

## THE HUMAN PERSON: A STUDY IN PARADOX

Dr. Richard Penaskovic,  
The College of St. Rose, Albany, New York 12203

The way the term, person, has been understood down through the centuries might be called a test-case for the path concepts cut through time. In ancient civilizations one looks in vain for a true concept of the person. Apart from the Christian revelation the notion of person does not even exist. Theologians in the early Church formulated a concept of the person in order to make some sense out of the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation. The more the concept of person was looked at through philosophical lens, the more theologians allowed this concept to move out of their exclusive territory. When this occurred in modern times, the notion of person became secularized.<sup>1</sup>

It is the thesis of this paper that the human person is more than can be contained in a univocal concept. The human person might best be described as a two-legged paradox. The human person has never become accustomed to the tragic miracle of consciousness.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps "his species is not set, has not jelled, but is still in a state of becoming, bound by his physical memories to a past of struggle and survival, limited in his futures by the uneasiness of thought and consciousness."<sup>3</sup>

It will be argued that the human person might best be described as a bridge or mediator between a closed and an open world, between nature and culture, instinct and reason. The attempt to come up with a satisfactory definition of the human person is not entirely pointless. Past definitions of the human person are valid building blocks to a yet to be completed integration, functioning in a similar vein to comments about God's nature and essence.<sup>4</sup>

### The Problem

There are two main traditions present in Western philosophy concern-

1. A. Guggenberger, "Person" in *HANDBUCH THEOLOGISHER GRUNDBEGRIFFE* II ed. by H. Fries (Munich: Koesel Verlag, 1963) p. 295.
2. J. Steinbeck, *SEA OF CORTEZ: A Leisurely Journal of Travel and Research* (New York: Viking Press, 1941) p. 96.
3. J. Steinbeck, *SEA OF CORTEZ*, p. 96.
4. H. Urs von Balthasar, *THEODRAMATIK II: Die Personen des Spiels* (Einsiedeln, Switzerland: Johannes Verlag, 1976) p. 316.

ing the human person. The first may be called the individualistic tradition. This finds its main proponent in Boethius who defined person as "*rationalis naturae individua substantia*."<sup>5</sup> Such a definition has a twofold thrust; rational individuality and subsistence. Some scholars wonder whether it suffices to approach the human person from the vantage-point of *ousia*.<sup>6</sup> Correspondingly, such an approach to an understanding of person seems quite static, i.e., excludes becoming. Such a view of the person may have sufficed in the early Middle Ages, however, the contemporary philosophical scene puts a premium on the person as process, as project, as task and as becoming.<sup>7</sup>

The second main approach to an understanding of the human person may be called the relational view. Most personalist and existentialist philosophers understand the human person relationally. One finds such a view of the person in such men as M. Buber, G. Marcel, R. Guardini, K. Jaspers, J. Macmurray, E. Mounier, R. La Senne, M. Nédoncelle, P. Wust, and Th. Haecker. This understanding of the human person has its roots in the christology of the early Church. St. Augustine, for example, understood the trinitarian persons relationally.

This approach finds its clearest spokesman in Richard of St. Victor, who understood one's relationship to God as constituting the human person. Richard of St. Victor defines person in this way: "*Persona est rationalis naturae incommunicabilis et singularis existentia*."<sup>8</sup> Richard of St. Victor's definition substitutes *incommunicabilis* and *singularis existentia* for the *individua substantia* of Boethius. Richard believed that the definition of Boethius was valid only for created persons. By using the term, *existentia*, Richard felt that he had a concept which was wide enough to encompass the person of God, the angels and the human person.<sup>9</sup>

John Duns Scotus seconded the view of Richard of St. Victor in regard to the human person. For Scotus human beings are persons precisely through their orientation to God. Scotus believed that the human person could stand in relationship to God in two ways: in prayerful openness to God or as standing alone apart from God. The latter move has the character of

5. Boethius, *LIBER DE PERSONA ET DUABUS NATURIS CONTRA EUTYCHEN ET NESTORUM*, PL 64, 134 BC.

6. J. D. Zizioulas, "Human capacity and human incapacity: a theological exploration" *SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY* 28 (1976) p. 403.

7. M. Heidegger, *SEIN UND ZEIT* (Tuebingen: M. Niemeyer Verlag, 1949) pp. 145ff. See G. Allbright, "The Person in the Thought of Jose Ortega y Gasset," *INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY* 15 (1975) pp. 279-292 and A. Tallon, "Person and Community: Buber's Category of the Between," *PHILOSOPHY TODAY* 17 (91973) pp. 62-82.

8. Richard of St. Victor, *DE TRINITATE* 4,21; PL 196, 945 A as cited by H. Muehlen, *DER HEILIGE GEIST ALS PERSON* (Muenster: Verlag Aschendorff, 1967) p. 37, footn. 2.

9. H. Meuhlen, *DER HEILIGE GEIST ALS PERSON*, p. 37.

sinfulness, although Scotus never called it such.

Philosophers in the Middle Ages, particularly Aquinas and Scotus, believed that it was impossible to come up with a satisfactory definition of the human person. The human person might best be termed an analogy or a paradox. There are at least three ways of considering the paradox that is the human person: as body and spirit, as man and woman, as individual and community. Reflection on these three polarities does not solve the riddle of the human person. In point of fact, they make the puzzle more profound and penetrating. In each of these three dimensions the human person continuously runs between the two poles in search of rest and completion, but in such a way that he/she is ordained to transcend the poles.<sup>10</sup>

### Body and Spirit (*Geist*)

It is important to distinguish the human body (*Leib*) from other, non-human bodies (*Koerper*). The human body is part and parcel of the self as experienced, whereas non-human bodies and things are regarded by the self as foreign objects. This understanding of the human body goes back to Max Scheler who regards the human body as being prior to the distinction between physical and psychical.

Soul and body refer to two entirely human principles of the one human being (*Seienden*). Body is not the same as matter. Body may be described as matter informed by spirit, whereas soul (*Seele*) should not be identified with spirit (*Geist*). Soul may be called spirit informing matter. What is paradoxical about the human person is this: that the human soul is not a pure spirit independent of matter, but the finite and the human spirit is constituted in its intellectual/spiritual qualities (*Geistigkeit*) through its bodyliness.<sup>11</sup>

The human person, then, may be regarded as the synthesis of two, otherwise not to be united, kingdoms, nature and spirit, matter (*matière*) and thought (*pensée*). For this reason the human person may be called a compendium of the world, the measure of all things, the world-sphinx.<sup>12</sup> The human person mediates between the lower and the higher worlds, the world of the senses and the intellectual or intelligible world. The human person forms the border or limit (*methorion*) around two realities, the one being material, bodily, without reason, the other incorporeal and intelligible.

The paradox that is the human person finds expression even in the Stoics who distinguished between life according to nature and the renunciation of human passions. Aristotle has as his moral ideal the ruling of the passions, yet even Aristotle must concede the fact that humans are

10. H. Urs von Balthasar, *THEODRAMTIK II*, p. 325.

11. F. P. Fiorenz, J. B. Metz, "Der Mensch als Einheit von Leib and Seele" in *MYSTERIUM SALUTIS II: Die Heilsgeschichte Vor Christus*, ed. by J. Feiner *et al* (Einsiedeln, Switzerland: Benziger Verlag, 1967) p. 621.

12. H. Urs von Balthasar, *THEODRAMTIK II*, p. 327, footn. 3.

evil, undisciplined, yes animals. In *Genesis* mankind is made from the slime of the earth while simultaneously coming forth from the hand of God. Paul continues the paradox by pitting spirit and flesh in war against each other in Romans 7:23.

The human person guards the border between brute, animal life and the intelligible, divine world. Apropos of this Peter Lombard writes "*homo quasi in medio collocatus, habet supra se Deum, sub se mundum.*"<sup>13</sup> Ficino has a similar view. He says, "If man connects the higher and the lower nature as its bond, he desires both. Therefore by a certain natural instinct he ascends to the higher, descends to the lower. And while he ascends, he does not desert the lower, and when he descends, he does not leave the sublime."<sup>14</sup>

Even Pascal admits the paradoxical nature of the human person. "There is internal war in man between reason and the passions. If he had only reason without passions ... If he had only passions without reason ... But having both, he cannot be without strife, being unable to be at peace with the one without being at war with the other. Thus he is always divided against, and opposed to himself."<sup>15</sup> Pascal adds that this twofold nature of man is so evident that some have thought that we had two souls.

It should be pointed out that dualism does not exist merely between spirit and matter. Dualism is found right in spirit or *Geist* which for its own proper activity, namely, reflexion, needs the body/soul foundation while, at the same time, transcending it. In every act of the human person from digging a ditch to mystic contemplation we have a remarkable *conspiratio* or working together of spirit and matter, soul and body.

Teilhard de Chardin, using the creation account in *Genesis* and the thought of Aquinas as his points of departure, sees the human person as a bridge between two shores, matter and spirit. Chardin distinguishes between the outer face of things (*matière*) and the inner face of things (*pensée*), the "without" of things and the "within". For Chardin tangential energy acts on the outside of things. Scientists look upon the growth of the universe as a sequence of combinations: atoms forming molecules, molecules forming cells, cells forming plants and animals. On the other hand, we have consciousness or the "within" of things, which one finds in the lowest forms of inorganic matter. Operating on the inside, on consciousness we have radial or spiritual energy, separated from, but related to, tangential energy. Chardin formulated the Law of Complexity-Consciousness, which states that complexity increases on the outside until stopped by the loss of tangential energy. But, on the inside, radial energy drives the organism toward higher

13. P. P. Lombardus, II SENT. 1,7 as cited by H. Urs von Balthasar, THEODRAMATIK II, p. 330, footn. 15.

14. M. Ficino, THEOLOGIA PLATONICA III, 2 (Opp 1576, I, 1, 119) as cited by H. Urs von Balthasar, THEODRAMATIK II, p. 331.

15. B. Pascal, PENSEES, trans. by W.F. Trotter (New York: E.P. Dutton & CO., Inc., 1958) p. 109.

levels of both complexity and consciousness. In the evolution of animals, complexity-consciousness reached the level of instinct and awareness, while in man, the level of thought.<sup>16</sup>

The paradox of the human person means that, spatially, the universe encompasses and swallows me up like an atom, yet "by thought I comprehend the world."<sup>17</sup> Neither one of the poles, spirit nor body, has the upper hand; both form *unum ens*. The one-sided Platonic understanding of the person as a soul who uses a body must be corrected by the Aristotelian emphasis on the *meson* or *aurea mediocritas*, the golden mean.

### Man and Woman

The polarities and tensions between spirit and body repeat themselves and become even more profound when speaking about the sexual differentiation of the human person into man and woman. The polarity between man and woman anticipates the third tension, that between individual and community, since the man/woman relationship serves as a model for the orientation of the human person to community.

Man and woman are simply two poles of a single reality, two different representations of a single being, two *entia* in a single *esse*, an existence in two lives. In no way are man and woman two different parts of a whole which one puts together later on much like a puzzle. The human person, then, is a "dual unity". What we have are two different, but inseparable realities. Both man and woman are ordained to a final, unfathomable unity.<sup>18</sup> In this context we are dealing not so much with a problem capable of resolution, but with a profound mystery.

Metaphysicians in all cultures have seen the polarity between man and woman as the basic rhythm of life.<sup>19</sup> This polarity may be seen most clearly in the relationship between heaven and earth. Heaven is seen as fruitful, invigorating the earth by means of the sun and rain, whereas the earth, as the passive principle, answers by reason of its own power and potential, *materia-mater*.

Assuredly, we have here a real danger, that of identifying the heavenly/masculine sphere with spirit and the earthly/feminine sphere with matter or with nature. Thus we have the subordination of the earthly/feminine to the heavenly/masculine. Such a tendency may be seen in Plato's *Timaeus*, Aristotle's *Physics*, (Aristotle looks upon woman as matter and as an object to be used), and from there to the anti-woman statements in the patristic period and well on into the Middle Ages.<sup>20</sup>

16. T. de Chardin, *THE PHENOMENON OF MAN*, trans. by B. Wall (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961) pp. 300-302.

17. B. Pascal, *PENSEES*, p. 97.

18. H. Urs von Balthasar, *THEODRAMATIK II*, p. 335.

19. *ibid.*, p. 336.

20. *ibid.*, p. 336.

St. Augustine, for example, believes that in relation to man Eve stands for body vis-à-vis male spirit. Augustine defines only the male as alone the full image of God. Woman, in herself, is not this image, but only when taken together with the male, her "head". In short, for Augustine and many of the Church Fathers, male: female — spirit: flesh.

In accord with Aristotelian hylemorphism, Aquinas looks upon the human person as composite of body and soul, in contradistinction to the platonized patristic anthropology that sees the human being as a soul imprisoned in the materiality of the flesh. This more integrated view of the body/soul relationship made possible for Thomas an escape from the patristic dualism that identified the male with spirit, and the female polarity with the earthward drag of the body.<sup>21</sup> In a word, Thomas gives a positive valuation to the body. Aquinas believes that the body has an excellence with respect to its end as long as it serves that end. This view might have helped overcome the patristic pessimism about women, sex and the body except for the fact that Aquinas followed Aristotle and the Church Fathers in their intellectualist definition of *homo*, so that the body-denying dualism and its associated androcentrism were reinvigorated.<sup>22</sup> Aquinas did this by saying that the final fulfillment or end of the human person, viz., life with God, is achieved by the operation of the rational soul. Thus, ultimately, the body is left out once again.<sup>23</sup>

It would appear that no metaphysical polarity can claim to be the final answer for an understanding of the difference between the sexes. Chinese philosophers, perhaps even as early as 1000 B.C. distinguished two interacting energy-modes within every natural object. These energy-modes or principles were called the *yang* and the *yin*, the former masculine in character, the latter feminine. Men and women, not less than inanimate things, were seen as the product of the interaction in varying degrees of the *yang* and the *yin*. They manifest differing proportions of the qualities of each activity-mode. Not even the Chinese philosophers were able to achieve a perfect balance between these two principles. Men were thought to be heavenly, that is, predominantly *yang* and of great worth, whereas women were reckoned to be earthly, i.e., predominantly *yin* and of less account. Speaking, then, about the sexual differentiation of the human person into man and woman we again are up against the paradox that is the human person.

21. E.C. Mc Laughlin, "Equality of Souls, Inequality of Sexes: Woman in Medieval Theology" in *RELIGION AND SEXISM*, ed by R.R. Ruether (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974) p. 216.

22. *ibid.*, p. 217.

23. *ibid.*, p. 217.

24. J.B. Noss, *MAN'S RELIGIONS* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., 1974) pp. 242ff.

### Individual and Community

A certain polarity or tension exists between the individual and the community. At one time concern for the total salvation of the individual appears to predominate, while at another time the salvation and well-being of the community seems to be the central task, even though the latter task can only be attained by means of the salvation or well-being of each individual.

Pre-Christian thought looked upon both poles as a whole. The tension was especially felt where an individual failed to stay in his community or in cases where he was, for one reason or another, ostracized. The individual, so ostracized, lost his footing in society and only the precarious right of the "sanctuary" could, in certain circumstances, save him.<sup>25</sup> The individual, stripped of community, lived a precarious existence. In order for the individual to live and to grow, some community or other had to put a mantle around his nakedness. Only the slaves without rights, or those tolerated in some way because they were used, those who imperfectly integrated into society, could live on the edge of the community.

How does the individual escape the prison of his/her own individuality? By insertion into a community, be it the city, state or country, the individual escapes the prison of his/her own self. Even among primitive peoples this insertion into the community occurs only at a price. Certain limits are placed on the individual's freedom. The *bonum commune* takes precedence over one's own good as an individual.

By insertion into the community the individual takes on certain obligations and has certain rights. Insofar as the community lives and is nourished within the eternal law (*theios nomos*), which far surpasses the boundaries of a single community, the individual comes to share in this too. Does anyone act as the mediator between divine and human laws or rights within the community? Yes, in the pre-Christian world at least, special individuals possess authority and represent the established order before the gods. The founder, the hero, the king become mediators between two worlds, two laws, two rights, divine and human. In such individuals alone do we find individuality represented in its fullness. These special individuals represent the community before God and God before the community. These special individuals may be called corporative persons. Such corporative persons are not abstractions from the idea of a single individual, nor simply the exponent of a body-politic independent of themselves, but are its essential incarnation, one in which every single individual is present.<sup>26</sup>

In community the individual *qua* individual feels at home. However much the individual questions the concrete conditions and situation of a city or country, he/she does not question the notion of a city or a country as such. The milieu or area of a city or country inserts the individual into the sphere of the divine. In primitive cultures, as in all developed cultures,

25. H. Urs von Balthasar, THEODRAMATIK II, p. 352.

26. *ibid.*, p. 354.

the center of the city or of the kingdom coincided with the center of the world. As Mircea Eliade shows using numerous examples, the axis-point between heaven and hell went clear through this center. If the establishment of a city meant inserting oneself into a new community, it was thought to be connected with the establishment of the world by the gods themselves. To settle in a territory, to build a house implied, both for the individual and for the community, that one make an important and even vital decision.<sup>27</sup> By creating the environment in which one would live, one imitated the gods who created the world. The world means "ordered multiplicity", community, apart from which the individual could not even imagine him/herself. Thus individuals understood themselves primarily and without question as members of a family, a group, a city, a country, all of which were thought to be at the very center of the world: the family, group, city or country to which I belong were not simply communities parallel to other communities, but were thought to be *the* community in relationship to which all other communities were on the fringe.<sup>28</sup>

In what way is the relationship between the individual and the community paradoxical? The word, individual, comes from the Greek, *a-tomon* and means in-divisible. The human person is in-divisible inasmuch as the human person is self-conscious and free. That is to say that there is something unique to every human, a uniqueness which excludes commonality. To be a person means to share in common what other persons have while, at the same time, excluding what others have. This statement, however paradoxical, is true despite the fact that persons (as centers of freedom and self-consciousness which exclude each other) can know each other and communicate with each other.

Apart from the community the individual falls prey to loneliness. Loneliness might be described as a kind of exhilarating deprivation. The lonely person is deprived of wordly relations, but is surfeited with the experience of the self. Loneliness may be called that event which invites our inward voice to discuss, but ultimately, nothing can be said. Loneliness constantly outmaneuvers the individual being here, there and nowhere.<sup>29</sup> How does loneliness arise? It wells up from our autobiographical narration. As we lie sick in bed what is lonely is our narrative to ourselves of our being there cut off from the community of our friends.

Is it possible for the individual to free him/herself from that narrating voice within, which places one as the main character in one's autobiographical adventure? No, the self always has as its travelling companion the story of how it is alone. In reflecting on one's loneliness, the individual can always give it a name, a place, a narrative. In a word, loneliness means lonely narration. One cannot touch, evoke, or call forth the story-less me.

27. *ibid.*, p. 351.

28. *ibid.*, p. 351.

29. A La Branche, "Autobiographical Loneliness" *PHILOSOPHY TODAY* 19 (1973) p. 188.

The self may be billed as the main performer in the drama one narrates mentally. Far from being a virus that may be filtered out of one's experience loneliness is part of the narrative self which the individual weaves thick and fast.<sup>30</sup>

One may illustrate the polarity which exists between the individual and the community by an analysis of language. However, such a task falls outside the scope of this paper. An analysis of language would show that while, on the one hand, language expresses that which individuals share in common (for example, words having specific and agreed upon meanings), still, at the same time, language functions as a creative expression of one's unique individuality.<sup>31</sup>

### Conclusion

The human person eludes every attempt to be boxed into categories or to be encompassed within the limits of a definition. For this reason the definition of person proposed by Boethius and the relational understanding of person are inadequate. The human person is essentially a paradox or an analogy and is therefore undefinable.

An analogy may be drawn between the human person and the cosmos. Human persons exist in the world (because the cosmic powers are amalgamated within the person), yet the human person transcends the world (insofar as the person represents God to the rest of creation). This inner-cosmic analogy is grounded in the analogy between God who is represented by the human person and the person who represents God. God as the original copy (*Bild*) can clearly be seen in the human person as the image of God (*Abbild*). However, this occurs in such a way that God remains Creator and the human person created, i.e., God transcends the human person in a yet greater dissimilar way. To the extent that the human person is an analogy or a paradox, to that extent does the human person approach God of whom we can only say what He is not. "*Si comprehendis, non est Deus.*"<sup>32</sup>

It may well be the case that philosophical reflection can take us only so far in understanding the meaning of person. It seems to be true, at least on the theological level, that the paradox of the person is continued and even intensified when speaking of the divine persons, three persons in one God or the union of the divine and human nature in the person of Christ. If this be true, then this paper should be understood as clearing the forest to build a house, philosophy at the service of theology.

30 *ibid.*, p. 192.

31. H.G. Gadamer, WAHRHEIT UND METHODE (2d ed.; Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr Verlag, 1964) pp. 361-465.

32. E. Przywara, MENSCH: Typologische Anthropologie I (Nuernberg: Glock und Lutz, 1958) pp. 116ff.

# THE NATURE OF "IBLĪS" IN THE QUR'AN AS INTERPRETED BY THE COMMENTATORS

Fr. Edmund Teuma, O.F.M. Conv.

In this study we shall see what some of the classical Muslim exegetes of the Qur'ân say about the Devil (*Iblīs*) as he is figured out in the *Holy Book of Islām*.

## Philological derivation of name "Iblīs"

Among the six commentaries consulted only two venture to speak about the philological derivation of the name "*Iblīs*": *Tabarī* explaining Q. 2,34; and *Alūsī* also explaining the same verse. From an overall glance at what is said by these two authors one comes to know that two are the current opinions circulating among the '*ulamā*' regarding the genesis of this proper noun. One of them retains that the noun is purely Arabic, while the other holds it to be of a non-Arabian origin.

*Tabarī* gives his own personal attempt. According to him *Iblīs* is shaped on *if'īl* from *iblās*, meaning: *desperation, giving up hope, remorse, grief*. In support of his theory *Tabarī* reports two *ḥadīth* narrations, one of which comes from *Ibn 'Abbās*:

— God caused *Iblīs* to despair in way of every blessing, and he made him a damned devil for punishment for his disobedience. From the other *ḥadīth* we come to know that originally, before his transformation, *Iblīs* was called *al-Hārith*.

But although *Tabarī* seems to interpose his own theory in the realms of orthodoxy, he does not make a mystery out of the foreign characteristics manifest in the word "*Iblīs*". Answering one of the gravest objections raised against his opinion, the fact that the noun is diptote, he said that once "*Iblīs*" is a noun with no parallel to it among Arabic nouns, the Arabs felt tempted to compare it with other loan nouns, which are generally diptotes. This gained for it a place among the nouns of the second declension, a place normally occupied by proper nouns of foreign derivation. According to *Tabarī* similar cases to this are: *Ishāq* (Isaac) and *Ayūb* (Job).

*Alūsī* speaks in the first place about "*Iblīs*" being a loan word, diptote for two reasons: (a) because it is foreign, and (b) a proper noun built on the *fi'līl* form. This he retains to be the more plausible theory. But he also reports the other option expounding it like *Tabarī*, with the difference that he gives *mif'īl* for paradigm instead of *if'īl*. He then raises an objection about its being a diptote, once one admits its pure derivation and once it is clear that there are parallels to it in the language which are regular triptotes, such as: *ihlīl* and *iklīl*. Like *Tabarī*, *Alūsī* tries to solve the problem by presuming the fact that "*Iblīs*" was compared to words of foreign deriv-

ation, owing to the fact that the noun is never used in Arabic except with reference to the Devil.

Apart from the commentaries, *Jeffery's Foreign Vocabulary of the Qur'ân* was also consulted. Under "*Iblis*" the author gives the two tendencies already mentioned current among Muslim scholars, but he retains that the non-Arabic derivation of the noun is sustained by the more acute philologists among whom *Nawawî* and *Zamaksharî*. Among the few Western scholars who promote the Arabian origin of the word Jeffery mentions *Pautz* and *Eickman*, but the overwhelming majority of these scholars recognise that *Iblis* is a corruption of Greek: *diábolos*. The author says that when compared to its Hebrew equivalent: *satan*, *Iblis* has merely the connotation of "*the adversary*", while in the New Testament and in other Christian literature the same word acquires the connotation of "*the chief of the hosts of evil.*" Now, Qur'anic "*Iblis*" corresponds exactly to this latter connotation. This would justify, according to Jeffery, the search for a Christian origin of the word. He then discusses three possible Christian sources which might have passed on the word to *Muhammad*. He reports a Syriac transliteration of *diábolos* which might have dropped initial "*dolat*" (letter d) in passing on to Arabic and donned a new vocalic sequence to become: "*Iblis*". He also mentions the possibility that the word might have been introduced directly from the Greek through Arabic-speaking Christians belonging to the Byzantine Church. Finally the author discusses *Grimme's* theory which suggests that "*Iblis*" might have come from Southern Arabia through Ethiopic, an opinion which Jeffery judges very far-fetched.

### Qur'anic texts

Before examining the material we have in hand regarding the nature of *Iblis* as presented in the Qur'ân, we should say immediately that the '*ulamâ*' are divided into two global factions when pronouncing their opinions about *Iblis*. Some say that originally he was an angel of immense beauty who was then transformed by God into a damned devil after his act of disobedience. This theory is held by many Muslim scholars. Others, especially the *Mu'tazilites*, claim that *Iblis* was never an angel but a *jinnî*.

The name "*Iblis*" is mentioned in the Qur'ân 11 times: in Q. 2,34; 7,11; 15,31; 15,32; 17,61; 18,50; 20,116; 26,95; 34,20; 38,74; and 38,75. Of all these texts only two hit directly our interest, the principal of which being Q. 18,50 and complementary to it Q. 2,34. We shall here look into the two verses in their English interpretation as rendered by *Arthur J. Arberry*.

- And when We said to the angels, 'Bow yourselves to Adam'; so they bowed themselves, save Iblis; he was of the jinn, and committed ungodliness against his Lord's command. What, and do you take him and his seed to be your friends, apart from Me, and they an enemy to you? How evil is that exchange for the evildoers! (Q. 18,50).
- And when We said to the angels, 'Bow yourselves to Adam'; so

they bowed themselves, save Iblis; he refused and waxed proud, and so he became one of the unbelievers. (Q. 2,34).

### Iblis an angel

#### 1) *Tabarî*

The major arguments reported by *Tabarî* favouring the angelic nature of *Iblis* are three, even though they are then presented in variegated *hadith* narrations. *Tabarî's* major informant in this problem is *Ibn 'Abbâs*, although in one instance he advances a narration which seems to expound contrary ideas to those he elsewhere retains.

#### a) *Iblis came from a tribe of angels called "Jinn":*

— From *Ibn 'Abbâs*: *Iblis* was from a tribe of angels called the "Jinn". They were created from the flaming fire (*min nâr alsamûm*) from among the angels. His name was *al-Hârith*. He was one of the treasurers of paradise. The angels not of this tribe were created from light (*nûr*). The *jinn* that are recorded in the Qur'an were created from a smokeless fire (*min mârij min nâr*) i.e. from fire tongues which are in the extremities of fire when it flares up.

In another *hadith* the same *Ibn 'Abbâs* says that *Iblis* was an angel of the earth, coming from a tribe called *Jinn*, and his name was then *'Azâzil*.

#### b) *Iblis was head of the treasurers of paradise; he is called "jinnî" in relation to "janna" (paradise):*

— From *Qatâda* reporting *Ibn 'Abbâs*: He was over the treasurers of the lowest heaven (*al-samâ' al-dunyâ*).

— From *Ibn 'Abbâs*: *Iblis* was among the most noble of angels and came from their most noble tribe. He was a treasurer of paradise, and he enjoyed power over the lowest heaven and over the earth. He used to behave in accordance to God's will. But he saw that with that he acquired nobility and greatness over the people of heaven, and because of this, pride conquered his heart, a fact no one knew but God. So when the prostration problem cropped up, i.e. when God ordered him to bow himself before Adam, God made his pride manifest and cursed him and made him fall down until judgement day. The words: "he was of the jinn" (*kâna min al-jinn*: Q. 18,5) indicate rather his relationship with heaven (*janna*), for he was a treasurer therein. Just as a man is called *Makkî* (from Mekka), *Madanî* (from Medina), *Kûfî* (from Kûfa), or *Basrî* (from Basra).

c) *Iblīs* was head of the angels of the lowest heaven (*al-samā' al-dunyā*):

- *Ibn Mas'ūd* from some companions of the Prophet: *Iblīs* was set over the dominion of the lowest heaven, and he came from a tribe of angels called *Jinn*...
- *From Sa 'id b. al-Musib*: *Iblīs* was the leader of the angels of the lowest heaven.

There are many other *ḥadīth* narrations reported by *Tabarī* both under Q. 18,50 and Q. 2,34, only six of which are contrary to *Iblīs* being an angel. The following *ḥadīth* tries to give the philological explanation of root *J N N*. We are citing it because of its originality in sustaining *Iblīs*, angelic nature through philological and historical arguments:

- *From Muḥammad b. Ishāq*: The Arabs say the *jinn* are nothing else but all those creatures that are hidden and are not seen (invisible beings). As to the words: "except *Iblīs*, he was of the *jinn*" (Q. 18,50) they mean he was an angel, and that is because angels are hidden and are not seen. God, great be his praise, said: "And they set up a relationship between Him and the *jinn*..." (Q. 37,158). That refers to the saying of the *Quraysh*: the angels are God's daughters. But God says: If they were my daughters, *Iblīs* would also be such, so that they set up between me, *Iblīs*, and his seed a relationship. *Al-A 'shā*, mentioning Solomon and what God conceded him, said:

... And he subjected nine *jinn* of the angels, erect before him serving him without payment. (Cfr. Q. 27,17; 38,36-38). He said: The Arabs insisted upon the fact that the *jinn* are all the invisible creatures. God did not call the *jinn* by this name except for the fact that they are hidden and not seen, and He did not call the children of Adam "ins" except for the fact that they are seen and not hidden. So what is visible is "ins" (mankind), and what is invisible is "jinn" (any spirit).

## 2) *Rāzī*

Under Q. 18,50 *Rāzī* reports briefly the opinions in favour of *Iblīs*' angelic nature. The arguments are essentially the same as those more abundantly illustrated by *Tabarī*. The only new element to be found in this author is that which puts *Iblīs* among a more specific category of heavenly treasurers: *the Jewellers of Paradise*.

- *Sa 'id b. Jubayr* says that he (*Iblīs*) came from among the gardeners who work in the gardens (paradise), a tribe of angels who invent the embellishments (jewels) of the people of paradise since they were created.

Under Q. 2,34 *Rāzī* is more prolific, but unfortunately it is here that the author renders himself confusingly unclear. In this part of his *tafsīr*, *Rāzī* gives a whole account of the polemic contended between the 'ulamā' on the ever discussible point of *Iblīs*' existential status. Strangely enough,

in his exposition the author sometimes does not distinguish between the different contrary opinions which he advances from various sources, neither does he seem to be always clear as to which opinions he is accepting and which he is confuting. So that the one who ventures to study Râzi's text is faced with the grave difficulty of interpreting objectively what has been written.

Among the objections brought against *Iblis* being a *jinnî* we find questions like: why should it be unfitting that he is called *jinnî* because of his relationship with paradise (*janna*)? And: why should it be unfitting that he was transformed from a magnificent angel to a damned devil? If this is befitting and possible, it would translate "*kâna min al-jinn*" of Q. 18,50 by "*he became a jinnî/one of the jinn*", and not by "*he was of the jinn*". Now this would make Q. 18,50 parallel to Q. 2,34 where of *Iblis* it is affirmed: "*kâna min al-kâfirîn*" which Arberry translates: "*he became one of the unbelievers*".

But according to Râzi the two principal arguments sustained by those in favour of *Iblis* being an angel are the following:-

- a) The exception "*illâ Iblis*" of Q. 18,50; 2,34 cannot be an interrupted exception (*istithnâ' munqati'*), but it is an uninterrupted exception (*istithnâ' muttasil*) and avails the expulsion of him who intervened contrary to God's will and, at the same time, it stresses his being one of the angels. Other parallels to this sort of exception would be: Q. 43,26; 4,29; 4,92.
- b) Once it is established that *Iblis* was with the angels when they were ordered to bow themselves before Adam, and once it is equally established that he was punished for disobeying, it follows that he should have been an angel for God's speech was exclusively addressed to the angels. Proving this there is God's question to *Iblis* after his disobedience: "What prevented you not to prostrate yourself when I commanded you?" (Q. 7,12).

### 3) *Baydâwî*

*Baydâwî* is very generic under Q. 18,50. But under Q. 2,34 he treats the problem more profoundly, citing authorities and making his own much of the material which promotes *Iblis*' angelic essence.

The author interprets the sentence in Q. 18,50 "... *save Iblis; he was of the jinn*" saying that *Iblis* was a *jinnî* with regards to his action, but an angel with regards to his quality (essence). But to stress the opinion that the *jinn*, in this case, are nothing but angels, the author reports a *hadith* from *Ibn 'Abbâs* narrating that there exists a variety of angels that multiply by generation and these are called "*jinn*"; *Iblis* was one of them. This would answer an objection from the opposite side claiming that *Iblis* has seed and offspring while the angels have not. *Baydâwî* makes it clear that both Q. 18,50 and Q. 2,34 refer to at least two factions of angels

gathered together before God and Adam: the *jinn*, which constitute a tribe of angels on their own; and the other angels. So that the verb "*fa-sajadū*" (so they bowed themselves) refers to all the angels who were present and were ordered prostration. The sentence therefore may be interpreted thus: "and the ones who were ordered prostration bowed themselves, except Iblis."

But if we retain that *Iblis* was an angel, how could he disobey, once it is known that angels are impeccable? *Baydāwī* answers: angels are not impeccable, even though the majority of them is. It is the same thing when it is said that mankind is faultless but the major part of mankind is not. In other words, the author thinks that there is a species of angels that does not differ in essence from devils, but it differs from them in accidents as in godliness and ungodliness, which are two qualities proper to mankind and *jinn*. So *Iblis* was an inferior type of angel. This opinion is corroborated by the authority of *Ibn 'Abbās*. According to *Baydāwī* this merely accidental difference between *jinn* and angels is manifest in the narration of their creation reported in a *ḥadīth* from *'A'isha* which says that the angels were created from light and the *jinn* from a smokeless fire. The author explains how light and fire are one in essence but different as regards to accidents.

#### 4) *Alūsī*

*Alūsī* is abundant in explanations and evidences both when he treats Q. 18,50 and Q. 2,34. Under Q. 18,50 he lists three groupings of *ḥadīth* which promote *Iblis'* angelic essence from which we shall extract only some original elements which are not repeated elsewhere.

- From *Ibn 'Abbās*: He was the noblest of angels... He was a treasurer of paradise... and he owned the congestion of the two seas (*majma' al-baḥrayn*) — the sea of Byzantium and the sea of Persia...
- Reported by *Abū al-Shaykh* from *Qatāda* about the meaning of his being a *jinnī*: He hid from submissiveness to God, i.e. he hid and refused.

In this part of *Alūsī's* commentary we find some important affirmations regarding the question of the impeccability of angels:

- *Qādī 'Iyād* records that a group of thinkers believe in the impeccability of those angels who are messengers and *muqarrabūn*, but they do not say anything about the impeccability of other categories of angels. So he who claims that *Iblis* was an angel would not rid himself of opposition except in the case that he retains that *Iblis* was not one of the *muqarrabūn* (or one of the messengers).
- Some *Sūfī* believe that the angels of earth were not impeccable and that *Iblis* was one of them.

Under Q. 2,34 *Alūsī* affirms that the great majority of the '*ulamā'* among the companions of the Prophet and their followers hold the opinion that *Iblis* was an angel. They draw their conclusions from the obvious

exception "*illâ Iblîsa*" (except *Iblîs*) which is stressed by the following clause: "*kâna min al-jinn*" (he was of the *jinn*). They also come out with the idea that if *Iblîs* was one of them, then he was their leader, so that he was not unpopular among them.

Explaining the disobedience of *Iblîs* as confronted with the impeccability of angels, *Alûsî* gives two possibilities. The first one is similar to that given by *Baydâwî*, the second one is original:

- ... Or because God most high deprived *Iblîs* from the angelic qualities and made him wear the satanic qualities, so that following this, he disobeyed. But an angel, as long as he remains an angel, does not disobey.

Commenting on the elements from which the angels are said to have been created, *Alûsî* says that although the major current agrees with 'A'ishâ's *ḥadīth* which affirms that angels were created from light, there are nevertheless other traditions narrating the creation of angels from fire, from ice, and from other contrasting elements. The author then gives a *ḥadīth* without *isnâd* (chain of authorities) which, owing to its curiosity, is not to be passed over:

- It is narrated that under the throne there is a river, and when Gabriel bathes in it and shudders, an angel is created from each drop of water emitted by him.

At this point the author passes on to discuss the grammatical implications of the exception employed in both verses: "*illâ Iblîsa*". He explains that an interrupted exception is produced when a thing is excepted from other things not of the same genre, while the contrary for an uninterrupted exception. In our case, if we consider "*illâ Iblîsa*" an uninterrupted exception it will follow that *Iblîs* was an angel, if on the contrary, we consider it an interrupted exception, then *Iblîs* would not be an angel. *Alûsî* seems to imply an accusation of a-priori judgement against those who hold the second position. He says: "they consider unnatural its uninterruptedness to hold the second opinion."

*Alûsî* concludes his *tafsîr* on this subject abiding by the unorthodox theory of the *pre-existence of Muḥammad*. He says that after all the totality of created beings is created from the *Muḥannadan essence*. But one has to distinguish in what way this is done. Tradition explains: heavenly angels were created from him (*Muḥammad*) with regard to beauty (*jamâl*), while *Iblîs* was created from him with regard to sublimity (*jalâla*)... God most high does what He wants... and there is no way to altering it. This is marked by the fact that God called him *Iblîs* after his fall, while before his name was 'Azâzil or *al-Hârith* and his *kunya*: *Abû Marra*.

##### 5) 'Abduh — Ridâ

The authors of *Tafsîr al-Manâr* are very short and sweet. In Q. 2,34 *Iblîs* is an individual angel, while *sûrat al-Khaf* (18,50) indicates that he is a *jinnî*. This is no contradiction at all, for — say 'Abduh and Ridâ — we

have nothing to show that there is a substantial difference between angels and *jinn*, but rather a difference of species. The *jinn* are a class of angels. In fact the word *jinnā* is applied in the Qur'an to angels both in Q. 37,158 and in *sūrat al-nās* (Q. 114,6).

### Iblīs a jinnī

#### 1) *Tabarī*

We have seen that the major part of the *ḥadīth* narrations reported by *Tabarī* promote the supposition that *Iblīs* is an angel transformed into a devil. In fact under Q. 18,50 only two very short *ḥadīth* narrations are to be found in favour of his *jinnī* nature.

- From *al-Hasan*: *Iblīs* was never an angel; he is indeed the origin of the *jinn* just as Adam is the origin of mankind.
- From *Shahr b. Hawshab*: *Iblīs* was of the *jinn* whom the angels drove away, but some angels captured him and carried him to heaven.

Under Q. 2,34 two *ḥadīth* narrations opt for *Iblīs* being a *jinnī*. But one of these remains somewhat ambiguous. The following *ḥadīth* reported from *Sa 'd B. Mas 'ūd* begins just like the above from *Shahr b. Hawshab* but then it continues:

- ... He was with the angels and with them he devoted himself to the service of God. But when they were ordered to prostrate themselves before Adam, they did so and *Iblīs* refused. That is why God said: Except *Iblīs*, he was of the *jinn*.

*Ibn 'Abbās*, who up till now has always defended *Iblīs'* angelic essence, provided *Tabarī* with a *ḥadīth* narration which can be described as ambiguous. In it *Iblīs* is said to have been created amidst certain creatures which it is not clear enough to define "angelic". It was these creatures who disobeyed God not the angels.

- From *Ibn 'Abbās*: God created some creatures and said, "Bow yourselves before Adam." They said, "We shall not!" So God sent upon them a fire which burnt them. Then he created some other creatures and said, "I am the creator of a man from clay, bow yourselves before Adam." But they refused. So God sent upon them a fire and it burnt them. Then He created these (i.e. the angels) and said, "Bow yourselves before Adam." They said, "Yes!" Now, *Iblīs* was among those who refused to prostrate themselves before Adam.

In one point of his commentary *Tabarī* gives a summary of the principal arguments brought forward by those who uphold the *jinnī* essence of *Iblīs*:

- (a) From the Book (i.e. the Qur'an) we know that God created *Iblīs* from fire, while it is not said that He created the angels in such a way;
- (b) God himself said that *Iblīs* is of the *jinn*;

- (c) *Iblīs* has seed and offspring while the angels are neither begotten nor do they beget.

## 2) *Râzī*

Under Q. 2,34 *Râzī* reports a good argumentation brought forward by those who hold that *Iblīs* is a *jinnī*. Although from the linguistic point of view one can apply the word "*jinn*" to angels, for they are invisible, on the other hand, the Qur'ân makes a net distinction between the *jinn* and the angels, so that it cannot be said that the ones and the others coincide. This is shown in Q. 34,40 which says: "*Upon the day when He shall muster them all together, then He shall say to the angels, 'Was it you these were serving?' They shall say, 'Glory be to Thee! Thou art our Protector, apart from them; nay rather, they were serving the jinn; most of them believed in them.'*"

The apology in favour of *Iblīs'* *jinnī* nature goes on along these lines:-

a) The words: "*except Iblīs, he was of the jinn*" constitute the motivation for his abandoning the *sujūd* (prostration). It is not possible that he did so because he was a treasurer of paradise, but because he was a *jinnī*. This confutes the idea of *Iblīs* being transformed from angel to *jinnī*. Consequently, if this is the case, the clause: "*kāna min al-jinn*" should be translated: "*he was of the jinn*", and not "*he became one of the jinn*".

b) The Qur'ân concedes seed and offspring to *Iblīs* but it denies such a thing to angels: "*And they have made the angels, who are the servants of the Merciful, females. What, did they witness their creation?...*" (Q. 43,19). When femininity is denied, procreation is also denied, and no doubt, seed is also denied with it.

c) *Iblīs*, like the *jinn*, was created from fire, the angels from light. In support of the first statement Q. 7,12; 15,27; and 55,15 are cited, while supporting the second we find the following *ḥadīth*:

— From 'A'isha, from the Messenger of God, may God bless him and keep him, he said: The angels were created from light and the *jānn* from a smokeless fire.

d) Angels are impeccable, *Iblīs* was not. The impeccability of angels is proved by the fact that they are God's messengers (Q. 35,1) and as such they must be impeccable: "*God knows well where to place His message*" (Q. 6,124).

## 3) *Alūsī*

Under Q. 18,50 *Alūsī* reports an authority affirming that the opinion that *Iblīs* was a *jinnī* who was captured by the angels is held by many an '*ulamā*'. In this section of his tafsīr the author records three *ḥadīth* narrations in favour of *Iblīs* being a *jinnī*, only one of which gives some new elements:

— From *Abū Shaykh*: *Iblīs* was never an angel; he is indeed the origin

of *jinn* just as Adam is the origin of mankind. This means that before his existence there was no *jinn*, just as before Adam's existence there was no mankind. All that is contained in the heart (seat of the intellect) originates from his power. This is the opinion held by the majority and it is nearer to truth than the other one which holds that before the existence of *Iblīs* there existed *jinn* but were destroyed and no descendant was left but he. This theory wants to make believe that the *jinn* and the demons of today all have their origin from *Iblīs*, so that he would be among the *jinn* what Noah is among mankind, as the well-known story goes.

### The commentator's own point of view

It is not always easy to deduct from the commentaries what might have been the personal opinions of the authors regarding the question discussed. Sometimes it is evident that the *mufassirūn* camouflage their own personal ideas in the midst of polemical expositions, at other times they seem to be cautious not to manifest what they think. On other occasions, again, they show themselves uncertain as to what position should be taken.

From a firsthand examination of the texts one would deduce the following:

- a) *Tabarī* and *Tafsīr al-manār* agree that *Iblīs* is a declined angel, although the former ends with a note of uncertainty.
- b) *Zamakhsharī* and *Rāzī* are definitely for *Iblīs* being a *jinnī*.
- c) *Baydāwī* and *Alūsī* affirm that in Q. 18,50 *Iblīs* is surely a *jinnī*, while in Q. 2,34 he is definitely an angel.
- d) *Baydāwī* tries to make a compromise about which we shall speak further on.

Explaining Q. 2,34, *Tabarī* says that once it is clear that all the angels obeyed God's order except *Iblīs*, it follows that *Iblīs* was one of them. In support of his argument the author cites Q. 15,31-32: "Save *Iblīs*; he refused to be among those bowing. Said He, 'What ails thee, *Iblīs*, that thou art not among those bowing?'" Another argument in favour of *Iblīs*' angelic nature advanced by *Tabarī* regards his being created from fire. He says that it is not objectionable that God created his angels from different sources, for He could have created some from light, others from fire, and still others from whatever other material. In Revelation there is no information pointing to the constituting elements of the angelic essence, while there is with regards to *Iblīs*' nature. But this very fact does not postulate *Iblīs*' exclusion from among the angels. Neither should the fact that *Iblīs* had seed and offspring or that of his liability to sin constitute an impediment against his angelic nature, for these were permitted him by God. Commenting the incision "*kāna min al-jinn*" of Q. 18,50, however, *Tabarī* plunges into uncertainty. He says that this expression is not repelled by retaining that all those beings which are hidden from the eyesight are "*jinn*" as is retained by those who hold that *Iblīs* is an angel.

*Zamakhsharī* interprets "*kāna min al-jinn*" (Q. 18,50) as an answer explaining why *Iblīs* had refused to perform prostration (*sujūd*). As if one had asked: why did he not bow to Adam? And the reply would be: *he was of the jinn* (Q. 18,50). In consonance with this line of thought, the author interprets the "*fa*" of "*fa-fasaqa*" (and he committed ungodliness — Q. 18,50) to be a "*fa sababiyya*" (*fa* of causality). This would mean that the reason for *Iblīs*' disobedience lies in the fact that he was a *jinnī*. *Zamakhsharī* concludes saying that once it is known that angels are impeccable, *Iblīs* was surely not one of them.

*Rāzī* manifests clearly his opinion about *Iblīs* under Q. 18,50. He says that in this verse God shows that *Iblīs* was of the *jinn*. To prove his standpoint *Rāzī* mentions the fact that God conceded *Iblīs* seed and offspring, something which He did not concede to angels. Under Q. 2,34 the author expounds the ideas of others not his own.

*Baydāwī* agrees with *Zamakhsharī* in interpreting Q. 18,50. So that according to this author the incision "*kāna min al-jinn*" must be either a condition with enforcing particle "*qad*" understood, or a renewed explanation. The same goes with "*fa-fasaqa*", in which, *Baydāwī* agrees, the "*fa*" is "*sababiyya*", so that it is there to indicate that *Iblīs* disobeyed because he was a *jinnī*. But once in Q. 2,34 it is not that evident that *Iblīs* is a *jinnī*, and once it can be deduced from this same verse that, on the contrary, he was an angel, *Baydāwī* makes a sort of compromise allotting to *Iblīs* a *jinnī* nature with regards to his action, but an angelic one with regards to his essential quality. So that he would be an angel behaving himself in a *jinnī* manner.

*Alūsī* agrees with *Baydāwī* and *Zamakhsharī* in the interpretation of Q. 18,50 from which he deduces that *Iblīs* must have been a *jinnī*. The author's position, however, is not quite clear when he discusses Q. 2,34. He gives ample space and importance to the defenders of *Iblīs*' angelic nature whom he believes to be the great majority of the '*ulamā*' among the companions of the Prophet and their followers. Neither does *Alūsī* refrain from defending this theory, every now and then, inserting his own ideas. This makes one think that in this part of his *tafsīr* *Alūsī*'s personal opinion regarding the question of *Iblīs* is contrary to what he actually retains under Q. 18,50.

*Muhammad Abduh* and *Rashīd Ridā* are more straightforward than the others in their exposition, and by far more coherent to their principal opinion. They opt for *Iblīs* being an angel because, as they say, in all verses where he is mentioned it is evident that he was so. The authors do not make a mystery, however, out of Q. 18,50 from where it is clear that *Iblīs* is a *jinnī*. They try to solve this problem by retaining that the *jinn* are but a variation of angels.

## Conclusion

At the end of it all one would expect to find some conclusion at hand.

But this is where one will get disappointed. No objective conclusion can be deduced from all the various and sometimes contradictory opinions we have reviewed. It is easy to note that many of the opinions studied result from unfounded suppositions and sometimes from pure fancy. Before we have in hand a good exegetical study giving an acceptable existential status to the *jinn*, we can never conclude whether it is more sound to put *Iblīs* among their lot by nature or by degradation. Until then we must satisfy ourselves with a personal note given by the two authors of *Tafsīr al-Manār* which concludes their talk about *Iblīs*, the *jinn*, and the angels:

"Notwithstanding all these citations referring to these names from the knowledge of the unseen, we do not know the right things on this subject, and we shall not search about it, neither shall we say anything relating to it which is not presented to us in a text taken from the Faultless (*al-ma 'sūm*, i.e. the Prophet Muhammed), may God bless him and keep him."

---

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 'Abd al-Baqi, Muhammad Fu'ad, *Al-Mu'jam al-mufahris li-alfaz al-Qur'an al-karim*, Bayrut, Dar ihya' al-turath al-'Arabi, 1364/1945.
- Abduh, Muhammad; Ridā, Rashīd, *Tafsīr al-Qur'an al-hakim (tafsīr al-manar)*, Al Qahira, Dar al-manar, 1353-1366/1934-1942 (vol. 1).
- Al-Alusi, Abu al-Thana' Mahmud Shihab al-Din, *Ruḥ al-ma'ani*, Misr, Idara l-tiba'a l-muniriyya, 1345/1926 (Vols. 1 & 15).
- Arberry, Arthur J., *The Koran interpreted*, London, Oxford university press, 1964.
- Al-Baydawi, 'Abd Allah b. 'Umar b. Muhammad b. 'Ali Abu l-khayr Nasir al-Din, *Anwar al-tanzil wa-asrar al-ta'wil*, al-Qahira, Mustafa l-Babi l-Halabi wa-awladuh, 1344/125.
- Jeffery, Arthur, *Foreign vocabulary of the Qur'an*, Baroda, 1938 (photocopy).
- Qur'an Karim*, al-Qahira, bi-matabi' al-Ahram al-tijariyya, 1393/1973.
- Al-Razi, Fakhr al-Din Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad b. Umar b. al-Husayn, *Al-Tafsīr al-habir*, Misr, al-matba'a l-Misriyya, 1352/1933 (vols. 1 & 21).
- Al-Tabari, Abu Ja'far Muhammad b. Jarir, *Jami' al-bayan 'an ta'wil ay al-Qur'an*, al-Qahira, 1383/1954 (vols. 1 & 15).
- Al-Zamakhshari, Abu l-Qasim Maymud b. 'Umar, *Al-Kashshaf 'an haqa'iq al-tanzil*, Misr, al-Maktab l-Tijariyya l-kubra, 1373/1953 (vols. 1 & 2).

## DIALOGO TRA MARXISMO E CRISTIANESIMO

Battista Mondin, Ph.D. (Harv.),  
 Professor of Philosophy, Pontificia Università Urbaniana, Rome.

All'origine (di questo tentativo) come di tanti altri esperimenti che hanno avuto luogo nella Chiesa cattolica durante l'ultimo decennio sta il Vaticano II. Questo Concilio ha prodotto un profondo cambiamento di atteggiamenti e di metodologia nel mondo cattolico per quanto concerne i rapporti con i non cattolici, i non cristiani e i non credenti. Dall'atteggiamento di ostilità polemica e dalla condanna si è passati ad un atteggiamento di comprensione, di dialogo e di tolleranza.

Questa radicale trasformazione psicologica e metodologica ha operato su tutti i fronti: non solo su quelli più vicini delle altre chiese cristiane e delle religioni non cristiane ma anche su quelli più lontani e più ostili al cristianesimo rappresentati dalle ideologie e dalle filosofie atee (positivismo, esistenzialismo, marxismo) e dai sistemi e movimenti politici apertamente contrari ad ogni forma di religione (comunismo, radicalismo).

Negli ultimi anni gli incontri e i contatti sono diventati sempre più frequenti in particolare con i rappresentanti e gli esponenti del marxismo e del comunismo. Ai convegni dei cattolici si invitano spesso marxisti e comunisti e, viceversa, ai congressi dei marxisti e dei comunisti si sollecita la presenza dei cattolici (purchè si tratti però di cattolici di sinistra). Così gli scambi di idee sono diventati piuttosto intensi.

In questa atmosfera di apertura e di dialogo, e in base ad una radicale distinzione tra i contenuti della fede e le espressioni culturali, i teologi cattolici si sono spinti molto avanti anche in direzione del marxismo. In virtù della constatazione che la cultura imperante oggi nel mondo è quella marxista, alcuni hanno cominciato a domandarsi se non sia possibile assumere oggi il marxismo per dare espressione al messaggio cristiano. Alcuni autori più volenterosi si sono messi subito all'opera. I teologi della speranza (Moltmann, Schillebeeckx, Alves ecc.) hanno assunto la filosofia della speranza del marxista Ernst Bloch per dare espressione alla dimensione escatologica della fede cristiana. I teologi della liberazione (Gutierrez, Assmann, Segundo, Bonino ecc.) hanno assunto l'analisi marxista della società e la strategia marxista della lotta di classe per tradurre in linguaggio vivo ed efficace il messaggio cristiano della salvezza.

L'accostamento al marxismo ha fatto registrare recentemente un altro passo in avanti per opera di Dom Helder Camara. In una conferenza assai reclamizzata, il coraggioso vescovo di Recife, ha auspicato che qualche genio del nostro tempo riesca a ripetere l'impresa compiuta da san Tommaso d'Aquino nel Medioevo: come san Tommaso è riuscito a tradurre il messaggio cristiano nelle categorie metafisiche della filosofia aristotelica, così qualche nostro contemporaneo dovrebbe tentare di esprimere il messaggio della salvezza mediante le categorie filosofiche, sociali e politiche del marxismo ossia dov-

rebbe tentare di acculturare marxisticamente il cristianesimo. <sup>1</sup>

Si tratta di un problema molto arduo e delicato, di cui in questa occasione cercherò di individuare i punti fondamentali e di indicare sinteticamente alcune linee di soluzione.

Inizierò con le definizioni di alcuni concetti fondamentali, come cultura e acculturazione, e con la determinazione dei rapporti che intercorrono tra cultura, religione e cristianesimo.

Come è stato ben dimostrato dagli antropologi, la cultura non è un fenomeno accidentale non è un vestito da festa che una società può mettersi e cambiare quando crede. La cultura è una forma stabile, una struttura permanente anche se dinamica: la forma, la struttura propria di una determinata società. Secondo la classica definizione di Christopher Dawson, "la cultura è la forma della società. Una società senza cultura è una società senza forma — un ammasso o collezione di individui, tenuti insieme dai bisogni del momento; mentre invece quanto più solida è una cultura, tanto più profondamente e completamente essa informa la società e trasforma il diverso materiale umano di cui è composta" <sup>2</sup> Il teologo protestante americano Richard Niebuhr ha chiarito ulteriormente il concetto di cultura dicendo che "la cultura è l'ambiente artificiale, secondario che l'uomo sovrappone a quello naturale. Esso comprende il linguaggio, le abitudini, le idee, le credenze, i costumi, l'organizzazione sociale, i prodotti ereditari, i procedimenti tecnici, i valori". <sup>3</sup>

La cultura si distingue essenzialmente dalla natura. La natura è tutto ciò che esiste prima che l'uomo compia qualche cosa. Invece la cultura è tutto ciò che è frutto della creatività umana: tutto ciò che è inventato, prodotto dall'uomo. La cultura non è però il risultato della creatività di un uomo, di un solo individuo, ma è il prodotto di un gruppo sociale più o meno esteso nello spazio e nel tempo. E la cultura finisce per informare, unificare, caratterizzare, distinguere il gruppo sociale che la crea da tutti gli altri gruppi. Si dà pertanto un cultura italiana, francese, tedesca, inglese, americana, sovietica, orientale, occidentale, africana ecc. che informa e caratterizza gli italiani, i francesi, i tedeschi ecc.

Acculturazione proviene da cultura e significa fare assumere una cultura, inserire qualche cosa (un gruppo sociale, una società, una popolazione, un messaggio, una dottrina ecc.) in una determinata cultura. Acculturazione occidentale del Giappone p.es. significa l'inserimento del Giappone nella cultura occidentale; acculturazione marxista del cristianesimo vuol dire inserire il cristianesimo nella cultura marxista.

La religione secondo un'opinione oggi assai diffusa è un elemento costitutivo essenziale della cultura, anzi secondo alcuni studiosi (Luckmann, Berger, Nijk ecc.) essa costituisce il suo stesso fondamento. Pertanto anche la

1. Per una trattazione più ampia ed approfondita di tutta la questione, mi permetto di rinviare il lettore al mio volume *I teologi della liberazione*, Borla, Roma 1977.
2. C. DAWSON, *Religion and Culture*, Londra 1948, p.48.
3. H. R. NIEBUHR, *Christ and Culture*, New York 1956, p.32.

religione è un prodotto, il primo e più importante frutto della genialità dell'uomo.

Invece il cristianesimo (per i credenti) non fa parte né della cultura né della religione, ossia non è una creazione dell'uomo. Il cristianesimo è l'azione di Dio nella storia, un'azione che trova il suo momento culminante nella incarnazione del Figlio di Dio in Gesù Cristo. Il cristianesimo è, quindi, essenzialmente incarnazione umana di Dio, e questa incarnazione si realizza, logicamente, in ciò che è più specificamente umano ossia nella cultura e nella religione che della cultura è il fondamento.

Perciò per chi vuole dilucidare i fondamenti dell'acculturazione del cristianesimo il principale problema è di intendere il senso e le conseguenze dell'incarnazione, oltre che determinare le condizioni affinché l'incarnazione abbia luogo.

L'incarnazione, come sappiamo, opera una unione assolutamente nuova, incommensurabile ed imprevedibile tra Dio e l'uomo. Tale unione ha luogo in Gesù Cristo che è un individuo umano e divino: per un aspetto è uomo, giudeo, lavoratore, per un altro aspetto è **theòs, pneuma, logos**: L'Incarnazione è un evento dialettico: essa comporta un abbassamento, uno svuotamento (**kenosis**), un gesto di estrema bontà e dedizione da parte di Dio e, viceversa, una assunzione e trasformazione profonda da parte dell'umanità. Nell'incarnazione la priorità spetta, ovviamente, a Dio. Però, allo stesso tempo, in Cristo si dà la comunicazione degli idiomi, per cui gli attributi di Dio si possono predicare anche del soggetto umano, e gli attributi dell'uomo si possono predicare anche del soggetto divino. Di Cristo si può quindi dire sia che è un Dio umano sia che è un uomo divino.

L'incarnazione del Figlio di Dio si prolunga nella Chiesa: essa è stata costituita da Gesù Cristo per annunciare il suo messaggio e per comunicare la sua salvezza a tutti gli uomini. Ora, per realizzare questo obiettivo, è necessario che essa esprima il messaggio di Cristo e realizzi la sua salvezza nelle forme culturali proprie di una data epoca, di un determinato gruppo sociale. E' necessario che si inserisca in una nazione, in un popolo.

Quindi l'acculturazione del cristianesimo non è soltanto legittima è anche necessaria: è una proprietà essenziale della incarnazione di Dio nell'umanità ed è una esigenza fondamentale della vocazione missionaria della Chiesa.

Senonchè quello che fin qui sembrava così logico e chiaro, ad un secondo e più attento esame diviene complicato ed oscuro. Ciò avviene quando passiamo dai principi che giustificano l'acculturazione del cristianesimo in generale, alla loro applicazione ad una cultura determinata. Allora ci si può trovare di fronte a culture così povere o così chiuse da rendere assolutamente impossibile una traduzione ed interpretazione soddisfacente della Parola di Dio. Assumerle come forme del messaggio cristiano significherebbe allora mortificarlo e deformarlo irreparabilmente. In effetti non si otterrebbe più una acculturazione, ma una perversione, deformazione, corruzione del cristianesimo; invece che di autentica acculturazione cristiana si dovrebbe parlare di una coloritura, infarinatura, inquinamento cristiano di una determinata cultura

Ciò significa che l'acculturazione pur essendo un'autentica esigenza dell'

incarnazione di Dio e della missione della Chiesa non rappresenta una firma in bianco in mano ai teologi, ai sacerdoti, agli operatori culturali alle chiese locali per operare a tutti i costi e ciecamente l'inserimento del cristianesimo in una determinata cultura, in una certa mentalità.

Prima di compiere qualsiasi tentativo di acculturazione si deve studiare profondamente la cultura in cui si intende inserire il cristianesimo. Occorre vedere se essa possiede una visione dell'uomo e delle cose così ristretta e riduttiva da precludere qualsiasi incontro con Dio. Ciò avviene se la cultura in questione esclude positivamente la Trascendenza. In tal caso è evidente che non è lecito assumerla come forma del cristianesimo. Chi lo facesse commetterebbe un errore madornale e un gravissimo tradimento del cristianesimo stesso.

Ecco, pertanto, il primo compito del filosofo, del teologo, del pastore d'anime, del missionario, della chiesa locale, quando si propone di acculturare il cristianesimo. Occorre anzitutto garantirsi che la cultura che si intende assumere per dare espressione alla Parola di Dio possiede le attitudini per fungere da principio ermeneutico della Rivelazione. Ciò si avvera soltanto nel caso che si tratti di una cultura già positivamente aperta verso la Trascendenza oppure non necessariamente chiusa. Per esempio, una cultura aperta come quella dei Pigmei e di molte altre popolazioni dell'Asia, dell'Africa e dell'America centrale e meridionale, la quale pone Dio al vertice di ogni cosa e da Lui fa dipendere ogni avvenimento della natura e della storia, offre uno strumento ermeneutico sostanzialmente valido, anche se non ancora perfettamente agibile a causa della sua povertà logico-metafisica. Invece, in molti altri casi si tratta di visuali culturali apparentemente chiuse o anche di fatto chiuse, ma non di diritto, ossia non in forza dei loro stessi principi primi. Per cui se si considerano secondo le loro apparenze oppure anche secondo la loro situazione di fatto non presentano nessun aggancio con la Parola di Dio. Così è apparsa per esempio, la visuale aristotelica ai padri della chiesa e a molti scolastici. Invece a san Tommaso è stato possibile dimostrare che i principi della filosofia aristotelica, in quanto tali, non comportano nessuna chiusura verso la trascendenza assoluta, nessuna riduzione della realtà e, perciò ha potuto assumerli in larga misura per la sua interpretazione ed acculturazione del messaggio cristiano.

In altre culture si può riscontrare una inadeguatezza sostanziale in ordine ad un'acculturazione globale del messaggio cristiano; mentre vi si possono reperire intuizioni, istanze, categorie appropriate per un'acculturazione parziale del cristianesimo, ossia di una sua parte per esempio della soteriologia, dell'escatologia, dell'etica ecc.

Dopo tutti questi preamboli possiamo affrontare con lucidità e con rigore il problema scottante ed attuale dell'acculturazione marxista del cristianesimo.

Dato però che da un secolo in qua il marxismo ha subito molte trasformazioni e ha dato luogo a molteplici interpretazioni, è bene precisare che qui mi riferirò al marxismo classico (di Marx e Engels) e al marxismo italiano di Gramsci, e non al marxismo esoterico e revisionistico di Bloch, Garaudy, Machovec ecc., per il quale sarebbe necessario fare un discorso a parte e

certamente diverso.

In secondo luogo, quanto all'interpretazione del pensiero di Marx fra le tante che oggi sono in circolazione non faccio mia quella che vuol lasciar intendere che il suo ateismo e anticlericalismo sono semplicemente casuali, dovuti alla corruzione della chiesa del suo tempo e alla sua ignoranza della vera, autentica natura della religione, della chiesa e del cristianesimo. Pur riconoscendo che le conoscenze religiose di Marx non furono molto profonde, ritengo con la maggior parte degli esegeti del pensiero marxista che il suo ateismo e la sua critica della religione non siano dovuti a motivi contingenti ma appartengano alla sostanza della sua visione della storia e della realtà, una visione decisamente immanentistica e materialistica e, quindi, necessariamente atea.

Del resto se diamo uno sguardo agli scritti di Marx, non ci vuol molto per convincersi che il suo ateismo non è soltanto pratico, ma teoretico, che l'ateismo teoretico è dovuto primariamente a ragioni filosofiche e solo secondariamente a ragioni storiche, sociali e politiche.

Già nella tesi per il dottorato Marx proclama senza mezzi termini che "nel paese della ragione" l'esistenza di Dio non può più avere nessun significato: "Portate della carta moneta in un paese in cui quest'uso della carta moneta non si conosce, ed ognuno riderà della vostra soggettiva rappresentazione. Recatovi con i vostri dei in un paese dove sono adorati dèi, e vi si dimostrerà che siete vittime di immaginazioni e astrazioni. E con ragione. Chi ai greci antichi avesse portato un dio migratore, avrebbe trovato la prova della non esistenza di questo dio, chè per i greci caso non esisteva. Ciò che per un determinato paese è per determinati dèi stranieri, avviene nel paese della ragione per dio in generale: è una regione nella quale la sua esistenza cessa".<sup>4</sup>

L'ateismo teoretico di Marx è la conseguenza di tre postulati:

- 1) il materialismo metafisico o dialettico che considera la materia quale causa suprema ed unica d'ogni cosa;
- 2) il materialismo storico il quale vuole che il fattore economico sia il fattore principale e decisivo, e che la struttura economica sia la struttura portante di tutte le altre strutture che compongono la società;
- 3) l'umanesimo assoluto il quale situa l'uomo al vertice del cosmo l'uomo è l'essere supremo.

A mio avviso la ragione decisiva su cui Marx fonda il suo ateismo è la terza. Marx è ateo per la sua passione per l'uomo. Ciò che egli vuole salvaguardare con l'ateismo è la grandezza dell'uomo. Con l'ateismo egli intende escludere che ci sia qualche essere superiore, più grande dell'uomo. E' in vista della grandezza dell'uomo che egli ritiene necessario distruggere la religione, perchè a suo giudizio questa è l'oppio, la droga, il surrogato che impedisce all'uomo di prendere coscienza della sua dignità.

Addurrò qualche citazione per suffragare questa tesi.

4. K. MARX. *Frammento dell'appendice della dissertazione dottorale*, in A. SABETTI, *Sulle fondazioni del materialismo storico*, Firenze 1962, p.415.

Nella **Questione Ebraica** leggiamo: “La religione per noi non costituisce il **fondamento**, bensì soltanto il **fenomeno** della limitatezza mondana. Per questo, noi spieghiamo la soggezione religiosa dei liberi cittadini con la loro soggezione terrena (.....) Affermano che essi sopprimeranno la loro limitatezza religiosa non appena avranno soppressi i loro limiti terreni. Noi non trasformiamo le questioni terrene in questioni teologiche. Trasformiamo le questioni teologiche in questioni terrene”.<sup>5</sup>

Il periodo iniziale di questo passo è assai espressivo. Esso dice che la religione è un **fenomeno** (secondo il senso kantiano del termine) e non una realtà. Perciò la religione non dà ragione, non fonda una limitatezza reale, una creaturalità effettiva dell'uomo, ma manifesta solamente una condizione storica contingente, ingiusta e transitoria. Essa esprime il mancato raggiungimento della propria grandezza da parte dell'uomo. Quando questi la conquisterà, anche il fenomeno religioso si estinguerà.

Nella celebre **Introduzione alla Critica della filosofia hegeliana del diritto pubblico** Marx dà una formulazione ancora più esplicita ed elaborata di questa concezione. “La miseria religiosa — egli scrive — è ad un tempo espressione della miseria reale e protesta contro di essa. La religione è il gemito dell'oppresso, il sentimento di un mondo senza cuore, e insieme lo spirito di una condizione priva di spiritualità. Essa è l'oppio del popolo. La soppressione della religione in quanto felicità illusoria del popolo è il presupposto della sua vera felicità (...) E' innanzi tutto compito della filosofia, operando al servizio della storia, di smascherare l'autoalienazione nelle sue forme profane, dopo che la forma sacra dell'autoalienazione umana è stata scoperta. La critica del cielo si trasforma così in critica della terra, la critica della religione nella critica del diritto, la critica della teologia nella critica della politica”. E poco prima: “La religione è la consapevolezza e la coscienza dell'uomo che non ha ancora acquisito o ha di nuovo perduto se stesso. Ma l'uomo non è un essere astratto, isolato del mondo. L'uomo è il mondo dell'uomo, lo Stato, la società. Questo Stato, questa società producono la religione, una coscienza capovolto del mondo, proprio perchè essi sono un mondo capovolto. La religione è la teoria generale di questo mondo, il suo compendio enciclopedico, la sua logica in forma popolare, il suo **point d'honneur** spiritualistico, il suo entusiasmo, la sua sanzione morale, il suo completamento solenne la sua fondamentale ragione di consolazione e di giustificazione. Essa è la realizzazione fantastica dell'essenza umana, poichè l'essenza umana non possiede una vera realtà. La lotta contro la religione è quindi indirettamente la lotta contro quel mondo del quale la religione è l'aroma spirituale”.<sup>6</sup>

Ancora nella stessa **Introduzione** si legge: “La critica della religione porta alla dottrina secondo la quale l'uomo è, per l'uomo, l'essere supremo; dunque essa perviene all'imperativo categorico di rovesciare tutti i rapporti nei quali

5. K. MARX, *La questione ebraica*, Roma 1966, pp.81-82.

6. K. MARX, *Per la critica della Filosofia del diritto di Hegel, Introduzione*, Roma 1966, pp. 57-58.

l'uomo è un essere degradato, asservito, abbandonato, spregevole".

Nelle opere di Marx abbondano anche i passi in cui egli denuncia le chiese e i loro rappresentanti come alleati dei governi, delle classi privilegiate, dei padroni, in cui mette a nudo le loro colpe e loro miserie, in cui ne invoca la soppressione. Ma dall'insieme dei suoi scritti risulta che per Marx i nemici dell'uomo non sono i preti e le chiese, ma la religione in quanto tale. E' proprio la religione nella sua essenza più pura, e non nelle deviazioni dei suoi rappresentanti che costituisce l'ostacolo principale alla promozione umana, alla liberazione dell'uomo, alla conquista della sua maturità.

I cristiani che vogliono dialogare con Marx e con i suoi discepoli devono tener conto di questo punto di capitale importanza. E pertanto non devono impostare il dialogo sul materialismo metafisico (dialettico) o sul materialismo storico, e neppure sulla storia della Chiesa (potere temporale, crociata, inquisizione, caso Galilei ecc), ma sull'umanesimo e sulla religione, e sulla valenza umanistica della religione e del cristianesimo.

I cattolici che non ignorano le ragioni della loro fede non avranno difficoltà a trovare validi argomenti per mostrare a Marx e ai suoi discepoli che la religione e il cristianesimo in particolare lungi dall'essere nemici dell'uomo, sono invece gli strumenti (i sacramenti) che gli conferiscono la possibilità di realizzare pienamente se stesso, ben oltre i più alti livelli di grandezza che sia concesso alla ragione umana di prefigurare.

Nel cristianesimo, l'uomo elevato alla dignità di figlio di Dio, diventa più grande e non più piccolo, più libero e non più schiavo, più nobile e non più meschino, più sereno e non più angustiato. Infatti il cristiano è l'uomo che, sapendosi amato infinitamente da Dio, sa di essere diventato infinitamente grande. Per questo il suo cuore esplose nel canto francescano della perfetta letizia.

Se passiamo, ora, al pensiero religioso di Gramsci, credo che sia facile costatare quanto siano infondate e illusorie le supposizioni che su questo punto, nella visuale filosofica gramsciana, esistano maggiori possibilità di dialogo di quante se ne incontrino in quella di Marx. In effetti, il definitivo superamento della religione è ritenuto anche da Gramsci come da Marx un passo assolutamente necessario in vista di una più completa ominizzazione, poichè questa, secondo Gramsci, coincide con l'umanesimo assoluto.

Questo traguardo (dell'umanesimo assoluto) per Gramsci oltre che un'esigenza metafisica è anche un'esigenza storica: è il momento logico e conclusivo del pensiero moderno, che è un pensiero squisitamente storicistico e immanentistico, e della storia moderna che è una storia sempre più profondamente caratterizzata dalla secolarizzazione ossia dalla estromissione di Dio da qualsiasi vicenda umana. Il marxismo, secondo Gramsci, ha il merito di avere esteso la secolarizzazione, l'immanentismo e lo storicismo, che fino al secolo XIX erano privilegi della borghesia e delle classi colte, anche al proletariato. La missione di fare questo per il popolo italiano spetta ai marxisti italiani. Ma Gramsci ritiene che tale operazione potrà avere successo solo se i marxisti riusciranno un po' alla volta ad impadronirsi dei principali centri e strumenti culturali: scuole, università stampa, radio, cinema, giornali ecc.

L'ateismo di Gramsci è di una tale crudezza da escludere qualsiasi possibilità di fraintendimento. Egli identifica il partito comunista col "nuovo principe" (con riferimento al Principe di Machiavelli): esso è la fonte di ogni potere, di ogni diritto e di ogni legge: la sua attività è intrinsecamente morale ed è morale tutto ciò che serve al partito. Il "nuovo principe" prende il posto della divinità e regola tutti i rapporti individuali e sociali. Il "nuovo principe" così come lo configura Gramsci, ha tutti i tratti caratteristici del Leviathan di Hobbes: è assoluto e totalitario. Se Gramsci parla di pluralismo, egli lo fa esclusivamente riguardo all'autonomia che spetta ai partiti comunisti nelle varie nazioni, ma non per i vari partiti e movimenti culturali all'interno della stessa nazione: qui il potere spetta di diritto solo al partito comunista. Gramsci non riconosce nessun pluralismo né ideologico né politico <sup>7</sup>

Veniamo ora, finalmente, al nostro interrogativo: il marxismo, ossia la visione marxista dell'uomo, del mondo e della storia è assumibile dal cristianesimo? In altre parole, è possibile acculturare marxisticamente il cristianesimo?

A mio parere qualsiasi tentativo di questo genere è destinato a fallire miseramente, perchè esso non può condurre che al suicidio del cristianesimo, il quale per essere recepito nella cultura marxista dovrebbe rinunciare a ciò che gli è più essenziale: la sua dimensione trascendente, soprannaturale, divina e di conseguenza, dovrebbe rinnegare la propria fede nella incarnazione di Dio nella storia. <sup>8</sup>

Assodata l'impossibilità di un'acculturazione globale del cristianesimo in chiave marxista, si può tentare di vedere se sia possibile una acculturazione parziale di questo o di quel settore della teologia mediante l'assunzione di alcune categorie politiche, etiche sociologiche, storiche (come alienazione, lotta di classe, società senza classi, liberazione, strutture e sovrastrutture, prassi rivoluzionaria, ecc.). Ritengo che qui esista una certa possibilità di lavoro, ma penso che si possa ottenere un'acculturazione assai limitata, ambigua e pericolosa, perchè la dimensione trascendente e verticale rimane sem-

7. A. GRAMSCI, *Gli intellettuali e l'organizzazione della cultura*, Torino 1974, pp. 9-19, 97-114; cfr anche G. F. MORRA, *Marxismo e religione*, Milano 1976.

8. Su questo punto il Magistero ecclesiastico s'è sempre pronunciato negativamente. Anche quando nei confronti dei marxisti e comunisti ha cambiato strategia, passando dalla condanna al dialogo, esso ha sempre continuato a respingere categoricamente l'ideologia marxista. Dalla *Divini Redemptoris* alla *Octogesima adveniens* l'insegnamento dei Pontefici su questo punto è stato uniforme. Nella *Octogesima adveniens*, Paolo VI, ribadendo l'insegnamento dei suoi predecessori, afferma che è necessario rigettare l'ideologia marxista (materialismo ateo, dialettica della violenza, negazione della Transcendenza, assorbimento della libertà individuale nella collettività ecc.) due che è "illusorio e pericoloso accettare gli elementi dell'analisi marxista, senza riconoscere i loro rapporti con l'ideologia" (n. 34)

pre essenziale in tutte le parti del messaggio cristiano, mentre invece tutte le categorie marxiste, se non sono sottoposte ad un processo di profonda catarsi, rimangono necessariamente rinchiusi in una prospettiva orizzontale ed immanente. Il campo più fecondo è l'antropologia.

In conclusione, un'acculturazione marxista del cristianesimo è legittima soltanto a condizione che si realizzi una sostanziale trasformazione, una autentica conversione della cultura marxista al cristianesimo. Del resto ciò è sempre avvenuto anche nelle precedenti acculturazioni del cristianesimo. Oggi si parla con molta leggerezza di ellenizzazione del cristianesimo da parte dei Padri della Chiesa oppure di acculturazione aristotelica del cristianesimo da parte di san Tommaso. Ma in entrambi i casi, per chi è un pò informato e ha letto gli esperti in materia, risulta evidente che si è trattato di un'operazione assai complessa, che ha comportato una revisione sostanziale delle categorie della cultura greca o del sistema di Aristotele; perciò è più corretto parlare di una cristianizzazione del pensiero greco e di Aristotele che di acculturazione ellenica o aristotelica del cristianesimo.<sup>9</sup>

Altro discorso si può e si deve fare quando dal dialogo culturale, teoretico, si passa al dialogo operativo, pratico. Qui il cristiano incontrerà dei marxisti che gli potranno far da maestri e che potranno anche essere suoi ottimi alleati. Quando si tratta di risolvere problemi di ordine politico, economico, sociale (in cui, per adoperare l'espressione di Bonhoeffer, l'"ipotesi religiosa" non può essere invocata) e di elaborare programmi per la scuola, la casa, gli ospedali, l'esercito, la magistratura ecc. i marxisti possono ben essere più competenti, più preparati, più bravi dei cattolici. Anche sul terreno dell'azione (della esecuzione dei programmi) i marxisti possono dare lezioni di serietà, disciplina, efficienza. Pertanto, nel campo della promozione umana i cattolici potranno collaborare con i marxisti, e qualche volta faranno bene ad imitarli ed emularli.

Concludendo, in materia filosofica e teologica, il dialogo tra cattolici e marxisti è praticabile, ed è bene che sia praticato per una migliore comprensione delle rispettive posizioni, ma non certamente in vista di un incontro a metà strada o di un compromesso; bensì, lo si voglia o no, in vista di una conversione intellettuale.

Invece in materia politica, economica e sociale il dialogo è spesso necessario per il raggiungimento del bene comune. Non è un'operazione priva di

9. Sulla questione della ellenizzazione del cristianesimo vedi: G. L. PRESTIGE, *God and Patristic Thought*, SPCK, Londra 1964; J. DANIELOU, *Message chrétien et culture hellénistique aux II<sup>e</sup> et III<sup>e</sup> siècles*, Desclée, Tournai 1961; G. BONTADINI, *Metafisica e decollenizzazione*, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1975. Riguardo alla possibilità di una conversione del marxismo al cristianesimo si veda J. M. BONINO, *Cristiani e marxisti*, Claudiana, Torino 1976.

rischi, perchè può essere facilmente strumentalizzata per finalità inaccettabili. Tuttavia il cristiano non si lascerà paralizzare da una prudenza eccessiva, che finisce per tagliarlo completamente fuori da tutto ciò che riguarda l'ordine pubblico. Ma, spinto dall'amore incondizionato e gratuito di Cristo, oltre che dal coraggio e dall'entusiasmo della propria fede, vincendo ogni sospetto e diffidenza, accetterà volentieri il gioco della collaborazione con tutti gli uomini di buona volontà, senza tener conto della loro professione religiosa e del loro partito politico.

## MELITA THEOLOGICA

1947 — 1980

# INDEX OF ARTICLES

AUTHORS in alphabetical order;  
Articles in chronological order of publication.

compiled by  
Fr. J. Azzopardi, S.J., B.A. (Hons.), M.A.

- AGIUS, Dennis, "Jerusalem — in Medieval Fadà'il Literature" Vol. XXX (1978-79), pp. 14-31.
- ANONYMOUS "Don Maurus Inguanez, O.S.B.", Vol. VIII (1955), pp. 47-52.
- AZZOPARDI, John "Revelation in Saint Paul", Vol. XXIV (1972), pp. 31-39, Vol. XXV (1973), pp. 60-67.  
"St. Ambrose — Doctrine and Importance", Vol. XXX (1978-79), pp. 38-43.
- BEDOVELLE, Guy-Thomas "Bartholome de Sas Casas — Universalité d'un Message Missionaire", Vol. XXX (1978-79), pp. 37-37.
- BIANCO, C., "An Exposition of and Critical Note on Dr. Rhine's Theory of Parapsychology", Vol. XIII (1961), pp. 36-59.  
"The Universe, Divine Providence — and — Sin Relationship in St. Thomas", Vol. XV (1963), pp. 50-72.
- BONNICI, A., "The Causes of the French Revolution", Vol. I, no. 1 (1947), pp. 35-51, Vol. I, no. 2 pp. 42-55.  
"The Programme of Studies in the Faculty of Theology Enforced by the Magisterial Chirograph of 1771", Vol. I, no. 3 (1948), pp. 38-43.  
"L'Origine della Sovranità Temporale dei Papi", Vol. III (1950), pp. 23-41.  
"Britain's Assurances to Protect the Roman Catholic Religion in Malta", Vol. XI (1959), pp. 45-50.

- "Protestant Propaganda in Malta (1988-30)",  
Vol. XIII (1961), pp. 60-64.
- "From a Suffragan to a Metropolitan See", Vol.  
XVIII (1966), pp. 18-21.
- "Mixed Marriages in Malta (1800-1900)", Vol.  
XX (1968), pp. 18-25.
- "Arrival and First Days in Malta of Anthony  
Pignatelli Inquisitor and Apostolic Delegate",  
Vol. XXV (1973), pp. 34-47.
- BONNICI, C., "Questiones de re Morali-Canonica-Liturgica",  
Vol. I, no. 1 (1947), pp. 52-56,  
Vol. I, no. 2 (1947), pp. 56-62,  
Vol. I, no. 3 (1948), pp. 52-63.  
"Quaestiones Morales",  
Vol. I, no. 4 (1948), pp. 42-48,  
Vol. II, no. 4 (1948), pp. 51-56, 131-137,  
Vol. III, no. 4 (1950), pp. 42-48, 93-98.  
Vol. IV, no. 4 (1951), pp. 48-50.  
"Casus Morales", Vol. IV (1951), pp. 98-100  
Vol. V (1952), pp. 40-44.
- BORG, G., "Moralità del Parto Indolore", Vol. VIII (1955),  
pp. 26-34.
- BUONTEMPO, A., "De Poenitentia", Vol. IX (1956), pp. 27-30.
- BUSUTTIL, S., "Morality and Economic Development", Vol.  
XVII (1965), pp. 19-24.
- CACHIA, Gemma, "The Birth Pangs of the Fourth Genus of Chris-  
tian or Laymen in Search of the State of Per-  
fection", Vol. XXVII (1970), pp. 27-42.
- CACHIA, Laurence, "The Eucharist: A Short Commentary on Some  
New Trends", Vol. XIX (1967), pp. 35-43.
- CALLUS, Ph., "The Church and the Rise of the Universities",  
Vol. I, no. 2 (1947), pp. 33-41,  
Vol. I, no. 3 (1948), pp. 44-51.  
"A Source of Historical Importance", Vol. I,  
no. 4 (1948), pp. 33-41.
- CARUANA, E.M., "S. Helarius Picaviensis Festes Epistulae ad  
Hebraeos", Vol. I, no. 3(1948), pp. 25-36.
- CASSAR, C., "De Crisi Idealismi", Vol. XIV (1962), pp. 29-57.  
"The Historic and Doctrinal Development of

- Revelation according to Saint Thomas”, Vol. XVI (1964), pp. 30-47.
- CHIRCOP, Francis Leonard, “Religious Personality”, Vol. XXVII (1975), pp. 51-59.  
 “Culture and Religion in America”, Vol. XXIX (1977), pp. 19-28.
- CIRILLO, R., “St. Thomas Aquinas and the Theory of Wages”, Vol. V (1952), pp. 78-85.
- COLEIRO, E., “Monasticism in St. Jerome’s Letters and Lives of the Hermits”, Vol. III (1951), pp. 1-13  
 Vol. IV (1951), pp. 61-74  
 Vol. V (1952), pp. 17-30.
- COLLINS, Raymond F., “The Temptation of Jesus”, Vol. XXVI (1974), pp. 32-45.  
 “‘He Came to Dwell among us’ (Jn 1:14)”, Vol. XXVIII (1976), pp. 44-59.
- CRANNY, Titus, “Our Lady and Salvation”, Vol. XXI (1969), pp. 58-60.
- DEBONO MONTEBELLO, Nicholas, “Euphemistic and Non-Euphemistic Content of References to Death in Early Christian Scriptures”, Vol. XXII (1970), pp. 19-26.
- DEPASQUALE, Annetto, “Does Legal Relationship’ Constitute an impediment to Marriage in Malta?”, Vol. XXII (1970), pp. 10-18.  
 “Towards a ‘New Dea!’ for the Laity in the Church’s Legislation”, Vol. XXV (1973), pp. 1-12.
- EMINYAN, Maurice, “St. Thomas on the Salvation of Infidels”, Vol. IX (1956), pp. 49-60.  
 “Modern Atheism”, Vol. XIX (1967), pp. 24-34.  
 “One or many Adams?”, Vol. XXII (1970), pp. 1-9.  
 “The Church as the Sacrament of Salvation”, Vol. XXIV (1972), pp. 9-14.  
 “The Green Light to Renewal”, Vol. XXVI (1974), pp. 2-6.  
 “Human Being or Human Person?”, Vol. XXVII (1975), pp. 34-35.  
 “Christian Ethical Behaviour”, Vol. XXX (1978-79), pp. 1-13.

- “Recent Developments in the Theology of Salvation”, Vol. XXXI (1970), pp. 2-9.
- FENECH, Alanus M., “Notio Thomistica Satisfactionis Vicariae Jesu Christi Mediatoris”, Vol. VI (1953), pp. 65-78  
Vol. VII (1954), pp. 20-43.
- FRENDO, J., “The Phrase ‘Transformatio Corporis et Sanguinis Domini’ in the Documents of The Gallican Hispanic Liturgies”, Vol. XX (1968), pp. 12-17.
- GALEA, Emmanuel “Actionis Catholicae Fundamentum Scripturiticum” Vol. I, no. 3 (1948), pp. 7-15.  
“Il Valore Pastorale della Costituzione ‘Gaudium et Spes’ sulla Chiesa nel Mondo Contemporaneo”, Vol. XVIII (1966), pp. 52-56.
- GALEA, J., “The Triumph of the Spirit”, Vol. XV (1963), pp. 1-5.
- GALEA, Paul “St. Thomas Aquinas on Heredity”, Vol. II (1949), pp. 17-22, Vol. II (1949-50), pp. 113-118.  
“Un Maltese Venerato nella Sicilia”, Vol. V (1952), pp. 86-101,  
Vol. VI (1953), pp. 41-56, 110-118.
- GATT, U.M., “L’Uomo — Divergenze tra S. Tommaso e S. Agostino”, Vol. XIV (1962), pp. 22-28.
- GAUCI, R., “A Commentary on Can. 506, §§ 2,3,4”, Vol. VIII (1955), pp. 35-38, 72-77.  
“Il Parroco alla Luce del Diritto Orientale Vigente e del CIC”, Vol. XVII (1965), pp. 25-29.
- GRECH, G., “The Predestination of Christ and the Motive of the Incarnation”, Vol. I, no. 4 (1948), pp. 17-23, Vol. II (1949), pp. 23-33.
- GRECH, J.G., “The Dark Night of the Ascent of Mount Carmel”, Vol. VI (1953), pp. 98-109.
- GRIMA, George “Christ and Conversion: H. Richard Niebuhr’s Thought between 1933 and 1937”, Vol. XXVIII (1976), pp. 1-29.  
“Vatican II and Puebla on Church and Politics”, Vol. XXXI (1980), pp. 23-37.
- HARING, Bernard, “Freedom and Authority in the Church according to the Constitution ‘Lumen Gentium’”, Vol.

- XXI (1969), pp. 1-14.
- HORMANN, Karl, "Are there Absolutely Binding Moral Norms?", Vol. XXX (1978-79), pp. 44-53.
- HOWELL, Clifford, "Theology of the Liturgy Mystery-Presence Theory", Vol. XVIII (1966), pp. 37-45.
- INGUANEZ, Mauro, "Alberico di Montecassino e Berengario", Vol. III (1950), pp. 1-4.
- "Frammenti di un Codice del Secolo XI Contenente Opere di S. Agostino", Vol. V (1952), pp. 1-6.
- "Un Rarissimo Incunabulo della R. Malta Library", Vol. VII (1954), pp. 65-68.
- LIA, Carmelus "De Evolutione Liturgica in Cultu S.S. Cordis Jesu", Vol. IX (1956), pp. 1-13.
- LUPI, J., "The Doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ in the Works of St. Thomas", Vol. I, no. 4 (1948), pp. 8-16.
- "La Crisi Spirituale di Sant'Agostino", Vol. IV (1951), pp. 89-97,  
Vol. V (1952), pp. 31-39,  
Vol. VI (1953), pp. 30-40.
- "The Solemn Vigil of Easter", Vol. V (1952), pp. 61-77.
- "Devotion to Our Lady in the Early Church", Vol. VI (1953), pp. 79-97.
- "The Queenship of Our Lady in the Liturgy", Vol. VII (1954), pp. 93-102.
- "Book Chronicle", Vol. IX (1956), pp. 39-44,  
Vol. X (1958), pp. 72-75.
- "Catechetical Instruction in the Church in the First Two Centuries", Vol. IX (1956), pp. 61-71.
- "The Ordination of Deacons in the Early Middle Ages", Vol. XI (1959), pp. 18-28.
- "Scripture Readings during Holy Week in the West", Vol. XIII (1961), pp. 27-35.
- "Greek Rite in Malta", Vol. XV (1963), pp. 6-11.
- "The Homily", Vol. XVII (1965), pp. 35-48.
- "Pontifical Insignia: The Origin and Use", Vol. XXI (1969), pp. 26-51.
- "Pontifical Insignia", Vol. XXIII (1971), pp. 38-56.
- "Liturgical Symbolism in the Baptismal Homi-

- lies of St. John Chrysosthom and Theodore of Mopsuestia", Vol. XXIX (1977), pp. 29-42.
- MARIA, Odoricus de' "Quid Venit Nomine 'Indulgentiae' ", Vol. XVII (1965), pp. 49-51.  
"De Origine et Natura Duarum Potestatum Civilis et Ecclesiasticae", Vol. XVIII (1966), pp. 32-36.
- MICALLEF, P.J., "Abortion and the Double Effect Principle", Vol. XXV (1973), pp. 68-77.  
"Whether we can speak of a Difference between the Human Being and the Human Person", Vol. XXVII (1975), pp. 10-24.  
"Contemporary Trends in the Philosophy of Religion", Vol. XXIX (1977), pp. 3-18.
- MIZZI, Egidio, "I Generi Letterari nella Controversia Cattolica", Vol. XXVI (1974), pp. 16-25.
- MIZZI, J., Appunti Filologico-Esegetici per la Migliore Intelligenza della Versione Maltese di Matteo XIII, II", Vol. I, no. 4 (1948), pp. 24-32  
Vol. II, (1949), pp. 34-43, 119-123.  
"Mt. VI, 13 and a Peculiar Augustinian Reading", Vol. VII (1954), pp. 17-19.
- MONDIN, Battista "The Christian Humanism of John Paul II", Vol. XXXI (1980), pp. 10-22.  
Dialogo tra Marxismo e Cristianesimo, Vol. XXXI (1980) no. 2, pp. 22-31.
- MUSCAT, C., "Notio et Effectus Censurae ab Homine", Vol. IX (1956), pp. 22-26.  
"Clericatus et Provisio Canonica", Vol. XIV (1962), pp. 11-21.  
"De Sterilizatione", Vol. XIV (1962), pp. 75-80.  
"De Statu Gratiae Requisito in Sacerdote Celebrante", Vol. XV (1963), pp. 77-80.  
"Il Problema Morale della Pace e l'Azione della Chiesa", Vol. XVIII (1966), pp. 1-9.  
"Some Moral Reflections on Heart Transplant Surgical Procedures", Vol. XX (1968), pp. 1-11.  
"An Unknown and Unpublished XVth Century Manuscript", Vol. XXXI (1980), pp. 38-52.
- MUSCAT, G., "De Obligationibus Ordini Sacro Adnexis", Vol. XII (1960), pp. 46-50.

- NEUNHEUSER, B., "Problemi della Concelebrazione", Vol. XXIV (1972), pp. 1-8.
- PENASKOVIC, Richard, The Human Person: A Study in Paradox. Vol. XXXI (1980), no. 2, pp. 1-9.
- PEREIRA, T., "The Paschal Mystery and the 'Ordo Baptismi' Parvulorum", Vol. XXIV (1972), pp. 15-30  
Vol. XXV (1973), pp. 48-59.
- PIROTTA, Angelus, M., "De Sacerdotum Dignitate", Vol. I, no. 1 (1947), pp. 16-34.
- POUPARD, Paul, "L'Eglise et l'Avenir du Monde", Vol. XXX (1978-79), pp. 74-97.
- SANT, C., "Religious Worship in the Book of Amos", Vol. III (1950), pp. 75-92,  
Vol. IV (1951), pp. 34-47.  
"The Commentary of St. Thomas on Mt. 24: The Destruction of Jerusalem", Vol. VII (1954), pp. 1-16.  
"The Pentateuch and Catholic Criticism. The Catholic Critical School (1897-1906)", Vol. IX (1956), pp. 16-21.  
"Catholic Pentateuchal Studies (1906-1956)", Vol. X (1958), pp. 52-63.  
"The Promise narratives in Genesis", Vol. XI (1959), pp. 1-13, Vol. XII (1960), pp. 14-27.  
"The Merits of the Maltese Translation of the Bible by Prof. P.P. Saydon", Vol. XIII (1961), pp. 13-18.  
"The Non-Promise Narratives in Genesis", Vol. XIV (1962), pp. 62-74.  
"Links between the Three Main Divisions", Vol. XV (1963), pp. 41-49.  
"Links between the Three Main Division of the Book of Genesis (2)", Vol. XVI (1964), pp. 56-64.  
"Biblical Themes in the Constituion Lumen Gentium", Vol. XVII (1965), pp. 52-61.  
"Biblical Interpretation in 'Dei Verbum'", Vol. XIX (1967), pp. 1-12.  
"Eusebius of Caesarea's Views on the Canon of the Holy Scriptures and the Texts he Used in his Works", Vol. XXIII (1971), pp. 23-37.  
"Sex and Love in the Old Testament", Vol. XXVII (1975), pp. 1-9.

- SAPIANO, G., "Modern Phenomenology and Existential Experience", Vol. X (1958), pp. 47-51.
- SAYDON, P.P., "The New Latin Translation of the Psalter", Vol. I, no. 2 (1947), pp. 13-32.  
 "Dislocations in the Fourth Gospel with Reference to Recent Theory", Vol. I, no. 3 (1948), pp. 16-24.  
 "Book Chronicle — Some Recent Commentaries on the Bible". Vol. I, no. 4 (1948), pp. 62-65,  
 Vol. II (1949), pp. 70-72,  
 Vol. IV (1951), pp. 51-54.  
 "Recent Developments in Old Testament Literary Criticism", Vol. II (1949-50), pp. 79-96.  
 "Paleography of the Old Testament and its Bearing upon Textual and Literary Criticism of the Old Testament", Vol. III (1950), pp. 5-22.  
 "Cult and Prophecy in Israel",  
 Vol. IV (1952), pp. 75-88,  
 Vol. V (1952), pp. 7-16.  
 "The Literary Structure of Isaias 40-55 and the Servant Songs", Vol. VI (1953), pp. 1-15.  
 "The International Congress of Old Testament Scholars at Copenhagen", Vol. VI (1953), pp. 119-127.  
 "Gen. 3,15 in the Light of Recent Discussions", Vol. VII (1954), pp. 69-92.  
 "History of the Maltese Bible", Vol. IX (1956), pp. 1-15.  
 "The Second International Congress of Old Testament Scholars", Vol. IX (1956), pp. 72-81.  
 "St. Thomas Aquinas' Biblical Commentaries", Vol. X (1958), pp. 37-46.  
 "Domenicus Magri and his 'Apparentes Scripturae Contradictiones'", Vol. XI (1959), pp. 14-17.  
 "A Fragment of a Lectionary in the Royal Malta University Library", Vol. XII (1960), pp. 1-4.  
 "The Master-Idea of the Epistle to the Hebrews", Vol. XIII (1961), pp. 19-26.  
 "The Site of St. Paul's Shipwreck", Vol. XIV (1962), pp. 58-61.  
 "Disease and Healing in the Bible", Vol. XV (1963), pp. 12-27.  
 "The Maltese Translation of the Bible 2, Vol. XVI (1964), pp. 1-22.  
 "Some Biblico-Liturgical Passages Reconsider-

- ed”, Vol. XVIII (1966), pp. 10-17.
- SCHEMBRI, George “The Relevance of an Anthropologic-Biblical Approach in Contemporary Mariology”, Vol. XX (1968), pp. 26-32.  
 “The Penitential Act at the Beginning of the Mass in the ‘Ordines Romani’ ”, Vol. XXI (1969), pp. 52-57.  
 “The Offertory Rite in the Ordines Romani”, Vol. XXVII (1975), pp. 36-50.
- SCHEMBRI, Jos. “Hymnus Rebus Divinis Studentium”, Vol. I, no. 1 (1947), p. 57.  
 “Elegia in Honorem Sancti Thomae Aquinatis”, Vol. I, no. 2 (1947), p. 12.  
 “Melita Theologica”, Vol. I no. 3 (1948), p. 37.  
 “St. Thomas’s Interpretation of the Passion Psalm”, Vol. XII (1960), pp. 5-13.  
 “The Biblical Scholarship of P.P. Saydon”, Vol. XIII (1961), pp. 1-12.
- SERRACINO INGLOTT, Peter, “The Mass Media and Theology”, Vol. XVI (1964), pp. 65-72.  
 “The Structure of the Gilgamesh Epic”, Vol. XVII (1965), pp. 1-18.  
 “The Humanistic and Philosophical Training of Future Priests”, Vol. XVIII (1966), pp. 46-51.  
 “Marx and the Philosophy of History”, Vol. XXI (1969), pp. 15-25.  
 “On the Freudian Equation of Religious ritual with collective Infantilism”, Vol. XXIII (1971), pp. 9-22.  
 “L-Edukazzjoni Nisranija”, Vol. XXV (1973), pp. 26-29.  
 “The Meaning of Meaning and the Meaning of Revelation”, Vol. XXVI (1974), pp. 26-31.  
 “The Necessary Bilingualism of Christians”, Vol. XXVIII, (1976), pp. 30-43.
- SPITERI, Donat “An Outline of St. John’s Doctrine on the Divine Sonship of the Christian”, Vol. VIII (1955), pp. 1-25, 53-71.  
 Vol. IX (1956), pp. 14-38.  
 “The Specific Contribution of Divino Afflante Spiritu”, Vol. XXVI (1974), pp. 7-15.
- SPITERI, L., “De Iudicium Officiis”, Vol. XVII (1965), pp. 30-33.

- SULLIVAN, F.A., "The Holy Spirit and the Church: Some Recent Developments in Ecclesiology", Vol. XXIII (1971), pp. 1-8.
- TABONE, A., "Casus Morales", Vol. V (1952), pp. 45-50, 106-110, Vol. VI (1953), pp. 57-59, 127-132, Vol. VII (1954), pp. 44-46. "Casus Moralis", Vol. VIII (1955), pp. 78-81. "Il Conferimento della Cresima ai Moribondi secondo il Decreto del 14 Sett., 1946", Vol. V (1952), pp. 102-105. "Casus Canonico-Moralis", Vol. VII (1954), pp. 103-105. "De Transplantatione Organorum Humanorum", Vol. IX (1956), pp. 82-88. "De Partu sine Dolore et de Usu Narcoticorum", Vol. X (1958), pp. 64-68. "De Sponsalibus", Vol. XI (1959), pp. 51-57. "De Abusu Matrimonii et de Hysterectomia", Vol. XIII (1961), pp. 86-90. "De Privilegio Liberae Sepulturae", Vol. XIV (1962), pp. 1-10. "De Parocho Absolvente et Matrimonio Assistente", Vol. XV (1963), pp. 28-39. "De Quibusdam Actibus Illicitis in Matrimonio", Vol. XVI (1964), pp. 73-77. "De Quibusdam Officiis Parochi", Vol. XVII (1965), pp. 62-66, Vol. XVIII (1966), pp. 67-71.
- TABONE, P., "De Systemate Novi Codicis Juris Canonici", Vol. II (1949-50), pp. 97-112. "Quaestiones Morales", Vol. III (1950), pp. 99-106.
- TEUMA, Edmund "The Nature of "Iblis" in the Qur'an as interpreted by the Commentators Vol. XXXI, 1980, no. 2, pp. 10-21.
- TONNA, Benjamin "Sociology can Help Theology", Vol. XIX (1967), pp. 55-60.
- TUNG, B., "De Ordine Caritatis inter Propriam Alteriusque Vitam iuxta Theologos Franciscanos Saec. XVII" Vol. XI (1959), pp. 29-44, Vol. XII (1960), pp. 28-45, Vol. XIII (1961), pp. 65-85.

- VATTIONI, F., "Nota Scritturistica: Proverbi 3,8 ed Ecclesiastico 34, 14-16", Vol. XV (1963), pp. 73-76.
- VELLA, An., "Early Thomistic Controversies", Vol. III (1950), pp. 57-74, Vol. IV (1951), pp. 14-33.
- VELLA, Ar. "De Amore Hominis erga Deum et Semetipsum in Luce Doctrinae 'Totius et Patris' apud Sanctum Thomam", Vol. XVI (1964), pp. 48-55.  
"Agape" in 1 Corinthians XIII", Vol. XVIII (1966), pp. 22-31, 57-66, Vol. XIX (1967), pp. 44-54.
- WAARD, Jan de "Biblical Metaphors and their Translation", Vol. XXV (1973), pp. 13-25.
- WORGUL, George S., "Metz's Fundamental Theology", Vol. XXX (1978-79), pp. 54-73.
- ZAMMIT, George "Principles of Hexaemeron Interpretation according to St. Thomas", Vol. II (1949), pp. 5-16.  
"Bibliographical List of Articles in Reviews", Vol. I, no. 4 (1948), pp. 49-61, Vol. II, (1949), pp. 57-69.
- ZAMMIT, Paul "La Christologie de Paul Tillich, un Essai de Christologie pour Aujourd'hui", Vol. XXVI (1974), pp. 46-78.  
"L'Etre Nouveau dans le Christ est Notre Salut", Vol. XXIX (1977), pp. 43-69.
- Zarb, Seraphim M., "The Authority of St. Thomas Aquinas in Theology", Vol. II (1949), pp. 44-50, (1949-50), pp. 124-130.  
"A Mental Analysis of Creatures with respect to the Simplicity of God", Vol. VI (1953), pp. 16-29.  
"De Criterio Revelationis Divinae", Vol. XVI (1964), pp. 23-29.  
"III Congresso Internazionale degli Scrittori Cristiani", Vol. XIX (1967), pp. 13-23.

**PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED IN EXCHANGE WITH MELITA THEOLOGICA**

Angelicum  
 Asprenas  
 Analecta Tor  
 Augustinia num Aurora Christi  
 Bulletin d'Information de l'Academie Theologique — Varsovie.  
 carmelus  
 Catholic Biblical Quarterly  
 Clergy Review  
 Convergence  
 Currents in Theology  
 East Asian Pastoral Review  
 Ephemeridies Theologicae Lovaniensis  
 Evangelical Quarterly  
 Homiletic and Pastoral Review  
 Irish Theological Quarterly  
 Journal of Dharma  
 Journal of Ecumenical Studies  
 Journal of Philosophy  
 Journal of Psychology and Theology  
 Jurist (The)  
 Lateranum  
 Manuscripta  
 Marianum  
 Medicina e Morale  
 Melita Historica  
 Missione Oggi  
 Mulino (II)  
 New Liturgy  
 New Testament Abstracts  
 Nuevo Mundo  
 Old Testament Abstracts  
 Orientamenti Sociali  
 Parole di Vita  
 Parrocchia (La)  
 Presenza Pastorale  
 Rassegna di Teologia  
 Religious and Theological Abstracts  
 Renovatio,  
 Riflessi  
 Rivista (La) del Clero Italiano  
 Sacra Doctrina  
 Scripture in Church  
 Schede Bibliografiche  
 Scuola Cattolica

Spirituality Today  
Stromata  
Studia Patavina  
Studi Storici  
Studium  
Spiritualità Presbyteri — Quaderni di  
Teologia  
Theological Studies  
Vita Monastica  
Vita Sociale  
Teaching all Nations  
Worship.



**NSTS – the student travel bureau  
at your continual service**

- international student identity card and discount scheme**
- student and youth hostels and accommodation**
- student fares on various flight services**
- group and individual travel arrangements**
- student discounts on land & sea services**

**220, St. Paul Street,  
Valletta.**

**Tel: 64983 Tlx 626 MW**

## **TYPEWRITERS**

### **IMPERIAL - ROYAL - ADLER**

Dawn l-ismijiet huma magħrufin mad-dinja kollha għall-prodottj ta' kwalità u rezistenza mill-aqwa, bi prezzijiet mill-aktar attrajenti. Agħzel il-Mudell adattat għalik mill-portable għall-użu fid-dar kif ukoll varjetà ta' mudellj akbar għall-użu fl-uffiċini. Staqsu wkoll għal dettalji dwar l-electronic calculators ta' l-istess isem.

**IMPERIAL — ROYAL — ADLER**

Irrikorru għand l-Aġenti

**INDEX LIMITED**

31, Triq Federiku, Valletta.

Tel: 625846 - 607094

240, Triq ir-Repubblika,

Valletta.

Tel: 22060

kif ukoll

**TWINLOCK INTERNATIONAL**

132, Triq l-Arċisqof.

Valletta.

(qrib il-Knisja tal-Griegi)

# **SULLIVAN & SULLIVAN LTD.**

● **SHIPPING** ● **FORWARDING**

● **INSURANCE**

**Tel: 29497 - 627358 - 625946**

**TRAVEL ● ALL INCLUSIVE TOURS**

● **TRAVEL INSURANCE ETC.**

**TEL: 624715 - 625946**

*OR CALL AT:*

**150, ST. LUCIA STREET, VALLETTA**

Telex 239

Cables NAVILLUS

# **PRECA LIBRARY**

**Society of Christian Doctrine,  
Blata l-Bajda, Malta.**

**The only store in the Island  
specialising in books, cards, posters,  
filmstrips, cassettes and a wide  
range of religious gift items.**

**Publishers of Maltese religious literature  
and leading importers/distributors of  
religious books.**