Disconnection at the Limit: Posthumanism, Deconstruction, and Non-Philosophy

David Roden
david.roden@open.ac.uk

Abstract: Speculative posthumanism (SP) conceives posthumans as agents made inhuman by a technological disconnection or ‘withdrawal’ from human social systems (The disconnection thesis – DT). DT understands becoming nonhuman in terms of agential independence. An artefact like a robot is a ‘wide human’ so long as it depends on its human-related functions to exist.

But what is an agent? SP forecloses a purely conceptual response to this question because it rejects transcendental accounts of subjectivity founded in human experience or social practice (Unbounded Posthumanism – UP). UP renders this question illegitimate because it denies there is any theory of agency that could apply to all agents. Not only does DT not tell us what posthumans are like, it has no criteria for determining when disconnection occurs.

It follows that understanding the posthuman (if possible) must proceed without criteria. The content of unbounded posthumanism is produced by disconnection rather than by the schematic theoretical content of DT. I will argue that this implies an intimate relationship between the understanding and practice in posthumanism that allows us to draw fertile analogies between UP and two other ‘philosophies of the limit’ Derrida’s Deconstruction and Laruelle’s Non-Philosophy.

Disconnection

Speculative posthumanism (SP) is concerned with the prospect of a posthuman reality emerging from the technological alteration of the human one. This technological focus comports with a general concern with human-made futures that don’t include us. Outside fiction, our moral concern for a nonhuman future is prompted by the theorized potential of technology to drastically alter us or our environments.
Thus qualified, SP claims ‘there could be powerful nonhuman agents that arise through some human-instigated technological process’. More precisely, posthumans are *wide* human descendants of humans who have become *inhuman* through some technical process.

The concept of wide descent avoids bio-chauvinism. We don’t know where posthumans could come from or how. ‘Wide’ descendants can come from any part of the ‘Wide Human’ of humans and their technological objects, a system on which we depend much as it depends on us. Your toothbrush is wide human, as are you and your pet pig.

Its emphasis on technogenesis means that SP is often conflated with Transhumanism. That’s an egregious mistake. Transhumanists, like classical and modern humanists, hope to cultivate human capacities, such as reason and creativity, with advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence or germline genetic engineering. Transhumanism is an *ethical claim to* the effect that technological enhancement of capacities like intelligence or empathy is a good idea.

SP, by contrast, is *metaphysical*. It says only that there could be posthumans; not that they would be better than us, or even comparable from a moral perspective.

This does not mean that SP is morally inconsequential but the metaphysics and epistemology of the posthuman drive the ethics, not vice-versa.

So how can we put bones on the thought of a *nonhuman wide human descendant*? A posthuman?

A plausible condition for any posthuman-making event is that the resulting nonhuman entities could acquire purposes not set by humans – and that this autonomy is due to some technological alteration in their powers.

I call this claim the ‘Disconnection Thesis’ (DT). The core theoretical construct of SP.

DT says posthumans are feral technological entities. Less roughly, an X is posthuman if and only if X or its wide human ancestors originated in ‘Wide Human’ but now acts outside of it.
DT understands human-posthuman differences without being committed to a ‘human essence’ that posthumans will lack. This is a feature rather than a bug because if there is an essential human nature nobody knows what it is. So best get by without it.4

Becoming posthuman, then, is a matter of acquiring a technologically enabled capacity for independent agency.

DT is multiply satisfiable by beings with different technological origins and very different natures or powers (e.g. artificial intelligences, mind-uploads, cyborgs, synthetic life forms, etc.). This is as it should be since there are no posthumans and no substantive information on them, yet.

Nonetheless, DT has philosophical commitments which can be approached with varying stringency. The key variable is agency.

Disconnection is stipulated to only involve agents. This is to avoid the trivial consequence that any formerly useful part of WH becomes posthuman when it ceases to have a human function. Hulks, ruins and discarded mobile phones are not posthumans because none exhibit agency following their loss of human-centred function.5

However, the concept of an agent can be relatively constrained or liberal. I refer to a version of SP with a constrained agency concept as ‘bounded’; with a relatively liberal one as ‘unbounded’.

Bounded Posthumanism

Posthumanism with constrained agency usually conforms to some moral conception of human life and is often indistinguishable from transhumanism.

For example, in Posthuman Personhood Daryl Wennemann adopts a Kantian, rationalist conception of agency. He holds that true agency is personhood. Being a person requires one be answerable to reasons or in the space of reasons. A person can reflect on ‘himself and his world from the perspective of a being sharing in a certain community’. A person is reflective subject capable of belonging to a moral community, bound by norms of action, etc.6

5 Ibid., 127–30.
6 Daryl Wennemann, Posthuman Personhood (New York, 2013), 47.
This stringent concept implies that, whatever the future throws up, posthuman agents will be social and, arguably linguistic beings like us, even if they are robots or computers, have strange bodies, or even stranger habits.

A (First) Unbounded Posthumanism (UP1)

However, we can also can frame much more liberal agency requirements which need not involve the capacity for self-evaluation though social norms or rational autonomy.

The agency concept I introduce in Posthuman Life only requires some degree of what I refer to there as ‘functional autonomy’.7

This minimal agent is a self-maintaining system. Its functional autonomy measures its capacity to exploit the world to survive while becoming useful in its turn for other things. A drastic diminution of functional autonomy is a reduction in power that, for us, is experienced as harm. Arthritis of the back or limbs painfully reduces freedom of movement. Gaining new skills or becoming fitter increases functional autonomy or one’s capacity to affect and be affected.8

Hyperplasticity

However, we could envisage posthuman entities with equivalent or greater functional autonomy than us that do not satisfy the conditions for personhood or rational autonomy because they cannot answer to communal principles or norms.

To bring the implications of this home, I’ll focus on what happens if we take functional autonomy to a monstrous limit: the case of the hyperplastic.

I call an agent ‘hyperplastic’ if it can make arbitrarily fine changes to its body or structure without compromising its capacity for hyperplasticity.9

7 Roden, Posthuman Life, 125–41.
9 Hyperplasticity is discussed in greater detail in David Roden, ‘Reduction, Elimination and
Now, it is possible to argue that, if certain assumptions about the relationship between physical and mental properties hold, a hyperplastic agent would be uninterpretable for us.

The assumption in question is modest. An antireductionism for which our mental life depends on our body’s physical state without being reducible to it or inferable from it.

If mental life cannot be inferred from physical facts about a creature or vice-versa, a hyperplastic would have no use for concepts of belief, intention, or desire, for it would never be able to infer what it would believe or want from the physical or functional consequences a self-intervention. Nor would it be able to preclude that some mental state would be deleted by another self-modification since, assuming antireductionism, believing that Lima is capital of Peru or desiring to sail round the world, wishing it were Christmas, or similar such ‘intentional’ states are not reducible to the physical states on which they nonetheless depend. Thus, the common-sense or ‘folk’ psychology underlying our communal attachments would be effectively useless to hyperplastics.

The limit of functional autonomy, or of plasticity, then, is not an immortal superhuman but something infinitely capable yet refractory to our ideas about mind and meaning. An entity inciting comparisons with the disgustingly shapeless Shoggoths that Lovecraft depicts in his novella, *At the Mountains of Madness*, or maybe Cthulhu himself.10

As stated, hyperplasticity is an ideal limit, what is interesting is whether we can approach it. Significant hyperplasticity may not be possible in worlds like ours.

However, its introduction here is intended as salutary not demonstrative. To show that our conceptions of agency and subjectivity may be too parochial to travel far beyond our ecological niche. As a route to posthumanity, hyperplasticity would constitute an instance of what the deranged and deranging protagonists of R. Scott Bakker’s ultra-dark thriller *Neuropath* call the ‘semantic apocalypse’ – the point at which the scientific predilection to eliminate meaning in the nonhuman world completes itself by extirpating the kingdom of persons or moral subjects.11


If this, or an equivalent derangement of subjectivity and agency, is possible through disconnection, then bounded posthumanism is false and some regions of posthuman possibility space may be quite as weird as the ‘abysms of shrieking and immemorial lunacy’ hinted at in Lovecraft.

Before considering the implications of unbinding for our understanding of human-posthuman disconnection, I want to consider some complementary justifications for unbinding posthumanism with a lax as opposed to a stringent agency concept.

**Dark phenomenology**

The first justification is the thesis concerning ‘dark phenomena’. Dark phenomena are contents or structures of experience such that having them does not confer much or any understanding of them. For example, we seem to experience time as an open flow into the future. Many philosophers have thought that this flow is a condition (technically a ‘transcendental condition’) of experiencing objects and worlds. Phenomenologists like Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty have argued that we can grasp this structure in experience and thus understand the structure of objectivity in any world.

But, if temporality is dark, experiencing it is philosophically overrated. For example, although this flow seems continuous we cannot know it is continuous without analysing it at ever finer grains. This seems to be as much beyond our powers of attention and memory as remembering very fine differences in colour.

So, if lived time has the features it needs to give access to a world, its structure must elude us much as the fine structure of matter does. If so, how can we know it gives us worlds. How can we even know what a world is?

Doing phenomenology can’t tell us what phenomenology is or can do. Our capacity for self-reflection exposes us to the simulation of a subject whose utterly non-subjective nature is entirely inaccessible to it.13

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Dark pragmatism

The second plank of my argument for the opacity of agency is aimed at the widely shared post-Hegelian consensus that serious agency is constituted by participation in linguistic or cultural practices. We have already seen an example of this in Wennemann’s appeal to the reflexivity afforded by the social bond but it is a staple of analytical and continental thought, from Wittgenstein to Sellars, from Habermas to Brandom. Clearly, if this is true, then hyperplastic agency is a contradiction in terms (as, incidentally, is almost any kind of agency on the part of nonhuman animals). However, if it can be shown to be incomplete in its own terms then we no longer need assume that agency is exhausted by our manifest image of it.

Explaining subjectivity and agency in terms of shared practices requires a durable account of how certain behaviours get to be evaluable as practices. I’ve argued that the most plausible account is to claim that behaviours are evaluable wherever a competent interpreter would judge them to be so. 14

Unfortunately, this doubles subjectivity in such a way as to unbind it again. We have a first order subject accounted for by its participation in social practice. We have a second order, interpreter-subject presupposed but not explained by that first account. ‘[In] principle interpretability is ill-defined unless we have some conception of what is doing the interpreting’ or what their competence would involve.15

The common thread here is that bounding constraints invoke untamed ‘wild’ principles which cannot be regimented or reined in. This form of argument is inspired by Jacques Derrida’s method of deconstruction. His close readings of philosophers like Kant, Husserl, and J.L. Austin were designed to show that their claims about consciousness, form, or meaning required an excessive and conceptually antithetic element outside their systems. For example, meaning requires repeatable symbols. Derrida argues that such repetition only works if symbols can also be abused or misused. So, no symbol can be defined by fixed rules of use. Which is the same as saying there are no meanings, no semantic essences.16

15 Id., Posthuman Life, 128; Id., ‘Spectral Machines’, 111.
SP, deconstruction and The Philosophy of the Limit

Deconstruction is a form of what Drucilla Cornell refers to as ‘The Philosophy of the Limit’ (POL) – as is the afore-mentioned process of constraint peeling I call ‘unbinding’.

POL’s strip away the artificial constraints that make the world in our image, layer by layer, concept by concept. What remains, as in deconstruction, is something other than a world, and perhaps something more or less than philosophy, but an encounter with a remainder or non-meaning that philosophy cannot recognize or conceptualize.¹⁷

Reconsider the minimal agency model of unbound posthumanism. We should call this **Unbound Posthumanism I (UP1)** since yet more unbinding is necessary if we are to take this to the limit.

In **UP1** all agents are assumed self-maintaining. But what is it to maintain oneself in the most general sense? Is it a tendency to preserve a certain organic boundary or core temperature? Why assume that posthumans have fixed tolerances, state blankets, or operating parameters?

The extremum case of the hyperplastic suggests otherwise. Hyperplastics would lack structural invariance beyond the bare fact of hyperplasticity itself. They would not be self-maintaining in any sense that connects with the biological forms we know about. Above all, entertaining the possibility of a hyperplastic means thinking about agents we could not see, interpret or recognize as agents.

Can we even **think** of an agent that we cannot recognise as an agent?

The problem ramifies to a dilemma, or a conversation between monsters Philosophy Scylla and Philosophy Charybdis:

**Scylla** – the criteria for attributing agency do not apply to all agents since hyperplastics are unrecognizable as agents. Thus, the concept *agency* extends beyond our capacity to recognize instances of it.

**Charybdis** – Scylla, this seems absurd! How does any concept have an extension it is not applicable to? Being an agent must be coterminous with being recognizable as an one. Thus, hyperplastics would not count as agents according to first principles.

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However, opting for the whirlpool Charybdis does not save us from ruin if, as argued independently, the concept of agency can only be elucidated by some wild principle of subjectivity. We are simply left with quietist claims like ‘agents are the things we call agents relative to our background practices’. But appeal to some anthropological invariants, if such there are, is of no moment when, as with SP, we are considering the implications of the long-run eliminability of the human and, as with other posthumanists, contesting the limits and boundaries of the human. Yet, even SP in the form developed in Posthuman Life is not immune from this corrosion for unbinding arguments also threaten the ontological clarity of the disconnection thesis, not least by implying that the Wide Human system is just another reification of ‘us’, another tautological assertion of human privilege.

Non-Posthumanism

If unbinding is justified (and I’ve indicated that it can be), posthumanist philosophy is at an impasse; not only because the speculative concept of the posthuman is undetermined in advance (that we knew!) but because DT is even disconnected from principled ways of identifying disconnections when and where they occur. We thus move from the first form of unbound posthumanism (UP1) that is still informed by a determinate agency concept to the limit version in which the concept has become maximally indeterminate. (UP2)

Such indeterminacy also held of the standard formulation of speculative posthumanism. As we noted, DT doesn’t provide any information about posthumans. Even with UP1, the only way we can acquire substantive knowledge of posthuman lives is through an event of synthesis or engineering: making posthumans, becoming posthuman.

This, I think, is the ethical impasse of the posthuman, of modernity even. If we unbind the posthuman we cannot deliberate on becoming posthuman without pre-empting our deliberation. A ‘major’ or ‘state politics’ of disconnection is consequently impossible since the voices that will contribute to the decision cannot be fixed independently of challenging the very composition of voices, those with the right of decide.18

18 Roden, Posthuman Life, 179–82.
Posthuman prospects can be identified or evaluated only by bringing them about since that is the ideal knowledge state for such a political decision. As Steven Shaviro asks:

How can we come to terms with forms of ‘knowledge’ whose very effect is to change who ‘we’ are? How do we judge these disciplines, when they undermine, or render irrelevant, the very norms and criteria that we use to ground our judgments?19

**UP1** referred to an abstract event of technogenesis that could not be decided within any pre-existing ethics or politics precisely because only it could produce the conditions under which it could be retroactively assessed. What changes with **UP2** is that there is no longer a distinction between wide or narrow human or between wide human and posthuman to regiment its content.

However, the problem of pre-emption has not gone away – our fatal entanglement with a planetary technology that is *inhuman* not because it is made of metal and plastic or lithium or silicon, but because its totality is not compliant to norms. It is not even an autonomous monster ruled by impersonal principles of efficiency.20 Its hypertrophy is contrary to any end or transcendent order.

With this historical and semantic background in view, I want to enlist Derrida again by describing disconnection as ‘a differential function without an ontological basis’.21

This formulation, which originally applied to Derridean textuality, is intended to reaffirm the affinity I broached earlier between unbound posthumanism and POL.

Deconstruction, like other POLs, suspends philosophy’s assumption of sufficiency or competence, just as unbinding appears to *cede philosophy’s relation to futurity*.

In what remains of this paper, I hope to use this affinity or analogy to begin to rethink the relationship between **UP2** and the reality with which it is involved and thus help to understand the

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pull, ethical or otherwise, of the posthuman in a world of ramifying technics.

We can illustrate this with two of examples of Derridean terms that are drawn from the phenomenology of subjective time: *différance* and trace.

*Différance* (which utilizes the homonymy between the French verbs for differing and deferring) indicates a slippage between the now or present and an undetermined future. This present is always ‘vitiated’ by a *not yet* which undermines its stability. For example, the literal meaning or role of a word in a language depends on its history of use but also on the possibility of being affected by future decisions about use. However, subsequent uses and decisions, as in the legal interpretation of a constitutional notion such as the right to privacy, are not programmed by a prior system of rules, even if they are historically constrained or conditioned by them. Thus, in the linguistic case, *différance* is a condition of meaning which cannot be expressed in terms of meanings.

The ‘trace’ is another name for this susceptibility to modification or destruction through the passage to a new state. It is thus also a potentiality for memorization or return that is never betokened by determinate content. Again, it can also be interpreted libidinally as the inherent dynamism in desire, a deferral that can become indefinitely postponed through a relay of substitute objects or fetishes.

Both trace or *différance*, then, refer to a bending back (fold, *pli*) that can never be given and is thus inconceivable and unpresentable. They split and fold subjectivity irrevocably.

Since these structures are not experiencable, Derrida will re-use them to discuss other folds or splits in biological, linguistic, and social structures, not just minds. The account of the trace can thus be re-used beyond its origin to motivate a form of speculative materialism; a deconstruction of matter, if you will. For example, in his *Radical Atheism: Derrida and Time of Life*, Martin Hägglund reads the trace as the inherent destructibility of any material mark or entity. Nothing in time can be closeted in the now if it is not to be stuck in a changeless present. Everything is hollowed by ‘a relentless displacement in everything that happens’.

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23 Cornell, 148–9.
Différance and trace thus have a topic neutrality which slips beyond the field of subjectivity much as disconnection slips beyond the philosophy of the posthuman future.

However, even this extra-philosophical status is insufficiently radical as an analogy for the caesura between UP2 and philosophy. For unbinding gives us almost nothing other than the fact of technological pre-emption. Particularly, as the instance of the hyperplastic shows, it does not guarantee that this pre-emption can be understood in terms of the categories appropriate to subjectivity, such as meaning or the subjective time of conscious experience.

Différance and trace mark a simultaneous dependence upon unmeaning processes of alteration but do so in terms of the slippages, equivocations or blind spots these generate in meaning, intentionality, and experience. Or as François Laruelle, has suggested in his *Principle of Non-Philosophy*, deconstruction still abides within the assurance of philosophy’s ability to adequately grasp structures of meaning and temporality. Différance is an otherness that ‘protrudes from unity’. Its disunifying power thus reiterates the assumption of Philosophy’s sufficiency to grasp and order the real.\(^25\) Bakker poses this more clearly when he argues that deconstruction operates within a philosophical idiom that cannot theorize its own inability to understand its non-conceptual and non-phenomenological conditions – the conditions that I have glossed under the rubric of ‘dark phenomenology’:

One way to put Derrida’s point is that there is always some occluded context, always some integral part of the background, driving phenomenology. From an Anglo-American, pragmatic viewpoint, his point is obvious, yet abstrusely and extravagantly made: Nothing is given, least of all meaning and experience. What Derrida is doing, however, is making this point within the phenomenological idiom, ‘reproducing’ it, as he says in the quote. The phenomenology itself reveals its discursive impossibility.\(^26\)

However, as we have seen the legibility or the future and even the present are at issue in SP. Thus, the deconstructive argument for the necessity of trace or iterability on the grounds that they are conditions


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of legibility or consciousness is moot here. SP is an attempt to address the long-run implications of technological modernity which, unlike transhumanism, rejects the transcendent moral status of the human subject or person as well as any subject-like or language-like transcendental organizing principles. Thus, unbound posthumanism is immanentist in so far as it brackets hierarchical conceptions of this ‘long-run’ which deconstruction still appears to require.27

This context is incomplete or open because the planetary engine is non-purposive, counter-final, not a project. It voids itself without ever having an itself. This means that philosophies of technology, like the work of Benard Stiegler, which conceptualize technology primarily as a supplement to experience, memory, and meaning, a ‘primordial artefactuality of the spirit’ as he puts it, may still be too anthropocentric to appreciate the stake of the posthuman condition.28 Stiegler’s work begins with the Derridean idea that technics both supplements and supplants (alters) the subjective life to which it is added. But this ‘logic of supplementarity’ is still pitched as a division of presence; a displacement or division of the origin, whereas even the relevance of this displacement is not assured for SP.29

This implies a potentially instructive analogy with a second POL: Laruelle’s own Non-philosophy, of which a very inadequate sketch follows:

Non-philosophy goes further than deconstruction by suspending what Laruelle terms the ‘philosophical decision’, a term for any analysis of the real into form and content. For Laruelle, as we have seen, Derrida doesn’t abandon this mixture-making but treats the trace as yet another transcendent organising principle for the empirical field of non-philosophical entities.30

In contrast, Non-philosophy does not attempt to think or conceptualise the real at all. The real is no longer a topic or object of

30 Laruelle, 53–4.
enquiry – as is the case with traditional realism – but the medium in which all philosophical decisions operate. This is because it is radically autonomous and non-relational; not given ‘relative to Being, to the Other’ or to even thought itself. Thought can obviously think ‘about’ itself, as we are doing here but, for Laruelle, this is already operating ‘in-One’ (that is as radically autonomous or non-related) independently of interpretative decisions made by philosophies of thought such as idealism or realism.

Thus understood, thought is not bonded to the real by intentionality or semantics. Rather all varieties of thought are actuated by it in a unilateral relation of pure passivity. In this, as John Ó. Maoilearca has argued, all forms of thought are equal since there is no transcendent meta-thought that can organize the universe only a series of ‘clones’ or mutational variants generated by it.

Philosophy has no privileged status as a means of accessing the world in Non-philosophy. It is just another raw material for performances which could be artistic, political, erotic, poetic, or inhuman or posthuman, in a field devoid of anything beyond simulacra of transcendence – much as unbound posthumanism holds. Philosophy is a marionette dancing to strings suspended from an invisible point, like the ‘clown puppet’ apparition that reiterates for no reason, floating before the hapless narrator of Thomas Ligotti’s horror story of that name.

Using non-philosophy as a model, posthuman disconnection may be conceivable as an instance of the non-transcendental marionette or clone. Disconnection remains to be specified through production; immanently related as a precursor of ‘disconnection’, perhaps comparably to the twitter hashtag and the search options it generates. Posthumanism thus does not think a world. It composes one.

I think this (tentative) analogy between SP and NP may be fruitful insofar as it explains how the posthuman operates contingently through humans and nonhuman agents, a differing cloned through unbinding.

31 Ibid., 23.
32 Ibid., 27.
33 J.Ó. Maoilearca, All thoughts are equal: Laruelle and nonhuman philosophy (Minneapolis, 2015). One might cavil here. It’s far from clear that removing transcendental order suffices for equality. Maybe the democratic rhetoric of Non-Philosophy is inflated.