawyer tended to keep to one case at a time; Savona the schoolmaster tended to indulge in a potpourri. Mizzi avoided mentioning names; Savona delighted in doing this and could conjure a spectacle: burn a newspaper, swear on a crucifix, give three cheers, take bouquets. Mizzi was rather too dignified to resort so such antics, although he could well descend to the level of the crowd, judging by his references to Queen Victoria as 'their Popess' and Archbishop Benson as 'the first authority after their Popess'.

Savona’s inflated popularity in 1896 was a transient one: he had no reserve of political muscle to draw upon once the bishop no longer needed him; although he kept the right connections with Panzavecchia and the strong regional base of support at Senglea. Believing his own rhetoric, Savona went to extremes, forfeiting the sympathy of moderate elements not already committed to him. Malta Taglina’s ‘politics of religion’ would in another paper have surely incurred Pace’s ultimate censure:

*We do just what we like; nobody has any power over us; our will is God’s will.... The leader of our souls is the Pope; the leader of our hearts is Mr. Sigismund; by their word of command we will drown Malta.... We are the King, the Government and the law; our will shall have to be carried out; and nobody is great when compared to us. With the red and white flag around the portrait of Gismond, and with the Pope’s cockade, we will run down every enemy.*

If the bourgeoisie disdained social inferiors for their attire and habits, that scorn would be doubly reciprocated:

*They have called us... the men of the turned-up sleeves, as if they were the offspring of noble paladins. You, our brethren, you dogs! say what you like; the reins of this Island are in our hands.... Hurrah for the turned-up sleeves! they are the King of Malta.... The Redeemer, Mr. Savona, our Master, long may he live.*

The anonymous, anarchical hymn was dedicated to Valletta’s slumdwellers: and of course, the fanatically religious partisans, drawing comfort from the demagogue without any pangs of conscience, were only regurgitating what the ‘Redeemer’ had taught them: ‘Do not heed what the Enemy tells you in his excommunicated paper. Do not heed....’ Savona was made powerful, wrote Mizzi, by ‘the brutal force of the irrational rabble’ and ‘the blind fanatics’ that surrounded him. Mizzi also chided those in authority who were collaborating with Savona instead of restraining him – obviously a reference to Panzavecchia and Pace since after the marriage meetings Savona and Panzavecchia had led the crowds to the bishop’s palace where they had received the prelate’s benediction or some other form of overt encouragement; no wonder Mizzi himself was at this stage seriously threatened with excommunication.

Fremantle warned Pace that unless he stopped backing Savona the bishop’s rank and privileges might be lowered; and the governor fixed on
Pace the responsibility for any fatal consequences which the marriage agitation could lead to.\textsuperscript{227} Seeing the agitation as 'a danger to the public peace',\textsuperscript{228} the government were afraid, for the first time, that the police would be 'quite inadequate', 'quite helpless', to deal with any uprising should this occur.\textsuperscript{229} After Fremantle's warning to Pace, Chamberlain wrote a disarming assurance saying the Privy Council judgement and its consequent endorsement by order-in-council was 'neither a judicial nor a legislative act'; the whole agitation was based on a 'misapprehension'; he did not think an ordinance was 'either necessary or desirable'; he did not intend to legislate on the mixed marriage question at all.\textsuperscript{230} Cardinal Rampolla, (who was said to have been 'pulling the strings')\textsuperscript{231} and possibly Cardinal Vaughan, Archbishop of Westminster (who was once suggested as an intermediary)\textsuperscript{232} as well as other diplomatic aides, including the papal nuncio in Paris (who presented the Foreign Office with a memorandum on the marriage question),\textsuperscript{233} together with the widely reported agitation in Malta, apparently prevailed on the British government to leave things as they were, thus legislating neither for nor against mixed marriages; unmixed marriages would continue to be recognized by \textit{consuetudo}. Without the Vatican's involvement, however, the Privy Council judgement might well have been put into effect although the British always showed a high regard for the Malta church hierarchy and religious practices in the fortress-colony. The bishop was considerably placated by Chamberlain's nice assurances, though he still expected the canon law to be made to prevail by a legislative act\textsuperscript{234} and sent his petition, supported by nearly 38,000 signatures.\textsuperscript{235}

In January 1897 Leo XIII wrote an authoritative letter to Pace strongly reiterating that

as no one doubts that the promulgation of the Tridentine Decree was long ago made in the island of Malta, and that the same decree in past times was always observed, that decree is therefore still in force, both in marriages between Catholics, and in those which are usually called mixed.\textsuperscript{236}

The marriage question continued to be a topic of discussion for some months but the most serious fears had been calmed. Panzavecchia was rewarded for his labours by being made a prelate of the Pope, and he was later admitted to the Order of the Knights of Malta.\textsuperscript{237} As the agitation burst like a bubble, Savona was left high and dry with his own limited band of supporters, better represented outside the Council than inside it. Nevertheless, in accordance with Pace's hope and Leo XIII's advice, Savona persisted, trying to have his marriage ordinance re-introduced for yet another time;\textsuperscript{238} but in this matter he did not have more than three or four supporters in the Council. When he saw that Savona was trying to re-open the marriage question, Mgr. Mifsud resigned,\textsuperscript{239} and Dr. Salvatore Grech may be said to have assumed the leadership of the pro-government P.N. Savona sometimes gathered as many as six, seven, even more votes
in the Council, because of the deteriorating political situation and the shakiness of the still surviving P.N. Mizzi had no faith in 'big-boy' Grech, who was considered to be a Stricklandian at heart; and he called the elected majority la maggioranza degli sfiduciati (the distrusted majority).

Mizzi was particularly aghast at Strickland's prohibition, in 1897, of public meetings in Valletta, Floriana and the Three Cities. Caused in the last resort by agitation in connection with quarantine regulations out of fear of the bubonic plague, this drastic step had been first contemplated during the marriage meetings.

'I directed the superintendent of police', announced Strickland, 'to intimate to Mr. Savona that if he attempted to hold a meeting, he would be arrested at once'.

Anti-government articles became 'conspicuous' for their violence, as 'not even in Ireland' were such measures taken. The government thus earned 'the hatred and the disgust of the population'. In another country, said Malta Ghada Taghna, 'the people would have risen in rebellion in order that everyone might get his due'. Savona, Panzavecchia, Mattei and others stumped the country clamouring for Strickland's dismissal and self-government.

Saying almost the same things, the parties nonetheless went their ways separately: Mattei's confident attempt to reconcile Mizzi and Savona failed because, said Savona, he was trying 'to reconcile the irreconcilable'; however, Mattei allegedly prevailed on the P.N. to adopt a self-government programme.

Other serious questions arose; there were cases of discrimination, and a 'new' language question was threatening: 'I have had enough of the language question', confessed Savona, 'and I don’t want to have any more of it'. Language and the law, rather than religion and the plebs, were traditionally the domain of the P.N. rather than of the P.P.

In 1898, angered by the repeated rejection of his marriage ordinance, Savona left the Council chamber, and then resigned. He intended to return to the Council unopposed but when he saw that his opponents were backing a simpleton against him he withdrew and, in retaliation, put forward as a candidate a servant at his printing office. Crestfallen, disgruntled, disillusioned, Savona retired from active politics, thus making way for Mizzi's triumphant re-emergence.

In the absence of any heir-apparent among Savona’s inner circle, the P.P.'s natural torch-bearer was Panzavecchia; but Panzavecchia was neither an elected member not exactly a Savonian. Inspired more by the patriotic-religious ideal than by the 'cultural' or 'social' nationalism of the Mizzian or Savonian brand, Panzavecchia could exercise a moderating influence on Mizzian italianità and Savonian demagoguery, continuing to oppose Strickland's 'pro-British' arbitrariness, to demand self-government. Closer to the populace and less secular-minded than Mizzi, more coherent
and less class conscious than Savona, better adapted to the cassock than to the rostrum, this outspoken ‘people’s priest’ could ensure that any threat to the church’s interest would not be taken lightly. In Senglea he had his hometown stronghold, in the P.P. his ready-made political base; but still he was no match for Mizzi.

In the history of Maltese political parties, Savona was influential first of all by elevating English on to a different base in elementary education and consequently in popular culture; unlike the Maltese phonetic alphabet this system was never quite reversed. Savona recognized the value, the utility, of Maltese, both as a necessary means for primary education, as a just medium of court litigation, and also as a symbol and carrier of nationalism. An anglophile at heart, a believer in the efficiency ethic, Savona sought to make common people conscious of their socio-economic as well as their political rights, directing his appeal particularly to those associated with the dockyard in the Three Cities, the services or the government. Well equipped by experience to view life on the utilitarian calculus, Savona foresaw and foreshadowed the formation of a labour party: even the working classes, ‘among which a Labour Party must sooner or later be formed’, could not be satisfied with the colonial government, said Public Opinion in 1906.255

Presenting Malta with an alternative adjustment — the English-like rather than the Italian-like; the changeable rather than the traditional — Savona sowed the seeds of a bi-party system. When in 1880 the Antiriformisti mobilized to oppose him, he in turn sought to maintain a base of support through the R.P., which he led after his resignation in 1887 and, subsequently, as the P.U., in association with Mizzi’s P.N., then again as the P.P., together with Panzavecchia; Riformisti altered their ideas as circumstances changed but they remained the same men. Parties develop their own momentum: even without any elaborate political philosophy, the party comes into being, made of men behind a leader, the feeling that there is a common bond, a worthwhile ideal to pursue. Maltese political parties bore the stamp of their respective leaders and of the multifold circumstances of their birth. The ‘instinct of hostility’ co-existed with the ‘instinct for freedom’.256 Had it not been for Savona’s party (or rather parties), the ‘one party’ situation of 1888 might perhaps have channelled political history differently, possibly on the lines of the Egyptian Wafd or the Indian Congress Party. With Savona, party politics came into existence: personalized, abusive, vindictive, errant, but also complimentary, fact-finding, patriotic, election-minded, and generally (if vaguely) democratic, believing in government by ‘the people’ for ‘the people’.

Although his public career was a mosaic of inconsistency, Savona brought to the legislature a statesmanlike quality by that cut and thrust of debate which makes a forum. The greatest faux pas of his life, the proposal in 1886 that plenary powers should be handed to the governor, seriously
marred his future credibility: the army schoolmaster was at war with the elected member. Reversing his political attitude, Savona spearheaded, with Panzavecchia and Mattei, the movement for self-government. Harrassed but irrepressible, pinning his faith to mass religious sentiment as a instrument for his liberation movement, Savona was most popular in 1896 when he was most inconsistent and most irresponsible. Even so, when he had power, he could not keep it; when he sought power, he could not gain it: the quest for power kept him alive. Savona was a politician as Shakespeare defined him — ‘one that would circumvent God’. First he said, like Wolsey, ego et rex meus, then he put his hand on his heart and proclaimed the popular virtues of religio et patria. Unable to attract professionisti or rely on village notables, Savona located the two major sources of power and patronage, each of which had a nationwide organizational network, collaborating with each in turn, first with the governor, then with the bishop: thus he maintained a secure political existence for twenty years creating a party distinct from Mizzi’s.

The R.M.F.A. apprentice went to London returning to succeed the English regimental schoolmaster; the ex-sergeant resigned his commission campaigning for educational, sanitary and fiscal reforms, attacking the government’s despotism; the agitator then joined the regime to execute a divisive anglicization programme and re-organize educational establishments; the collaborator quarrelled with his masters and turned against them, the Cobdenite anticlerical becoming the ultramontanist champion. A rabble rouser in a top hat, who went to monster meetings in a carriage and pair, Savona was rather like the well-meaning Gibraltarian civil servant who suddenly transformed himself before the eyes of his guest: ‘The neat, polite and precise “Englishman” vanished; in his place a shrill and voluble Spaniard came to life’.257 Collaborating and resisting at his own expense, Savona left his followers a mixed legacy: he had a personal following in the country, especially in Valletta and the Three Cities, and he continued to interest himself in journalism and politics until he died in 1908. No fusion dynamic could blur altogether the lasting differences that there were between the various political leaders and their respective parties; as time passed it became obvious that many of the traits evinced by Savona’s leadership style, aspects of his thinking on social questions, and attitudes to government, had passed into the mainstream of Maltese party politics.

NOTES

1 ‘Indirizzo ai Gozitani’, 1 Jan. 1889, enc. Torrens/Holland, 7 Jan. 1889, 158/290; ‘Al Partito Nazionale’, Malta, 9 July 1889. By Letters Patent of 14 Feb. 1889 the salaries of the three unofficial members were removed from the civil list and made subject to the legislature; it was also specified that the ecclesiastical representative to be returned by the special electors could only be a Catholic.
4 Infra, iii, passim.
5 enc. Smyth/Ripon, 1 July 1893, 158/305; E. P. Vassallo, op. cit., pp. 7–9.
6 Infra, iii.
7 Supra, ii.59, fn. 326.
8 Infra, iii.
9 Supra, ii.59, ftn. 326.
10 C.G., 8 Nov. 1895, 4.195.
16 enc. 1, no. 28, 30 Sept. 1889, 158/293/8254.
19 Dr. Alfredo Naudi memo, 12 Apr. 1890, enc., no. 66, 158/293.
21 Strickland/Herbert, 5 Feb., 7 Feb. 1890, 158/293.
22 In his 1890 address to the electors Castaldi rebelled against Baron Chapelle’s leadership; enc. 158/293/8254.
23 C.G., 29 Jan. 1890, 1.6; 20 May 1890, 4.173.
25 Smyth/Knutsford, 4 Jan. 1892, 158/299.
26 Supra, ii.51–52.
27 Strickland memo., 21 Mar. 1890, enc. 1, no. 68, 158/293.
28 Pearson min., 11 Dec. 1891, on Smyth/Knutsford, 4 Dec. 1891, 158/293.
29 Knutsford min., 14 Dec. 1891, ibid.
30 Pearson min. on Smyth/Knutsford, 4 June 1891, 158/297.
31 Wingfield min., 5 Dec. 1893, on Smyth/Ripon, 29 Nov. 1893, 158/306.
33 Herbert min., 14 Mar. 1900, on Wilkie/Holland, 12 Mar. 1900, 158/293.
34 Wingfield min., 18 Oct. 1892, on Smyth/Ripon, 11 Oct. 1892, 158/301.
37 Smyth/Ripon, 21 Dec. 1892, 158/301.
38 min. on Fremantle/Chamberlain, 29 Nov. 1895, 158/313.
40 Hansard, 3rd ser., 1876, cccxxix.362.
42 E. P. Vassallo, op. cit., p. 10.
43 Ibid., p. ii.
44 C.G., 2 Nov. 1898, 3.69.
45 Supra, ii.19.
48 Torrens/Knutsford, 20 June 1889, 158/291; Dr. O. Grech Mifsud’s address to his electors, 5 July 1889, enc. 158/291/14008.
49 Politica e Commercio, no. 1, 28 May 1889.
50 Police rep., 4 June 1895, enc. Fremantle/Chamberlain, 8 June 1895, 158/312.
51 Malta, 21 June 1892, enc. Smyth/Knutsford, 18 Mar. 1892, 158/299.
52 C.G., 12 Dec. 1894, 70.66g-670.
53 C.G., 4 Dec. 1895, 8.460.
54 C.G., 6 Apr. 1899, 2.24-25.
55 Strickland/Crewe, 23 July 1908, 158/360.
56 Ibid.
57 Infra, iv. passim.
58 Infra, iii. passim.
60 Smyth/Knutsford, 4 June 1891, 883/4.
61 Wingfield min., 7 May 1891, on Smyth/Knutsford, 30 Apr. 1891, 158/296.
62 Malta, no. 2240, 27 Apr. 1891.
63 La Primaudaye/Strickland, 28 Apr. 1891, enc. 2, no. 100, 883/4.
67 Supra, iii.67-68.
69 Ibid.
70 ‘Sentenza, a dire il vero, che non trova confronto in nessuna pagina degli annali giuridici’; G. Gauci, op. cit., p. 12.
71 See reports by law officers of Crown, R. E. Webster and E. Clarke, 5 May 1891, 27 June 1891, 883/4.
72 In the anti-Rowse riot of 1878 (supra, i.8, ii.18) crowds had entered the palace grounds.
75 La Dépêche Tunisienne (organ of the French Residency in Tunis), 24 May 1891, enc. Drummond Hay/Salisbury, 25 May 1891, 158/296.
76 Smyth/Knutsford, 6 July 1891, 883/4.
77 enc. Smyth/Knutsford, 1 June 1891, 883/4.
80 Strickland/Borton, 6 Oct. 1882, enc. Borton/Kimberley, 12 Oct. 1882, 158/262; Strickland was ‘a useful political supporter’ but his request was ‘very preposterous’. Wingfield min., 20 Oct. 1882, ibid.
81 Supra, ii.51-52.
85 ‘Unione’, Malta, 26 Aug. 1891.
87 M.S., 28 Aug. 1891.
89 enc. Fremantle/Chamberlain, 23 Nov. 1898, 158/326.
91 Salisbury/Simmons, 1 Aug. 1899, Correspondence regarding Sir L. Simmons’ Special Mission to the Vatican relative to the Religious Questions in the Island of Malta, May 1890 (C. 5975).
92 Rampolla/Simmons, 20 Mar. 1890, ibid.
93 Simmons/Salisbury, 23 Dec. 1889, ibid.
94 Harsand, 3rd ser., 1890, cccxlvi.701.
95 W. H. Mackintosh: Disestablishment and Liberation (Lond., 1972).
99 Hansard, 3rd ser., 1890, cccxlvi. 1386.
100 Hansard, 3rd ser., 1890, cccxlvi. 1312.
101 Hansard, 3rd ser., 1890, cccxlvi. 509.
102 Simmons/Salisbury, 22 Jan. 1890, Correspondence regarding Sir L. Simmons' Special Mission, op. cit.
103 supra, ii. 51–52.
104 Simmons/Salisbury, 23 Dec. 1889, ibid.
105 Rampolla/Pace, 20 June 1890, quoted by T. M. Healy, Hansard, 3rd ser., 1890, cccxlvi. 508.
106 Simmons/Salisbury, 22 Jan. 1890, Correspondence regarding Sir L. Simmons' Special Mission, op. cit.
108 supra, ii. 47, iii. 72–73.
110 Caruana/Smyth, 24 July 1890, enc. ibid.
111 Ibid.
113 Ibid., cols. 191–192.
114 C.G., 20 June 1890, 13. 684.
115 Ibid., cols. 649–650.
116 Ibid., col. 628.
117 Ibid., col. 703.
120 Hansard, 4th ser., 1892, v. 1521.
121 Naudi/Strickland, 16 Apr. 1896, enc., no. 49, 883/5.
122 A. Mifsud: La Legge Civile sul matrimonio (Malta press, 1893); Canon (later Mgr.) Salvatore Grech (Pace's secretary): Dove stà la Ragione ed il Torto (Giov. Muscat, Valletta, 1893).
123 Naudi/Strickland, 16 Apr. 1896, enc., no. 49, 883/5.
125 Ibid.
127 Shortly before this dissolution Strickland's motion to expel Castaldi from a sitting for saying 'si viene qui per scherzare' was rejected unanimously; C.G., 2 Dec. 1891, 44. 273.
129 Herbert min. on Smyth/Ripon, 7 Nov. 1892, 158/301.
130 See also Pace's letter to his vicar-general, Malta, 25 Nov. 1892, enc. Smyth/Ripon, 1 Dec. 1892, 158/301.
136 Malta, 12 Dec. 1892.
137 Mattei/C.O., 29 April 1896, no. 48, 883/5.
139 V. M. Alier: Marriage, Class and Colour in Nineteenth Century Cuba (Cambridge, 1974).
140 Dr. Alfredo Mattei letter, The Times, 4 Apr. 1896.
143 Anon (? Baron Sir E. M. De Piro): Saggi di Storia e Ragionamenti sull’Isola di Malta, 'Scritti da un Maltese' (Luigi Tonna, Malta, 1839), p. 98.
146 P.O., 10 Jan. 1893, enc. ibid.
147 Malta, 9 Jan. 1893, enc. ibid.
149 Malta, 9 Jan. 1893.
150 Mifsud et al/Smyth, 23 July 1894, enc. 158/308.
151 Fremantle/Ripon, 28 June 1894, 158/308.
152 enc. Fremantle/Ripon, 4 Aug. 1894, 158/309.
154 enc. Fremantle/Ripon, 18 July 1893, 158/305.
155 Smyth/Ripon, 18 July 1893, 158/305.
156 Rampolla/Adami, 2 Sept. 1893, Malta, no. 3011, 20 Nov. 1893.
159 Il Vessillo Cattolico, 16 Oct. 1893, enc. ibid.
160 Police rep. enc. Smyth/Ripon, 31 Oct. 1893, 158/306. A large number of the inhabitants of the Three Cities 'crossed in boats' to attend this meeting in Valletta.
164 C.G., 14 Jan. 1891, 27.703.
165 Malta Taghna supplement to no. 191, enc. Fremantle/Ripon, 21 Jan. 1895, 158/311.
166 Fremantle/Ripon, 21 Jan. 1895, 158/311.
167 Fremantle/Chamberlain, 8 June 1895, 158/312.
168 L'Attualità, Indirizzo del Comitato Popolare al Sig. S. Savona, Capo del Partito del Popolo (Lorenzo Busuttil, Valletta, 1895).
169 Police rep. 4 June 1895, enc. Fremantle/Chamberlain, 8 June 1895, 158/312.
170 e.g. police rep. enc. Fremantle/Chamberlain, 7 Feb. 1896, 158/315.
172 Police rep. 4 June 1895, enc. Fremantle/Chamberlain, 8 June 1895, 158/312.
174 C.G., 8 Nov. 1895, 4.136.
175 Ibid., col. 165.
177 Chamberlain/Fremantle, 11 Dec. 1895, 158/313.
180 Ibid., col. 159.
183 Wingfield min., 22 Apr. 1896, on Fremantle/Chamberlain, 14 Apr. 1896, 158/316.
184 enc. Fremantle/Chamberlain, 30 July 1895, 158/312.
185 C.G., 8 Nov. 1895, 4.154.
186 C.G., 8 Feb. 1896, 74.795-796.
187 Fremantle/Chamberlain, 14 Aug. 1895, 158/312.
191 Fremantle/Chamberlain, 9 July 1895, tel., 158/312.
192 The Marriage Laws of Malta. A Record (Valletta, 1897), pp. 18-19.
193 Supra, iii. 70-71.
196 Fremantle/Chamberlain, 10 Mar. 1896, 158/315.
199 Naudi/Strickland, 16 Apr. 1896, 883/5.
200 Parnell/Chamberlain, 3 Sept. 1896, 883/5.
203 Mifsud/Strickland, 30 Mar. 1896, conf., enc. 34, 883/5.
204 Mifsud/Pace, 8 Mar. 1896, enc. ibid.
207 Fremantle/Chamberlain, 4 Oct. 1895, 883/5.
211 Fremantle/Pace, 23 Mar. 1896, 883/5.
212 Fremantle/Pace, 22 Apr. 1896, enc. no. 58, 883/5.
213 Fremantle/Pace, 23 Mar. 1896, 883/5.
214 Fremantle/Pace, 22 Apr. 1896, enc. no. 58, 883/5.
215 Malta, 9 Jan. 1893.
216 Risorgimento, 9 Jan. 1893.
217 Malta, 9 Jan. 1893.
218 Risorgimento, 9 Jan. 1893.
219 De Piro was on Savona's platform during the 1893 meeting; police rep. enc. Smyth/Ripon, 13 Jan. 1893, 158/303.
221 Supra, iii.72.
222 Malta, 12 Dec. 1892.
226 Naudi/Strickland, 16 Apr. 1896; enc. 495 in Parnell/Chamberlain, 3 Sept. 1896; no. 73 and enc. 1, Malta, 13 Aug. 1896, 883/5.
227 Fremantle/Pace, 23 Mar. 1896, 883/5.
231 Wingfield min. 21 Mar. 1896, 158/315/6462.
233 F.O./C.O., 1 July 1896, enc. 68, 883/5.
236 Leo XIII/Pace, 13 Jan. 1897, enc. Fremantle/Chamberlain, 15 Mar. 1897, no. 81, 883/5.
240 Malta, no. 2147, 21 Jan. 1891.
241 C.G., 7 Apr. 1897, 40.960.
243 Naudi/Strickland, 16 Apr. 1896, enc. 49, 883/5.
244 C.G., 17 Feb. 1897, 34.550.
245 Fremantle/Chamberlain, 2 Feb. 1897, 158/319.
246 C.G., 17 Feb. 1897, 34.537.
247 Ibid., col. 563.
252 Fremantle/Chamberlain, 5 Apr. 1898, 158/323.
253 Fremantle/Chamberlain, 29 Apr. 1898, 158/323.
254 Infra, iv. passim.
255 P.O., 4 Apr. 1906.