Man’s Capacity for Self Transcendence
– On “Conversion” in Bernard Lonergan’s
Method in Theology –

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The concept of “conversion”, while seldom used in his writings until the late 1960's, constituted the major interest of Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984) for more than a generation. For him, the core of conversion itself is the transformation of the “subject”. It is man’s call to the realisation of ever higher levels of self-transcendence putting into action the cognitive, ethical and affective response to the religious object. Especially in his Method in Theology, Lonergan explains that only in undergoing a series of conversions – intellectual, moral and religious – culminating in the experience of the love of God (Rom 5,5) by obeying the transcendental precepts that the subject can progressively expand his horizons. In studying the relationship among the different conversions, this essay shows that even if the religious conversion can indeed enjoy a priority over the others, still one is in relation to the other and yet so meaningful on its own. It is a three-dimensional process of self-transcendence taken in whatever order.

In Method in Theology and elsewhere, Lonergan\(^1\) describes conversion as a three-dimensional process of self-transcendence,\(^2\) which is played out, so to speak, on the intellectual, moral and religious levels. Conversion, then, concerns the cognitive, ethical and affective response to the religious object, that is to say, the object of

ultimately involves, therefore, man's call to the realisation of ever higher levels of self-transcendence.

1. The term "conversion"

"Conversion" is given ample treatment in his Method in Theology, referred to by some as "the crowning achievement of a thinker of genius". Interestingly enough, however, the word conversion does not even occur in the massive index of Insight. In point of fact, it is also true that the whole thrust of Insight is toward what Lonergan later spoke of as "intellectual conversion", but in Insight he speaks rather of the "self-appropriation of the knower". It was eleven years later, in The Subject, that Lonergan decided to discuss and deal with conversion, describing it as "a personal philosophical experience". Thus, the word "conversion" is seldom used in Lonergan's writings up until the late 1960's. Notwithstanding this, the word refers to realities or occurrences that have perhaps constituted the major interest of Lonergan for more than a generation. Becoming a favourite term in his latter years, conversion appeared as a major theme in the articles entitled "Revolution in Catholic Theology" and "Theology in its New Context".

Pointing out that Lonergan's discovery of the fact and significance of conversion was not something that occurred between the writing of Insight and of Method, Donal J. Dorr identifies the articles on Gratia Operans as ample evidence of the

5. Cf. Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, Philosophical Library, New York 1957. Insight, Lonergan's monumental opus, has been compared in significance to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. This work is a study of human understanding as it is operative in mathematics, scientists and men in their common-sense activities. Bernard Tyrrell clarifies that as such the whole thrust of Insight is toward what Lonergan later spoke of as "intellectual conversion": however in Insight he speaks rather of the "self-appropriation of the knower". Cf. Bernard J. Tyrrell, "The dynamics of conversion", 57-58.
Man's Capacity for Self Transcendence 25

Canadian Jesuit's interest in religious conversion over a period of sixty years. It is not, however our object here to point back to the origins of Lonergan's cognitional theory in *Insight* and even the pre-*Insight* *Verbum* articles. An attempt to trace the development of the notion of conversion over that period is beyond our scope. Our goal is to present Lonergan's understanding of the three conversions and their interrelationship. Thus, there will not be an explanation of the functional specialties and their dynamic interrelationships.

As such, *Method in Theology* has no comprehensive and systematic treatment of conversion but like any other key notions, Lonergan's treatment of the topic must be understood against the background of his earlier writings. Lonergan arrived at his first definition of conversion after conducting an early study on Thomas Aquinas's use of the notion. Lonergan began to understand conversion as a change of orientation. He noticed that *conversio*, for Aquinas, did not entail conversion from, but simply meant a natural orientation: "the conversion of possible intellect to phantasmata is described ... as a natural orientation of human intellect in this life". This led Lonergan to understand conversion as a change of "intention". Having his interest moved on without discontinuity from philosophy and traditional dogmatics to history and the moral and religious levels of actual human living, Lonergan shifted his attention to the core of conversion itself, that is, the transformation of the subject. The latter, he maintains, constitutes the basic horizon of the individual.

10. The second of these articles (now chapter three of *Grace and Freedom*) present it in Thomistic categories as a *gratia operans* which is a *habitus*. In the final article, he refers to the distinction made by Aquinas between this kind of conversion and how other types – the perfect conversion of the beatific vision and the preparatory conversion which does not involve the infusion of a "habit". Cf. Bernard Lonergan, *Theological Studies* 3 (1942) 558; *Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas*, Darton, Longman and Todd, London 1971, 122. The relationship between Lonergan's analysis of conversion and his earlier work on grace has been treated briefly in Kevin Colleran, "Bernard Lonergan on Conversion", in *Dunwoodie Review* 11 (1971) 3-23. For a different interpretation, confer Charles E. Curran, "Christian Conversion in the Writings of Bernard Lonergan", in *Foundations of Theology*, edited by Philip McShane, Gill and Macmillan, Dublin 1971, 41-59; Donal Dorr, "Conversion", in *Looking at Lonergan's Method*, edited by Patrick Corcoran, Talbot, Dublin 1975, 175-186.

11. We refer the reader to chapter 5 in *Method* which gives a kind of diagrammatic view of the functional specialties.


2. "The Subject" as a knower

The turning towards the subject, remarks Michael T. McLaughlin, characterises Lonergan's contribution to the renewal of theology after Vatican II. In *Method in Theology*, therefore, Lonergan wanted to contribute not only a theory of knowledge which would open out to a renewal of metaphysics but also a new method in theology itself. The turn to the subject was a way of beginning theology from below. Thus, Lonergan starts with the human person seeking to know himself or herself as a knower, as a knower located in history, and as one who has inherited from the past not only culture but religious beliefs. But let us refer to what Lonergan has to say about "the subject".

The study of "the subject" – the experience, thinking, judging and deciding subject – is, he says, "the study of oneself inasmuch as one is conscious. It prescinds from the soul, its essence, its potencies, its habits, for none of these are given in consciousness. It attends to operations and to their centre and source which is the self". The subject or self is one who not only experiences, thinks and judges, but also "deliberates, evaluates, chooses and acts". And in so doing, he (the subject) not only changes his environment; he changes, and indeed in some sense "makes" himself: "he makes himself what he is to be, and he does so freely and responsibly". Lonergan explains that the turning-point for the subject comes when he becomes explicitly aware of this freedom and responsibility for "making himself", and responsibly chooses it.

Lonergan explains that human persons are subjects by degrees. He presents a scheme where the existential subject stands in distinct but related levels of consciousness:

1. on the first level, the lowest level, Lonergan places what he calls the *merely potentially subject* whereby the person is unconscious in dreamless sleep,
2. then, due to a minimal degree of consciousness and subjectivity, the person is a *helpless subject* of his or her dreams,

3. he becomes an experiential subject when he awakes. Lonergan explains that at this stage, people become “subjects of lucid perception, imaginative projects, emotional impulses, and bodily action”;²¹
4. on the fourth level, Lonergan places the intelligent subject who sublates the experiential realm. Lonergan explains that the person in this stage, among other things, grows in understanding and expresses his inventions and discoveries;
5. on the next level, the rational subject sublates the intelligent and experiential subject. Lonergan explains that at this stage, a person not only questions, but also checks his own understanding and expression. He can also marshal the evidence pro and con as well as judge something to be so or not to be so;²²
6. Finally, there is human consciousness as its fullest. Lonergan argues that when a person deliberates, evaluates, decides and acts, rational consciousness is sublated by rational self-consciousness. Thus, there comes to be the existential self.

3. Changing horizons: the subject in conflict

Lonergan relates the idea of conversion to that which Joseph de Finance has named “the vertical exercise of freedom”.²³ There is a bond between conversion (sometimes also referred to as the nature of human authenticity)²⁴ and the exercise of freedom by which one’s horizon is changed. Avery Dulles explains that in undergoing a series of conversions—intellectual, moral and religious—culminating in the experience of the love of God by obeying the transcendental precepts, the subject progressively expands his horizons.²⁵ One can speak of a conversion, remarks Lonergan, when the new horizon is not merely a harmonious expansion of the previous horizon, but is in some respects contradictory to the older horizon.²⁶

Before coming to terms with the meaning of a “horizon”, it should be made clear that Lonergan uses this notion as an image for explaining how conflict can arise. It can be described in terms of conflicting beliefs, differences in horizons, or

24. Conversion is explored in the fifth functional specialty, entitled Foundations, however, the most synthetic discussion of the three conversions occurs in the fourth chapter of *Method* dealing with the speciality, Dialectic. *Cf.* Hugo A. Meynell, *The Theology of Bernard Lonergan*, Scholars, Atlanta, Georgia1986, 15.
the presence or absence of any of the three conversions. Furthermore, conflict can occur in any one of the eight functional specialties from research onward.

The conflicts may be overt or latent. They may be in the religious sources, in the religious tradition, in the pronouncements of the authorities, or in the writings of theologians. They may regard contrary orientations of research, contrary interpretations, contrary histories, contrary styles of evaluation, contrary horizons, contrary doctrines, contrary systems, contrary policies.27

David Tracy, one of Lonergan's disciples, describes horizon as the "maximum field of vision from a determined viewpoint and embraces both relative horizon which describes one's field of vision relative to one's development, and basic horizon which describes the human subject as related to the three transcendental conversions already mentioned".28 Moreover, Michael T. McLaughlin notes that though the image "horizon" is a visual one, its content is not.29

As fields of vision vary with one's standpoint, so too the scope of one's knowledge and the range of one's interests vary with the period in which one lives, one's social background and milieu, one's education and personal development. So there has arisen a metaphorical and perhaps analogous meaning to the word horizon. In this sense, what lies beyond one's horizon is simply outside the range of one's knowledge and interests: one neither knows nor cares. But what lies within one's horizon is in some measure, great or small, an object of interest and knowledge.30

Lonergan identifies four characteristics concerning horizons. Firstly, many horizons, in some measure, include and complement one another. Secondly, horizons may differ "genetically". In other words, each later stage presupposes earlier stages,

27. Ibid., 235.
partly to include them, and partly to transform them. Thirdly, horizons may be opposed dialectically. For instance, what is true for one person may be false for another. Lastly, horizons are the structured resultant of past achievement and both the condition and the limitation of further development. Lonergan explains that all learning is, not a mere addition to previous learning, but rather "an organic growth out of it".31

At this stage, we cannot speak of conversion without having first presented the conscious and intentional operations which are the "rock" on which Lonergan constructs his theological method.32 The human mind, Lonergan explains, is governed by an unrestricted dynamism toward the fullness of truth, reality and goodness, and that from this dynamism one can distil the transcendental notions of the true, the real and the good. These notions, if taken in reference to Lonergan’s four levels of intentionality (experience, insight, judgement, and decision), yield four transcendental precepts: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, and be responsible.33 Frederick E. Crowe explains that these precepts Lonergan offers are concerned with what it is to be an "incarnate subject". Crowe includes the precept "to be in love".34 The criteria used in the transcendental method are thus rooted in

31. Ibid., 237.
32. Cf. Lonergan, Method, 19-20. Frederick E. Crowe maintains that Lonergan’s work is not "a theory, a model, or a system; not even a way". It is an organon, which concerns "a developed talent of an incarnate subject, a way of structuring man’s conscious activities that has been of immense importance for the ongoing work of the human race". In this context, the Greek word, organon, has been used to designate an instrument of mind. Crowe suggests that specific use of the words "incarnate subject" suggests something more integral than the "mind" which may suggest to some a mental faculty in a body. Integral in the sense of people who experience, question, understand, reflect, judge, deliberate, decide and sometimes fall in love. Thus, calling this methodology an organon, emphasis is laid on the inseparability between the theological knowing and who is the theologian. Cf. Frederick E. Crowe, The Lonergan Enterprise, Cowley, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1980, xiii-iv. 7, 15.
33. Method in Theology adapts Insight’s four levels of intentionality: empirical (gathering data), intellectual (seeking intelligibility), rational (true judgements), and responsible (action and value). However, reflecting the development in his thought since Insight, Lonergan was later to give greater emphasis to the fourth level, the responsible level, on which human beings deliberate, decide and act. Initially, the cognitive theory which has been described in detail in Insight consisted of three levels of consciousness and intentionality: the empirical level on which we sense and perceive, the intellectual level on which we enquire, understand and express, and the rational level on which we reflect and judge. Cf. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 9; John M. McDermott, "Bernard Lonergan", in The Dictionary of Historical Theology, William B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapid, Michigan 2000, 328.
the very nature of the human mind. In other words, Lonergan’s method requires
the subject to observe the four precepts.

Obeying these precepts, man expands his horizons and experiences a series of
conversions culminating in the experience of the love of God. Furthermore, John M.
McDermott explains that along the four levels of intentionality, it is the Spirit who
spontaneously advances in self-transcendence to intellectual, moral and religious
conversions. 35 To quote one of Lonergan’s favourite texts, “the gift of God’s love
flooding our hearts is the gracious gift of a conversion”. 36

4. Conversion as the cognitive, ethical and affective response
to the religious object

Understood in this sense, conversion becomes a new type of foundation
with which theology nowadays can “mediate between a cultural matrix and the
significance and role of a religion in that matrix”. 37 Lonergan is concerned with
a transcendental method that is not confined to any particular field or subject
matter. His method is concerned with meeting the exigencies and exploiting the
opportunities presented by the human mind itself. Lonergan describes this method
as transcultural and normative, based on the structures of human knowing, which
are universal and invariant. 38 He argues that since culture has come to be seen as
a moving target, theology has to adapt in order to meet its task of mediation. 39 On
the same lines, Richard M. Liddy comments that what characterises Lonergan’s
Method in Theology is conversion: “the apprehension of conversion through
historical scholarship and the communication of the meaning and value of authentic
conversion through a methodical theology”. 40

Attentiveness to experience, intelligence in theorizing, reasonableness in
judgement, and responsibility in decision imply “authentic subjectivity”. Lonergan
explains that rather than putting away one’s imaginative capacities and taking a look

36. Cf. Romans 5, 5. See Lonergan, Method in Theology, 105. 278, for the context in which Lonergan
uses it.
37. Lonergan, Method in Theology, xi.
38. Cf. Ibid., 14.
at reality, "objectivity" is "the fruit of authentic subjectivity".41 Method in Theology, therefore, is "the fruit of a life-time's patient reflection on what theologians do, can do, and ought to do".42

4.1 Intellectual Conversion

The first of the three conversions is intellectual. Lonergan describes intellectual conversion as the overcoming of all solipsism in and through the realization that the real world is the world mediated by meaning.

Intellectual conversion is a radical clarification and, consequently, the elimination of an exceedingly stubborn and misleading myth concerning reality, objectivity, and human knowledge. The myth is that knowing is like looking, that objectivity is seeing what is there to be seen and not seeing what is not there, and that the real is what is out there now to be looked at.43

Lonergan distinguishes between the world of immediacy and the world mediated by meaning. Whereas the former is a world known by the sense experience, the latter regards the external and internal experience of a cultural community and the continuously checked and rechecked judgements of the community as foundational. As further explained by Lonergan, the result of intellectual conversion is the position named "critical realism". This is to be distinguished from the naïve realist, the empiricist, and the idealist. All four correspond to totally different horizons with no common identical objects.44 Hugo A. Meynell argues that intellectual conversion takes place when the critical realist opts for the fully critical theory of knowledge, and applies it to all his opinions, whether common-sense, scientific, philosophical, religious or anti-religious.45

Bartholomew M. Kiely explains that the true, objective, and real are attained in judgment, and that a judgment "must meet conditions" before it can be considered

41. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 292.
42. Crowe, The Lonergan Enterprise, xiii.
43. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 238.
44. Cf. Ibid., 239.
a verified judgment.\textsuperscript{46} He adds however that these conditions vary with the kind of judgment. Kiely shows that in principle, there are a number of steps which the critical realist is not free to take. For instance, he is not free to disregard questions about the genuineness of his values. Conversely, he must always respect the further question, no matter how uncomfortable it may be. Thus, intellectual conversion is the taking up of a position on the nature of knowledge and truth.

For Terrence Merrigan, central aspects to the understanding of the intellectual conversion are both the community and its tradition: “For religious men and women, that meaning is disclosed in the tradition mediated by the religious community”\textsuperscript{47} Merrigan continues that the maintenance of that tradition, in its integrity, is only possible on the basis of the rigorous commitment to truth which is characteristic of the intellectually converted.\textsuperscript{47} As has already been stated, the religious community must be prepared to ‘continuously check and recheck its judgments’ about what it regards as true, good, and worthy of devotion.\textsuperscript{48}

4.2 Moral Conversion

The second of the three conversions is moral conversion. Lonergan describes moral conversion as the radical change in the criterion of one’s decisions and choices from satisfactions to values\textsuperscript{49}. Thus, on the frontier between intellectual and moral conversion lies the judgement of value. In other words, it involves the thrust of our human freedom toward authenticity. He explains that whereas children have to be “persuaded, cajoled, ordered or compelled to do what is right”, an adult can “decide for himself what he is to make of himself”\textsuperscript{50}.


\textsuperscript{47} Cf. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 238, 243. Let us refer to what Lonergan remarks on the intellectual conversion: “Finally, among the values discerned by the eye of love is the value of believing the truths taught by the religious tradition, and in such tradition and belief are the seeds of intellectual conversion” (243). On his behalf, Tracy describes intellectual conversion as the “radical reorientation of the authentic subject from some little world of his own... to a world of the intelligently understood and the reasonably affirmed.” Cf. Tracy, The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan, 231.

\textsuperscript{48} Cf. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 238, 114-115.

\textsuperscript{49} Cf. Ibid., 240.

\textsuperscript{50} Cf. Ibid., 240.
Kiely argues that moral conversion differs from intellectual conversion in that it involves choice and decision, and not only judgement.\footnote{Cf. Kiely, \textit{Psychology and Moral Theology}, 215.} This can be best illustrated when Lonergan states that moral conversion "consists in opting for the truly good, even for value against satisfaction when value and satisfaction conflict."\footnote{Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, 240.} It involves the recognition that the world is "regulated by value,"\footnote{Ibid., 112.} and the willingness to opt for value against satisfaction. Merrigan notes that for religious men and women, the absolute value is the religious object.\footnote{Ibid., 115-124. See pp. 115-116, where Lonergan writes that the apprehension of transcendent value "consists in the experienced fulfilment of our unrestricted thrust to self-transcendence, in our actuated orientation towards the mystery of love and awe. Since that thrust is of intelligence to the intelligible, of reasonableness to the true and the real, of freedom and responsibility to the truly good, the experienced fulfilment of that thrust in its unrestrictedness may be objectified as a clouded revelation of absolute intelligence and intelligibility, absolute truth and reality; absolute goodness and holiness." Lonergan describes the "apprehension of transcendent value" as faith.} Merrigan writes that it is worth noting that Lonergan increasingly highlighted the role of feelings as intentional responses to values.\footnote{Bernard J. Tyrrell, "Feelings as Apprehensive-Intentional Responses to Values," in \textit{Lonergan Workshop}, vii, edited by Fred Lawrence, Scholars Press, Atlanta, GA 1988, 331-360; Frederick E. Crowe, \textit{Appropriating the Lonergan Idea}, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, DC 1989, 344-359; Mark J. Doorley, \textit{The Place of the Heart in Lonergan's Ethics}, University Press of America, Lanham, MD 1996, 111-112. See also Bernard Lonergan, "Religious Commitment," in \textit{The Pilgrim People: A Vision with Hope}, edited by Joseph Papin, Villanova University Press, Villanova 1970, 64-65.}

Feelings reveal values to us. They dispose us to commitment. But they do not bring commitment about. For commitment is a personal act, a free and responsible act, a very open-eyed act in which we would settle what we are to become. It is open-eyed in the sense that it is ... aware that one's present commitment however firm cannot suspend the freedom that will be exercised in its future execution.\footnote{Lonergan, \textit{A Third Collection}, 173. Cf. Neil Ormerod, \textit{Method, Meaning and Revelation: The Meaning and Function of Revelation in Bernard Lonergan's 'Method in Theology'}, University Press of America, Lanham, MD 2000, 124-125.}

In other words, while feelings are vital to religious commitment, such commitment cannot escape the challenge, and the burden, of ongoing critical self-
appropriation. On his part, Meynell highlights the striving for the objective good and the avoidance of any bias. Moral conversion consists in envisaging and striving for the objective good, and in setting oneself against all tendencies to individual and group bias, both in oneself and in one’s environment. The subject, therefore, must “root out bias, acquiring morally relevant knowledge, learning about one’s values and motives, and acquiring the habits of a good man”.

4.3 Religious Conversion

The third conversion is religious conversion, “a topic little studied in traditional theology”. Thus, beyond intellectual and moral conversion, but also on the fourth level of responsible, existential consciousness, there is the possibility of religious conversion. Like the other two conversions, religious conversion is a special modality, a crucial instance of self-transcendence. It concerns the being grasped by an other-worldly love. In Meynell’s words, It is “a matter of being touched and directed by a basic and unconditional love and good will”. As Paul put it in Romans 5, 5, it concerns God’s love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us. Religious conversion, then, is “the efficacious ground of all self-transcendence, whether in the pursuit of truth, or in the realization of human values, or in the orientation man adopts to the universe, its ground, and its goal.”

It is being grasped by ultimate concern. It is other-worldly falling in love. It is total and permanent self-surrender without conditions, qualifications, reservations. But it is such a surrender, not as an act, but as a dynamic state that is prior to and principle of subsequent acts.

Central to Lonergan’s understanding of religious conversion is the reality of love, a total, other-worldly, love of God “with all one’s heart and all one’s soul and

59. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 240.
63. Ibid., 241.
64. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 240; (see also 105-106).
all one's mind and all one's strength". In "Faith and Beliefs", Lonergan points out in his introductory remarks on religious involvement that "man's capacity for self-transcendence" becomes "achievement when one falls in love". Such a being-in-love brings about a transformation of one's horizon, one's world, one's very being, and so a transformation of the source of all one's discoveries, decisions, and deeds.

Religious conversion, involving "a changed relation to God", is in its total form, "a radical transformation" of the object, "on all levels of living, an interlocked series of changes and developments", accompanied by "a change in oneself, in one's relations to other persons, and in one's relations to God". It is a gift of God, received and accepted by the converted; and it is capable of growth. It is "transvaluation of values". Thus, it is an existential event, and a gift from God.

There remains however the task of making religious conversion effective in one's life. Lonergan here refers to the distinction between operative and cooperative grace. The former is religious conversion; the latter is the effectiveness of the conversion. Thus, man is in need of "the gradual movement towards a full and complete transformation of the whole of one's living and feeling, one's thought's, words, deeds, and omissions".

Meynell observes that religious conversion should give us the heart to put forward the effort and endure the hardship involved in undergoing, and fully implementing, the two other kinds of conversion. Kiely suggests that religious conversion is to be conceived as a beginning, in a manner analogous to the other two conversions. At any rate, the nature of the relationship between religious conversion, and moral and intellectual conversion has generated much discussion. I shall shortly be referring to their relationship.

65. Ibid., 242.
Lonergan equates religious conversion with "religious experience" and ascribes it to the action of the Holy Spirit. In Method in Theology he identifies its defining feature as the encounter with "a charged field of love, and meaning." Frederick E. Crowe points out that, as "a religious philosopher groping toward a common language for dialogue among the religions," Lonergan sought to go beyond "the Christian terms that [were] his predilection," and develop, as it were, a generic description of the religious differentiation of consciousness.

In any case, Lonergan recognizes that the state of being grasped by ultimate concern is not knowledge as such, by which he means critically reflective consciousness. Properly religious knowledge is the fruit of abstraction from the original experience. It comes to expression in the "word," which Lonergan defines as "any expression of religious meaning or religious value." "Its carrier," he explains, "may be intersubjectivity, or art, or symbol, or language, or the remembered and portrayed lives or deeds or achievements of individuals or classes or groups." Nevertheless, "since language is the vehicle in which meaning is most fully articulated, the spoken and written word are of special importance in the development and the clarification of religion." It is above all by means of the word that the religious person is able to relate himself to the religious object, i.e., to what Lonergan, too, calls "the object of ultimate concern."

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72. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 105-109, 290. See also pp. 119, 122-123, 266.
73. Ibid., 290. Lonergan appeals, for this characterization, to Olivier Rabut, L'expérience religieuse fondamentale, Casterman, Tournai 1969, 168.
74. Crowe, Appropriating the Lonergan Idea, 338.
75. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 106: "To say that this dynamic state [of being in love with God] is conscious is not to say that it is known. For consciousness is just experience, but knowledge is a compound of experience, understanding, and judging. Because the dynamic state is conscious without being known, it is an experience of mystery." See also p. 57: "As inner experience, it [religious conversion] is consciousness as distinct from self-knowledge, consciousness as distinct from any introspective process in which one inquires about inquiring, and seeks to understand what happens when one understands, and endeavours to formulate what goes on when one is formulating..." Crowe, Appropriating the Lonergan Idea, 337, n. 17.
76. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 112. The fact that religious experience comes to expression in religious traditions says nothing, of course, about the value of such expressions. Crowe, Appropriating the Lonergan Idea, 325-326. insists that Lonergan held that the Son completes the 'prior' mission of the Spirit who is at work in the non-Christian religious traditions and that, according to Lonergan, "the need of the world religions to hear the gospel message is the same need still that the world had when God sent the only Son to be its way, truth and life (Jn 14, 6)."
78. Ibid., 63.
5. The three conversions as a series of "questions"

Turning to the question of the relationship of the three conversions to each other, they may be considered first of all in an order determined by the degree of self-transcendence involved. All three kinds of conversion are modes of self-transcendence. Kiely argues that considered in this order, the three conversions appear as a series of "questions" or challenges, each of which leads on to the next.79 The sequence to be followed in this order: intellectual-moral-religious.

Intellectual conversion is a conversion towards truth attained by cognitional, self-transcendence.80 It implies a willingness to learn, to discover the truth in the light of critical reflection and to accept this truth whether it be pleasant or unpleasant, whether it concerns oneself or anything else. As has been mentioned, moral conversion is a more complete form of self-transcendence than intellectual conversion. On the frontier between intellectual and moral conversion lie judgements of value and the moral challenge that these imply. Moral conversion is a conversion towards values apprehended, affirmed, and realised by a real self-transcendence. Moral self-transcendence is more difficult than cognitive self-transcendence. It "goes beyond the value, truth, to values generally".81 Religious conversion is a conversion towards a total being-in-love as the efficacious ground of all self-transcendence, whether in the pursuit of truth, or in the realisation of human values. This grounds the will to live responsibly and to be responsible in the pursuit of truth, however difficult it may be to discover or to accept the truth.

Notwithstanding this, Lonergan proposes to conceive all three forms of self-transcendence in terms of sublation when they occur in a single consciousness.82 The three conversions are not necessarily separate events. However, it needs to be said that their interrelations can be complex. McLaughlin explains that the relation of sublation between the three conversions is important because Lonergan wants to avoid at all costs a simplistic dichotomy between the heights of speculative theology and the heights of mysticism. Thus, on the one hand, the theologian must have

81. Ibid., 241-242.
82. Lonergan explains that the notion "sublation" should be understood in a Rahnerian sense rather than in a Hegelian sense. Thus, what sublates needs the sublated, includes it, preserves all its proper features and properties, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context. Cf. Lonergan, Method in Theology, 241.
experienced this conversion to be able to evaluate the works of others. On the other hand, no mystic who is at the same time a Catholic can deny the role of reason.83

6. The three conversions in reverse order

The three conversions can also be considered in reverse order. Thus, the order would be religious-moral-intellectual. In Lonergan’s view, it is the religious conversion which is most vital, central, common, and foundational.84 The basic reality is the encounter with God as revealed in Jesus Christ, an encounter which makes a total claim on the individual. The individual’s response to this total claim, his letting himself “be seized” by the person of Christ, corresponds to Lonergan’s idea of religious conversion. Hence, without religious conversion, a sustained and enduring moral conversion is a de facto impossibility.85 Likewise without religious and moral conversion a fully developed intellectual conversion which enables an individual to arrive at a critically grounded natural knowledge of the existence of God is for all practical purposes an impossible achievement.86

At this point, a question may perhaps naturally arise. Why does Lonergan insist on making a sharp and clear-cut distinction between moral and religious conversion? In response to this question, Lonergan distinguishes between moral and religious conversion because he insists on the importance of distinguishing between nature and grace.87 Thus, while man is capable of rising to various levels of self-fulfilment or self-transcendence (it can be both cognitive and moral self-self-transcendence), he is not, however, capable of achieving total self-transcendence or religious conversion. Rather he receives this type of ultimate self-transcendence as a gift. Evidently, man is not by nature a participant in the divine nature or in the inner life of God, but only by the free gift of God’s love flooding his heart through the Spirit which is given to him.88

88. Cf. 2 Peter 1. 4 and Romans 5. 5.
Tyrrell points out that while in traditional Catholic theology, the gift of God's love flooding our hearts has been spoken of as sanctifying grace, Lonergan prefers to describe it as the dynamic state of being in love with God. It concerns a radical transformation. Thus, maintains Tyrrell, Lonergan "shifts from a metaphysical discussion of religious conversion in terms of sanctifying grace to a psychological analysis of conversion in terms of a state of being in love". Here, we are to see both approaches, the classical and that of Lonergan, as simply different ways of approaching what is basically the same reality. It must be stated, therefore, that they are in no way contradictory or mutually exclusive.

Another important dimension in Lonergan's theology of religious conversion is his articulation of faith as "the eye of love" and of the need to distinguish clearly between faith and religious belief. For Lonergan in the conversion phenomenon, it is love and not knowledge which is the heart of the matter. Thus, in the first place, what is at stake is the gift of God's love. Conversion in its first moment is a matter of God taking out the heart of stone and replacing it with the heart of flesh. Secondly, "the eye of love" or the knowledge which enables individuals to make the value judgement that it is worthwhile to believe, and then to express freely acts of belief, is born of love which is the immediate fruit of the experience of the gift of God's love. This is poured forth into our hearts by the Spirit.

For Lonergan, there exists a major exception to the general rule that knowledge precedes love. This is the gift of God's love flooding into our hearts, the dynamic state of being in love with God. To explain how the love of God, poured forth into our hearts, generates knowledge, Lonergan cites Pascal's famous aphorism: "The heart has its reasons which reason does not know". In this instance, therefore, love does not flow from knowledge, but rather knowledge flows from love. Here, the heart is the subject in love. Tyrrell explains that the reasons known to the heart are the value apprehensions which only the individual who is in love discerns. Only a lover has the experiential knowledge of what it is to be in love. "The individual whose heart is flooded with the gift of God's love experiences the fulfilment of the deepest longings of his spirit for absolute truth, goodness and value; and this experience involves a basic shift in value orientation, a transvaluation of values".

Thus far, the question of ‘priority’ of the religious conversion over the others should be highlighted. Two theologians who make a critical analysis of Lonergan’s discussion of the relationship between religious conversion, and moral and intellectual conversion are John H. McDermott and Walter Conn.92 Both of them seem to have difficulties with Lonergan’s ordering of the conversions in terms of sublation (the religious conversion sublating the moral, and the moral sublating the intellectual). Conn explains that difficulty lies in the fact that Lonergan seems to be saying two different things.

It is not easy to understand how Lonergan can assert an order of occurrence that has religious conversion preceding moral, and moral preceding intellectual, while at the same time claiming that as sublating, religious conversion needs the sublated moral and intellectual conversions, and as sublating, moral conversion needs the sublated intellectual conversion.93

The same tension in Lonergan’s theory of conversion is taken into question by John H. McDermott.

Without doubt there seem to occur intellectual and moral conversions without religious conversion, but in Lonergan’s system they are ultimately referred to religious, supernatural conversion... Those who stop short at intellectual or moral conversion have not yet completely realized the full implications of their conversions; but implicitly every authentic lower conversion involves a religious conversion.94

Conclusion

I would conclude this paper by saying that if there is any tension at all in the relationship between the different conversions, this could be called a “healthy” tension. One is in relation to the other and yet so meaningful on its own. I think that this issue can be resolved in Lonergan’s own words when he points out that these dimensions are “distinct, so that conversion can occur in one dimension

93. Ibid., 392.
without occurring in the other two, or in two dimensions without occurring in the
other one. At the same time, the three dimensions are solidary. Conversion in one
leads to conversion in the other, and relapse from one prepares for relapse from
the others ... The authentic Christian strives for the fullness of intellectual, moral
and religious conversion.”95 Perhaps, rather then questioning the order or priority
of the different conversions, we should focus our attention, with Lonergan, on the
religious commitment with its threefold quest to love, contemplate, and attain to,
the religious object.

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33-39; see also A Third Collection, 32.


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