CONCEPTUALISING LABOUR IN DEVELOPMENT: A THEORETICAL REVIEW

Godfrey Baldacchino

INTRODUCTION

This article reviews the changing prerogatives of development theory and strategy within a historical perspective. Their implications on "the labour question" are reviewed, particularly from the perspectives of popular, radical and functionalist positions. The suggestion is then made for adopting a perspective to labour studies which properly captures the interplay between structure and agency in the management of the circumstances of production. The methodology is recommended as a guide to studies and research on issues concerning labour (sic personnel or human resources).

LABOUR IN DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND STRATEGY

"Development" has long been tacitly equated to growth with an appealing simplicity, and growth is generally understood as implying the expansion of productive capacity based on the accumulation of capital. Thus labour, from this perspective, is important only in so far as it contributes to the creation of surplus value within an economic capitalist system. The biases in favour of industrial, wage-earning, productive labour, hailing back to the emergence of political economy, persist. But they are accentuated and given a definite normative tinge because non-productive labour – that which does not produce commodities – is also seen as a burden on the developing economy. It is an anachronism which must, in some way, be reformed and armed with skills, social mobility, a "hungriness motive" and/or enterpreneurship to join the ranks of the producers. Labour policy is already gripped by the imperative to create a work force which "must be recruited, committed, advanced in its skills, and maintained in a state of productivity...mobile geographically and occupationally, must be educated and must be given a structure of rules within which to work".

Within the parameters of development, the sharpened cardinal objective of labour policy is the transformation of a rural – meaning backward, subsistence oriented, idle and underproductive – mass population into a skilled, industrial, consumer oriented proletariat.

A PASSING PARADE OF MODELS

The act of cherishing such an ambitious project can only be understood if situated historically, and accompanied with a critical stance which permits a review of the "passing parade" of development models. In the wake of rampant
decolonization, the governments of newly independent countries were under popular pressure to speed up the development process, thus consolidating their own fledgling political power and at the same time engaging in a programme of cultural and economic nation-building. The cold war helped to ensure a plentiful supply of aid in cash or in kind to third world clients. And, irrespective of whether the choice fell on Western or Soviet models, the emphasis was invariably for an industrialisation strategy. After all, industrialisation had been the key to the (different but equally impressively successful) economic development of both First and Second Worlds. It was treated as virtually synonymous with development itself. It promised substantial value added, economic verticalisation and domestic linkages, skill formation, work discipline, large scale non-seasonal employment, greater economic self-reliance and a move away from the dependent status of primary production which colonial economic policy had dictated for many years.

THE PROBLEM OF POVERTY: A HISTORICAL SWEEP

The starting point of the so-called “labour question” in development theory and policy was invariably the phenomenon of rampant labour underutilisation, going back to the colonial period: “The fact that in Asia and Africa hundreds of millions of human hands are lying idle, capable of being employed, if at all, only for a few months of the year, and then for the most part in a highly unproductive way”. Within the general concern with scarcity which forms the basic preoccupation in subjective preference, neo-classical economics, labour appeared initially as the scarcest resource - unwilling or unable to join the other, presumably available, factors of production to create wealth. Already in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, European observers and colonial administrators had noted the apparent abundance of leisure among indigenous workers and the chronic shortages of unskilled wage labour. Their conclusion was given flesh as a respectable theory: A leisure-preference hypothesis and a backward bending supply curve of labour. This reinforced the image of the lazy and directionless primitive (in contrast to the industrious, work-ethic infused, western master) and legitimated, apart from moral superiority, a low wage policy.

Research eventually suggested that labour scarcity in both rural and urban employment was better explained by the miserable remuneration paid to labour (which made it suicidal to leave the subsistence economy and therefore explained seasonality of employment and temporary migrations) as well as by the absence of worker or legislative pressure on employers to raise wages, given the active policy of generating labour supplies. The resort to leisure, that is the refraining from wage employment, began to be seen more as an involuntary act.
Hence, the old assumptions underlying conventional wisdom came up for revision. One cause of poverty and lethargy (against which the resources of the rich world were powerless to intervene) was replaced by another (against which the rich world could apply an already proven prescription). People were now depicted as willing and able to work, if only there was productive work available. In a variation of the Marshall Plan's single-barrier, bottleneck theory, the existence of unlimited supplies of labour waiting in the wings to be productively unleashed was hailed as a great advantage to countries seeking to achieve high and rapid rates of growth. Dualist economics described how the marginal product of labour in the traditional subsistence sector—which was claimed to be close to zero in any case—would be below the going wage in the modern sector, thus guaranteeing a highly elastic supply of labour even at low wage rates. The way forward was confidently laid out, and would be activated naturally, following the establishment of a growth pole or a propellant industry.

One basic fallacy of the labour surplus philosophy (as with the backward bending supply curve of labour before it) lies in its improper understanding of the working behaviour of indigenous workers in the subsistence sector. The absence of productive, meaning market-oriented, work had been wrongly interpreted as the absence of work activity itself. Peasants and rural workers were actually believed to be most of the time idle—doing nothing, a view reinforced by the tropical temperatures. Yet, empirical investigation suggests that rural subsistence workers may even have too much to do.

But the main outcome of the fallacious premises of modernisation theory was that the sleeping giant of labour underutilisation, indeed, had been awakened; but it was now on the verge of an uncontrollable rampage. Even where fast economic growth in real terms had been achieved, the outcome was very rarely accompanied by a trickling down of wealth to the lower rungs of society. There was a widespread failure of the modern urban industries to generate a sufficient number of employment opportunities. The blame was placed on a push-pull combination resulting in a mass rural exodus to the towns. The political and economic bargaining power of emerging trade unions was also hailed as the culprit behind wage increases among urban/mining labour segments unmatched by productivity gains, leading to a preference for capital-intensive technology. The outcome on labour was rampant unemployment and underemployment, especially in urban concentrations, made worse by levels of high population growth. The threat of escalating labour costs and of a climate not conducive to foreign investment encouraged the establishment of political repression, a situation which further curtailed the possibilities of pluralist industrial relations for the organised labour minority.

If one understands labour policy to mean management, or "the marshalling of the labouring population to get the necessary work done", then in the context of developing areas, the policy instruments to do so were, simplistically
put, on one hand, a "destruction of natural economy" via slavery, indenture, monetary tribute, landlessness or debt bondage;\textsuperscript{17} and, on the other, the promotion of widespread total, seasonal or partial proletarianisation, a combination which guaranteed that the price for labour would remain cheap.\textsuperscript{18} This was the case in the unskilled, unprotected job opportunities created by mobile foreign investment in both primary (such as plantations) and secondary (screwdriver industries and textiles) economic production. Free Enterprise Zones attracted young (cheap and disciplined) women, although nimble fingers and patience are often cited as formal justification.\textsuperscript{19} Meanwhile, strategic and skilled personnel (the military, miners, dockworkers, public servants) enjoyed such relatively envious conditions of work that have been considered in the literature as labour aristocrats, lost forever to the revolutionary cause.\textsuperscript{20} The bulk of the remainder eked out an existence in a sprawling and unrecognised informal urban or rural economy as landless, casual poor, swelling the ranks of the underemployed, the unemployed and the petty self-employed.\textsuperscript{21}

In recognition of this "breakdown of modernization", optimistic evolutionism gave way to a mixed bag of less euphoric policy prescriptions.\textsuperscript{22} Departing from the painful recognition that economic development was evidently not synonymous with economic growth, a compromise, reformist strategy of redistribution with growth was put forward.\textsuperscript{23} The model called for the guarantee of basic needs for all and for the adoption of more labour-intensive techniques and the promotion of small scale industry which would reduce inequalities in the general process of increasing income. A rural development school switched its focus onto the rural areas, encouraging the raising of rural income levels via land reform, appropriate technology and a boost of agricultural productivity.\textsuperscript{24} One significant novelty here was the hitherto neglected informal sector, now recognised as holding great promises of productive activity, given a positive relationship with the state and the modern sector.\textsuperscript{25}

In contrast, radical underdevelopment theorists diagnosed the crux of the crisis to lie in the inherently exploitative, capital extracting world economic system, fostered and defended locally be a neo-colonial state and a \textit{comprador} bourgeoisie which siphoned off potential capital investment.\textsuperscript{26} Such a structural diagnosis of the problem called for a structural solution, intended to wean countries away from international dependence and an emiserising world economy. Reformist strategies were seen to be attacking the symptoms and not the real causes of the problem.\textsuperscript{27} Calls were made in the early 1970's for the establishment of a New International Economic Order, involving a drastic restructuring of international trade practices.\textsuperscript{28} The empirical countering of imperialism was sought via a more active state role as an enlightened investor and manager of the local economy as well as via attempts at enhanced self-reliance via import substituting industrialisation.\textsuperscript{29}
Such protectionist policies, however, generally fell victim to political patronage and economic inefficiency. Coupled with consumer demands for more and better choice, such policies by and large failed the test of time and heightened rather than reduced international dependence because of resulting indebtedness on an unprecedented scale. The cumulative effects of oil price hikes, the grips of a world recession, failed ambitious development programmes, stagnating agriculture and deteriorating terms of trade have contributed to long term national indebtedness with a blacklash effect even on the relatively secure, public sector salariat. Other countries simply failed to “take off” and remain located as primary producers in the “old” international division of labour, banana republics victims of an enclave, often monocrop, plantation economy. Elsewhere, natural disasters, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, have meant that even the natural economy safety net had been dealt a heavy blow. Those countries which actually succeeded in establishing themselves as vigorous and competitive exporters have apparently done so in the context of exceptional historical circumstances, and at the price of stifling political opposition and/or by fostering effective subsidising mechanisms within the domestic economy.

This most recent crisis of developing nations has led to the perhaps irrevocable breakup of the (always strained) concept of a unified Third World. The newly industrialising ‘tigers’ — particularly the Asian ‘Gang of Four’ (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore) along with Mexico — have now been promoted to a class of their own and theoretical debate addresses the effects of their successful industrialisation spurt within the context of global post/neo-fordist restructuring and relocation. Those indebted beyond relief are relegated to a still lower rung of a “fourth world” which effectively is a public declaration of the absence of credit worthiness. These countries—the new LDCs—now risk serious emarginalisation from aid, trade and investment flows. Development policy for them is down to basics, concerned with the fulfilment of basic needs in spite of conditions of negative growth. And everywhere, the role of government as an active agent in the process of economic development has come under attack, not only for ideological reasons; but on the basis of the poor track record of domestic policy which failed to respect market discipline—by interfering with prices and exchange rates; dampening private enterprise, investing in large unproductive bureaucracies, squandering funds on white elephants and warmongering as well as indulging in corrupt practices. The retrenchment of the state in the economy is also to be seen as one of the rigorous conditionalities of structural adjustment which inevitably accompany the “salvage operations” of the IMF and World Bank. Recent events which have led to the sudden collapse of the Second World alternative serve to reinforce further this anti-Keynesian policy orientation that government is not the solution but the problem.
POPULAR IMAGES

All of this has about it a certain Malthusian air of the inevitable. And, indeed, it conforms very well to the prevailing popular image, fed by the western media, of the labour condition in developing countries. The labouring masses are looked upon exactly in this sense: as amorphous and impersonal millions who lack the will, let alone the ways and means, to influence, much less to control, their lives. They are portrayed not only as generally idle and lazy but also as silent and expressionless, so subdued in the (heroic) bearing of perpetual misery that they are incapable of anything else. This conforms to the cultivated myths of functionalist industrial relations, where workers are seen (or perhaps desired to be?) submerged passively in scenarios determined by strategic management and other industrializing elites. This image of deficiency is reinforced by the selective media reportage on third world events, which generally make the headlines only occasionally to report yet another flood, famine, earthquake or epidemic. This perspective may evoke pity and sympathy but not empathy and understanding. It thus serves to cultivate a more discreet, contemporary form of benevolent paternalism.

Otherwise developing world labour is depicted as composed of uncontrollable revolutionaries taking part in demonstrations, civil wars or military coups. While in themselves indicative that there is more than mere resignation in the third world character, such episodes are often reported out of context and suggest volatile, untrustworthy, indisciplined and violent mobs easily manipulated by power-hungry demagogues— invariably chiefs or generals. This process of stereotypication is a common feature among social groupings which lack sufficient control and influence over the means of communication. For most, therefore, the people of the Third World are simply passively waiting for their deathbell, with the occasional uprising or revolt adding a spice of adventure to an otherwise dull and drab existence.

RADICAL IMAGES

In the more radical literature, which theoretically acknowledges conflict among social classes as a powerful causal dialectic, labour does at least enjoy the pride of centre stage. Nevertheless, the preferential focus on the labouring condition has tended towards one of two extremes. The romantic and optimistic indulge in the utopian search for a revolutionary working class, concentrating on the otherwise very fleeting episodes of explosive unrest by the industrial proletariat. And, faced with very few concrete cases of this, the category of analysis may be widened to incorporate other oppressed social groupings. Add to this the portrayal of trade unions in the developing world as corrupt organisations unable to advance anything but the bigoted self-interest of already powerful union cadres and privileged occupational groups. The logical outcome appears to be to cry farewell to the working class altogether, with its imputed messianic role. Such a vision effectively relegates worker action analysis to somewhat rare and exceptional moments— as would a botanist who studies the life pattern of a cactus on the basis of its short and fleeting flowering period.
Alternatively, for those focussing on structural features and global tendencies—such as the penetrations of capitalism, the articulation of modes of production and the international division of labour—it is easy to become gripped with pessimistic functionalism. The temptation here is, in strictly Althusserian fashion, to ascribe these with deterministc powers. Whether explaining urban unemployment, capital accumulation, class alliances or class ideologies, the procedure, at the bottom line, tends invariably towards the same *deus ex machina* — the (changing?) reproductive needs of western capitalism. Indeed, the growing, explicit recognition of the international dimension to labour affairs makes it so much easier to emphasise the global structures and processes which impinge upon workers than to assess the sporadic, weak and often invisible reactions of workers to these. All the more so when the collapse of the command economies of Eastern Europe has legitimated with vigour the lack of a workable alternative to free market capitalism and reinforced the logic of industrialism and the end of ideology and history. The bargaining potential and initiative of any form of individual or collective behaviour disappears from the agenda of possibility. The very *raison d'être* of labour organisation may be questioned.

**A ROLE FOR THE HUMAN ACTOR**

Yet, global determinism is a far from homogenous affair. The shaping of actual labour relations and labour policy is carried out in the context of uneven capitalist development, where potential internationalisation is realised historically in concrete, local social formations. One such consequence is that, other than as a gross generalisation, it is most difficult to talk in terms of a homogenous working class. There are real distinctions of nationality, race, gender, skill and status which separate worker from worker. The issue is compounded by the large numbers of non-proletarian workers as well as by myriad variations of proletarianisation. It appears to make more sense to speak of working classes rather than impute a simple working class. Otherwise the large majority of the developing world’s labouring population would be automatically excluded. This state of affairs inhibits the construction of a unified labour concept in theory as much as of labour solidarity in practice.

Nor is the terrain of labour organisation and reaction necessarily straightjacketed to the level of structures, albeit different ones. One cannot simply turn a blind eye to the natural tendency of human beings to respond to objective socio-economic conditions. Continually and inexorably, people both influence and are influenced by human and impersonal factors and forces in their lives as workers. Admittedly, other persons, plans, markets or organisations shape the quality of their lives, define the limits of their potential, influence their aspirations, tastes, skills and consciousness in different and significant ways. But to such a reception, workers may, individually or collectively,
consciously or otherwise, react, seeking to escape, forget, succumb or else transform or influence intended effects with different degrees of success. After all, structures which appear to have a life of their own are, more often than not, historical products which trace their origin to social dynamics. Hence social structures may be better understood as epiphenomena, reflections of a process through which different people try to sustain, advance or change their interest. The responsive mechanism of the management of circumstances by the human interface can thus be easily lost within a panoply of powerful and seemingly inescapable structures. Overstating the objectivity and passivity of workers is tantamount to overkill.

The danger here is to consider the human response as being a relatively autonomous project, as the "consumer is king" philosophy would have us believe. But nor should one perhaps dismiss completely the existence of action strategies and alternatives by individual actors, some of which are surprisingly rational and ingenious. The terrain between the dangerous pitfalls of neoliberal humanistic reductionism and politico-economic structuralism is to be skilfully negotiated. Global forces, along with histories, cultures, resources, personal qualities and skills, do limit possibilities but that does not mean that they determine outcomes. They always allow a number of alternatives, leaving some room for manoeuvre within which actors individually or collectively realise, or fail to realise, their conflicting and contradictory projects and, as a result, bring about social change. There is always something which can be done; nor is the choice in doing so forced upon us.

In a sense, the fundamental concern of development should perhaps be addressed precisely at the creation of more options for more people, the creation and provision for the greatest number of people of more choices and better life chances. Just as with revolutionary impulses, resignation to the status quo is neither natural nor inevitable; the seeds of such a response not least occasioned by the techno-social experience of work itself. Hence the diversity of response increases in the understanding of the objective diversity of work experiences.

LABOUR RELATIONS BEYOND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

Moving on to the technocratic model of conventional industrial relations, the plea is once again to move beyond, but in a different sense: In the western context, industrial relations has emerged naturally given the industrial character of the workforce, working in formal, stable, urban, organised, male dominated, large scale establishments. But this has only been the exceptional case in the developing world, nor does it look like being the case in the foreseeable future. Following on the narrow wage earning segment is the limited extent of trade unionism, not only in terms of absolute numbers and membership density but also given the more heavily regulated and institutionalised curtailment of other
than pre-programmed trade union action. And while trade unions may be recognised as legitimate bargaining agents, all other forms of labour organisation and action, whether individual or collective, may easily be once again relegated to a marginality which may incorrectly be mistaken for inexistence.

The very selective orientation of industrial relations studies in developing countries may perhaps be seen as a reformist concession to the most strategic and potentially most troublesome labour segments. But, in isolating groups of workers for special treatment, the descriptive and explanatory powers which industrial relations studies bring to bear on labour organisation, control and resistance become pathetically limited: They cannot vouch for the far richer, more assorted and complex reality of the developing world condition. By the standardised criteria of industrial conflict, third world workers would prove to be surprisingly docile, if not outrightly content: They are generally non-unionised, they do not strike and they do not play truant. But worker resistance can, and does, take different forms apart from the ones expected when using the industrial relations lens. These forms may be easily overlooked therefore, all the more so because they tend to be hidden or latent, silent and unorganised.

Indeed, steady deindustrialisation and fragmentation of production are causing a resort to work relations which differ from the traditional stable employment patterns even in the western world – migrant labour, homeworking, subcontracting, cooperatives, part-time and contract employment – the study of industrial relations risks becoming an anachronistic analytic tool even on its home turf. A purist pursuit may nevertheless be encouraged and sustained both out of financial discipline – that's where the bulk of sponsorship for labour studies originates anyway – and because of the much lower levels of public concern with work activities invisible to the police, trade unions, safety officers, tax collectors and the general public eye: Hence a convenient disguise to practices where the absolute exploitation of labour may proceed unperturbed.

The deficiency in scope must be twinned to a deficiency in method. Industrial relations has been dominated by structural-functionalist and cyberneticist systems models which serve as indirect apologetics to the forces of order and authority, such that the essence of social order is not questioned. The perseverance of this approach and its promulgation by respectable international bodies is perhaps indicative of its socially cathartic effect in chanelling labour protest into tolerable expression and sterilising it from the more sensitive area of political mobilization.

Indeed, in the cold neo-liberal climate of the 1980s, the emphasis on the reification of labour appears even further advanced. Labour relations specialists in both industry and academia have been forced to come to better terms with the spirit of human resource management and human capital theory which seek – in the name of market discipline – to re-establish the dominance of a functionalist perspective. Perhaps this even transcends its previous systemic
and pluralist framework by imposing a monist, unitary one where there is now only one recognised policy making elite, enlightened management, and only one form of labour mobilisation, responsible unionism.\textsuperscript{65} Workers have returned to being a resource, robbed this time of legitimate room to react, their institutions discredited, their actions accused of subversive political motives, their academic and media supporters made redundant or readily incorporated and silenced within less critical departments.\textsuperscript{66}

**TAKING STOCK**

The "gestalt switch"\textsuperscript{67} in the study of labour may thus be summarised as follows: Firstly, the worker is definitely the central social agent.\textsuperscript{68} One key idea dismissed as debilitating is that there are only a few workers in the developing world. The scope of the working class, confined to wage earners in industry, perhaps also assuming that this is an emergent class which will eventually engulf all other forms of productive employment, is not borne out in practice.\textsuperscript{69} Another dismissal is that these workers are either completely passive (except when regimented through fairly tightly orchestrated protest) or totally sovereign in what they choose to do. The actual balance cannot be specified across the board or \textit{a priori} because this also depends on specific space-time configurations. Thirdly, the critically widened scope of both the working class(es) and of labour resourcefulness suggest a complementary widening of concepts relating to social relations of production, labour formation, control and resistance. Lastly, by dismissing the preconceived primacy of either conflict or consensual social relations as well as by widening the definitional scope of key organising principles, there is a danger of ideological adriftness;\textsuperscript{70} or, worse still, the failure to become aware of ideological positions and normative perspectives which impinge all along the research process: infusing one's research question, one's methodology, one's presumed conclusions.\textsuperscript{71}

Nevertheless, such a conscious attempt at normative distancing is crucial if what is at stake is a process of theoretical formulation and articulation carried out by the examination of, and exposure to, a particular set of data.

**CONCLUSION**

The division of caricatured humanity into utopians and pedants is deplorable. The upholders of the former ascribe too much volition and autonomy to individuals, expecting them to move mountains and defy all odds with will power, knowledge and drive. Functions, policies and strategies are considered without exposing their relationship to structures which mould, inhibit and distort processes and people. This is perhaps the strongest critique one could level at the contemporary more popular variant of labour policy and labour relations— that of strategic human resource management. The technocratic focus is simply too empty of two centuries of advances in the social sciences. The other extreme perspective, yet as equally resorted to as the former, is to play paranoid and ascribe powerlessness across the board, a stance reminescent of puny, mock-heroic mortal status in Greek mythology.
“What is needed is to marry the two: Pedantic utopians or utopic pedants—who cultivate, with informed fantasy, imaginative but carefully worked out visions of alternative social possibilities”. To rehash an old and hackneyed phrase which however remains surprisingly fresh, it is men (and women) who make history, but not just as they please: They make it under circumstances directly encountered and transmitted from the past, inter alia, which they cannot control. But they make it nevertheless.

Dr Godfrey Baldacchino is Research Officer at the Workers’ Participation Development Centre, University of Malta.

Notes

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1. The discipline of political economy directed attention away from the sphere of circulation and trade (with the money difference between buying goods and selling them dear as the source of wealth for the mercantilists) to the sphere of production—Chatterjee (1987, p. 49).

2. The hunger motive is a revealingly crude concept coined by Samuelson (1966) to represent the incentive to work.


7. “The African worker is inherently indolent...His direct wants are few; the climate is warm and he needs little clothing; ... leisure ranks high in his scale of preference” – Guillebaud, a commentator, quoted in Sabot (1979). For other examples, see Illife (1969) and Orde-Browne (1946).

8. On the backward bending supply curve of labour see Berg (1961). For an example of low wage policy justification, note the following by a colonial administrator: “...travelling labourers...have a definite sum in view and that they hope to earn that amount and then go home again...Consequently, the offer of more money seldom has much attraction; increased wages enables him to leave earlier, but do not persuade him to remain longer” – Orde-Browne (1946).


11. Rostow (1956) and Perroux (1955) respectively.


13. “The average per capita income has increased by over 50% since 1960. (Nevertheless) the incidence of poverty...seems to have either stagnated or further increased.” Brara (1983, p. 2).

14. Todaro (1973) and Tidrick (1975) both propose “wage-gap” models of urban unemployment.


17. On the destruction of the “natural economy” see Bradby (1975).

18. A focus on the creation of a developing world labour force is expounded by Munslow & Finch (1984, pp. 1–17). These processes are perhaps best described in studies utilising the “articulation of modes of production” approach. See Foster-Carter (1984) for an overview.


22. A diagnosis of the disorder in the sequence of development is attempted by Eisenstadt (1969).
24. This philosophy was adopted by FAO in a major project undertaken in eight Asian countries in the early 1970’s – see FAO (1977, 1979). On the “urban bias” of most development projects see Lipton (1977) and Streeten (1986, p. 23).
25. “The informal sector... is composed of the self-employed and small scale traditional crafts and services, all unprotected by government policies. In the informal sector are the hawkers, porters, shoe-shine boys, but also the small scale craftsmen, small retail traders, own account workers and unpaid family workers” – Meier (1977, pp. 16 – 7). The sector includes “heterogenous sets of activities and of people, whose definition is imprecise, and who have no identifiable, analytically useful common characteristics” – Bienefeld & Godfrey (1975, p. 7).
27. Brara (1983); Blaikie et al. (1979); Seddon (1982).
28. Resolutions 3201 and 3202 (S-VI) adopted by the UN General Assembly on May 1st 1974.
29. The most notable being the policy advocated by Prebisch (1950) and the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA/CEPAL).
30. See, for example, Kaplinsky (1983, p. 205).
33. Shaw (1986); JASPA (1986).
34. The performance of such a “reserve army” role is discussed by Dore (1983) with reference to Japan. Streeten (1983), also makes relevant comments in the context of the “success” stories of South Korea and Taiwan.
36. See, for example, Cline (1982).
38. Neo-Liberalism as expounded by Friedman and Friedman (1976), the rediscovered Hayek (1976) and the “new development economics” of Balassa, Lal, Little, Scitovsky and Scott – reviewed in Toye (1987).
40. Korner et al. (1986, Chapter 4).
41. Schneider (1987, p. 8).
42. See Dunlop (1958, pp. 317–341); Kerr et al. (1960) and criticism by Cox (1977, pp. 409).
43. This is allegedly due to the effects of the iron law of oligarchy – Michels (1949) – the subordination of unions to nationalist governments, documented evidence of corrupt and maverick leadership; the proneness to “trade union imperialism”. See discussion in Munck (1988, Chapters 6 & 10).
44. Skopcol (1979); Burawoy (1985, p. 6).
45. As described by Bourdieu (1980) and quoted by Lipietz (1984, p. 81).
47. See for example Dunn (1990).
52. The dialectic, hailing from Marx, has been described as labour control and labour resistance – Crisp (1984, p. 1); Munck (1988, Chapter 7). The concepts’ application is however usually limited to the industrial proletariat and the capital-labour relations to which it is subjected.
54. For example, "many of the pejorative stereotypes about small scale farmers have been challenged as impressive levels of environmental knowledge and sound ergonomic principles are being repeatedly identified, documented and confirmed by scientific investigation"—Barker & Spence (1988, p. 198). Lipton (1977, p. 264) describes how the farmer is no fool. See also Chambers (1983) and Pitt (1970, p. 265).
55. See, for example, from different historical periods, how Gramaci and Giddens try in their different ways to manoeuvre their way between agency and structure: See Femia (1981, pp. 83–5) and Giddens (1984) respectively.
61. See for example, the Passfield Memorandum of 1929—commented upon by Harrod (1988, p. 50).
63. The issue of hegemony, the presumed authority of the state and the symbolic equilibrium between the forces of capital and labour in collective bargaining are cases in point. See Schuller (1985, Chapter 2) and Fox (1974, p. 207).
64. Cohen (1980b, pp. 8–9; 1987, pp. 4–8).
65. Dunn (1990); Hyman (1989, p. 13). On the difference between the pluralist and unitary traditions in industrial relations see, for example, Burchill (1992).
68. Bergquist (1984, p. 15); Bjorkman et al. (1988, p. 64).

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