MELITA

THEOLOGICA

Freedom and the Unconscious in Thomas Aquinas*

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A) *Preliminary remarks on the interdisciplinary dialogue between Theology and Psychology*

If Thomas Aquinas had to be given a religious name, as it is customary among Carmelites, he could have been called Thomas a Creatore. With this proposal in his delighting essay on Aquinas, G.K. Chesterton has underscored a ruling perspective of Thomistic thought. This ruling perspective of the unity of theology of creation and salvation underlies the following affirmation which I understand as an urgent plea for interdisciplinary learning and dialogue to be sought by theologians:

> *"Error circa creaturas redundat in falsam de Deo scientiam, et hominum mentes a Deo abducit in quem fides dirigere nititur"* (Summa contra Gentiles 11, 3).

An error about the creatures causes an even more mistaken theology, and distracts human minds from God in whom they ought to direct their faith.

We can find a similarly open-minded call for the study of the humanities in the 2nd Vatican Council. In Gaudium et Spes N. 62, the Council expresses the confidence, that the due use of the findings of secular sciences in pastoral care, especially of psychology and sociology, will result in "a purer and more mature living of the faith". Likewise, John Paul II has repeatedly demanded that theologians and ecclesiastical judges make use of the findings of the human sciences, not missing however to call them to be critical and not to forget that theology has its own object, principles and

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methods of research as is true of other sciences, too (cf. GS 36; e.g. VS 111; FR 43. 68–69; discourses to the Roman Rota in 1984, 1987, 1988).

Interdisciplinary learning and dialogue enjoy a long tradition in Catholic theology, especially in Moral and Pastoral Theology. It has also seen ups and downs, progress and failures. It is not uncomplicated. Just let me mention a few basic difficulties a theologian may encounter. I limit myself to the most poignant issue: that is, the findings that concern the image of what and who the human person is (theological anthropology). First, the theologian generally is not an expert in the matters of the other disciplines, e.g. psychology. How can he or she judge the reliability or validity of the psychological contribution? Is it simply a hypothesis to be proved or is it knowledge which enjoys the scientific status of convalidated theory? Is the contribution and the research which has led to this contribution a mixture of empirical facts and anthropologically relevant interpretations which derive from implicit or explicit ideological presuppositions on the part of the scientists? What are these presuppositions? Are they acceptable - or do they determine, already from the starting point, the results?

> *Parvus error in principio magnus est in fine* (De ente et essentia, Prooemium).

From these epistemological questions, it is evident that there is need of a philosophical mediation between the contributions of psychology and theological thought in order to integrate these contributions adequately. There is no naive and direct use of the humanities in theology. The different scientific objects, principles, methods and results need an apt philosophical system which serves as platform both for the dialogue and for the integration of findings (cf. Fides et Ratio, passim). In this situation, there are two seemingly opposed dangers.

First, that theologians look for dialogue with partners in psychology, or the humanities, whom they know will confirm them. Such opportunism may be enticing and assuring, but it is not real dialogue. It also prevents from real interdisciplinary learning.

Second, theologians surrender their own constructive and critical theological contribution and accept psychological affirmations uncritically. A truly theological anthropology is swept away. Again, this is not dialogue. Both of these behaviours are defensive and immature.

Dialogue presupposes two strong partners who want to learn from each other and who are able to critically scrutinize their own thinking just as the other counterpart. As

Karl Rahner (1980, 44) has put it, the real misery of interdisciplinary dialogue, however, remains that both partners are not sufficiently experts in the field of the other in order to understand each other and to achieve results which are acceptable for both sides.

In seeking a dialogue, one also needs to look for a right partner. Now, in psychology, including depth psychology, there is plenty of academic and clinical directions, schools and traditions which do not even dialogue among themselves. Which of them could be the right partner? This difficulty adds even more to the misery of not being an expert in the psychological field.

It is obvious, therefore, that interdisciplinary learning and dialogue between theology and psychology is facilitated if and when a theologian has received a thorough and recognized formation not only in philosophy and theology, but also in psychology. Being well enough at home in both theology and psychology requires this scholar to search for an integration of both bodies of knowledge. It also enables and urges one to articulate questions which emerge from one's professional and academic activities. Such truly and existentially relevant questions will then determine the concrete method for an interdisciplinary study to resolve the question at stake. It is the question which should determine the adequate scientific method, not some scientific method which determines what questions may be asked.

B) *Concretization: The leading and stimulating question of my research*

Straddling as a priest and psychotherapist between psychology as science and clinical practice on the one side, and moral theology on the other side, there was raised an urgent question inside me. My psychological studies, and even more so my own didactic therapy and clinical work, cognitively and emotionally convinced me of the reality of the strong, if not ubiquitous influence of unconscious dynamics or emotions.

For instance, one could take the case of a nurse and think - like herself - that she is daily committing herself to her work because, as a Christian, she wants to care for others and likes to help the poor and the suffering. However, no one could ever be aware that at the same time she is unconsciously defending herself against strong unconscious guilt-feelings towards her mother – a defence which contributes much to her drive in her work, to her accumulating frustration, to the decrease of her enthusiasm and even to her psycho-somatic exhaustion after a number of years.

Another example: A priest firmly convinced of his vocation and of the value and need of prayer for a Christian and especially for his priestly life. After several years of

dutiful apostolate in which he functioned quite well and efficiently managed his parish, he comes for consultation after suffering from several depressive symptoms. For years he had noted that although he wished to pray, he always fled from it. He fulfilled his official duties, but felt an increasing alienation and bitterness. It is only now that he conceded he needed help – after realizing that he cannot manage to change by himself and to live a spiritual and balanced life and fulfill his apostolate even though he has regularly confessed and celebrated mass.

The research and theory developed by L.M. Rulla and his collaborators has provided a convincing framework to the understanding of such unconscious dynamic processes and developments in living the Christian vocation. Such dynamics are not to be considered merely in a moral perspective of free and good will. Nor are they to be understood within the perspective of psychopathology, but within that of the strong dynamic unconscious. Such contradictory dynamics are inconsistent with, or in significant tension with the consciously intended personal as well as objective ethical and Christian ideals.

On the basis of L.M. Rulla's work (1986, 1989, 1997), which considers longstanding developments in Christian living, one might ask: How can these empirically verified and convalidated findings be adequately integrated into an ethical action theory, that is into the theory of both moral theology and philosophical ethics of how the human person exercises his or her freedom in his or her concrete and single deliberate actions? Note that it is in our concrete living and acting whether we do or do not translate and live our ideals and convictions of what is good. Note that the conviction that unconscious and irrational influence is always present in our living, is a central feature and basic column not only of Freudian psychoanalysis but of all the different schools of depth-psychology (cf. Wyss 1977; Wallwork 1991; Baumann 1996,1–73).

The driving question for my research became: How could philosophical and theological ethics integrate this basic insight from depth-psychology with their action theory without denying the freedom and the responsibility of the human person, that is, without taking these unconscious dynamics as psychopathological. In fact, Moral Theology has to consider the totality of the components of human acting (cf. Honnefelder 1995,905). In interdisciplinary dialogue it seeks to understand and work through a maximum of reality:

> "All the aspects which are relevant for moral acting need to be considered" (Demmer 1989, 156).

As you could see from the examples, these unconscious realities seem most relevant for moral acting and living. The difficulty of integrating them into ethical action theory becomes more evident, when we consider

C) *Aquinas's concept of the human act and its classical interpretation*

In the very first article of the *Secunda Pars* of the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas provides a number of brief formulas relating to his concept of the human act (cf. I–II, 1, 1c). He equates properly so-called human actions with those actions which stem from deliberate will. Human acts are the same as voluntary acts. This corresponds to another affirmation in the same article which says:

> Only those actions of which the human person is master may properly be called human actions.

These formulas have determined action theory of moral philosophies and theology through the centuries and have entered the Catechism of the Catholic Church on human freedom and responsibility, which reads:

> "Freedom is the power, rooted in reason and will, to act or not to act, to do this or that, and so to perform deliberate actions on one's own responsibility. By free will, one shapes one's own life." (1731)
> "Freedom makes man responsible for his acts to the extent that they are voluntary." (1734)

Summarizing the classical interpretation of this concept of the human act, N. Mailloux (1954,265) explains that from

> "the start, the moralist makes a clear distinction between the acts over which man has complete control, since they proceed from a deliberate decision and conform with the dictates of reason – human acts - and the acts which escape such control and the causes and motives of which do not submit to any rational influence - the acts of man."

With these brief affirmations of Aquinas on human action in mind, our question becomes more urgent still: Can, along this concept of the human act, our deliberate actions be subject to important, distorting psychic influences of which we are entirely unaware?

It might seem that M. Rhonheimer (1994, 17) was answering just this question when in an article on the interpretation of *Veritatis Splendor* he affirmed that in considering human actions,

> "we must start from the normal condition in which actions are chosen and performed, that is, from the condition that the agent chooses and thus willingly performs exactly the action which he believes he is choosing and performing."

Rhonheimer is doing nothing more than faithfully echoing the classical interpretation of St. Thomas's concept of the *actus humanus*. The psychiatrist who told me in a discussion that the concept of the dynamic unconscious could not possibly be inserted into the classical concept of the human act, seemed to be right. Rhonheimer, like all the other authors, stresses correctly that the agent has to operate consciously, determining the act by will and reason. He and the other authors are also aware of the relevance of the character and dispositions of the agent, since Aquinas conceives of ethics mainly as virtue ethics. However, it seems that this awareness has definitely and immediately fainted out in their interpretation of the concept of the human act. Let me explain.

Making this longer discussion a shorter one, in the interpretations of the treatise on the human act in the Summa Theologiae (I-II, 6-17), authors have usually focused on the interplay of reason and will in bringing forth a human act, that is, a voluntary act, be this an inner act of the will or an act commanded by the will (cf. McInerny 1997, 61-76). They call this interplay of reason and will the "structure" or even the "psychology (cf. Gilby 1970) of the human act" . They do not pay suffficient attention to the role of the emotions or of sensitive appetite in the process of human acting, even though this is repeatedly mentioned and discussed by Aquinas himself.

Still motivated by my question and in search of a solution, I started to read his treatise on the human act with a different focus of attention.

D) *The gradual definition of the concept of the human act (I–II, 6, 1–2)*

Aquinas takes two articles of *Quaestio* of the *Prima Secundae* to define the term "voluntary". He starts from movements in general which derive from an inner principle. Such movement from within is given perfectly and in the full sense when there is some kind of knowledge of the goal of the movement. Such knowledge is maximally realized in the human person, and therefore, his or her acts are maximally found to be

voluntary. But it is also found, to a lesser extent, in the sensitive apprehension and appetitive behaviour of animals. Thus, in a first step,

Aquinas is stressing the twofold characteristic or structure of any appetitive movement of animals, including the human person:

First, there is an inner dynamic principle which brings about movement from within. Second, this inner principle also provides a direction towards some apprehended goal.

Such movement, brought about and directed from within, is defined as voluntary in the first article, whether this movement is stimulated by external influences or not. In the second article then, Aquinas confines "voluntary" to mean "perfectly voluntary". A "perfectly voluntary" act is given when the agent not only moves towards a goal but also knows that the goal is a goal, that is, he knows that he is acting for the sake of a goal. Such knowledge implies the capacity to reflect and to decide whether to move towards a goal or not, and by which means to get there (you may call this the 'reflexive principle'). Such a capacity is only given to beings who possess reason. In contrast with the first article and the first definition of voluntary, Aquinas calls voluntary only what comes from the will as rational appetite, or that to which the will is directed.

E) *Why this gradual definition?*

It is striking that Aquinas did not immediately provide the precise definition. Why is it that there is a gradual definition of the term voluntary, starting from a rather vague one which Aquinas finds no longer adequate in the second article and in which he gives a precise account of the necessary elements that make an act voluntary? Let me propose that in using this gradual method he has a twofold intention with regard to the distinctive quality of human acts.

First, he recalls, and thus emphasizes, the common dynamic and directive structure of the appetitive powers, that is of both the sensitive and the rational appetite. In other words, of the emotions and the will. My interpretation is that Aquinas does so in order to make the scholar keep in mind that both of these powers are present and united in the human agent and that both of these powers contribute to the human act.

Secondly, St. Thomas maintains that one cannot speak of a human or voluntary action if there is no active participation of will and reason. He does not however, demand that only will and reason should interact in the inner process of bringing forth

a human act. In fact, for St. Thomas it is inevitable that sensitive appetite play an important role in this process.

When in his gradual definition of the human act he calls attention to the sensitive apprehension and appetite which contribute to the human act, Aquinas allows the scholar to remember what he has already studied in the *Prima Pars* of the Summa Theologiae as far as the "inner human senses" are concerned (cf. I, 78, 4; 81, 1–3). Let me recall them while I refer to

F) *The interplay of emotions with reason and will in the human act (cf. I–II, 6–17)*

Sensitive cognition and sensitive appetite are structured similarly in both animals and human beings. In human beings, however, sensitive cognition and sensitive appetite have undergone a specifically human and individual development due to the operation of the (specifically human) *vis cogitativa* which takes the place of the animal *vis aestimativa* with its fixed instinctual dispositions of appraisal. The *vis cogitativa* however, is much more flexible and is influenced by reason. Hence, it is also called *ratio particularis*, but it remains an inner corporeal sense; it is not part of the incorporeal mind like reason and will in Thomistic psychology.

The *vis cogitativa* combines into one apprehended thing several activities of the inner senses: the sense perceptions of external stimuli, the perceptual organization effected by the *sensus communis*, the spontaneous memories which the affective memory immediately associates to these percepts and the fantasies spontaneously produced by or elicited from the *vis imaginativa*. Furthermore, the *vis cogitativa* automatically appraises this apprehended object as more or less pleasurable or painful for the person and evokes some corresponding emotional desire for, or rejection of, this apprehended object.

In other words: there is quite a host of operations of the inner senses, of sensitive cognition and appetite, which form part of a spontaneous "intrapsychic" process, before the human person can intervene actively and consciously by the use of will and reason. The *vis cogitativa* presents to the will and reason an apprehended object which beforehand has already been cognitively organized and emotionally charged by the sensitive part of the soul, that is, by the sensitive perception, by the perceptual organization, by the sensitive memories and by the fantasies as well as by the sensitive appraisal and emotional response of desire or rejection. No need to say, these intrapsychic operations remain also influential and active during the interventions

Sense perception

Sense perception (sensitive memory)

External Stimuli

Perceptual organization (*sensus communis*)

Sensitive fantasies (*viz imaginativa*)

1) Combination into the "apprehended object" (*vis cogitativa*)

2) and emotional or sensitive appraisal (*vis cogitativa*)

Conscious perception, insight, reflection, judgement, and decision (theoretical and practical reason, "mind"; *ratio*)

Wish, intention, consent, choice (will, *voluntas*)

Bonum apprehensum = obiectum Object (of the human act)

of the will and reason. Reducing the complexity of these intrapsychic processes of sensitive cognition and appetite into a scheme, we can say that they produce (1) an apprehended object and (2) an emotionally dynamic directedness of the person in relation to this apprehended object. Both apprehended object which is an intra-psychic reality – and the spontaneous emotional reaction of the person are connected with each other in the psychic reality of the person.

When this apprehended object is presented to the will and to reason by the *vis cogitativa*, it is already emotionally toned. It is linked, within the person, to an activated inclination of sensitive appetite towards or away from it. This spontaneous dynamic directedness of sensitive appetite persists in the person when reason is about to appraise the apprehended object "rationally" as good to be chosen or less (*sub ratione boni*) and hence to present it to the choice of will as a "*bonum apprehensum*" (or object). Evidently, the rational appraisal as directive principle (11) and the choice of will as dynamic principle (11) have undergone a predisposition into a direction which has been pre-determined by the spontaneous dynamic directedness (1) provided by the sensitive part of the soul - precedingly and concomitantly.

G) *Unconscious emotional influence on the human act?*

Could there be unconscious emotional influences on the human act according to this Thomistic conception of the spontaneous intrapsychic operations of sensitive cognitions and appetite? The given analysis of the inner processes constituting the apprehended object presented to reason and will can be interpreted as providing an open system which Aquinas, had he lived today, would allow and use to integrate unconscious emotional influences. But would this not alter his concept of freedom and responsibility, the necessary condition of which is human acting?

Continuing with the reading of the treatise on the human act, it becomes clear that for St. Thomas, the dynamic emotional orientation of the person as part of the apprehended object, cannot by itself force the will to an act of willing in relation to this apprehended object. However, it has a disposing effect on practical reason. Consequently, something may appear as desirable or undesirable but which otherwise the person would have judged differently by practical reason. In other words, the preceding sensitive process of apprehension and appraisal makes practical reason more ready to appraise the apprehended object as good and suitable (*conveniens*) or bad and unsuitable (*inconveniens*) for the person, in line with the preceding appraisal by the *vis cogitativa*. In the same way, by way of disposing it, the sensitive or emotional appetite can move the human will *ex parte obiecti*, that is by means of the rationally

appraised – and, previously, emotionally appraised – object (cf. I–II, 9, 2c). It is with reference to such emotional (pre-) dispositions in the human agent that Aquinas quotes and shares Aristotle's opinion that

> "qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei" (ibid.). What manner of person a man or woman is, such is the end that he or she finds desirable.

E.g. due to her unconscious guilt feelings towards her mother the nurse spontaneously and unconsciously seeks situations in which she can prove her worthiness and lovability e.g. by helping others. And the priest, for some unconscious reason, has been emotionally pre-disposed to reject moments of silence and personal prayer. An understanding in depth of "what manner of person a man is" should therefore take account of the kind of intrapsychic sensitive operations which constitute the apprehended object. In a special way, it should consider the contributions from the sensitive memory and fantasy which store up the profound affects and desires of one's emotional biography.

Again, the will cannot be forcibly moved by any object or emotional predisposition (cf. I–II, 9, 1c). However, for Aquinas, the disposing influence of emotions on the specification of the object to be chosen is especially strong in concrete situations and in face of concrete persons and things. Human actions and choices, nonetheless, always take place in the context of concrete situations, of persons and things (cf. I–II, 9, 2 ad 2). Now, there are three possible ways in which this influence of emotions may be related to the person's awareness of it, according to the discussion of Aquinas.

First, it is possible that the person becomes aware of such a disposing influence of the emotions. After considering them one may either take a distance or else take another stand in order to appraise the situation more amply, more realistically, and more objectively. Secondly, one may come to notice only the result of such influence, such as in moments of weakness of the will (*"akrasia"*),

> "When the reason is swayed by conflicting considerations about commanding or not, with the result that it fluctuates between alternatives, and makes no decisive ruling" (I–II, 17, 5 ad 1, transl. Gilby 1970, 195).

Finally, and most importantly for our context, this disposing influence of the emotions may, in other cases, go completely unrecognized by the person, with the result that he or she chooses to pursue an object or goal as a "good" for him or her (*sub ratione boni*) when in fact it is only apparently good, though he or she is convinced

of aspiring to realize a true good.

It is this notion of apparent goodness which Aquinas has in mind when he explains why the will is not forced against its natural aspiration to the good when the person sets out to sin:

> "That on which the will is set by sinning, though it be an evil and contrary to rational nature in reality and truth, is nevertheless apprehended as something good and responding to some emotion or some decayed disposition in man" (as Gilby 1970, 19 is translating I–II, 6, 4 ad 3).

He gives the same reason to account for the ignorance when a wrong choice is made because a person does not actually attend to what he or she could and should consider (cf. I–II, 6, 8). And in discussing the fundamental question of whether human willing is directed only towards the good, he explains that both the sensitive and the rational appetite tend towards what is apprehended as good. He concludes:

> "One consequence is that the object to which the will tends is not necessarily good for it in point of fact; it is enough that it is apprehended as a good. Which is why Aristotle says that the end is a good or a seeming good" (I–II, 8, 1c, transl. Gilby 1970, 53).

In most cases, it seems a person would not choose an apparent good in contrast to what he or she has recognized as a true good, that is, if he or she knew that it is only an apparent good.

If these elements do not yet suffice to evidence that for Aquinas there may be completely hidden and disadvantageous emotional influences on the human act, let us listen to what he responds to the question of astrological beliefs. These beliefs contain the assumption that there are hidden astrological laws which reign over us. Hidden influences which govern our course of life and actions and from which we cannot escape. As a consequence, even what may appear as an exercise of freedom to us, remains under the control of the stars – even though we do not know how. To this difficulty of true astrological predictions, Aquinas responds:

> "We have already noted that emotional feeling is an act of a bodily organ. Consequently, there is nothing to prevent us holding that impressions from heavenly bodies render some people more prompt to

anger than others, or to concupiscence, or to some such emotion. Indeed, they are such by temperamental constitution. Most men follow their passions; only the wise men resist. And therefore in the majority of cases astrological predictions may well be verified. All the same, as Ptolemy remarks, The wise man dominates the stars; he checks their effects by withstanding his passions, for he is free and not under the sway of the heavenly bodies. Or we may admit with Augustine that when the truth is foretold by astrologers, this is due to some most hidden inspiration to which the human mind is unconsciously subject and since it is done to deceive it is the work of the seducing spirits" (I–II, 9, 5 ad 3, transl. Gilby 1970, 79).

I have discussed this response more at length elsewhere (Baumann 1996,229-234; 1999, 147-152. 162). In a nutshell: Thomas traces back the influence of stars to their eventual prompting or stimulating of emotions, passions and sensitive appetite in the human person. However, in the majority of cases, the persons do not become aware of such influence and of the elicited emotions – and therefore, they have no control of these emotions and of their impact on their behavior. To the contrary, the persons who are convinced that they are acting with full insight and freedom, in fact are not, as unconscious emotional tendencies are co-determining the object of the (deliberate) action which is chosen and carried out. Nevertheless, the person accomplishes a human act in the full sense (*perfecte voluntarium*) according to Aquinas's understanding of the *actus humanus* – and also according to the person's self-understanding.

It is a human act in the full sense, because there is an active (and decisive) participation of will and reason, without which no action can be considered a human act. This participation is a sufficient condition. But this does not mean, for St. Thomas, that the necessary inner dynamic principle, which gives a direction toward an apprehended goal, is uniquely determined by will and reason. On the contrary, it may be co-determined by preceding and accompanying inclinations which stem from the sensitive appetite and of which the agent may be more or less aware. Aquinas would even suggest and concede that in the majority of cases, the person is not at all aware of such relevant emotional tendencies and of their respective – disadvantageous – influence on his or her perceiving, choosing and acting.

Again, these cases are to be considered as human acting in the full sense of St. Thomas's concept of the *actus humanus*. The normal condition from which we must start, therefore, need not be "that the agent chooses and thus willingly performs exactly the action which he believes he is choosing and performing" as traditionally demanded

(cf. Rhonheimer 1994, 17). It would be probably enough to affirm that under normal conditions there is a sufficient correspondence between the choosing or acting of the agent, and what the agent believes he is choosing and doing, to the effect that they are and remain his own choosing and acting and for which he is responsible - notwithstanding the distorting unconscious tendencies which pertain to him as well.

H) *Conclusion: a re-discovery with consequences*

1. The interpretation of St. Thomas's concept of the human act, which I have presented here, seems to be a re-discovery of a central feature of what Aquinas himself had intended by his gradual definition and extensive discussion of the human act. He has translated long-standing spiritual wisdom on freedom in the human condition into action theory and has created an open philosophical system which proves capable of integrating valid insights from depth-psychology. My research has given proof to K. Demmer's conviction that the study of our best traditions can frequently show that they contain starting points for the solution of contemporary questions (cf. 1989, 111). However, it was necessary to study Aquinas in the original and not just summaries (cf. Torrell 1993,231[1]). It seems that Ockham's razor which has established the principle of parsimony in scientific explanation and theory, has been applied in excess in the reading of Aquinas in the past seven centuries, especially in the action theory. Instead of isolating affect and concentrating on the conscious operations of will and reason, a principle of multiple operations and tendencies, both conscious and unconscious, including both the rational and the sensitive appetite, would have been most suited to the understanding of the concept of the human act – respecting both Aquinas's thought and the real conditions of the exercise of freedom.

Let me give you a maybe astonishing confirmation for this opinion, formulated not by a psychoanalyst but by the Polish phenomenologist and moral philosopher Karol Wojtyla in 1969 (91/ 93, emphasis added):

> "An analysis of the human being, of the acting person, if it were to be grounded on consciousness alone, would from the first be doomed to inadequacy.... In this respect, as it seems, potentiality of the subconscious comes first; it is primary and more indispensable than

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[1] "Même si c'est à regret, l'historicien doit bien constater que l'oeuvre maîtresse de Thomas n'atteignit pas elle-même directement un très large public. Ses options en matière de théologie morale se répandirent bien davantage par des vulgarisateurs."

consciousness for the interpretation of human dynamism as well as for the interpretation of conscious acting."

If my interpretation of Aquinas has not gone astray and is correct, then we do not only have an adequate philosophical instrument with which to conceive the unconscious in freedom, but we also have a lot of research in front of us which can be stimulated by this re-discovery. This can start in the first place by understanding the work of Aquinas himself. E.g. from the viewpoint of the strong relevance of the unconscious emotional impacts on human acting, it seems most significant that in the course of the Summa Theologiae, after the treatise on the human act, there follow only four – dense – questions on the specification of human acts as good or bad (I–II, 18–21). While on the passions of the soul, that is on human emotions, there are 28 questions (I–II, 22–48) and another seven questions on the basic considerations of habits or dispositions as principles of human acts (I–II, 49–55).

It will hence be important not only to favour Aquinas's virtue ethics, but also to take into consideration and study systematicalty more factors in the agent rather than the agent's mere knowledge or consciousness of the act he is performing. Aquinas had already done this when he set out to define and discuss the human act. Research should take this into consideration – be this research in the other treatises of the Theological Sum, or in the philosophical or theological ethics in general. Certainly, this is another call for interdisciplinary learning and dialogue between theology and psychology. An error about the creatures, especially about the human agent, will lead to an even more mistaken theology, as Aquinas had put it (ScG II, 3). It seems that this applies to action theory and to moral theology, as well.

2. These findings should have a repercussion place, not only and not even primarily, in the field of the academic setting but in our daily moral and religious living. In his comment on Aristotle's "*De anima*", Aquinas says that we need to become familiar with the forces of our soul when we want to start and live a moral life and grow in virtue (cf. In *De anima* 1, 7; cf. Schockenhoff 1998, 110). In our treatise on the human act, he considers the "despotic" repression of emotions as dangerous in regard to moral competence and effective freedom. In contrast, he prefers and advices that will and reason govern the emotional needs and longings "royally". Just as the free and not the oppressed citizens will serve their good king best, or contribute best to a political community with just laws, Aquinas thinks that human emotions and psycho-social needs have their inherent laws and as such may constructively contribute to the realization of the image of God towards which every person is created in her or his totality (cf. I–II, 9, 2 ad 3; 17, 7c). The recognition of the potentially constructive

role of human emotions in our moral living implies the task of an accepting, firm and flexible attitudes, pedagogy and re-education of the emotions (cf. Imoda 1993) which do not deny the necessary tensions implied in any moral decision (cf. Kiely 1980; Schafer 1976, 52). The acceptance of these necessary tensions prevents their repression to the unconscious, and is in contrast with a wide-spread ideology which aims at an illusionary ethical and temporary psychological tranquillity.

This firm accepting attitude, however, is only a first step. The reality of strong unconscious influences, which have accumulated on our human acting since the earliest childhood, implies that they are withdrawn from our free control and "government". Growing in virtue does not seem to be simply a matter of conscious striving and of good will. As in the example of the afore mentioned priest: There could be strong resistances in his life which proved stubbornly refractory to change by his conscious efforts. One needs to uncover the unconscious emotions and dynamics at their roots and to understand their meaning. Only then will it become possible for him, with God's help, to deal with his long-repressed emotional realities consciously and with greater freedom, so as to implement gradual changes and to experience new joy in his priestly life. Note again the striking remark of Karol Wojtyla in his "The Acting Person" (1969, 166):

> "the transfer to the domain of consciousness of moments captured in subconsciousness and especially those hindered from coming to a genuine objectivization, stand out as one of the chief tasks of morality and education."

No wonder that John Paul II has emphasized affective maturity as a principal request and goal of priestly and religious formation (cf. *Pastores Dabo Vobis* 43f; *Vita Consecrata* 65f) and called for a corresponding formation of the formators.

3. Let me conclude. The reality of the unconscious in freedom is to be considered as an anthropological given, that is, as part of the human condition. It should not only be integrated into a theory of ethical action but it ought to become part of our self-understanding. This will make us acknowledge the limits of our "objectivity" in perceiving, in understanding, in judging and in deciding in particular situations. Accordingly, Aquinas teaches that perfect certainty is not expected in moral matters (cf. In Eth Nic,I,III, n. 32 and 36). Rather, what is required is a basic docility towards the experiential moral wisdom of the wise (cf. I–II, 14, 1.3.6), especially in and as part of the community of faith which is guided and assisted by the Holy Spirit (cf. I–II,106–108). Acknowledging the unconscious should make us more realistic, more humble, and more responsible. With God's help, it could actually challenge and help

us to "a purer and more mature living of the faith" (GS 62).

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Actus humanus – human act:

"Acts over which man has complete control, since they proceed from a deliberate decision and conform to the dictates of reason"

Actus hominis – act of man:

"Acts which escape such control and the causes and motives of which do not submit to any rational influence"

(cf. N. Mailloux [1954] Psychic determinism, freedom, and personality development, in: M.B. Arnold/J.A. Gasson [Ed.s], *The Human Person* (Ronald Press; New York 1954) 265.

"I would rather not be wearisome to you"
Saint Augustine' as preacher

Hubertus R. Drobner

1. *The burden of preaching*

"What business is it of mine to be wearisome to people; to say to the wicked, 'Don't act wickedly, act like this, stop acting like that'? What business is it of mine to be burdensome to people? I have received instructions how I should live; let me live as I have been told to, as I have been commanded. Let me sign for what I have received; why should I give an account for others? The gospel terrifies me; because nobody could outdo me in enjoying such anxiety-free leisure. There is nothing better, nothing more pleasant to search through the divine treasure chest with nobody making a commotion; it is pleasant, it is good. But to preach, to refute, to rebuke, to build up, to manage for everybody, that is a great burden, a great weight, a great labour. Who would not run away from this labour? But the gospel terrifies me" (*s* 339,4). Thus Augustine addresses his flock on one of the anniversary days of his bishop's ordination, in which year we do not know. He might have been still young, deploring his lost monastic freedom and peace and not yet having come to terms with the hustle and bustle of the manifold duties of a bishop. If he was already old he was certainly tired of a lifelong battle against the sins and failures of those entrusted to him as a pastor, yearning for repose in order to care only for his own peace of soul.

In any case it certainly seems as if Augustine – though being a trained professional orator – did not enjoy preaching but rather considered it a burdensome duty, which becomes understandable when one considers how many sermons he must have been giving throughout his lifetime. For almost fourty years Augustine preached every Saturday and Sunday, on all liturgical feasts and feastdays of the saints during the year, during Advent, Lent and Easter Seasons daily, and often even twice a day. The corpus of Augustine's sermons preserved to us and recognised as authentic comprises 559 "Sermons to the people", i. e. sermons for all occasions during the current liturgical year; a complete set of over 150 homilies on the Psalms, the *enarrationes in Psalmos*", (because quite a number of Psalms are treated twice); the "Tractates on St. John's Gospel", and the homilies on the first epistle of John. Compared to his overall preaching activity this represents, however, only a rather measly number of at least 4000 if not up to 8000 sermons he must have given during his service as priest and bishop - and that

on top of all the rest of his duties: writing many hundreds of letters, big books, attending to the pastoral needs of his diocese, passing judgment and settling conflicts, participating in synods, travelling etc. etc.

One understands well that Augustine was sometimes weary and tired and would have liked to just quietly participate in a liturgy, but wherever he was people wanted to hear him and none else. At the beginning of sermon 94, given in the cathedral in Hippo on the occasion of the dedication of a shrine in honour of St. Stephen, for which a number of fellow bishops had come to assist, Augustine complains to them straight away in public: "My lords, brethren and fellow bishops have indeed been good enough to visit us and cheer us with their presence; but goodness knows why they refuse to help poor, weary me. The reason I have said this to your graces while they are listening, is in order that your hearing it may somehow appeal to them on my behalf, to preach a sermon or two themselves when I ask them to. Let them invest what they have received, let them be good enough to work, rather than make excuses. Tired though I am, and scarcely able to speak, accept ungrudgingly a few words from me ...". And then Augustine indeed gives one of his shortest sermons of only a few minutes.

2. *The qualities of a preacher*

Albeit therefore Augustine himself felt the task of preaching to be a burden and not always up to it, his contemporaries saw him in quite a different light altogether. Augustine's friend and biographer Possidius, bishop of the Numidian Calama, who assisted him on his death-bed, judges about Augustine's qualities both as author of books and as a preacher the following way: "In his writings Augustine proves himself – this one can plainly perceive in the light of truth – as a priest pleasing to God, who lived upright and good in faith, hope and love of the Catholic Church, a fact all acknowledge who profit from the reading of his writings about divine matters. I, however, believe that those could even profit more who had a chance to see and listen to him in church, and above all who were acquainted with his conduct amongst the people. For he was not only a writer learned in everything regarding the kingdom of heaven, who brings out from his treasure what is new and what is old (Mt 13,52), and one of those merchants who on finding a pearl of great value sold everything he owned in order to buy it (Mt 13,45–46), but he also belonged to those persons, for whom it is written: 'So speak and so act' (James 2,12), and about whom our Saviour said: 'Whoever thus acts and teaches will be called great in the kingdom of heaven.'"

Quite undoubtedly Augustine himself, asked what he regarded as the highest and most indispensable quality of a preacher, would have answered: That he acts as he speaks, that he himself gives the first and splendid example of a life according to the truth he proclaims to his flock from the pulpit. In book four of *De doctrina Christiana*

(151–154), his manual for the preacher, he writes: "More important than any amount of grandeur of style, to those who seek to be listened to with obedience is the life of the speaker. A wise and eloquent speaker who lives a wicked life certainly educates many who are eager to learn, although it is 'useless to his own soul'" (Ecclesiasticus 37,2). It is true that even a wicked preacher may teach the truth and people learn from him "for they may seek their own thing, but they dare not to teach their own words from the elevated position of the episcopal chair, which sound teaching has established" (*doctr chr* IV 152). But it does imperil the faithful, as they might be prone not to believe his words but rather follow his deeds and so be led to destruction. "There are plenty of people who look for a justification of their own evil lives from those in authority who teach them; they reply within their hearts or even, if they blurt it out, with their lips. 'Why don't you practise what you preach?' That is why people do not listen with obedience to the man who does not listen to himself, and they despise the word of God preached to them as well as despising the preacher" (*doctr chr* IV 153).

However: "How are you going to exuse yourself at the judgment of Christ? Are you going to say, 'The reason I acted badly was that I saw my bishop not leading a good life'? You will get the answer, 'You have chosen for yourself someone to be condemned with, not someone to be set free with. You have imitated him leading a bad life; why did you prefer to imitate him, rather than to listen to me through him? After all, hadn't I said to you in my gospel, that when you see bad people in authority you should do what they say, but not do what they do (Mt 23,2)?" (*s* 340A,9). Therefore Augustine admonishes the preacher with the words of St. Paul to Timothy (1 Tim,12): "Be an example to believers in speech, in conduct, in love, in faith, and in purity" (*doctr chr* IV 154). Pastors not acting upon their own preaching kill the sheep entrusted to them: "'How do they kill them?' you say. By leading bad lives, by setting a bad example. Was it for nothing that a servant of God was told, one prominent among the members of the supreme shepherd, *Offering yourself in all company as an example of good works* (Tit 2,7); and, *Be a model to the faithful* (1 Tim 4;12)? You see, even a strong sheep often enough, when he notices his pastor leading a bad life, if his eyes wander from the rules of the Lord and are attracted by human considerations, well he begins to say to himself, 'If my pastor lives like that, who am I not to behave as he does?' He has killed a strong sheep" (*s* 46,9). No less than 19 times Augustine repeats this warning in front of his audience in those 559 sermons preserved to us.

3. *God's word and the arts of rhetoric*

The preacher is nothing else than the servant of God's word. *S* 114,1: "The holy gospel, as we heard when it was chanted, was advising us about the forgiveness of sins. That is what I have to remind you of in my sermon. You see, I am a servant of the word,

not mine but God's, of course, our Lord's, whom nobody serves without honour, nobody ignores without punishment."

This fact that the preacher is only a servant of God's word, not its master, fundamentally changes his attitude towards the rhetorical arts he nevertheless is not only entitled but even obliged to apply. St. Augustine knew that from his own experience. He had been a professional orator all his lifetime. Rhetoric formed his life from his earliest youth right unto his death. School education in Greek and Roman antiquity consisted mostly of studies in languages and literature, wherein Augustine, as he himself records in his *Confessions*, particularly excelled (*conf* I 16). He received the best education available in the Western Empire in Thagaste, Madaura, and Carthage (in the east he would have had to go to Caesarea, Constantinople, and Athens as Basil the Great and Gregory of Nazianzus had done). All his training aimed straight at taking up the profession of an orator, and he purposefully advanced to the top of his profession first as teacher of rhetoric in Carthage and Rome then as official rhetorician of the imperial court in Milan.

Being called to the priesthood in Hippo Augustine was also mainly prompted by his being well known as a highly educated rhetorician. Bishop Valerius, being a Greek and unable to express himself fully in Latin needed an accomplished preacher, even if so far his theological knowledge was not quite complete yet. In fact after his ordination Augustine asked for a leave of absence to study the scriptures in order to prepare for his task as preacher.

In general, the art of rhetoric is a common tool for everyone who wants or needs to relate a message without any intrinsic value. It can be used for any subject whatsoever, right or wrong, good or bad, valuable or idle: "rhetoric is used to give conviction both to truth and falsehood" (*doctr chr* IV 4). The fundamental difference between the wordly orator and the preacher is that "the profane rhetorician is a master of the word, the preacher its servant". The orator chooses content and aims of his speech and forms them applying the means of his art; the preacher, however, does not choose either subject matter (or the ends of his sermon, both of them are given: the word of God as proclaimed by Holy Scripture, and the guidance of God's people towards him. Indeed, the preacher applies the very same rhetorical rules, for "the rules of eloquence are valid in spite of the fact that they can be used to commend falsehood. Since they can also be used to commend the truth, it is not the subject itself that is reprehensible, but the perversity of those who abuse it") (*doctr chr* 11 132). The preacher is even obliged to use the tools of rhetoric: "Since rhetoric is used to give conviction to both truth and falsehood, who could dare maintain that truth which depends on us for its defence, should stand unarmed in the fight against falsehood? This would mean that those who are trying to give conviction to their

falsehoods would know how to use an introduction to make their listeners favourable, interested, and receptive, while we would not; that they would expound falsehoods in descriptions that are succinct, lucid, and convincing, while we would expound the truth in such a way as to bore our listeners, cloud their understanding, and stifle their desire to believe ... No, oratorical ability, so effective a resource to commend either right or wrong, is available to both sides" (*doctr chr* IV 4–5).

Both the profane orator and the ecclesiastical preacher are fundamentally guided by the three main aims of rhetoric "instruct, delight, move" *(docere, delectare, movere)*, and Augustine expressly quotes the pertinent passage from Cicero's *De Oratore* 69 (*doctr ch* IV 74), but their aims differ widely. While the profane orator may teach whatever he likes, even in order to deceive people and lead them astray, the preacher is bound by the divine truth which must be his only subject. The profane orator may excel in dazzling phrases that delight the ear but mean nothing, while the preacher's aim in speaking in a delighful way is to "grip the hearer and make him listen in order to be able to communicate the truth and move him towards it" (*doctr chr* IV 75), not to excel in grand words without meaning which always looms up dangerously: "There is a danger of forgetting what one has to say while working out a clever way to say it" (*doctr chr* IV 11). What aim the profane orator moves his audience to is of his own choosing and liking, the preacher has nothing else to envisage than to move his hearers towards God, i. e. their salvation.

4. *The preacher and his audience*

The foremost rhetorical requirement of any orator consists in adapting his speech both to the subject matter and to his audience. To speak inadequately (*ineptum*) is the grossest fault he can commit. When, therefore, Augustine in his sermons applies a rather simple, commonplace style, this does not mean that he is neglecting rhetoric, on the contrary, he is adequately adapting to his task. We know that his audience consisted of all levels of society and education, from senators and highly trained teachers down to the so-called "rudes", uneducated, often even illiterate people. The task of a sermon is to teach everyone present the truth of faith in a way they can understand. In his sermons Augustine's style is therefore simpler, less learned, more popular, more direct, more personal than in his treatises, but nevertheless never vulgar. He explains both in easily understandable words and delights at the same time by catching phraseology lest he bores the better educated.

He usually enters into a dialogue with his audience which they are normally eagerly responding. In sermon 164,3 Augustine explains Gal 6,2.5 saying "Bear your burdens for each other" and "Each one will bear his own burden" and tells his people: "You heard it briefly and understood it quickly. I have not seen into your minds; but I heard

your voices bearing witness to your minds. So now, as being sure of what we have understood, let us discuss the matter a little more widely." It was quite common that Augustine's audience reacted with applause, cheering, shouting and general unrest.

In sermon 131,5 the hearers anticipate Augustine's further argument by shouting understanding and approval; maybe, as Augustine is quoting Psalm 2,11–13 by simply continuing to pray the Psalm aloud:[1] "I see by your shouts that you have got there ahead of me. I mean, you know what I am going to say, you have got in first with your shouts. And where do you get the ability to do this from? It can only be that you have been taught by the one whom you have come by believing in him. So in fact it is what he says. Listen then to what you know already; I am not teaching you, just reminding you by preaching it. In fact, I am neither teaching you, because you know it already, nor reminding you, because you remember it. But let us both say together what you and I both hold together."

In sermon 332,4 Augustine sees and hears the reaction of his congregation and reacts to it: "Scripture mentioned fornicators; I heard you beating your breasts. I heard, yes I heard, I saw; and what I did not see in your bedrooms, I saw in the sound, I saw in your breasts, I saw when you beat your breasts." And a little later, speaking about 1 Cor 7,4: *"The wife does not have authority over her own body, but the husband does. Yes,* you were delighted at that, you felt grand, you clapped yourself on the back.... You have all applauded. Listen to what comes next, listen to what you don't like, to what I beg you to like. What is that? Listen: *Likewise also the husband,* that lord and master; *likewise also the husband does not have authority over his own body, but the wife does.* One can literally imagine the long faces of the men in the church after that, because -and Augustine says it time and again- many of them expected their wives to be absolutely faithful to them as a matter of course, but they themselves never even thought of behaving likewise."

This dialogue with the audience does not simply make the sermon more lively and helps to keep their attention, but it aids Augustine to meet the needs of the congregation. In sermon 335A,2 people applaud, but not all of them, because they haven't grasped the point. This is for Augustine the sign that he needs to enlarge further: "Those of you who clapped and applauded have understood; but for the sake of those who have not understood, permit me, you that have done so, to open up for a few moments what I have just said." In sermon 23,8, however, Augustine notices from the murmuring in the congregation that some of them have not understood what he said, and others try to explain it to them while Augustine goes on with his sermon. But he does not do so, he notices it on doubles back in his tracks to take everyone along: "I am sure many of you have caught on straightaway.

1. Cf. Hill III/4 (1994) 323 note 11.

I can see, from the conversations you are having with each other I can tell that those who have caught on are trying to explain it to those who haven't yet caught on. So let me put it a little more plainly in order to get home to all of you".

So Augustine and his audience enter into an actual dialogue, they react to one another openly for the advantage of both sides: Augustine gets to know when he is not understood or when his congregation agrees or disagrees and can then try to enlarge and correct; and the congregation is not left alone with the problems they might have with Augustine's preaching.

Augustine's audience, however, did and did not consist only of those attending his services. His contemporaries considered him to be both the most accomplished theologian and the most trustworthy pastor of their times. The copious number of letters and numerous treatises Augustine composed on request of inquirers all over the Roman empire bear witness to the high esteem in which his word was held. It is well known how impatient his friends grew when after fourteen years of toiling on twelve books "On the Trinity" Augustine nevertheless did not consider his manuscript complete and worth publishing yet. They pinched the unfinished manuscript, had it copied and distributed without the author's knowledge or consent, whereafter Augustine only with the greatest of difficulties could be persuaded to complete the enormous task in eight further years. There existed a veritable "international market" for Augustine's writings that eagerly awaited every new publication of his and sold it as far as Italy, Spain and Gaul thus initiating the different strands of transmission of his works.

His sermons were therefore taken down by stenographers (*notarii*) in the pay of the people. Augustine himself refers to them a number of times in his sermons. In the "Expositions on the Psalms" 51,1 he says: "Since the brethren like not only to gather up my words with their ears and their hearts but also to put them down in writing, I must keep in mind not only my listeners but my future readers as well." And Augustine's biographer Possidius relates in his *Vita Augustini* 7,3–4: "Augustine taught and preached in private and in public, in his household and in the church.... And to those books and sermons, which came forth and issued from him through the wondrous grace of God, full of the treasures of reason and the authority of the Scriptures, even heretics, who came together with the catholics listened enthusiastically. And anyone who wished and had the means could have his words taken down by stenographers, who took down every word he said. And thus his brilliant teaching and the sweetest perfume of Christ (2 Cor 2,14) spread all over Africa, even the overseas churches of Christ participated joyfully when they heard of it. A quite clear testimony to the propagation and influence Augustine's preaching had far beyond the limits of Africa already in his own times.

That those stenographers did indeed take down every word spoken during Augustine's

sermons, – according to Cyrille Lambot "the stenographers, careful to let not a single word escape them, took notes feverishly and with an accuracy equaled only by their dexterity – is well testified by a number of sermons, where they even preserved interruptions and technical "asides". From sermon 323,4 we learn that Augustine while speaking about the healing miracles wrought at the shrines of Saint Stephen, was interrupted: "And while Augustine was saying this the people round the shrine of Saint Stephen began to shout, 'God be thanked! Christ be praised!' In the midst of this continuous clamour, the young woman who had just been cured was led into the apse. When they saw her, the people prolonged their shouting for some time with great joy and weeping, not uttering any words, but just making a noise; and when silence was eventually restored, bishop Augustine said ... "And with that the stenographer ends his own report and returns to Augustine's sermon, which, however, is concluded in a few sentences in order to be continued the next day. Fortunately the continuation has been preserved as well. Sermon 324 begins: "1 must finish the sermon which was interrupted yesterday by a cause for much greater joy. You remember ..."

These two sermons do not only bear witness to the already mentioned fact that Augustine often prayed every day, but show how detailed and reliable the work of the stenographers was. The reader finds himself transported back in the middle of the pulsing life of Augustine's times with all its colourful proceedings. And they prove both the accuracy of their transmission and the fact that Augustine did not revise them afterwards to make them more literary for publication. Reading the sermons of St. Augustine we may trust to have the originally pronounced text.

5. *The preacher as interpreter of God's word*

What is the subject matter of preaching? Nothing else than God's word. The preacher therefore is nothing else than the interpreter of God's word, not proclaiming his own words. God is the author of the preacher's words, he preaches through his mouth, and the better a preacher absolves himself of this task to proclaim God's word in a convincing way the better he will give account for himself and for all those entrusted to him.

In sermon 339,4 Augustine clads it in very imaginative words: "We have our fellow poor to feed today, and we have to show them humanity and share with them; the rations I provide for you, though, are these words. I quite lack the means to feed everyone with visible, tangible bread. I feed you on what I am fed on myself. I am just a waiter, I am not the master of the house; I set food before you from the pantry which I too live on, from the Lord's storerooms, from the banquet of that householder who *for our sakes became poor, though he was rich, in order to enrich us from his poverty* (2 Cor 8,9). If I were to set bread before you, when the bread was broken you would each just carry away a scrap; even if provided a great quantity, very little indeed would arrive in

the hands of each of you. Now, however, all of you get everything I say, and each and every one of you gets it all. You haven't, I mean to say, divided the syllables of my words among yourselves, have you? You haven't taken away, have you, one word each from my drawn-out sermon? Each of you has heard the whole of it."

As the preacher is only a servant administering the word of God, he himself is nourished by it and subject to it: "Therefore, brothers, if you wish to prepare yourselves for following the will of God, what I say to you, what I say first of all to myself, indeed what he says to everybody, he who says it with absolute assurance ..." (s. 32,18). "Step in with me, if you can, into the sanctuary of God. Perhaps there, if I can, I will teach you. Or rather, learn with me from the one who is teaching me even now ..." (s. 48,8).

The annunciation and interpretation of God's word being the subject matter of all preaching Augustine's sermons usually do not consist of anything else than the Bible. He normally departs from the liturgical readings which include the Psalms, either interpreting them verse by verse or using them to explain a general topic or problem. The presence of the biblical message in Augustine's sermons extends so far as to be omnipresent in his vocabulary. Many allusions are only heard by people who know the Latin text of the Bible by heart or check upon it very carefully with the help of a concordance.

Above all it is the duty of the preacher to explain difficult passages or parts of the Bible that seem to contradict one another, especially if enemies of the church, scismatics and heretics, try to use it for their own purposes. Sermon 1 against the Manichees, confronting Genesis 1,1 and John 1,1 is a splendid example for that. "These people, you see, have the nerve to set this kind of trap in front of the unwary: they say the scriptures of the New and Old testament contradict each other to the point that they cannot both be accepted by one faith. In particular, in their efforts to convince us that the openings of the book of Genesis and of the gospel according to John disagree with each other, since they oppose them to each other head on, almost like two bulls. Moses, they tell us, says *In the beginning God made heaven and earth*, and doesn't even mention the Son through whom all things were made; whereas John says *In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God and the Word was God. This was in the beginning with God. All things were made through him, and without hin was made nothing* (John 1,1–3)".

The solution Augustine finds on the basis of arguments taken from scripture, is: "That 'beginning', in which Genesis says God made heaven and earth is the Son of God ... God made heaven and earth in the Son, through whom all things were made and without whom was made nothing. And thus, the gospel being in agreement with Genesis, we may retain our inheritance in accordance with the consensus of both Testaments, and leave fault-finding quibbles to the disinherited heretics" (s. 1,2).

6. *Praying and preaching*

Finally, in order to being a faithful hearer of God's word himself and be able to explain it to the people entrusted to him, the preacher has to hear it internally and to turn to the author of these words for help and inspiration in prayer while being supported by the prayer of the faithful as well. Sermon 179,1 : "On the strength of this uttering flowing from the wellspring of truth, through the absolutely truthful mouth of the apostle, I too make bold to add my own exhortation to you; and while I am exhorting you, to take a look at myself. After all, it is a futile preacher outwardly of God's word, who is not also inwardly a listener. Nor are we, who have to preach the word of God to his various peoples, such strangers to common humanity and faithful reflection, that we are unaware of our own danger when we do so. However, he gives us the reassurance that while we are put in danger by our ministry, we are aided by your prayers."

Prayer is not only the indispensable preparation for the preacher as Augustine tells him in *De doctrina christiana* IV 32,87: "He should be in no doubt that any ability he has and however much he has, he derives more from his devotion to prayer than his dedication to oratory; and so, by praying for himself and for those he is about to address, he must become a man of prayer before becoming a man of words," Augustine even inserts those prayers for the Lord's help into his sermons themselves: (s. 116,5). "So come then, Lord, make some keys, open, so that we may understand"; or s. 225,4: "I give you thanks, Lord, because you know what I am saying, or what I have wanted to say; still, from the crumbs of your table I have managed to feed my fellow servants; feed them yourself as well, and nourish inwardly those you have brought new birth."

Conclusion

With this prayer I shall conclude my few remarks on St. Augustine as a preacher. There is much more to say. Cardinal Michele Pellegrino wrote more than 100 pages introduction to the sermons of St. Augustine, and even that does by no means exhaust them. Maybe someone will write a book "Augustine the Preacher" as Fritz van der Meer wrote on "Augustine the Bishop". But that is a task for the future.

God and the Trinity in the Fathers
The First Two Centuries

Joseph Lupi*

The declaration of one God, the Father and Creator of heaven and earth, formed the background and indisputable premise of the faith to the early Church, a faith inherited from Judaism, a faith which marked the dividing line between the Church and paganism. According to Hermas the first commandment is to believe that God is one and that He created and established all things and brought them out of nothingness (Mand. 1.1). For Clement God is the Father and Creator of the entire cosmos (19,2) and for the writer of the so-called letter of Barnabas and for the Didache (1,2) God is our maker, the Lord Almighty, who governs the whole universe and master of all things.

These ideas were derived from the Bible, but found their echo in contemporary philosophy, especially in the writings of the Apologists. Aristides in his Apology to the Emperor Hadrian proves the existence of God from Aristotle's argument from motion, and Justin's language is coloured by the Platonizing Stoicism of his time. Justin went so far as to say that the Greek philosophers derived their ideas from the works of Moses.

The problem, already evident in the New Testament times, was how to integrate the Christ-Event with the belief in one God. The early Church was convinced that God had made Himself known to Man in the Person of Jesus, the Messiahs, raising Him from the dead and offering salvation to all men through Him, and that he had poured out his Holy Spirit on the Church. The Church's liturgy and the day to day catechetical practice clearly showed that the Apostolic Church firmly believed that God had sent his Son Jesus who died on the cross, rose again on the third day and ascended into heaven and would return a second time in glory. The writings of

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Ignatius and Justin clearly affirm this: Liturgy confirms this through the baptismal creeds of the early Church, the baptismal creeds for the Jews manifesting belief in Christ the Son of God, and the baptismal creeds for pagans manifesting belief in the Father, Creator and Master of all things and in Jesus Christ who was crucified under Pontius Pilate and in the Holy Spirit who foretold through the prophets the whole story.

Together with these confessional formulas, which later on became integrated in one formula (1), there are also several hymns, some of which we probably find quoted in the New Testament Scriptures (2) and to which reference is made in the famous letter of Pliny the Younger to the Emperor Hadrian: *Carmen Christo quasi deo dicere secum invicem.*

The early Church was fully conscious that the *mysterium Christi* was beyond words, and it grasped it more in a kind of spiritual intuition than in words and formulas. Fixed formulas proclaiming the faith of the Church resulted mainly from the encounter of Christianity with pagan philosophy.

The aim of these formulas was clarification of the relationship of Christ to the Father. The great task of the second century Fathers was to better grasp the data of revelation with the help of Greek philosophy; this proved to be the driving force to theological progress but also the starting point for heresies.

Leaving aside the Judaeo-Christian theology (3) on Christ which is at the basis of many of the apocrypha of the Old and New Testament as well as in Hermas and other writers of the Apostolic times, and leaving aside also the popular picture of Christ by means of which the Christian faith was kept alive in the hearts of the uneducated, a picture resulting from various myths and legends concerning the conception and birth of Jesus, his childhood, his temptations, his transfiguration, his passion, death and ascension, we will begin by considering the teachings of the Fathers of the Church from Clement of Rome onwards. But before doing this we have to make a reference to those, who already in Apostolic times, were trying to *solvere Christum.*

For the Jews the fact that Christ was the Son of God was a stumbling block. This is also true for many Jewish Christians, who are therefore generally included together under the name of Ebionites, so called either because they were followers of a certain Ebion, or because of the poverty of their intelligence or because of their

poor opinion about Christ. Opinions on the Ebionites' writings among scholars are as numerous as the interpretation given to the word Ebionite. To some extent the Ebionites did not consider Jesus as a mere man but they denied the virgin birth and his divine sonship; some hold that they embraced the gnostic idea of the union of a heavenly being with a man Jesus, resulting in the Christ the Son of God.

Another *solutio Christi* was ADOPTIONISM. The first adoptionist was Theodotus the Elder who justified his apostasy by saying that by denying Jesus, he did not deny God, but merely a man. According to him Christ was a mere man specially gifted by God.

DOCETISM takes us to another' extreme: the humanity and sufferings of Jesus are a mere semblance. The term docetism embraces a variety of sects all denying the reality of Christ's flesh.

The theological factor which in the second and early third century tries to dissolve Christ, was Gnosticism. Behind the material traditions and doctrines of Gnosticism, behind the elaborate pseudo-mythological phantasies and rudimentary theories derived from many religions to develop the elaborate myth of a redeeming gnosis, there stood a new experience of God, man and the world. Within the gnostic experience different systems were possible, and that is why we meet with pagan, Jewish, Judaeo-Christian and Christian Gnosticism.

Gnosticism with its pseudo-mythological phantasies could not be a danger to Christianity, but it was a real danger with its attempt to answer the great human questions concerning God, man, the world, the cosmos and history, death and after-life, body, matter and spirit.

Both Christianity and Gnosticism were concerned with man, but for Gnosticism man occupied the centre of the universe, his nature was derived from the world above. The world into existence through the incompetence or the clumsiness or the displeasure of God, and the divine element became imprisoned in the human body; the divine element is hidden in man as a mark of divine self-consciousness and must be redeemed. This divine element, this spark of light, must return to the Logos, the redeemer of the world from which it has fallen: this means the dissolution of man and a return to a pre-existent condition.

Gnosticism therefore is concerned with a physical redemption understood in

the context of a hostility between spirit and matter. In Christianity redemption is freedom from sin.

Gnosticism stems from a real experience of human existence and to explain it Gnosticism takes refuge in mythical genealogies and in magic enriched with elements from Jewish, Christian and other religions.

Christianity differs from Gnosticism in two ways:

i) The transcendant God retains a constant relationship to the material world He has created: only sin, not matter seperates from God. The fall is a historical, not a mythological event. To overcome sin, God intervenes to bring back to himself man in body and soul and the whole world.
ii) God's action culminated in the incarnation of the Son of God who by his obedience lays the foundation for the restoration of all things in God already accomplished *in figura* in his resurrection.

Gnosticism and Christianity have in common the experience of man and the world and a longing for freedom from death, fate and sorrow: redemption. In Christianity, in contrast with Gnosticism, this experience is founded in the historical act carried out by God in Christ, which while resting on a revelation, in the last resort rests on a spiritual and a moral act accomplished by Christ.

The Apostolic Fathers

The Apostolic Fathers are rather witnesses of the traditional faith than its interpretation. CLEMENT of Rome (4) hardly gives us any hint of the Christian mystery except by mentioning the three persons together in an oath (58,2): "As God lives, and the Lord Jesus Christ lives, and the Spirit, and in the question (46,6) "Have we not one God, and one Christ and one Spirit of grace poured upon us?" Clement is averse to speculation, although a Judaistic and a Stoic tone is evident in his letter. His picture of Christ is developed along the lines of St. Paul (2 Cor 8,9; Phil 2, 5–11) and the letter to the Hebrews (1,2). The pre-existent Son of God, the brightness of the Father, came into the world not with the pomp of pride and arrogance, but in humility (16,2), he came as a man, but he is the High Priest of mankind and their way to blessedness (ch.36); he is above all creatures, King of the world, giver of Divine Gifts, i.e. light, knowledge and immortality. After his exaltation he is united with the Father in glory and receives divine honour.

IGNATIOUS OF ANTIOCH (5) is more revealing. The centre of Ignatius' teaching is Christ, but he assigns a proper place to the Holy Spirit: through Him Christ was conceived, He was the gift sent by the Saviour, through Him bishops, presbyters and deacons are established and confirmed. The Trinity is mentioned at least three times (Eph 9,1; Magn. 13,1 and 13,2). But much more frequently he speaks of God the Father and Jesus Christ, declaring that there is one God who has revealed Himself through His Son Jesus Christ who is his Word emerging from silence (Magn. 8,2).

Against Docetism and emergent Gnosticism, Ignatius clearly affirmed the objective reality of the Christ-Event and at the same time showed it to be a message about man and his salvation. Like St. Paul, Ignatius lives in the hope of future salvation: he calls Christ our hope and our life: the whole life of the Christian is drawn into a sacramental unity with Christ and thereby receives a sacramental character i.e. participation in Christ's passion, death and resurrection.

As in St. John, Ignatius speaks of the unity of the two kinds of being in Christ, the Logos and the man, as being in continual tension. To emphasize the distinction between the two kinds of being in the one Lord, and the genuinness and completeness of both kinds of being, excluding all hint of semblance (*dokein*), he uses a formula in Eph 7,2 which later on, when the christological controversies reached their climax, was so often used to express the orthodox position: our physician is

<div align="center">

our physician is

corporal	and	spiritual
begotten	and	unbegotten
in the flesh	and	God
in death	and	true life
of Mary	and	of God

first passable and then impassable
Jesus Christ our Lord

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The passage contains two series of statements about Christ, on the left those concerning Christ in the flesh; on the right those which are said about Him as the pre-existent Son of God. The passage is a clear recognition of the two kinds of being in Christ, both kinds of expression referring to one and the same reality, Christ.

The terms *gennetos* (begotten) and *agennetos* (unbegotten) caused difficulties during the Arian controversies, as we will see later on.

The Apologists

With the Apologists we have the first attempt of an intellectually satisfying explanation of the relation of Christ to the Father. Their explanation, reduced to essentials, was that, as preexistent, Christ was the Father's thought or mind, as manifested in creation and revelation. The Apologists based their explanation on the doctrine of the divine Logos, a doctrine familiar to later Judaism and Stoicism. The Apologists developed the Logos idea to explain the twofold fact of Christ's pre-temporal oneness with the Father and his manifestation in the world of space and time. They blended the Old Testament idea that by the Word of God the heavens were made (Ps 33,6) with the Stoic idea of the immanent Logos and the uttered Logos, and developed a theology of economic Trinitarianism, which became to be considered unorthodox only after the Arian crisis, on account of the subordinationism in the Trinity it implies. This explanation is clearly found in the writings of JUSTIN (6), who laid the first foundations of the Logos theology and Christology. Justin develops his ideas within the context of a historical understanding of revelation: basing himself on the prologue of St. John he identifies the Word made flesh with the pre-existent Logos who is also the mediator of creation and revelation. The incarnation – the Word made flesh – was the last link in a chain of events, during which the Logos had earlier already appeared on earth in other circumstances to reveal the will of the Father. The Logos continues being mediator of revelation till the end of the world, till the second Parousia, by being *Nomos* (Law) of the human race – this explains the expansion of Christianity: by believing in the Word, men free themselves from the confusion brought about by the demons who exerted their influence in the world through the *nomos* of the peoples – in Christ a new order has been created in the world.

The starting point of Justin's theology is the notion of the *Logos spermatikos*, i.e. the Logos considered in his activity of implanting a seed (*sperma*) of himself in man i.e. seeds of knowledge in human reason. All men, even pagans, have always possessed as it were, seeds of the Logos, and so were able to perceive some truths. Pagan philosophers had lived in accordance with the Logos, i.e. had had sown in them seeds of the Logos, but they had the Logos only *in part* – seeds – and so they knew the Logos only partially and obscurely, and therefore their teachings were incomplete and false. These pagan philosophers nevertheless were able to participate

more fully in the revelations of the Logos through the Old Testament writings, with which they were familiar; but their knowledge remained always partial. The Old Testament prophets received the Logos in an exceptional way, while Christians possess the whole personal Logos, dwelling with them in the freedom of grace. In Christ finally we have the supreme example of the conjunction of the Logos with man: our religion, says Justin (Apol. II, 10), is more sublime than any other teaching of man because Christ represents the Logos principle in its totality i.e. body and Logos and soul; in other words, the Logos has assumed shape and become man in Christ, he has become incarnate in his entirety in Christ.

According to Justin, the Logos is not only distinct from the Father in name but also numerically distinct because:

(i) the theophanies of the Old Testament suggest that below the Creator of all things there is another who is also God and Lord since it is inconceivable that the Master and the Father of all things should make himself visible in a minute corner of the world (Dial. 56.4; 60.2)

(ii) Old Testament passages represent God conversing with another who is a personal being like himself (Dial. 62.2)

(iii) in Prov. 8, 22 ff. we read that "The Lord created me in the beginning of his ways...." (dial. 129.3)

The Logos being Word and first begotten of God, is also God and therefore to be adored.

According to Justin, the Father created and ordered the universe through His Logos; he revealed himself to man through His Logos. The Logos is God's offspring and only·Son begotten before all creatures in the beginning; but this begetting does not entail any separation between Father and Son – to explain this Justin makes use of the analogy between human reason and its extrapolation in speech, and between the sun and its light.

TATIAN, a disciple of Justin, speaks of the Logos as existing in the Father as his rationality, and then, through an act of His will, being generated. Tatian put into greater relief than Justin the contrast between the two successive states of the Logos. Before creation the Father was alone, the Logos being immanent in Him as his rationality and His potentiality for creating all things; at the moment of creation the Logos came forth from the Father as His primordial work.

We find the same ideas in THEOPHILIUS OF ANTIOCH and in ATHENAGORAS. Briefly the Apologists:

(i)   When speaking about God the Father, the Scriptures were not speaking of the first Person of the Trinity but of the Godhead;
(ii) Dated the generation of the Son not from eternity but from the moment of the creation: the Logos from immanent in the Father became "proferred", was put forth, for the purpose of creation and revelation, from *logos endiathetos* to *Logos proforikos.*

Theophilus was the first Christian author to distinguish between the "immanent" and "proferred" Logos. He was also the first writer to use the term *trias* (trinitas) for the union of the three Persons in the Godhead.

The Apologists often speak of the Son as a *deuteros theos*, a second God – their object is not to subordinate the Son but to safeguard monotheism.

With regard to the Holy Spirit the Apologists have very little to say generally conceiving him as inspiring the prophets; generally they find great difficulties in distinguishing the Spirit from the Logos, v.g. the Spirit of the Most High in Lk 1,35 for the Apologists is not the Holy Spirit but the Logos who being the eternal Dynamis of the Father can himself beget his earthly existence in the womb of a Virgin (Justin Apol. I, 33).

Although Theophilus had already made use of the term *trias*, his contemporary IRENAEUS (7) never uses it. In his refutation of Gnosticism he prefers stressing the fact that God the Creator of the world is also the God of the Old Testament and the Father of the Logos. Although Irenaeus does not discuss the relationships of the Three Divine Persons within the Godhead, he is convinced that the existence of the Three Persons is clearly proved in the history of mankind: they existed before creation as the words: "Let us make man..." are addressed by the Father to the Son and the Holy Spirit, who are often called by Irenaeus, allegorically, the hands of God.

Irenaeus approaches the mystery of God from two directions: (i) in his intrinsic being, (ii) in his *oikonomia*, i.e. in the process of his self revelation.

God is the Father of all things, ineffable and unknowable; from all eternity He contains in Himself his Word and His Wisdom. In making Himself known in creation

and redemption he manifests His Word and His Wisdom as the Son and the Spirit: they are "his hands", the forms of his self revelation. "Since God is rational, He created whatever was made by His Word": here we have a conception, so familiar with the Apologists, of the Word as God's immanent rationality which He profers at creation. Nevertheless, Irenaeus avoids using philosophical language and refuses the analogy of God's utterance of His Word with the declaration of human thought in speech, for God is identical with His Logos, and basing himself on Is 53,8 says: *Generationes eius quis enarrabit?*

With the Son Irenaeus closely associates the Spirit: as God is rational He has His Logos, and as God is spiritual He has his Spirit. The Word and the Spirit collaborated in the work of creation being as it were God's hands: *Manus tuae fecerunt me et plasmaverunt me* (Job 10,8): through the Logos creatures came into existence and the Spirit ordered and adorned them: it is the Word who establishes things, i.e. gives them body and reality of being, and the Spirit gives order and form to these different powers (Demons. 5).

Creation does not exhaust the function of the Logos and the Spirit. God is ineffable and unknowable: it is the Logos who reveals the Father: the Son reveals the knowledge of the Father through his own manifestation – in the Old Testament theophanies it is really the Logos who spoke to the patriarchs. Then at the incarnation the Logos hitherto invisible to human eyes, became visible and disclosed for the first time that image of God in the likeness of which man was originally made.

The Spirit's role is essential, for without the Spirit it is impossible to behold the Word of God, since the knowledge of the Father is the Son, and the knowledge of the Son of God can only be obtained through the Spirit, and according to the Father's pleasure the Son ministers the Spirit to whomsoever the Father wills (Demonstr. 7). In other words, our sanctification is the work of the Spirit, for it is the Spirit who purifies man and raises Him to life of God.

Irenaeus, in his approach to the mystery of God in his *oikonomia*, aims at refuting the Gnostic notion of *olkonomia*. The Gnostic olkonomia – that of Valentinus – was a planned ordering of salvation, but it excluded the flesh from it, and thus the object of salvation was not the whole man, but only his soul.

Against Gnosticism, Irenaeus asserts the reality of the *substantia domini nostri*, he emphasises the reality of the incarnation and the true historicity of the act of redemption.

In doing this, Irenaeus emphasises against Gnostic dualism, the fact that Christ, God and man, is the embodiment and the real centre of unity in the cosmos and in history.

Non Christian elements – pagan philosophy – have no place in his understanding of Christ – Irenaeus is not a philosopher as Justin but a biblical theologian. His starting point is the Creed. Against the Gnostic dissolution and separation of God from the world, Irenaeus stresses the unity of God, of Christ, of salvation, and develops the idea of one universal *oikonomia* embracing both creation and the *eskaton*, with the Christ-Event at the centre. Creation, incarnation, redemption are different parts of an all embracing *oikonomia*. Christ's contribution to this *oikonomia* is his *anakephalaiosis*: just as in the invisible world the Logos is already head of all beings created through Him, so now in the incarnation He becomes head of the visible and corporeal world and above all head of the Church drawing everything to Himself. This represents the recapitulation of creation and above all of the fallen Adam, a renewing of the whole history of the world and of mankind by Christ the head, from its beginning to its end. The world, history, man are brought to their climax and at the same time they are brought back through Christ to God.

Some scholars have noticed a "Nestorian" ring in the concrete language used by Irenaeus, but we must not forget that at the end of the 2nd century theological language had not yet been fixed, it lacked the refined mode of expression we meet with in the Fathers of the 4th and 5th centuries. Irenaeus wants to stress the unity of the God-man; his concern is with the resurrection of the human body which in Christ had become a participant in the life giving divine power through its union with the Logos. For this reason he stresses that it is the flesh, the *sarx*, which was in need of redemption, although Irenaeus states that it is the whole man who is destined for salvation. It is because of Gnosticism that he lays so much stress on the flesh. But this does not mean that he denies a human soul in Christ. This is a problem belonging to a later period to the 4th century.

Concluding, we can say that in the 2nd century the two main theological problems of the golden age of Patrology are already emerging, i.e. the relationship between the Logos and the Father, and the unity of the Godhead and the Manhood in Christ.

FROM HIPPOLYTUS TO ORIGEN

Foundations for further development in Christology were laid by Origen in the East and Tertullian in the West. The controversy with Gnosticism made the Church

realize the value of a closed biblical and apostolic tradition within the framework of the *regula fidei*. This consciousness was a continual corrective in the trinitarian and christological controversies of the 4th and 5th centuries.

The Church found herself driven to thinking the traditional material of her belief more deeply, because the confession that Christ was the Son of God required a twofold demonstration, i.e. that it was compatible with Jewish monotheism and different from pagan politheism. The problem was how to combine the unity of the Godhead with the Trinity of the Persons.

Because of Gnosticism, Christian theologians had to show that their belief in God the Father and in His incarnate Son fitted with the whole pattern of the relationship between God and the world – they had to construct a Christian picture of the world and of history. With the help of Stoicism, Middle Platonism and finally Neo-Platonism, Christian theologians saw a possibility of solving the problems just mentioned.

Pagan philosophies gave some little help to explaining the procession of the Son, and the procession of the world, creation and incarnation, but the help was very limited, and this help could easily lead to error if the corrective of faith and apostolic tradition was lacking, for in this case we would have had a hellenization of Christianity.

The process began with the Apologists, with the Logos doctrine of the Apologists, and it reached its first heights with Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria and Origen.

The two sources of the Logos doctrine of the Apologists were Christian tradition (St. John's prologue) and Hellenistic philosophy (Middle Platonism and Stoicism).

The step forward taken by the Apologists was positive: it was only through contemporary philosophy that the Apologists could speak to the intellectuals of their time, but it was always a risk – in fact Arianism was the consequence of the error committed by the Apologists, who considered the Logos as the servant, the angel of the absolutely transcendent Father, a *deuteros theos*. This subordination is still evident in Hippolytus and in Tertullian.

HIPPOLYTUS has a Logos theology which in its emphasis on the history of revelation directly recalls the second century, and above all Irenaeus. According to him, when God willed, He engendered His Word to create the universe, and His

Wisdom to adorn and order it. Later still, with the world's salvation in view, He rendered the Word visible at the incarnation.

Therefore alongside the Father (i.e. the Godhead) there is "an other", a second *prosopon* (person), while the Spirit completed the Triad. There are therefore Three revealed in the *oikonomia*, the Father, the Son who obeys, and the Spirit who makes us understand: the Father who is above all things, the Son who is everywhere, and the Spirit who is in all things. In *Contra Noetum* 10, Hippolytus writes: "When I speak of an other, I do not mean two Gods, but as it were light from light, water from its source, a ray from the sun; for there is only one power, that which issues from All. The All is the Father and the power issuing from Him, and He alone is from the Father."

Hippolytus is reluctant to designate the Word as Son before the incarnation. Against Noetus Hippolytus wants to stress the distinction in the same unity of Father and Logos, and so he stresses the fact of the incarnation, for at the incarnation the Father and the Logos are distinct from each other as now the Logos stands visibly against the Father as "Son". This does not mean that the Logos *qua* Logos came fully to himself at the incarnation; it only means that now the invisible procession of the Logos becomes visible to the world. These two stages are intimately related. At first the Father procreated the Logos as light from light, pronouncing his Word to create the universe – at this stage the Logos was visible to the Father, but invisible to the created universe. At the second stage he made his Logos visible to the world for our salvation. The incarnation is seen by Hippolytus as the unity of the procreation of the Logos from the lips, the heart and the loins of the Father and from David and the Virgin – the incarnation is not simply a coming of the Logos into the world but a procreation in respect of the world. Hippolytus speaks of a twofold birth of the Logos, from God and the Virgin (cfr. Ignatius, Eph. 7,5). The Logos is begotten of the Father, as it were, in the corporeality supplied by the Virgin, and thus is fully revealed as Son. The true Son of God, who has come in the flesh, is the Logos, who is called Son because he has become a man. "This is the new name for the love he has for us, a name he has taken by calling himself Son, for without flesh and in himself the Logos was not true Son, although he was truly Only begotten... and now he has manifested himself as the only Son of God" (C. Noet. 15). In the mystery of the oikonomia, the Logos through his birth from the Holy Spirit and the Virgin has shown himself true Son of God.

Hippolytus sees the one Christ in two stages, as the pre-existent Logos *asarkos*

(without flesh) and as the logos *ensarkos* by being born, in the flesh, of the Virgin Mary.

The theophanies of the Old Testament are a prelude to the incarnation, the beginning of the process of the incarnation in the full sense. At first the Logos only appeared "in part", not in full human form, which he assumed in the incarnation, experiencing every age of man, taking upon himself all the realities of man's sufferings. This idea, found also in Gnosticism, was later to be developed in the principle: *qued non assumpsit non redemit.*

Hippolytus does not mention, at least explicitly, the problem of the unity of the two natures in the one Christ. We are still far from the technical language developed in the 4th century, but he certainly excludes modalism. Nevertheless in Hippolytus we already meet with expressions which were to become so common later on: the Logos clothes himself with the flesh, he dwells in the body as in a temple: and there is a passage in C. Noetum where he uses the word which later on became a key-word in the Christological controversies of the 4th century. In a fragment from the C. Noetum we read: "The Logos... before the incarnation and when by himself was not perfect Son, although perfect Logos, only begotten; nor could the flesh exist by itself (*hupostanai*), apart from the Logos as it had its existence (*ten sustasin*) in the Logos". The term *hupostanai* does not have here the technical meaning of subsistence it took later on, but simply "existence" – we are still too far away from a clear formulation of the unity and duality in Christ.

TERTULLIAN had to defend the *regula fidei* against pagan polytheism and against Christian monarchianism as well as against the disruptive tendencies of the Gnosticism of Marcion and Valentinus. In doing this, Tertullian coined his terminology derived from the Bible, Judaism, Gnosticism and the legal language of Rome at his time, thus giving the West its theological formulas long before the East was able to provide its own.

Tertullian's task was to *probare Christum, probare divinitatem Christi*, (the theme of his *Apologeticum*), and he starts by making clear the Christian conception of God, the singleness of God. To do this he makes use of the concept of *monarchia*, introduced into Christian theology by the Apologists from the Hellenistic Jews of Alexandria. According to Tertullian the deepest mystery of the Christian faith i.e. that God has a Son is expressed by the term *monarchia*. God the Father is the supreme ruler but hands over the administration of the rule to His Son – thus Tertullian sees the *monarchia* in the framework of an economic Trinity. The

monarchia is further guaranteed by the inner unity in substance of Father, Son and Spirit: they are *una substantia.*

Tertullian imagines *substantia* to be some light, fine invisible matter which while being one, is differentiated within itself. Father, Son and Spirit are in the one total reality of God. The Son proceeds from this *una substantia* as it is in the Father and thereby receives his own reality; so does the Spirit, and they are distinguished through the order of their origin. The Father possesses the *substantiae plenitudo*, while the Son and the Spirit have a *portio* – a share – in this *una substantia*, not a *pars* but a share – *Pater enim tota substantia est, filius vero derivatio totius et portio*. With regard to the Logos, Tertullian says in the *Apologeticum*, we are taught that he is derived from God and begotten by derivation so that he is Son of God and called God because of the unity of susbtance: just as a sunbeam is an extension of the sun, and is one with the substance of the sun and yet distinct from it, so the Son of God is God from God. The *substantia* is not divided but extended on account of the special task to be accomplished by the Son in creation and redemption.

From the *una substantia*, there comes forth a special form of existence, the *status* in which God finds Himself; the Father, Son and Spirit are *tres non statu sed gradu, non substantia sed forma, non potestate sed specie, unius autem substantiae, et unius status et unius potestatis, quia unus deus*. By the status of God, Tertullian understands God's essential properties. The *una potestas* is the keystone of the unity of God. Although three, the Persons are several manifestations of a single invisible power, of a *una potestas* on the analogy of the imperial government – the *monarchia* – the one and same sovereignty exercised by coordinate agencies – the *monarchia* of God is preserved because the Son exercises only the one rule of the Father and gives it back to the Father at the end of this world.

Tertullian continually stresses the fact that the distinction between the Three did not involve division or separation – *distinctio* or *dispositio* but not *separatio* analogically illustrated by the root and its shoot, the source and the river, the sun and its light. The Three are one reality – *unum* – not one Person – *unus*.

Tertullian conceives the Trinity as an economic, organic, dynamic Trinity i.e. the second and third Person proceed from the *unitas substantiae* because they have a task to perform: the divine threeness unfolds itself with a view to creation and redemption. From Tertullian's Trinitarian doctrine logically follows his doctrine on the incarnation: the tri-personality of the one God is an unconditional

presupposition of his doctrine on the incarnation.

We must not confuse Tertullian's *monarchia* with monarchianism, which Tertullian refuted in his *Contra Praxeam*, who applied his trinitarian modalism also to the incarnation, interpreting Christ as the manifestation of the Father by saying that the Father became man and suffered (patripassianism), and by explaining that when the Scriptures ascribe the incarnation to the Son, they meant that the flesh was the Son: *Ecce, inqulunt haeretici (Praxeas) ab angelo praedicatum est: Propterea quod, nascetur sanctum vocabitur filius Dei. Caro itaque nata est, caro itaque erit filius Dei.* (Adv. Prax. 27, 4) *Filium carnem esse, id est hominem, id est Iesum, Patrem autem spiritum, id est Deum, id est Christum* (ib. 27, 1).

Tertullian begins from trinitarian presupposition and introduces the Logos (Tert. uses the terms *Sermo* and *Spiritus*) as a person – *persona*. Before proceeding further, what meaning does Tertullian give to the term *persona*? He gives it the meaning of human individuality, and in this meaning it had already been accepted by a number of theologians at the end of the 2nd century with reference to the Trinity. A person is a being who acts and speaks. Now God the Father and the Son speak one with the other, the Bible uses the plural for God, it reports different *voces* which must therefore belong to different persons. Therefore, Tertullian concludes, the Logos is substance and person: *quaecumque ergo susbstantia sermonis fuit, illam dico personam* (Adv. Prax. 7, 9) for person is only realised in a substance and in a special reality in the substance.

The one *substantia* in God has three figures or forms: species, gradus, personae, by virtue of a distinction in the one divine substance (the *substantia* becomes a person when it has added to it the characteristics, the individual properties of the particular *ens concretum physicum*) these properties which Tertullian calls *species, forma, character*. The *una substantia* of the Godhead has three *species, gradus, personae*.

The Logos (*Sermo* according to Tertullian) already has a particular reality, a *status*, a *persona* in God. Assuming human nature this person of the Son has now a twofold *status*, Godhead and manhood: *vidimus duplicem statum, non confusum sed coniunctum in una persona, deum et hominem Iesum.*

This *duplicem statum* is a permanent reality because the Godhead and the manhood in Christ are not mixed, but conjoined in *una persona*. To interpret the

unity of Christ, Tertullian makes use of the Stoic *krasis* doctrine. Tertullian, in the case of Christ, excludes the *mixtio secundum confusionem* of the Stoics i.e. the mixture of two substances which results in a *tertium quid*, for in this case there would be a *transfiguratio* and a *demutatio substantiae;* he also excludes a *iuxtapositio* for in this case there is no unity; but between these two, Stoics admitted a third type of union, a *mixtio* i.e. when two solid bodies compenetrate each other maintaining their co-natural characteristics and *concretio* i.e. the complete mutual penetration of two fluid bodies which maintain their corresponding properties. The *coniunctio* of the Godhead and the manhood in Christ is not to be explained as a *confusio* nor as a *iuxtapositio*, but as a *duo in uno esse*.

Tertullian stressed continually the reality of the incarnation; he even wrote a treatise *De carne Christi* to show that Christ was really born from a Virgin, and not that He had come into the world through a Virgin as the Gnostics taught. He was also subject to the *passiones humanae*, hunger, thirst, etc.

In *De carne Christi* Tertullian makes use of the early Christian practice of the *communicatio idiomatum* although later in the *Adv. Praxeam* he checks somewhat his language clearly distinguishing what belongs to the Godhead and what to the manhood. In *De carne Christi* we read: "The Son of God was crucified, I am not ashamed because men must need be ashamed, the Son of God died: it is by all means to be believed, because it is absurd; he was buried and rose again: the fact is certain because it is impossible."

The *in una persona* of Tertullian which was the key to the solution of the Christological problem at Chalcedon, remained unnoticed for two centuries, and only towards the end of the 4th century, in St. Jerome, and later, after 411, with Augustine, it acquired a new theological significance.

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA's theology has the idea of the Logos at its beginning and basis: he made the Logos the highest principle for the religious explanation of the world: the Logos is the creator of the universe, the source and teacher of all gnosis, i.e. the ideal of all contemplative life involving separation from the visible world and communion with the intelligible realites. The Logos manifested God in the Law of the Old Testament, in the philosophy of the Greeks and finally, in the fulness of time, in his incarnation. He forms with the Father and the Holy Spirit the divine triad. It is through the Logos that we can recognise God, for the Father cannot be named as he is completely transcendent, ineffable,

incomprehensible. The Father (i.e. the Godhead) can be known only through His Logos, who is his image and inseparable from Him.

Clement's ideas are derived from Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy, Neo-Platonism, Middle Platonism and also from Gnosticism. Like the *nous* of Middle Platonism and Neo-Platonism, the Logos is at the same time unity and plurality, comprising in Himself the Father's ideas and also the active forces by means of which he animates the world of creatures, for the Logos is the image of the Father, he is his mind or rationality, inseparable from him. His generation from the Father is in him and He in the Father. The Spirit is the light issuing from the Logos, illuminating the faithful and pervading the world as the power of the Logos attracting men to God.

Clement clearly distinguishes the Three, although his language might have shades of Modalism, but this is due only to lack of the technical terms which came later; but Clement admits a certain subordination in the Trinity due to Platonic influences.

For Clement the special role of the Logos is the communication of the *gnosis*: he reveals the "secret tradition", in contrast to the common Christian tradition, a secret tradition reserved only for the "gnostics' who find it in the Scriptures hidden under the veils of symbolism (all Scripture is to be interpreted allegorically). The Logos alone can teach gnosis for he alone can enter the innermost sanctuary of the holy of holies, being the high priest himself (ideas in Philo and Gnosticism).

Like Justin, Clement sees in the theophanies of the Old Testament a preparation of the incarnation, which nevertheless is something altogether new. The incarnate Logos, while retaining his transcendence, which he has in common with the Father, enters history and completes the Old Testament theophanies, becoming the centre of all history.

Through incarnation the Logos becomes visible: he begets himself (Clement applies Lk 1, 35 to the Logos), but this does not mean that he has become twofold, he is one and the same who is begotten of the Father in eternity and becomes flesh.

Through the incarnate Logos, the Father is made visible and manifest, and thus the Logos is the *prosopon* of the Father, but this is so because the Logos is the *Imago* of the invisible God from all eternity.

Clement imagines three different stages of existence of the Logos with the Godhead: the first stage the Logos is the mind of God which contains his thought, and at this stage he is identical with God; the next stage is when the Logos becomes a separate hypostasis, distinct from the Father and thus he is the immanent law of the universe, the soul of the world; the third stage is being the revelation of the Father. Here again we notice the influence of Jewish Alexandrian philosophy, Middle and Neo-Platonism. To the threefold stage of the Logos in the Godhead, corresponds the threefold stage of the revelation of the Logos to the world, in creation, in incarnation, in the Church, for in the Church the Logos is father, mother, guardian, teacher and nourisher, he is the divine pedagogue.

Clement keeps his distance from Middle Platonism when he identifies the pre-existent Logos with the historical person of Christ, and stresses the fact of the descent of the Logos in the flesh, although he has been suspected of docetism. But this is due to the fact that Clement allowed himself to become enamoured of the Greek concept of *apatheia* i.e. emancipation from all passions, a condition which should be attained by the true gnostic. Clement actually distinguishes two types of *pathe*, one necessary for the preservation of the body, the other a suffering of the soul: the true gnostic will free himself from this second *pathe*. In Christ the *pathe* of the soul is unthinkable. The *pathe* of the body is necessary for ordinary man to maintain his bodily life, but in Christ it was not necessary, for the indwelling holy power in him – the indwelling Logos – substituted the impulses to which ordinary men are subject (v.g. pangs of hunger). In this idea we can see the influence of the Stoic *hegemonikon* i.e. the principal part of the soul, the soul of the soul, the seat of free will decision and power of thought. The Logos, according to Clement, it seems, is the *hegemon* in Christ: when the original appears, the copy loses its place and function: the Logos in the "inner man", in Christ, is the all predominating physical principle. This should imply that the Logos substituted the human soul in Christ, but accusing Clement of Apollinarianism would be too harsh: the problem of Christ's human soul had not yet risen, it had not even been thought of.

ORIGEN is the first Christian systematic theologian. His doctrine of the Trinity can be understood only with reference to his spiritual teachings. All his speculation about the mystery of the Trinity is a reflection of this speculation on the soul's ascent to God.

Origen's doctrine is mainly found in the *Peri arkon*, the first *Summa Theologica*; in this work Origen wanted *seriem quandam et corpus ex horum omnium ratione*

perficere, ut manifestis et necessariis assertionibus de singulis quibusque quid sit in vero rimetur et unum... corpus efficit. Cfr. also *C. Celsum*, and *Comm. in Evang. Ian* and *De Oratione*.

"God," says Origen, "is *ex omni parte monas (one) et ut ita dicam hinas (unity)... incomprehensibilis, inaestimabilis, impassibilis.*" Yet man can naturally arrive at knowing God by freeing himself from matter. But God is also *trias* (trinity): Father, Son and Spirit.

Starting from the Incarnation, as expressed in the Creed, he states that the Son is God, distinct from the Father begotten from eternity and consubstantial with the Father.

Origen knew modalism, which he firmly opposed: "There are people who say that the Father and Son are not numerically distinguishable, separable only in thought, one not only in substance but also in subsistence. The truth is that the Son is other in subsistence (hupokeimenon) than the Father, they are two in respect of their Persons *(duo te hupostasei)* but one in unanimity, in harmony and identity of will."

Speaking of the unity of the Three Persons, Origen sometimes represents it as a moral union (their wills are identical) or as the union of man and wife in one flesh, but these are only analogical expressions which do not reflect Origen's real teaching which is based on the fact that the Son has been begotten, not created from all eternity – *non enim dicimus, sicut haeretici putant, partem aliquam substantiae Dei in filium versam ex nullis substantibus filium procreatum a Patre, i.e. extra susbtantiam suam, et fuerit aliquando quando non fuerit, sed abscisso omni sensu corporeo, ex invisibili et incorporeo Verbum et sapientiam genitam dicimus absque ulla corporali passione, velut si voluntasprocedata mente* (De princ. 4, 28).

This passage clearly states (i) the Son is not a part (*pars*) of the substance of the Father i.e. when the Son was generated a part of the divine *ousia* was not separated from the Father and attained a distinct subsistence; (ii) the generation of the Son was not an act which had a beginning and an end, but it is *ab aeterno*, an eternal act as light continually generates its splendour.

Therefore, the Son is God *kat'ousian*, in essence, not by participation: He is of the same substance (*homo ousios*) of the Father. The term *homo ousios*

(consubstantial) which was the keyword to express the orthodox teaching against Arianism in the following century, may not have been used by Origen, for the Greek text of the fragment from his commentary in *Ep. ad Hebraeos* is quoted in Latin by Pamphilius in his Apology for Origen. The Latin text reads: *Sic et sapientia ex Deo procedens, ex ipsa substantia Dei generatur. Nihilominus et secundum similit nudi nem corporalis aporrhoeae (effluence) esse dicitur aporrhoea gloriae omnipotentis pura et sincera. Ouse utraeque similitudines manifestissime ostendunt communionem substantiae esse filio cum patre. Aporrhoea enim homocusos videtur i.e. unius substantiae cum illo corpore ex quo est vel aporrhea vel vapor.*

With regard to the Holy Spirit, Origen is very reticent. According to Origen the problems about the Holy Spirit had not been yet fully studied. Though he never doubted the divinity of the Holy Spirit, and held that nowhere is there evidence that the Spirit was *factura vel creatura*; for him the Spirit was eternal and had the same dignity and holiness of the Father and the Son, although he complained that there were people *minore quam dignum est de eius divinitate sentientes*; nevertheless he held that the problems *utrum Sp. S. sit natus an innatus vel filius Dei habendus sit necne* were still open to discussion. Origen, basing himself on St. John's prologue, *(omnia per ipsum facta sunt)*, questions the manner of the Spirit's origin. The Holy Spirit is not *agennetos* – the Father alone is so – therefore his origin is *per Filium*, the first of all things produced a *Patre per Filium*. Origen thus distinguishes the origin of the Spirit from that of the Son: the latter is directly generated from the Father. The Spirit's origin is a *Patre per Filium*, but the Spirit's origin is not a *generatio*. The Son is *Unigenitus*, there cannot be another Son in the Trinity. This solution was later fully developed by Gregory of Nyssa.

Origen has been accused of subordinationism by St. Jerome, Theophilus of Alexandria and Justinian and accused of being a precursor of Arianism. This second charge is unjust, but the charge of subordination is serious and it is due to the fact that the underlying structure of thought in Origen is contemporary Platonism.

The Father alone is *autotheos* and *ho theos*, the Son is only *theos* not *ho theos* and merits only a secondary degree of honour for He is not absolute goodness or truth, but His goodness and truth are a reflection of the Father's goodness and truth, and the Son is the Father's agent executing His orders in creation. Therefore we should not pray to Christ but to the Father only. Whereas the Father's actions extend to all reality, the Son's are limited to rational beings, and the Spirit's to those being sanctified. Origen's Platonism led him to conceive a whole world of spiritual beings,

coeternal with the Father, in relation to the Logos, just as the Logos, at a higher level was in relation to the Father. These spiritual beings were images of the Logos, just as the Logos, at a higher level was in relation to the Father. These spiritual beings were images of the Logos as the Logos was of the Father. (8)

Briefly Origen's Trinity has the Father as the source and goal of all existence, transcending mind and being itself. Being perfect goodness and power He must have always had objects on which to exercise his goodness and power, and so brought into existence a world of spiritual beings co-eternal with himself. To mediate between His absolute unity and their multiplicity He has his Son, His express image, the meeting place of a plurality of "aspects" – *epinoiai* – which explain his twofold relation to the Father and the world. These *epinoiai* stand for the manifold characteristics of the Logos either in His eternal being (Wisdom, Truth, Life) or as incarnate (Shepherd, Physician, Priest, etc). These *epinoiai* are partly absolute, and partly relative ("for us" as our sanctification, our redemption, etc). These *epinoiai* can be also classified as those given only to Christ, those proper to Christ and to others, those which describe Christ in relation to others v.g. shepherd.

The Father also is Truth, Wisdom, Holiness, but in the Father these *epinoiai* are not objectively manifest because of His simplicity and transcendence; in the Son they have an objective multiplicity, for the Son, according to the Scriptures, has many names. Christ is *multiplex in constitutione* and therefore has a number of titles not only because of his redemptive role but also in respect of his constitution, Christ is called Wisdom, Power, Life, Logos, etc. already in his divine nature. By virtue of the supreme and first *epinoiai* i.e. in so far as He is wisdom, he is already a multiplicity: *"sapientia" Dei "multiplex" dicitur, ut per haec mereamur participium sumere "sapientiae Dei" qui est "Christus" Jesus Dominus noster (In Iesu Nave Vll, 7).*

As revelation of the Father and his mediator towards the world, He shows the transcendant properties of the Father in their objective inexpressible reality. Christians on their part, by means of participation can express these perfections of Christ, and further unfold the *epinoiai*: through the knowledge of these perfections we ascend to the Father. Applying this to the quotation above, we can say that Christ reveals to us the Wisdom of the Father, making us participate in it, and thus leading us towards the Father. The starting point of the soul's ascent to God is Christ's manhood: the way to the Logos-God is through the Logos – incarnate. With the progress of the ascent of the soul the manhood of Christ becomes more

and more (and finally in the beatific vision completely) transparent for the Godhead. The manhood of Christ is a filter – like the Scriptures – through which the Godhead is imparted in accordance to the capability of man. Ordinary Christians limit themselves to a literal reading of the Scriptures, the gnostic is able to see its spiritual meaning: the ordinary Christian remains attached to Christ's manhood, the true gnostic strains upward to the Logos, the soul's authentic life from which it originally fell away.

Christ's manhood was real – there is no sign of Docetism in Origen. The incarnation is the real new element in the New Testament, for it meant the real arrival of the Logos in the world. The incarnation was a real historic event, even though Origen, in his doctrine of the ascent seems to imply that Christ's incarnation is only relative and supposes that at some point corporeality would cease, being totally absorbed in the divinity. Nevertheless, the conjunction of the Logos with the human soul, which he assumed, is permanent.

In the manhood of Christ, the Godhead is present in all its fulness though hidden through the *kenosis:* the conjunction of the Godhead to the manhood of Christ is achieved through the mediacy of the soul of Christ between the *sarx* and the Logos. Christ's human soul had already been united from eternity to the Logos in complete understanding and love of God, Logos and human soul of Christ are conjoined through direct vision of love as spirit to spirit: completely united to the Logos in adoring contemplation, it properly belonged to a body, and thus formed the ideal meeting point between the infinite Logos and the finite human nature.

Origen insists on the duality of the nature in Christ: he even speaks of His *hypostasis* as man and his *hypostasis* as Only-begotten; interpreting Psalm 72, 1 he explains the king and king's son as referring respectively to the nature of the Word and the man whom He assumed. Both natures retained their special characteristics, the Logos remaining Logos in essence and undergoes none of the experiences of body and soul, whereas the human nature has to put up with the customary human lot. But the incarnate Lord is one, a unity, an actual union – *henosis*, a commingling, an *anakrasis*, resulting in the deification of the human nature. The Logos and the humanity are really one because the Logos has united himself substantially to Christ's human soul in a union more intimate than he ever effected with the souls of prophets or apostles by inspiration and grace.

This explanation could lead on to a false trial, for it could imply that the union

of the Logos with Christ's human soul was only "quantitatively" different from the union of the Logos with the just through grace.

Nevertheless Origen considers the union of the Logos and the human soul of Christ as a mystery, and points out that the final grounds of the difference between the union of the Logos and the human soul of Christ and the indwelling of the Logos in the just, is that in Christ the Logos is the *hegenmonikon*, the guiding principle. From this point Origen could have arrived at an interpretation of the unity of Christ through the concept of "person", for the real personality of man is rooted in his *hegenmonikon*; but Origen lacked this concept of "person".

Origen is a key witness of the traditional teaching of the soul of Christ, although mixed with strong philosophical elements, and he already advances the notion, already met with in Tertullian, that the whole man could not be redeemed had the whole man not been assumed by the Logos.

From Origen to the Council of Nicea

During this period two men emerge – Sabellius and Paul of Samosata – who were to arouse momentous reaction for centuries afterwards. Sabellius gave a systematic philosophical shape to the Modalism of the 2nd century. According to him, the Godhead expressed itself in three operations: the Godhead regarded as creator and lawgiver was Father; the Godhead as Son projected itself as a ray from the sun, for our redemption, and once accomplished it withdrew itself back; the Godhead as Spirit inspires and bestows grace. The three persons are simply outward appearances of the Godhead – the Godhead takes three different appearances according to its operations *ad extra*.

These ideas were in direct opposition to the teachings of the Alexandrians (Clement, Origen) who clearly acknowledged the distinction of the three hypostases in God, and especially the distinction between the Father and the Son.

DIONYSIUS, the head of the school of Alexandria after Heracles, who succeeded Origen and was head of the school for one year, strongly opposed Sabellianism, and in so doing perhaps he went so far and seems to have advocated tritheism.

From Athanasius we know that some bishops from the Pentapolis had embraced Sabellianism and accused Dionysius, who had become bishop of Alexandria, of

tritheism. The charges were the following:

   i. He separated the Father and the Son;
  ii. He denied the eternity of the Son;
 iii. He named the Father without the Son and the Son without the Father;
 iv. He rejected the term *homoousios* with regard to the Son;
  v. He spoke of the Son as a creature of the Father.

The Pope, Dionysius by name also, wrote to the Church of Alexandria taking the via media between Sabellianism and tritheism, condemning all those who "destroy God dismembering him in three forces and three separate deities and hyposthases. Sabellius blasphemes God in saying that the Son is the same as the Father and viceversa, but they (the followers of Dionysius of Alexandria) proclaim three gods.... It is necessary that the divine Logos be united with the God of the universe and that the Holy Spirit also dwell and abide in God..."

Dionysius of Alexandria answered the charges against him in four books:

   i. He denies separating the Father and the Son: his argument proceeds from the terms 'Father' and 'Son' which mutually determine each other.
  ii. He grounded the eternity of the Son in the fact that He is the Logos, wisdom and power of God, and also from the fact that the Logos is termed the reflection of the eternal light (Hebr 1, 3). If light is always there, so is its reflection; if the Father is eternal, so is the Son as the terms are correlative. This is also the answer to the third charge.
 iii. Dionysius did not use the term *homoousios* because it is not found in the Scriptures, and because it only expressed in a limited way what he wanted to state with similar terms and certain comparisons: he wanted to express at the same time both the unity of and the distinction between those who are *homoousioi*, the Father and the Son. Though he did not use the term, he never rejected it. And then we should not expect too much of Dionysius here – there were still many years of long discussions before the term was accepted in the meaning it received in the Nicene Creed.
 iv. Dionysius perhaps compromised himself by speaking of the Son as a *poiema* of the Father, although he never meant to say that the Son was the work of the Father and that the Father was the maker of the Son – the comparisons he brings i.e. shipbuilder and ship, farmer and vine, were misleading, for he only meant to imply the pre-eminence of the Father. (9)

Athanasius tried to defend his predecessor by saying that he was speaking of Christ's manhood. Basil is more outspoken and says that Dionysius was the first person to have sown the seed of godlessness, for he gave Arius some footholds, some slogans; Arius even quoted Dionysius as his authority, together with the Scriptures.

Another writer who could be accused of having prepared the way for Arius, is THEOGNOSTUS, but of his writings only a few fragments have survived in the writings of Photius, who was particularly concerned with the use of the term *ktisma* (creature) with reference to the Son – but Theognostus was using the term in the same meaning as *poiema* by Dionysius of Alexandria – he did not mean to imply that the Son was created by the Father, but that he proceeded from the Father. Though subordinating the Son to the Father, he did not deny his divinity – the Logos was *deuteros theos.*

For Theognostus the Logos, the Son is still on the side of God, while for Arius, he is among the creatures.

Scholars feel that it is very difficult to say what were actually the teachings of PAUL OF SAMOSATA, as what we know of them are from his opponents. Generally he is considered as an Adoptionist. According to the synodal letter preserved in part by Euseblus in his Eccl. Hist. Vll, 30, Paul denied the divinity of Christ: Christ has not come down from heaven but was from below. Later writers say that Paul taught that the Logos indwelt in a man with body and soul. The synod at Antioch, which deposed Paul, condemned the term *homoousios* as being unfit to describe the relation between Father and Son, but we do not know what meaning Paul was giving to the term – perhaps it had a modalist meaning. Paul's chief opponent was the priest Malchion, who, it seems held that Christ's unity of Logos and sarx corresponded to the unity of body and soul in man, which might imply that the Logos substituted the human soul in Christ (Apollinarianism). We can therefore say that the seeds of Arianism, Apollinarianism and some aspects of Alexandrian theology were sown during this period.

The last orthodox subordinationists were Euseblus of Caesarea and Lactantius.

EUSEBIUS was no theologian: this is quite evident from the fact that while confessing the orthodox faith, his theological reflection was often unorthodox. He clearly confesses "Jesus Christ, God from God, light from light", but when

interpreting the relationship between the Father and the Son of God he adopts a very difficult position. He wants to stress the singleness of God, monotheism, and so for him only the Father is *ho theos*, the Father is the only God, who has received his Godhead from nature i.e. from no one else. The Son occupies second place having received the Godhead from the Father – the relationship between Father and Son is the same as that between the original and its representation.

Eusebius solved the problem posed by Christian monotheism in terms of Origenist subordinationism, but Eusebius' subordinationism was more acute than that of Origen.

There is a supreme *hypostasis*, the 'first God', the one Father, 'wisdom unbegotten and without beginning'. The Son is 'second', *deuteros theos*, 'second lord'. While the Father has absolute primacy in rule, the Son is allotted only the second role in his reign. Subordination is expressed in the order of sovereignity. Influenced by Middle Platonism, Euseblus reduces the role of the Logos to that of a mediator between the uncreated God and the created beings. The Logos is the helmsman who directs the ship of the world according to the instructions of the Father who stands far above him; the Logos is always considered as the instrument of the Father, to carry out or restore the order of the Father; his chief task is to reveal the truth about God and educate all men in morality.

Eusebius hardly refers to the Holy Spirit in his writings; and he considers him the first of all creatures. For Eusebius the origin of the Logos is mysterious, incomprehensible to the human mind. He was the last to subscribe to the *homoousios* at Nicea and he never used the term: though begotten but not created, the Logos is not of the same substance of the Father, and he has no divinity of his own right. For Eusebius the incarnation is the supreme instance of the theophanies; the law of adaptation to corporeal men required that the incarnation be the last of the ways taken by the Logos. In visible form, Christ became teacher of knowledge of God and victor over death and the devil. The body is the clothing, the abode, the temple of the Logos, who is the decisive element in the total reality of the incarnate Christ. The *anima mediatrix* of Origen has disappeared for Eusebius cannot see the use of a human soul in Christ.

i. the Son dwelling in the flesh, distinct from the Father, but begotten from Him and similar to Him;
ii. by the unity of the Logos-Son and the *sarx*, Christ trascends the usual universal

nature; he is no mere man but a naturally higher being; Eusebius seems to make Christ a sort of mythical being between divinity and the created world;

iii. the Logos indwelling in the *sarx* physically accomplishes the spiritual actions by which he achieves God's pleasure; it is the Logos who is the moving element in the *sarx*. All soteriological acts are derived from the Logos. In the flesh the Logos proves himself before the Father and gains his good pleasure even in the voluntary acceptance of death. But because he is God he is not exposed to mutability and sin like angels. Christ has no real 'human' existence; all his soteriological acts are acts of the Logos qua Logos. What hindered Eusebius from making a true evaluation of the human element in Christ was his fear of the notion that Christ was a mere man.

LACTANTIUS was born in North Africa, but became a Christian in the East at Nicomedia in Bithynia. His most important works is the DIVINAE INSTITUTIONES where he tried to answer two pressing problems:

i. how can Christianity confess monotheism, when it believes in the Son of God?
ii. how can Christianity speak of the incarnation of God?

His solution to these two problems does not go beyond what Tertullian had taught. In both Father and Son there is one *mens*, one *spiritus*, one *substantia*. But the Father is like the spring and the Son the brook flowing from it. Lactantius also uses the term *portio*. While Tertullian used the analogy *monarchia*, Lactantius used that of the *paterfamilias* to show that distinction must be made between Father and Son in the one God. The Son belongs to the side of God and not to that of created things; he participates in the transcendence and unknown ability of the Father; he issues from the Father. But also 'spirits' issue from God – what is therefore the difference between them and the Son?

Lactantius makes use of an analogy from man: *sermo est spiritus cum voce, aliquid significante, prolatus* – words are a breath (*spiritus*) which is produced by the voice giving it a meaning – the word is produced in the *mens* and the *spiritus* is the breath, the vehicle by means of which the voice gives a meaning. But man also breathes (*spirat*) through the nose, therefore one must distinguish between the *sermo spiritus* the *vocalis spiritus*, the words and the *spirationes* (breathings). Analogically the Logos corresponds to the *vocales spiritus* while angels correspond to the *spirationes*. Angels, because spirationes of God are immortal, but they are not His Word, his Logos.

With reference to the incarnation, Lactantius tries to answer the question *Cur Deus homo?* He has different answers: He is the heavenly teacher, the bringer of divine knowledge, a model of virtue. To do this he had to assume a human body. Therefore incarnation means the proving of a heavenly being, in corporeality, so that he becomes a model to instruct fallen men. The Son is pre-existent, born of God before the world and thus not a creature; but also born in time, but the twofold birth of Christ does not destroy the unity of Christ: in his birth from God and by his birth from Mary, Jesus appears as the *homo coelestis*, a 'middle being' between the supreme God and all created beings, a sort of mythical being – Arianism is only a step away.

(To be continued)

NOTES

1. A study of the earliest history of the Creed reveals two distinct forms: the christological and the trinitarian formulas. The most primitive form of the Creed is found in the Acts of the Apostles (8,37): Philip baptised the eunuch of Ethiopia after the latter had professed his faith thus: "I believe in Jesus Christ the Son of God". Other christological formulas are found in the letters of St. Paul and in the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, e.g. "His Son, who was made to him of the seed of David according to the flesh, who was predestinated Son of God in power, according to the spirit of sanctification by the resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ from the dead. (Rom 1,3). See also 1 Cor 15,3;1 Peter 3, 18–22). Besides the christological formula there was also a trinitarian formula for the baptismal rite, and we find a reference to this formula in Justin's Apology: canditates of baptism receive the washing with water" in the name of God the Father and Lord of the universe and of our Saviour Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Spirit. The trinitarian formula became the dominant form, and within it we find incorporated a christological formula which St. Ignatius of Antioch recalls in his letter to the Trallenses: "Jesus Christ who was of the race of David and of Mary, who was truly born ... was persecuted under Pontius Pilate, was truly crucified and died ... who was also truly raised from the dead...." The earliest form of the ordination formula is found in the *Traditio Apostolica: Credo in Deum Patrem omnipotentem et in Christum Iesum, filium Dei, qui natus de Spiritu Sancto ex Maria Virgine, et crucifixus sub Pontio Pilato et mortuus et sepultus. Et resurrexit die tertia vivus ex mortius, et ascendit in caelis et sedit ad dexteram Patris venturus iudicare vivos et mortuos. Et in Spiritum Sanctum et sanctam ecclesiam et carnis resurrectione.* This was the Baptisimal Creed of the Roman Church and as early as the fourth century a tradition about it had spread over the whole western Church, attributing its composition to the Apostles before leaving the Cenacle to go into the world to preach the Good News. (Cfr. J. Quasten, *Patrology*, vol. 1, chap. I Utrecht 1950).
2. Ef 1, 3–10; Phil 2, 6–11; Col 1, 12–20 1 Tim 3, 16; 1 Peter 2, 21–24; Apoc 4,11; 5,9–;2 Apoc 11, 17–18; Apoc 15, 3–4; Apoc 19, 1–7.
3. A characteristic of Judeo-Christian theology is the use of terms derived from Angelology to indicated the Logos and the Holy Spirit. In early times, the term "Angel" was applied to Jesus, but was no longer used after the 4th century on account of Arianism. The main sources for the use of the term, are
   1. the expression MALA'K JAHWE which in the Old Testament frequently indicated a theophany,

which Christians attributed to the Logos;

2. in the Judaism of the centuries immediately preceeding the birth of Christ, angels were the intermediaries between God and man. Among the Jews themselves, the Logos was called an Angel v.g. Philo considers the Logos as the chief among the Angels, the MALA'K JAHWE, the *protos angelos.*

The term 'Angel' indicated a supernatural Being manifesting himself – it was the Semitic term indicating the Logos and the Holy Spirit as spiritual substances, as person. 'Angel' is the archaic term indicating 'Person' in the mystery of the Trinity.

II. The Logos (in The Shepherd of Hermas) is the "glorious Angel", "the Most Vulnerable Angel", clearly distinguished from the angel (the shepherd or the angel of penance) who visits and assists Hermas because (i) it is the glorious angel who sends the shepherd to Hermas (5th Vision), (2) therefore the glorious angel is the one who sends angels, *qui miffit angelos suos spiritus.*

ii. it is the most venerable angel who justifies those who have done penance (5th precept), and justification belongs to God alone;

iii. to the "glorious angel of the Lord" in the 8th Similitude various divine actions are attributed: he confers the crown, the white robe, the palms (Cfr. Apocalypse 2, 10; 7,3; 7,9).

iv. "the glorious angel" is of immense height surpassing all other angels.

III. Contrary to common usage, Hermas spoke of six (not seven) archangels, and of a "glorious man of great height" who is the Son of God (9th similitude), which he identifies with the Archangel Michael (8th sim.) who in Jewish tradition was the chief of the archangels and prince of all the angels. Christians applied to the Logos the title *archestrategos* which the Jews gave to Michael the Archangel.

The identification of St. Michael with the Logos is also found in 2 Henoch (12, 11–16), in the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs (Edan 6,8), in the Homilies attributed to Clement of Rome (18, 4).

The Logos was also sometimes identified with the Archangel Gabriel (in the Epistle of the Apostles; Sybilline Oracles), while in St. Justin (Apol. 75, 2) he is identified with the Angel of Israel, and Origen (De Principiis 1, 3, 4) states that he had learned from a Jew (Philo) that the Logos and the Holy Spirit were to be identified with the two Seraphim of Isaias 6, an interpretation which St. Jerome wholly rejects. This identification seems to be found also in the Proof of the Apostolic Preaching of St. Irenaeus (ch. 10).

The names of Jesus – One of the most important titles given to Christ in the Jewish-Christian Communities was that of the "name" of God. This title was soon abandoned on account of its unintelligibility in the Grecian milieu.

In the Old Testament the title indicated Jahwe in his ineffable reality; in other words it corresponded to the Greek *ousia.* It also indicated the Power of God in accomplishing His works.

In the New Testament the title receives a new connotation. In the New Testament Scriptures, it has often the same meaning as in the Old Testament, but sometimes it is applied also to the Son, but mainly to indicate the unity of nature of the Son with the Father.

In the first century writings, the title is applied to the Son as a Person distinct from the Father. (Cfr. *Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians* and the Shepherd of Hermas, 49th similitude) and references made to those who carry the Name of the Lord. This expression may have a liturgical meaning. In

fact it seems to imply a *signatio* which indicated the name of God (the letter 'Tau' for the Jews which became an X for the Greeks – later on this was interpreted as being the first letter of Christos, and also as symbolising the cross).

The title is also used to indicate Christ in the eucharistic prayers of the Didache, and in this case, it may also be an invocation of the Christ (an *epiclesis*).

It is also used in connection with persecution, in the Acts (5, 41), St. Paul (Eph 1, 2;3,1) speak of sufferings for His Name; this is also true of Hermas (Vis. 3, Sim. 9). But the text which clearly establishes the fact that in primitive Christianity the title "Name of God" indicated the Person of the Son, is the *Evangelium Veritatis* discovered at Nag Hammadi; though Gnostic in character the passage which speaks of the Name as distinct from the Father is orthodox. The passage in question is the following: "Now the ideal is to come to know Him who is hidden. He is the Father from Whom the Beginning came forth and towards whom all things who have come from Him and who have been manifested for the Glory and Joy of his Name will return. The Name of the Father is the Son. It is the Father who in the beginning gave a name to Him who came from him and was Himself, and whom He generated as Son. He gave Him His name, which belonged to Him – the Father, to whom belong all things existing after Him.... What is the Name? He is the one Name, the Name coming from the Father ... there is no other person to whom the Name has been given. But it was unnamed and unnamable until He who is Perfect, expressed it.... And so when He wanted that His beloved Son should be His Name, and when He gave Him His Name, he who has come out of the depths has spoken about his secrets."

Other names of Jesus were (a) Law & Testament. In Judaism at the time of Jesus the Thora was considered to be a divine reality, pre-existing before the world. We find the title applied to Christ in Hermas (8th Sim.) and in Justin (Dial. 51,3; 122,2) and Irenaeus applies the words of Ps. 77, 5–6 (suscitavit testimonium in Israel and legem posuit in Israel) to Christ (Adv. Haer. 4, 34,4),

b) The Beginning & the Day: The first word of Genesis *In principio* has been interpreted as meaning *In Filio* v.g. Origen in Hom. Gen 1.1 says: "Who is this beginning of all things, if not Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, the firstborn of all creatures?"

Clement of Alexandria says in Eclog. proph. 73, 1 that Christ is often called the Day. According to Marcellus of Ancyra Christ called himself Day. The origin of the title is derived from speculations on Gen. chp. 1 & 2.

The Incarnation

The first characteristic of Judaeo-Christian christology is that the mystery of the descent of the Son of God was hidden from the angels. The principal text which explains this point is the Ascension of Isaias, where we read:

"I heard the voice of the Most High, the Father of my Lord, saying to my Lord the Christ, who will be named Jesus: Rise and descend through all the heavens; then you will descend to the firmament and to this world. And you will transform yourself according to the form of those who are in the five heavens and you will see that you transform yourself according to the form of the angels of the firmament. And no angel of this world is to know that you are with me the Lord of the seven heavens and their angels, so that you may judge and destroy the princes and angels and gods of this world.

Notice that the Son of God will take on not only the appearance of the good angels but also that of the fallen angels of the firmament and of the angels of the Scheol.

We find the idea of the descent of Christ hidden to the angels in St. Paul (1 Cor 2,8; Eph 3, 10,12):

a wisdom which none of the rulers of this world have known – in order that through the church there be made known to the Principalities and the powers in the heavens the manifold wisdom of God), in Ignatius of Antioch (Eph 19,1 The Prince of this was in ignorance of the virginity of Mary), in Irenaeus (Dem. 34).

It is also found among the Gnostics, but the interpretation they give is unorthodox.

The second characteristic of Judaeo-Christian christology is the stress given to the supernatural character of the Incarnation. The birth of Christ is as marvellous as His virginal conception, the lack of labour at the birth and the absence of a midwife being chiefly stressed. The Apocryphal Gospel of James describes various marvels of nature which take place at the birth; other apocryphal gospels enlarge and develop these marvels.

A third characteristic are the theological considerations on the star that appeared to the Magi. Ignatius of Antioch (Eph. 19, 2–3) says: "The star blazed forth in the sky outshining the other stars and its light was undescribable ... and all the starry orbs with the sun and moon formed a choir round the star ... every form of magic began to be destroyed.....

The exceptional character of the star is due not to its brightness but to its significance ... the writers of the time v.g. Justin refer the star of Mt 2.2 to the star which will rise from Jacob (Num 24, 17). The appearance of the star brings about a destruction of all magic, for Christ overcame the devil from the moment of his birth, and Christ's victory appears in the conversion of the Magi, whose magical and astrological practices were considered to be a worship of the devil.

Baptism

Another important event in the life of Our Lord for Judaeo-Christian theology is the baptism of Jesus; under certain aspects it was more important than the birth itself, e.g. the Gospel of St. Mark begins with the Baptism of Jesus. The Baptism of Christ must have been important on account of the Judaeo-Christian contacts with the Essenes and with John the Baptist: as an immersion in running water it must be referred to the baptismal movements common at that time and to which the Essenes were attached. As an effusion of the Holy Spirit it is to be referred to the eschatological effusions of the Spirit to which so great importance is given in the Qumran documents.

What aspects of the event are stressed in Judaeo-Christian theology?

The descent of Christ into the waters of the Jordan has been given various meanings:

a) Christ descended into the waters of death where the dragon reigns: Ps 73, 13 is taken as a reference to this (*contribulasti capita draconum in aquis*), and the idea has persisted in Christian tradition; it is a symbolical anticipation of the descent of Christ into hell after his death to conquer the devil. The idea appears continually in the Greek rite prayer for consecrating the water for baptism.

This idea establishes a connection between the baptism of Jesus and His Passion. St. Paul had established a connection between the Death and Resurrection of the Lord and Christian baptism, but here the baptism of Our Lord prefigures Christian baptism not only because Christ's baptism has consecrated the waters for baptism, but also and chiefly because it associates the descent into the waters of the Jordan to the mystery of the Death and Resurrection of Christ. A reference to this may be seen in Ignatius of Antioch (Eph. 18, 2): He was born and was baptized that by His Passion He might consecrate the water.

b) Another line of development is in relation to the eschatological character of Christ's baptism: the connection between the baptism with water and the baptism with fire (Mt 3, 11: *Ipse vos baptizabit in Spiritu sancto et igni*). Matthew's words may have been an allusion to the end of the world, but in Judaeo-Christian theology this prophecy of the Baptist is realised at the baptism of Jesus: in fact

certain archaic texts (v.g. the Gospel of the Ebionites) mention the presence of fire on the Jordan at the Baptism of Jesus. There are two different traditions with regard to this idea: in the less common one the fire which appears on the Jordan is an allusion to the destructive fire of the last day (Justin. Dial. 88,3: Sybilline Oracles 6, 3–7; Clement of Alex, Extracts from Theodotus 76, 1): "as Christ's birth has delivered us from fate, so his baptism has delivered us from the fire, as his passion has delivered us from our passions"; "Christ descends into the waters not because he had any need to be baptised, as he had no need to be born or crucified, but he suffered for the sake of humanity which and fallen in the power of death."

A second tradition gives a different interpretation of the fire; in this second tradition the appearance of the fire is not connected with the descent of Christ into the Jordan, but only accompanies the baptism. Actually it is not a fire, but a great light: it is the light of glory which accompanies the divine manifestation of Jesus – the parallelism with the Transfiguration in this case is evident. We find also evidence of this light of glory in the account of the birth in Luke (*et gloria Domini circumfulsit eos* – the shepherds). This may most probably help us to understand the term used by Clement of Alexandria photisma and by Justin (*photismos*) to indicate Baptism. It is certainly the oldest name for Baptism as in Hebr 6,4 and 10,3 the baptised are called "Illuminated".

The Redemption – The descent Into hell

A question which certainly troubled Judaeo-Christian was the fate of the just who had lived before the coming of Christ. The dead went to a place below the earth – the *Scheol* of the Jews, Hades for the Greeks, the *inferi* for the Latins. The doctrine of the descent of Christ into the lower regions to give deliverance to the just detained there, is not found in the New Testament writings, but it originated in Judaeo-Christian circles.

Other themes have been integrated with this doctrine:

a. the theme of the descent of Christ into hell was integrated with that of the descent of Christ through all the heavens down to earth (*Ascension of Isaias*)

b. it was also integrated with Christ's combat with the bad angels after his passion: this combat mentioned in Col 3, 15 took place in the air: that was the place of the bad angels in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, but by the 2nd century the place of the combat is transferred to the lower regions and this idea will prevail, and is developed still further. These are the various stages of its development:

i. Christ descended into Hell to announce to the just their redemption (Gospel of St. Peter; Justin: Dial. 72, 4; Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. passim).

ii. Christ descends into Hell to announce the redemption and to deliver the just from their prison – the just rise again – (crf. Mt 27, 53 *multa corpora sactomm visa sunt* in the Holy City at Christ's death).

iii. Baptism is necessary for salvation, therefore even the just of the Old Testament must be baptized, and so according to Hermas (Pastor 9th parable 16, 5–7) the Apostles and Doctors descend into Hell to baptize the Just, while in the apocryphal Epistle of the Apostles, this baptism is conferred by Christ himself.

iv. To deliver the just Christ has to fight against the devil who detains them in his power (Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs), and in this connection Ps 67,19 is quoted: *ascendens in altum captivam duxit capbvitatem, deditdona hominibus.*

v. Finally Origen synthesises the whole doctrine by saying (Comm. in Rom. S, 10): "He began by tying the demon on the Cross, and then, having entered his home, i.e. the lower regions, he led forth the captives and took them up with him to the heavenly Jerusalem."

vi. In the Odes of Salomon we reach the last phase of the evolution of the doctrine of the descent into hell: it becomes connected with baptism – the idea will become fully developed in the baptismal liturgy of the Eastern rites, especially the Syriac. The theme is developed in this manner: Christ dying is a prisoner of death, but he conquers death and frees all the dead. Therefore Christ's combat with the devil, is first to free himself by rising again – *mors et vita duello conflixere mirando*. The victory of Christ over death is renewed sacramentally in baptism which frees the Christian from death and makes him participate in Christ's liberation. In the Odes the descent of Christ into hell and the liberation of the souls of the just, the descent of the baptised Christian in the font and his liberation from sin and death, the resurrection of the body are all intimately connected.

The Ascension Into Heaven

As the Incarnation in Judaeo-Christian cosmology was expressed as a "descent" so Christ's glorification was expressed as an ascension. We find the idea already present in the New Testament (Eph 4,9; Jnx 16, 28).

We have to note that theologically the ascension implies the exaltation of the sacred humanity of Our Lord above all creatures: his visible departure from the Mount of Olives is only a secondary aspect of the doctrine.

In Judaeo-Christian circles the exaltation of Christ's humanity is often attached directly to the resurrection: this does not mean that in those circles there was no belief in Christ's sojourn on earth after his resurrection (Cfr. Testaments of the Patriarchs, Benjamin 9,5; Gospel of Peter).

Other circles clearly distinguished between the resurrection and the ascension, which according to these circles took place on Easter Day: Christ arose from the dead, manifested himself to the Apostles and then ascended into heaven (Cfr. Epistle of Barnabas 15,9; Aristides, Apology, 15).

But among Judaeo-Christians the prevalent idea is to associate Christ's exaltation with his ascension, which took place after a more or less long stay on earth after the resurrection. In the ascension of Isaias (3, 16–20) we have first a description of the resurrection with more or less the same ideas with which Christ's exaltation is described in the Gospel of Peter; then, after the description of this first exaltation, we have the description of a second exaltation – the ascent of Christ through the seven heavens; and this takes place after the accomplishment of the mission with the Apostles.

The duration of Christ on earth after the resurrection, in Judaeo-Christian circles, is considerably lengthened: the Ascension of Isaias says that Christ remained on earth for 545 days: during all this period Christ instructed his Apostles. We have the same idea in the Epistle of the Apostles which purposes to be an account of all that Christ taught the Apostles before his ascension, but here the duration of Christ's stay on earth is said to be 'a few days': during this period Christ teaches the Apostles what is contained in St. John's Gospel ch. 14–17.

Gnosticism took up the same idea of a long stay on earth after the resurrection – the *Pistis Sophia* (3rd cent.) gives 12 years: this is due to the fact that this period was required to give to the disciples the superior gnosis which was not to be given to the ordinary believers.

Turning now to the visible ascent of Christ into heaven, the term **ascension** belongs to Jewish and Judaeo-Christian apocalyptic literature. It may either mean (i) elevation of a human being into heaven by means of a vision as the one about which St. Paul speaks in 2 Cor 12, 2–3, or it may mean (ii) elevation of a human being to heaven after his death.

Christ's ascension is his glorification after his death: in Judaeo-Christian circles this glorification is also given to some of the just of the Old Testament, but only after Christ's resurrection. Christ's ascension, formally, is not distinguished from these ascensions, in fact the description in the **Ascension**

of Isaias, of the prophet's ascension and that of Christ is more or less expressed in identical words; the same thing may be said with regard to the description of Christ's transfiguration in the Apocalypse of Peter and Christ's ascension in the Epistle of the Apostles. Christ's ascension is distinguishable from other ascensions on account of its significance.

Christ's ascension takes place on the shoulders of the angels (Cfr. Gospel of Peter; Ascension of Isaias) – we have here the idea of the *Merkeba*, the celestial throne of angels which we find in Ezechiel.

Christ ascending into heaven crosses all the heavens and all the hierarchies of the angels: we have here the contrast between the *descensus* and the *ascensus*.

Christ's ascension causes sorrow among the angels for they had failed to recognize Him when He descended on earth (Ascension of Isaias 11, 23–26). In the Epistle of the Apostles a further detail is given: Christ's ascension is accompanied by the angels until they are dismissed by Him – this is contrary to what had happened in the descent: then the archangels had accompanied the Lord till they were dismissed when He arrived at the fifth firmament.

Another source for Judaeo-Christian theology of the ascension is given to us from the Testimonia, mainly derived from the psalms: these express the regal instauration of the Messias. The first psalm to be considered is 109: the New Testament quotes it in relation to the glorification of Christ (Acts 2, 30 Eph 1, 2022;1 Cor 15.25–26; Hebr 10,12–13), its expressions find their way also in the Rule of Faith: *sedet ad dexteram Patris*. Another psalm is Ps 67 which is also quoted by St. Paul with reference to Christ's glorification who carries with him to heaven those whom he has captured by conversion from paganism (Crf. Justin, Dial. 39,4: Irenaeus, Dem. 83).

Finally there is Ps 23: we have already referred to the consternation of the angels at Christ's resurrection, but now there is a dialogue between the guardians of the heavenly gates and the angels accompanying the Lord; a similar dialogue took place at the *descensus* – Christ had taken the form of each successive angelic hierarchy and therefore was unrecognizable. Ascending into heaven he was unrecognizable on account of His Humanity, which causes consternation among the angels. Origen adds that Christ's humanity bore the marks of the passion and in this way it becomes common tradition from the 4th century onwards.

The Cross

Judaeo-Christian theology was a *theologia gloriae* – it mainly insisted on Christ's victory over sin and death: this is particularly evident in the Judaeo-Christian theology relating to the Cross. The Cross is not considered as the instrument of Christ's death or as an object of veneration, but as a theological symbol. As such it has to be considered under various aspects.

A. In the Gospel of Peter we read that at the resurrection of Christ three persons came out of the tomb, two carrying the third and the Cross followed them. The Cross is associated with Christ's glory: it follows Him out of the tomb, it is glorified with Him, it is a living reality, it ascends with Him into heaven (crf. Sybilline Oracles), it speaks with divine voice, it will appear again at the parousia (Mt 24,30), it is identified with Christ Himself.

From a liturgical point of view the various passages from the apocrypha on the Cross have a particular interest: Christ's second coming will be from the East – this is the origin of the custom of praying facing the East; we know also that in early times a Cross on the walls of a house indicated the East (Acta Hipparchi et Philotheae): the custom of having a cross in one's home has its origin in the custom of praying facing the East and in the belief of the *parousia*. The Cross is not the image of the suffering Christ, but the Cross of glory which precedes Christ in His second coming. This insistence

of the glorious character of the Cross is also evident from the accounts of the various apparitions of the Cross in the 4th cent. (Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech. Instr.)

B. For Judaeo-Christian theology the Cross is not the wood on which Christ was crucified but a spiritual, mysterious, living reality accompanying Christ risen: it is often identified with Christ Himself. But it also means the redemptive value – the *dunamis* – of Christ's Passion, which is made visible to us through its material, its form and its position. This symbolism is derived either from the Scriptures or from nature.

A first group is from the Old Testament v.g. the Bronze serpent (St. John's Gospel, Epistle of Barnabas, Justin Dial. 94, 3, Tertullian, Adv. Marc. 3,18), Moses praying with arms extended (Barnabas 12,2; Sybilline oracles 8, 25~3; Irenaeus, Dem. 46; etc); the door-posts and lintels of the Jewish homes covered with the blood of the lamb (Justin, Dial. 91,3); the homes of animals (Justin Dial. 91,2 on Deut. 33,1317); (also Tertullian Adv. Marc. 3,19).

A second group is from natural objects (Justin Apol. 55, 1–6). These natural symbols have nothing Judaeo-Christian in themselves, but actually they have a Jewish origin. In fact the symbol of man's standing posture is a transposition of the prayer of Moses; the symbol of the axe has Biblical antecedents (the axe of Eliseus); the symbol of the plough mentioned often by Justin and to which Ireneaus refers Is 2, 34; and finally the symbol of the masthead.

These symbols all refer to the form of the cross; but other symbolical meanings are derived from the material of the cross i.e. the wood which more often than not is associated with the water, and this gives a sacramental character to the symbol.

Justin gives us a list of Old Testament *testimonia* which refer to the wood of the cross; the tree of life in Eden, the rod of Moses, the oaktree of Mambre, the seventy willow trees near the twelve springs of the Jordan, the rod and staff of David (Ps 22,4) etc. Later on some of these figures received a different interpretation v.g. Noah's ark later on was taken to prefigure the Church, and the rod of Jesse later on indicated Christ himself. These *testimonia* insist continually on the power of the wood when coming in touch with water: they figure the ever present action of the cross as a *dunamis* acting through baptism. The Cross, say the Sibylline oracles, is a sign for all men, a noble seal will be the wood for believers ... a scandal for the world, enlightening the chosen in the waters of the twelve fountains, a rod of iron which governs. Notice that the Cross gives light, gives life, and this through baptism, through the twelve fountains which symbolise the Apostles.

In the 2nd century these speculations on the power of the Cross become the expression of the universal redemptive action of the risen Christ. St. Irenaeus in Adv. haer. 5, 17, 4 says: "As we have been lost by the wood, it is through the wood that he has manifested himself again to us, showing in him the length and the breadth, the height and the depth, and uniting two peoples in one God by extending his hands... "These words recall Eph 3, 18 and Eph 2, 14–16: a double wall, one separating two peoples from each other, and another separating man from God, has been pulled down by Christ through the Cross for he has reunited man to God and the two peoples together.

According to Irenaeus the Cross symbolises the recapitulation of all things in Christ: He who is lifted on the Cross carries all things himself. The Cross, symbol of Christ, is the support of the whole creation (crf. Meliton of Sardis, Hippolytus, St. Cyril of Jerusalem and esp. St. Gregory of Nyssa whose *Oratio Resurrectionis* gathers together all the speculations of previous centuries on the symbolism of the Cross. (Cb. J. Danielou, *Theologie du Judéo-Christianisme*, Paris 1957, chps. V to IX).

4. Clement of Rome was the third successor of St. Peter in Rome; his Epistle to the Corinthians is the earliest piece of Christian literature outside the New Testament and deals with the factions, so severely reprimanded by Saint Paul, which had raged anew in the city of Corinth.

5. Ignatius, second bishop of Antioch, was sentenced during Trajan's reign to be devoured by wild beasts in Rome. On his journey as a prisoner to Rome he wrote seven letters, five of which were addressed to the Christian communities of Ephesus, Magnesia, Tralles, Philadelphia and Smyrna, one to Polycarp, bishop of Smyrna and one to the church of Rome.

6. Justin is the most important of the Greek Apologists of the second century; born of pagan parents in Flavia Neapolis (Sichem) in Palestine, he became a Christian after honestly searching for truth first from the Stoics then from the Peripatetics, and finally from the Pythagoreans: none of the Greek philosophies satisfied him and he became convinced that Christianity alone was the true philosophy. Justin was a prolific writer but only his two Apologies and a Dialogue with the Jew Tryphon had survived.

7. St. Irenaeus of Lyons is the most important of the theologians of the second century: his principal work is *The Detection and Overthrow of the pretended and false Gnosis*, generally known as the *Adversus Haereses*; in the first part of the work Irenaeus gives a detailed description of the doctrines of the Valentinians, but makes reference also to the doctrine of other Gnostics; the second part, which comprises books II to V of the work, refutes the teachings of the Gnostics from reason, from the doctrines of the Church on God and Christ, from the sayings of the Lord, and concludes with a defence of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body denied by the Gnostics. Another work of Irenaeus which has survived is *The Demonstration of the Apostolic Teaching*, an apologetic treatise discovered in 1904 in an Armenian version.

8. J. Tixeront, *Histoire des dogmes dans l'antiquité chrétienne*, Paris 1930, vol. 1, pp. 303–308.

9. Eusebius of Caesarea gives us this information in his *Ecclesiastical History*, book VII, chap. 26,1.

Hebrews 9,2:
Some Suggestions about Text and Context

James Swetnam SJ

The Problem

The Greek text at Heb 9,2 has long been recognized as containing vexing problems. The text discusses the outer "tent" (*skēnē*) of the desert tabernacle. This is beyond dispute. The difficulty centres on the word *Hagia* at the end of the verse.[1] Normally this is taken as a reference to the outer tent as the "Holies". But a closer examination reveals difficulties.[2] Part of the problem involves the text itself. But textual uncertainties are part of a larger challenge constituted by the interpretation of Heb 9,2 in its context.

9,1 *Eiche men oun [kai] hē prōtē dikaiōmata latreias to te hagion kosmikon.*

9,2 *skene gar kateskeuasthe he prote en he, he te Iychnia kai he trapeza kai he prothesis ton arton hetis legetai Hagia;*

9,3 *meta de to deuteron katepetasma skene he legomene Hagia Hagiōn*[3] . . .

9,1 Now the first [covenant] had ordinances of worship and the earthly sanctuary.

1. Text after Nestle-Aland[27] (Nestle-Aland, *Novam Testamentum Graece* (Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft; Stuttgart 1993)

2. Cf. H. Koester, "'Outside the Camp': Hebrews 13.9-14", *Harvard Theological Review* 45 (1962), 309, n. 34: "The remark *hētis legetai Hagia* referring to the 'first tent' Hebr. 9.2 is very odd and not consistent with the word usage of the rest of the Epistle. In 9.3 Hebr. calls the inner tent *hagia hagiōn*, but in all other places the simple Hagia is the technical term for the 'inner tent,' the earthly one (9.25; 13.11) as well as its heavenly prototype (8.2; 9.12; in both passages the inner sanctuary, called *Hagia*, is clearly distinguished from the *skēnē* of the heavens; 9.23; 10.19; 9.9). The use of the term *Hagia* for the outer tent in 9.2 is either to be explained as due to the dependence upon a '*Vorlage*' in the description of the tabernacle, or, preferably, the sentence *hētis legetai Hagia* is a marginal gloss which later came into the text, that is at a wrong place. . .". The view being suggested in this paper is that there is no need to resort to a '*Vorlage*' or a gloss. The Greek text makes sense as it stands. The problem is that the sense that it makes is not the sense which it would seem to make if one relies only on the obvious fact that v. 2 is speaking about the first tent. That the first part of v. 2 speaks about the first tent is beyond doubt. The question is about what the second part of the verse is speaking.

3. Text after NA[27].

9,2   For the first tent was fashioned in which were the lamp and the table and the presentation of breads, which is called *Hagia*;

9,3   And after the second veil, the tent called "Holy of Holies". . .

There are four principal readings for the end of v. 2:

1) The above text, with the reading of *Hagia*, represents the interpretation of the editors of NA[27]. They understand the word as referring to the "first tent" (*skēnē ... hē prōtē*), i.e., the "Holy" of the desert tabernacle, and accordingly supply the capital letter while relying on the readings of D², 0278, 33, 1739, 1881, 𝔐, ℵ, D¹, I, P (the last four, however, without accents). This understanding of the text is influenced by the presumed parallelism with Hagia Hagion in the following verse which is also capitalized courtesy of the editors and which relies on ℵ*, A, D*, I^VID, 33, 1881, 𝔐.

2) B reads *ta hagia* which can be construed as support for the neuter plural and the NA[27] interpretation as against the interpretation of *hagia* as a feminine singular (*hagía*).

3) Some witnesses take the letters *hagia* as representing a feminine singular *hagia* (365, 629 and others of lesser moment, along with vg^mss). This can be understood as a reference to the word *skēnē* so that the meaning is "holy (tabernacle)".[4]

4) Finally some witnesses have *hagia hagion* ($\wp$⁴⁶, A, D*, vg^mss).[5] This is a common way of referring to the "Holy of Holies" and is never used of the "Holy" [Place], i.e., the first tent. Hence it is a *lectio difficilior* according to the common understanding of the verse.

Inasmuch as v. 3, with its the designation of the inner "tent" (*skēnē*), is of relevance for the interpretation of v. 2, the various manuscript readings for it are worth noting:

4.   Cf. P. Ellingworth, *The Epistle to the Hebrews* (The New International Greek Testament Commentary; Eerdmans, Grand Rapids / Paternoster Press, Carlisle 1993) 423.

5.   This is the position taken by the present writer in 1970: J. Swetnam, "Hebrews 9,2 and the Uses of Consistency", *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 32 (1970) 207. The argument used there is based on the Vulgate's understanding of the Greek text. The present note will attempt a solution based on the Greek text itself.

1) *Hagia Hagiōn* (though not necessarily with capitals): ℵ*, A, D*, I^vid, 33, 1881, 𝔐.
2) *ta hagia tōn hagiōn*: ℵ², B, D², K, L, 0278, 1241, 1505 and others.
3) *hagia tōn hagiōn*: P, 1739 and a few other manuscripts.
4) *hagia* 𝔓^46.[6]

No matter how the above readings are construed, they are usually interpreted on the basis of the prevalent opinion that vv. 2 and 3 are giving the two parts of the desert tabernacle.[7] But while the readings *hagia*, *hagía*, and *ta hagia* are intelligible on the basis of this interpretation, the well-attested reading *hagia hagiōn* definitely is not.[8] For this is a classic way of referring to the "Holy of Holies" or inner tent, as the variants for v. 3 attest.

The Function of the Relative Clause **hētis legetai hagia**

It is the contention of the present note that the current prevalent opinion—that the relative clause *hētis legetai Hagia (?)* refers to the words *skēnē ... he prōtē*— is contrary to what the Greek text of Heb 9,2-3 actually says.

Essential to prevalent opinion that the phrase *hētis legetai Hagia (?)* refers to the noun *skēnē ... hē prōtē* at the beginning of the verse is the understanding that the relative pronoun *hētis* is synonymous with the relative pronoun *hē*. This in turn depends on the common view that the distinction in classical Greek between the simple relative *hos* and the qualitative relative *hostis* had disappeared by New Testament times.[9] As a generalization this is undoubtedly true. But general rules can have particular exceptions. It is essential to see in this regard what is the usage of Hebrews.

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6. The reading is *ana*, which seems to be an error for *hagia*. The same mistake (or possibly an attempt at a phonetic transcription) is found at Heb 10,14.
7. Cf., for example, Ellingworth (*Hebrews*, 423): "In any case, however *hagia* here [sc., in Heb 9,2] and *hagia hagion* in v. 3 are understood grammatically, they must denote the two parts of the tabernacle".
8. "The designations of inner and outer portions of the sanctuary in vss 2–3 have caused consternation, both ancient and modern" (H. W. Attridge, *The Epistle to the Hebrews. A Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews* (Hermeneia; Fortress Press; Philadelphia 1989) 230.
9. Cf. Ellingworth, *Hebrews*, 422, with regard to Heb 9,2: "The distinction between the relative pronouns *he* here, and *hetis* later in the verse, had disappeared by NT times . . .; the variation is purely stylistic".

Hebrews uses the qualitative relative *hostis* ten times: 2,3; 8.5.6; 9,2.9; 10,8.11.35; 12,5; 13,7.

> 2,3:   *hētis* refers to the immediately preceding word of the same gender and number, *sōtērias*.

> 8,5:   *hoitines* refers to the immediately preceding word of the same gender and number, *prospherontōn*.

> 8,6:   *hētis* refers to the immediately preceding word of the same gender and number, *diathēkēs*.

> 9,9:   *hētis* refers not to the immediately preceding word of the same gender and number, *stasin*, but to the word of the same gender and number, *skēnēs*, which governs the immediately preceding word, *stasin*.[10]

> 10,8:   *haitines* refers to the words of the same gender and number, *thusias kai prosphoras* and the words which are in apposition to them, *holokautomata kai peri hamartias*.

> 10,11: *haitines* refers to the immediately preceding word of the same gender and number, *thusias*.

> 10,35: *hētis* refers to the immediately preceding word of the same gender and number, *parrēsian*.

> 12,5:   *hētis* refers to the immediately preceding word of the same gender and number, *paraklēseōs*.

> 13,7:   *hoitines* refers not to the immediately preceding word of the same gender and number, *hymōn*, but to the word of the same gender and number which governs it, *hēgoumenōn*.

These examples show how the mind of the author of Hebrews worked with regard to the use of the qualitative relative *hostis*. He links it, if not always with the

10. Cf. Ellingworth, *Hebrews*, 439.

word of the same gender and number which immediately precedes (the usual procedure), at least with the word of the same gender and number which governs the immediately preceding word. In all instances, the word or words to which a form of *hostis* refers are in close proximity, with no intervening clause. The clause *hētis legetai Hagia* can easily fall under this usage by interpreting the *hētis* as referring not to the distant *skēnē* but to the proximate *prothesis*.[11] This syntactical consideration demands a semantic reconsideration of what the text then means. But first the textual variants should be re-examined in the light of this interpretation.

Possibility #3 above, in which the form *hagia* is interpreted as a feminine singular, *hagía*, does not represent a strong manuscript tradition and is of minimal importance for the understanding of Heb 9,2.

Readings ##1, 2, and 4 (#1: *hagia* [with the capital of Nestle-Aland[27] removed]; #2 *ta hagia*; #4: *hagia hagiōn*) represent variations of a neuter plural form, *hagia*, and this convergence indicates that it is among these three possibilities that the best reading is probably to be found. But to make a decision it is necessary to study afresh what the author of Hebrews means by *hagia* by seeing how it is used elsewhere in the epistle. For it is clear that if this word is predicated of the *prothesis tōn artōn* a different set of semantic considerations come into play.

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11. An added consideration is the fact that the simple relative *hē* is used in the same verse with reference to *skēnē: en hē he te lyknia kai hē trapeza kai hē prothesis tōn artōn* .... The sequence *hē ... hētis* seems unbalanced; and to make *hētis* refer to *hē* not only goes against the usage of the author of Hebrews but posits an confusing antecedent, given the intervening feminines *he lyknia, hē trapeza* and *hē prothesis*. E. Gräßer (*An die Hebräer* [Evangelisch-Katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament, XVII/2; Neukirchen-Vluyn; Neukirchener Verlag 1993}, 117) holds that although the relative clause referred to the immediately preceding showbread in the exegesis of the early Church, this position is "far" from the thought of the author of Hebrews, who is thinking of the nature of the two divisions of the tabernacle and uses traditional terminology to designate them. But Gräßer does not examine the function of *hostis* elsewhere in Hebrews, which should be the decisive criterion for how it is used in Heb 9,2. Nor is clear why the contemporary mind should have such a privileged insight into the mind of the author of Hebrews, an insight denied the early Church. That the author of Hebrews is discussing the two tents of the desert tabernacle in Heb 9,2-3 is true, but not necessarily decisive for judging the antecedent of *hetis* in the verse. What is really at stake here is a general view of what *hagia* often means in the Septuagint ("Holy Place') in the context of the first part of 9,2 (which clearly speaks of the "Holy Place") and what *hagia* means in Hebrews in the context of the second part of 9,2. For anyone who holds the second position, as is the case in the present paper, part of the problem is to give a plausible suggestion as to why the author of Hebrews does not give a designation for the first tent parallel to the "Holy of Holies" of 9,3. A suggestion in this regard will be made later in this paper (Cf. below, n. 21).

The Function of the Word hagia

The best attested reading for Heb 9,2 has the form *hagia*.[12] This then would seem to be the most obvious place to begin looking for the meaning of the clause beginning *hētis legetai* which refers to the *prothesis tōn artōn*. The author of Hebrews uses the expression [*to*] *hagion* / [*ta*] *hagia* in a number of places, so there is no lack of material for arriving at an understanding of the word *hagia*, just as there was no lack of material for arriving at an understanding of the word *hētis*.

The expression *ta hagia* and variants is found ten times in the Epistle to the Hebrews: 8,2; 9,1.2.3.8.12.24.25; 10,19; 13,11.[13]

8,2: Christ as high priest is *tōn hagiōn leitourgos kai tēs skēnēs tēs alēthinēs, hēn epēxen ho kyrios, ouk anthrōpos*. A common interpretation is to take *tōn hagiōn* and *tēs skēnēs* as synonymous, with the intervening *kai* being understood as epexegetic.[14] But this view does not take into account the other uses of *ta hagia* in Hebrews where the words refer to the inner tent.[15] Further, the distinction between the inner sanctuary of the tent and the entire tent is found in the LXX.[16] The author of Hebrews is using this distinction to show that in his view the Christian inner sanctuary (*ta hagia*) is a part of the heavenly tent which the Lord established.

9,1: The first covenant had ordinances of worship and *to ... hagion kosmikon*. Here the use of the singular is striking, the only such occurrence in Hebrews. It refers to the entire tabernacle. There are biblical precedents for this usage.[17] The adjective "worldly" is pejorative.

9,2.3 are the texts under discussion.

9,8: The Holy Spirit shows by the imagery of the restricted access to "the second tent" that *mēpō pephanerōsthai tēn tōn hagiōn hodon eti tēs prōtēs skēnēs echousēs stasin* .... Here the expression *tēn tōn hagiōn hodon* refers to the way into the Holy

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12. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 230.
13. A. P. Salom, *"TA HAGIA* in the Epistle to the Hebrews", *Andrews University Serrunary Studies* 5 (1967) 59-70.
14. Ellingworth, *Hebrews*, 399-400.
15. Cf. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 217. Contra: Salom, "TA HAGIA in Hebrews", 65-66.
16. Cf. Lev 16,16.20.23 (Attridge, *Hebrews*, 218 and 218, n. 23).
17. Cf. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 231-232 and 232, n. 19.

of Holies. The contrast is between *ta hagia* and the "first" or outer tent, i.e., the Holy Place. Here the phrase *hē prōtē skēnē* has the same meaning that it has in 9,2 and 9,6. As long as the first tent had legitimacy as the official cult, the "way" into the Holy of Holies was not yet "revealed" (*phaneroō*).[18] That is to say, as long as the outer tent and all its accompanying ceremonials was legitimate, there was no question of unqualified access to the inner tent, i.e., *ta hagia*.[19]

9,12: Christ entered not through the blood of goats and calves but through his own blood once and for all into *ta hagia* after finding an eternal redemption. The contrast is between the "greater and more perfect tent not made with hands, that is, not of this creation" in 9,11 *through which* Christ enters and *ta hagia into which* Christ enters. The "greater and more perfect tent" is plausibly viewed as the risen body of Christ.[20] Here the risen body of Christ is viewed as taking the place of the outer tent of the Mosaic tabernacle. The risen body of Christ in 9,11 is paralleled by the blood of Christ in 9,12: the first gives the "physical possibility" of entering into *ta hagia*, whereas the second gives the "cultic justification" for the entrance.[21]

18. Ellingworth, *Hebrews*, 437-438. Salom ("TA HAGIA in Hebrews", 68) interprets *ta hagia* as referring to the entire tabernacle even though he maintains that "the first tent" means the outer tent.
19. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 240.
20. Cf.: A. Vanhoye, "~ar la tente plus grande et plus parfait . . . ' (Hebr 9,11)", *Biblica* 46 (1965) 1-28; J. Swetnam, "Christology and the Eucharist in the Epistle to the Hebrews", *Biblica* 70 (1989) 79-80. This interpretation is contested of course. Cf. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 246-247. Attridge claims that the major objection to such an interpretation is that it ignores or does violence to the basic imagery of the Yom Kippur ritual that Hebrews is using. The objection depends on how one understands the use of the imagery of the risen body of Christ. The risen body of Christ and the Eucharistic body of Christ to which it is ordered (according to the suggestions being presented in this paper) are *sui generis* realities that would fit neatly into no comparison. But that does not mean that a comparison cannot be made.
21. Swetnam, "Christology and the Eucharist", 80, n. 25. The view of the author of Hebrews that the first "tent" of the Christian fulfilment of the desert tabernacle is the risen body of Christ would seem to be the reason why he refuses to call the first tent of the desert tabernacle "Holy" in 9,2. Such terminology, if pressed, would lead one to the inference that the risen body of Christ was merely "holy" while the Eucharistic species of bread "into which" he enters was "very holy" (i.e., "Holy of Holies"). In other words, given the perspective of the author of Hebrews as to the nature of the Christian "outer tent" and "inner tent" it would be inadvisable to make any predication about the degree of holiness of the outer tent of the first covenant, for this is being taken a prefiguration of the "outer tent" of the new covenant (Cf. above, n. 11.)

9,24: Christ did not enter into *hagia* made by hands, which are the antitype of the true *hagia*,[22] but into heaven itself, in order to appear before the face of God for the Christians.[23] Here the point of the passage is that Christ did not enter into the created Holy of Holies of the old dispensation, but into heaven in the new dispensation. It is not stated here that Christ entered into the *hagia* of the new dispensation, though the implication is that the "heaven" into which Christ enters is related to these *hagia*.

9,25: Christ did not enter into *hagia* made by hands in order to offer Himself many times, just as the high priest enters into *ta hagia* every year in the blood of another. Here the expression for the inner tent uses the article: *ta hagia*.[24]

10,19: The Christians have "authorization"[25] for the "entrance into the Holy of Holies" (*eis tēn eisodon tōn hagiōn*) in the blood of Jesus. Here again the article is used: *ta hagia*.[26] The following verse, with its mention of the veil (10,20), indicates that the entrance is into the Holy of Holies.

There is ample warrant, then, for saying that the author of Hebrews consistently used the expression [*ta*] *hagia* to refer to the Holy of Holies, despite the fact that when placed against the background of the LXX usage the expression usually refers to the "sanctuary" in general or, to a notably lesser degree, to the outer compartment

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22. Ellingworth (*Hebrews*, 480), claims that the adjective *tōn alehthinōn*, used here as a noun, does not refer to individual parts of either sanctuary, but this seems to ignore the emphasis of the image of "entering" stressed in the passage (vv. 24 and 25). Cf. C. Spicq, *L'Epître aux Hébreux*. II. Commentaire (Études Bibliques; Paris; Gabalda 1953), 267.

23. The mention of "heaven" conjures up for Attridge (*Hebrews*, 263) Platonic imagery. But the word is used here in the sense of the "place" of the angels (cf. Heb 1,6) and of Christ who sits at God's right hand (Heb 1,13—cf. the second half v. 24, which speaks about appearing before God's "face"), and of God Himself (Heb 1,13). Cf. Spicq, *Hébreux*, 267-268, and F. Zorell, *Lexicon graecum Novi Testamenti* (Cursus Scripturae Sacrae, Pars prior, Libri introductorii, VII; Paris; Lethielleux 1961), col. 959.

24. Salom ("TA HAGIA in Hebrews, 69) says that the service of the high priest was carried on in the inner compartment. But since the whole sanctuary is involved in these services the "basic" meaning is "sanctuary", i.e., the entire tabernacle. Thus here, as elsewhere, Salom blurs the imagery used by the author of Hebrews and thereby blurs the theology which the imagery is intended to convey. Linguistically speaking, there is no "basic meaning" of *ta hagia* independent of its use in specific contexts.

25. Ellingworth, *Hebrews*, 509.

26. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 284.

or "Holy Place".[27] It is because of this Septuagint background that many translations and authors understand the expression in Hebrews as referring to the "sanctuary" in general.[28] This view seems all the more justified when placed with the interpretation of the relative clause *hētis legetai hagia* of Heb 9,2.

But if the relative clause *hētis legetai hagia* refers to the immediately preceding *prothesis tōn artōn*, and if the best-attested manuscript reading *hagia* refers to the "Holy of Holies", the meaning of Heb 9,2 changes radically. The author of Hebrews is talking about the first tent of the desert tabernacle (*skēnē gar kateskeuast hē prōtē*) which he is intent on comparing with the second tent mentioned in 9,3 (*meta de to deuteron katapetasma skēnē hē legomenē Hagia Hagiōn*). But *skēnē ... hē prōtē* and *skēnē hē legomenē Hagia Hagiōn* are the elements of *to hagion kosmikon*, "the worldly tabernacle". Within this worldly tabernacle, however, is the *prothesis tōn artōn*, and these are called *hagia*.[29] The word is chosen deliberately to insinuate that the Holy of Holies of the Christian dispensation is being prefigured in the old dispensation by the *prothesis tōn artōn*. This is a jarring juxtaposition and requires reflection to see what the author of Hebrews is driving at.

In the immediate context of Heb 9,2 the primary meaning of the word *hagia* is "holy things", and is a standard way to refer to sacred food in the LXX.[30] But the implied meaning in the context of Heb 9,2 is the "Holy of Holies" of the true

27. Cf. the table given in Salom, "TA HAGIA in Hebrews", pp. 62-63 for the data.
28. For example, Salom, "TA HAGIA in Hebrews", 65: "The general conclusion reached from the study of the LXX use of *ta hagia* and the comparison with the use in Hebrews is that this expression refers basically to the sanctuary in general. The question remaining to be answered is the question of translation. How should it be translated in Hebrews? Should it be left in translation with the emphasis on the basic meaning and thus be translated 'sanctuary' each time (as by Goodspeed and Knox)? Or should it be interpreted in the light of its context and the theology of the passage, and translated according to that specific part of the sanctuary which seems to be in the mind of the writer? It is the contention of the present writer that the basic meaning of the word should be uppermost in the mind of the translator and, provided it makes sense in the context, should be used for the translation." Salom then appeals to "ambiguity in translation" as the relevant principle at hand. But this is a false analysis of the problem in Hebrews: the "ambiguity" is of his own making. A study of the context shows that there is no ambiguity in the use of *ta hagia*, only a refusal to adapt one's thinking to the thinking of the author of Hebrews.
29. On the use of the word *prothesis* for the showbread rather than for the act of placing the showbread cf. Swetnam, "Hebrews 9,2", 208.
30. Cf. Lev 24,9 (the most relevant passage) and also Ex 29,32-33; Lev 10,12; 22,6-7.10.14.15-16; 2 Chr 35,6; 1 Sam 21,4; 2 Esdras 2,63; 17,65; 20,34 (Swetnam, "Hebrews 9,2", 208, n. 14).

tabernacle of which the bread of the Presence of the desert tabernacle is the antitype. Thus, for the author of Hebrews, the true Holy of Holies, the Holy of Holies of the New Covenant into which Christ enters through his risen body (the "tent not made by hands" [9,11]) and of which he is the "cult minister" (8,2), is the bread for which the bread of the presence of the earthly tabernacle was the foreshadowing. That is to say, the Holy of Holies of the Christian dispensation into which the high priest has entered once and for all is the Eucharist bread.

The Variant Readings

If this seems fanciful[31] there is at least one objective check to go by: the variant readings for 9,2.

The reading *hagía* (#3 in the list given above), in which the adjective *hagios* is taken as a feminine singular, could be understood of the immediately preceding *prothesis tōn artōn*, as well as of the more remote *skēnē ... hē prōtē*. But in either case it represents a rather banal meaning. The weakness of the witnesses which give this reading indicate that it is not a serious contender for the meaning of Heb 9,2.

The reading *hagia*, without the capital (#1 in the list of readings given above) makes excellent sense in the context, with its primary referral to the sacred foods of the old dispensation and its secondary referral to the Holy of Holies of the Christian dispensation. This is probably the original reading.

The reading *ta hagia* (#2 in the list of readings given above) bears the same interpretation as that given above for *hagia* without the article.

Finally, the *lectio difficilior* of *hagia hagiōn* can be explained as a reference to the Holy of Holies of the Christian dispensation, as opposed to the *hagia hagiōn* (#1 in the list of readings given for v. 3 above). It would seem to be not the original meaning[32] but a modification of the original reading *hagia* in order to emphasize the secondary meaning in Hebrews.

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31. Swetnam, "Hebrews 9,2", 213; Attridge, *Hebrews*, 233.
32. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 230.

The Latin Witnesses

The Vetus Latina and Vulgate versions of the Latin New Testament have some instructive readings with regard to the suggestion that *hētis legetai Hagia* refers not to the first or outer tent but to the presentation of the bread in the outer tent.[33] The text forms J and D of the Vetus Latina and the Vulgate text read as follows:

J 9,2: *tabernaculum enim factum est primum in quo inerat candelabrum et mensa*

D 9,2: *tabernaculum enim factum est primum in quo candelabrum et mensa*

V 9,2: *tabernaculum enim factum est primum in quo inerant candelabra et mensa*

J *et propositio panum quod dicitur sanctum.*

D *et propositio panum qune dicitur sancta sanctorum.*

V *et propositio panum qune dicitur sancta.*

J 9,3 *post velamentum autem secundum quod dicitur sancta sanctorum.*

D 9,3: *post velamentum autem secundum quod dixit sanctam sanctorum.*

V 9,3 *post velamentum autem secundum quod dicitur sancta sanctorum.*

From the above it is clear that J represents the tradition which holds that *hētis* in the Greek refers to the outer tent, while D and V represent the tradition which holds that *hētis* refers to the presentation of the bread. Further, D holds for the reading *sancta sanctorum*, which clearly indicates that the bread represents the Holy of Holies, while V holds for the reading sancta with reference to the presentation of the bread. The readings of all three traditions for 9,3 have *sancta sanctorum* except that D has the verb in the active, *dixit*, and has the unusual accusative feminine form *sanctam*, which seems to imply some relation to the presentation of bread.

With reference to a variant reading *quo* for *quod* in tradition J at Heb 9,2, manuscripts from Milan in the tenth century (Γ^{A2}) and from Verona in the ninth century (Verona LXXXII [77]) have this to say: *refert* hētis *ad verba* prothesis tōn artōn, *quibus traditio christiana panem eucharisticum praefi guratum esse credit.* ("it has *hētis* refer to *prothesis tōn artōn*, by which Christian tradition believes the Eucharistic bread is being prefigured"). This is the tradition which the present paper holds, on evidence from the Greek text itself, was the same tradition, either formally or materially, which the author of Hebrews follows.

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33. Material on Latin versions is taken from H. J. Frede (ed.), *Epistulae ad Thessalonicenses, Timotheum, Titum, Phulemonem, Hebraeos* (Vetus Latina, 25/II; Herder; Freiburg 1983) 1371-1375.

The Meaning "Holy Things" for [ta] **hagia**

Given that the suggestion made above is that the expression [*ta*] *hagia* has two meanings in Hebrews, and that one meaning, "[the] Holy Place" has already been canvassed, it would seem appropriate to consider briefly the list of places where [*to*] *hagion* / [*ta*] *hagia* is found to look for indications of the second meaning.

8,2: Christ as high priest is *tōn hagiōn leitourgos kai tēs skēnēs tēs alēthinēs, hēn epēxen ho kyrios, ouk anthrōpos*. The expression *tōn hagiōn leitourgos* is normally translated with reference to the desert tabernacle, as, for example, in the Bible of Jerusalem: "minister of the sanctuary". But according to the suggestion made above it also means "minister of the Holy Things", i.e., Christ, as minister of the Christian dispensation, is minister of the Holy Things which constitute the true sanctuary in that dispensation.[34] This is the first occurrence of [*ta*] *hagia* in Hebrews and the use of Christ with explicit reference to *ta hagia* in the sense of both Holy Things and Holy of Holies would be made in the context of reference to the entire desert tabernacle as the "true tent which the Lord established, not man" in the same verse. The contrast, together with the location of the verse in Hebrews, serves to give to the text a thematic significance.

9, 1: The first covenant had regulations of worship and to *hagion ... kosmikon*. Here the use of the singular is striking, the only such occurrence in Hebrews. It refers to the entire tabernacle and, because it is singular, has no suggestion of "Holy Things". But that seems to be the point: the author of Hebrews goes out of his way to link the singular, *to hagion*, with the first covenant and its way of worship. The designation *kosmikon*, with its pejorative connotation, sums up the tone of the verse nicely.

9,8: The Holy Spirit shows by the imagery of the restricted access to "the second tent" (i.e., the inner tent) that the "way" into the Christian Holy of Holies has not yet been made manifest as long as "the first tent" (i.e., the outer tent) had standing. Here the expression *tēn ... hodon* refers to the "way" into the Holy of Holies. An

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34. The expression "minister of the holy things" (*leitourgos tōn hagiōn*) is found in Philo, *Allegorical Interpretation of Genesis II, III.* (*Legum Allegoria*), III.xlvi (F. H. Colson - G. H. Whitaker [eds.], *Philo* (Loeb Classical Library, Philo I; Cambridge, Massachusetts / London; Harvard University Press/William Heinemann 1949) 390. The expression refers to Aaron and his sons.

identification is being made between the "way" into *ta hagia* and the "first" or outer tent, i.e., the Holy Place (the same meaning *hē prōtē skēnē* has in 9,2 and 9,6). In Christian terms, the "way" into "the Holy Things", i.e., the new and definitive Holy of Holies, is made possible by a different outer tent, which is the risen body of Christ. As long as the outer tent of the tabernacle (and of the temple) had legal status, the real "way" into the Holy of Holies was blocked. Only by the risen body of Christ, the "tent not made by hands", is entrance into the Holy Things possible.

9,12: This verse constitutes, along with 9,11, a chiastic structure which gives a concise theology of the entrance of Christ into *ta hagia* of the new dispensation:[35]

9,11   Christ, high priest of the good things which have come about,
            through the greater and more perfect tent
                not made by hands, that is, not of this creation,

9,12   nor through blood of goats and calves
                but through His own proper blood
            entered once and for all into *ta hagia* after having found an eternal redemption.

V. 12 is important because it and v. 11 help establish the deeper meaning of *ta hagia*, which here again indicate on the surface the Christian Holy of Holies in Hebrews. In some way *ta hagia* are correlative with 1) the greater and more perfect tent and 2) Christ's own blood. The greater and more perfect tent is the risen body of Christ according to the suggestions being made in this paper.[36] The meaning of *dia* in v. 11 in connection with the greater and more perfect tent, in accordance with the imagery, is local: the image is of movement into *ta hagia*.[37] The meaning of the

35. Cf. Ellingworth, *Hebrews*, 451.
36. Cf. above, n. 20.
37. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 245-246. But this image of local movement does not translate neatly into ontological realities. In the view defended in this paper the distinction being suggested in vv. 11-12 is between the risen body of Christ as it exists in "heaven" ("the greater and more perfect tent") and the risen body of Christ as it exists in the form of the Eucharistic bread (*"ta hagia"*). Obviously the distinction does not imply separation. Hebrews regards them according to the distinction between offerer (Christ as high priest in heaven) and offering (Christ as victim in the Eucharistic bread). The language of Hebrews is *sui generis* to try to account for realities which are *sui generis*.

dia in v. 12 is instrumental: the blood of Christ shed on the cross is that which authorizes His entry.[38]

The contention of the present paper is that only the Eucharistic body of Christ is truly correlative with the realties of his earthly blood and his risen body in a context such as Hebrews, fraught as it is with profound symbolic undertones: an elaborate build-up demands an elaborate conclusion.

9,24: Christ did not enter into *hagia* made by hands, which are the antitype of the true *hagia*, but into heaven itself, in order to appear before the face of God for the Christians. The language of the verse bears scrutiny. Christ here is not said to have entered into *ta hagia* but into "heaven itself" (*eis auton ton ouranon*). This "heaven" is considered in some way to parallel the *hagia* of the first dispensation which were "made by hands". The context is the Yom Kippur ceremony of expiation.[39] Christ's blood— His self sacrifice—has achieved definitive expiation (vv. 25-26). The goal of Christ's entrance in this context is the presence of God (v. 24) in order to make intercession for Christians so that this expiation may be exploited for salvation. "Heaven" here is used in the sense of the "place" where the angels dwell (Heb 1,6), where the risen Christ dwells (Heb 1,13), and where God dwells (Heb 1,13).[40] This is not to say that "heaven" in this sense has no relation to the old dispensation's Holy of Holies, or of the new dispensation's Holy of Holies: the context clearly supposes a relation. Just as the old dispensation *hagia* made by hands were the antitype of the true (*hagia*), so the old dispensation *hagia* are in some way the antitype of heaven itself, for just as the high priest of the old dispensation entered into a Holy of Holies not made by hands, so Christ enters into the new dispensation Holy of Holies and also into heaven itself.[41] The link between the Christian *hagia* and the "heaven" where the angels and God dwell is that Christ

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38. Cf. F. Blaß – A. Debrunner, *Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch* (ed. F. Rehkopf; Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht; Göttingen [16]1984) §223.4 (p. 180). In Heb 10,19 authorization to enter the Holy of Holies is 'in' (*en*) Christ's blood. But in Heb 9,12 the parallelism with v. 11 suggests that *dia* be used. The earthly blood of Christ offered in a sacrifice which obtains eternal redemption ("having found an eternal redemption") authorizes His entry which is made ontologically possible by His risen body.

39. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 260.

40. Cf. above, n. 23.

41. On the relation in Jewish tradition between the imagery of the Holy of Holies and ''heaveni' cf. Attridge, t'The Heavenly Temple and its Significance", *Hebrews*, 222-224.

"entered" into both. In fact, this seems to be the point of the section 9,23 -10,4, that *ta hagia* need to be consecrated by sacrifices superior to their old dispensation foreshadowings because they are "heavenly" (*epourania*), and they are "heavenly" because Christ entered into them as part of an action in which he entered into heaven itself.

9,25: Christ did not enter into *hagia* made by hands (9,24) in order to offer himself many times, i.e., he did not enter as the high priest (of the old dispensation) enters into *ta hagia* every year in the blood of another. Here the expression for the inner tent uses the article: *ta hagia*. Since it is a reference to the tabernacle (temple) of the Sinai dispensation, the expression *ta hagia* refers only to the Holy of Holies, with no direct indication of the Christian "Holy Things". The high priest of the Sinai dispensation does not enter into "Holy Things"; only Christ does that because only Christ has a glorified body (9,24; cf. 9,11).

10,19: The Christians have "authorization" for the "entrance into the Holy of Holies" (*eis tēn eisodon tōn hagiōn*) in the blood of Jesus. Here again the article is used: *ta hagia*. The following verse, with its mention of the veil, indicates unmistakably that the entrance is into the Holy of Holies. The nature of the Holy of Holies is suggested by the metaphorical language of 10,20. Christ inaugurated a new "entrance way" (*eisodon*) into *ta hagia*, a "way" (*hodon*) which is "new and living" (*prosphaton kai zōsan*). This "new and living way" is another manner of speaking of the outer tent, the "way" into the Holy of Holies of the Christian dispensation. In the Christian dispensation this "way" is the risen body of Christ, "the tent not made by hands" (Heb 9,11). This "way" was made "through the veil, that is, [through] His flesh" (10,20).[42] Here the earthly body of Christ (cf. Heb 5,7), indicated by the word *sarx*,[43] is used in a bold image to represent the "veil" which He penetrated to enter into the Christian Holy of Holies, i.e., Holy Things. The flesh of Christ is both an obstacle and an opportunity for entrance: as obstacle, it is overcome by death (the natural fulfilment of *sarx*); as opportunity, it is fulfilled by the risen body of Christ. The risen body of Christ has an intrinsic relation to the Christian Holy of Holies for which it provides the entrance, and that Christian Holy of Holies is the Holy Things prefigured by the setting out of the bread, i.e., the Christian Eucharist. Without the glorified body of Christ the Eucharist is impossible.

42. On the use of the expression "through the veil, that is, of His flesh", cf. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 285-286.
43. The word *sarx* in Hebrews always has the connotation of the earthly and mortal. Cf.: Heb 2,14; 5,7; 9,10.13; 12,9.

The Underlying Structure

In order to get a clearer idea of the role of *to hagion / ta hagia* in Hebrews it is necessary to situate the above discussions in their macro context, and for this it is necessary to suggest a macro structure for all of the texts which mention *to hagion / ta hagia.*

The present writer understands all of the texts cited above regarding *to hagion / ta hagia* as being part of the following structure:

Hebrews 8.1 - 10.39: The New Covenant

Introduction: 8,1-6

A.   The Frame: The Prophecy from Jeremiah (8,7–13)
  B.   The Three Entrances of Christ (9,1–10,14)
    B. 1.   Introduction (9,1–10)
    B. 2.   The Entrance into the Holy of Holies/Holy Things (9,11–23)
    B. 3.   The Entrance into Heaven Itself (9,24–10,4)
    B. 4.   The Entrance into the World (10,5–14)
A'.   The Frame: The Prophecy from Jeremiah (10,15–18)

  C.   Paraenesis (10,19-39)[44]
  C. 1. Negative (10,19-30a)
  C. 2. Positive (10,30b-39)

Introduction: 8,1-6. Heb 8,1-7 acts as the introduction to the entire passage: Christ is high priest who has taken His seat at the right of God in heaven (v. 1), is cult minister of the Holy of Holies / Holy Things and of the entire true tent which was established by the Lord, i.e., not by human hands (v. 2). He needed an offering as does every priest (v. 3), but the gifts He gives are not according to law because He is not on earth (v. 4). Those who do offer gifts according to law are worshipping at a shadow of the heavenly tent, shown to Moses as he was fashioning the earthly one (v. 5). Christ's is a better liturgy inasmuch as He is mediator of a better covenant established on better promises (v. 6). A need for a second, better covenant was indicated by the fact that the first covenant was not above criticism (v. 7).

44. Cf. J. Swetnam, "Hebrews 10,30-31: A Suggestion", *Biblica* 75 (1994) 388-394.

A. *The Frame: The Prophecy from Jeremiah (8,7-13).* A new covenant is needed because the old was not blameless. The new one is based on better promises and offers Christ, its mediator, a better liturgy. Hence the following passage is going to be about promises and liturgy in the context of a new covenant of which Christ is mediator. The lengthy citation from Jeremiah involving the new covenant (vv. 8-12), when placed in the context of liturgy by the author of Hebrews in an introduction to the culminating part of the epistle, could hardly avoid suggesting the Eucharist to the Christian familiar with Christian tradition (cf.: Matt 26,28; Luke 22,20; 1 Cor 11,25).

B. *The Three Entrances of Christ (9,1 -10,14). B. 1.Introduction (9,1-10).* The choice of the image of "entrance" as a principle of structure for the central and culminating section of Hebrews is suggested by the following considerations: There are parallel statements involving "entrance" at 9,11-12 ("Christ entered into the Holy of Holies / Holy Things"), at 9,24 ("Christ ... entered into heaven itself"), and at 10,5 ([He], entering into the world, says ..."). These constructions are followed by passages which are roughly equivalent in size (9,11-22; 9,23 - 10,4; 10,5-12). And each mention of "entering" is found at the beginning of the passage, i.e., not only their contents are parallel but their positions in their context as well. Finally, at 10,19, the introduction to the paraenesis which follows the central part begins with the image of entrance while using the distinctive expression *ta hagia* which suggests the Holy of Holies / Holy Things.

The introduction at 9,1-10 prepares the way for the three passages on entrance by describing the desert tabernacle and the ceremonies involved in the rite of expiation of Yom Kippur. At the very beginning are found the verses 9,2-3 which, according to the suggestion being made in this paper, situates the Christian Holy of Holies as involving Holy Things understood with reference to the bread of presentation.

B. 2. *The Entrance into the Holy of Holies / Holy Things (9,11-23).* Christ enters once and for all into *ta hagia*, i.e., into the Holy Things viewed as the Christian equivalent of the Holy of Holies. He does this through "the greater and more perfect tent not made with hands", i.e., his glorified body. By offering himself through a Holy Spirit he was able to achieve true purification of the consciences of all, and hence becomes the mediator of a new covenant. This covenant is in fact a testament because by its very nature it involves the death of the mediator. By implication the new covenant is inaugurated in blood just as Moses inaugurated the first covenant

at Sinai in blood. (The citation of Ex 24, X at Heb 9,20 seems to have been modified under influence of the words of institution of the Eucharist in Christian liturgical tradition.[45] This allusion to the Eucharist would be not inappropriate in Hebrews at this point, given the relevance this would have for the meaning of *ta hagia* suggested in this paper.) Without shedding of blood there is no remission of sin (v. 22). Hence, just as the "copies" of the heavenly realities needed to be dedicated with blood, so the heavenly things themselves need to be dedicated with blood by better sacrifices still (v. 23).[46]

B. 3. The Entrance into Heaven Itself (9,24 -10,4). The entrance into *Ta Hagia* (9,11-23) involves heavenly realities because Christ entered into heaven itself (v. 24). He did this by the unique offering of himself (vv. 25-26). Thus Christ is being presented here as high priest who offers, whereas in 9,11-23 he is presented as the victim being offered,[47] a victimhood only alluded to in vv. 25-26.[48] The entrance into the Holy of Holies / Holy Things is connected with the entrance into heaven as offering is connected with offerer. "Heaven" is the "place" of God and of angels: the entrance into heaven in 9,24 is the mention from a different perspective of the presentation of the risen Christ by God to the angels given in Heb 1,6-9. Christ's unique priesthood is based on his unique sacrifice, and hence he does not need to act as the high priests of the first dispensation, with yearly entrance and yearly sacrifice and yearly remembrance of sin (v. 25, v. 1, v. 3). Christ will exit only once, to appear to those who await him for their salvation (v. 28).

B. 4. The Entrance into the World (10,5-14). A third entrance is now the subject of attention: the entrance into the world.[49] The citation of Ps 40,6-8 fixes the centre

45. Cf. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 257-258 and 258, n. 52.
46. The use of the plural, "sacrifices" (*thysiais*) is usually taken as a generic plural, with the plural *nekrois* at 9,17 being at times invoked as a parallel (cf. Ellingworth, *Hebrews*, 478). But at 9,17 *nekrois* is part of a generalization involving all testaments, whereas at 9,23 the statement involves only the dedication of the heavenly realities proper to Christ's sacrifice, which is repeatedly stressed as being singular. What seems to be hinted at by the plural *thysiais* is the plurality of the Eucharistic celebrations based on the one sacrifice and one entrance into the Holy of Holies of Christ. The statement in v. 23 that "heavenly things" need purification is startling, but it is in function of the statement in v. 22 that almost everything is purified in blood. The meaning is that if something is to act in cult as an instrument of purification it itself must be purified in the cult. If this is true of the weak instruments of the old dispensation *a fortiori* it is true of the heavenly instruments of the new.
47. The blood of Christ is explicitly mentioned in 9,12.14 and alluded to in 9,20.
48. There is no mention of Christ's blood in the section 9,24 - 10,4.
49. No name is attached to the verb "says" in 10,5 because, strictly speaking, Jesus is constituted Jesus by the result of His coming, i.e., His taking flesh, and Christ is constituted Christ by His resurrection.

of attention on the intention of the one who is to make the offering of himself the center of his redemptive act (vv. 5-10). The comments focus on the sacrifice of Jesus Christ viewed as an offering of his body (v. 10) in contrast to the priests who offer daily sacrifices which cannot remove sins (v. 11). There is no mention of the symbolism of the desert tabernacle because the Eucharistic aspect of Christ's sacrifice is not in view; it is his sacrifice on the cross which is. In other words, this passage concerns the earthly priesthood and victimhood of Christ as opposed to the previous two passages which were concerned with the heavenly aspect of that victimhood (9,11-23) and the heavenly aspect of that priesthood (9,24 - 10,4). Thus 9,11 - 10,14 fulfil the promise of the introduction at 8,1 to speak of the priest of the Christians who sat at the right hand of God in the heavens. The theme of this session the right hand of God is taken up again at the end of the presentation of the earthly priesthood (10,12-13). This is the present situation, with Christ at God's right hand, with the earthly unique sacrifice and its heavenly consequences understood as now in place and effective until the enemies of Christ are put under his feet and his redemptive action has its ultimate saving effect.

A'. The Frame: The Prophecy from Jeremiah (10,15-18). A repetition of part of the prophecy of Jeremiah frames the passage. There is no more need of sacrifice for sin, for all sins have been forgiven (v. 18).

C. Paraenesis (10,19-39). C. 1. Negative (10,19-30a). The *paraenesis* begins with mention of the "right" which the Christians have of entrance into the Holy of Holies / Holy Things based on the blood of Christ which he dedicated through the veil of His flesh (vv. 19-20). Here there is allusion to both phases of Christ's priesthood, the earthly (*tout' estin tēs sarkos autou*) and the heavenly (*eis tēn eisodon tōn hagiōn*). Mention of the "community" (*episynagōgē*) in v. 25 reflects the underlying cultic aspects which have been presumed throughout the previous discourse.[50] The warning at the end of the passage concerns those who reject the blood of the covenant, i.e., the blood of the heavenly Christ (v. 29) in contrast to the parallel passage at 6,1-8 which warns those who reject the cross, i.e., the sacrifice of the earthly Christ (v. 6).

C. 2. Positive (10,30b-39). The second portion of the *paraenesis* is entirely positive, with stress on the joy with which the Christians should await the return of

50. Cf. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 290, and 290 n. 86.

Christ. There is no mention of sin, for at Christ's return Christ will come "without sin" (9,28).[51]

Background Assumptions

The above interpretation of the expression *ta hagia* risks being misunderstood as an ill-advised and fanciful attempt to regard purely metaphorical language as relevant for specifically liturgical realities. But this assessment ignores the place of the expression *to hagion / ta hagia* in the liturgical tradition of Judaism and of the Church.

In Scripture *to hagion / ta hagia* is used in the Septuagint of the animal destined for sacrifice or for the sacrificed flesh.[52] Already the expression *to hagion* of Matt 7,6 ("Do not give that which is holy to swine …") is possible interpreted in the *Didache* as referring to the Eucharist.[53] Such an interpretation is also advanced on occasion by commentators of Matthew independently of *The Didache*.[54] In the Greek Fathers the expression and in the Greek liturgy the expression *ta hagia* is used with reference to the Eucharist.[55] Also relevant for the present discussion is the place of the "presentation of the bread" (*prothesis tōn artōn*) of the cult of the old dispensation with relation to the Christian Eucharist.[56]

Summary and Conclusions

Summary. The present paper was occasioned by the problems inherent in the interpretation of Heb 9,2, especially the unusual textual variants which present themselves as candidates for the ending of the verse. It is obvious that in vv. 2-3 the author of Hebrews is comparing the "first", i.e., outer, tent of the "worldly sanctuary"

51. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 266: "The phrase indicates that Christ's second coming will not have the atoning function of the first; it will be apart from sin in its aims and effects."
52. Cf. above, n. 30, and also O. Michel, art. *"kyon, kynarion"*, *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, III (Kohlhammer; Stuttgart 1938) 1101-1102.
53. Cf. K. Niedervvimmer, *Die Didache* (Kommentar zu den,Apostolischen Vätern 1; Vandenhoexk & Ruprecht; Gottingen 1989) 176-180, for arguments in favour and against a Eucharistic meaning in *The Didache*.
54. Michel, *"kyon, kynarion"*, 1102.
55. W. Elert, *Abendmahl und Kirchengemeinschaft in der alten Kirche, hauptsächlich des Ostens* (Lutherisches Verlagshaus; Berlin 1954) 178-181 ("Koinonia und ta Hagia").
56. A. Adarn, "Ein vergessener Aspekt des frühchristlichen Herrenmahles. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Abendmahlsverstandnisses der Alten Kirche", *Theologische Literarturzeitung* 88(1963) cols. 9-20.

proper to the first covenant (9,1) with the tent which lies beyond the second veil called the "Holy of Holies". This obvious comparison has led scholars to the almost unanimous view that the expression found at the end of v. 2—*hagia* or variants thereof— must refer to the first tent, i.e., the "Holy Place". Three of the textual variants for the word (*hagia, ta hagia*, and *hagía*) can be adjusted to this interpretation, but the fourth variant (*hagia hagiōn*) cannot except by making it depend on a clumsy and ultimately unintelligible duplication of the same words in v. 3.

The paper addresses this problem by pointing out that the use of the qualitative relative *hostis* elsewhere in Hebrews indicates that in Heb 9,2 the form *hētis* refers not to the distant word *skēnē* at the beginning of the verse but to the immediately preceding expression *prothesis tōn artōn*. If the best attested manuscript reading— *hagia*—is assumed to be original, the focus of the interpretation is changed to the precise meaning of *hagia*. A study of this and related forms in the epistle indicates that [*ta*] *hagia* is the most common way used by the author for referring to the Holy of Holies of both the first covenant dispensation and the Christian dispensation. But this same expression — *hagia* — is used in the sense of "Holy Things" to designate the holy food of the first covenant dispensation, a meaning which fits the immediate context in Heb 9,2 inasmuch as the relative clause in which the word *hagia* is found refers to the "presentation of the bread" in the tabernacle/temple. The primary meaning of the expression *hētis legetai hagia*, then, is that of "Holy Things" to describe the showbread. But the suggested, underlying allusion based on the way *hagia* is used in Hebrews is that these Holy Things are the foreshadowing of the Christian Holy of Holies.[57] This would explain the otherwise unintelligible fourth variant, *hagia hagiōn*: some early scribe felt it necessary to make the allusion explicit.

Thus the expressions in Hebrews which are based on *hagia* and variations of the same, given the context of the Christian fulfilment of the archetype of the earthly sanctuary, are to be understood as implying that the Holy of Holies of the Christian sanctuary is the fulfilment of the showbread, i.e., the Eucharist. This helps explain the emphasis given by the author to the glorified body of the risen Christ which is viewed as the new first tent through which Christ enters into the new second tent or Eucharist. The text of the *Vetus Latina* and of the *Vulgate* at Heb 9,2 can be adduced to support this interpretation.

57. Part of the crux of 9,2 is that the word *hagia* in Hebrew is used to mean the Christian "Holy of Holies".

A suggested structure of Heb 8,1 - 10,39 offered in conjunction with this discussion seems to situate the use of *to hagion / ta hagia* in meaningful contexts. The expression is used in connection with Christ's heavenly exercise of His priesthood, i.e., that portion of His priesthood which occurs beginning with His resurrection-exaltation. His earthly priesthood is the intrinsic preparation for this heavenly priesthood and culminates in the sacrifice of the cross.

Conclusion. The author of Hebrews is endeavouring to make several points if the above analysis of Heb 9,2 in its context is correct.

1. He is attempting to show in a way peculiar to the suppositions of the culture in which he writes that the New Testament reality of the Eucharist is foreshadowed in the cult of the Old Testament.
2. He is attempting to explain how the Eucharist is related to the sacrifice of Christ on the cross through Christ's risen body.
3. He is attempting to indicate that in a real but inexplicable way Christ who in one way exists in heaven in his glorified body, in another way exists in the Eucharistic species of bread.
4. He is attempting to bring to the attention of his readers that just as God was present to the desert generation of Israel in the tabernacle as the people wandered in the desert, so Christ is present to the Christian generation in the Eucharist as the new people of God wander toward the promised land of Heaven.

The language used by the author of Hebrews is veiled and indirect, as appropriate for the mysteries he is presenting.[58] It is this veiled and indirect language which

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58. A further aspect of the whole question is the possible relevance of the "Discipline of the Secret" for the entire discussion. This is the practice of deliberately referring to certain aspects of Christian life, especially the liturgy, in a veiled way, to protect them from the profane curiosity of those not initiated in the Christian mystery, but also to assure an appropriate way of referring to what in themselves are worthy of reticence and respect. Cf.: Adam, "Ein vergessener Aspekt der frühchristlichen Herrenmahles", cols. 15-16; Joachim Jeremias, *The Eucharistic Words of Jesus* (New Testament Library; SCM Press; London 1966) 132: "The deepest *secrets of Christology ...* belong to the esoteric material. The clearest evidence for this is Heb. 5.11-6.8. In this passage elementary Christian instruction, consisting of three parts: (*a*) repentance from dead works, (*b*) faith towards God, (*c*) the doctrine of baptism, of the laying on of hands, and of the last things (Heb. 6.1-2), is distinguished from instruction for those mature in the faith (*teleiotēs*, 6.1), which is expounded in the Christological passages of Heb. 7.1-10.18."

makes study of Heb 9,2 so challenging and so rewarding: challenging for what it does not say, and rewarding for what it does.

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LYNELL ZOGBO/ERNST R. WENDLAND, *Hebrew Poetry in the Bible*. A Guide for Understanding and for Translating,(United Bible Societies; New York 2000) xiv.246pp.; ISBN 0-8267-0037-3.

Since Bishop Robert Lowth's famous monograph *De sacra poesi Hebraeororum praelectiones academicae Oxonii habitae*(1753), introductions to, and general treatments of Hebrew poetry have often graced the shelves of academia. The limited bibliography appended to the text of the present volume(pp.219-223) includes some of the more known books in the field that appeared the last twenty five years or so: Kugel1981; Alter 1985; Berlin1985; Alonso Schökel 1988. And yet this number in the UBS series 'Helps for Translator' breaks new grounds.

Lynell Zogbo and Ernst R. Wendland work with the United Bible Societies as translation consultants. Their responsibilities include monitoring translations in a number of nations, training translators, and helping them as they struggle to render into their own languages and cultures the contents and beauty of the Hebrew and Greek text of the Christian Bible. As such, this volume is only partially addressed to academics, that is, to their colleagues who would use this book as textbook in their training sessions of Bible translators. This book is a teaching aid as the 'Questions for Reflection' at the end of each of the eight chapters of the book demonstrate. But the

monograph may be read with profit also by the translators themselves, individually, or in teams. In the Preface it is these translators who are explicitly mentioned as the 'target audience' of this enterprise. "The book is meant as a practical guide for the translator with limited or no background in Hebrew. Its main purpose is to convince translators that, in certain contexts, rendering biblical poetry as poetry in their own language is a worthy goal. It suggests ways translators can compare the linguistic techniques of the Hebrew text with those in their own language. In this way they can try to create the same poetic effect in their translations. It points out typical problems that Old Testament translators face and suggests ways to set out the text that will help the reader" (p.xi; cfr also p.8).

One may probably say that it was this practical intent of the monograph that was responsible for some of its strengths: straightforward and clear style of its presentation; wise selection of the material to be discussed both as regards the texts as well as the poetic techniques and features; balanced review of positions concerning the many options that the translator has to consider as he/she attempts to transfer biblical poetic forms into his/her own target language. These strengths would make of this monograph a good textbook not only for practitioners of Bible translation but also for students of theology as long as the latters will have received a good humanistic preparation. For in order to study the Bible as a literary phenomenon with profit one has to

experience the literary capacities of one's own mother tongue.

The authors of the monograph do not examine the literary phenomena and the poetic techniques employed by the biblical authors for their intrinsic beauty alone. Their concern is to show how the poetic functions played by these phenomena and techniques in the source language can be met with when the poems wherein they appear are translated into the living languages of today that often are light years away from the cultural milieu where these phenomena and techniques sounded pretty and meaningful. The questions the monograph tries to answer: Should poems in the Hebrew Bible be produced literally? And to what extent is the translator bound to reproduce the literary phenomena that the authors resorted to in order to produce the effects intended? Could he/she depart somewhat 'from the text' to attain to the same effect as the original authors, and to communicate more or less identical meaning(s)? These are the issues that the monograph addresses and which not even the academic specialist can simply ignore as he/she grabbles with the text to resolve its mysteries.

In the one hundred seventy five pages of its text, the book treats eight different aspects of the issue 'translating Hebrew Poetry'. The first three focus on Hebrew poetry itself, while in the next five chapters the subject matter is the translational side. We shall briefly visit each chapter adding short comments here

and there in the hope of consolidating the good work done by the authors of the monograph. Chapter One (pp.1-9) deal briefly with the definition of poetry in general and of Hebrew poetry in particular. The discussion of the latter had to include listing criteria for distinguishing between poetry and prose; the bounderings between the two genres are far from clear. In this part of the chapter I expected to find at least a reference to Wendland's useful list of differences given in the other UBS monograph *Discourse Perspectives on Hebrew Poetry in the Scriptures*(1994), pp. 3-5. Chapter Two tackles a more technical subject though absolute form-critical precision in the terms involved is a dream. The authors here focus on 'life setting and genres in Hebrew poetry'(pp.11-17). The words in the chapter title are reminiscent of Hermann Gunkel's *Sitz in Leben* and *Gattungen* and Gunkel's contribution for form criticism and particularly for psalms studies is also acknowledged(pp.13-15) [The title of his books as well as that of Robert Lowth appear nowhere in the monograph!]. I wonder though whether 'life setting' as described on pp.12-13 corresponds perfectly to Gunkel's *Sitz im Leben*. Besides, the present reviewer is slightly confused as to what to make of the two statements on p.11: 'Certainly by the time that David, the most well-known songwriter in the Bible, was composing, poetry had taken on a more individual flavour. Many of the psalms attributed to him are personal, referring to specific circumstances in his life." Perhaps the

writer who penned these statements would have profited from reading the recent monograph by Harry P. Nasuti, *Defining the Sacred Songs. Genre, Tradition, and the Post-Critical Interpretation of the Psalms*,(JSOT Supplement Series 218; Sheffield1999). Writing for non-specialists requires more accuracy of the specialist.

Chapter Three is the longest section of the introductory discussion (pp.19-60) dedicated to theoretical issues. It offers a useful description of a number of features of Hebrew poetry. Zogbo and Wendland identify some features as the ones affecting the structure of the poetic composition; here they include parallelism, chiastic structures, refrains, and Inclusio(pp.20-33). One notices with pleasure that the authors have gone beyond the schematism of Robert Lowth's classification of parallelism(pp.23-28). Stress, Meter, rhythm, alliteration, assonance, rhyme, and word play are treated under the rubric 'sounds effects in Hebrew poetry'(pp.34-40). The authors of this monograph are aware that most of the users of their book will not be able to enjoy the employment of these sound features by the Hebrew poets whose works we read, as many of the translators use for their *Vorlage* or 'base text' other translations where such 'sound effects' in the original do not feature because the language is different. For which reason, the description of the features mentioned in this subsection is understandably sketchy. More prepared translators who are capable to read Hebrew poetry in the

original, may have to supplement this description with reading from some of the titles mentioned in the general bibliography, which could be enlarged to include for instance the two specialised works of Wilfred G. E.Watson, *Classical Hebrew Poetry: A Guide to its Techniques*, (JSOT Supplement Series,26; Sheffield 1984); *Traditional Techniques in Classical Hebrew Verse*,(JSOT Supplement Series,170; Sheffield 1994); also useful would have been Roland Meynet's *Rhetorical Analysis. An Introduction to Biblical Rhetoric*, (JSOT Supplement Series,256; Sheffield1998). The next bunch of features is qualified by the rubric 'stylistic features found throughout Hebrew literature' which is rather strange; this third list contains 'figures of speech'(similes, metaphor, personification, anthropomorphism[I wonder whether this should be treated with figures of speech], part-whole relationships, and 'standard figures' under which they enter metonymy), rhetorical and leading questions, hyperbole, irony and sarcasm, key words(or 'terms', p.167), and shifting persons. The use of 'Key Words' merited perhaps a wider treatment seeing that some translation 'traditions' make much fuss about it. For the use of the technique 'person shift' readers will profit also form the contribution of Lénart de Regt, *Participants in Old Testament Texts and the Translator. Reference Devices and their Rhetorical Impact*, (Van Gorcum; Assen1999) and a paper that he has read in the joint seminar of the *Oudtestamentisch Werkgezelschap* and

the *Society for Old Testament Study* held Soesterberg, Holland, August 2000, "Roles and Person Shift in Prophetic Texts: Its Function and its Rendering in Ancient and Modern Translations".

The last part of the chapter Zogbo and Wendland describe 'poetic units': strophes and stanzas(pp.53-58), while on pp.58-60 they deal with some cases where the Hebrew poet chose to diverge from the expected pattern.

With chapter Four (pp.61-99) start what is probably the more original part of the authors in this monograph; for in this second half of their book Zogbo and Wendland discuss the translational aspects of Hebrew poetry. "We believe that it is possible and even recommended to render poetry in the source text as poetry in the translation in certain well-defined contexts,"state the authors on p.61. The 'key expression' in this sentence is 'in well-defined contexts'. In this chapter they say that poetry in the source text may be rendered as poetry in the target languages on two conditions: first, that poetry play more or less identical roles in the target culture as it did in the source culture; secondly, there exist stylistic matches between the poetic expressions of the two cultures. Here Zogbo and Wendland try to show that these two conditions are fulfilled in the case of Hebrew poetry even though there may not be one to one correspondence either in the social function of poetry or in its formal expression with modern languages and cultures, so that caution is always

necessary. "Rendering the biblical text in poetic form should be a conscious decision made by the translators...It must first be determined that a poetic transfer can be made, based on thorough research of the available functional matches between the source and the target languages. This means that for every book (or even parts of each book), translators...must agree how each text will be treated in order to express its message faithfully"(p.76). And this holds good also for any formal correspondence between the two poetic traditions, that of the source and of the target languages. "If there is a formal match between poetic devices, translators must make sure that the moods and connotations conveyed by the stylistic technique match as well. Otherwise a translated poem may be interpreted in an incorrect way, or the poem may convey the wrong feeling"(p.82).Words of wisdom indeed.

The next thirty eight pages (pp.101-138) constitute chapter Five, and translators and general users of this handbook should constantly refer to this section where Zogbo and Wendland give guidelines as to how to deal with a number of problems related to the translation of Hebrew poetry. They discuss problem relating to parallel lines [this discussion deals also with word pairs, an important feature of Hebrew poetry: when to reproduce these pairs in the target language, when to 'collapse' them?](pp.101-117); repetition and ellipsis(pp.117-121); poetic language(pp.121-130); and shifting persons(pp.131-134); towards the end of

the chapter, they describe when footnotes should be used, when a literal translation is preferable to a more dynamic one, when instead of purely translating a text it may be advisable to 'recreate' a literary composition. After the discussion of each important item, the authors would conveniently summarise the contents: cfr pp.107(word pairs), 123(translating exotic or unknown vocabulary in the source text), 130 (dealing with difficult figures of speech), 132-133 (shift of persons in poetry).

With chapter Five we have reached the climax of the monograph. In the next three chapters Zogbo and Wendland discuss minor though not unimportant aspects of translating poetry. In chapter Six (pp.139-154)they examine an issue that was not given importance in times past: of how poetic texts from Scripture should be disposed in a printed text. "... How a poem is formatted or set out on the printed page contributes significantly to how it is read and interpreted"(p.153). Chapter Seven (pp.155-163) reviews the possibility that poetic structures can help determine the meaning of a word or phrase, while the concluding chapter Eight (pp.165-175)makes suggestions as to how to deal with Old Testament poems quoted by the New Testament writers; should the translator reproduce the Old Testament citation in the New Testament as it is to be found in its original OT context, or should he/she reproduce the citation as it appears in the NT writing? What Zogbo and Wendland say in this chapter transcends the exigencies of mere

translation work, and the professional exegete will surely find it profitable to read their work.

In the Appendix are included three case studies of how biblical poetry can be translated as poetry in the target language, and the work of one translation team as they tried to establish the principles to follow in rendering Hebrew poetry in their mother tongue(pp.117-218). Besides one finds a bibliography, a glossary of the literary and linguistic terms employed in the monograph, and a list of Bible references(219-246).

The present reviewer opines that this 'handbook' should be in the hands not only of Bible translators and theology students who are handling their first arms in scholarly exegetical work, but also of biblical scholars, since the solutions Zogbo and Wendland propose for handling biblical poetry takes into account modern linguistic studies which standard training in professional Scripture studies do not always consider. And this is a must nowadays.

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