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THE FOURTH EUCHARISTIC PRAYER
A General Analysis of its Structure and Content
to appreciate its Ecclesiological Meaning

Hector M. Scerri*

Introduction: The Eucharistic Prayer — Climax and Heart of the Mass

In the General Instruction of the Roman Missal (1970), it is asserted that the Eucharistic prayer is the “climax and the very heart of the entire celebration [of the Mass], a prayer of thanksgiving and sanctification”.1 In fact, each of the Eucharistic prayers — whether present in the liturgy of the early Church or else introduced after the reforms of the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council — is a lyric proclamation “of what it means for the Church to celebrate the Eucharist”.2 On closer examination and upon meditation of the text of any Eucharistic prayer, one encounters the use of highly evocative language which is pregnant with Christological and ecclesiological meaning.

Eucharistic prayers are so structured as “to speak for and to the entire praying

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assembly".3 The celebration of the Eucharist by the liturgical assembly is indeed — as one reads in the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy of the Second Vatican Council — “... the principal manifestation of the Church ... [This] consists in the full, active participation of all God’s holy people in the same liturgical celebrations, especially in the same Eucharist, in one prayer, at one altar, at which the bishop presides, surrounded by his college of priests ...”4

Now, in the Eucharistic prayer — which as stated above is the very heart of the celebration of the Eucharist — the priest exhorts those who constitute the liturgical assembly to uplift their hearts to God “in praise and thanks, and associates them with himself in the prayer which he addresses to God the Father, through Jesus Christ, in the name of the whole community”.5 During this liturgical action, the whole gathered assembly — with the president at its head — unites itself with Christ in praising God’s wonderful deeds in salvation history and in offering sacrifice.6

The aim of this article is to study the ecclesiological content of the fourth Eucharistic prayer. The language in the liturgical text of this prayer will be put under scrutiny. This linguistic analysis points to many interesting nuances regarding the *ekklesia*. Particular phrases will be indicated which are very rich in meaning — a meaning which can sometimes be traced to Jewish meal practices, the early liturgy of the Church, or else, to the ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council. The dialogue with the liturgical assembly as well as the gestures used will be delved into. All these features will assist the reader in appreciating the fecundity of the various ecclesiological aspects intertwined within the fourth Eucharistic prayer.

1. *The Fourth Eucharistic Prayer: Genesis and Background*

Writing on the wide, far-reaching reform of the liturgy — as carried out to implement the changes advocated in the Second Vatican Council — Archbishop Annibale Bugnini (who was very involved in liturgical commissions and bodies at

5. *General Instruction of the Roman Missal*, n.54.
the Roman Curia from 1948 to 1975) asserts that "once euchological pluralism and rubrical flexibility had been rediscovered after centuries of fixism, it was unthinkable that a monolithic approach to the Eucharistic prayer should long endure".7

Soon after the end of the Second Vatican Council, the idea of composing new Eucharistic prayers gained ground. As one would expect, great prudence was exercised in this process, especially when considering the fact that the Roman Canon was the only Eucharistic prayer used in the West for centuries. In May 1966, the Consilium for the Implementation of the Constitution on the Liturgy, of which Bugnini was secretary, presented Pope Paul VI with a report explaining the endeavours carried out on the revision of the Rites of the Mass. It stated that if it were asked to compose new models for Eucharistic prayers, it would feel responsible "to see to it that any new prayer still displayed the Roman genius, so that the Roman Mass would continue to be faithful to the spirit of the Roman liturgy".8

When it was decided to compose new Eucharistic prayers, in-depth studies were made by liturgists and other scholars on early liturgical texts. The relators of the sub-committee for the fourth Eucharistic prayer were Joseph Gelineau and Cipriano Vagaggini. Paul VI suggested that anaphoras were to be sought from the vast richness of liturgical texts from both East and West. This proved to be very valuable in the composition of new Eucharistic prayers and helped "to emphasise the different aspects of the mystery of salvation, and to express a variety of motives for giving thanks to God".9

Initially, a proposal was considered of taking an Oriental anaphora in toto into the Latin Rite. One of the anaphoras of St Basil was seen as a likely text to carry out the proposal. Although this suggestion never materialised, one can still observe several similarities between the fourth Eucharistic prayer and the mentioned anaphora. The endeavour of composing new Eucharistic prayers was not short.

8. Ibid., 449.
Certain requirements had to be adhered to in order to retain a common structure for these prayers. Yet, while respecting a basic structure, each of the new Eucharistic prayers was to have its own “spiritual, pastoral, and stylistic characteristics”.

With regard to the fourth Eucharistic prayer which is being studied in this article, the study group in question attempted to satisfy the

“need for an anaphora in which the account of institution would be preceded by a leisurely but still summary exposition of the entire economy of salvation. To this end the preface had to limit itself to praising God in himself and for creation in general ... Then, after the Sanctus ... the anaphora would run through the economy from the creation of the human person down to Christ and Pentecost. All this means that in such an anaphora the preface cannot change ... but always remain the same. The result: Eucharistic prayer IV”.

Annibale Bugnini illustrates the mens underlying the fourth Eucharistic prayer. As indicated above, the main intention was “to develop the total picture of the economy of salvation on a much broader scale than in the other anaphoras”. Analysing this Eucharistic prayer, one can see that it has the form and structure of a Roman anaphora, yet it is blended with several characteristics which contribute to give it its Oriental tinge.

The resulting fourth Eucharistic prayer is hence very strongly scriptural in its images and language. In fact, such a broad exposition of the economy of salvation could be best done using scriptural language. The fourth Eucharistic prayer has its own preface which cannot be substituted. This is because what precedes and what follows the Sanctus together constitute a single unit describing the plan of
The Fourth Eucharistic Prayer

Salvation. The text of the Eucharistic prayer under study mentions the more significant moments of this divine plan — a panorama which is fulfilled in the Paschal mystery of Jesus Christ.

In the presentation of God's salvific plan, the text of the fourth Eucharistic prayer is clearly of the narrative type. Furthermore, the style used in this narrative is highly lyrical. The texts of the new Eucharistic prayers were promulgated by a decree of the Congregation of Rites, on May 23, 1968, and were first used on August 15, 1968.

The fourth Eucharistic prayer follows the Antiochene type of anaphoras very closely. As referred to above, it resembles one of the so-called anaphoras of St Basil, which can be traced back to the fourth century. The fourth Eucharistic prayer is hence often envisaged as being ecumenical in character, because in it, aspects which are characteristic of Oriental rites are seen to merge with the Latin milieu of the Western liturgy.

2. The Celebration of the Eucharist — An Ecclesial Act

Before delving into the fourth Eucharistic prayer, it is necessary to pause for a moment and recall briefly the qualities which are to characterize participation by the liturgical assembly. Participation is to be full, conscious and active. By being fully aware of what is taking place during the fourth Eucharistic prayer (and, for that matter, in every other liturgical celebration) — that is, by being aware of the depth of meaning in the language used, the gestures of the president, the

23. Cfr ibid., nn. 11; 14; 21; 50.
24. Cfr ibid., n. 11.
different postures at different moments, the interventions by the assembly (for example, in song) — each member of this assembly can truly take part with devotion and full collaboration.

Participation — both internal and external — is not only an individual or personal matter, but an action carried out as a community. This feature, coupled with all the above-mentioned characteristics, helps the faithful to be spiritually enriched by participation in the celebration. The mode of participation by members of the assembly differs according to their respective ministry in the Church. This helps us to understand why the presence and active participation of the faithful clearly manifests the ecclesial nature of the Eucharist. The whole assembly — with Christ at its centre and the ministers manifesting his presence — is the subject of the liturgical celebration. In the celebration of the Eucharist, "the unity of the faithful is effected and symbolized: they constitute one body in Christ". This is seen more clearly in the Eucharistic prayer itself where it is the one and holy Catholic Church present and made manifest in every local Church which enters into dialogue with God. It is in this light that we can appreciate better the celebration of the Eucharist as signum unitatis and vinculum caritatis. This will now be illustrated with reference to the fourth Eucharistic prayer.

27. Cfr ibid., n. 19.
30. Cfr ibid., n. 11.
31. Cfr ibid., n. 14; 26; 28; General Instruction of the Roman Missal, n. 58.
33. Cfr Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church Lumen Gentium, n. 3.
34. Cfr ibid., n. 23; Eucharistiae Participationem, n. 11.
3. *Un “nous” ecclésial*

Paul De Clerck talks of the use of the first person plural in the Eucharistic prayers, what he calls *un nous ecclésial*. This helps to convey a sense of the *ekklesia* which is assembled to celebrate the Eucharist. De Clerck asserts that “the subject of the Eucharistic prayer is the People of God gathered for the celebration; like all liturgical prayer, it is formulated in the first person plural, in an ecclesial *we*”.36 One can understand the celebrating *ekklesia* under three senses, which can be envisaged concentrically: (i) the universal Church; (ii) the particular local Church; (iii) the concrete here-and-now gathering for worship. These senses can be rightly applied to all the instances where the *nous ecclésial* features.

A careful examination of the fourth Eucharistic prayer indicates that the personal pronoun *we* is used twelve times as the subject of an action-verb. For ten times, it is used by the priest, who presiding “in the person of Christ ... over the assembly ... [addresses prayers to God] ... in the name of the entire holy people and of all present”.37 The use of the first person plural, instead of the singular, helps to emphasize the sacramental action of the priest as an ecclesial gesture. Hence, the assembly can really associate itself with the presidential prayers. The ecclesial *we* is used to express thanksgiving, praise, the assembly’s *confessio*, celebration and offering.

- **Thanksgiving:**
  
  “...it is right *we* should give you thanks and glory”. (Preface)

- **Praise:**

  “... *we* too praise your glory...” (Preface)

  “... *we* shall sing your glory...” (Intercessions)


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- **Confessio:**
  "Father, we acknowledge your greatness". (Post-Sanctus)
  "... We proclaim your death, Lord Jesus..." (Memorial acclamation)
  "We recall Christ’s death..." (Anamnesis)

- **Celebration:**
  "... as we celebrate the great mystery..." (Epiclesis I)
  "Father, we now celebrate this memorial of our redemption". (Anamnesis)

- **Offering:**
  "... we offer you his body and blood..." (Anamnesis)
  "Lord, remember those for whom we offer this sacrifice..." (Intercessions)

- **Other actions:**
  "... that we might live no longer for ourselves..." (Post-Sanctus)
  "When we eat this bread and drink this cup..." (Memorial acclamation)

This reflection on the *nous ecclésial* helps one to appreciate better the fact “that because the Eucharistic prayer is the prayer of the Church, it belongs to the whole community and not exclusively to the priest”. This does not detract from the presidential prayer “precisely because it is the prayer of the Church”, and so it is led by the head of the community, namely the bishop or his representative, who proclaims the Eucharistic prayer in the name of the whole community.

4. **An Appreciation of the Ecclesiological Meaning of the Fourth Eucharistic Prayer: An Analysis of its Form and Structure**

Some of the aspects which shall be discussed in this section of the article are common to the other Eucharistic prayers. Such features include the Introductory Dialogue, the *Sanctus*, the Memorial Acclamation, the Intercessions and the

39. Ibid.
40. Cfr *Sacrosanctum Concilium*, nn. 41; 42.
Doxology. Nonetheless, the fourth Eucharistic prayer shall be treated in toto, in order to appreciate the full ecclesiological content and nuances present in the celebration of this anaphora.

4.1 The Introductory Dialogue

It has already been pointed out that the Eucharistic prayer is said “nomine totius communitatis” and that it belongs to the whole community. This is made clear from the very start when, in the Introductory Dialogue, the priest invites the members of the assembly to associate themselves with him in the celebration of the Eucharistic prayer. The assembly’s responses during the dialogue function as “the assembly’s assent to the president’s request to pray in their name”. Furthermore, the dialogue — as the other parts of the Eucharistic prayer — are in the plural “which presumes a gathered community”.

In this dialogue, one notes the spiritual relationship between the priest and the assembly. The former urges the gathered faithful “to adopt the spiritual attitude ... [necessary] ... for the prayer of thanksgiving”. Even the priest’s gesture accompanying the words “The Lord be with you” is indeed an important and expressive sign. In outstretching his fore-arms, this gesture by the president helps to express “the mental attitude and dispositions ... and enhances” the sense of the ekklesia. Not only is this a gesture of invitation, but it can be seen as a gesture whereby the president is “embracing” the whole assembly.

In the triple invitation and the triple response which takes place in the dialogue, one observes a crescendo. The verbal sequence employed in this gradual build-up helps to unite the assembly as one body, as the climax and heart of the celebration

42. Ibid.
of the Eucharist is reached. After the first response by the assembly, the president urges the assembly to adopt the proper spiritual attitude and disposition for the celebration. Then the priest exhorts the faithful “Lift up your hearts”, the response being “We lift them up to the Lord”. The heart here refers to humanity in its totality. The ekklesia is then urged to give thanks to God.

The final response (“It is right to give him thanks and praise”) is indeed significant. Its remote origins will be discussed below. This response⁴⁹ is “the high point of the dialogue”.⁵⁰ The ekklesia is with the Lord, whose presence is symbolized by the priest who has received the Spirit of the Lord in his ordination. In the light of what has been discussed above, it is important that the assembly’s responses be real acclamations. The invitations of the president are to create the desired attention and active participation on the part of the assembly.⁵¹ The dialogue also serves to forge a bond of communion between the priest (and the concelebrants if present) and the remainder of the assembly.⁵² This is enhanced if the dialogue is sung, because the assembly’s prayer is done in harmony, as a body.

### 4.2 The Preface

In the Preface, the priest “in the name of all the People of God, offers praise and thanksgiving to God the Father for the whole work of redemption”.⁵³ It should be noted that a philological analysis of the term *preface* does not primarily refer to the fact that this prayer is situated at the beginning of the anaphora, as a prologue to it, and *preceding* what follows. Rather, the term *praefatio* refers to a solemn announcement, a prayer *spoken before* the people, a prayer in the presence of the

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⁴⁹. It is interesting to note this response in other translations. The Latin original is “Dignum et iustum est”. One notes a different emphasis from that found in the English translation, due to the use of two adjectives: “È cosa buona e giusta” (Italian); “Cela est juste et bon” (French); “Es justo y necesario” (Spanish); “Das ist würdig und recht” (German).


people. Johannes Hermans goes on to assert that "it is evident that the word preface is used to refer to a public prayer, which is proclaimed loudly. One is praying ‘in front of the people’ and ‘in front of God’; the pre here conveys the idea of space".

The high ecclesial significance of the preface is hence understood by referring to the proclamatory and public nature of this prayer of thanksgiving. In the fourth Eucharistic prayer, the preface — which is a fixed one — inaugurates the account of God's plan for creation, which is continued in the Post-Sanctus. Reference is made in the preface to the attributes of God and the vastness and beauty of the cosmos. A deep sense of thanksgiving is clearly evident, use being made of the ecclesial we and the first person plural: "... it is right that we should give you thanks ... We too praise your glory".

It is appropriate to stop and meditate on the opening words of the Preface: "Father in heaven, it is right that we should give you thanks and glory". The Latin original states: "Vere dignum est tibi gratias agere, vere iustum est te glorificare, Pater sancte". The Italian translation states: "È veramente giusto renderti grazie, è bello cantare la tua gloria, Padre santo". The vere dignum ("It is right") is intimately linked with the third response by the assembly in the preceding dialogue. It is a further invitation by the president to the assembly so that it may join in prayer and thanksgiving. The idea conveyed by vere dignum is found in the Shema in the Hebrew morning prayer. The same meaning can be traced to the Greek polis when the local assembly uttered the word axios (which means dignum est) as an acclamation of consent. Hence, the remotest origins of the phrase portray a vivid idea of an assembled gathering whose members are united in their acclaim. This helps one appreciate the pregnant ecclesial sense behind the phrase as used today in the preface.

55. Author's translation of Hermans, ibid., 314: "È evidente che la parola prefazio viene usata per indicare la preghiera pubblica, a voce alta. Si prega 'davanti al popolo' e 'davanti a Dio'; il pre ha qui un significato spaziale..."
57. Cfr ibid., 318.
Addressing God as “Father in heaven” or “Pater sancte” recalls the Johannine text of the prayer of Jesus on the eve of his passion. The use of this term helps to bring out the idea of the adoptive sonship of the Christian faithful.\(^\text{58}\) The notion of a common sonship is linked to the concept of the \textit{ekklesia}, in the light of the Pauline text which states: “As you are sons, God has sent into our hearts the Spirit of his Son crying ‘Abba, Father’” (Gal 4,6). In the Preface, the assembly contemplates God the Creator in himself and in his works, and proclaims his greatness and his sanctity.\(^\text{59}\) This helps to explain the fixed nature of the preface of the fourth Eucharistic prayer, so that together with the text of the Post-Sanctus, it forms an uninterrupted \textit{corpus} of the history of salvation.

The conclusion of the Preface offers also a brief comment on the different nuances conveyed by different translations. The English text states: “United with them (i.e. the angels), and in the name of every creature under heaven, we too praise your glory as we say...”. The Latin text states: “Cum quibus et nos et, per nostram vocem, omnis quae sub caelo est creatura nomen tuum in exultatione confitemur, canentes ...”. The Italian is expressed as follows: “Insieme con loro anche noi, fatti voce di ogni creatura, esultanti cantiamo ...”.

The idea of unity in praise with the heavenly choirs is expressed clearly in the English translation, “\textit{united} with them”, and also in the Italian, “\textit{insieme} con loro”. The original Latin simply resorts to using \textit{cum}, followed by the ablative to express the same notion, without however mentioning unity at all. Yet, this seems to be made up for by the pregnant phrase “per nostram vocem”. Even the Italian text is very condensed when it states “noi, fatti voce di ogni creatura”. In other words, paraphrasing the Latin and the Italian texts one can say that the uttered praise embodies the praise and the glory of all the cosmos. According to Enrico Mazza, “this phrase condenses the doxological vocation of all creation. ... All creation celebrates the greatness of the Lord by means of man who becomes its synthesis and interpreter”.\(^\text{60}\)

60. Author’s translation of Mazza, \textit{Le odierne preghiere eucaristiche}, 200: “Questa frase condensa la vocazione doxologica di tutto il creato ... Tutto il creato celebra la grandezza del Signore attraverso l’uomo che ne è diventato la sintesi, l’interprete”.
In the English translation, the embodiment of the praise of creation is, in a way, slightly diluted by attributing to man a vicarious role: "in the name of every creature ... we too praise your glory ...". In the Latin and Italian versions, we not only praise God in the name of every creature, but even more than that: we become the very voice and mouthpiece of every creature. Man, therefore, has the important role "to become one with creation and the cosmos in order to be its voice in a continuous hymn of praise to God". 61 This notion widens the ecclesial nature of the Preface, and makes the assembly's prayer extend its arms wider, in order to embrace all creation. A note of joy is evident in the conclusion of the Preface, especially by the terms "in exsultatione" (Latin) and "esultanti" (Italian), which convey a deeper sense of rejoicing than the English "we too praise your glory". The sentiment here is not only one of praise, but furthermore, one of deep joy, rejoicing and celebration. Such a feeling helps to cement together the celebrating assembly in its hymn of joy, thanksgiving and praise to God.

4.3 The Sanctus

The theme of praise and thanksgiving continues in the Sanctus. This is probably the oldest section of the Eucharistic prayer to be proclaimed by the liturgical assembly.62 This prayer is highly scriptural in origin, a "collage" of biblical texts.63 Its biblical content, coupled with the fact that it is introduced by the closing phrase of the Preface, is a strong indication that the Sanctus was intended "as the Eucharistic assembly's joining in the song of all creation in praise of God".64 This acclamation is indeed "an integral part of the Eucharistic prayer itself" and directly involves the members of the assembly in their celebration of the Eucharist.66 Participation is enhanced when the Sanctus is sung.67 The singing helps the various biblical concepts to sink into the minds of the members of the praying assembly, and fosters the unity of the communal action.68

61. Author's translation of ibid., 201: "... di immedesimarsi nella natura e nel cosmo per esserne la voce in un inno continuo di lode a Dio".
63. Cfr Mazza, Le odierne preghiere eucaristiche, 203.
64. Ibid., 116.
65. General Instruction of the Roman Missal, n. 55b.
68. Cfr Sacred Congregation of Rites, Instruction on Music in the Liturgy Musicam Sacram, n. 16; General Instruction of the Roman Missal, n. 15.
The sense of the *ekklesia* is strengthened by the following attitudes of prayer, all present in the *Sanctus*:

- **Adoration**: “Holy, holy, holy Lord”.

- **Confessio**: a solemn acknowledgement of the divine attributes: “God of power and might”.

- **Praise**: “Heaven and earth are full of your glory”.

- **Acclamation**: “Blessed is he who comes in the name of the Lord”.

- **Petition**: “Hosanna”, which means ‘Save us, Lord!’ This is envisaged as a petition to God to accept the assembly’s thanksgiving for his saving power.  

By joining in the singing of the *Sanctus* the assembly is united in the heavenly praise given to God. This form of participation owed its earliest origin to the service of the synagogue by the Jews. In order to conclude the prayer of blessing uttered by the president of the synagogue assembly, the Jews who were present sung a similar hymn based on Isaiah 6,3 (“Holy, holy, holy is Yahweh Sabaoth. His glory fills the whole earth”).

Reflecting upon the impact of the *Sanctus* in the Eucharistic prayer, Dennis Smolarski observes that here the assembly “is joining in a praise of the Father which is even wider than the Church on earth”. Furthermore, the eschatological thrust of the *Sanctus* (“heaven and earth” joined in praise) helps one to appreciate the fact that the celebrating *ekklesia* is in “union with the Church throughout the ages” — in other words, one here refers to the *pilgrim Church*, as described in chapter VII of Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, *Lumen Gentium*. In the latter, one reads that “it is especially in the sacred liturgy that our union with the heavenly Church is best realized ... [and] ... when ... we celebrate the eucharistic sacrifice we are most closely united to the worship of the heavenly Church”.

71. *Ibid*.
72. Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church *Lumen Gentium*, n. 50.
4.4 The Post-Sanctus

This prayer is one of praise to the Father for his plan of salvation. In fact, one encounters an account of humanity within the history of salvation — an anamnesis of salvation. Focus is made on the alliance between God and humanity, reference being made to the latter’s infidelity throughout the ages, and to redemption “in the fullness of time”.

In the Post-Sanctus of the fourth Eucharistic prayer, one encounters a number of phrases which are of ecclesiological significance. The opening words — “Father, we acknowledge your greatness” (Confitemur tibi, Patre sancte) — refer to the public praise which was part and parcel of the Jewish thanksgiving or todah. The ekklesia here thanks God for his marvellous plan of salvation. The phrase “... but helped all men to seek and find you” is indeed significant because it reflects the ecclesiology of Vatican II. All men are called to salvation. Recalling also St Paul’s speech in the Areopagus (“... and, by feeling their way towards him, succeed in finding him” [Acts 17,27]) and the prophet Jeremiah (“When you search for me, you will find me; when you search wholeheartedly for me...” [Jer 29,13]), reference is being made to “those who, through no fault of their own, do not know the Gospel of Christ or the Church, but who nevertheless seek God with a sincere heart”.

Reference is made to the mission of Jesus (Lk 4,18), especially when the outcasts of society are mentioned. Indirect reference is then made to the Church instituted by Christ: “... he sent the Holy Spirit from you, Father, as his first gift to those who believe ...”. One hence observes, in the fourth Eucharistic prayer, a movement from the proclamation of the Paschal mystery of Christ to the sacramental presence of the Church.

77. Lumen Gentium, n. 16. Cfr Schnitzler, I tre nuovi canoni, 121.
4.5 The Epiclesis (I) and the Institution Narrative

During the Epiclesis, the priest, on behalf of the assembled community, asks the Father so that the Holy Spirit may sanctify the offerings which have been brought to the altar by members of this same community, so that they may become the Body and the Blood of Jesus Christ. As stated earlier, the priest uses the first person plural, we — “as we celebrate the great mystery” — and so associates the whole ekklesia in the celebration of the sacrament of the Eucharist. The whole ekklesia, with Christ at its head, is the subject of the celebration of the Eucharist. The words addressed by Jesus to his disciples at the Last Supper are now addressed by the priest, acting in persona Christi, to the liturgical assembly: “Take this, all of you...” One also hears the very evocative phrases: “my body which will be given up for you” and “shed for you and for all men”.

4.6 The Memorial Acclamation and the Memorial Prayer

The Memorial Acclamation “succinctly commemorates the triple aspect of the Paschal mystery” — Christ’s death, resurrection and parousia. There are a number of possible acclamations. The ecclesial we can be observed in the formula “When we eat this bread and drink this cup, we proclaim your death, Lord Jesus, until you come in glory”. This is based on 1 Cor 11,26. According to Burkhard Neunheuser, these acclamations constitute a precious enrichment to the celebration of the Eucharist, and also offer an active participation by the assembly, more so if they are sung. The references to the Parousia (“Christ will come again”; “Lord Jesus, come in glory”; “until you come in glory”) help the assembly to reflect upon the eschatological image of the pilgrim Church, as described in the previous section. The standing posture of the assembly signifies a people redeemed and free, a people whose hearts are imbued with eschatological hope.

In the Memorial Prayer, the presider, on behalf of the ekklesia, prays to the Father. He states that the gathered assembly has been obedient to the command given by Christ, “Do this in memory of me”. The triple aspect of the Paschal mystery is also recalled in this prayer. Another point worthy of mention is that part of the

79. Smolarski, Eucharistia, 63.
text of the Memorial Prayer which describes the sacrifice of the Eucharist as that "which brings salvation to the whole world". Francis Sullivan refers to this dimension.\textsuperscript{81} The fruits of the celebration of the Eucharist are not restricted to the Church, but its benefits reach the whole of humanity. The underlying stratum is hence one which depicts an outward-looking Church: in other words, not a Church apart from the world, but a Church \textit{in} the world, a Church \textit{for the life of the world}, a Church whose presence and action in the world is akin that of leaven in the dough.

4.7 \textbf{Epiclesis (II)}

A beautiful prayer, based on 1 Cor 10,16-22, is made to God that the Holy Spirit may bring unity in the Church. For Aidan Kavanagh, this epiclesis is primarily a prayer of unity with the Father and with each other through Jesus Christ. Having recalled the \textit{mirabilia Dei} and responded in acclamation to this "good news", the \textit{ekklesia} prays that all who participate in the Eucharistic meal may be united together in the Holy Spirit.\textsuperscript{82} The Holy Spirit is envisaged as the source of fellowship (\textit{koinonia}) within the Christian community which celebrates the Eucharist.\textsuperscript{83} Writing from within an Oriental milieu, Pavel Evdokimov asserts that the Epiclesis is a \textit{Eucharistic Pentecost} which invokes and expresses the action of the Holy Spirit not only on the bread and the wine (which become the Body and the Blood of Christ) but furthermore, in the members of the celebrating assembly.\textsuperscript{84} According to Max Thurian, while the Epiclesis before consecration leads to the sacramental epiphany of Christ at the consecration of the bread and the wine, so this second Epiclesis achieves "a sacramental epiphany of the Church".\textsuperscript{85}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{81} Cfr Francis A. Sullivan, \textit{Salvation Outside the Church?}, (Paulist Press; New York – Mahwah, New Jersey 1992) 160.
\item \textsuperscript{82} Cfr Aidan Kavanagh, "Thoughts on the Roman Anaphora", \textit{Worship} 39 (1965) 528-529; 40 (1966) 5-8.
\item \textsuperscript{83} Cfr John H. McKenna, "The Eucharistic Epiclesis in Twentieth Century Theology (1900-1966)", \textit{Ephemerides Liturgicae} 90 (1976) 320; Scerri, \textit{Koinonia, Diakonia and Martyria}, 134-137.
\item \textsuperscript{84} Cfr Pavel Evdokimov, \textit{L'Orthodoxie}, (Delachaux et Niestlé; Paris – Neuchâtel 1959) 249-251.
\item \textsuperscript{85} Cfr Max Thurian, "La théologie des nouvelles prières eucharistiques", \textit{La Maison-Dieu} 94 (1968) 91; 100-101.
\end{itemize}
This second Epiclesis brings about communion between the members of the assembly, this communion being sacramentally realized when the faithful partake in the Body and Blood of Christ. A strengthening of the bonds of koinonia takes place. Therefore, the most important fruit of the presence of the Holy Spirit is the unity of all those who eat the Body and drink the Blood of Christ. The unity of the Church is the underlying tenet of this second Epiclesis.

4.8 The Intercessions

The Intercessory prayers in the Eucharistic prayer “express the truth that the Eucharist is celebrated in union with the whole Church, in heaven and on earth”. The Pope’s name is mentioned, thus recalling universal unity in the Catholic Church. The bishop’s name is also mentioned: the bishop is a sign of unity in the local Church, and of unity between the various particular Churches scattered all over the world. The ecclesiological reference can be seen to be in continuation with the theme of unity in the Church, mentioned in the second Epiclesis. What one first encounters in these intercessions is a list of members of the hierarchy in descending order. At the end of the list, “all your people” (cfr 1 Pt 2,10) is included in the text. Commenting on the composition of the intercessions from an ecclesiological point of view, the text seems to place the Pope, the bishops and the clergy apart from the remained of the People of God. It might have been more appropriate had “all your people” preceded the hierarchy, hence putting the intercessions more in harmony with the vision of the Church as expressed in Lumen Gentium.

On the other hand, a very positive ecclesiological point is present in the text of the fourth Eucharistic prayer. One encounters the following words: “Remember those who take part in this offering, those here present and all your people, and all who seek you with a sincere heart”. Francis Sullivan asserts that “the ‘people’ and

89. General Instruction of the Roman Missal, n. 55g.
‘all who seek you’ are undoubtedly the Christians and the non-Christians, for both of whom the Eucharist is offered”. 93 This phrase indicates that the “horizon” of prayer in the intercessions is not limited just to within the Catholic fold, but embraces the whole of humanity. 94 Therefore, besides expressing “the concern of the local community for the more universal community of Christians”, 95 these intercessions are ecumenical 96 and outward-looking in that the ekklesia prays for those who “seek God with a sincere heart, and ... his will as they know it through the dictates of their conscience”. 97

One can also reflect upon another intercession: “Remember those who have died in the peace of Christ and all the dead whose faith is known to you alone”. This last phrase refers to all the members of the human family “who never had the opportunity to profess their faith with the Christian community, and yet arrived at saving faith through the grace which the Holy Spirit offered to them”. 98 This is a reminder of the text of the Pastoral Constitution of Vatican II on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes which states that “the Holy Spirit offers everyone the possibility of sharing in this paschal mystery in a manner known to God (modo Deo cognito)”. 99 Sullivan states that these intercessions in the fourth Eucharistic prayer are fully in line with the ecclesiological doctrine of the Second Vatican Council which they reflect. 100 Hence, one can rightly say that both the mens and the vision of Vatican II on the Church as universal sacrament of salvation, as well as the missionary spirit animating the Council, exercised a very positive influence on the composition of the intercessions of the fourth Eucharistic prayer. 101

93. Sullivan, Salvation Outside the Church?, 160.
95. Smolarski, Eucharistia, 84.
97. Lumen Gentium, n. 16.
98. Sullivan, Salvation Outside the Church?, 160.
99. Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium et Spes, n. 22.
100. Cfr Sullivan, Salvation Outside the Church?, 160.
4.9 The Doxology and the Final Amen

The Eucharistic prayer ends with an expression of praise to the Holy Trinity. The doxology is emphasised by the assembly’s acclamation, “Amen”. James Dallen states that “like the Introductory Dialogue and the Sanctus, the Doxology of the Eucharistic prayer has been fairly invariable” in liturgical texts throughout the centuries. Similar to what is found in the Jewish berakah, it entails “a return to the theme of praise and thanks and sets a seal on this dominant eucharistic theme”. The assembly intervenes in its acclamation, Amen, thus enhancing the ecclesial aspect by forging stronger bonds within the ekklesia. The acclamation denotes the congregation’s agreeing to, and sharing in, what has been carried out throughout the whole Eucharistic prayer. Dallen asserts that this “ratification of the whole Eucharistic prayer by the congregation is the oldest and most basic form of congregational participation in prayer”. It also helps to signify “the people’s share in the offering”.

Joseph Gelineau holds that the assembly’s active participation in this Amen should bring out the fact that it is the most important Amen in the celebration of the Eucharist. It is also called the “Great Amen”; all other responses by the assembly are therefore secondary, when compared to this solemn proclamation “which sums up and affirms the entire preceding prayer”. This emphasis is enhanced by singing the Amen in polyphony or by being repeated. There are many ways in which this can be achieved, for example, by the musical composition of an Amen which includes “a crescendo in its intensity and in its choral nature”. This helps the celebrating assembly to understand that the Doxology is, in a way, a synthesis of the whole Eucharistic prayer. Furthermore, by saying (or singing) “Per ipsum, et cum ipso et in ipso”, the president is affirming that Christ involves all humanity in his praise to the Father. “In unitate” helps recall that it is the whole Church — gathered and

102. General Instruction of the Roman Missal, n. 55h.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
109. Author’s translation of ibid.: “... un crescendo della sua intensità e della sua coralità”.
united in communion by the Holy Spirit — which is celebrating this meal of thanksgiving and praise.\footnote{111}

5. Conclusion

This article has studied \textit{per longum et per latum} several features which constitute the fourth Eucharistic prayer. A number of these aspects can also be found in other anaphoras. Yet, it is worth recalling the distinctive features of the ecclesiology underlying the fourth Eucharistic prayer. The panorama of the whole economy of salvation is indeed particular to it. Furthermore, the outward-looking ecclesiology present in the Post-\textit{Sanctus} and the intercessions is highly particular to the anaphora under study. Reference to those “who ... do not know the Gospel of Christ or his Church, but who nevertheless seek God with a sincere heart”\footnote{112} is very significant.

Francis Sullivan, as already pointed out, asserts that the new Eucharistic prayers composed after Vatican II reflect the latter’s doctrine. Their texts, he states, “make it clear that the Eucharist is offered not only for the Christian faithful,”\footnote{113} but for all humanity. Regarding the fourth Eucharistic prayer, Sullivan refers to the significant phrases in the text which point markedly to contemporary ecclesiology, and the relationship of members of other religious traditions to the mystery of Christ.

A Eucharistic prayer reflects the faith of the Church. In fact, with every anaphora the \textit{lex credendi} is made evident in the \textit{lex orandi} of the \textit{ekklesia}.\footnote{114} This has been studied with special reference to the ecclesiological tenets of the fourth Eucharistic prayer. This ecclesiology is coloured with the dialogue between the Church and the world\footnote{115} — the dialogue which is so much at the heart of the Second Vatican Council.

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\footnote{111}{Cfr Hermans, \textit{La celebrazione dell'eucaristia}, 343.}  
\footnote{112}{\textit{Lumen Gentium}, n. 16.}  
\footnote{113}{Sullivan, \textit{Salvation Outside the Church?}, 159.}  
\footnote{114}{Cfr Luca Brandolini, “Le nuove preghiere eucaristiche (rassagena bibliografica)”, \textit{Ephemerides Liturgicae} 83 (1969) 281; Scerri, \textit{Koinonia, Diakonia and Martyria}, 165.}  
\footnote{115}{Cfr Brandolini, “La IV preghiera eucaristica”, 603.}
"YOU CANNOT PICK GRAPES FROM THORNS":
Saint Augustine's imagery – archaelogical evidence and spiritual meaning.

Rev. Prof. Hubertus DROBNER

1. Grapes and thorns

"You cannot pick grapes from thorns" – we are all well acquainted with this image taken from the New Testament that has become proverbial over the centuries. We hear it and take its meaning for granted and even use it in our daily language seemingly in exactly the same way as Jesus first coined it according to the testimony of the gospels: "Beware of false prophets, who come to you in sheep as clothing

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In 1998, Prof. Drobner was invited to deliver the IV Annual St.Augustine Lecture at the University of Malta in collaboration with the Foundation For Theological Studies of the Archdiocese of Malta and the Maltese Augustinian Province. The Lecture was founded in 1994 and is coordinated by the Rev. Dr. Salvino Caruana OSA, STHD, Lecturer in Patristics at the Faculty of Theology of the University of Malta. This is one of four lectures delivered in 1998.
but inwardly are ravenous wolves. You will know them by their fruits. Are grapes gathered from thorns, or figs from thistles? So every sound tree bears good fruit, but the bad trees bears evil fruit. A sound tree cannot bear evil fruit, nor can a bad tree good fruit. Every tree that does not bear good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire. Thus you will know them by their fruits.”

“For no good tree bears bad fruit, nor again does a bad tree bear good fruit, for each tree is known by its own fruit. For figs are not gathered from thorns, nor are grapes picked from a bramble bush. The good man out of the good treasure of his heart produces good, and the evil man out of his evil treasure produces evil, for out of the abundance of the heart his mouth speak.”

But as it happens with most of the things we automatically take for granted in our lives, the very moment we stop to reflect upon them they no longer seem so self-evident as they appeared to us before. Who in the world would ever hit on the idea to go to a thornbush and look for grapes? No one, of course. Is this image, therefore, simply meant to illustrate the absurdity of the enterprise? But then, why thorns and grapes, why not other comparisons like milk from a bull or healing from a weapon? Because - you would immediately answer - this very image transported best the message Jesus wanted his listeners to understand. This image must have meant something to his hearers.

And with that we touch the very core, the very essence of an image without which it neither makes sense nor will it work. It needs must relate to the experience of the audience. An image people do not automatically connect to their known world cannot be understood. Imagine you tell someone “You cannot pick grapes from thorns” who in his life has never seen neither bramble bushes nor vineyards, he will have no possibility at all to “make head or tail of it” - to put it in another metaphor that only makes sense to us because we know animals with heads and tails and know that they are only complete with both of them attached.

That is, someone who does not know the actual surroundings from which an image is taken, will either not understand it at all or misunderstand it or comprehend it only partially. And saying that I speak of ourselves. Already the fact that hearing

3. Lk 6,43–45.
the gospel say “You cannot pick grapes from thorns” we have to ask “Who in the world would ever hit on the idea to go to a thornbush and look for grapes?” shows that we ourselves are too far removed from the world it comes from as to understand it without explanation.

Let us turn to St. Augustine to get an explanation (s. 340A, 10). “Here is another comparison for you to consider. Don’t gather grapes from thorns; after all it is impossible for grapes to be produced from thorns. But haven’t you noticed vine shoot getting into a hedge as it grows, and entwining itself in the thorns, and putting forth buds among the thorns, and producing bunches of grapes? You are hungry, and you are walking past, and you see a bunch hanging among the thorns; you don’t do anything, you don’t pick it. You are hungry and you want to pick it. Pick it then; stretch out your hand carefully and attentively; beware of the thorns, pick the fruit. In the same way, too, when a bad or worthless man speaks the teaching of Christ to you, listen to it, accept it, do not ignore it. If he is a bad man, the thorns are his; if he says good things, it is the bunch hanging among the thorns, it is not growing from the thorns.”

So then, if you are hungry, pick it, but watch out for the thorns. You see, if you begin to imitate his deeds while gladly listening to him, you have been careless in stretching out your hand; you have encountered the thorns before reaching the fruit. You emerge wounded, you emerge scratched and torn. The fruit coming from the grape is now no use to you, but the thorns, springing from their own proper root, are doing you damage. Notice, I mean to avoid being misled, where you have picked the fruit from; it is a vine branch. Keep your eyes on the branch, and see how it belongs to the vine, comes from the vine, proceeds from the vine, but encounters the thorns. So the vine does not have to draw back its branches, does it? In the same way too, the doctrine of Christ, as it has grown and made progress, has entwined itself with good trees, entwined itself with bad thorns. It is spoken by the good, spoken by the bad. It is for you to notice where the fruit comes from. Where what feeds you springs from, and where what pricks you springs from. They are mixed together in public appearance, but distinct from each other in their roots.”

So, “Who in the world would ever hit on the idea to go to a thornbush and look for

grapes?" Someone who is used to the fact that vineyards are surrounded by bramble bushes as fences in order to protect them from wild animals and the entry of unauthorised persons. But the branches of the vines growing next to the thorny hedges happen to entwine themselves with the branches of the thorn bushes so that to a fortuitous passerby it may seem as if the grapes stem from the brambles. A close inspection, however, will confirm the general experience that of course grapes only grow on vines and never on bramble bushes. It is an accidental outward appearance, but well known to the people Augustine is talking to: “But haven’t you noticed …?”

This example of our reading or hearing ancient texts from the Bible or the Fathers of the Church using the imagery of their times, but not really understanding them fully while we are thinking to do so, constitutes rather a general phenomenon, caused by the fact that we do not longer live in the very same world those images come from. We have to make an effort to understand the ancient world in detail in order to understand its imagery fully – an effort we rarely undertake because we usually only look at the spiritual meaning of an image without asking for its actual background. But without that we do not fully realize the spiritual meaning either as Augustine’s or other Church Fathers’ audience did.

Just to give you an example from the more recent studies on the Fathers: In 1995 Reinhard Jakob Kees published a book on: “The Doctrine of the God’s Oikonomia in Gregory of Nyssa’s Catechetical Oratio” and noted especially the numerous examples, images and comparisons from medicine, sciences and jurisprudence Gregory employs therein: “Gregory tries to illustrate and explain christian doctrine by departing from the daily experience of his audience and transporting them to a theological level by way of analog.” For this aim he uses the images of a rock rolling down a mountain; a clay pot that is ruined, because someone by way of a practical joke fills it with liquid lead, so that after its cooling the pot is of no use any longer and must be redone by the potter; the removal of warts; gold melted in the kiln; and many more images. Kees comments these images according to their theological and spiritual meaning, but he does not ask after their real background, e. g. “How did kilns look like in antiquity, how did they work and what does this contribute to the understanding of the image?” or “Do we have any information or even archaeological remains of pots filled with lead?”

This is the aim of this present paper: to make us aware of this usually totally neglected side of ancient images, their relation to the real world of their times and the impact
on their theological and spiritual meaning resulting from it, which I should like to
demonstrate by a few further examples from the sermons of St. Augustine.

II. Glass, fragile and precious

In sermon 17,7 Augustine speaks of the fragility of human life and compares it to
the fragility of glass: “Aren’t we in fact more fragile than if we were made of glass?
After all, even if glass is fragile, it lasts a long time if it is preserved, and you find
goblets that belonged to grandfathers and great-grandfathers, from which grandsons
and great-grandsons are drinking today. Such fragility, if protected, can reach a
great age. But as for us human beings, not only do we walk around in our fragility
among so many daily hazards, but even if sudden accidents do not happen, we are
still not capable of living a long time.”

There seems to be doubt about the full meaning of this image: Glass is by its very
nature the proverbial most fragile substance of everyday life we know. On the
other hand it actually is a very hard substance and therefore, properly preserved,
endures a very long time, so long in fact that even today antique glass is preserved.
We know of those goblets (calices) Augustine speaks of, a few of them are even
preserved in their entirety. Because of their fragility and the great difficulty of their
manufacturing glass goblets and every other glass item understandably were
extremely precious in antiquity. This is true for human life as well, every person
has only one, it is one’s most precious property, and because of the manifold dangers
in life it is fragile and must be carefully preserved.

So far both the archaeological facts and the spiritual meaning of Augustine’s image
are quite clear. Only, however, if one inquires a little further both into the works of
St. Augustine and the reality of the antique world one understands it even more
deeply. In the Adnotationes in Job Augustine quotes lob 28,17 “Gold and glass
cannot equal it”. So, is gold and glass equally precious? No, in antiquity glass is
much more valuable than gold, because it is much rarer and much more difficult to
manufacture. First gold and then glass means a climax of value. This is made quite
clear by a story Pliny the Younger relates in his Naturalis Historia 36,114; When
Marcus Scaurus, Sulla’s son-in-law, was aedile in Rome (1st century B.C.) he had
a new theatre built, three stories high. The lowest he had lined with marble, the
uppermost with gold, but the intermediate – “luxury unheard of even by later
generations” - with glass. This type of glass lining of the walls originated in Egypt
and was manufactured in Alexandria, Sidon and Tyros, where Marcus Scaurus got
to know it when he battled against Mithridates.

These “unheard of” luxury glass panels of the theatre of Marcus Scaurus have not been preserved, and nowhere in the whole antique world have any been preserved in situ. By an extraordinary strike of luck, however, a complete set of them were found during the excavations of the port of Corinth, Kenchreai, in the second half of this century. In 365 or 375 an earthquake destroyed Kenchreai. At this time a series of more than 100 polychrome glass panels were stored there in a warehouse in their wooden transport crates, most probably on their way either from Asia or Egypt to Rome. The earthquake broke the glass and buried the crates. Being enfolded in the crates, the fragments of the glass panels remained together and could thus largely be recomposed. The panels consist of multicoloured -green, yellow, red, brown, orange, white, grey, pink, purple, blue, and turquoise – scenes, depicting landscapes, animals, and persons, forming geometrical, floral, and architectural design.5

More recently a second discovery of the same kind was made, albeit not as spectacular one. Excavating basilica C in Philippi dating from the second quarter of the 6th century, 747 polychrome glass fragments were found which most probably served as wall lining.6

Those glass panels therefore imitate the usual colourful opus sectile in marble which is known both in geometrical and figural forms, but in an even more precious way. For the glass panels do not simply consist of a composition of glass parts in various colours, but every single piece is already multicoloured in itself – a further development of the so-called “millefiori” technique. Thus it becomes quite clear how much more complicated and costly it was to produce glass than gold or marble.

Returning to Augustine, only this background makes it quite clear what it means to compare human life to glass. Fragile and precious at the same time, but not simply expensive but uniquely costly above everything else, even the most precious metal,


gold. Here someone might object: "But the book of Job dates from a time much earlier than Greek and Roman glass production, so the quotation from it cannot possibly refer to it." True, the original does not, but Augustine does, because he uses and understands the quotation in the very same way we ourselves do nowadays: in relation to his own knowledge and times, because this constitutes one of the basic and indispensable elements of the usage of an image. Albeit all our attempt to explain images of past times in their context, if it is used centuries later it will always primarily be understood in the context of our own times, otherwise its use would fade away.

III. Silver spoons

The third example I would like to present goes both beyond the bounds of Augustine's sermons and even beyond the limits of St. Augustine himself in order to show how extremely important the archaeological evidence is for the interpretation of patristic texts and vice versa.

Since Giovanni Battista de Rossi (1868) it has been discussed whether antique silver spoons, often engraved with names of saints or prayers like "Deo gratias", were used during the liturgy in order to distribute the eucharist under both species as the Greek church does it until today, or if they rather had profane everyday use in a rather well-to-do household. The question arose from a curious state of archaeological findings. Up to today there have been excavated over five hundred silver spoons from tombs all over Europe and the Near East, dating from the second to the seventh century. This fact in itself would not have been surprising, what was most startling was the fact that all the rest of the table gear found in the very same tombs were made of far lesser material: wood, iron, bronze etc. And very often those spoons were engraved with religious names or symbols. The first reaction of scholars was to surmise that those spoons did not fit to the rest of the gear and did not therefore belong to profane but rather to liturgical use.

This controversy could not be resolved without texts which explained the use of these spoons as the archaeological evidence alone naturally remained ambiguous.

One of them is to be found in Possidius—Vita Augustini reporting Augustine's lifestyle (22): "His clothes, his shoes, his bed sheets were modest but decorous, neither too showy nor all too ragged ... he observed the way in the middle without deviating from it neither to the right nor to the left. He used to have a frugal and parsimonious
table, furbished with herbs and vegetables, and sometimes also with meat for guests or sick people, and always with wine, knowing and teaching, as the Apostle says, that all of God’s creation is good and nothing needs be rejected what is accepted by saying grace; it is indeed blessed by God’s word and prayer; ... What regards wine we have the Apostle’s advice he wrote to Timothy: Do not drink water only, but use a modest quantity of wine for your stomach and your frequent illnesses.” He used, however, only silver spoons, all the rest of the table gear used for serving the food were either made of clay or wood or marble, and that not because necessity compelled him to do so, but because he so wanted it. Always, however, he freely offered hospitality. And at his table he valued the reading or the conversation more than the food; and against a despicable human habit there was written on the table: “Whoever likes to slander with his words the lifestyle of someone not present, may know that at this table his own way of life is not considered worthy”! Thus he reminded everyone of his guests to abstain from superfluous and detrimental talk. When at one time some of his fellow bishops, who were his close friends, forgot this maxim and talked in disregard of it, he reproached them harshly by saying that those words either had to be cancelled from the table or he felt obliged to rise and to retire to his quarters in the middle of the meal.”

Augustine therefore observed a simple, but dignified lifestyle without “showing off” his ascetism and monastic poverty. He himself was a vegetarian though he was not generally opposed to the consumption of meat on the grounds that nothing of the good God had made was to be despised on principle, as Holy Scriptures copiously attested. A reasonable daily amount of wine he regarded as healthy, following the advice given by St. Paul, and he enjoyed company at his table, readings and conversation, unless it became unpleasant because people started to talk badly about others not present. Then, even if they were fellow bishops, he reproached them harshly up to the point that he threatened to leave the table. Everything used at his table – platters, plates, cutlery – was made of simple materials, with the sole exception of the spoons which were made of silver.

According to Possidius’ testimony there is therefore no doubt that silver spoons were indeed used at the table together with other gear of lesser value, and that not in a rich household, not even in a well-to-do one. Even a bishop like Augustine, leading an ascetic and adequately modest lifestyle did not consider them to be a luxury, and so they apparently were not. Up to today though I have not read or heard any convincing reason why this should have been so, as the spoon usually was the only instrument you used at the table – a fork is a modern invention, and
the knife was not needed as meat was usually cut before being set on the table – it might have something to do with the fact that all other material corroded, made food taste bad or even emitted poisonous particles into the food. Though one must clearly surmise that in really poor households these spoons must have been made of wood for the simple material value.

Be it as it may, "one swallow does not make a summer"; Augustine's testimony alone does not prove the use of silver spoons at table to be the general case. Fortunately we have another one, and again from a bishop and monk, not from a rich nobleman. More than a hundred years later, the *Vita* of Caesarius of Aries (470/71-542) recounts the visit of Caesarius with king Theodosius in his capital Ravenna. Theodosius presented Caesarius with a large silver platter weighing 60 pounds to use it at his daily table in memory of the king. "Caesarius, however, who never used any silver at his table except of the spoons, had the platter sold and used the money to pay ransom for prisoners" (*Caes* 1 37). So here again we have the same phenomenon: everything in the household of Caesarius is held simply with the exception of spoons. This double testimony – and some more are in fact known of the same kind – proves the profane, not liturgical use of silver spoons at the daily table next to other gear of lesser value and thus easily explains the finds made in the graves.

These two testimonies still suffer from one common disadvantage which limits their validity; they both come from the western church. And what about the east where especially we surmised a liturgical use of the silver spoons, because this tradition is observed up to today? It is very well conceivable that East and West followed different traditions so that the testimonies of Augustine and Caesarius of Arles need not mean anything for the Eastern church. Unfortunately up to very recently, no written testimony from the east was known. Only in 1996 was it discovered in the "Homilies on Ecclesiastes" by Gregory of Nyssa. He writes there in Homily 8: "it is as if someone has set out on a table all the preparations for a banquet where to put certain implements alongside suitable to help with eating, the sort of thing manufactured by specialized craftsmen, small knives with which the diners cut up some of the food offered to them, or silver prongs made with a hollow part attached to one end convenient for holding soup; then one of the guests at the dinner changes the function of what lies before him and uses each for the wrong purpose, and cuts with his knife either himself or one of the people sitting next to him, and with his prong pierces his neighbour's eye or his own; you might say that this person misused his host's cutlery, not because the one who provided it prepared
beforehand the cause of what happened, but because the wrong use of the things laid out led to this disaster the one used stupidly what lay before him.”

Here again the aim of presenting this image of a table prepared for a meal and therefore laid with every item necessary for it is a spiritual one. Gregory of Nyssa wants to explain that not this God who by creating all things is responsible for human misuse of his creation, but man alone, as it appears absolutely plausible from the comparison with the host and his guests. But at the same time this imagery is only fully understandable if one knows how those implements, that cutlery, looked like. Gregory describes the spoon as “a silver prong made with a hollow part attached to one end convenient for holding soup”, and thus explains it in exact the opposite way we should have done. We should have said: “A spoon for eating soup with a handle formed as a prong in order to pick up the morsels in it”, but as Gregory’s point of comparison will be the misuse of the prong, he is first of all interested in this part of the spoon. And again, without intending it, Gregory gives the answer to the question as to what use was made of silver spoons in the eastern church, saying explicitly – and only for the spoons – that they were made of silver.

So it may be considered as a valid principle in general that only the combination of literary and archaeological evidence at the end provides a complete picture and satisfactory explanation. Archaeological evidence coming from excavations see only the material phenomenon without being able to interpret it; from the artifact alone one can only surmise regarding its use. Vice versa this is true, too. Literary evidence alone would only give an approximate idea about the actual appearance of the objects, and as – in the case of the cutlery – without the archaeological evidence that the combination of silver spoons with other gear of lesser value was the usual in antiquity, might interpret the texts quite differently.

IV. Sin, disease and physician

For the last paragraph of this paper let us return both to St. Augustine’s imagery and his sermons. It is well known that Christ himself introduced the image of sin as a disease and he himself as the saviour being the physician (Mt 9,12–13, see

parallelism [Mk 2,17, Lk 5,31–33]): “Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick. I came not to call the righteous, but sinners”. But it is already less known that Christ quotes from the Old Testament. Immediately after the passage of the Red Sea, the salvation of Israel from the hands of the Egyptians, and the song of triumph and thanksgiving to the Lord the people of Israel come to the bitter waters of Marah, where they first begin to murmur against Moses, and Moses through God’s command turns it into sweet, drinkable water by means of a tree. At this point the text reads (Ex 15,25–26): “There the Lord made for them a statute and an ordinance and there he proved them, saying: ‘If you will diligently harken to the voice of the Lord your God, and do that which is right in his eyes, and give heed to his commandments and keep all his statutes, I will put none of the diseases upon you which I put upon the Egyptians; for I am the Lord, your physician’.” Apart from this quotation it is well known that for Jewish faith righteousness and health and wickedness and sickness conditioned one another. We find it in 2 Sam 12,13–15, when king David sinned by desiring Bathsheba, Uriah’s wife, and provoking her husband’s death in battle; their firstborn son falls ill and dies because of it. David humbly recognises his sin before the prophet Nathan, and Nathan announces the death of his child to David as the punishment for his sin: “David said to Nathan: ‘I have sinned against the Lord’. And Nathan said to David; ‘The Lord also has put away your sin; you shall not die. Nevertheless, because by this deed you have utterly scorned the Lord, the child that is born to you shall die. ... ‘And the Lord struck the child that Uriah’s wife bore to David, and it became sick.’ The New Testament takes this concept up in various places, most famous probably John 9,2–3, when Christ meets the man born blind “and his disciples asked him; ‘Rabbi, who sinned, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?’

So far again, there does not seem to exist any difficulty to understand this image up to today; but again things rather change when analysed in detail. Certainly, there is no doubt that an antique physician and a modern medical doctor are hardly comparable, both in skills and function. The book of Jesus Sirach ch. 38,1–15 gives a rather good idea of it; “Honour the physician with the honour due him, according to your need of him, for the Lord created him; for healing comes from the Most High, and he will receive a gift from the king. The skill of the physician lifts up his head, and in the presence of great men he is admired. ... He gave skills to men that he might be glorified in his marvellous works. By them he heals and takes away pain; the pharmacist makes of them a compound. ... My son, when you are sick do not be negligent, but pray to the Lord, and he will heal you. Give up your faults and direct your hands upright, and cleanse your heart from all sin.... There is a time
when success lies in the hands of physicians, for they too will pray to the Lord that he should grant them success in diagnosis and in healing, for the sake of preserving life. He who sins before his Maker, may he fall into the care of a physician.”

So here again sin and disease are linked together, and the rôle of the physician is to remove pain through medicines, to heal, and to preserve life by his skills. But ultimately he is only God’s instrument. It is God who heals through the physician, God gave the physician his skills to do his will. Therefore the physician is highly honoured and princely paid for his services by kings, so much that he is even honoured among great men and he can proudly hold up his head high.

There are, however, allusions to medical procedures in Scripture that are not as easily recognisable, I even dare say, rarely recognised at all. In I Tim 4,1–2 Paul writes: “Now the spirit expressly says that in later times some will depart from the faith by giving heed to deceitful spirits and doctrines of demons, through the pretensions of liars whose consciences are seared” (Revised Standard Version).

What does the expression “seared conscience” mean? The New English Bible translate “branded by the devil’s sign”, the Jerusalem Bible, however, “branded as though with a red-hot iron”, which comes closest to the Greek original ΚΕΚΟΨΗΡΙΩΣΕΙ ἘΝΟΥ; in Latin “cauteriata conscientia”. Without knowing what this terminus technicus means one will neither understand St. Paul fully, nor will one recognise it as an allusion to the medical profession. “Branded as though with a red-hot iron” certainly comes close to the original, but the exact translation would be “cauterized”.

What exactly is a cauterium (in Greek καυτὴ ἡρ or καυτὴ ἡριον) and how was it used? The classic description is given by Mario Tabanelli in his book Lo strumento chirurgico e la sua storia. Dalle epoche greca e romana al secolo decimosesto,(Forli 1958) 101: “The cauterium is one of the most used instruments by ancient surgeons. It was usually made of iron, for which reason only few specimens have been preserved, but some were made of bronze, gold and silver as well. Their form and size differed, and it was used for the most various and unique applications: to stop haemorrhages, to remove tumors, to sterilize injuries and wounds, to cut fistulas and open cavities. Sometimes it served in cases of precise diagnoses, but otherwise it was just used experimentally. The Greeks and Romans often used it instead of a scalpel; its form was rather variable: either a long thin iron with a little olive-shaped plate at its end, or formed like a sickle, a paddle or tubular, like a nail, a needle or a wedge, shaped like a Greek Chi or an Obolos. Some
cauteria were inserted into a tube of clay in order to protect the surrounding tissue from its heat.”

The cauterium therefore was a surgical instrument used both for cutting and sealing wounds, but in any case, it left a scar. Unfortunately we have no testimony from St. Augustine on this point, but his contemporary Gregory of Nyssa makes it quite clear “This is like the case of a person who through excessive greed accumulates in himself a mixture of indigestible fluids, and then, when his body develops a fever, is treated with lancing and cauterization and has the disease as a sort of tutor in discipline for the rest of his life as he sees the scar of the cauterization on his body”.8

Augustine, however, does quote 1 Tim 4 time and again9, and in at least two cases gives a quite clear idea about how he understood Paul. In Contra Faustum 31,4 he refers to Tit 1,15 as an explanation: “their very minds and consciences are corrupted (polluta)”. And some chapters before in the same treatise (20,16) he describes those consciences as “inusta”, burned. So Paul and Augustine does not refer to the healing function of a cauterium, but rather to its harmful use – either by accident or on purpose – as it is attested by other sources.

Conclusion

After all these details on grapes and thorns, glass, silver spoons and cauterizing irons, they may not seem to be of great importance for our actual life. What, however, I wanted to achieve is to show how necessary it is to fully understand the actual background of an image to really appreciate it; I wanted to show how archaeology and theology serve one another reciprocally in order to understand both texts and findings; and if I did not present examples of sensational impact the reason for that is that this kind of research was scarcely begun, though there is no doubt that it will be fruitful for more than one field of studies.

9. C Faust 15,10.30,1.3.4; c Fel 1,7.8; C Sec 2; C adu leg 2.32 etc.
Nietzsche, communication and the possibility of emancipation
Claude Mangion

Communication has become an increasingly discussed concept in postmodernity. While commentators agree on the value of the concept, there is a wide range of views on the consequences of the concept: Vattimo sees communication as heralding a new type of society based on transparency, while Habermas sees communication as a form of action with the potential for emancipation. In this paper, I will be questioning the possibility of the latter: to do this I will first examine Nietzsche’s views on communication; then I will examine Nietzsche’s use of communication as a critique of consciousness; finally offer a critical analysis of Habermas’s project of communicative action in the light of the Nietzschean critique of communication.

The early writings of Nietzsche on language are chiefly concerned with rejecting the correspondence theory of truth and knowledge. On this account, the formation of the concept involves a process of eliminating differences and retaining what is common. This process is applicable both to things and to abstract ideas.2

'We obtain the concept as we do the form, by overlooking what is individual and actual; whereas nature is acquainted with no forms and no concepts, and likewise no species, but only with an X which remains inaccessible and undefinable for us' (Nietzsche 1873: 83).

In effect, the concept is mistakenly said to represent the essences of things. However, accompanying this negative judgement of language is a positive thesis

2. The application of Nietzsche’s theory of language to moral concepts is clearly shown in this passage from 'On Truth and Lying in an Extra Moral Sense': 'we call a person “honest.” We ask, “Why did he act so honestly today?” Our answer usually goes: “Because of his honesty.” Honesty! That means once more: the “leaf” is the cause of the leaves. For we know nothing of an essential quality called honesty; what we know are numerous, individualised, hence dissimilar, actions which we equate by omitting the dissimilar and then referring to them as honest action. Lust of all, we formulate out of them a gualitas occulta with the name “honesty” (249).
whereby an instrumentalist view of language is suggested. In the notes for the course on *Ancient Rhetoric*, Nietzsche specifies the necessity of language as a medium for communication, but refrains from elaborating on this thesis. Elaboration is found in the later works—specifically in *The Gay Science*—which, whilst still adhering to and presupposing the rejection of the representational function of language, shifts priority to the function of language as a medium of communication, an origin located in the need to ensure survival.

In describing language as a mode of communication, the early Nietzsche claims that prior to the development of verbal language we find that ‘older than language is the mimicking of *-est*<es-* which takes place involuntarily’ (Nietzsche 1879:99). The ‘mimicking of gestures’ describes the process of non-verbal communication: the sensation felt by the individual is gesturally expressed with other individuals imitating these gestures and in so doing experiencing the same sensation:

> The imitated gesture leads him who imitates it back to the sensation which it expressed in the face or body of the person imitated. That is how people learned to understand one another: that is how a child still learns to understand its mother’ (99).

Nietzsche’s account relies upon the assumption that there is a naturalistic relation between gesture and sensation: it is vulnerable to the charge analogous to that usually labelled as the problem of other minds. In this latter problem, it is argued that we cannot infer, on the basis of our mental states and physical actions, that the physical states and mental states of others are similar. In fact, it is claimed that we cannot even assume that they have mental states. Likewise, in the case of Nietzsche’s argument, it is hard to accept that just by observing the physical behaviour of others, then they will experience the same sensations as we do.

Language develops out of this primitive system of communication: the natural meaning of gestures is associated—conventionally—with a particular sound: with time, the sound was understood without the need for the accompanying gesture. ‘I mean a sign-language of sounds could be so agreed that at first one produced sound and gesture (to which it was symbolically joined), later only the sound’ (I00). The importance of Nietzsche’s claim is that both language and communication are reduced to the level of sensation: both verbal and non-verbal language are ultimately an expression of the sensations of pleasure (what is useful) and pain (what is harmful).
It is this pragmatic aspect of language which Nietzsche is concerned to show: within a life-threatening context, there is no question of interest in the nature of the world. Rather, philosophical considerations are outweighed by the necessity of communicating one's perception to the other. 'Language does not desire to instruct, but to convey to others a subjective impulse and its acceptance' (Nietzsche 1872–74: 21).

The condition of society is judged from the perspective of the way communication is used. Nietzsche opposes the communication of needs to the communication of knowledge as the framework for the analysis of society. This way of conducting a critique of society is elaborated upon in his essay on Wagner in *Untimely Meditations*. Language is 'sick' precisely because its original function has been replaced by another: instead of acting as a medium for the expression of human needs, language has developed as the expression of concepts. An 'unhealthy' society is one where language is used to express,

the realm of thought – a realm diametrically opposed to that for the expression of which it was originally supremely adapted namely the realm of strong feelings – it has during the brief period of contemporary civilisation become exhausted through this excessive effort. Man can no longer express his needs and distress by means of language, thus he can no longer really communicate at all' (Nietzsche 1876: 214).

The decline of contemporary society, according to Nietzsche, is rooted in the development of language for something other than its original purpose. Authentic communication cannot take place because rather than the communication of feelings, the communication of ideas has been valorised. Men are alienated from each other since genuine communication no longer takes place, 'that is to say from a mutual agreement as to words and actions without a mutual agreement as to feelings' (Nietzsche 1878:237).

But it is not a question – as Hazelcroft argues - of a conflict between language as the communication of feeling and language as the communication of thought originating in a 'fundamental tension within language itself' (Hazelcroft 1943:56). Instead, the question as to why language is abused of is answered by referring to the shifting values of society, which places greater value on knowledge than on feeling. The personal communicative use of language has been transformed into
the impersonal communication of thoughts: this development brings about a lack of personal involvement between individuals towards each other. Instead of attempting to understand each other's feelings, on establishing interpersonal relations, understanding is linked to what can be known.

The continuity of Nietzsche's thought on the necessity of language as the medium for the communication of human needs and feelings is evident not solely because it is textually warranted throughout his writings, but crucially because it is the obverse of his epistemological critique. Thus whilst the origin of language is not related to establishing the truth of things but to the communication of dangerous situations, this necessity ensures that the possibility of misunderstanding must be reduced to a minimum. 'The greater the danger, the greater is the need to reach agreement quickly and easily as to what has to be done; not to misunderstand one another in situations of danger is an absolute necessity in human relations,' (Nietzsche 1886:186).

Nietzsche's theory of communication links the intelligibility of language to its context. This is in fact one of the important claims put forward in the early *Truth and Lie* essay, where the establishment of linguistic meanings is ultimately a question of conventional agreement grounded in the context of survival. Mutual understanding between speaker and listener are ultimately the goal of communication. The later Nietzsche specifies the relation between meaning and social context, adopting a reductionist account of meaning by arguing that in order to understand and communicate we need a situation where the same basic experiences are shared,

'To understand one another it is not sufficient to employ the same words; we have also to employ the same words to designate the same species of inner experiences, we must ultimately have our experience in common. That is why the members of one people understand one another better than do members of differing peoples even when they use the same language' (Nietzsche 1886:14).

The importance of this passage is that it brings out the role of language as the expression of the shared experiences (as opposed to purely individual ones) of a community. The emphasis on the social makes the claims put forward by some interpreters hard to accept. In his book *Nietzsche and Political Thought* Warren claims that Nietzsche's account of language would lapse into a private language if it became so particular that it would express purely individual needs, (Warren 1991:56). This view is simply mistaken for it tails to acknowledge Nietzsche's
explicit concern with the social aspect of language. The goal of language, according to Nietzsche, is that of communicating those needs which are common to all individuals within a particular society.

Nietzsche’s theory of communication is not only a general claim linking language to the context of its production, but a theory which specifies the relation between communication and context as one where the experiences which the community undergoes function as the crucial formative element in the production of language. The sharing of common experiential situations and their translation into language becomes the criteria which enables understanding to take place between different individuals within the same community.

Nietzsche’s view on the concept of communication is developed into a thesis concerning the relation between communication and consciousness. According to Nietzsche, communication is the necessary condition for the development of consciousness. By following this line of argument, Nietzsche re-values the view of man as a subject whose subjectivity is defined by consciousness: it is, in effect, a critique of Cartesian philosophy.

In *The Gay Science* Nietzsche specifies: *V consciousness has developed only under the pressure of the need for communicating* (Nietzsche 1882: 298). The awareness of one’s needs necessitates telling others about them: these needs originate in man’s situation in a hostile environment where the likelihood of survival depends on the possibility of communicating his ‘distress and to make himself understood’ (298). Clearly, Nietzsche places communication as the basis of intersubjectivity: it is only because man is primarily a social being that consciousness develops as ‘a net of communication between human beings’ (298). Danto rightly points out that the individual with a sense of self comes into being only after his union into society: (Danto 980: 141-3); the identity of the individual as an individual and opposed to other individuals is the product of socialisation. Self-consciousness is the end result of the relationship between individuals in an environment which necessitates the possibility of articulating one’s needs.

The further development from consciousness to self-consciousness results from having acquired language. The possibility of communication is not only directed externally but also internally: ‘the human being inventing signs is at the same time the human being who becomes ever more keenly conscious of himself. It was only as a social animal that man acquired self-consciousness’ (Nietzsche 1882: 298).
Outside the human community the need for consciousness and consequently for language would not have arisen: man would have lived in a condition similar to that of animality, where actions are governed entirely by 'unconscious drives' (Nietzsche 1887:217). The transition from animality to that of humanity is characterised by the need to 'think, deduce, calculate, weigh cause and effect' (217). These functions are possible with the conscious, rational application of concepts. But whilst these activities are performed instinctively in the natural world, the socialised man performs them consciously so as to survive.

It is precisely because these activities take on a linguistic form that their value is lost, 'the thinking that rises to consciousness is only the smallest part of all this — the most superficial and worst part — for only this conscious thinking takes the form of words, which is to say signs of communication' (299). By showing that what is performed by consciousness can also be performed unconsciously, Nietzsche debunks the privilege of consciousness. The privileged status of consciousness is discredited because of its association with language.  

There is an evident shift of emphasis in Nietzsche's theory of language and communication. The nature of language itself, irrespective of the type of communication, constitutes an impoverishment of life. Because the language of a community is related to the sharing of similar experiences within a particular environment, the experiencing of certain 'conditions of life' provide the framework which generate the needs of the individual. The community is precisely the gathering of individuals with similar needs:

now supposing that need has at all times brought together only such human beings as could indicate similar requirements, similar experiences by means of similar signs, it follows that on the whole the easy communicability of need, that is to say ultimately the experiencing of only average and common experiences' (Nietzsche 1886:187).

But this, in effect, constitutes for Nietzsche a diminution: the sharing of a

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3. The same point is repeated in the Will to Power: 'usually one takes consciousness itself as the general sensorium and supreme court; nonetheless, it is only a means of communication: it is evolved through social intercourse and with a view to the interests of social intercourse' (284). It is given that Nietzsche's point is to undermine the privileged status attributed to consciousness.
common language describes the loss of individuality. If communication implies mediocrity and consciousness is the product of communication, then conscious man is a mediocre being. It is clear therefore, that if consciousness is equated with language, and language is a product of the community, then 'whatever becomes conscious becomes by the same token shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, sign, herd signal' (299–300).

The type of community is intimately tied up with the language used in the community: because it expresses common needs, Nietzsche argues that it is characterised by 'herd' qualities. The consequences are negative: the 'subtle, select' individual tends to remain solitary on account of the difference between his experiences and needs from those of the 'herd'. The sharing of a common language in turn helps the 'herd' to promote itself: ultimately, Nietzsche claims, individuality is being lost at the expense of mediocrity.

This view on the mediocrity of the herd is paralleled to the views on language. Ordinary language is described in Nietzsche with reference to a fundamental principle: 'every concept originates by the equation of the dissimilar' (Nietzsche 1873:249). Nietzsche's assertion presupposes a radical nominalism such that each and every thing in the world is unique and individual; it is by negating what is particular that the condition of the possibility for the formation of the concept is met. The power of language is precisely that of operating a principle of identity, in so doing removing difference: things are postulated as identical precisely because the concept itself necessitates a selection of features of things which are merely similar but postulated as identical. It is man who sees things as similar in a world where difference reigns: language produces commonness both in the world, but also in society.

The innovation of Nietzsche's thought is that of formulating the critique of consciousness from a linguistically derived position. The claims of the later writings represent a further development with the thesis of language as a communicatory medium for the expression of human needs coupled with the rise of consciousness. It is here that we can understand Nietzsche's valorisation of language as communication, for this supports his radical critique of the subject-object duality: this duality is mistakenly justified on the grounds that it is consciousness that makes us aware of this duality. Whilst the early texts offer a critique of epistemology suggesting communication rather than knowledge at the origins of language, the later writings suggest communication as the key to the critique of consciousness.
Nietzsche's critique of communication has further implications for postmodernism. The relationship between language and power is one of the dominant themes of discussions within postmodernism. Interestingly, for Nietzsche, power is the starting point for theory of language: in the early writings Nietzsche recognises Aristotle's insight that the human being has an inherent, natural 'power' to create signs. Clearly, he is not referring to political power as yet, but in the later writings, language itself becomes a product of the will to power, which in turn can be politically charged. It is in this respect that Nietzsche argues that language is value-loaded and therefore its use for communication can never be neutral. Power and language are intimately connected.

This idea finds resonance in the work of Lyotard: the narratives of the social legitimates its own power. Western civilisation has justified its practices by referring to a number of transcendental values inherited from the Enlightenment. These are what Lyotard calls the 'metanarratives' of history - the narratives of progress and freedom. In the contemporary world, Lyotard argues that the end of the metanarratives of western civilisation imply the decline of the justification of the western way of life and its imposition on others. Replacing the 'grand', universal narratives of the west, Lyotard points to 'mini', particular narratives: these are justified locally on social and historical grounds.

What Lyotard points to - and which Nietzsche had already described in his theory of language, - is that language lost or more precisely never had any representational power. Clearly, from our study of the origins of language 'the construction of identical cases reminds us of the nature of the concept: the 'error' Nietzsche alludes to is the error of believing in a representational model of language, i.e., believing that language grasps the essence of reality. This has been labelled as the crisis of representation: each language communicates the ideology of the dominant group as opposed to representing the world. Because all communication is ideologically slanted the act of communication is not neutral.

The use of communicative action for emancipation is also suspect when Lyotard equates reason with power: with Adorno and Horkheimer, his understanding of reason is that of an instrumentality which makes emancipation impossible: instrumental reason expresses itself through language and representation. While instrumental reason had been acknowledged and was the object of critique in *The

4. See the Nietzsche's lectures on rhetoric in 'Description of Ancient Rhetoric' p. 9.
Postmodern Condition, Lyotard elaborates on its concrete effects: 'reason and power are one and the same thing. Your may disguise the one with the dialectics or prospectiveness, but you will still have the other in all its crudeness: jails, taboos, public weal, selection, genocide' (Lyotard 1984:11).

The starting point of Habermas' thinking is his refusal to accept the renunciation of reason, the conclusion reached by Adorno and Horkheimer in the Dialectic of Enlightenment. In their analysis of modernity, Adorno and Horkheimer argued that instrumental reason had become the culminating element of the Enlightenment. As instrumental reason was described in terms of administrative efficiency, it had transformed the liberatory potential of the Enlightenment into a medium of oppression.

The work of Habermas can be seen as an attempt at rerouting reason: while he acknowledges the prevalence of instrumental reason, his objection to Adorno, Horkheimer and Lyotard is that there are other forms of rationality. On the extent and critique of instrumental reason, Habermas is in full agreement with the critics of modernity: he is, however, unwilling to accept this dominance as inevitable. Accepting the view that reason functions within a means-end excludes the possibility of liberation.

Habermas' strategy starts by relating different forms of reason to different forms of life. In particular, his theory links communication with reason: in The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas develops the view that the medium of communication - language - inherently allows for the possibility of a use of reason that does not aim at domination. Linguistic communication is structured according to what Habermas calls 'validity claims': every act of communication involves mutual understanding between speakers and listeners, which in turn consolidates the intersubjectivity of human relations (morality and justice), establishes a relationship with the external world (truth) and expresses the speaker's intentions, beliefs or feelings (sincerity).

Habermas makes it a point to differentiate between communication and communicative action: the latter presupposes the former but not vice-versa. It is because Habermas wants critical theory to be the instrument for social change that he lists four types of action: communicative action aims at mutual understanding, strategic action aims at instrumentality, normative actions aims at value-orientation and dramaturgical action aims at the presentation of one's self to others.
While communicative action takes place within the framework of linguistic communication, Habermas goes to great pains to establish the point that inherent in the very act of communication lies the possibility of mutual understanding, 'Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus' (Habermas 1968:310).

By using mutual understanding via communication as his starting point, Habermas is able to justify the critique of those forms of communication that do aim at domination. Communicative action offers a model for the critique of 'distorted communication': this type of communication is ideological in that it is a expression of the values or ways of thinking of particular social groups. Power and domination are the hallmarks of 'distorted communication'.

However, the question of whether communication leads to the possibility of emancipation in the way that Habermas describes it is highly debatable. It is on this point that Nietzsche's critique of communication becomes relevant: in describing language and its relation to the world, the question of power transforms itself across Nietzsche's writings.

In Nietzsche's unpublished writings on rhetoric, the possibility of language itself is described primarily as the 'power to discover and to make operative that which works' while the question of whom the power of language serves is alluded to as 'to convey to others a subjective impulse and its acceptance' (Nietzsche 1872–73: 21). In rejecting the traditional theory of language as picturing or corresponding to the world, Nietzsche theory emphasises the pragmatic dimension of language.

And insofar as language serves a practical function, it has political implications: it is the powerful who create language so as to communicate and dominate effectively. Power and domination – not consensus – are inherent in communication, with the action desired as that of obedience. It is this point which Nietzsche specifies in The Genealogy of Morals,

'the lordly right of bestowing names is such that one would almost be justified in seeing the origin of language itself as an expression of the rulers' power. They say, "This is that or that"; they seal off each thing and action with a sound and thereby take symbolic possession of it' (160).

It is therefore difficult to accept Habermas's view. On his account communication
is a neutral medium which can be used either for liberation - communicative action - or for domination - strategic action. But this is precisely what Nietzsche shows to be impossible: language can never be value-free as it is an expression of the prevalent ideological point of view.

This in turn brings out another weakness in Habermas’s account: Habermas tries to reconcile contradictory positions: on the one hand he wants language to be a medium for liberation while on the other hand, the same language serves as a medium for domination. But it is evident that language cannot be both at the same time. Communication is itself primarily ‘distorted’ or biased towards some position of power: it reveals the impossibility of the Habermasian project.

The emphasis on communication in Nietzsche’s theory of language is linked to the critique of language insofar as it is intended to offset the valorisation of epistemology and consciousness in modern philosophy. The need to communicate is grounded within an existential situation where the possibilities of survival are maximised. While shifting towards intersubjectivity through the linguistic medium, Nietzsche points to an inherent difficulty which this brings about. So as to function as a medium of communication, language inevitably brings about with it an equalisation process which reduces difference to identity. The nature of communication is such that it detracts from the qualitative nature of experience. The act of communication is in itself a falsification of reality and is therefore non-representational. Nietzsche’s anticipation of postmodernity is elaborated upon by Lyotard – among others – who describes postmodernity as the end of the belief in the representational power of language. By way of reaction to Lyotard, Habermas re-values communication as the tool for the ‘thinking after’ of postmodernity. In the light of the Nietzschean analysis, however, it seems that Habermas’s optimism is unfounded.

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Introduction

The present writer during the past few years has attempted to present in *Melita Theologica* a new structure for the Epistle to the Hebrews.¹ The present article will concentrate on a relatively small segment of the structure, Heb 1, 5-14, and will attempt to show not only how the verses are coherently organized into a meaningful unit, but also how this organization fits into the structure of Heb 1, 1-3, 6 which was previously proposed.² A key factor in the interpretation of Heb 1, 5-14 being presented here is the use of Jewish hermeneutical techniques. They are adduced to help discern the structure. “Structure” is probably the most disputed aspect of the

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2. Swetnam, “The Structure of Hebrews 1,1 - 3,6” (1992). In this article not much attention was paid to the structure of the subsection 1, 5-14; the present article hopes to remedy this lack. Of considerable help in the writing of the present article has been the publication of a recent book on Heb 1,5-14: H. W. Bateman, IV, Early Jewish Hermeneutics and Hebrews 1:5-13: The Impact of Early Jewish Exegesis on the Interpretation of a Significant New Testament Passage (American University Studies, Series VII, Theology and Religion, Vol. 193; Peter Lang; New York, 1997). Cf. also: I. Bowker, The Targums and Rabbinic Literature: An Introduction to Jewish Interpretations of Scripture (Cambridge; New York, 1969 [reprint 1979]), 315-319; W. S. Towner, “Hermeneutical Systems of Hillel and the Tannaim: A Fresh Look”, *Hebrew Union College Annual* 53(1982) 101-118. Bateman, in the opinion of the present writer, makes a major contribution to the study of the epistle by showing how Jewish exegetical techniques contemporary with the writing of Hebrews help explain the meaning of the individual verses in 1, 1-14. But, also in the opinion of the present writer, Bateman’s suggested structure for the 1, 5-14 is not well done for two basic reasons: 1) it does not take into account the indications in the text of a three-fold structure of 1, 5-14; 2) it does not take into account the way 1, 5-14 fits into the larger structure of 1, 1-3, 6.
study of the Epistle to the Hebrews at the present time. But it is crucial for the understanding of Hebrews as a whole: macroexegesis is essential if both it and microexegesis are to be understood as the original author intended.

The Threefold Division of Hebrews 1, 5-14

Heb 1, 5-14 seems to be delimited by two parallel expressions: tini gar eipen pote tòn aggelôn (“to which of the angels did he [sc., God] ever say”) in 1, 5 and pros tina de tòn aggelôn eireken pote (“to which of the angels has he [sc., God] ever said”) in 1, 13. This is a rather common observation. Both verses are questions beginning with an expression involving the interrogative pronoun, which is used nowhere else in the intervening verses. Further, both verses contain the word aggeloi. Finally, both verses contain a form of the verb legô. The combination of these elements is found nowhere else in the intervening verses. Hence the two verses seem to indicate a deliberate framing technique on the part of the author of Hebrews.

But for a complete view of the way the author has organized the passage, in addition to the framing verses 5 and 13 the expression at 1, 7 would also seem necessary: pros men tous aggelous legei (“to which of the angels does he [sc., God] say”). For this verse contains another form of the verb legô, legei, also with mention of the aggeloi. The form legei would seem to be parallel to the forms eipen in v. 5 and eireken in v. 13, for it is a still different tense of the same verbal root in


4. One reason why the several of the proposals made in this article are new is that they are based on Jewish hermeneutical techniques for interpreting the use of the citations in the passage, as will be explained.

5. Translation of the Greek here and elsewhere is by the author of the present article.

6. Cf.: Bateman, p. 362, n. 39; E. Grässer, An die Hebräer. 1. Teilband. Hebr 1-6 (Evangelisch-Katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament, XVII/1; Benziger Verlag; Zürich-Braunschweig / Neukirchener Verlag; Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1990), p. 73, n. 15. Grässer points out that vv. 5, 7, and 15 are used for introducing a rabbinic interpretation of Scripture.

7. For a justification of the translation “to” for pros cf. below, n. 9.
these verses which frame the passage. This diversity in similarity seems to constitute a pattern distinctive enough to warrant attribution to the intention of the author. Thus the basic elements which structure the passage seem to be the three forms of legei: eipen (1, 5): legei (1, 7); and eireken (1, 13), present, aorist, and perfect tenses respectively. 8

The way vv. 5, 7 (with 8), and 13 make use of interlocking wording strengthens the view that they are formal signs of the author’s organization of his discourse, especially when viewed in conjunction with the appropriate citations from scripture:

I) 1, 5: rhetorical question: tini (A) + verb legô (B) + pote (C) +
two citations from Scripture addressed to Son
1, 6: statement: de + one citation from Scripture about angels

II) 1, 7: statement: pros (A [equivalently])9 + verb legô (B)10 + men + one
citation from Scripture about angels
1, 8 statement: pros (A [equivalently]) + de + two citations from Scripture
addressed to Son


9. Pros in the sense of “to”. This pros in v. 7 is usually taken in the sense of “about” (e.g., Grässer, p. 81, n. 73; Ellingworth, 120). But the sense “to” seems indicated: 1) by the implied contrast between 1, 7 and 1, 6—in the citation in the latter verse the angels are spoken “about” and the use of pros would seem to be the sign of a change of some sort, i.e., pros in the sense of “about” in v. 7 would seem repetitious; 2) by the implied parallelism between the use of pros in v. 7 and v. 8—in v. 8 pros means “to”; 3) by the implication in v. 13 that God can speak “to” (pros) the angels—this use seems to imply a continuity with the use of pros previously with regard to angels; 4) by the context—it seems more appropriate that when the Son is being reintroduced into the oikoumenê that he be pictured as not being alone with the Father. In v. 7, then, God speaks to the angels but uses a citation of scripture which speaks about them. This is a somewhat harsh transition, from a pros meaning “to” to a citation which is in the third person, not the second. But the conventional interpretation—that pros means “about”—is also harsh, involving as it does two meanings of pros in parallel positions in vv. 7 and 8. For a discussion which takes into account the possibility that pros means “to” in Heb 1, 7 cf. H. W. Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews (Hermeneia; Fortress; Philadelphia, 1989) 57, n. 80.

10. The legei of v. 6 belongs properly to what precedes, v. 5, and not to what follows, as is indicated by the particle de which contrasts what the angels should do with respect to the Son.
III) 1, 13 rhetorical question: *pros* (A [equivalently]) + verb *legō* (B) + *pote* (C) + one citation from Scripture addressed to Son

1, 14 rhetorical question about angels with no citation

Or, more abstractly still:

I) 1, 5: question: (A) + (B) + (C)

1, 6: statement: *de*

II) 1, 7: statement: (D) + (B) + *men*

1, 8: statement: (A) + *de*

III) 1, 13: question: (A) + (B) + (C)

1, 14: question

The (A) of vv. 7 and 8 and the (A) of v. 13 are parallel in meaning to the (A) of v. 1. The *men* of v. 7 and the *de* of v. 8 bind together vv. 7 and 8 and help separate them from v. 6, which is linked by way of contrast to v. 5 by the particle *de*.

The resulting structure viewed from the standpoint of the contrast between Son and angels would accordingly be as follows:

I) 1, 5: God speaks to the Son (two citations)  
1, 6: God speaks about the angels (one citation)  

II) 1, 7: God speaks about the angels (one citation)  
1, 8-12 God speaks to the Son (two citations)  

III) 1, 13 God speaks to the Son (one citation)  
1, 14 The author speaks about the angels (no citation)  

A primary consideration concerning this structure of 1, 5-14 is that, even though it is complicated in the analysis, it is basically simple in the result, and can be grasped instinctively because of the parallelisms and repetitions and other formal elements in conjunction with the particles of transition.

The tenses of *legō* are so chosen as to give a progression to the whole passage and situate it precisely with regard to the addressees of the epistle. The introductory aorist of *legō, eipen*, situates the passage with regard to the past from the standpoint of the present time of the author of the epistle and his addressees; it conveys the idea of some definite point in past time which serves in the passage as the basis for what is being said in the letter.\footnote{Cf. Vanhoye, 124: "Ici [i.e., in v. 5], le verbe grec est à l'aorist, temps qui indique un fait historique bien défini, apte à servir de base à l'argumentation".} The use of the present tense of *legō, legei*, situates
the passage with regard to what follows this point of the past and serves to bring the scripture citations to bear on the ensuing present.\textsuperscript{12} Finally, the use of the perfect tense of \textit{legō}, \textit{eirēken}, situates the passage with regard to the future by stressing the continuation of the established fact contemporary with the writing and receiving of the epistle which was introduced by the aorist tense and commented on by the present tenses.\textsuperscript{13}

This threefold division perhaps corresponds to the three stages of an enthronement ceremony occasionally suggested as the basic structure of the passage.\textsuperscript{14} This ceremony is usually presented under labels such as the following: Exaltation, Presentation, Enthronement.\textsuperscript{15} The evidence for such a ceremony are slight but, where apparently existing, striking as regards possible relevance for Hebrews 1, 5-14. For example, in "The Testament of Levi", one of "Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs", there are three stages of a ceremony, each of which is introduced by a form of the verb \textit{legō}.\textsuperscript{16} The ceremony involves three stages: a

\textsuperscript{12} Cf. Grässer, 71; Swetnam, \textit{Jesus and Isaac}, 142-145.

\textsuperscript{13} Cf. Grässer, p. 71, n. 4; Swetnam, \textit{Jesus and Isaac}, 142, n. 45. Cf. P. Ellingworth, \textit{The Epistle to the Hebrews: A Commentary on the Greek Text} (New International Greek Testament Commentary; Eerdmans; Grand Rapids / Paternoster; Carlisle, 1992) 108-109: "This formal threefold division, already noted by some older commentators, has been explained as corresponding to the three stages of a coronation liturgy, for which there is evidence in the OT and other ancient Near Eastern Texts, especially in Egypt.... The three stages of such a liturgy are typically (a) a declaration by God that he has adopted the king as his son (cf. v. 5); (b) the presentation of the king to his people, and his proclamation as king (cf. vv. 6-12); (c) the enthronement proper (cf. v. 13). The influence of any such liturgy on the author of Hebrews is likely to have been via the Greek OT. The formal parallels are striking, but it is necessary to allow for at least three phases of reinterpretation, (a) as a foreign liturgy was adapted to Israelite views of God and of kingship; (b) as statements about a particular king were generalized and idealized in pre-Christian messianic expectation; and (c) as the coming of Christ stimulated Christians to relate the scriptures to him in new ways." As noted above, the present writer would include v. 6 with the first stage.

ritual humiliation and exaltation, an investiture with symbols of office, and a long oracle. Angels are involved. Levi will become the son of Elyon, i.e., God. The whole liturgy seems to have reference to what actually obtained in the time of the Hasmoneans. The evidence for a Jewish background to the enthronement ritual is thus real but elusive. But there is enough to warrant a suggestion that it perhaps stands behind the three-fold division of Heb 1, 5-14.

It remains to be seen how these formal considerations pointing to a threefold structure of 1, 5-14 contribute to the understanding of the meaning of these verses: form demands corroboration by content.

II. The Meaning of Hebrews 1, 5-14

A. Hebrews 1, 5-6

Heb 1, 5-6 reads as follows:

1, 5 For to whom of the angels did He ever say, My Son are you, today I generated you.

and again,

I shall be a Father to Him, and He will be to me a Son?

1, 6 Then, when he again leads the first-born into the world, he says,

And let all the angels of God worship Him.

V. 5 contains two citations from the Old Testament, one from Ps 2, 7 and the other from 2 Sam 7, 14. The key insight for interpreting the relationship between these two citations is that the relationship would seem to be based on the exegetical rule of *gezerah shawah*. This rule has been defined as follows: “Verbal analogy from one verse to another; where the same words are applied to two separate cases,
it follows that the same considerations apply to both".\textsuperscript{20} Thus, what is true of Ps 2, 7 is true also of 2 Sam 7, 14, and vice versa. Ps 2, 7 in Hebrews seems best taken as an allusion to the resurrection of Jesus (cf. Acts 13, 33).\textsuperscript{21} It illumines, by reason of \textit{gezerah shawah}, the following quotation from 2 Sam 7, 14 in which the original context seems to refer to the actual taking of the throne by the Davidic king, i.e., the enthronement in the strict sense of the word.\textsuperscript{22} This act of enthronement in turn illumines, by reason of \textit{gezerah shawah}, the previous text. The result is that the reader is to know that the resurrection of Jesus involves his enthronement/exaltation, and his enthronement/exaltation involves his resurrection: there are two distinct citations from scripture because there are two distinct realities under discussion, and it is the function of the \textit{gezerah shawah} to show that they are intimately linked.

\textsuperscript{20} Bateman, 13. Bateman (220) brings in another exegetical rule, \textit{kayose 'bo bemauqom 'aher}, according to which "a difficulty in one text may be solved by comparing it with another which has points of general though not necessarily verbal similarity" (Batemen, 18). Resort to this second rule seems unnecessary and perhaps even confusing, given the appropriateness of \textit{gezerah shawah} based on the common occurrence of the word "son" in both passages. Bateman suggests that the linking of the two verses points out that "in the progress of Jewish history and God's revelation, Psalm 2:7 and 2 Samuel 7:14 are exegetically linked, conceptually linked, and fulfilled in the Son". But this interpretation seems to be too general, and does not take into account the context of Chapter 1 of Hebrews, related as it seems to be to Chapter 2, as will be explained.

\textsuperscript{21} The exact relevance of the citation of Ps 2, 7 in Hebrews is, of course, much discussed. For a presentation of this discussion cf. Ellingworth, 112-114. The interpretation which seems to commend itself from the general context of the epistle (cf. Swetnam, "The Structure of Hebrews 1,1 - 3,6", 59-60) is that of B. Lindars, \textit{New Testament Apologetic: The Doctrinal Significance of Old Testament Quotations} (SCM Press; London, 1961) 140: "This use of Ps. 2.7 [sc. at Acts 13, 33] is legitimate according to the proper meaning of the psalm. The verse about God's 'begetting' of his son is equivalent to v. 6, being a poetic metaphor for the religious significance of the act of enthronement. In later days, when all such psalms were interpreted eschatologically, this became a truly messianic psalm in the strict sense, and a grasp of its poetry would suggest that this verse should be connected with the moment of revelation of the Messiah, rather than literally with the time of his physical birth (for which the thought of God's begetting would be felt to be inappropriate and distasteful, if not blasphemous). To the early Church the Resurrection, and its special aspect of Heavenly Session, was precisely the moment of this expected revelation. Granted that Ps. 2.7 is a metaphor of enthronement, then it can be claimed that the expectation embodied in the whole psalm has been fulfilled in Jesus. The argument is very close to that of Ps. 110.1" (ibid., 141). Lindars also has Ps 2, 7 refer to the resurrection in the citation at Heb 5, 5 and in the allusion at 7, 28 (ibid., 140). Cf. a presentation of the various opinions given in Ellingworth, 113. For the present writer the resurrection should be carefully distinguished from the exaltation or enthronement, though the two are intimately linked. Cf. J. Swetnam, "Ps 110, 1 and New Testament Christology: An Interpretation", \textit{Melita Theologica} 1/1(1999) 37-55.
The distinction is crucial for the christology of the author of Hebrews, for he conceives the resurrection of Jesus as being in function of Jesus as man, not in function of Jesus as God. Only as man can Jesus die;\(^22\) hence, only as man can Jesus rise from the dead.\(^24\) Heb 1,5 indicates that what follows in vv. 6-14 is about the enthronement of Jesus which takes place at the moment of his resurrection-exaltation. As was noted above, the introductory *eipen* in the aorist tense, which situates the passage with regard to the past and conveys the idea of some definite point in time, serves in vv. 5-14 as the basis for what is being said. The moment of the resurrection is that point in time, and the resurrection is the basis for what is said. Thus Heb 1, 5 corresponds well to the possible label "Exaltation" of a presumed enthronement ritual by showing that the resurrection of Jesus (v. 5a) really involves also his exaltation (v. 5b).

Heb 1, 6a refers not to the moment of Christ's incarnation nor to the moment of His second coming but to the moment of his exaltation.\(^25\) The use of the present tense, *legei*, situates the passage with regard to what follows the moment of the resurrection-exaltation and serves to bring the scripture citation to bear on the resulting present. The word *prōtotokos*, "first-born", in the context is an allusion to the Son as first-born from the dead.\(^26\) As he is reintroduced into the heavenly world he now has a (glorified) body.

The second part of the verse, 6b, is a citation from Dt 32, 43. It states simply that the angels of God should prostrate themselves before him who has been enthroned: what is the special concern of the author of Hebrews here is the difference

\(^{22}\) Cf. Grässer, 75-76.

\(^{23}\) That this is the opinion of the author of Hebrews can be inferred from Heb 2,14.

\(^{24}\) Cf. Swetnam, "Ps 110, 1", passim.

\(^{25}\) "Pour s'accorder vraiment au contexte, la phrase doit s'entendre, non pas d'une venue du Christ sur terre, mais de son intronisation céleste" (A. Vanhoye, *Situation du Christ: Hébreux 1 – 2* [Lectio Divina, 58; du Cerf; Paris, 1969] 155. Cf. also Grässer (77): "Hier [sc., Heb 1,6a] geht es nicht darum, dass jemand ein zweites Mal erscheint oder ankommt, sondern dass er zurückgeführt wird en einen ihm angestammten (2,10) oder zugewiesenen Ort (13,20 «hinaufführen»aus den Toten) durch einen anderen, der dazu die Macht hat. Das passt nicht zur Parusie, wohl aber zur Erhöhung als einer Inthronisation, bei der die Engel die Huldigung darbringen (Phil 2,11; Offb 5,6-10)").

\(^{26}\) Cf. Col 1, 18; Rom 8, 29; 1 Cor 15, 20; Acts 26, 23; and Grässer, 79.
between the Son's relation to God—implied parity—and the angels' relation to the Son—implied subordination.

B. Hebrews 1, 7-12

Heb 1, 7-12 reads as follows:

1, 7 Now to the angels he says,

He is the one making his angels spirits and his ministers a flame of fire,

1, 8 But to the Son,

Your throne, O God, is for ever and ever,
and the scepter of uprightness is the scepter of your kingdom.

1, 9 you loved justice and hated lawlessness;
because of this, God your God anointed you with the oil of rejoicing beyond all your companions.

1, 10 and,

You, Lord, in the beginning founded the earth,
and the heavens are the works of your hands;

1, 11 they will perish, but you will abide,
and all will grow old as a cloak,

1, 12 as a garment you will roll them up;
as a cloak they will also be changed;
but you are the same and your years will never stop.

The introductory verse, v. 7, is a statement about the angels as creatures. It seems to contain two anomalies: 1) the use of pros in the sense of "with regard to" and not "to", as for the other uses of pros in the passage (vv. 8 and 13); 2) a scripture

27. Grässer (76) seems to regard this parity as merely involving "honorific titles" on the part of the Son, invoking as background the Hellenistic world which regarded a plurality of titles as indicating a high position. But this is to ignore the fact that in vv. 5-14 the principal titles given to Jesus—"Son", "God", and "Lord"—are taken from the scriptures, not from Hellenistic sources. Further, this is to ignore the fact that elsewhere in the epistle the author alludes to the Son in a way which implies parity with God and the Spirit (e.g., Heb 2, 4). Cf. C. Spicq, L'épître aux Hébreux. II. Commentaire (Etudes bibliques; Gabalda, Paris, 1953) 28.

reference which does not seem to refer to the Son, in contrast with the all other scripture citations which, when not referring to the angels, refer to the Son (cf. vv. 5 [2x], 8-9, 10-12, 13)). Under closer inspection the anomalies disappear when the texts in question are given a different interpretation. On the basis of formal considerations the pros of v. 7 is better translated as “to”. The expression ho poiôn of v. 7 is better taken as referring to the Son for two reasons: 1) the verb poiôn echoes the verb eipoisen of v. 2 where it was stated that God created through the Son; 2) the understanding of the expression ho poiôn as referring in the context to the Son much improves the relevance of the citation which it introduces: the angels must do reverence to the Son (citation of v. 6) because it is the Son who has created them (v. 7). The underlying supposition seems to be that even though the angels are “spirits” (pneumata) and “a flame of fire” (puros ploga), they must do obeisance to the Son even though he has a (glorified) body now that he is being reintroduced into the oikoumène (v. 6): this supposition explains the otherwise rather gratuitous reference to the Son as being prototokos, “first-born”, which alludes to the Son as now being the first-born from the dead. This supposition leads one to reexamine the objects of address in v. 6. They would seem to be not only the angels but the Son as well: this seems to be implied by the lack of any explicit reference to anyone spoken to in the context of the rubric “as he (i.e., God) introduces again the first-born into the world”. The resulting presentation from the standpoint of the addressees would seem to be as follows:

v. 5: address to Son (implied by the rhetorical question introduced by tini and the direct address used in the citations);
v. 6: address to Son and the angels (implied by the use of legei with the rubric of introducing the first-born into the world—both the person being introduced (the Son) and the world he is being introduced to (the angels) are present;
v. 7: address to the angels (in contrast with v. 6 where both angels and Son are being addressed);
v. 8: address to the Son (in parallel with v. 7 where the angels are being addressed).

30. Cf. above, n. 9.
31. This possibility is noted, only to be rejected, by Ellingworth on the grounds that the angels are “more naturally understood as God’s angels or servants, rather than the angels or servants of the Son, though the Son’s participation in creation was mentioned in v. 2c” (120).
The citation in v. 6 refers to both parties being addressed, angels and Son, and the citation in v. 7 refers to the one party being addressed, the angels, but with reference to the Son who has just been jointly addressed in v. 6 and will again be solely addressed in vv. 8-12.

Thus the *pros* of v. 7 is intelligible in the sense of “to”, and the citation which follows is intelligible as a reference to the Son.

The two passages in the passage introduced by *pros de ton huion* in v. 8—quotations from Ps 45, 6-7 (vv. 8-9) and Ps 102, 25-27—are linked by the Jewish principle of *kayose ‘bo bemaqom ‘aher*. That is to say, the two passages are mutually illuminating even without a verbal link. The illumination consists in showing that the two titles, “God” (*theos*) and “Lord” (*kyrios*) are both equally applicable to the Son. This is of crucial significance. The two principal Old Testament designations for the divinity are here applied to the Son without qualification. This, of course, is a major statement about the identity of the Son, situating the names within the context of the even more fundamental—for the

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34. The textual problems involved with interpreting *theos* as a vocative are discussed in Ellingworth, 122-123; cf. also Vanhoye, 179-184.
35. In the original Hebrew text it is not clear how the word for “God” is to be interpreted, whether as a vocative or as a genitive (cf. Attridge, 58; Vanhoye, 176-177). But in the Greek text of the Epistle to the Hebrews the vocative use seems clear (cf. Ellingworth, 122; Vanhoye, 181-184). Ellingworth (122) notes that the two quotations are used to show that the Son is addressed both as God and as Lord in Scripture, with the fact that the titles occupy corresponding positions at the beginning of the quotations aiding this interpretation. This overt parallelism between the *theos* of Ps 45, 6 cited at Heb 1, 8 and the *kyrios* of Ps Ps 102, 25 cited at Heb 1, 10 eliminates any ambiguity about the function of *theos* in the former citation in Hebrews: it is clearly intended to be taken as a vocative; God is speaking to the Son as divine. Ellingworth (122) further says that neither title is emphasized or enlarged on here or later on in the epistle. But the Jewish principle of *kayose ‘bo bemaqom ‘aher* would explain why the quotations are used with no further comment or development: their mutual illumination is contained within the verses in question. The implications of this mutual illumination are in play throughout the epistle, of course, but in function of who Jesus is as Son, with no explicit reference to the Old Testament quotations contained in vv. 8-12.
36. On the view that these titles are being used in an “honorific” sense cf. above, n. 27. The citation from Ps 110, 1 at Heb 1, 13 is also relevant for a refutation of the view that the titles “God” and “Lord” in vv. 8 and 10 are merely honorific, as will be explained.
purposes of the author of Hebrews—name of “Son”: Jesus is fully “God” and “Lord” in the scriptural (i.e., Old Testament) sense of these words because he is Son.\(^{36}\) Such is the force of the quotations in the context of the structure of 1, 5-14.

This section, vv. 7-12, corresponds to the second possible division of a presumed enthronement ritual, “Presentation”. The Son would then be being presented by the formal procedure of identifying him through the use of the two scripture quotations. The way the scripture quotations are being used lends credence to the theory of such a ritual. The section presents the angels as being inferior to God, and then asserts that the Son is God. By inference, the angels are thus inferior to the Son.

**C. Hebrews 1, 13-14**

The final division of 1, 5-14 reads as follows:

1, 13 To whom then of the angels has he ever said,

\textit{Sit at my right hand until I place your enemies as a footstool of your feet?}

1, 14 Are not all of them ministering spirits sent out for service for the benefit of those about to inherit salvation?

V. 13 begins with the introductory words which echo the question at the beginning of 1, 5, thus framing the whole section. The use of the perfect tense of \textit{lego, eirēken,} situates the passage with regard to the future by stressing the continuation of the established fact, the resurrection-exaltation, to the time of writing of the epistle.\(^{37}\) The scripture quotation introduced by \textit{eirēken}, is from Ps 110,1, the classic exaltation/enthronement text in the New Testament.\(^{38}\) The text has God saying to the Son to wait at his right hand until he, God, places the Son’s enemies under the Son’s feet; that is to say, the present result of the action of the enthronement is to continue until some future, unspecified time.\(^{39}\)

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39. That the Son’s sitting is to be construed as a waiting until the enemies are placed under his feet would seem to be inferred from the allusion to Ps 110, 1 at Heb 10, 13, where the verb \textit{ekdechomai} replaces \textit{kathizō}. Cf. the discussion in Ellingworth, 131.
The present writer has attempted to show that the way Ps 110,1 is used in the New Testament indicates that the New Testament writers were consciously using this passage to show that Jesus as God, and precisely as God, did not die. This conclusion is inferred from the way Ps 110,1 is used in Hebrews 1 - 2, 1 Corinthians 15, Ephesians 1, and Acts of the Apostles 2.

In Heb 1, 13 the Ps 110, 1 is used in a gezerah shawah construction paired with a citation from Ps 8, 5-7 cited at Heb 2, 6-8. The connecting phrase is hypodion tôn podôn sou / hypokato tôn podôn autou. In the section following Heb 2, 6-8 the author of Hebrews is thinking of Jesus in the context of his death, speaking about his glorification through his sufferings (2, 9) and the liberating power of his death (2, 14-15). In contrast, Heb 1, 5-14 does not mention the death of Jesus. Reference to the resurrection, according to the interpretation followed in this paper, is limited to an allusion in 1, 5 which serves as an introduction to the exaltation culminating in the enthronement in 1, 13. This pattern of contrast between Ps 110, 1 and death is found in 1 Corinthians (1 Cor 15, 25-27, again in a gezerah shawah construction with Ps 8), in Ephesians (Eph 1, 20-22, an implied gezerah shawah construction with Ps 8), and in Acts of the Apostles (Acts 2, 25-35, in a gezerah shawah construction with Ps 16, 1-8). In these four passages the citation of Ps 110, 1 is presented consistently according to the following five patterns as: 1) indicating a recognized, widespread and early tradition with regard to establishing the identity of Jesus; 2) saying something distinctive about the identity of Jesus; 3) elaborating on the relation of Jesus to God through the imagery of subjection; 4) referring to a future subjection in establishing the relation of Jesus to God; 5) standing in contrast with a text representing Jesus’ past subjection to death.41

The patterns visible in 1 Corinthians, Ephesians, and Acts of the Apostles help sharpen the vision with regard to what the author of Hebrews is doing: he is using Ps 110, 1 as part of a recognized, widespread tradition (pattern 1), in order to say something distinctive about the identity of Jesus (pattern 2) with regard to the relation of Jesus to God using the imagery of subjection (pattern 3). The imagery of a future subjection is conveyed through the citation of Ps 110, 1 (pattern 4) in a stylized contrast with the imagery of a past subjection to death (Ps 8). Putting these patterns together results in the following picture: Jesus is portrayed in early Christian tradition

as having a distinctive identity which involves a past subjection to death according to one aspect (Ps 8, Ps 16), but which involves a contrasting future subjection which is based on his exaltation/enthronement (Ps 110, 1). Death is accordingly outside the purview of Ps 110, 1 precisely as such, even though the death of Jesus is an essential element for the proper understanding of who Jesus is. In other words, Ps 110, 1 conveys the idea that Jesus does not die even though the context it is clear that Jesus does die. The antecedent context of Heb 1, 13 explains why this can be: Jesus is Son and God and Lord and as such is exalted and enthroned at the moment of his resurrection. The context subsequent to Heb 2, 6-8 explains what is involved in the resurrection: Jesus is man and as such suffers death and is glorified. The two passages are linked by gezerah shawah so that what can be affirmed about Jesus according to Ps 110, 1 can also be affirmed about him as regards Ps 8, 6-8. Thus a complete picture of Jesus as God and man emerges from the way the two texts figure in the structure and in the way the structure serves as a basis for further elaboration. This is the God-man of Nicea, Ephesus and Chalcedon, but not in the formally ontological terminology of Greek philosophic culture but in the authoritative terminology of Hebrew scripture. In Catholic theology the latter would seem to be the prime analogate. But texts from scripture can be reductively ontological unless the statements of the above councils are to be considered as lacking in relevance and validity.

The first division (vv. 5-6) had two scripture references referring to the Son (vv. 5-6), mutually illuminating; the second division (vv. 7-12) had two scripture references referring to the Son (vv. 8-12), mutually illuminating. This third division has only one scripture reference. In the light of what was said above about the relation of Ps 110, 1 and Ps 8, 6 it is clear why there is only one scripture reference in the third division: it is paired in a gezerah shawah construction with the latter psalm cited at Heb 2, 6-8, a citation which serves as basis for comment in Heb 2, 9-18 just as Ps 110, 1 serves as a basis for comment in Heb 1, 5-14.

Heb 1, 14 rounds out the treatment of the exalted Jesus with a final reference to the angels to their role as ministering spirits sent for service. This verse not only ends the section 1, 5-14 but introduces the following parenetic section, 2, 1-4, with its mention of angels at 2, 2. The opening words, dia touto, indicate that what

follows is a conclusion from what went before. Again, in view of what was said above, it is clear why no scripture citation is given in this comment on the angels: such a citation would have detracted from the symmetry of the gezerah shawah involving Ps 110, 1 and Ps 8, 5-7. As the text of Hebrews stands now there is no scripture citation intervening between the use of the two texts at Heb 1, 13 and Heb 2, 6-8.

**Summary and Conclusion**

Heb 1,5-14 can be structured into three parts, each containing a scriptural component referring to the Son and a reference to the angels. The scriptural components in the first two parts, vv. 5-6 and vv. 7-12, each consist of two quotations from the Old Testament about the Son and one scriptural component about the angels. The quotations about the Son are related by Jewish exegetical devices, gezerah shawah (v. 5) and kayose 'bo bemaqom 'aher (vv. 8-12). Thus the two Old Testament quotations about the Son in v. 5 and the two Old Testament quotations in vv. 8-12 are mutually illuminating.

In v. 5 of the first part, the illumination is that the Jesus who has been raised from the dead is the same Jesus who has been exalted, and the Jesus who has been exalted is the same Jesus who has been raised from the dead. Given that being raised from the dead in the perspective of Hebrews (cf. 2,14) presumes humanity and that exaltation is used in the restricted sense of a divine being glorified without death (cf. 1,13), v. 5 is thus a miniature scriptural testimony to what later generations would term the two natures of Christ (cf. Chalcedon). The scripture quotation in v. 6 becomes, in the context, an indication of the subordination of the angels.

In the second part, vv. 7-12, the illumination from the interplay of the two scripture quotations is that the Jesus who has been exalted is both God and Lord in the scriptural sense. Thus vv. 8-12 constitute a miniature scriptural testimony to what later generations would term the full divinity of Christ (cf. Nicaea). The antecedent scriptural quotation at v. 7 again indicates the subordination of the angels by reason of their being created by the Son. The contrasting particles men and de of vv. 7 and 8 also imply that the subordination is to be understood with relation to Jesus insofar as he is God and Lord.

In the third part, vv. 13-14, there is only one scripture text about Jesus. The other, matching, text is found at 2, 6-8. The Old Testament quotation at 1, 13 sums up what has preceded and is the classic New Testament summary of the exaltation. In Hebrews this means what happened at the resurrection to Jesus insofar as he was God. The scripture citation at 2, 6-8 is the Old Testament text used for the development of what follows in vv. 9-18, a summary of the resurrection. In Hebrews this means what happened at the resurrection to Jesus insofar as He was man. Thus the combination of the Old Testament quotations at 1, 13 and 2, 6-8, when combined in the Jewish hermeneutical construction of *gezerah shawah*, constitute a mutually illuminating presentation of who Jesus is: God and man, and what the implications of this identity is in the perspectives of the epistle. The reference to the angels in this third part (v. 14) serves again to indicate their subordination to Jesus as spirits sent on a mission. Thus the verse also serves to introduce the parenesis which follows at 2,1-4.

These three parts of 1, 5-14 constitute a structure which is clearly an integrated whole in the mind of the author of Hebrews. There is good reason to assert that this structure follows the structure of the ancient enthronement ceremony which involves exaltation, presentation, and enthronement. But apodictic conclusions are not possible given the present knowledge of such a ceremony as it was known at the time the author of Hebrews was writing.

When viewed in the context of the entire passage 1, 5 - 2, 18, i.e., Jesus as enthroned and risen, the added nuance suggests itself that what is ultimately at stake here is not simply the subordination of angels to Jesus but the subordination of angels to one who has a body. For the Jesus as enthroned and risen has a body, albeit a glorified one. It is this body which may have been a sticking point for the addressees of the epistle, given the *prima facie* primacy of the spirit.44

The entire discussion which takes place in Heb 1, 5-14 is presented under the rubric of the “name” (1, 4). This “name” or “title” would seem to be the word “Son” itself. This is the word used in the prologue to introduce the subject of the discourse (1, 2). This is the word which links the two Old Testament quotations to form a *gezerah shawah* construction immediately following the introduction of v. 4

44. Cf. above, nn. 26 and 32. Cf. also Heb 2, 9 in which the temporary inferiority of Jesus as man with respect to the angels is contrasted with his risen glory. The temporary inferiority is not caused by the body of Jesus, but by the body of Jesus which made him subject to death.
in v. 5. This is the word which is used to introduce the identification of that subject as God and Lord (v. 8). This is the word which seems to be used as a title for 2, 5-18 in a quotation from Ps 8, 5 ("Son of man"). And, finally, this is the title used of Jesus in 3, 6, the final verse of the parenthesis which ends the entire section 2, 5-3, 6.

The name "Son" is important for understanding the relation of Jesus to God the Father (cf. 1, 5b) in the entire passage 2, 5 - 3, 6. Not only is the word "Son" important for understanding the Son as "heir" to the promises made to Abraham, but also for understanding the word "Son" as enthroned in relation to the right of the Father. In the Hebrew way of thinking, the word "son" indicates similarity. In Heb 1, 5-14 the sonship of Jesus indicates similarity with the Father in an ontological sense: Jesus is ontologically God and Lord but he is so as "Son", not as "Father". Thus the implications of the passage—no more can be affirmed than this—point to a relationship of the Son to the Father based on distinction within parity.

45. Cf. the implication of the phrase "many sons" in 2, 10, and the way the following verse, 2, 11, gives Jesus as sanctifier and those being sanctified a common origin.
47. "Der Begriff des Erbes spielt im Hebr eine wichtige Rolle (vg. 1,4.14; 6,12,17; 11,7,8; 12,17). Er fasst auf einer breiten und vielschichtigen biblischen Traditionsgrundlage, die im Früjudentum eine eschatologische Zuspitzung erfährt und im Hebr ganz auf die zukünftige Welt ausgerichtet ist: das ewige Erbe (9,15; 11,8), das 'Besitztum in der "Ruhe", das einen betont räumlichen Klang hat. Wenn der Sohn als 'Erbe von allem' eingesetzt wird, so eben als prototokos Erstgeborener (1,6), der vorlaufend von der himmlischen Heimat Besitz ergriffen hat. Die Inklusion kekleronoméken onoma er hat einen Namen geerbt V 4 und die Ausgestaltung dieser Belehnung in Form eines feierlichen Inthronisationsaktes V 5-14 entscheiden die Datumsfrage: Durch die Erhöhung wurde der Sohn zum Erben des alls eingesetzt" (Grässer, 57-58).
48. "huios mit Genitivus der Sache, um den zu beziehen, der dieser Sache teilhaftig oder würdig ist oder sonst in engem, sich oftmals aus dem Zusammenhang ergebender, Beziehung zu ihr steht, ist wohl berwiegend Hebraismus" (W. Bauer - K. Aland - B. Aland, Griechisch-deutsches Wörterbuch [Berlin-New York 1988], "huios", l.c.d. [col. 1664]). The importance this definition gives to the context should be noted.
49. Bateman (223) says that "The designation 'God' [sc., as found in Heb 1, 8-9] ... is not necessarily an ontological statement, but rather as the catena develops, it serves as a link and a reference to the Davidic Son's divine activities as God which have already been mentioned in Hebrews 1:2c, 3b and then supported in Hebrews 1:7, 10-12." This seems to ignore the ontological implications of the word "Son". The author of Hebrews thought ontologically, but not qua ontologically as do those who are accustomed to view Christ in a thought frame arising from Greek philosophy. Cf. again the implications of Heb 2, 14.
Thus Jewish hermeneutical techniques seem to be of service in the proper understanding of the structure, and hence of the meaning, of Heb 1, 5-14: the use of such techniques results in an interpretation which is elegant in its simplicity and unforced in its profundity.

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THE LANGUAGE OF UNIVERSAL SALVATION IN ROMANS

Paul A. Guillaumier

One cannot begin to investigate the source of the Apostle Paul's theology without taking into account his Judæo-Hellenistic milieu. What was the formative culture that Paul imbibed? For instance, one dares not delve into the plan and mind of Paul by studying only his Hebrew origins, for it would be wholly inexplicable to do so without a consideration of his Hellenistic education. It is a question of degree: for one must take care not to overemphasize the Greek element in his education, since his writings reveal no cognizance of the higher literature.

An initial problem is the language of universal salvation in Romans. What are the reasons for its origin? Are there, perhaps, oratorical passages in Greek literature, like speeches by military or political leaders embodying the hope of universal victory, that have idiomatic parallels in Romans?

According to Martin Pope, "There is no parallel in his Greek style in his predecessors or in contemporary writers [...] Pauline Greek is that of his age, when the Greek language had been and continued to be subject to the influence arising out of the mingling of races in the Greco-Roman world. Hence it remains an individual achievement in the Epistles, which become a powerful medium of direct personal appeal".¹

On the other hand, at Tarsus, Paul may have been acquainted with some of the Greek classics; and if he heard any Stoic lectures (there was in his days the school of Athenodorus), he would have been conversant with the thought of Plato—perhaps the Symposium. In the Phaedrus, the closing prayer of Socrates affords a clearer parallel with Paul's distinction between flesh and spirit:

"Such reading, reflection and mixing in the Greco-Roman world may have been seminal in instilling into Paul's mind ... the idea of unity and brotherhood that

transcended the limits of a city or a tribe, but the conception of universal brotherhood may have remained as yet an abstract and ineffective thought, devoid of a driving plan to move the world.”

For example, Paul’s military and architectural metaphors are vague and were in general use: “Words like to ‘fight’ and to ‘build’ have been coined into the universal language of mankind, and are constantly utilized without any idea of their origin […] Throughout the military metaphors, some of which are clearly conscious and intended, there are none which even in the slightest degree suggest any real interest and familiarity with military matters; they are quite popular; and there are only two which are constantly Roman in character, all the rest are military in general; they are not Roman any more than are Greek; they relate to the conception of the soldier in general.”

There is, however, an allusion to the completion of the divine saving victory in Col 2, 14-15 in terms of the soldiers in the train of a conqueror-hero’s Roman triumph. Even so, the problem of locating the source of Paul’s victory/salvation language is further complicated by whether we are looking for Hellenistic or Jewish-Hellenistic language that might have crept into the Apostle’s writings. According to A. Schweitzer even Paul’s use of the LXX (= the Septuaginta) does not yield word parallels in his writings, since he may have used Greek scriptural anthologies rather than the standard Greek texts. Paul may have been familiar with other writings, like those of his Judaeo-Hellenistic contemporaries, Philo of Alexandria and Josephus.

But Paul “does not use the ideas which are here offered to him. Jewish–Hellenistic theology is so characteristic a product that it can never be overlooked […] but in Paul no trace of it can be shown.”

Lately, the argument in favour Paul’s “higher all-round education” (höhere Allgemeinbildung’) and access to images and idioms in koine use, was reiterated

5. Ib.,92.
by Jürgen Becker. But Paul’s notion of the human predicament—the dilemma of sin/redemption—cannot be traced back to a specific branch of contemporary thought: “Paul does not have simply a ‘Jewish’ or a ‘Hellenistic’ or a ‘Hellenistic-Jewish’ conception of man’s plight. It appears that Paul’s thought was not simply taken over from any one scheme pre-existing in the ancient world.”


Hence, rather than Greek rhetoric ... primitive Christianity and its animating beliefs and traditions viewed vis-à-vis the sectarian background of Palestinian Judaism, could hold the key to the singularity of Paul’s eschatological language of salvation in Romans.

E.P. Sanders’ notion of ‘participationist eschatology’ may help in understanding Paul’s fundamental thought: “Salvation for Paul means primarily participation in the new reality created by the advent of Christ.” Although Paul’s view of universal or limited salvation is not clearly articulated, the notion of ‘transfer’ thus enabling salvation seems to be the crux interpretum to the understanding of his doctrine.

Further, whereas according to Sanders, ‘covenental nomism’ was formerly held by Palestinian Judaism to be the norm, i.e. the process of ‘staying in’ or being born within the covenant of the people of God, Paul’s view of salvation was that “... only those who ‘transfer’ [become Christians] will be saved [and] salvation is for all because Christ conquers all; but salvation is nonetheless [...] only through Christ.”

4. Ib., 291.
Thus, Paul’s view of the human predicament and the ‘wrath of God’ provide the parameters of his eschatology in the light of Jewish apocalyptic. This view would then exclude any derivation from Greek tradition with its framework of a moral world-view: “The decisive perspective is the eschatological one, which already in Zeph, 1,18 and Dan, 8, 19 allows the last judgement to be called technically the day of wrath.”\(^{10}\) This background has been thoroughly studied by W.D. Davies in his seminal work *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*.\(^{11}\) Well before Qumran and its documents came into view, Davies thought that “…apocalyptic is especially important in any study of the background of Paul [and] that Paul was acquainted only in the slightest degree with both Greek literature and philosophy.”\(^{12}\)

But in what way does Old Testament apocalyptic inform the plan and language of Romans? According to James D.G. Dunn\(^ {13}\) Paul embraced a form of the Hebraic notion of the two aeons. Within this framework – a beginning in creation leading to an end, and a final judgement – Paul interposed the coming of Christ and his saving grace as the central theme in the human drama of failure and suffering of the new age.\(^ {14}\)

Paul’s apocalyptic has close affinities with that of Ezra\(^ {15}\) yet only Judaeo-Christian apocalyptic has a world-redeemer – a messiah – the Lord of the coming age.\(^ {16}\) But there is a difference: Paul passes over the catastrophic end-of-the-world events typical of Judaeo-Christian apocryphal writings. All that Paul looks forward to is the proclamation of universal salvation (Rom 5,18,11) in the sense of the defeat of Satan (Rom 16,20) as a result of Christ’s coming.

This means that Paul’s language of universal salvation spells out the ‘victory’ of the ‘conqueror’ and ‘liberator’ over the alien threat: sin and death, and not Greco-Roman civilization or its protagonists. This language conjures up figures of God-the-King whose reign extends to include all creation. This salvation is freely available

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10. See Ernst Käsemann, *Commentary on Romans*, (Grand Rapids 1990), 33–52.
12. Ib., 10,12.
13. See *The Theology of Paul the Apostle*, (Grand Rapids 1998).
16. (Ib., 193 n.2).
to ‘all’ mankind as a whole. It evokes images of Christians as ‘conquerors’ (Rom 8,37). The ‘victory’ as such, the last fight of Christ Jesus and the Christian community, will be over “angels and principalities, powers of the height and of death” (Rom 8,38-39). Yet even these will be ultimately reconciled to God in Christ: “The material universe will be liberated from thraldom [and] we shall move – at the end – to glorious liberty.”17

Paul’s universalism reveals a mindset informed by the LXX language of prophetical salvation in Deutero-Isaiah, Habakkuk and Ezekiel, as well as in some sections of apocryphal Enoch, Ezra and Baruch. In this literature Jahweh is acknowledged not only as the God of Israel but also as the Ruler, the Lord, of the universe.18

Particular importance should also be given to the Qumran literature, since the “salvation-creating power” inherent in Paul’s understanding of the “righteousness of God” parallels early Christian eschatology. This language reveals a God who in the end will not only be victorious over the defeated, unrighteous cosmos, but who seems to long for his creation to be reconciled to him.19

Although Paul “observed none of the literary conventions of apocalyptic literature”,20 his usage of to “be made righteous” in the sense of to “be justified” is a term indicating “getting in”, not staying, in the body of the saved. This is the concept of ‘transfer’: “The similarity is probably connected with the fact that both in Qumran and in Paul one must ‘be converted’: join a group [in which] one was not born.” Ultimately, with the victory brought about by the death of Christ, the struggle comes to an end and, with the restoration of the divine image, there is hope of future glory and access to the Praesentia Dei.21

18. See Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism, 55–85.
20. ib., 544.
Another point in the formation of Paul’s language is the use of ‘triumphal imagery’ and the designation of himself as the “priest of the Messiah” (Rom 15:16-21, 23): “In the last resort his [Paul’s] metaphor of the priest of the messiah is interchangeable with that of the cosmic conqueror (Cf. 2 10.4ff); on both occasions the subject is the singular mandate and world-wide function of the apostle to the gentiles who places the ungodly at the feet of his lord and sets them in his triumphant procession.”

In conclusion ... this kind of doctrine developed by Paul (and John) harks back not to Judaeo-Hellenistic gnosticism but to Judaeo-Christian sectarianism: “Paul and John must have been familiar with the writings of Qumran, or others like them, and whether approving or opposing them, made use of them to formulate and express their Christian message.”

Although it is by no means easy to find parallels between Qumran and Pauline literature, there are, for instance, echoes in Romans 3:21–31, 1, 17 to some passages in the Thanksgiving Psalms and the hymn in the Manual of Discipline. These hymns “express also a profound sense of the righteousness of God, by which man is given a righteousness he could never attain for himself.” This view is also maintained by Joseph A. Fitzmyer “In such ideas [see 4:30-38; 9:32-34; 14:14-16 in 1 QH=The Hymns and 11:9-15 in 1 QS=The Manual of Discipline] one finds the Palestinian matrix for the Pauline idea of God’s righteousness and of justification by faith.”

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22. Ib., 140.
H. SCERRI, KOINONIA, DIAKONIA AND MARTYRIA\(^1\); INTERRELATED THEMES IN PATRISTIC SACRAMENTAL THEOLOGY AS EXPOUNDED BY ADALBERT G. HAMMAN O.F.M.

Les disciples font les maîtres, directement souvent, indirectement parfois. Ils stimulent leur recherche, précisent leur pensée, clarifient le foisonnement de leurs élucubrations, puis ... en tirent matière à une thèse.

C'eût été le parcours de Hector Scerri, s'il avait été mon élève. Ce qui ne fut pas. Mais au lieu d'écouter des cours, il s'est évertué à rassembler puis à analyser avec diligence, méthode et discernement mon enseignement épars en quantité de publications et jusqu'à l'inédit, qui couvre une cinquantaine d'années. Principalement la théologie sacramentaire, plus particulièrement l'eucharistie et sa dimension sociale et caritative.

Une thèse de théologie, présentée par Hector SCERRI, à la Faculté de Théologie de l'Université Grégorienne de Rome, a comme titre "KOINONIA, DIAKONIA AND MARTYRIA; ce qui veut dire communauté, "diakonie" ou service, et martyr ou témoignage.

C'est une analyse des travaux et des études diverses échelonnés sur une trentaine d'années du Père HAMMAN, Franciscain, qui a enseigné à Rome à l'Institut Patristique. L'auteur présente là un excellent ensemble de la démarche élaborée, jusqu'en 1984, sur ce triple thème "communauté, diakonie ou service et témoignage".

Scerri y expose par ailleurs la majeure partie des racines culturelles et les influences exercées sur le Père Hamman.

On pourrait tout au plus, dans l'analyse des différents travaux, regretter l'oubli

1. Hector SCERRI, Koinonia, Diakonia and Martyria, (Melita Theologica Supplementary Series 4; Malta 1999) 418 pages.
presque total de l’aspect cosmique qui, ici en particulier, aurait pu jouer un rôle capital dans l’élaboration de la théologie qui est chère à l’auteur, a savoir la partie existentielle, la partie active, vivante, de la réalité sacramentaire dans l’Église.

Un autre aspect qui semble insuffisamment pris en considération, est l’offrande liturgique (IVème partie de “Vie liturgique et vie sociale”): cette coutume, habituelle dès les premières communautés chrétiennes, consistait à apporter à la célébration eucharistique, des dons, d’abord le pain et le vin de la célébration, mais aussi d’autres offrandes pour les partager avec les plus démunis de la communauté.

Ceci dit, dans un deuxième temps, Scerri essaie d’esquisser une synthèse, une conclusion; celle-ci à vrai dire n’est pas complètement dans le thème; elle s’aventure dans la théologie de la libération et sur le thème de la liberté, préconisé pour un congrès eucharistique international à Wroslaw en 1997, ce qui ne conclut pas réellement l’analyse précédente.

J’aimerais donc essayer d’esquisser avec le recul de l’histoire, du temps, la réflexion sur ce thème: “Que pourrait être la synthèse de cet ouvrage?”

1. “Vision sacramentelle de l’univers”

Maurice Zundel, dans sa période la plus jeune, avait écrit un ouvrage qui a été loué, et je crois préfacé, par Mauriac et qui s’appelle “Le poème de la divine liturgie”. Il s’ouvre sur ce qu’il appelle la vision sacramentelle de l’univers donc, si nous voulions transposer, la vision sacramentelle de la création, de la création comme telle, base du sacrement.

C’est un thème qui n’est pas familier à la théologie occidentale, et cependant, quand on y regarde de très près, la Bible commence le récit de la création, non pas par l’homme, mais par l’univers: le ciel, la terre, la mer et finalement la flore, la faune et au sommet de cette création arrive enfin l’homme. Et c’est là le premier thème important qui n’a pas tellement été accueilli en Occident mais qui est familier aux Grecs et plus particulièrement à la théologie syriaque. Il présente la création comme la première révélation, la première parole, la parole devenant acte de Dieu qui exprime là ce qu’est pour Lui le monde créé. Il s’agit donc du dévoilement de Dieu, dévoilement de la place de l’homme dans cette création.

Quand nous reprenons les deux récits de la Création, nous voyons que l’homme
n’apparaît pas tout de suite, il y a d’abord une préparation, il y a une progression lente des différentes étapes qui sont la terre, la mer, les étoiles, ensuite les produits du sol, la faune, la flore et ce n’est qu’au sommet qu’apparaît finalement celui que Grégoire de Nysse appelle le “souverain”.

Il y a dans “La création de l’homme” de Grégoire de Nysse cette phrase très curieuse, très belle, “le palais est prêt, il ne manque que son souverain”.

Grégoire écrit aussi:
“… C’est dans ces conditions qu’il fait apparaître l’homme dans le monde; les merveilles de l’univers trouveront en lui leur contemplateur et leur maître; ainsi, jouissant de ces merveilles, il aura l’intelligence de son bienfaiteur, et la beauté et la grandeur du spectacle lui feront suivre la trace de ce créateur dont la puissance indicible passe l’entendement”.

Et, plus loin:
“… il introduit l’homme qu’il destine non pas à acquérir des biens qui seraient encore à rechercher, mais à jouir de choses déjà bien présentes. Et c’est pour cela que Dieu, quand il crée l’homme, place en lui une dualité de principes: il y mêle le divin et le terrestre, pour que ces deux principes mettent l’homme en accord et en conformité avec la double puissance de Dieu par la nature divine, et des biens terrestres par la sensation qui est de la même nature qu’eux”.

Donc ce palais est déjà créé pour l’homme, en vue de l’homme, et c’est l’homme qui achève, qui est le dernier chaînon de l’histoire de la création. Quand il est dit dans le récit de la Genèse que l’homme est créé “à l’image de Dieu”, il est créé tel antérieurement à aucun de ses actes. Ce n’est donc pas le péché qui peut tant soit peu toucher cette ressemblance ontologique; l’image de Dieu est inscrite dans la nature structurelle de l’homme, qui constitue son être, qui donc est inammissible, même pour le pécheur.

Sur ce point, saint Augustin a hésité et pris conscience qu’il avait erré, et, dans ses Révisions, il est revenu à la thèse primitive que l’homme comme tel, dans sa structure humaine, est image de Dieu, donc reflète quelque chose du Mystère de Dieu.

Cela, il le montre en particulier par sa liberté: il est le seul être par rapport à tout ce qui a existé précédemment qui est responsable de ses actes et le reste même
lorsqu’il devient pécheur et qu’il a pu faillir.

Donc l’homme, ou plus exactement l’humanité, tous les hommes, sont ensemble (retenons bien cette expression) sacramentum futuri, la traduction latine de la Genèse (cf Corinthiens 1, 15) et nous avons là très ponctuellement déjà le mot de “sacrement”. C’est une manière de percevoir, de pouvoir toucher de la main, par ses sens, ce qui est invisible du Mystère de Dieu. “Sacramentum futuri” est une expression que saint Paul emploie (Romains 5, 14) pour dire que ce premier homme comme tel regarde en avant vers l’homme à venir, l’homme parfait qui sera le Christ Jésus et qui viendra finalement nous fournir l’unique homme, parfaite image de Dieu.

II. Le sacrement par excellence est l’incarnation


C’est en Christ que le créé et l’incréé se rejoignent, c’est l’union du ciel et de la terre. Beaucoup de mystiques y ont vu le mystère nuptial, l’alliance définitivement scellée entre Dieu et l’humanité, jusque dans la chair de l’homme, et nous touchons à nouveau ici le point de vue concret, palpable du mystère de l’incarnation et de Dieu. Ce thème est biblique, il est patristique, souvent repris et souvent lié à l’histoire de Jésus, où l’Christ apparaît comme soulevant avec lui la terre entière. Il existe un texte d’Ambroise où il dit: “Jésus est descendu dans les eaux du Jourdain et sortant des eaux, il souleva le cosmos tout entier avec lui”: c’est-à-dire il a sacré, il a rendu porteurs de grâce toutes les choses de la terre, il les a sacramentalisées.

Je me souviens d’un énarque qui me posa un jour la question: “Qu’est-ce qu’un sacrement?” Je lui ai répondu:” Mon cher L., je ne vais pas te faire une réponse de catéchisme; tu ne serais pas avancé si je te disais que c’est un signe qui porte la grâce. Je vais te dire une chose: de toutes les religions de la terre, toutes, une seule chose distingue le christianisme des autres religions (bouddhisme, hindouisme,
taïsme, islamisme ...): dans la religion chrétienne, Dieu s’est fait homme, il a paru dans une existence, il a vécu une existence, il a assumé la terre, la matière dont il a été lui aussi tiré pour la porter à Dieu, son créateur.

C’est donc là que se situent à la fois la personne et la mission de Jésus. En venant dans l’histoire, dans un pays donné, dans une famille humaine, dans une race précise, il apporte le message de bienveillance, de tendresse, de philanthropie, comme disent les Pères Grecs, d’amour de l’homme jusqu’à assumer son existence quotidienne, en des épousailles d’amour.

Donc la personne de Jésus est le véritable, le seul, le parfait sacrement, parce qu’il est terre et ciel, il est temps et éternité, il prend la route de la terre qui conduit jusqu’à la cité divine. Son existence est déjà annoncée dès le départ mais elle se déroule dans le temps, dans les trente ans de sa vie terrestre qui s’achèvent d’une façon tragique, dans la Passion qui elle-même, n’est pas une fin’ mais qui aboutit finalement à sa résurrection, c’est-à-dire au retour de son existence terrestre, de son corps et de son âme, au retour de l’homme tout entier qui partage à partir de sa résurrection la gloire de son Père et fait partager à toute l’humanité, pétrie de chair et de sang, le mystère de Dieu, la résurrection de l’homme tout entier, la gloire de la Tête. Le corps tout entier marche vers sa glorification qui achèvera l’histoire du salut.

III. L’incarnation s’achève en l’Église, l’épousee

Le Christ en gloire entraîne désormais toute la caravane terrestre derrière lui à travers ce que nous appelons l’Église.

Je donnerai là encore un exemple très concret. On a pu très souvent représenter au tympan des cathédrales le Christ en gloire, rayonnant, ouvrant ses deux bras pour bien exprimer que tous ceux qui montent vers cette église marchent dans la direction du Christ en gloire, leur chef, leur tête; le corps tout entier va s’engouffrer par le même chemin pour aboutir à la même gloire.


La catéchèse primitive aimait l’image nuptiale; on montrait aux jeunes candidats au baptême que le mystère de l’Église est le mystère des épousailles du Christ et
des hommes. Ce thème a été choisi pour la liturgie de Noël pour bien montrer que Dieu s’est engagé d’une façon définitive, absolue et totalement irréductible par le Christ dans cette folle aventure d’un indicible amour.

Tout naturellement, Ambroise aime citer aux jeunes baptisés des textes du Cantiques des Cantiques – qui est le texte nuptial par excellence de l’Ancien Testament – pour leur faire comprendre qu’ils sont des épousés, choisis désormais, entrant dans ce que l’auteur de la thèse appelle la “koinonia”, la communauté, le corps mystique du Christ. C’est ce corps du Christ, préparé avant le Christ, à travers l’humanité et la généalogie qui est développée dans la Genèse; par ses ancêtres il jette ses racines dans cette terre, dans cette terre d’Israël, et à travers le temps il réalise ainsi le dessein de Dieu qui veut réunir, associer, partager son mystère, son royaume avec ceux qui en sont les sujets.

Rappelons-nous ce mot de Saint Augustin à propos de l’Eucharistie: “Tu dis ‘Amen’ lorsque le prêtre te dit ‘le Corps du Christ’; c’est à ton mystère que tu dis ‘Amen’.”

L’Eucharistie n’est pas simplement une devotion, ce n’est pas simplement une présence, ce n’est pas simplement une action passagère, c’est un chantier, une construction qui va rassembler tous les membres humains dans une même réalité qu’on appelle Eglise, Corps du Christ, Temple de L’Esprit.

L’Eucharistie est donc le sacrement qui contient et exprime toute l’oeuvre de Dieu dans l’univers, à partir de la première création jusqu’à l’achèvement final.

Sacramentum fidei, c’est le sacrement qui fonde la foi. C’est toute la dynamique qui a été donnée à l’Eglise, aux premières générations chrétiennes, que les nouvelles se sont transmise et qui leur donne à toutes cette impulsion vivante à travers les trois thèmes que récapitule Hector Scerri: la “koinonia” (ils commencent à devenir une communauté organisée, une structure du corps total), et cette communauté n’est pas seulement une communauté de prière, mais d’action; ils vont désormais vivre entre eux la même tendresse de Dieu qu’ils ont reçue et donc partager leurs biens, les mettre en commun et en faire la peréquation.

C’est pour eux et chacun des êtres humains qu’ils ont une vocation, un service à rendre (diakonia) à tel point que l’autre, de quelque couleur qu’il soit, de quelque culture qu’il soit, en tout homme nous devons découvrir le visage de Dieu.
Qui vous reçoit, Me reçoit.

"Chaque fois que vous l’avez fait à l’un de ces petits, qui sont mes frères, c’est à moi que vous l’avez fait" (Matthieu 25, 40).

Nous voyons là à quel point non seulement entre chrétiens, mais le chrétien par rapport à tout homme a une vocation que Scerri appelle “martyria”, de témoignage, qui autrefois, dans les premières générations, a bouleversé les païens et les a fait venir en masse se convertir dans le Christ – seul l’amour fait naître la foi – s’écriant: “Comme ils s’aiment!”

Parfois, certaines communautés, certains chrétiens ont failli à cette mission; on pourrait dire: “comme ils se détestent, comme ils préconisent la haine de l’étranger, de celui qui pour une raison ou pour une autre leur déplait!”

C’est cela que signifie finalement l’Eucharistie: l’Eucharistie veut ouvrir nos yeux à cette présence active de Dieu, à notre responsabilité de chrétien par rapport à l’ensemble de tous les hommes que nous pouvons rencontrer. C’est la présence active du Christ (pas seulement sous la forme pain/vin, corps/sang): le Christ continue son oeuvre dans l’Esprit et fait du chrétien un “homme-eucharistie”, selon le mot de Patrice de la Toudou Pin.

IV. Tension Eschatologique

L’histoire de l’Eglise est une histoire qui aura une fin; c’est encore une vérité qui nous est rappelée dans les textes qui parlent de l’Eucharistie. Ainsi saint Paul dit: “Chaque fois que vous mangerez de ce pain, que vous boirez à cette coupe, vous annoncerez la mort du Christ, jusqu’à ce qu’il revienne.”

L’histoire aura donc une fin. Le Christ reviendra: quand le compte sera complet de ceux qu’il veut introduire dans son royaume, le temps s’achèvera.

Or l’Eucharistie est à la fois, en nous, la prise de conscience et l’action de grâce de toute la création qui reconnaît le passage de Jésus, mais qui en même temps, comme dit saint Paul aux Romains (au chapitre VIII je crois) “La création entière gémit en attendant son achèvement”: “donec veniat”. Une des paroles que l’on a réintroduite dans la liturgie, une parole sémitique, le “maranatha” ne signifie pas autre chose: “Dieu vient”, ou “que Dieu vienne”! Le Christ est devant
nous dans la gloire pour tirer vers lui, entraîner vers lui l’histoire entière jusqu’à la fin du monde.

Grégoire de Nysse, dans son volume sur la Création de l’homme (chapitre XVI), en vient à développer ce thème du *corps total*. Il dit que l’homme, Adam, est un nom collectif; il signifie “l’humanité”; ce sont tous les hommes qui se rassemblent dans le Christ, qui se retrouvent en lui; ils mènent à l’achèvement la création entière.

“Voilà pourquoi un seul homme désigne l’ensemble de l’espèce, parce que pour la puissance de Dieu il n’y a ni passé ni futur; l’avenir comme le présent sont soumis à son activité qui enveloppe l’univers. Toute la nature humaine, des origines jusqu’à la fin, est donc une seule image de Celui qui est ...”.

Nous l’avons vu, nous recevons le Christ, nous recevons son dynamisme par le pain, par le vin, par l’huile, par des matières, par l’eau au baptême: c’est donc l’intégration de la création tout entière qui, à travers l’histoire, trouve son unité universelle quand le Christ aura tout déposé aux pieds de son Père.

Grégoire de Nysse affirme, dans son *Traité sur la parole* “*A lors le Fils lui-même se soumettra à celui qui lui a tout soumis*” (*1 Co* 15, 28).

“Celui qui nous a unis à lui et qui s’est uni à nous, et qui en tout est devenu un avec nous, s’approprie tout ce qui est nôtre. Et la soumission au divin est le sommet de nos biens lorsque toute la création sera en accord avec elle-même, et que “tout genou flechira devant lui, les êtres célestes, terrestres et infernaux, et que toute langue proclamera que Jésus Christ est le Seigneur” (*Ph* 2,10–11). Alors toute la création étant devenue un seul corps et tous étant unis les uns avec les autres en lui par l’obéissance, il rapportera à lui-même la soumission de son propre corps au Père.”

C’est à ce moment-là que l’histoire sera terminée. Et jusque-là, l’humanité attend; elle a reçu, elle recevra. C’est ce que nous appelons, d’un mot très simple dont nous avons un peu perdu la valeur, l’*espérance*. C’est ce que nous avons au coeur lorsque nous passons à travers les épreuves de la vie, dans ce que Paul appelle le “*gémissement du cosmos*”, le gémissement des élus dans l’Esprit, dont parle l’Apocalypse, qui finalement aura un terme.

Ce terme sera ce qui est désigné dans les Actes des Apôtres par l’“*apocatastase*”,

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H. Scerri
c’est-à-dire le renouvellement, le remodelage de toute la création depuis ses origines avec les nouveaux cieux, la nouvelle terre, dans le royaume de Dieu où l’homme, l’humanité entière, sera définitivement et irrévocablement uni à Celui qui est à la fois son Créateur et son Père.

Aux lecteurs à présent, que je souhaite nombreux et attentifs, de découvrir la somme de travail réunie ici, d’en déceler les aspects parfois occultés, d’en dégager le profit pastoral et existentiel, à l’école des Pères, pour en vivre “jusqu’à la plénitude”, comme le dit et le fit Ignace d’Antioche, devenu “pain de Dieu”.

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It is not without a deep sense of loss that the present writer undertakes to write this late coming review. The author of the volume being presented here in this number of Melita Theologica has passed away in 1998 and hence needs no such reviewing service to understand the merits and limitations of what turned out to be his last major work. On the other hand, reviews are written also as contributions to scholarship and as a service to readers who would willingly receive illumination and guidance regarding the value of books and other exegetical tools. In this case we are in front of an opus magnum. How are we to judge this last major contribution of one of the most influential Catholic exegetes of the Twentieth Century? What are its strengths and/or its weaknesses? How are we to evaluate the methodological options made by its writer as he sought to understand what the Gospels and other sources say about the passion and death of Jesus Christ? Has Brown succeeded in communicating his insights to the ‘variety of audiencies’ (1:viii) he had chosen as his target audiences?

The work’s subtitle already spells out its literary genre: “A Commentary on the Passion Narratives in the four Gospels”. In this volume Brown offers a detailed commentary on every single episode in the Passion Narratives read ‘horizontally,’ that is, “studying each episode in all four Gospels simultaneously” without ceding however to any ‘harmonizing goal’ and without losing sight of the ‘vertical chain of thought peculiar to each Gospel read consecutively’ (1:viii). The four editions of the Passion Narrative are divided into four “Acts” which Brown entitles “Prayer/Arrest”; “Jewish Trial”; “Roman Trial”; “Crucifixion/Burial”. Several of these Acts have “Scenes”. “The use of ‘Act’ and ‘Scene’ to designate the divisions reflects my understanding of the Gospel accounts as dramatic narratives” (1:ix; cfr pp.4-13). In practice, Brown’s commentary consists of forty-eight paragraphs of which §3 is dedicated to general bibliography with §§4.12.17.25.30.37.45 carrying sectional bibliographies. The first two paragraphs are introductory though they should be seen as essential for a proper understanding of the author’s perspectives and methodological options. §§4-48 are mostly taken by the commentary proper. However, even when the text of the commentary comes to an end, Brown’s opus continues for another three hundred pages or so with a number of appendixes wherein he discusses very specific issues related to the com-
mentary: 'the Gospel of Peter' (II:1317-1349); the date of the crucifixion (II:1350-1378); some texts considered to be 'difficult to translate' (II:1379-1393); 'Judas Iscariot' (II:1394-1418); 'Jewish groups and authorities mentioned in the Passion Narratives' (II:1419-1434); 'The sacrifice of Isaac and the passion' (II:1435-1444); 'the OT background of the Passion Narratives' (II:1445-1467); 'Jesus' predictions of his Passion and Death' (II:1468-1491); and the 'question of a PreMarcan Passion Narrative' (II:1492-1524). Other services that are offered include a number of indexes covering names of authors consulted, subjects treated (II:1525-1581) and 'Gospel Passage Index consisting of translations of the four passion narratives' and a list of pages where each text is principally commented upon (II:1584-1608). One may say that Brown makes sure that no aspect of the Passion Narratives remains without some explanation.

In order to show how the commentary functions, we shall detail Brown's treatment of 'Act I, Scene I (which comprises Mk 14,26-42; Matt 26,30-46; Lk 22,39-46; John 18,1). First comes a table of the contents on I:108-109; the sectional bibliography follows, §4, on I:110-116 with items for each subheading: 'Jesus goes across the Kedron to the Mount of Olives'; 'the prayer and agony of Jesus in Gethsemane'; 'the strengthening Angel in Luke 22,43-44'.

The sectional bibliography is followed by a literal translation of the text to be commented upon ['May I emphasize my awareness of how painfully literal is this translation-at times to the point of awkwardness..." (I.ix). This occasioned the translation of the text at the end of the second volume]. Then come the main sections of each paragraph of the commentary, one entitled 'Comment', the other 'Analysis'. In the first Brown tries to show and explain 'what the evangelist wanted to convey by the passage' (I.ix); in the latter he 'studies possible dependence of one Gospel on another, proposed preGospel traditions, and factors pertinent to historicity unavoidable questions, answered of necessity by theorizing, but scarcely the heart of the commentary' (I:x).

One cannot hope to do full justice to Brown's contribution to scholarship in this important heritage. The present reviewer found his discussion of the texts and the particular issues involved quite comprehensive, thorough, balanced, 'user-friendly', and sensitive to both the ecclesial dimension and to the human and pastoral aspects of the passages studied [His discussion of the 'responsibility and/or guilt for the death of Jesus' and of the question of the 'antijudaism in the passion narratives of the four gospel' (I:383-397) merits a mention in this regard]. Having stated that much, there remains room for
discussion over some of the methodological options made by the author of the commentary; and this is what the present reviewer has thought of offering in his evaluation of this work. Our discussion will touch upon three options:

1. The 'horizontal' reading of the pericopae. From the synoptical perspective Brown's approach carries no few advantages. The reader learns 'instantly' how each edition of the Passion Narrative treats the detail, personage, or episode. Brown is of course aware both of the 'vertical' dimension of each Passion Narrative as well as of the danger of harmonization tendencies (cfr I:viii). However, what his 'horizontal' reading misses is the role each Passion Narrative presumably plays within its context, that is, each gospel as whole read as a literary unity even if the Passion Narrative could have antedated the gospel proper or could have enjoyed time of independent existence before it became part and parcel of the gospel. Just to take one example: the Passion Narrative is considered by some as the climax of the gospel as a whole with Jesus' cry on the cross reported in Mk 15,34-36 as the interpretative key of Jesus as he is represented in Mark. But all this is lost in Brown's work.

2. The division into 'scenes' and 'acts'. Brown has been correct in underlining the 'narrative' character of the four Passion Narratives and their 'dramatic nature'. “The division of the commentary into acts and scenes”, he reiterates on p. 11 of volume One, “is meant to underline my view that the passion accounts are truly dramatic narratives”. It would appear that the evangelists did have some auracular representation in mind. Unfortunately, however, i) in order to understand how one should approach these 'stories' as narrative Brown turns to scholarly work the terminology and conceptual apparatus of which are in dire need of metalinguistical exercises (I: 12 note 11); ii) he should have taken the path of biblical narratology rather than that of drama. And in biblical narratology 'scene' means something different than it does in drama [The reviewer would refer the reader to Jean Louis Ska, “Our Fathers Have Told Us”. Introduction to the Analysis of Hebrew Narrative, (Subsidia Biblica, 13; Rome 1990)33-35; in this way he would be situting NT narrative art within the OT narrative tradition where it belongs].

3. Is the Last Supper part of the
Passion Narrative? The sheer mole of narrative material constituting the four passion accounts led Brown to operate an artificial delimitation within each Gospel. “I have chosen to write this commentary on that section of the Gospels that begins with the Gethsemane (the place of the arrest of Jesus) and ends with the grave (the burial of Jesus’ body), thus Mark 14,26-15,47; Matt 26,30-27,66; Luke 22,39-23,56; John 18,1-19,42” (I: 36-37). According to Brown this delimitation of what is the Passion Narrative in each gospel is defensible on two grounds: “Those who wish to reflect, study, or preach about the passion generally do not think of the Last Supper or the resurrection as part of the subject matter” (I: 37). A second argument is that while through his ministry and the Last Supper “Jesus has held the initiative and proclaimed God’s kingdom as he deemed best; but now, at least on the visible level, others take the initiative, for the Son of Man is given over into their hands” (Ibid). One may understand Brown and accept that some artificial delimitation of the text understand cannot be avoided so that parts of the text have to be left out from the commentary given the limits imposed by editorial considerations. But Brown’s procedure is neither licit nor valid. His word of caution is in order: ‘Despite the defensibility of delimiting the area on which this book comments, I would caution the readers that the evangelists themselves may have had a different understanding of what constituted Jesus’ passion” (I:37). As if determining the internal segmentation of the text to be exegeted is not basic to any exegesis activity [Cfr Ernst R.Wendland, “The Discourse Analysis of Hebrew Poetry: A Procedural Outline” in Id (ed), Discourse Perspectives on Hebrew Poetry in the Scriptures, (United Bible Societies; Reading/New York 1994) 1-28]. If the goal of the present commentary was set as “to explain in detail what the evangelists intended and conveyed to their audiences by their narratives of the passion and death” (1:4) how can we choose to run the risk of leaving out whole parts of what the evangelists may have considered as part and parcel of their Passion Narrative? This becomes clear in the case of Mark where 14,1-25 narrates a number of incidents which not only led directly to the passion story but antecipated a number of narrative elements.
Just to mention one detail: Jesus’ description of Judas, at the close of what Brown terms as the First Scene in Act One as \textit{ho paradidous} (14,42) remains vague unless one has read also 14,10-11 where the verb \textit{paradidomai} features twice with Judas appearing as the subject and Jesus as the object.

These strictures on global methodology adopted by Brown made, the present reviewer would recommend this commentary to be on the shelves not only of public libraries, but on that of individuals. The strength of this commentary lies in the author’s discussion of the individual pericopes where his treatment is masterful, balanced, thorough, respectful of different opinions, and conscious that these narratives were originally meant to address the Christian commitment of individuals and communities which were undergoing persecution. Brown’s commentary is also addressed to a wide spectrum of readership; but whoever reads this work, whatever his/her religious or cultural background, cannot but profit from the insights he offers into the narrative of the passion and death of the One whom Brown too considered his Messiah.

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