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THE CONTENTS OF TRADITION AND THE DISCONTENTS OF CULTURE

Edward G. Farrugia, S.J.

Wherever there are lovers there are whispers – and wherever whispers abound suspicion is bound to arise. So, maybe, it is not enough to appeal to love in order to explain culture. Love, that Figaro of modern-day psychologists, sociologists, counsellors and preachers, could, as a term, profit from some linguistic analysis. A term which is used to express everything says, in the last analysis, nothing specific.

One reason, perhaps, why contemporary culture finds it so imperative to establish a link to love is because, according to the well-known thesis of Sigmund Freud, the contents of culture are negative.[1] We do what we do, undertake arduous enterprises, build cities, discover deserts, chart oceans, explore space, because we are afraid of death. On the contrary, love is stronger than death and capable of making us survive where pyramids crumble and hearts fail. But where this love-link does not reach a faith beyond "animal faith" (to borrow a phrase from G. Santayana, while giving it a specific meaning)[2] it would be idle to talk of positive or love-contents of culture.

We need desperately to be reminded of this because we find ourselves in the opposite danger, namely to reduce tradition to a cultural form and then ascribe to it the negative signs of culture. Precisely this confusion is at the roots of our discontent (*Unbehagen*) with tradition. A typical form of Western European reasoning runs as follows: "There is no argument against a particular novelty, *except that of tradition.* Therefore, let us go ahead and implement our dreams!" Since Orthodoxy is associated, and rightly so, with tradition, the dissatisfaction with culture is transferred, consciously or unconsciously, to Orthodoxy and the East generally. Actually, however, it is

1. See G. Ebeling, "Lebensangst und Glaubensanfechtung. Erwägungen zum Verhältnis von Psychotherapie und Theologie," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 70 (1973) 77-100.

2. In his *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, (New York 1923) G. Santayana (1863-1952) tried to show that skepticism, pushed to its logical consequences, would unsettle both idealism and materialism and that therefore an "animal faith" is needed that goes beyond the immediate grasp of things. There is, in the love that builds culture, a similar transcending of an immediate "do ut des," a capacity to wait, in faith, for long-term results.

not an argument that concerns only the East, but also the West. In Roman Catholicism tradition plays a central role, comparable to that in Orthodoxy, whereas it is typical of the erosion of the role of tradition that, as a matter of principle, the burden of the proof is often supposed to lie with those who question the change proposed. So, the erosion of tradition is a common European argument because, if we abstract from Europe's tradition, we would have to invent one anyhow.

No language is as living as a dead language

A main psychological reason why contemporary culture has lost the sense of tradition is that this is often considered to be a dead language. The example of Latin is instructive. It used to be spoken, but is no longer used as mother tongue by anybody. We can trace the beginning of the end with Latin as a living language back to Quintillian, who maybe died before A.D. 100,[3] when the difference between written and spoken word starts getting to be particularly noticeable.[4] Indeed, philosophically speaking, a dead language has significance in terms of the difference between what is written and what is spoken. Could we claim a comparable value, in a theological framework, for dead languages?

While it would be to beg the question if we were to go along with the common prejudice and simply assume, without further ado, that tradition is a dead language, the opposite is not true. In theology, there is a difference between the written and the spoken word, and it lies at the heart of theology itself. Many would call it the difference between Scripture and Tradition, even though it might not occur to them to further specify that the difference between what used to be – misleadingly – called "the two sources of revelation" is really one between two kinds of words – between the spoken and the written word. Precisely this ignorance of the ontological status of the word is at the root of the widespread contempt of tradition.[5] But theology knows better. It

3. In *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, (Oxford 1968) p.754, H.E. Butler writes on Quintillian: "The date of his own death is uncertain. It is rashly assumed that he died before A.D. 100 on the strength of Pliny's words 'ita certe ex Quintiliano praeceptore meo audisse memini' (written 97-100). Others have estimated the year of his death to have been later (about A.D. 118).

4. See W. Ong, *La presenza della parola*, (Bologna 1970) 90-93.

5. See Y. Congar, *La tradition et les traditions* II, (Paris 1963) 137-180. For a succinct review of the Orthodox viewpoint see Bishop K. Ware, "Tradition and Traditions," in N. Lossky *et alii*, *Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement*, (Geneva 1991) 1013-1018.

knows, with the pre-Nicene tradition common to both East and West that only the Son of God, the second Person of the Trinity, can reveal the Father, which is why the Son is called the Logos, the Word. Every revelation is to be seen in function of this Word, is nothing but a modality of this Word.

Theologians have not always pursued to the last the question about the implication of this for theology, as well as for culture. They have not particularly devoted time to the issue of what the status of humans would have been like had the Trinitarian God not spoken, had God chosen not to reveal Himself – whether they would then not be condemned to wait for God to break the silence or whether the human species as we know it would exist at all. On the one hand, some (e.g., K. Rahner) have asked whether, if humans should forget the meaning of God altogether, humanity as we know it, defined as it is by its intercourse with mystery, would not have become extinct, since it would have transmuted itself into a new breed of wily animal.[6] But theologians have not asked what culture would be like if there was no essential difference between the written and the spoken word. The Reformers' emphasis on the theology of the word (with its bias for scriptures) seems to imply that the written is the primary normative form of the word, spoken and written.[7] *Verba volant, scripta manent!* Nor have they (= theologians) asked what culture would have been like had God chosen to reveal Himself, but with the understanding that that revealed word was not to be committed to writing but was rather to be passed on from generation to generation as the spoken word – somewhat like the process in which Homer's poetry was handed on from generation to generation, or, better still, like that in which revelation itself was first transmitted before it was set down into writing.

It is hard to surmise how things could have been like. Weary speculation pushes us back onto our side of reality. We may guess that, under our current way of conceiving things, if the distinction between written and spoken word came to be missing then there would be, strictly speaking, no dead languages, but simply extinct languages having no chance of being revived. Perhaps the term "dead language" is a misnomer, anyway. Not the language is dead but rather there are no longer people around to speak it as their mother-tongue. These language-carriers lived further in the hearts and minds of those who were on speaking terms with them, by studying their language and literature,

6. K. Rahner, *Grundkurs des Glaubens*, (Freiburg i.Br. 1976) 57-58.

7. See Ong, *La presenza della parola*, 294-320.

but now that Latin is fast becoming an exotic language they are doubly dead, killed by lethal sickness and assassinated by fatal neglect. That this, as such, is no plaidoyer to restore Latin – a point which is just not under discussion here – may be gathered from the following consideration, more of an ontological than of a pedagogical nature.

Nothing is so alive as a dead person. What N.A. Berdjaev (1874-1948) said of the dead we extend to dead languages. Both dead persons and dead languages have something in common. First of all, the distinction between living and dead characterizes reality only from the viewpoint of this side of eternity, i.e. from the human viewpoint of looking at things. God does not draw such a distinction at all. He only deals with the living, whereas we are forced to compartmentalize reality into the living and the dead.[8] Death, for the believer, removes this ambiguity and makes him see reality without the logical mortgage of death. Besides, there are eloquent examples of the superiority in vitality of the dead over the living. Many a tyrant who thought to remove a perilous opponent from the land of the living found, after the crime was committed, the victim's presence everywhere and doubly aggravating, haunting the tyrant's dreams in guilty suspicion and pervading the hearts of the faithful who henceforth revere him as a martyr.[9]

And so it is with dead languages. Nothing is so much alive as a dead language. Like a dead person, a dead language has terminated its becoming. Like a person, too, it must pass a test, it may or may not enter into the perennial life of the classical languages, whereas a living language is still in the process of becoming and the outcome, one way or the other, is uncertain. Having become what it will always be, a dead language which has not been mortified into a fundamentalism of sorts has something permanent to say. Indeed, language can become dead in the negative sense of the word only when reduced to its bare foundations and interpreted literally. Fundamentalists are right in seeing that tradition contains all the fundamentals needed. Thus, besides monks on Mount Athos it was the old Believers who preserved the icons without training after Western models, as N.S. Leskov's story, *Sealed*

8. R.M. Rilke (1875-1926) has expressed this mystery in the following fashion:

> "Aber Lebendige machen alle den Fehler, daß sie zu stark unterscheiden. Engel (sagt man) wüßten oft nicht, ob sie unter Lebenden gehn oder Toten. Die ewige Strömung reißt durch beide Bereiche alle Alter immer mit sich und übertönt sie in beiden;" Die Erste Elegie, *Duineser Elegien*, (Frankfurt am Main 1970) 11.

9. In this sense, Herod's suspicion becomes perverse faith when he considers Jesus to be only John the Baptist redivivus: Mark 6,16.

Angel (1873), goes to show.[10] But the fundamentalist forgets that foundations follow a certain hierarchy of importance, based on objective truth. He kills tradition by making it conform to the letter as first priority in his *hierarchia veritatum*[11] instead of the spirit. And the letter kills, because it interrupts a dialogue to which it is a means by drawing attention to itself, the means. Any attempt to revive the past as such is, as it were, archaeology where urban renewal is called for. It is the interruption of a dialogue, whereas life is insertion into an on-going dialogue. Such efforts are only justified insofar as we see in them our future.

On the contrary, from the vantage-point of the future, dead languages are capable of eliciting a response long after they themselves have ceased to exist as an independent language. In a sense, a "black hole" comes very close to this description, for a star which is dead continues to exercise an influence as if it were still out there. Indeed, this is the great function of any language, which is dead in the sense of being immortal: to keep a language or an issue alive in spite of the fact that, as such, it could have ceased long ago to have anything to say and exercise any influence. The fascination of dogma and canon derive from their status as dead languages, in the sense of being dialogues one cannot afford to avoid. No wonder that both are archaic in diction and vibrant in content. When both diction and content coalesce we have true eloquence. Linguistic beauty is the revitalization of an archetype brought to bear on one particular moment, presently urgent.

Nothing is as eloquent as a silent language

Any attempt to revive the past for its own sake amounts to aping the language of the dead, that is, imitating an outdated diction instead of carrying on a conversation which threatened to be interrupted for ever. Those who cling to tradition for its own sake are rightly dubbed traditionalists, whereas the past can only be revived as the language of the future. To see the future in our past requires the capacity to borrow signs without a syntax, to make a sound without a noise, to predict the future without rousing curiosity. It calls for a silent language.

10. A. Martini-Wonde, "N.S. Leskows Entdeckung der Ikone," in W. Kasack (Ed.), *Die geistlichen Grundlagen der Ikone* (München 1989) 141-152.

11. "Hierarchy of truths" means that all truth is relative to the main – deep down, the only – truth: that of the Trinitarian God, who reveals and communicates Himself to humanity in grace. Not all truths proposed by the Church enjoy the same nearness to that of the Trinitarian God.

A silent language is one that transmits a message without speaking. Examples of this are rest in music, the rousing of tension in an audience by putting off the beginning of a speech in order to heighten the expectancy, the signpost on the road which indicates the way without following suit, the taciturn in politics, Carthusian sign language, Holy Saturday in the liturgy. But a silent language becomes problematic when the fitting words fail. Inadvertently we remember the eloquent who become hoarse when they have to speak up and the efforts used to silence G.J. Danton (1759-1794), a powerful. speaker, at his trial.

Tradition has something in common with a silent language. It can identify itself with no one language and with no one culture. It is in this sense a universal language. But though it is independent of particular cultures and languages, it cannot do without incarnation in some concrete language(s). The closest tradition gets to be a silent language is through the **disciplina arcani**, the secrecy needed to protect sacred things from the indiscreet, and **apophaticism**, or the negative theology necessary to preserve mystery. The creed was passed on "from hand to mouth" by the first volunteers to become Christians, for volunteers they really were; they had no 2000 years of survival to go by, but 200 years of struggle not to be discouraged at.[12] Apophaticism is the struggle for survival of silent language in the heart of humanity. And in apophaticism tradition recognizes a kin soul, a language which is silent and yet eloquent.

If no language is so much alive as a dead language, no language is so eloquent as a silent language. For in a silent language, enjoying its immortality without being degraded into a few catchy but empty phrases, the form of silence and the absence of words make for a perfect match.

No language is as sacred as a public language

But though tradition is cognate to silent language it is not, in itself, silent language. It resorts to apophaticism, but is no more silent than music is just because there are rests in it. On the contrary, tradition speaks with the most public of languages. Precisely because of this its character as universal language it can be easily ignored, whereas in fact it is the condition of any other language, dead or silent. It is only the transcendental subject which speaks the silent language, just as only the Church speaks the public language. Now this

12. This should be repeated in the same breath as S. Kierkegaard's (1813-1855) warning not to make an argument out of so many centuries of Christianity; see his *Philosophical Fragments* and *Training in Christianity*.

is anything but obvious. Something "sacred" is, by definition, something "set apart." So it would seem that the more arcane and restricted a language the more sacred it should be.

In point of fact, it turns out to be quite different. The public language under consideration is known as liturgy. It is the only language capable of preserving tradition. This it does in a way open in principle to everybody else. It gets its universality not through its factual membership, but through its potential addressees. It is the only language capable of making the freshness of origins available to subsequent generations. The only really fully public language is one in which birth dies and death is born, beginning and end coalesce so that nothing is lost but everything may find its place.

In birth everybody repeats the beginning of the world; in death everybody anticipates the end of the world (N.A. Berdyaev). Every newcomer repeats the creation of the world, but everybody does it in his or her own way. Some are born short, others tall; stout or slim; bright or dull; but all somehow, through their birth, intone a hymn of hope, arouse great expectancies. There is an unbounded horizon of hope which characterizes birth, whereas, as Hölderlin says, "das Meiste vermag aber die Geburt," most ambitions have been dealt a fatal blow by birth. So existents, starting to try existence, follow a certain logic or dialectic, repeat mistakes long overcome, become inventive or depressive, till they finally discover who they were at the moment of birth. And everybody who dies anticipates, in his own way, the end of the world. There are those who die out of breath or out of time; hungered or in surfeit; of a natural death or through violence. But all add just another tinge of mystery to the riddle of the world, nay, conflate into the Great mystery of Being itself. The point is that everybody, in his or her birth, re-enacts the beginning of the world; and everybody, in his or her death, anticipates the end of the world, but, and that is the point, only in his or her own way. Whereas in the Christian mystery, theme and syntax of the liturgy, where it is overtly identified with the Paschal mystery, beginning and end, plan and execution, coincide.

And so does language. In its birth language re-enacts the beginning of speech; in its death every language anticipates the end of speech. Every language does it in its own way. Some, like Jeremias, are perennial stammerers; others, like Zacharias are dumbstruck by the violence of message. But the Paschal language, the language of Christian mystery, repeats the beginning of all attempts to articulate hope, and anticipates all attempts to silence despair, in Christ's way. For this reason this public language is capable of recovering the thread of historical significance from the immense flow of banality, of *loci communes*, of "they say," of "così fan tutti."

Humans learn language; they learn particular languages. But there are also universal languages, like gestures and music. Of public languages which come closest to the liturgy the foremost is monasticism. Eastern theology has eloquently defended the view that monasticism is not the preserve of a few, but a duty incumbent on everybody. First of all, monasticism is a universal phenomenon, found, in one way or another, in practically all religions. In some Buddhist countries like Thailand there was even a duty, comparable to compulsory military service, for everybody to pass a certain time in a monastery. Not everybody may want to go along with the pacifist B. Russell who quipped: "The fatherland punishes those who kill natives and those who refuse to kill foreigners!" However, it is a pity that contemporary culture pretends that its citizens should be able to defend the country against potential aggressors, often only framed as such, and does not equip them to fight the very real though often invisible warfare of the Spirit.

In this regard, Eastern theology (e.g., P. Evdokimov, 1900-1970) has stressed that all Christians ought to be spiritually monks.[13] If there is so much sickness in the world, one has to ask whether we are sick because the world is sick – or whether the world is sick because we are sick. Here, the crisis with religious vocations, is at once a symptom of the malaise and hope of its potential cure. Even in profane literature, much is written about the need of an ascetic culture. Prosperity becomes a deficiency. We need a tinge of mysticism to this ascetic culture. We need a language capable of prodding us on to sacrifice, and yet able to show the vast vistas of mystery. In brief, we need the monastic language.

Monasticism is a language, just as man and woman are two languages and East and West two or even several languages. So it, too, can become a dead language. The temptation – in any philosophy or any theology or any formula for the religious life – to think that the last definitive language has been invented and history has come to an end is great. Against this temptation, the appeal to return to the Fathers is an abiding warning against pretences of this type. Many religious founders did not do anything else but return to the Fathers as "back to square one," a corrective of vision. But the monastic language pays attention to the foundations as the future in our past. The fascination of the Fathers is that they had no such cut and dried formula, they knew that they were God's "dilettantes." Nothing could help the world unite better, nothing help the world better out of its current slump, than a universal

13. P. Edokimov, "Le monachisme intériorisé," *Le millénaire du Mont Athos (963-1963)* I, (Chevetogne 1963) 331-352.

monastic culture, cutting through denominations and faiths. Without a dose of alternative culture, of which monasticism with its refusal to identify with the "schemes"[14] (Romans 12,2) of the world is the prime example, culture itself becomes a flight from reality, a rehearsal of death in the sense of vanity of vanities, living in perennial mourning. The contents of vision become the discontents of culture.

Man and Woman, East and West are (at least) two languages: one may be using silent language when the other is using a dead language. Dialogue can take place only when language is synchronized. Contemporaneity can only be reached in the simultaneous immediacy of the same vision. The only vision capable of creating universal immediacy is public worship.

But can languages be synchronized so easily? Every language is complete, a monad on its own, Just like sickness, which is a split-image in reverse of the corresponding healthy situation. This very completeness may mislead us into thinking that we are solipsists, each in his own way, keeping track of the great passage of time till we are picked up into the fine collection of being. It was perhaps this type of solipsistic feeling that gave rise to L. Wittgenstein's (1889-1951) adage "Die Grenzen meiner Sprache sind die Grenzen der Welt" (The limits of my language are the limits of the world).

There is nothing wrong, of course, in tying up confines with language, in putting words into their place. Words are not only defined; they also define. Grammar is only an extreme case of custom duty, our solecisms real accidents which take place in conversation rather than in driving. What is wrong is the pretence of tying up the world to the one who speaks rather than to the one who listens; that is solipsism. Because of this it would be more correct to say, "The limits of the world are the limits of my audience." This is true so long as not just any audience is meant, but one capable of accommodating all of reality. That can only be the ideal response to worship. In this sense we see the need of a monastic culture.

Conclusion

The cloak does not make the monk, but monks have been known to make excellent cloaks. One could almost say that the most fantastic collection of cloaks comes from monastic inventiveness. So, monasticism does not destroy culture; it usually only punctuates it with a dash for reflection, though at times,

14. See I. Hausherr, *Renouveau de vie dans le Christ Jésus*, (Paris 1969) 25-37.

when culture gets out of hand, it can also set itself up as a counter-culture. Symphonies do not make culture (Max Frisch) either, but monks make tradition. They make it by keeping it. Once this language becomes a dead language in the fundamentalistic sense of the world, tradition will become extinct. Humanity, too. Tradition is the global vision of humanity, which is coterminous with the global vision of faith. Vision says everything "in the twinkling of an eye," without recourse to words. This is because global vision is what word is before it is either spoken or written. To say that culture has only discontents to serve is to claim that culture remains nominalistic unless it incarnates the values of global vision, which are real symbols of life. Monasticism is like humour: it is a necessary accompaniment of the genius of a culture, but, if there is too much of it, it becomes a substitute for missing genius.[15] The monastic language is only the seasoning of other less universal languages. Like the salt of the earth, it must be served in small doses but must permeate everything.

15. O. Bismarck is supposed to have said: "Humour is an accompaniment of genius, but, if humour gets the upperhand, then it replaces genius."

WAYS FORWARD IN THE HUMANITIES

Peter Jones

The Humanities are moribund and we cannot identify, let alone pursue, ways forward in the Humanities until we confront what I shall here call "the four tyrannies": the tyrannies of ignorance, of habits, of time and of the self. To address the tyranny of *ignorance,* we must resolve the challenges of scepticism: for ignorance can function as a shield and excuse, as well as a threat to our deepest desires. To confront the tyranny of *habits*, habits of mind as well as of behaviour, we must recognise the domain of dogma – the application of yesterday's answers to tomorrow's problems. The tyranny of *time* forces us to consider the relentless implications of change; for although the traditions of the past alone make the present intelligible, we cannot justify our future actions only in terms of a vanished context. To fight the tyranny of *self*, we must identify the myriad factors in life which engender and endorse egoism; these include, let me alert you, some central practices within education itself.

Everything changes, and change weakens our grasp on things. Which is why we are creatures of habit. So how do we gain anchorage in the shifting sands of time? Various arrangements, from families to nation-states, have evolved which give us stability in the face of change, although all of them initially require the individual to subordinate his will to that of others. But alone we are powerless to achieve our wants, yet in the face of group inertia or the uncontrollable impetus of its mindless gyrations, we remain impotent and our anxiety yields to despair. Normally only philosophers luxuriate in the vertigo of such dilemmas, but all of us become aware of them from time to time, and a healthy and vibrant community will ensure that its citizens are appropriately forearmed against them. The best defense is the same now as it

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This is the text of a public lecture given in Malta by Professor Jones during his visit to the Philosophy Department (University of Malta) in April 1993.

has been throughout history, although its precise nature necessarily changes: education.

Unfortunately, all institutions, of course, and the professions associated with them, tend towards paralysis, inaction, conservatism, hostility to criticism, and the generation of jargon which acts as a bond between initiates and an intended mystery to outsiders. The unredeemed become resentful, and the accused petulant. Institutions foster habit addiction; and for addicts serious measures are called for.

These remarks apply, I repeat, to all institutions – the churches, universities, government administrations, the medical and legal professions. You would expect a philosopher, would you not, to take a high and mighty line, albeit a simple one – namely this: BAD PRACTICE RESULTS FROM BAD THINKING.

We undertake enquiry in order to conduct our lives more effectively, but from the outset two notions must be emphasised, for these are clues to ways forward in the Humanities: *complexity* and *context*. Most issues are extremely complex, calling not only for extensive analysis of the actors involved, but also for delicate judgement on appropriate action. In addition, all events occur within contexts, which can be understood as the matrix of beliefs, attitudes and judgements we impose on whatever we investigate. In brief, our own interpretation of meaning and value determines what the context is. If we recognise these two points we can see why one endeavour remains central to the nation's vitality and very existence: education.

It is well known that in the Western World we are all heirs to two distinct traditions of the humanities, one deriving from Cicero, the other from writers such as Petrarch and Leonardo Bruni. These Renaissance scholars devised a primarily literary curriculum (*studia humanitatis*) which excluded logic, mathematics, natural sciences and metaphysics from their concerns. Their educational programme was centred on a notion of a unique, autonomous self, which would be shaped by a study of the language and literature of ancient Greece and Rome. The inner life, in their view, is all, and for the perfection of the inner man study of the natural world was held to be morally useless. Petrarch, for example, was quite unable to embrace the Roman conception of the unbreakable bonds between an individual and society, or the view that as an agent, man had to be judged by deeds, not intentions. The departure from Cicero could hardly be more complete, for he had held that a whole man must embrace all areas of learning, in order to fulfil his many roles in the complex universe of which he is a part.

Of course, no single factor is responsible for the intellectual challenges we face today, but two of them are traceable to the sharp distinction between the arts and the sciences in seventeenth century France, and the institutional consequences that followed. The crucial events, largely political in nature, can be quickly summarised. Colbert, like Richelieu and Mazarin, was keen to establish, or consolidate France's intellectual pre-eminence over its rivals, parallel to its economic, military and political strength and ambitions. Obvious models lay in the sixteenth century Academies of the Italian city-states, but the immediate practical questions centred on what was to be taught, how and why. It was argued that in fields of enquiry where measurement was crucial, the modern world was demonstrably superior to the ancients, and conventions could be devised as a basis for teaching and learning. In areas where the ancient world excelled and had not been bettered, success seemed to depend on individual talent, and systematic teaching, even if devised, could not guarantee progress. Using existing terminology, but with unforeseen consequences, they defined the mathematically irradiated enquiries as 'les sciences' [from *scientia*]; here, skills could be imparted and progress charted. The remainder of human enquiry – and notice this marginalisation at the outset – depended on individual talent, and was designated 'les arts' [although this term had specifically meant, until then, teachable skill].

Of course, the ancients had themselves occasionally implied that the makers of certain things (artists, as we would say) were not mere craftsmen, and the seventeenth century embellishment of this idea was harnessed to other social and political developments, only one of which is there time to mention here: the gradual creation of a 'public' for the arts, that group of people who were neither patrons nor practitioners. And these spectators, ignorant of the processes, could only concentrate on the effects of what they encountered; in the days of John Locke and others, in the early eighteenth century, that meant attention to personal feelings. The arts, it is true, were credited with imagination, genius, talent – all pious assertions of the indefinable – but they were also linked with decoration, pleasure and idleness; something to be enjoyed in moments of relaxation from pursuit of knowledge, or even from the conduct of life. It scarcely needs to be added that almost nobody considered the endeavours of non-European cultures, and we all know the dismal consequences. In eighteenth-century Scotland, at least, civic leaders worked hard with Universities to retain the insights of the ancient and modern world in tandem; all students combined studies of the arts and sciences, with the overall goal of the 'improvement' of society itself. Unfortunately, the intellectual and social division of labour which thinkers such as David Hume and Adam Smith described and predicted, led to institutional specialisation and mutual incomprehension. By the middle of the nineteenth century, British attitudes had polarized almost completely between the arts and sciences, and the Humanities unwittingly surrendered any right to be taken seriously. It is against this background, in Britain at least, that ways forward must be identified.

For largely social reasons, and until the last decade, the liberal arts or humanities have enjoyed a century or more of protection from effective intellectual challenge and, like comfortably protected clergy before them, have ignored the duties of self-criticism and accountability. All practices evolve against a background of inherited traditions, and in response to perceived needs. Central concepts used in their defence may be difficult to analyse and explain, but the effort must be made; moreover, it must be made with respect to, and with respect for, the genuine bewilderment of questioners. The Humanities today are moribund, and their representatives for too long have devoted their lives to the conservation of energy, the harnessing of inertia and the assiduous nurture of their incapacities.

Let us define the Humanities as being responsible for interpreting the meanings and values of the past, present and future. The range of their enquiries cannot therefore be limited in any way. Social historians who remain ignorant, for example, of scientific ideas, practices and techniques, will be as distorted in their judgement as art-historians who know nothing about making paintings or sculptures. But precisely because the range of issues over which thought must range is so wide, it ought to be more of a co-operative endeavour. The so-called Renaissance man must be replaced by the modern analogue of a team or group of investigators who individually contribute different expertise and perspectives. In many areas associated with the humanities in the past, solo work and judgement is no longer of first priority; and institutions which fail to recognise this fact are doomed.

When it is argued that certain skills are pre-eminently acquired by studying the humanities we do well to check the evidence. It may be only a matter of degree, if that, in which a study of literature develops the imagination better than a study of astronomy; there may be little significant difference in capacity to collect, analyse and interpret evidence between an historian and a palaeontologist; skill in ordered, coherent thinking may be acquired in mathematics as much as in philosophy. Most certainly it matters that citizens can communicate effectively, and for this training in analysis and presentation are crucial. It is also essential that citizens have the imaginative capacity to envisage possibilities, and to reflect flexibly in the light of changed and changing circumstances. A study of the past, and of other cultures, of literature and the arts, are fruitful ways to enable people to enlarge their minds, and to think beyond the present and themselves. And the biographical reports of such experiences should not be ignored. Nevertheless, there seems to be nothing necessary about the outcome of such studies, and very little that could not come by other educational means.

Let me refer once again to Cicero, because his notion of the Humanities involved three features that were progressively downgraded, except for a brief period in eighteenth century Scotland: *scepticism*, *moderation* and *rhetoric*. Each requires brief comment, especially because scepticism and rhetoric allow us to comment on the *tyrannies of ignorance and of self*. As a method, scepticism simply involves proportioning claims to the evidence available. Logically, of course, there is no end to questioning; but psychologically and socially there will be.

Throughout history many people have felt uneasy or even threatened by *scepticism*, that is, the view that no certain knowledge of how things are can be found. Such doubt, it was felt, inhibits action of any kind and undermines the very fabric of thought and society. Of course, however unlikely it may seem, any particular factual claim could be mistaken. Indeed, a claim is a factual claim only if it could be mistaken: if you couldn't be wrong, you cannot be right. We must remember, however, that we all learn how and when to doubt, and that doubting can itself be justified or unjustified. Not everything can be doubted at once; whenever we express doubts about some things, other things remain stable within our assumptions. The tyranny of ignorance must be resisted by accepting that although we could on any occasion be mistaken, we could not on *all* occasions be mistaken about everything; that although there are always other perspectives to be considered, what we have may have to suffice.

The ancient advice to follow 'moderation in all things' is not an empty saw, but a necessary condition of personal sanity, social cohesion and political stability: only moderate scepticism is justifiable. There are certainly difficulties in how best to characterise *moderation*; because moderation is always relative to boundaries and to context, the burden of judgement is always upon us. The practical problem is that we cannot set out to be moderate unless we know how far to go.

To secure a hearing and to elicit a sympathetic response, to harmonise conflicting elements and ensure judicious decisions, to enlist the co-operation of others, moderation was taken as a profoundly important social device. There were problems, however, and they confront us still. Today, as ever before, hysterical fanatics terrorise their fellow beings in the name of one or other exclusive dogma, god or myth. Hungry souls, it seems, always settle for a mere pot of message. Moderation in thought does not entail compromise in action, however, nor does it involve seeking peace at any price. But how can moderates secure power from, or resist the attacks of, fanatical opponents? Can moderates gain, maintain and defend an effective power base without sacrificing the integrity or consistency of their views? Can moderation, indeed, be more than a luxury and a mask, enjoyed by those who hold power by other means?

And here a third objection emerges. We must learn when how and why to be moderate, just as we must learn when, how and why to doubt. But our moderation, like our scepticism, defines the style of our lives – the content as well as the form. Moreover *moderation* is a crucial tool in combating the tyranny of HABIT – because *moderation* in all things calls for continual reflection, on every single different case, and cannot itself become a habit.

The remedy for too much scepticism is the anchorage of reflection in everyday life and action, and the third Ciceronian notion that suffered debasement over the centuries was equally central to daily life: *rhetoric*. Although rhetoric embraced the arts of communication, Cicero emphasised that this called for thought about the medium, the message and the context – in brief, *attention to others rather than to oneself*. Communication faces the tribunal of judgement in public. Rhetoric, for Cicero, was at the heart of education; only someone versed in the history and politics of the community, in the interests and aspirations of his hearers, of their own prejudices, habits and psychology, could be a true citizen of the state, able to communicate effectively, persuasively and responsibly. Nothing could be achieved without effective communication, and nothing worthy without sceptical, moderate judgement – sceptical, because the available evidence is usually inadequate, and moderate because excess leads to a loss of control.

But, I hear you say, we cannot survive without some measure of innovation. Innovation can be recognised, of course, only by reference to an existing practice or tradition; and context alone enables one to decide whether the claim to innovation is favourable or unfavourable. Oriental cultures, for example, seem to have sustained unchanging patterns of activity over many millennia – but we should be extremely careful to avoid branding their peoples as craftsmen but not artists.

In Western thought the roles of tradition were explicitly acknowledged by the ancient rhetoricians who rightly held that effective and intelligible communication called for consideration of the audience – their knowledge, capacities, expectations. Moreover, they realised that the inescapable anchorage of traditions, in matters of medium, style and even content, entailed that understanding was impossible without the supposition and delineation of a context.

But if these conditions are necessary for understanding, how do they square with familiar yearnings by artists for the new, the original, the revolutionary? Three points, at least, can be made immediately. First: artists are not ignorant of what other artists are doing and have done: even when they know little about the past, they are intensely interested in their contemporaries and rivals. What they do, to be intelligible to themselves, occurs within an already existing matrix of practices and possibilities – historians readily see this in retrospect, when previously shocking artists are seen to be barely supplementing established trends.

The second point is this: whilst it is typically true that artists cannot in advance say precisely where they are going, they can recognise and reject false trails; and the exercise of critical judgement throughout the making of their work is essential, and central to final acceptance, notwithstanding the contribution of accidents and the unforeseen. Third: puzzles about how understanding of an artist's apparent innovation is possible, parallel puzzles about how understanding of language is possible. We all know that linguistic competence is revealed in the capacity to understand countless utterances that we have never heard before, and may never hear again; the acquisition of initial skills and rules, underwritten, some say, by innate capacities, ensure that we very quickly learn how to make and respond to previously unmet utterances. I am certain, myself, that only when philosophical reflection on the arts is securely located within work of this kind, alongside analysis of social action, that we shall escape the dismal mumbo-jumbo bequeathed to us by aesthetic propagandists – and art critics.

To confront the tyranny of *time* we must acknowledge that all human practices, and the concepts used to characterise them, have histories. The generic concepts of the arts and sciences have histories which, even in the last decades, have undergone considerable change, as additional perspectives have been added to the discussions. It should not be thought, however, that the talkers should be silenced in order to allow the practitioners to get on with their tasks. Fruitful discourse about the arts, at least, requires the contribution of practitioners and non-practitioners alike, and the roles each play in society are modified by the outcomes of such discourse; the nature of that discourse, however, should always be submitted to the most critical and sceptical scrutiny, for otherwise we shall be unable to separate the categories that are imposed from the resemblances that are found.

Practising scientists often complain that the accounts given by historians and philosophers of science bear little relation to the science they themselves do; and artists say the same. We should ponder this dislocation: the traditions suggested by observers for locating the co-ordinates of a work, often differ from those acknowledged by the artists themselves. Historians, after all, select, omit, re-order, invent and embellish, in order to tell a narrative which secures and holds a reader's attention; to identify a tradition, or commend innovation is to engage in interpretation, and historians, as Hume emphasised, are simultaneously blessed with knowledge of outcomes, but ignorance of original intentions. This point is part of a larger philosophical view that not all the characteristics of processes can be detected in their traces.

I must now say something briefly about the tyranny of *self*, of the pernicious effects of egoism, so tragically underwritten by certain trends in education. Let me alert you to the dangers of DOOTING: this is not a Scots, or even a Canadian, representation of doubt but an anagram for "doing one's own thing". I shall show you how dooters doot and anti-dooters don't.

Fundamentally we must grasp that we are all social beings who learn the nature of social behaviour, with its attendant duties and rights, from other people: the emphasis here is on *others* as the source of our views and on *learning* as the means to acquire them. The opportunities for self-assertion and even self-awareness are initially limited. Learning is at the centre of our socialisation and of our humanisation. A small example must suffice: illiteracy. In an extended sense illiteracy involves deviant or anti-social behaviour, because all who remain illiterate are deprived of command over those thoughts and responsibilities which require language for their expression.

I am well aware that different ethnic and social groups have different linguistic habits, traditions and conventions; but language is a mode of symbolism, and some modes are simply richer for certain purposes, and more extensible than others – it is grotesque to restrict peoples to their own traditions simply for the reason that they *are* the traditions, or for the reason that to offer them alternatives is to impose alien interests. In this context one must censure academics who are obscure in the hope of appearing profound, as much as students who confuse self-betrayal with self-expression. Verbal felicity may well presuppose verbal facility, but articulacy, precision and coherence are attainments learned only through rigorous discipline.

In addition to command over language, and thus of thought, I hold that good manners and courtesy are ingredients of genuine moral and social autonomy precisely because they involve consideration of and respect for others. Those who do their own thing often intrude on others, and in so doing fail to grasp the nature of social inter-dependence. Although what counts as good-manners in a particular society is quite contingent, the intentional flouting of such manners represents a double mistake: a mistake about knowledge and a mistake about morality. Of course, no-one denies that one should dispense with snobbery and artificiality – which are sometimes mistaken for good-manners; but respect for others requires recognition of the social nature of man, and his most distinctive capacity, the capacity for complex communication, without which there could be no knowledge. The second point I want to make may strike you as rather odd: I refer to absence of wit, particularly among those who advocate doing their own thing. Many reasons have been given for denigrating wit and humour in general, especially by religious and political fanatics. The commonest reason is that serious matters ought not to be treated with levity – a claim that has many marks of circularity. The exclusive zeal implied in such a view, in my judgement, is misplaced and narrowing. For wit and humour bring before the mind alternative possibilities, and this power enables them to perform the inestimable function of self-protection. Moreover, in general, wit presupposes knowledge of the field in which it is exercised and a high degree of literacy in that field. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that where education is deemed to have no standards and no foundations, reading, writing and arithmetic are replaced by rudeness, rancour and riot.

I must return to my main remarks. It must be forcibly emphasised that a thorough training in the traditions of a discipline must precede justified and effective scrutiny of it, even if such training also serves to discourage such scrutiny. My point is this: unless one knows the vocabulary and methodology of a discipline, one will be able neither to circumscribe the target of one's criticism, nor determine its proper focus. I am not saying that one must, in some sense, 'accept' the tenets before one is qualified to challenge them – understanding something does not entail accepting it; if that were the case, establishing that a claim is false would require that one did not understand it. Rather, any discipline ought to instil two related, but fundamental, capacities: the capacity for self-criticism – because one cannot know how the future will call upon one to defend, modify or even abandon our procedures; and a rational flexibility, based upon a secure grasp of one's own grounds and standards. But, you may ask, are there any such standards? How are they articulated, preserved and taught? By whom, and under what conditions? The short answer – and there is time, unfortunately, for no more – is this: anything at all that can be taught logically must have standards, because standards simply are the rules or conventions which govern what is being taught. Depending on the task, the teacher may not be able to *say* what those standards are, but he must know and be able to detect them; a musician can show the standards, for example, by performing a piece in a certain way. *Showing*, indeed, is at least as essential to teaching as saying, especially when standards are at issue. When Leonardo da Vinci said that he is a poor pupil who does not excel his teacher, part of what he meant was that every pupil ought to be able to excel his master in those skills that are strictly teachable. For surely what a teacher is doing, is enabling the pupil to go on; that is, to proceed appropriately in the light of what has been taught, but in the absence of the teacher; to go on by himself, but because he is a social being, to go on not alone, secure in the knowledge that the conventions he follows are publicly available and discernible. It was, after all, a goal of Ciceronian humanism to be never less alone than when wholly alone.

Two points need to be added here. Those strains in educational theory which stress self-expression above all else have been as disastrous in their effects as those which exclusively stressed sheer drilling. There can be ex-pression only if there is something to express, and techniques with which to do it. The second, related, point is this. Intelligibility is a function of one's present knowledge and ignorance. No teacher need condone the indolence of those with no motivation to learn, by yielding to demands for instant intelligibility. I accept, of course, that at some levels of education, a major task is to bring about such motivation, and here a necessary means may well be the harnessing of present interests. But effective University teaching presupposes motivation in the students, and their actual interests cannot conceivably be a limiting factor on what is taught – for how, on such a view, could present interests ever be subjected to scrutiny, let alone replacement?

Oscar Wilde tells us that the only exercise small minds get is jumping to conclusions; let me, therefore, walk sedately to my own. Those who teach try to develop each individual to the full, try to secure the effective exchange of ideas in an atmosphere of rational enquiry, try to increase sensitivity and breadth of understanding and decrease uniformity and mindless habit. Indolence and anti-intellectualism are their enemies; a liberal education teaches a passionate application of the mind, a means to sustain and enrich one's life by focusing and thereby prolonging one's energy. It may be embarrassing to remind ourselves of these old truths; if they are truths, they need to be regularly announced, critically examined in the light of changed ideas, modified where necessary, and proudly affirmed. I hope that the rigour with which we undertake these noble tasks can be infused with elegance, and courtesy and wit, for our standards are revealed in our style. That suggestion is not trivial. It is sadly easy for administrators and faculty to adopt what I call a siege-mentality, in which the mildest enquiry is morosely resented, and genuine questions treated as subversive challenge.

If the Humanities, then, are concerned with the interpretation of meanings and values they cannot be, institutionally, confined in what they do, limited by departmental or disciplinary boundaries. Those from within the institutions must work very closely with those outside and in all domains of life. I have suggested that the Humanities can go forward only by transcending the boundaries by which they are *now* confined. Moderate scepticism must be harnessed to challenge our beliefs and practices, and thereby combat the tyrannies of ignorance and habit; awareness of the ever-changing context, together with a grasp of the historical sources of everything we do, will help us resist the tyrannies of habit and of time; constant attention to the challenges and responsibilities of communication, together with insistence that we learn from others more than we could possibly learn by ourselves, will help us combat the urges of self-absorption, self-promotion and self-esteem that I have called “the tyranny of the self”.

Infectious enthusiasm, generosity of interpretation, healthy scepticism, moderation in judgement, and above all style – style as understood in the eighteenth century French saying that style defines the man (*le style c'est l'homme même*: Buffon). It is the absence of such values that many lament in contemporary society: scepticism is seen as subversive, moderation as unprincipled compromise and style as superfluous. In their place we find assertion, stridency and exaggeration. But the view that style defines a man embraces both a philosophical definition and a moral prescription. It means that the unique character of each of us can be detected in the harmonies and disharmonies we generate – our beliefs, as well as our behaviour, our posture as well as our possessions, and in practical life our omissions as well as our actions. It also embodies the moral tenet that individuals and society are better to the degree to which they strive for self-knowledge and harmony, recognising the complexities they confront. It is an intensely humanist and humanitarian view: it is also a view that requires us to keep our wits, and to exercise our wit.

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A POSSIBLE STRUCTURE OF HEBREWS 3,7 – 10,39

James Swetnam

A previous article on the structure of the Epistle to the Hebrews concluded that the section 1,1–3,6 is best divided according to a symmetrical pattern: after the exordium (1,1-4) comes a passage of exposition about the risen-exalted Christ as Son of God (1,5-14) followed by a brief paraenesis based on this exposition (2,1-4); then comes a passage of exposition on Jesus as son of Abraham, possibly under the title "Son of Man" (2,5-18), followed by a brief paraenesis based on this exposition (3,1-6).[1]

This review of the first article in the series on the structure of Hebrews has set the stage for the second, which will now analyze: Heb 3,7–10,39.

Heb 3,7 begins with a citation attributed to "the Holy Spirit" involving the citation of Ps 95,7-11. Comments on this citation involving its "spiritualization" through use of *gezerah shawah* and God's "rest" after creation show that the author is thinking of the promise of the land given to Abraham.[2] The previous remarks in 3,1-6 with regard to Moses, based as they seem to be on 2,10-12 and the imagery of leading sons to glory, suggest that Christ who is foreshadowed by Moses is somehow involved in this journey to the spiritualized promised land. He is explicitly invoked at 3,14 under the name of Christ. He is not mentioned as "Jesus", but another foreshadowing of his leadership is — Joshua is presented under the name of "Jesus" (4,8). Joshua did not give the people definitive entrance into the land; if he had, there would not be talk of another "day" in which entrance is still possible.[3]

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1. James Swetnam, "The Structure of Hebrews 1,1 – 3,6", *Melita Theologica* 43(1992)58-66.

2. See H. W. Attridge, *The Epistle to the Hebrews* (Philadelphia 1989) 113-132, especially 129-132.

3. See Ibid., 130, under Heb 4,8. Attridge notes: "The reference to Joshua, whose name in Greek (*Iēsous)* is the same as that of Jesus, suggests a typological comparison between one *archēgos* of the old covenant and that of the new. Such a typology was explicitly developed

This presentation of the journey of the people of God to enter into his Rest — with the apparently gratuitous[4] introduction of Joshua under the name of "Jesus" — serves as the preparation for the famous passage at Heb 4,12-13 which speaks of God's "word" as "alive and active and sharper than any two-edged sword":

4,12 Indeed, the word of God is living and active, sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing until it divides soul from Spirit, joints from marrow; it is able to judge the thoughts and intentions of the heart. /
4,13 And before him no creature is hidden, but all are naked and laid bare to the eyes of the one to whom we must render an account.[5]

The almost universal contemporary interpretation of the "word" (*logos*) of v.12 is that it refers to Scripture.[6] This interpretation gives a superficially plausible exegesis to the passage. But there are also problems connected with this contemporary interpretation of *logos* in the sense of God's word as Scripture, problems which are not sufficiently noticed, much less resolved:[7] 1) It is not clear why the efficacy of Scripture is portrayed in such detail: in the context the elaborate description of a sword penetrating the interior of man seems ill-focused and arbitrary. What is the point of the comparison?[8] What is behind the vigorous imagery?[9] 2) It is not clear that Scripture is viewed in

in later Christian literature, but it is not exploited here." The present article will dispute this last observation.

4. "Apparently gratuitous" — on the supposition that the passage is a preparation for the passage in which the word of Scripture is said to be more powerful than a two-edged sword. If it is the word of Scripture which is providing the theme for the passage (cf. 4,2), why is Joshua introduced?

5. Text after NSRV (*The Holy Bible containing the Old and New Testaments. New Revised Standard Version: Catholic Edition* [Nashville 1993] 219 [New Testament section]).

6. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 134, notes that "The identification of the Logos here as Christ is common in patristic sources", some of which he identifies. He notes several modern commentators who follow this interpretation, but does not give his approval. See also W. L. Lane, *Hebrews 1-8* (Dallas 1991) 103, who strongly defends the contemporary consensus that *logos* means Scripture and not Christ.

7. See J. Swetnam, "Jesus as *Logos* in Hebrews 4,12-13", *Biblica* 62(1981) 214-224.

8. At Heb 4,2 both the desert generation and the addressees of Hebrews are said to have "received the good news" (*euēggelismenoi*), i.e., received the "promise" (cf. 4,1 — *epaggelias* [cf. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 124-125]). The word of Scripture is not what is decisive about entering into the "rest" of God of which Ps 95 speaks (cf. 4,3), but the failure to hear the word of God with faith (cf. 4,2).

9. The difficulty with trying to understand Heb 4,12-13 comes in no small part from the fact

the context as being only threatening, and accordingly the use of *logos* in a threatening sense in 4,12 — a sword penetrating into the interior of man — seems odd. It seems equally odd to assume that the penetrating power of the sword is designed to enable God to understand man through the power of the word of Scripture (cf. v.13).[10] 3) The use of two unrelated meanings of *logos* — "word" and "account" — within the brief compass of 4,12-13 seems bizarre.[11] 4) Elsewhere in the epistle the word for "living" — *zōn* — is used of God himself (3,12; 9,14; 10,31; 12,22) or of Christ (7,25; 10,20) or of human life (2,15; 7,8; 9,17; 10,38; 12,9), but never of non-personal life. Thus the exception in 4,12 seems odd. 5) Finally, there is the following verse, 4,14, with its illative particle, *oun*: "Having therefore a great high priest...". It is not clear to what the illative particle refers.[12] 4,15 and 4,16 are each linked with what precedes by illative particles, and the impression given is that the three verses form a tightly reasoned unity. This unity seems to be ill matched with 4,12-13 interpreted accordingly to the view of *logos* as the word of Scripture.

The starting point for a coherent resolution to the above problems may be found in still another problem inherent in the contemporary interpretation of Heb 4,12-13: the puzzling conflict in imagery. V. 12 speaks of the "sword" (*machaira*) in an imagery of penetration; but v. 13 speaks of everything as being "naked and laid bare".[13] Thus the juxtaposed images involved in vv. 12-13 clash

that the passage has become an accepted *topos* for the efficacy of the word of Scripture: Heb 4,12-13 is about the efficacy of the word of Scripture because, as everyone knows, the word of Scripture is sharper than a two-edged sword. Thus A. Vanhoye can indicate that Heb 4,12-13 corresponds to Heb 3,7-11 in the structure of the epistle because both concern the word of God, without explaining just *why* Heb 4,12-13 concerns the word of God, even when there are problems with this interpretation (A. Vanhoye, *La structure littéraire de l'Epître aux Hébreux* [Paris ²1976]102-103).

10. See Attridge, *Hebrews*, 134.

11. This point needs stressing. A. Vanhoye sums up the problem nicely: "Une inclusion ouvre et ferme la longue phrase: les premiers mots présentent *ho logos tou Theou* et les derniers disent *hēmin ho logos*. *Logos*, il est vrai, n'est pas pris les deux fois dans la même acception: au début, il s'agit de la parole de Dieu; à la fin, il s'agit, soit de l'exposé en cours, soit — plus probablement — du compte que nous aurons à rendre. Il en résulte pour le text une certaine bizarrerie, qui s'accentue encore, lorsqu'on remarqe que le *pros hon* (traduit: «et c'est à lui») désigne le *logos* du début: c'est à la parole qu'il faut adresser la parole!" (Vanhoye, *Structure littéraire*, 102).

12. Vanhoye, *Structure littéraire*, 104, construes v. 14 as the final point — "une conclusion parfaite" — of the long exhortation 3,7 – 4,11. It would thus seem that he regards the illative particle as referring by way of summation to all that has preceded since 3,7.

13. See Vanhoye, *Structure littéraire*, 102 (bottom of page), where he further remarks on the relation of 4,13 to 4,12: "La retombée de la phrase [sc., v. 12] est . . . amorcé, mais au lieu de continuer de façon symétrique à la montée, elle se met à suivre un autre schème: *logos* n'est

when the supposition is that the word *logos* first means "word" [of Scripture] and then "account".

The present paper basically argues that it is not sound exegesis to interpret two verses obviously related to each other by the presence of the same word in such a way that a number of problems remain, problems which do not go away just because the interpretation is upheld by a majority opinion. A solution which resolves these problems would seem to be preferable, even if it is currently a minority view. The first step toward such a solution will be to assume that the word *logos* means what a common opinion in patristic sources says it means, Christ in the sense of "Word". Given the common interpretation of the exordium and the particular interpretation of the expository section 1,5-14 argued in the previous article,[14] this view cannot be said to clash with the Christology of the epistle, which is decidely high in places. The translation of the two verses would then run as follows:

4,12 Indeed, the Word of God is living and active, sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing until it divides soul from spirit, joints from marrow; it is able to judge the thoughts and intentions of the heart. /

4,13 And before him no creature is hidden, but all are naked and laid bare to the eyes of the one with whom for us is the Word.

The inconcinnity involving the two meanings of the word *logos* is, of course, removed in this interpretation. But there remains the challenge of seeing how the imagery of the two verses is to be understood. The key insight would seem to be that the two verses, while joined by the same meaning of *logos* as "Word", are nevertheless seen to be pointing in opposite directions. V. 12 points to what precedes, and v. 13 points to what follows. If this view is adopted the possibility of a resolution of the apparently conflicting images is made available through a modification of the unity which is based on the occurrence of *logos* in each verse. It has been argued in the first article of this series that this structure of two adjoining verses pointing in opposite directions has been adopted by the author of Hebrews at 2,12 with regard to 2,10-11, and

plus sujet; on ne lui donne plus d'épithète; mais deux propositions parallèles expriment encoure une de ses propriétés...". At this point there is no more mention of the "bizarrerie" which Vanhoye himself had pointed out at the top of the same page. The presumption is that the interpretation of the two occurrences of *logos* is correct and the "bizarrerie" is not only forgotten but transformed into a virtue: "Cet éloge de la Parole de Dieu constitue donc un morceau particulièrement soigné" (Ibid., 102).

14. Swetnam, "Hebrews 1 , 1 – 3,6" , 59-60.

at 2,13b with regard to 2,14-18.[15] This also seems to be the structure which he has adopted at 10,30a with regard to 10,19-29, and at 10,30b with regard to 10,31-39.[16]

Once the basic structural orientation has been posited (it remains to be supported), it follows that the relevance for the imagery of 4,12 is to be found previously, in 3,7 – 4,11, and the relevance for the imagery of 4,13 is to be found in what follows, 4,14-16 The interpretation given above about the section 3,7 – 4,11 was that it referred to the spiritualization of the promise of God to Abraham involving the land: in some way Christ is involved in leading the people into God's Rest. Against this background, the key to the imagery of 4,12 seems to be found at 4,8, where Joshua is presented under the name of "Jesus". For the implication is that whereas the first Jesus (Joshua) did not give the people definitive rest, the second Jesus (Christ) will, provided the addressees remain united with him (cf. 3,14). If this implication is linked to 4,12, an interpretation based on two words in that verse — *machaira* and *kardia* — suggests itself: that the imagery of 4,12 involves a spiritualized circumcision corresponding to the spiritualized goal of the people. For Joshua administered a physical circumcision involving a *machaira* (to be taken in the sense of "knife" — cf. the Septuagint of Jos 5,2-3), but Christ as the Word administers a spiritual circumcision to those who believe, a spiritual circumcision which is more powerful than the knife. This spiritual circumcision is nothing else than the "circumcision of the heart" which Israelite tradition for centuries stated was the necessary accompaniment of any physical circumcision (cf. Deut 10,16 and Jer 4,4; taken up by Christian tradition as expressed in Rom 2,29 and Col 2,11).[17] This interpretation would seem to be supported by the importance of the word "heart" *(kardia)* in 3,7 – 4,11: it is found at 3,8.10.12.15; 4,7 as well as in 4,12 itself. The warning against "hardening the heart" is a solemn refrain in the passage, at 3,8.15; 4,7. There is also a charge that the desert generation "went astray" in their heart (3,10), and the addressees of the epistle are directly urged to avoid a heart of "evil and unbelief" (3,12). But, so goes the interpretation of 4,12 being advanced here, Christ as the Word will supply a circumcision adapted to the need of all who believe in him as the heir to the promises made to Abraham.[18] This spiritual circumcision, a circumcision of

15. Ibid., 61.

16. J. Swetnam, "Hebrews 10,30-31: A Suggestion", *Biblica* 75(1994) 00-00.

17. See Swetnam, "Jesus as *Logos*", 220.

18. Swetnam, "Hebrews 1,1 – 3,6", 60-62.

the heart urged by centuries of Israel's tradition, is effected by the Logos and makes certain the entry of the people.[19] The themes of certainty of entrance for the people as such but uncertainty of entrance for the individual as such is reflected in 4,11, which can be taken as a summary paraenesis of 3,7 – 4,10: "Let us hasten then to enter into that Rest, lest anyone fall into the same kind of disobedience".

4,13 is united to 4,12 by the occurrence of the same word, *logos*. But the imagery functions in view of what follows, not what precedes. The immediately following verse 4,14, on the analogy of 4,11, presumably serves as a summary paraenesis of what is to come: "Since, therefore, we have a great High Priest who has passed through the heavens, Jesus, Son of God, let us hold fast to the confession".[20] The supposition is that the illative particle *oun* relates to what immediately precedes unless that is seen to be impossible. On several grounds the particle seems appropriate as a sign of the close linkage between vv. 13 and 14 according to the interpretation of the former verse being advanced here. For one thing, there is the resulting relationship which is thereby affirmed between Jesus as Logos and his role as High Priest, a relationship found in Philo. The concepts behind the terminology in Hebrews and in Philo are certainly different, but it would be odd if such specialized terminology itself were not related in some way.[21] Then there is the congruence of the phrase "with whom for us is the Word" (*pros hon hēmin ho logos*)[22] with the idea that Jesus, the Son of God, has passed through the heavens: his passage through heavens has terminated in his place as Logos with the Father.[23] Finally, there is the underlying image of 4,13 and its relation to the term "high priest": the word *tetrachēlismena* ("laid bare" or, perhaps better, "laid back") is parallel to *gymna* ("naked") and the two refer to the

19. This certitude is expressed in 4,9, the verse immediately after the comment about Joshua's failure to give rest: "Hence, for the people of God, a Sabbath rest remains." This means that the people of God, as such, is guaranteed an entrance into God's Rest. This guarantee does not extend to any given member who separates himself from the group. Cf. J. Swetnam, "A Suggested Interpretation of Hebrews 9,15-18", *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 27(1965) 383.

20. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 137, omits the phrase "Jesus, the Son of God" from his translation, even though he comments on it as part of the text on p. 139.

21. See Attridge, *Hebrews*, 140, and 140 n. 44.

22. Cf. the phrasing of the Johannine prologue at Jn 1 , 1: *kai ho logos ēn pros ton theon.*

23. On the "confession" (*homologia*) referred to in Heb 4,14 cf. Acts 9,20 and 1 Jn 4,15; 5,5, where Jesus is confessed as "Son of God". In view of the interpretation given Heb 1,5-14 this title of Jesus is appropriate.

bending back of a victim's neck prior to a sacrificial killing.[24] Hebrews has already linked the idea of Jesus' death and his role as High Priest, at 2,14–18, and at 3,1 has explicitly attributed the title "High Priest" to him.[25] 2,14-18 has as its theme Jesus as "Son of Abraham", i.e., Jesus as characterized as one who had faith in God's power to fulfill the promises just as Abraham had.[26] The culminating moment of Jesus' faith-trust in this power was at the moment of his death (cf. Heb 2,13).[27] In Hebrews this moment is foreshadowed by the attempted sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham in Genesis 22.[28] All of this is helpful to try to understand the thought behind 4,13: Jesus as Word is more powerful than the *machaira* wielded by Abraham at his attempted sacrifice of Isaac (cf. the Septuagint at Gen 22,10).[29] Nothing escapes the all-knowing glance of God, every sacrifice is visible to him (4,13). The implication within the restricted context of Hebrews, which centres on only two individualized sacrifices, the sacrifices of Isaac and of Jesus,[30] is that both the sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham and the sacrifice of Jesus are visible to God, and that they are thus interrelated by God's knowledge as foreshadowing and foreshadowed (cf. the use of *parabolē* in Heb 11,19).[31] Thus the following translation of Heb 4,12-13 seems justified:

4,12 For the Word of God is living and active, sharper than any two-edged knife, piercing until it divides soul from spirit, joints from marrow; it is able to judge the thoughts and intentions of the heart.

24. See Attridge, *Hebrews,* 136: "The best explanation is that the term derives from the sacrificial sphere where it refers to the bending back of the victim's neck prior to slaughter."

25. Cf. Heb 3,3 and Swetnam, "Hebrews 1,1- 3,6", 62.

26. Ibid., 61-65.

27. Ibid., 61.

28. See J. Swetnam, *Jesus and Isaac: A Study of the Epistle to the Hebrews in the Light of the Aqedah* (Rome 1981)119-123.

29. A marginal gloss of the Targum Neofiti at Lev 22,27 has Isaac stretching forth his neck at the moment of sacrifice. Cf. Swetnam, *Jesus and Isaac*, 64, n. 335.

30. Other, "anonymous", sacrifices mentioned in Hebrews seem intended to be subsumed in these two in one way or another (cf. Heb 5,1; 7,27; 8,3; 9,9; 10,1; 10,11). The one exception to this generalization is the sacrifice of Abel mentioned in 11,4, an individualized sacrifice which seems intended to be foreshadowing of the sacrifice of Christ (cf. 12,24). Thus, though individualized, it is not at the centre of the author's attention the way the other two individualized sacrifices are. See J. Swetnam, "Hebrews 11 — An Interpretation", *Melita Theologica* 41(1990) 98-99.

31. Ibid., 122-123.

4,13 And before him no creature is hidden, but all things are naked and laid bare to the eyes of the one with whom is the Word.

The "two-edged knife" refers to the knives used by Joshua and Abraham considered as one knife with two functions, definitive circumcision and definitive oblation. The first function assures the fulfillment of the promise of land; the second assures the fulfillment of the promise of progeny.

This suggested interpretation of Heb 4,12-13 in which *logos* means "Word" gives a coherent solution to the problems connected with the interpretation in which *logos* means "word": 1) the description of the efficacy of the knife is not ill-focused or arbitrary, for in each of its functions it achieves a definitive fulfillment in line with biblical imagery elsewhere; 2) the use of *logos* is not threatening: it is the basis for the fulfillment of the promises made to Abraham; 3) the word *logos* is not used in two unrelated senses in close compass; 3) the word "living" is not applied to a non-personal reality; 5) the illative particle *oun* at the beginning of the following verse, 4,14, makes good sense: it does not refer to some vague previous reality in the epistle, but to what immediately precedes. Thus the positing of the patristic meaning for *logos* seems supported by the context.

The objection can be made that a reference to Jesus as Logos seems out of place in the epistle in general and at 4,12-13 in particular. But this is to ignore the meaning of *logos* in Heb 2,2. There *logos* means the Mosaic Law, and it is used in function of the theme of "speaking" *(lalēo)* which begins in the first verse of the epistle and runs throughout.[32] In Hebrews Jesus as *Logos* replaces the Mosaic *logos*. Jesus and the "salvation" which he began to "speak" *(laleo)* and which was handed on to those who had heard him are presented in Hebrews as taking the place of the Mosaic Law.[33] At Heb 4,12-13 the introduction of Jesus as *Logos* is a veiled but emphatic statement that Jesus replaces the Mosaic Law with his living and active presence as the new centre of the relations between God and his people. It is appropriate that this statement stand at the end of an exhortation to enter the Rest of God, but it is especially appropriate that this statement stand at the beginning of the section 4,14 – 10,39, which has as its heart the relation between Jesus as High Priest and the New Covenant: Jesus *is* the New Covenant just as he *is* the *Logos*. It is through this New Covenant, i.e., the Eucharist, that the promise of progeny

32. See Attridge, *Hebrews,* 64, n. 26.

33. See J. Swetnam, "Christology and the Eucharist in the Epistle to the Hebrews", *Biblica* 70(1989) 85-87.

made to Abraham is definitively fulfilled.[34]

In the verses which follow 4,14 the author alludes to what can best be described as the two stages of Jesus' sonship, which in turn imply two stages in his priesthood.[35] These two stages can be designated "before" and "after" his being "perfected" at the resurrection-exaltation, i.e., before and after his receiving a body commensurate with his divinity.[36] In the section 4,14 – 6,20 the author of Hebrews comments on these two stages. Jesus is now in the second stage, having passed through the heavens, and intercedes for men with God (4,14-16). The two Old Testament citations at 5,5-6 reflect this stage. But there is also an extended allusion to the first stage of Jesus' priesthood, in 5,7-8 — "in the days of his flesh", i.e., in the days when he was possessed of a body subject to death (cf. Heb 2,14).[37] It was only when he was "perfected" subsequent to this death that he entered into the second and definitive stage of his priesthood which is "according to the order of Melchizedek" (cf. 5,9-10).

Apparently the addressees had expressed their belief in the first stage of Jesus' priesthood but had grown "sluggish" (*nōthroi)* in their ability to listen (5,11). They needed to be taught "again" (*palin*) (5,12), but the author wishes, nonetheless, to press on, for the addressees must not remain "children" (5,13) but must become mature in their ability to judge regarding their faith (5,14). These verses are basically negative paraenesis, containing as they do a veiled

34. See Ibid.. 93-94. The activity of Jesus as Word in Heb 4,12-13 can probably be best summed up by resorting to the Christian terminology of "baptism" and "Eucharist". Pressed to their full contemporary meaning these technical, sacramental terms would, of course, be an anachronism in Hebrews. But not if they are used with due adjustment to the nature of first-century Christian theology.
The above argumentation that "logos" in Heb 4,12-13 means Jesus as "Word" is not intended to be definitively probative — no exegesis of a text dating from 1,900 years ago can be definitively probative. It simply states that the meaning of "Word" for "*logos*" makes more sense in the context than the meaning "word" (of Scripture) and hence should be used as a basis for subsequent discussion of the epistle until a more convincing interpretation is adduced.

35. See Swetnam, "Christology and the Eucharist in the Epistle to the Hebrews", 78-79.

36. Ibid., 75-78.

37. On the words "having offered petitions and supplications" as a technical expression of sacrifice cf. Swetnam, *Jesus and Isaac*, 183 and 183, n. 36. The words show that the author of Hebrews was concerned to present the earthly Jesus as a priest. On Heb 5,7-10 as based on the Aqedah — the sacrifice of Isaac in Israelite and Jewish tradition — cf. Ibid., 178-184. Several non-biblical texts concerning the Aqedah, from a period roughly contemporaneous with the New Testament, indicate that Isaac approached his sacrificial death not only knowingly but willing (cf. Ibid., 60). If the author of Hebews was aware of this aspect of the Aqedah tradition, the interpretation of Heb 5,7-10 would become less problematic.

warning based on the deficiencies of the addressees. The negative paraenesis continues until 6,8, and includes an explicit warning about the impossibility of repentance, one of the classic cruces in the epistle.

The failing which leads to the impossibility of repentance would seem to involve the words "crucifying for themselves the Son of God and putting him on display" (6,6).[38] The phrase "Son of God" evokes the same phrase at 4,14, by supposition a programmatic verse for the section. This phrase occurs in an exhortation to "hold fast to the confession". The inference which suggests itself is that the sin warned against consists of not holding fast to the confession, which involves viewing the Son of God as being crucified for the Christians: the Son of God has already been crucified for them; they cannot crucify him again, making fun of him in the process as was done the first time by those who did not believe. This interpretation squares well with 3,1, which views Jesus as "the apostle and high priest of our confession", i.e., the basic confession of faith which the addressees are called on to hold consists in the belief not only that Jesus is Son of God but also, in part, that he is a high priest. The phrase "crucified for us" implies the sacrificial nature of the crucifixion. This sacrificial death corresponds to the first stage of Jesus' priesthood, the priesthood he had "in the days of his flesh". The fact that it appears embedded in the negative paraenesis of 5,11–6,8 at a culminating point — the impossibility of repentance — is an indication that the paraenesis at 4,14 – 6,20 centres on this stage.

The section 6,9-20 constitutes a positive paraenesis. At 6,14 the author cites Gen 22,17, God's solemn oath renewing his promise of progeny to Abraham. This suggests that the sacrifice of Isaac has not been far from the mind of the author during his discussion of Jesus' earthly priesthood. It also shows that the author has been concerned with the promise of progeny during the entire discussion. The passage ends with the author's reiteration of God's solemn oath and promise following the sacrifice of Isaac which guarantees the addressees' hope of participation in Abraham's progeny (6,17-18).

Thus the entire section 3,7 – 6,20 can be best viewed as follows:

3,6 – 4,11:	exposition-paraenesis on the promise of land;
4,12:	Jesus as Word is the guarantor of entrance into the spiritualized Land of God's Rest;
4,13:	Jesus as Word is the guarantor of a spiritualized progeny which results from his sacrificial death and subsequent resurrection-exaltation;

38. On Heb 6,4-6 cf. the discussion in Attridge, *Hebrews*, 166-172.

4,14 – 6,20: exposition-paraenesis on the first stage of Jesus' priesthood as the means to achieve the spiritualized progeny promised to Abraham;
5,11–6,8: negative paraenesis;
6,9–20: positive paraenesis.

It is against the background of 4,13 – 6,20 that the Heb 7,1–28 should be viewed. The author has discussed the earthly priesthood of Jesus, i.e., the period of his life on earth before his being "perfected" at the resurrection-exaltation. He does so in an atmosphere of paraenesis, alternatingly threatening (5,11– 6,8) and encouraging (6,9-20), moved by an obvious concern of apostasy on the part of his audience. But he wishes to progress to an aspect of Jesus' priesthood which his audience has not been fully instructed about and which is part of the knowledge which they should have as mature Christians (cf. 5,14).

The author's discussion of the second stage of Jesus' priesthood begins with a linking between Ps 110 and Gen 14, the only two passages in the Old Testament in which the name "Melchizedek" occurs. It is tempting to think that the author resorts to this Old Testament figure because of the reason why he seems to have been used originally by the author of Genesis: legitimation,[39] but legitimation of a special sort. The figure of Melchizedek, appearing as he does with no antecedents and no descendants, i.e., no time-frame to situate him in, suggests the timeless existence of the exalted Jesus (7,3),[40] and thus legitimates the reality of the risen Jesus from God's previous speaking to the fathers. The subsequent treatment enables the author to view Jesus as re-ensconced in his eternity, so to speak, but now with the "benefit" of his unique sacrifice made eternally and irrevocably effective through his being "perfected" (cf. 7,11.19.28): the Word of God has taken on a new dimension (7,27-28). But this exposition is not made without reference to the underlying supposition of the relevance of Jesus' exalted priesthood for the promises made to Abraham, in particular of progeny (cf. 7,6 and the reference to the "people" in 7,11). The whole question of the "law" (*nomos* — cf. 7,5.12.16.19.28) and the "covenant" (*diathēke* — cf. 7,22) is introduced as an obvious way of preparing for the central concern of the epistle — the new covenant.

39. Cf. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 188 and 188, n. 18.

40. See Ibid., 190-191.

The beginning of the section of Hebrews embodying the author's central concern is indicated by his remark at the beginning of Chapter 8 that he has arrived at his "main point" (*kephalion*): "we have such a high priest, who took his seat at the right hand of the throne of the majesty in the heavens, the cult minister of the holy things / holy of holies[41] and of the true tent, which the Lord pitched and not man". The first half of this main point reiterates what has been stated previously, interpreted in this article as a high priesthood involving two stages, before and after the perfection bestowed by the resurrection-exaltation, with the definitive terminus being the presence of Jesus as Word with God. The second half of the main point indicates what is to come: Jesus, from his place at God's right hand, acts as a liturgical minister involving the holy things / the holy of holies and the true tent set up by God. The sacrificial basis for this new liturgist is recalled (8,3), and his heavenly status, which sets him in opposition to those priestly ministers who make offerings according to the Law (8,4). But these priestly ministers act out a shadowy replica of the heavenly liturgy as the Law itself indicates (8,5). 8,6 sums up this carefully worded preface to the central section: "As things stand now he has obtained a liturgy which is as superior as the better covenant of which he is mediator and which itself has been enacted on the basis of better promises".[42] One of the "better promises" is alluded to at 9,15, which links Christ's covenant through his expiatory death with the inheritance of the promise of "the eternal inheritance", i.e., the Rest of God, which is the spiritualized version of the promise of the land made to Abraham. The new covenant, with its forgiveness of sins, is here shown to be enacted on the basis of a "better" promise — "better" (sc., than Abraham's) because it is spiritualized, involving not an earthly land but heaven. Although 9,15 speaks about the spiritualized promise of the land, the emphasis in the central section is on the promise of spiritualized progeny, as can be seen from the paraenesis in 10,19-39,[43] which stresses the "house" over which the high priest is placed (10,21), God's vindication his people (10,30b), and the positive destiny awaiting those who live by faith (10,39).[44]

41. The Greek word translated "holy things / holy of holies" is ambiguous and is patent of both interpretations. See Attridge, *Hebrews*, 217-218, and Swetnam, "Christology and the Eucharist in the Epistle to the Hebrews", 82-84.

42. On "better" as a technical term implying not only relative but absolute superiority cf. Swetnam, *Jesus and Isaac*, 150.

43. For an explanation of the relation of 10,19-39 to 8,1-6 see the following paragraph.

44. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 221, construes the reference to "promises" as involving mainly the inheritance of the land; but for the reason mentioned above — the relation between

The extent of the section of central concern in Hebrews is set off by two citations from Jeremiah which serve as an inclusion. At Heb 8,8-12 Jer 31,31-34 is cited from the Septuagint (LXX 38,31-34), and at Heb 10,16-17 Jer 31,33 and part of Jer 31,34 are repeated. This repeated citation is followed by a long passage of paraenesis, first negative (Heb 10,19-30a) and then positive (Heb 10,30b-39).[45] Thus the section of the author's central concern extends in its entirety from 8,1 to 10,39.

A detailed analysis of Heb 8,1 – 10,39 is, of course, well beyond the scope of this paper. The present writer wishes simply to repeat views which he has expressed elsewhere,[46] that the key element involved in this section is the Christian eucharist viewed as the "holy things" into which Christ "enters" through "the greater and more perfect tent not made with hands" (i.e., his glorified body — cf. 9,11) so that this new "holy of holies" (the same Greek word, *hagiōn)* is now where God's presence is available liturgically to those who have faith. The "new covenant", so central to Hebrews 8,1 – 10,39, is connected with the eucharist elsewhere in the New Testament, and at Heb 9,20 there is an allusion to the institution of the eucharist, an allusion prepared for in Heb 3,5.[47] Just as Jesus is the *Logos* which takes the place of the Mosaic *logos,* so he is the new covenant, which supplants the old covenant.

The "liturgy" which the heavenly Christ presides over is carried out on earth, for it is available to the addressees (Heb 10,19-22).[48] But it is truly a "heavenly" liturgy (cf. Heb 3,1; 6,4; 8,5) because it is presided over by the heavenly Christ who, because he now transcends time and space through his being "brought to perfection", can provide God's effective presence — he is the Word who is "with God" — in the "holy things" / "holy of holies" throughout the Christian world. His presence is a sacrificial presence because he entered into the "holy of holies" / "holy things" through his (sacrificial) blood (9,12). This was and remains a unique sacrifice in terms of the first stage of Jesus' priesthood (9,12 — *ephafax),* but can be viewed as multiple in the

priesthood and people (cf. 2,14-18; 7,11-12) — the reference should be seen as involving mainly the progeny.

45. For the justification of this division see Swetnam, "Hebrews 10,30-31".

46. For references see Swetnam, "Christology and the Eucharist in the Epistle to the Hebrews", 74.

47. See Ibid., 85-86.

48. The elusiveness of the treatment of the eucharist can probably best be accounted for by presuming the need to follow the usages of the "discipline of the secret". See Swetnam, "Christology and the Eucharist in the Epistle to the Hebrews", 94, and 94 n. 63.

second stage which makes this unique sacrifice available to those who take part in the heavenly liturgy (10,19): the allusion to the "purification" obtained by "better sacrifices" at 9,23 is best taken as referring to the second stage and indicating real plurality.[49]

This view of Jesus' unique earthly sacrifice as being present in multiple fashion in the second and definitive stage of his priesthood explains why the author of Hebrews can state at 2,9: ". . . we see Jesus on account of suffering death crowned with glory and honour so that by the grace of God he may taste death for everyone". The "tasting death" *follows* upon Jesus' resurrection-exaltation and has been a classic crux from earliest times until the present.[50] Jesus "suffered death" in his earthly life and as a result can "taste death" in an infinite multiplicity of times and places because of his glorification-exaltation: "tasting death" refers to the presence of the death suffered by the earthly Jesus in his glorified existence. Jesus died only once and sacrificed himself only once; once glorified, he can die no more. But his unique death and unique sacrifice abide in multiple fashion thanks to his glorified body. The phrase "for everyone" refers to those who everywhere and throughout subsequent time can partake of the liturgy conducted by the heavenly liturgist.

The negative paraenesis at 10,19-30a deserves particular comment. In this section is found the second passage in Hebrews which speaks of the punishment for willful rejection of the foundations of covenental faith — 10,26-29. Thus it matches the placement of the first passage — 6,4-6 — which also occurs in a section of negative paraenesis. 6,4-6 concerns warning against apostasy from belief in the confession involving the earthly priesthood of Christ. 10,26-29 also mentions the "Son of God" (v. 29) and the "blood of the covenant" (ibid.).[51] The phrase "blood of the covenant", in the context of Hebrews, suggests the eucharist blood: one need only think of 3,5 in relation to 9,20.[52] There is question in 10,26-29, then, of apostasy from belief in the

49. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 261, maintains that the plural, "sacrifices" (*thusiai*) is used at 9,23 because the author is stating a general principle: "It is therefore necessary that the copies of what is in the heavens be purified by these things, but that the heavenly things be purified by better sacrifices than these". But how can a general principle be used when what is at stake is something *sui generis:* purification of heavenly things? Further, why would the author of Hebrews choose a way of indicating a general principle which is so confusing in the context of a verse which emphasizes the unique sacrifice of Christ (9,26)?

50. See Attridge, *Hebrews*, 76-77.

51. Mention of "the spirit of grace" deserves special treatment, which is reserved for the third and final installment on the structure of Hebrews.

52. See Swetnam, "Christology and the Eucharist in the Epistle to the Hebrews", 84-85.

confession as it touches the second stage in the priesthood of Christ, the stage in which his unique sacrifice is made available through the new covenant to all who believe.

This, then, is the suggested structure of Heb 3,7 – 10,39:

3,6 – 4,11:	exposition-paraenesis on the promise of land;
4,12:	Jesus as Word is the guarantor of entrancė into the spiritualized Land of God's Rest;
4,13:	Jesus as Word is the guarantor of a spiritualized progeny which results from his sacrificial death and subsequent resurrection-exaltation;
4,14 – 6,20:	exposition-paraenesis on the first stage of Jesus' priesthood as the means to achieve the spiritualized progeny promised to Abraham;
5,11– 6,8:	negative paraenesis [with reference to impossibility of repentance];
6,9–20:	positive paraenesis.
7,1-28:	Jesus as foreshadowed by Melchizedek — the second and definitive stage of Jesus' priesthood;
8,1 – 10,39.	the second stage of Jesus' priesthood and the liturgy over which he presldes;
10,19-30a:	negative paraenesis [with reference to punishment for the willful rejection of the foundations of covenental faith.];
10,30b-39:	positive paraenesis.

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Attridge's comments on the phrase "blood of the covenant" deserve citation (Hebrews, 294): "The phrase 'blood of the covenant' *(to haima tēs diathēkēs), although similar to the eucharistic blessing of the cup [cf. Matt 26,28; Mark 14,24; Luke 22,20; 1 Cor 11,25], is in this context not sacramentally focused. It rather designates the equivalent in the new order of the blood with which the old covenant was inaugurated (9,20), namely, the blood shed on the cross, which provides access to God and to God's forgiveness." Attridge here does not recognize the allusion to the eucharist in 9,20, although he notes the influence of "liturgical language" on the verse (ibid., 258). But his fundamental error lies in not recognizing two levels to Christ's priesthood.*

ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS AND PUBLIC POLICY[1]

John Haldane

Experiences of Landscape

In a famous letter of 26th April 1336, addressed to Francesco Dionigi da Borgo San Sepolcro, an Augustinian professor of theology, Petrarch recounts his ascent of Mont Ventoux made that day in the company of his brother and two servants. After describing his preparations for the climb and its early stages he turns to religious matters drawing parallels between the difficulties of the physical ascent and the process of spiritual formation. Having reached the highest summit he reflects on his recent past and then, as the sun begins to set he looks around again in all directions:

> I admired every detail, now relishing earthly enjoyment, now lifting up my mind to higher spheres after the example of my body, and I thought it fit to look into the volume of Augustine's *Confessions* ... Where I fixed my eyes first it was written: "And men go to admire the high mountains, the vast floods of the sea, the huge streams of the rivers, the circumference of the ocean, and the revolutions of the stars – and desert themselves." I was stunned, I confess. I bade my brother, who wanted to hear more, not to molest me, and closed the book, angry with myself that I still admired earthly things. Long since I ought to have learned, even from pagan philosophers, that "nothing is admirable besides the mind; compared to its greatness nothing is

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1. This essay derives from a lecture given in the University of Malta on 18th March 1993. I am grateful to my hosts, in particular to the Rector, Professor Fr Peter Serracino-Inglott and to Professor Joseph Friggieri of the Department of Philosophy, for their kind hospitality. A version of the present text appears in *Environmental Values*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1994.

> great" [Seneca, *Epistle* 8.5]. I was completely satisfied with what I had seen of the mountain and turned my inner eye toward myself. From this hour nobody heard me say a word until we arrived at the bottom.[2]

This is an interesting passage and for more than one reason. It belongs within a corpus that bears the marks of the emerging renaissance humanism, and the letter itself has often been referred to as anticipating later European mountaineering interests; but what I think we should be struck by is the unironic willingness with which Petrarch sets aside his aesthetic delight as unworthy of the human mind. We have become accustomed to praising natural beauty and to thinking of its appreciation precisely as a mark of a refined sensibility and as something to be approved of and cultivated. Thus the implicit opposition of aesthetic and spiritual concerns is hard for us to accommodate. Consider how unexceptional (and congenial to modern environmentalism) seem the ideas, if not the form, of Hopkins' sonnet "God's Grandeur".[3]

> The world is charged with the Grandeur of God.
> It will flame out, like shining from shook foil;
> It gathers to a greatness, like the ooze of oil
> Crushed. Why do men then not now reck his rod?
> Generations have trod, have trod, have trod;
> And all is seared with trade; bleared, smeared with toil;
> And wears man's smudge and shares man's smell: the soil
> Is bare now, nor can foot feel, being shod.
>
> And for all this, nature is never spent;
> There lives the dearest freshness deep down things;
> And though the last lights off the black West went
> Oh morning, at the brown brink eastward, springs –
> Because the Holy Ghost over the bent
> World broods with warm breast and with ah! bright wings.

Of course Petrarch was writing over six hundred and fifty years ago, long before romantic quasi-panentheism, and addressing a theologian with whom he shared an admiration for Augustine. This large historical and intellectual gap helps to explain the otherwise puzzling deprecation of the aesthetic

2. Petrarch, "The Ascent of Mont Ventoux" in E. Cassirer/P.O. Kristeller/J.H. Randall (eds), *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man* (Chicago University Press; Chicago 1956) 44.

3. G.M. Hopkins, *The Poems of Gerald Manly Hopkins*, (W.H. Gardner/N.H. MacKenzie eds) (Oxford University Press; Oxford 1970) 66.

appreciation of nature. Yet even in more recent times sensitive and thoughtful authors have dismissed what are now canonised landscapes in terms which are at least striking and which some will regard as blasphemous. Consider, for example, the following description from the pen of Dr Johnson writing of Scottish scenery:

> [The hills] exhibit very little variety; being almost wholly covered with dark heath, and even that seems to be checked in its growth. What is not heath is nakedness, a little diversified by now and then a stream rushing down the steep. An eye accustomed to flowery pastures and waving harvests is astonished and repelled by this wide extent of hopeless sterility. The appearance is that of matter incapable of form or usefulness, dismissed by nature from her care and disinherited of her favours, left in its original elemental state, or quickened only with one sullen power of useless vegetation.
>
> It will very readily occur, that this uniformity of barrenness can afford little amusement to the traveller; that it is easy to sit at home and conceive rocks and heath, and waterfalls; and that these journeys are useless labours, which neither impregnate the imagination, nor enlarge the understanding.[4]

This text and Petrarch's letter should serve as reminders that there is nothing perennially obvious about the present-day reverence for nature and the elevation of its appreciation to the higher categories of human consciousness. The "aesthetics of the environment" is like the "politics of the home" a term of art invented to label a set of concerns and an associated field of academic study each developed over time and out of particular cultural histories. In what follows I sketch something of the relevant philosophical

4. S. Johnson, *A Journey to the Western Islands*, (R.W. Chapman ed.) (Oxford University Press; London 1944) 34-35. It is interesting to compare these remarks with those of Thomas Gray: "I am returned from Scotland, charmed with my expedition: it is of the Highlands I speak: the Lowlands are worth seeing once, but the mountains are ecstatic and ought to be visited in pilgrimage once a year. None but those monstrous creatures of God know how to join so much beauty with so much horror. A fig for your poets, painters, gardeners and clergymen, that have not been among them, their imagination can be made up of nothing but bowling greens, flowering shrubs, horse ponds, Fleet ditches, shell grottoes and Chinese rails. Then I had so beautiful an Autumn. Italy could hardly produce a nobler scene, and this so sweetly contrasted with that perfection of nastiness and total want of accommodation that only Scotland can supply." Letter of 1765, T. Gray, *Correspondence of Thomas Gray*, (P. Toynbee/L. Whibley eds.) (Clarendon Press; Oxford 1935) 899. I am indebted to Christopher Smout for this quotation. He uses it to introduce a fascinating discussion of attitudes to Scottish landscape; see C. Smout, "The Highlands and Roots of Green Consciousness, 1750-1900," Raleigh Lecture, *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 1990.

background and then consider, though only briefly, some of its implications for environmental policy questions.

Recent years have seen the rapid rise to prominence of a range of studies, policy directives and initiatives concerned with the environment. These are sometimes unphilosophical, pragmatic responses to perceived threats arising from, for example, heavy industrialisation and increasing levels of human activity. Very often, however, they are presented through patterns of judgment and justification that are avowedly moral, not to say moralistic. Those involved in such presentations are then liable to speak in terms of "environmental *ethics*", or more likely of "an environmental *ethic*". Although there are reasons for doubting whether values can be thought of in compartmentalised isolation I want for present purposes, and so far as is possible, to place ethical concerns on one side and to focus on *aesthetic* considerations.[5] More precisely my interest is in whether, and if so how, philosophical aesthetics might be brought into contemporary thinking about the natural environment.

In advance one might suppose that the effect of introducing any kind of objective aesthetic element into the discussion of environmental values (what might be termed "environmental axiology") would be to strengthen the case for "deep" ecology. It is, after all, a common plea made by those concerned with protecting the natural environment from the effects of industry, say, that these deface the landscape, transforming what is naturally beautiful into something ugly. How then could an interest in the aesthetic qualities of nature be other than an instance of respect for the environment considered as something valuable in and of itself? To answer that question I need to say something about the general character of aesthetic theory.

Some Elements of Aesthetic Experience

From antiquity, through the middle ages, the renaissance and the enlightenment, to the present day, there has been a movement in philosophical discussions of beauty and other aesthetic values (such as the sublime – and in later periods the picturesque) from attention to the *objects* of aesthetic experience to the character of the *experience* itself, and of the modes of attention or *attitudes* it involves. Although there is no agreed inventory of the elements or aspects of aesthetic experience, and certainly there is no agreement on their

5. For a discussion of the way in which ethical concerns may constrain aesthetic appreciation see C. Foster, "Aesthetic Disillusionment: Environment, Ethics, Art," *Environmental Values* 1/3(1992) 205-215.



Figure 1

interrelationships, the following schema *(Figure 1)* sets out something of the broad range of favoured possibilities.

Again considered historically, the focus of interest has moved from left to right. Thus in *pre-modern aesthetics* (to the extent that one can reasonably speak in these terms of a subject that is often thought to have originated only in the eighteenth century[6]) aesthetic objects and values are generally taken to be prior, with aesthetic responses and attitudes being held to be posterior to and explicable in terms of these. So, for example, it might be argued that the 'objects' of aesthetic experience are the forms of natural entities, and that aesthetic value consists in the harmonious organisation of parts realised in such forms. An aesthetic experience will then be any experience in which these forms and values are attended to and appreciated, and an aesthetic attitude will be an (or perhaps *the)* attitude induced by such experiences.

Clearly any view of this sort, if it is to avoid explanatory circularity, must postulate certain objective features that are the basis for our experiences of beauty. The task of doing so is a challenging one and though there are still

6. The first philosophical use of the term "aesthetics" to identify a (more or less) autonomous field of experience is to be found in Alexander Baumgarten *Reflections on Poetry* (trans. K. Aschenbrenner/W. Holther) (University of California Press; Berkeley 1974). Baumgarten claims that the subject is the science of sensitive knowledge, "*scientia cognitionis sensitivae*".

efforts to complete it many have come to think it is impossible. Such scepticism together with other factors led, in the *modern* and *enlightenment* periods, to the development of broadly subjectivist accounts of aesthetics. By "subjectivist", here, I do not mean arbitrary or idiosyncratic. Rather, the unifying feature of such accounts is that the direction of explanation runs from the attitude or experience to the value or object. One might, for example, identify the aesthetic attitude as one of detachment from theoretical and practical concerns or of disinterested contemplation, thereby specifying the character of aesthetic experience as being that of expressing or being conditioned by such an attitude. Following this one might then say that an aesthetic object is any object attended to in that kind of experience, and an aesthetic value is any feature singled out in such an experience as rewarding of attention, or, and more likely, any feature of the experience itself which is found to be pleasant or beneficial. Once again explanatory circularity will only be avoided so long as one does not at this point appeal to aesthetic objects in order to specify the relevant class of attitudes and experiences.

Even if that can be done, however, it is tempting to suppose that a consequence of a subjectivist approach is that there can then be no question of correct or incorrect aesthetic judgements, or relatedly of better and worse judges; for without autonomous aesthetic objects surely there can be no aesthetic objectivity. One familiar reaction to this thought is to welcome it, arguing that one of the main reasons for favouring subject-based approaches is precisely that aesthetic judgements lack criteria by which to be assessed. However, a subtler response recognises that in giving explanatory priority to the aesthetic attitude and aesthetic experience one is not wholly precluded from having external criteria of greater or lesser, courser and more refined aesthetic sensibility; for one may hold that there are *intersubjective* standards.[7]

Consider the case of table manners. At the level of serious reflection we should not be tempted to suppose that there are objectively offensive modes of eating. Rather we should say that manners are a function of culturally shared interests. A mode of eating is offensive for a given community if in normal circumstances it would be judged offensive by a competent member of that community. Competence here being explained not in terms of an ability to discern objectively offensive eating practices but by reference to mastery of certain social conventions governing public eating. Although these norms are

7. This in effect the position advanced by D. Hume in his classic essay "Of the Standard of Taste" (1757) in *Of the Standard of Taste and Other Essays* (John W. Lenz ed.) (Bobbs-Merrill: Indianapolis 1965) 3-24.

subjective, in the sense of being rooted in the dispositions of *subjects*, none the less their existence allows for the idea that some member of that community can go wrong in his style of eating, and thereby correctly be described as ill-mannered.

It should be clear then that the resources of certain 'subjectivist' aesthetic theories are more considerable than might initially be supposed. Moreover, as *Figure 1* indicates, there are many different elements and combinations that might be included in an aesthetic theory of either objectivist or subjectivist orientations. Rather than pursue these possibilities in detail, however, I want to consider next how the aesthetics of the environment is likely to fare when considered from these perspectives. An objectivist approach will look for certain features of environments which will serve as the basis for aesthetic experience and evaluation. Immediately, however, various difficulties suggest themselves. To the extent that we think of artworks as the paradigm class of objects involved in aesthetic experience we will see a problem in seeking for beauty in nature. If, like Hopkins, one were a creationist, holding that the universe is an artefact fashioned by God, then of course one could treat it formally in just the same way. But traditional theists are likely to be cautious of aestheticising Divine creation; and others will find the theistic assumption at least unwarranted and perhaps incoherent.

However, while denying that the natural world is the product of deliberate design one might nevertheless regard it *as if* designed, and maybe even speak of "Nature" itself as the source of aesthetic order. This move, however, generates problems of its own. Consider the question how many pictures are there in a given art gallery, or performances in a particular concert hall? Notwithstanding elements of the avantgarde this would, in principle, be a relatively easy matter to settle by reference to the form, content, matter and source of the works. However, if one eschews any claim of literal creation it seems in principle impossible to say where one work of nature begins and another ends. The category of the scenic view, for example, is all too obviously one of our own fashioning. If there is any element of art-making in nature it is surely present through the selective attention of spectators to aspects of a continuous realm. Furthermore, in deciding where to locate the boundaries of one scene our designs are influenced by the experience of actual artworks. In short, the effort to identify aesthetic objects in nature tends quickly to return one in the direction of the subject of experience and of his or her interests, cultural presuppositions and classifications.

Whether for these or other reasons, an objectivist might not choose to employ the artwork model but try instead the sort of approach I described as being characteristic of pre-modern thinking. That is to say, he or she might hold that the objects of environmental aesthetic experience are natural forms, by which I mean, primarily, the forms of organisms and derivatively those of non-organic entities. Something of this view is suggested by the fragmentary but very interesting remarks made by Aquinas in his discussions of beauty. He explicitly denies the claim that something is beautiful simply because we like it, insisting by contrast that our appreciation is directed towards the beauty of things, and that a thing is beautiful to the extent that it manifests its proper form or natural structure. He writes:

> Three things are required for beauty. First integrity or perfection (*integritas sive perfectio*), for what is defective is thereby ugly; second, proper proportion or consonance (*proportio sive consonantia*); and third clarity (*claritas*).[8]

The background assumption is that each substance or individual is possessed of a nature which, in the case of living things, is at once a principle of organic structure and a determinant of its characteristic activities. Integrity and proper proportion are directly related to this nature or form (*forma rei*) and the issue of clarity arises from them. *Integrity* consists in the possession of all that is required by the nature of the thing, such and such limbs and organs, active capacities and so on; while *proportion* includes both the compatibility of these elements and their being well-ordered. These two factors are then presupposed in the idea of *clarity,* for that concerns the way in which the form of a thing is manifest or unambiguously presented.

This neo-Aristotelian account has certain merits from the point of view of those interested in developing an objectivist environmental aesthetic. Forms are real, mind-independent entities, there to be discovered and contemplated. Thus the question of whether one member of a natural kind better realises the species' common nature is one that it makes sense to ask and one which informed attention can hope to answer. Also values and policies seem to be implicit or rootable in such facts. A 'good' specimen is *ontologically* better than a 'poor' one; and it is clear enough how industrial practices can be detrimental to these natural values by causing harm to individual organisms and injuring the species. Thus, unlikely as it might have been supposed given the tone of Petrarch's fourteenth century reflections, it may seem that in the thirteenth

8. T. Aquinas, 1914 (c. 1270) Ia. q. 39. a. 8. For a brief account of Aquinas' view and of related ways of thinking see J. Haldane, "Aquinas" and "Medieval and Renaissance Aesthetics" in *A Companion to Aesthetics* (ed. D. Cooper) (Blackwell: Oxford 1993).

century writings of Aquinas there is a promising source for a deep ecological aesthetic, i.e., one in which the relevant values owe nothing to man's interests save of course where the forms in question are human ones.

However, this conclusion would be a mistake and it is important to see why that is so. First, although Aquinas is insistent that beauty is not simply a function of subjective preference his account of its conditions indicates that there is a subtle form of subjectivity, in the sense of relativity-to-a-subject, in its very constitution. Recall that beauty requires perfection, proportion and clarity. The last of these I glossed as unambiguously presented or manifest form. The existence and character of a given form may be a wholly mind-independent affair, but to speak of its presentation implies actual or possible knowers. Furthermore whether something is unambiguous or clear is in part a function of the cognitive powers and accomplishments of the actual or imagined subject. So to say that something is beautiful if the perfection of its form is clearly presented indicates that, of necessity, beauty is something which involves a spectator. It is also apparent both from what Aquinas says and from the logic of his position that the spectators in question require the sort of intellectual capacity which there is little reason to think is possessed by any other creature lower than man. In short, natural beauty is constitutively tied to human experience.

Second, on Aquinas' view there is an equivalence between goodness and beauty known as the "convertibility of the transcendentals". What this means is that in thinking or speaking of these attributes one is referring to the same feature of reality, *viz.*, the condition of the natural form that constitutes an item's essential nature. Thus a thing is good and beautiful to the extent that its form is perfected. This is an interesting thesis, and on reflection a plausible one with relevance for environmental philosophy. But it has a corollary that moves aesthetics deeper into the territory of humanistic ecology. If the referents of "good" and "beautiful" are one and the same how do the terms differ? Aquinas answers that each expresses a distinct kind of interest in, or concern with, the forms of things.

> The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the notion of good is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful is that which calms the desire by being seen or known. Consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful which are the most cognitive, *viz.*, sight and hearing, as ministering to reason; for we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds ... Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive faculty: so that *good* means that which simply

> pleases the appetite; while the *beautiful* is something pleasant to apprehend.[9]

Thus although Aquinas roots his account of beauty in objective fact, the existence of aesthetic objects and values involves human subjects taking delight in perceptually and intellectually discernible structures. His view should be congenial to those concerned with environmental axiology in general and with aesthetic values in particular. It accords a major role to natural forms and can accommodate within this classification entities more extensive than individual organisms, such as species and even eco-systems. Further, unlike the aesthetics of the scenic it need not confine itself to the 'visible surface' of the world. It can, for example, allow the aesthetic relevance of ecological history and of the sorts of environmental structures to which Aldo Leopold's *A Sand County Almanac* did much to draw attention. In "Marshland Elegy" Leopold writes:

> Our ability to perceive quality in nature begins, as in art, with the pretty. It expands through successive stages of the beautiful to values as yet uncaptured by language. The quality of cranes, lies, I think, in this higher gamut, as yet beyond the reach of words.
> This much though can be said: our appreciation of the crane grows with the slow unravelling of earthly history. His tribe, we now know, stems out of the remote Ecocene. The other members of the fauna in which he originated are long since entombed within the hills. When we hear his call we hear no mere bird. We hear the trumpet in the orchestra of evolution. He is the symbol of our untamable past, of that incredible sweep of millennia which underlies and conditions the daily affairs of birds and men.[10]

It should be clear, however, that like the earlier attempt to conceive an aesthetics of the natural environment along the lines of a philosophy of art, an element of which is also present in Leopold's thinking, Aquinas' theory of natural beauty has an ineliminable subjective aspect. My general conclusion, then, is that whichever side of the diagram one starts from – focusing on the aesthetic attitude or the aesthetic object – one should be led to think that

9. Aquinas, 1914 (c.1270) Ia, IIae, q.17, a.1, ad. 3.

10. Aldo Leopold (1949), *A Sand County Almanac* (Oxford University Press; New York 1989) 96. For an account of the aesthetic dimension of Leopold's writings see J. Baird Callicot, "Leopold's Land Aesthetic," *Journal of Soil and Water Conservation* (1983) reprinted in J.B. Callicot, *In Defence of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy* (SUNY Press; Albany 1989).

human experience plays a constitutive role in environmental aesthetics.

Environment and Public Policy

Contemporary discussions of the environment are apt to focus almost exclusively upon the realm of the natural; or to the extent that the built environment features it is viewed as a threat to nature, as part of the environmental problem. However, if any serious headway is to be made in working out legitimate policies for the environment one needs to recognise that a concern for the aesthetics of human surroundings will have to consider the natural and the built as inter-related elements in a total context. With that thought in mind, and recognising that public policy has to be attentive to individual rights as well as to general benefits, there needs to be an examination of the proper limits of environmental control.

This is not the occasion to conduct that examination, but in concluding I want to offer for consideration a version of a principle which I first proposed in discussing the politics of architecture (Haldane, 1990). Modelled on Joel Feinberg's reflections upon the problem of "offensive public nuisances"[11] it takes the form of an 'aesthetic offence condition':

> *Proposed behaviour affecting the natural or built environments provides grounds for restricting liberty if the relevant actions or their products cause serious aesthetic offence to others; providing (1) that this response is not eccentric (in a non- or minimally normative sense) i.e. it could reasonably be expected from almost any person of normal intelligence and sensibilities, chosen at random from the community as a whole, who was also apprised of relevant facts; (2) that people cannot reasonably avoid the offensive behaviour or objects; and (3) that those who produce them are permitted allowable alternative forms of activity.*

A good deal could be said in elaboration and justification of such a policy principle, but rather than try to defend it in the abstract I would rather that those concerned about the issue of environmental degradation, those accused of contributing to it and those charged with the tasks of making and enacting public policy, each and jointly considered this principle in relation to real life

11. See J. Feinberg, "Harmless Immoralities and Offensive Nuisances" in N. Care/T. Trelogan (eds), *Issues in Law and Morality* (Case Western Reserve University: Cleveland 1973); Id., *Offence to Others: The Moral Limits of Criminal Law* (Oxford University Press: New York 1985).

situations such as those currently prevailing in Malta. In doing so they would undoubtedly expose various inadequacies in its conception and formulation, but that is a necessary preliminary to working out a more adequate principle of intervention on aesthetic grounds.

The *aesthetic* is a fundamental and value-laden mode of human experience; the *political* is concerned with the promotion and protection of basic human goods. Even if it did not follow from reflections of an ethical kind, therefore, the necessity of a politics of the environment is entailed by the conjunction of these facts.

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YOUTH, RELIGION AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN MALTA*

Anthony M. Abela

This paper investigates the relation between youth, religion and options for social change in Malta through a comparative analysis of the European Values surveys held in Malta in 1983 and 1991. It seeks to understand the impact of socio-economic development on youth religious values in Malta. First, it examines change in youth religiosity that has occurred over the past decade. Second, it explores whether there is any relation between youth religiosity and a high social intolerance observable in Maltese society relative to other Western European countries. Third, it examines youth options for future social developments in Malta, their materialist and post-materialist values relative to other Europeans, and how this relates to youth religious activity in Malta.

Socio-economic development

The small Mediterranean islands of Malta have a total surface area of 246 square kilometres; they are 93 kilometres away from mainland Europe and 290 kilometres from North Africa. Since its independence from Britain in 1964, Malta has become a Republic, a non-aligned and neutral nation-state, joined the Council of Europe, established trade agreements with the European Economic Community and has applied for full membership on July 16, 1990. Most of its 350,000 population is practising Roman Catholic.

The high performance of the Maltese economy over the past decade is attributed to the liberalisation of trade, the restructuring and re-orientation of the manufacturing industry and the shift of resources into service activities. Malta's strength is believed to lie in its strategic position, its educational and

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health systems, business and professional expertise, intellectual qualities, dexterity and resourcefulness of its people. Over the past decade there has been an increase in output, record exports and imports levels, low unemployment, higher wages and high private sector investment. The per capita gross national product continued to increase at an average of 9 percent per annum (Malta Economic Survey 1992: 4). Tertiary education has increased threefold from 1,010 in 1983 to 3,125 in 1991. During the same period, however, the welfare gap widened from Lm12.3 million in 1983 to Lm45.7 million in 1991.

The present government supports youth culture and favours enterprise and exchange with other European countries. Youths are encouraged to build a future society on the foundation of Christian values. The Church is called to assist in the building of a new solidarity (Nationalist Party Manifesto 1992).

In fact, Church leaders had earlier taken the lead in the organisation of a variety of activities for Maltese youths on a national and local level (Abela 1992). Youth movements of the Church, now constituting the Diocesan Youth Commission, kept pace with changing youth culture and sought to reach the young by organising teens-encounters, youth festivals, voluntary work overseas, Masses with rock music in discotheques and in other places of entertainment. Previous research revealed how religious values are very much diffuse. They co-exist with other social values. In Malta, modernity has to come to terms with the traditional, often generating a neo-traditionality (Abela 1991).

European Values

A Maltese version of the European Values questionnaire was re-administered in Malta in the nineties by Gallup in association with the European Value Systems Study Group (EVSSG). The Maltese Values survey, conducted for the first time at the end of 1983 amongst a nationally representative sample of 467 respondents in Malta and Gozo (Abela 1991: 1-2), was repeated in June 1991 amongst a similar sample of 393 respondents. Interviews of approximately one hour each were carried out in the home of respondents by specially trained Gallup interviewers (Heald 1992). The available breakdown of religious values for young people in Western Europe, Italy in particular (Tomasi 1992: 553-568), makes possible a comparative analysis with the values of youth in Malta.

The analysis of religious values over the past ten years (1981-90) posits a combination of a cultural and an age-related change as well as a great diversity between European countries. Ashford and Timms (1992: 124) observe that

Church attendance in Western Europe has seen a dramatic fall for all ages, amongst young people in particular. There has been an overall decline in public recognition of church authority on moral and family matters. Personal religiosity, however, as distinct from conventional church-going has remained stable. Generally, religious practice and belief is more common with the old than the young. But there is no evidence of a decline in the practice of personal prayer by the young. The non-correspondence of a personal spirituality and the observed decline in the authority of the Church suggest an overall change in culture.

There are marked differences, however, between the committed and the not so-committed members of the Church. In the European studies, "the committed" also called "core members" of the Church are those who attend a religious service at least once a month and either belong to a church organisation or undertake voluntary work for it. These activists are distinguished from "modal members" who attend at least once a month and from "marginal members" who attend less often. On the one hand, modal and marginal members, and, on the other hand, core members of the Church are found to support differing priorities for the society of the future. Core church members are more likely to take a post-materialist position than either the unchurched, the modal or marginal members (Ashford & Timms 1992: 47; Abela 1993).

Although the basic dimensions of religiosity are common to all countries in Europe, there are considerable differences in the proportion of core, modal, marginal, alienated and unchurched, as well as in the modality and levels of religious participation. Generally, Catholics in Southern Europe have higher rates of participation at religious services than Protestants in the North. The latter, however, tend to have higher levels of commitment to the voluntary activity of their Churches. Here we shall compare and contrast the values of Maltese youths with those of their European counterparts.

Youth religiosity in Malta

In sharp contrast to all other Western European countries under study, the majority of Maltese youths in the nineties find religion to be very (60%) or quite important (18%) in their lives. In this respect Maltese youths do not differ much from the older generations in Malta who find religion to be very (70%) or quite (20%) important in life. Only the Irish Republicans (48%) come closest to the Maltese (70%) in their attachment to religion, whereas Italy (18%) or Great Britain (30%) fall far behind. Very few Maltese youths find religion to be not at all important (3%) or not very important (7%) in their life. This puts youth religiosity in Malta second only to the family (96%)

and work (81%), on a par with leisure (62%) much higher than the importance attached to friends (33%) and politics (7%). [Table 1].

Religious belief and practice

Studies of Europeans values in the nineties have observed the emergence of a plurality of individualised systems of religious values and beliefs. Europeans have become increasingly selective in their adherence to traditional beliefs, identified as a situation of religious individualism (Kerkhofs 1992: 79). Overall Maltese youths, as distinct from their European counterparts, have retained a high level of belief in the major tenets of the Christian faith. Thus, almost all young people in Malta believe in God (98%, compared to 79.9% in Italy and the average 58.7% in Western Europe). Similar to other Europeans, but to a lower extent, young people in Malta are selective in their adherence to belief in life after death (79%; Europe: 39%), a soul (85%; Italy: 68%; Europe: 56%), the devil (68%; Italy: 31%; Europe: 20%), hell (65%; Italy: 29%; Europe: 18%), heaven (75%; Italy: 42%; Europe: 33%), sin (80%; Italy: 60%; Europe: 45%), or the resurrection of the dead (65%; Italy: 39%; Europe: 26%). 77% of young people in Malta similar to 60% in Italy but in contrast to 29% in Europe think of God as a person. The rest either conceive of God as a sort of spirit or life-force (18%; 33% in Europe). Very few Maltese youths think that there is no sort of God or life force (2.7%), or find themselves confused and do not know what to think (9.4%). Again 89% of youths in Malta in contrast to a low of 30% in Europe find God to be very important in their lives (score 7, 8, 9 or 10 on a ten-point scale). In contrast to a high percent of European youths (48.9%), less than two percent (1.7%) of Maltese youths find God not at all important in their lives (score 1, 2, 3 or 4 on a ten-point scale). [Table 2].

In their majority, Maltese youths derive strength and comfort from religion (83.6%). Most youths in Malta (81.2%) but not so much in Europe (48.5%) spend some time in prayer. 82% of Maltese youths pray often (Europe: 11.4%), 46% sometimes (Europe: 22.1%), 3.5% in times of crisis (Europe: 14.5%) and only a bare two percent never pray (Europe: 37.7%). [Table 3].

In sharp contrast to the average European youth, only a small minority of Maltese youths never attend religious services (6.9%). Many Maltese youths go to Church more than once a week (28.3%) in comparison to 2.5% of their European counterparts, many others attend at least once a week (Malta: 56.3%; Europe: 10.4%) whereas the rest (Malta: 8.5%, Europe: 45.4%) attend once a month, during Christmas, Easter or less often. [Table 4].

Generally, a considerable number of European youths, however much alienated from the Church, find fit to celebrate important events in their lives with a religious service. Thus, although few European youths are regular church goers (12.9% attend at least once a week, 45.4% less often, 41.2% never or practically never), a considerable number think it is important to hold a religious service on the occasion of a death (70.2%), marriage (64.3%) but less for a birth of a child (59.6%). The younger generation in Europe – but not in Malta – associate religious ceremonies more with events marking a turning point in their life at the moment of marriage or death and not so much with baptism to mark the beginning of a new life. This reflects the rise of an individualised religion in Europe, where the choice of baptism is no longer decided by the community in the name of the child.

Unlike their European counterparts, the majority of Maltese youths think that the Church in their country is giving adequate answers to spiritual matters (84%; 46.9% in Europe), family life (83.3%; 23.8% in Europe), individual needs and morality (74.6%; 27% in Europe) and to a lesser extent on contemporary social issues (67%; 20.5% in Europe). They think that the Church should teach on the morality of abortion (90.8%), extra-marital affairs (86%), human rights (84%), Third World problems (84%), divorce (82.1%), euthanasia (67%), disarmament (65%), homosexuality (60.4%), unemployment (60%), ecology and environmental issues (49%) but not so much on government policy (32%). Unlike Europeans who give a priority to social issues, the Maltese attach great importance to the teaching of the Church on family and sexual issues. Thus in contrast to the Maltese, young people in Europe want their Churches to speak out more on international social issues dealing with Third World problems (76%), racial discrimination (68.4%), disarmament (54.5%), ecology and the environment (49.6%) than on personal family life issues of euthanasia (52%), abortion (44.8%), extra-marital affairs (34%) or homosexuality (28.9%). [Table 5].

Overall, in the intervening years between the two Values surveys, Maltese youths have retained almost equal levels of religious belief, attendance at religious services and trust in the Church. Unlike their European counterparts the majority of Maltese youths are not unfavourable to the teachings of the Church on personal and family-life issues. At the same time they have come to belief less in sin (from 89% in 1984 to 77% in 1991). Church attendance has dropped by 7 percent and fewer youths spend time in prayer (from 91% in 1984 to 82% in 1991). While retaining a high Church attendance as in the eighties, Maltese youths are coming to think of themselves as less religious that before (from 90% in 1984 to 70% in 1991). Fewer youths in the nineties derive comfort and strength from religion (89% in 1984 to 79% in 1991). Such a drop in religious identity and to a certain extent their diminished sense of sin suggests that over the past decade a considerable number of young people in Malta have experienced a personal religious crisis and an erosion of their moral conscience.

Tolerance

A high religiosity is often associated with low permissiveness and an intolerance of deviant behaviour. A closely-knit community which is held together by shared religious values has little space for divergent value systems. People tend to dislike being with others who hold different opinions from themselves. Earlier studies of European values posit Malta as a clear example of a closely-knit society where individuals are very particular about the type of people they would like to have as their neighbours. The Mediterranean code of honour and shame still regulates relationships in Malta.

The European Values studies asked respondents whether they would like to have as neighbours socially problematic people, such as those with a criminal conduct, political extremists, unmarried mothers, heavy drinkers, large families, the emotionally unstable, minority religious sects or cults, immigrants and foreign workers. The results from the survey makes possible a comparison of the level of tolerance and intolerance in Malta and Europe. Here we enquire whether in the intervening years between the two surveys, the Maltese relative to the average western European have become more tolerant of their neighbours. Are Maltese youths similar to their European peers and their older compatriots in their attitudes towards minorities, foreigners, people of other races, religions and those generally considered as deviants by society? How is a person's religiosity related to his or her tolerance or intolerance towards different others?

Overall in the beginning of the nineties and in comparison to the mid-eighties, the Maltese have become more tolerant of political extremists but have retained a high level of intolerance towards people with social problems. Generally, young people in Malta are more tolerant than their compatriots, even though by European standards they have retained their aversion towards people with a criminal record (70%, Europe 37%), heavy drinkers (59%, Europe 50%), the emotionally unstable (35%, Europe 28%), people with AIDS (49%, Europe 30%), drug addicts (58%, Europe 59%) or homosexuals (43%, Europe 31%). Like their compatriots, Maltese youths have become less opposed to having in their community left- or right-wing political extremists (16% in 1991 as opposed to 39% in 1983) and members of minority religious sects or cults (13% in 1991; 39% in 1983). [Table 6].

Very small minorities in Malta and fewer Maltese youths than in Europe generally, are hostile to having Muslims (7%, Europe 17%), Jews (6%, Europe 10%), Hindus (6%, Europe 12%), immigrants and foreign workers (7%, Europe 13%) or people of a different race (9%, Europe 11%) in their community. Racist attitudes are more pronounced amongst the Italians (12%) than the British (8%) or the Irish (6%).

In the intervening years between the two surveys the Maltese, the youth in particular, have become more reluctant to welcome tourists (from 1% in 1983 to 5% in 1991), large families (11% in 1983; 13% in 1991) or emotionally unstable people (26% in 1983; 35% in 1991) but are less opposed to unmarried mothers (11% to 4% in 1991) in their community. On the one hand, Europeans find less difficulty than the Maltese to accept deviants with social problems as their neighbours. On the other hand, the Maltese are more willing than Europeans to welcome foreigners in their community.

Community and religiosity

A factor analysis for our respondents' aversion to have outsiders as their neighbours extracted two factors. The first factor is characterized by intolerance towards foreigners or non-members of the community with high factor loadings in descending order obtained for Hindus (.83), Jews (.78), Muslims (.78), foreign workers (.68), right-wing extremists (.52), people of another political party (.51), left-wing extremists (.50), tourists (.49), unwed mothers (.39), people of a different race (.38), large families (.38) and members of minority religious sects or cults (.38).

The second factor stands for people's unwelcoming attitude towards others who have serious social problems. As these individuals do not comply with the acceptable norms of the community they are generally considered to be deviants. Foremost are to be found drug addicts (.80), people with AIDS (.77), homosexuals (.75), alcoholics (.74), people with a criminal record (.66), the emotionally unstable (.65), members of minority religious sects or cults (.43), left-wing (.43) or right-wing extremists (.39) and unwed mothers (.36).

An examination of the correlations obtained on a number of religious dimensions with the tolerance factors allows for an understanding of the relationship between religiosity and community care of the Maltese, the young in particular. First we observe no significant relationship between respondents' church attendance, membership and voluntary work in religious or Church organisations and intolerance towards foreigners and people with social problems. Intolerance is not dependent on a person's religious practice or belonging. Practising and non-practising, committed and alienated members of the church are equally welcoming or unsympathetic as the case might be of foreigners and people with social problems in their community.

Religiosity, prayer life and attachment to the teachings of the Church, however, obtain different correlations for the two distinct factors of community acceptance. On the one hand, a person's religiosity, prayer life and confidence in the church does not interfere in his or her attitudes towards foreigners. Foreign people are equally accepted by the religious and non-religious. On the other hand, community care, seen as a general willingness to accept as neighbours people who have serious social problems, is closely and negatively related to religiosity, prayer life and attitudes towards the Church. Non-religious Maltese youths show higher acceptance of people who have social problems than their religious peers. It seems that non-religious youths are less intolerant of deviants than the religious (-.28); the indifferent to prayer are less intolerant than those who spend time in prayer (-.32), and those who are diffident of the institutions of the Church are more sympathetic towards people with problems in their community than their trusting peers (-.32). There is no significant association however, between religiosity and intolerance for the whole population. [Table 7].

Materialism

The Values study administered Inglehart's battery of questions in order to test the hypothesis of a cultural shift in the advanced industrial countries of the world. Inglehart contends that the young are less materialist than their elders. Here we investigate if Maltese youths are less materialist than their compatriots. Have Maltese youths improved in their non-materialist concerns on a par with other Western Europeans? Is there any significant relationship between a religious commitment of young people in Malta and a non-materialist orientation?

In the intervening years between the two surveys, and in contrast to the Western European average, the Maltese, young and old alike, show no sign of departure from their predominantly materialist options. Thus, on Inglehart's first battery of questions, in the nineties just as in the eighties, Maltese youths are more concerned with the upkeep of national order (37% in 1991; 32% in 1983) and fighting rising prices (28% in 1991; 17% in 1983) than with post-materialist options like giving people more say in government decisions (14% in 1991; 18% in 1983) or the protection of freedom of speech (18% in 1991; 21% in 1983). By contrast, in the nineties, Europeans generally give less importance to materialist concerns. Overall Europeans favour more say in government decisions (23% in 1990; 19% in 1981) and freedom of speech (25% in 1990; 19% in 1981) than the upkeep of national order (23% in 1990; 31% in 1981) or fighting rising prices (24% in 1990; 26% in 1981). [Table 8].

Similarly, youths in Malta, in comparison to their compatriots and the average European, give slightly more importance to the upkeep of economic growth (36%) than to participation in the workplace and community (32%) or care for the environment (15%) [Table 9]. Again, and just like their compatriots but distinct from the average European, youths in Malta give priority to the fight against crime (35%) and the upkeep of a stable economy (26%) much more than working towards a more humane and less impersonal society (14%) where ideas count more than money (11%). [Table 10].

Overall, Maltese youths on a par with the average citizen in Malta, emerge as predominantly materialists. The materialist-postmaterialist ratio constructed from Inglehart's three four-item battery of questions of the 1990 Values Study posits a marked materialist (55:37) orientation in Malta relative to the overall one-to-one ratio (47:47) in Europe. In the intervening years between the two Values surveys, the materialist-postmaterialist ratio (constructed from Inglehart's first four-item battery question administered in 1983 and 1991) for Maltese youths seems to have shifted towards greater materialism (from 5:4 in 1983 to 2:1 in 1991). [Table 11].

Religion and post-materialist culture

The factors for materialism and post-materialism were correlated with a number of religious dimensions in order to examine whether there is any significant relation for the total population in Malta, and youths in particular. The results show that there is no significant relation between materialism or post-materialism and the religious dimensions of Church attendance, religiosity, belief in God, importance of God in life or confidence in the Church. The only significant relation is between membership or voluntary work in Church organisations and post-materialism. The religiously committed Maltese, in particular youth members or voluntary workers of Church organisations, are significantly post-materialist (.39) and anti-materialist (-.28) in their value options for the future. Such a result supports our earlier findings (Abela 1993; Ashford & Timms 1992: 47) that core members are more likely to take a post-materialist position than either the unchurched, the modal or marginal members of the Church. In this way young Church activists are seen to give a contribution to the development of a post-materialist culture in Maltese society. [Table 12].

Conclusion

The comparative analysis of religious values in the eighties and in the nineties does not give clear evidence of a decline in Church attendance, adherence to belief and practice of Maltese youths. At the same time, however, a significantly greater percentage of Maltese youths no longer come to see themselves as religious. This suggests that the socio-economic development that has occurred over the past few years has an ambivalent impact on youth religion in Malta. On the one hand, there continues the external manifestation of religion in Maltese society at large, and on the other hand, a number of Maltese youths are beginning to dissociate themselves from an exclusive formal and Church-related religiosity. The movement towards individualized religion that has been observed for Europe is making its way, albeit on a smaller scale, into Malta.

The analysis of youth religiosity and community care in Malta differentiates between the acceptance of foreigners and deviants in the community. On the one hand, acceptance of foreigners is independent of religion. On the one hand, youth community care, seen as a general willingness to accept as neighbours people who have serious social problems, is closely and negatively related to religiosity, prayer life and attitudes towards the Church of the young. Non-religious Maltese youths show higher acceptance of people who have social problems than their religious peers.

At the same time, however, the correlation between religion and intolerance is not significant for the total Maltese population represented in the sample. It might well be the case that social intolerance is just a passing phase of the present generation of Maltese youths. In this situation, an adequate strategy of pastoral policy in the nineties should seek to channel the relatively strong Christian faith of the young towards works of justice and solidarity with the emarginated and those suffering from any sort of social discrimination.

Finally we observe that the religiously committed Maltese youths, voluntary workers and members of religious or Church groups opt for post-materialist values for the future of the country. In this way core members of the Church, youung people in particular, are committed to the development of a post-materialist culture in Malta.

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TABLE 1

Please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life ... (Q.116)

Percent very important*:	YM	M	XE	GB	It	Ir
Family	96	94	81	89	83	91
Work	81	80	53	47	62	65
Religion	60	70	21	18	30	48
Leisure time	62	47	36	43	34	32
Friends & acquaintances	33	29	43	48	39	54
Politics	7	12	7	10	7	5

* ordered according to priorities in Malta. XE = Average for ten Western European countries, M = Malta; YM = Youths in Malta; GB = Great Britain; It = Italy; Ir = Republic of Ireland.

TABLE 2

Religious belief in Western Europe and Malta in the 1990s

	XE	It	M	M
Age years old:	-29	-29	-29	30+
Believe in:				
God	58.7	79.9	97.3	100.0
Life after death	38.7	38.7	78.6	79.0
A soul	56.1	68.2	84.9	87.4
The devil	20.1	31.2	68.1	75.6
Hell	17.7	28.9	65.4	76.6
Heaven	33.0	41.6	74.6	83.7
Sin	46.9	59.8	80.2	86.4
Resurrection of the dead	25.7	38.5	64.5	75.0
Re-incarnation	22.1	22.1	19.1	13.3
There is a personal God	29.3	59.9	66.7	72.2
Sort of spirit or life force	32.9	25.4	18.2	19.1
Importance of God in Life:				
very important (7-10)	28.7	56.7	88.6	95.3
not at all important (1-4)	48.9	22.3	1.7	0.7

TABLE 3

Frequency of prayer in Western Europe and Malta in the 1990s.

Age years old:	XE -29	It -29	M -29	M 30+
Pray, meditate or contemplate	48.5	69.0	81.2	88.4
Pray often	11.4	24.1	42.2	61.1
Sometimes	22.1	33.2	45.5	32.4
Hardly ever	11.6	12.0	7.0	2.0
Only in times of crisis	14.5	10.8	3.5	2.4
Never	37.7	19.0	1.8	1.5
Think about meaning & purpose of life:				
Often	32.2	46.9	17.7	17.2
Sometimes	40.1	40.4	29.7	36.2
Don't know			32.1	21.5
Think about death:				
Often	14.5	22.1	15.4	27.1
Sometimes	37.9	45.6	35.2	39.6

TABLE 4

Church attendance, religiosity and membership in voluntary religious organisations in Western Europe and Malta in the 1990s.

Age years old:	XE -29	It -29	M -29	M 30+
Attend religious services:	2.5	7.1	28.3	45.9
More than once a week	10.4	24.4	56.3	43.2
Once a week	45.4	50.4	8.5	6.6
Less often	41.2	16.5	6.9	4.4
Never, practically never				
Religious service important for:				
Birth	59.6	77.2	93.8	96.8
Marriage	64.3	74.5	93.0	95.6
Death	70.2	78.9	94.4	95.7
A religious person	46.6	73.9	60.9	76.9
Not a religious person	38.3	15.2	37.3	21.5
Member of a religious organisation	13*	8*	13.5	13.1
Voluntary work in religious group	6*	6*	8.2	9.5

Source: European & Malta Values Study, EVSSG 1991. * all ages.

TABLE 5

The teaching of the Church in Western Europe and Malta in the 1990s

Age years old:	XE -29	It -29	M -29	M 30+
Church gives adequate answers to:				
Individual needs and moral issues	27.0	38.1	74.6	81.4
Family life	23.8	30.8	83.3	85.8
Spiritual needs	46.9	54.5	84.3	87.7
Social problems of today	20.5	31.5	67.1	72.6
Church should speak out on:				
Disarmament	54.5	65.5	64.6	67.9
Abortion	44.8	54.0	90.8	91.2
Third World problems	76.0	85.0	83.7	83.0
Extramarital affairs	34.0	35.3	86.0	88.9
Unemployment	38.2	47.9	59.9	65.3
Racial discrimination	68.4	82.6	79.9	75.5
Euthanasia	52.6	58.4	67.0	72.2
Homosexuality	28.9	32.7	60.4	69.2
Ecology & environmental issues	49.6	52.9	48.8	48.8
Government policy	20.4	23.3	32.1	26.9
Human rights	na	na	84.2	78.4
Divorce	na	na	82.2	88.0

Source: European & Malta Values Study, EVSSG 1991.

TABLE 5B

Change in youth religiosity in Malta (1983-1993)

	1984		1991	
	YM	M	YM	M
	%	%	%	%
Attend church at least weekly	92	91	85	88
Religious person	90	94	70	73
Church teaching adequate on:				
Moral problems & individual needs	71	71	70	79
Family life	76	79	81	85
Spiritual needs	79	84	85	87
Belief in:				
God	97	99	95	99
Life after death	75	84	79	79
Soul	85	91	83	87
Devil	62	77	66	74
Hell	61	78	66	74
Heaven	71	86	77	82
Sin	89	90	77	85
Religion gives comfort and strength	89	94	79	92
Spend time in prayer	91	90	82	87
N	87	467	91	393

Maltese Values 1984/1991.
YM = 18-24 year old Maltese, M = Maltese respondents.

TABLE 6

Changing tolerance and intolerance towards others in Malta and Western Europe (1980-1991).

Do not like as neighbours:		YM	M	XE
People of criminal record	*'80s*	*70*	*76*	*29*
	'90s	70	78	37
People of a different race	*'80s*	*6*	*9*	*9*
	'90s	9	11	11
Left wing extremists	*'80s*	*36*	*45*	*30*
	'90s	16	22	34
Heavy drinkers	*'80s*	*56*	*61*	*49*
	'90s	59	62	50
Right wing extremists	*'80s*	*39*	*42*	*28*
	'90s	16	21	36
People with large families	*'80s*	*11*	*11*	*8*
	'90s	13	17	9
Emotionally unstable people	*'80s*	*26*	*32*	*23*
	'90s	35	35	28
Immigrants/foreign workers	*'80s*	*na*	*na*	*10*
	'90s	7	10	13
Unmarried mothers	*'80s*	*11*	*24*	*3*
	'90s	4	15	na
Tourists	*'80s*	*1*	*3*	*na*
	'90s	5	4	na
Members of sects or cults	*'80s*	*39*	*42*	*19*
	'90s	13	19	na
People who have AIDS*		49	47	30
Drug addicts*		58	66	59
Homosexuals*		43	45	31
Muslims*		7	15	17
Jews*		6	9	10
Hindus*		6	9	12
Of different political views*		6	7	na

na = not asked: * asked only in 1991.

TABLE 7

Correlation of religiosity and intolerance

		UNWANTED NEIGHBOURS	
		Foreign people	Problem people
Religious/ non-religious	all ages	.08	-.11
	youth	.06	-.28*
Prayer: often-never	all ages	.08	-.01
	youth	.05	-.32**
Church trust: high-low	all ages	.02	-.10
	youth	.07	-.32**
Membership in Church organisations	all ages	.00	.01
	youth	.08	.03
Voluntary work in Church organisations	all ages	-.09	-.04
	youth	-.14	-.01
Church attendance	all ages	.03	.03
	youth	.05	.22

N of cases for all ages = 393; N for youth = 91; * $p < .01$ ** $p < .001$

TABLE 8

Change in materialist and post-materialist options for Maltese youth, Malta and Western Europe (Inglehart's first four-item battery of questions 1980-1991)

	Materialist and post materialist options*	Year	YM	M	XE
			%	%	%
M	Maintain order in the nation	1980s	32	32	31
		1990s	*37*	*33*	*23*
M	Fight rising prices	1980s	17	19	26
		1990s	*28*	*29*	*24*
P	Say in government decisions	1980s	18	16	19
		1990s	*14*	*13*	*23*
P	Protect freedom of speech	1980s	21	18	19
		1990s	*18*	*17*	*25*

* mean of first and second choice; M = Materialist P = Post-materialist values

TABLE 9

Inglehart's second four-item battery of questions for Maltese youth, Malta and Western Europe in the nineties.

	Materialist and post-materialist options (1991)*	YM	M	XE
M	Maintain high economic growth	36	32	33
M	Ensure strong defence forces	8	6	6
P	More say in jobs and communities	32	29	33
P	Beautify cities and countryside	15	18	20

Question administered only in 1991. M = Materialist P = Post-materialist values. * mean of first and second choice.

TABLE 10

Inglehart's third four-item battery of questions for Maltese youth, Malta and Western Europe in the nineties.

	Materialist and post-materialist options (1991)*	YM	M	XE
M	A stable economy	26	29	28
M	Fight against crime	35	36	28
P	More humane/less impersonal society	14	11	24
P	Ideas prior to money	11	22	15

TABLE 11

Index from Inglehart's three four-item battery of questions for Maltese youth, Malta and Western Europe in the nineties.

Post-materialist index 1991**	YM	M	XE
Mean percent Materialist values	56.6	55.0	47.3
Mean percent Post-materialist values	34.7	36.7	46.6

** the percentage means of materialist and post-materialist options from Inglehart's three four-item battery of questions administered in 1991.

TABLE 11B

Maltese Materialist/Post-materialist ratio (M:PM) for Inglehart's first four-item battery question administered in 1983 and 1991.

	YOUTH	ALL
	M : PM	M : PM
1983	49 : 39	51 : 34
1991	65 : 32	62 : 30

TABLE 12

Correlations for religious dimensions with materialist and post-materialist values.

		M	PM
RELIGIOUS DIMENSION:			
Church Attendance	all	.00	.05
	youth	.08	.18
Religiosity	all	.03	.08
	youth	.06	.13
Belief in God	all	.05	.02
	youth	.08	.10
Importance of God in life	all	-.06	.00
	youth	-.04	.04
Spend time in prayer	all	-.15*	.10
	youth	-.10	.17
Church confidence	all	-.02	.07
	youth	-.02	.09
Membership in church/religious organisations	all	-.11	.15*
	youth	-.28*	.39**
Voluntary work in church or religious organisations	all	-.07	.14*
	youth	-.24	.32**

M = Materialist, PM = Post-materialist values. N of cases = 393, N (youth) = 91. * $p < .01$ ** $p < .001$

NEWMAN STUDIES: PRESENT AND FUTURE

Richard Penaskovic

This essay deals with some of the recent literature about Newman such as Ker's recent biography,[1] Jeremy Miller's book on Newman's ecclesiology, Clyde Nabe's book on Newman's epistemology of religion and Walter Jost's monograph on *Rhetorical Thought in John Henry Newman.*[2] Also, eight areas are listed where further research is needed.

Ian Ker's biography of Newman possesses one distinct advantage over the other biographies of Newman. Ker was able to take advantage of the thirty volumes of Newman's *Letters and Diaries*. Letters offer immediacy without second thoughts and often without later publication in mind, over against both biography and autobiography.

It is difficult to compress Ker's life into a few brief paragraphs. Nevertheless, here in summary fashion, are some of the special features of Ker's biography. First, Ker provides us with various examples of Newman's gift of insight. Apropos of Newman's spirituality, for example, we find out that for Newman spirituality is marked by its utter lack of pretentiousness, the continual practice of small duties which are distasteful to us. Newman made consistency the mark of a saint, stating that the greatest mortification was to do well the ordinary duties of the day.[3] Another example illustrates Newman's gifts of insight. Newman speaks of life as fleeting. He says that in the midst of life, we're in death. It is as if one were standing in a fight, and anyone might be shot down.[4] Sounding a similar note, Newman writes that "we seem to live and

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1. Ian Ker, *John Henry Newman: A Biography* (Clarendon Press; Oxford1988).

2. Edward Jeremy Miller, *Newman on the Idea of Church* (Patmos Press; Shepherdstown 1987), Clyde Nabe, *Mystery and Religion: Newman's Epistemology of Religion* (University Press of America, Inc.; Lanham, MD 1988) and Walter Jost, *Rhetorical Thought in John Henry Newman* (University of South Carolina Press; Columbia, South Carolina 1989).

3. Ker, *Newman*, 94.

4. Ibid., 172

die as the leaves; but there is One who notes the fragrance of every one of them, and, when their hour comes, places them between the pages of His great Book."[5]

Second, Ker provides us with an introduction to most of Newman's major writings. For this reason Ker's biography is more than a life of Newman, because it gives us important insights into Newman's thought. Particularly noteworthy are Ker's comments on Newman's *Lectures on Justification*, the *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* and the *Grammar of Assent*.

Third, Ker pays special attention to Newman the writer and Newman's use of language. Ker points out, for example, how the crisis of 1822 first inspired the satirical masterpiece of his Anglican period, the essay, the "Tamworth Reading Room." In the *Lectures on Justification* Ker makes reference to the richness of imagery, the new brilliance of aphorism and to the sharpened sarcasm and satirical wit, all signs of Newman the eloquent rhetorician.[6]

In regard to the *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, Ker notes that it is akin to Thomas Scott's book, *The Force of Truth*. Scott, who lived between 1747-1821, was an evangelical clergyman whose autobiography had a wide circulation. The dominant form of autobiographical writing in England when Newman wrote was the spiritual autobiography. Newman did not want to write his autobiography in the standard English mode because his Catholic theology inclined him against using literary forms that were Protestant. By using T. Scott's *The Force of Truth* as a model for the *Apologia* Newman could write within the English tradition of autobiography without acquiescing, in narrative pattern, to radical Protestant ideas about conversion.[7] Ker points out the fact that the *Apologia* is an intellectual or theological autobiography, rather than an autobiography in the usual mode. He also remarks that the book persuades by deliberately abandoning all argument in favour of cold facts, adopting sober documentation instead of polemical rhetoric.[8]

Ker shows how Newman did not write for the sake of writing but because of the controversies into which he was thrown. To write a book for the sake of

5. Ibid., 538.

6. Ibid., 157.

7. See Linda H. Peterson, "Newman's *Apologia pro vita sua* and the Traditions of the English Spiritual Autobiography," in *PMLA* 100 (April, 1985) 300-314.

8. Ker, *Newman*, 549.

writing would be for Newman an impossibility. Ker also observes that for Newman the study of the classics, particularly Horace, had a religious influence on the imagination. Why so? Newman believes that the classics remind us of our state by nature, increase in us a sense of our dependence on God, and arm us against the false promises of the world, namely, the promise of literature and science to provide us with liberty and life.[9]

Finally, Ker reminds us of the fact that in his writing Newman's main goal was to express his meaning clearly and exactly, taking Cicero as his master of style. Newman explicitly acknowledges his debt to Cicero to whom he owed a great deal.[10]

Edward J. Miller's recent study, *John Henry Newman On the Idea of Church*, takes an in-depth look at Newman's view of the church. Miller argues that Newman had a threefold orientation to the church, namely, 1) the foundational view which deals with the first principles of Newman's thinking and deals with the question: Why does someone practice religion in a church?; 2) the pastoral view which concerns processes in the church and asks the question: How ought that church to behave?; and 3) the theological view which treats of God's grace and treats the question, Does that church express more than the native abilities of its members?[11]

Miller attempts to provide a systematic framework for Newman's idea of the church, allowing Newman to speak for himself as much as possible. Miller does not believe that he is forcing Newman's thought into three airtight compartments, but genuinely believes that Newman himself saw the church from the vantage-point of perspectives.[12] Miller also underscores the fact that these three views of the church, the foundational, the pastoral and the theological, are related one to another. Thus the notion of the church as a sacrament is treated in the chapter on the foundational view of the church but also in Chapter Four on the theological view of the church.

Miller's thesis about Newman's three basic orientations to the church is

9. Ibid., 730.

10. Ibid., 630. Wilfrid Ward observes that the sources of Newman's much praised style were his ideas, his style arising from his desire to communicate to others the experience of his own life, which moved him to deep feeling. See Martin J. Svaglic, "John Henry Newman: Man and Humanist," in *Victorian Prose: A Guide to Research*, (ed. David J. De Laura) (The Modern language Association of America; New York 1973) 161.

11. Miller, *Newman*, xx.

12. Ibid., 143.

certainly an intriguing one. However, I wonder if Miller's study pays sufficient attention 1) to the role of the Holy Spirit in the church and 2) to the historical context and development of Newman's ideas on the church. If, for instance, Miller's tripartite framework — foundational, pastoral and theological — really reflects Newman's instincts about the church, why have no other scholars noted such a schema, particularly those like Was de Pol, Stanislas Jaki, Norbert Schiffers and John Coulson who have written specifically about Newman's ecclesiology?[13]

It would transcend the parameters of this study to deal at length with Miller's thesis. I merely want to sketch an alternative perspective for Newman's ecclesiology. In his Anglican period Newman's ecclesiology was dominated by his understanding of the church as sacrament with particular attention paid to the role of the Holy Spirit in the church as seen in both the *Parochial and Plain Sermons* and in the *Lectures on Justification*. During his Catholic period Newman did not speak much about the role of the Holy Spirit in the church. As a Roman Catholic, Newman did not have a unified view of the church. Rather, it arose from the various controversies into which he was drawn.

In the *Discourse on the Scope and Nature of University Education* (1852), Newman was deeply concerned with the relationship between the church and the world. In the *Rambler* article of 1859, "On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine," Newman tries to resolve one major difficulty in his theory of doctrinal development, namely, how is the mind of the church to be discovered before a definition of the church is made?

In the *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* Newman shows the need for Christianity to take on flesh and blood in a visible and infallible church. Only in this way could our wild, living intellect be tamed. On the *Apologia* Newman underscores two factors without relaxing the tension between them: 1) the sacramental nature of the church and 2) the need for freedom and diversity of theological investigation within the church. Newman never relinquished his Tractarian view of the church found in his early period but merely stressed other factors as a Roman Catholic. Newman's ecclesiology reaches its highpoint in the Preface to the 3rd edition of his *Via Media I* published in 1877.[14]

13. See the fine study of Norbert Schiffers, *Die Einheit der Kirche nach Newman* (Patmos; Dusseldorf 1956) and that by John Coulson, *Newman and the Common Tradition* (Clarendon Press; Oxford 1970).

14. See Richard J. Penaskovic, *Open to the Spirit: The Notion of the Laity in the Writings of J.H. Newman* (W. Blasaditsch Verlag; Augsburg 1972) 237-251.

How does this view of Newman's ecclesiology differ from Miller's thesis? I believe that my sketch of Newman's theology of the church shows better how Newman's ecclesiology changed and developed over the years paying greater attention to the historical context in which Newman wrote than does Miller's work. I also feel that Miller's book pays insufficient attention to the role of the Holy Spirit in Newman's ecclesiology. To point this out in detail would exceed the limits of this present study.

Clyde Nabe's book, *Mystery and Religion*, deals with Newman's theory of knowledge in regard to the subject of religion. Nabe shows that much religious truth evades the limitations of human reason. Nabe commences by analyzing Newman's use of human reason. Newman saw reason operating on two levels, first on the level of "implicit reason" and second on the level of "explicit reason."

Implicit reason is used by everyone; explicit reason by some people. Implicit reason occurs at the level of concrete, existential concerns and is preverbal, unconscious and spontaneous reasoning. Explicit reason, on the contrary, may be termed second order thinking or thinking about thinking. Explicit reason involves argument and is a distillation of implicit reason. Both implicit and explicit reason are powers of the mind or faculties for gaining knowledge.[15]

Newman, says Nabe, tried to widen our understanding of reason. The Liberals in Newman's day identified reason with explicit reason, whereas Newman argued that everyday reasoning is the foundation of all reasoning. For Newman the process of implicit reason was complete in itself, independently of any subsequent reflection on it.[16]

Newman dealt with questions about knowledge and the possibility of knowledge in the context of questions concerning religious belief. Newman wanted to justify the faith of simple folks unable to ground their faith philosophically. Newman says that everyone has a reason for positing an act of faith, although not everyone can give a reason.

Newman merely draws a distinction between implicit and explicit reason, one which should not be pushed too far. Both are different regions on the continuum of human rationality. We always reason in the same way. However, the method of reasoning is either implicit or explicit.[17]

15. Nabe, *Mystery*, 3.

16. Ibid., 6.

17. Ibid., 9.

Newman makes the point that the more explicit and verbal our reasoning becomes, the less it can include all that occurs. In other words, every move made toward explicitness involves a loss of the richness and fullness of reasoning. Moreover, reasoning on a concrete matter can never be fully translated into words. Language cannot capture or recapture the fullness of reality but will always be an inadequate representation of reality. Hence, Newman speaks about mystery. Mystery implies a partial view or manifestation of reality. Mystery eludes our intellect and is trans-rational, yet, at the same time, gives us glimpses of reality and partial knowledge. Mystery implies our inability to grasp fully the matter at hand. The concept of what mystery does is this: it forces us to recognize the fact that reality is larger than the natural world; that there is the super-natural which is above reason.[18]

In speaking about justifying our beliefs, it is important to consider what Newman calls "first principles" or antecedent probabilities. When we perceive the world, we bring to that perception our own first principles, which are personal to us. The theist and the a-theist each have their own set of first principles, although both disagree sharply over their first principles. These first principles proceed from their respective illative senses. Inasmuch as first principles guide us in our perception of the world, what data are recognized and seen as relevant are determined to a large extent by our first principles.

Those who criticize believers do so because they operate out of a different set of first principles and hence find unacceptable what the believer considers evidence.[19] First principles do not proceed from our intellects alone but are the products of who we are as persons. Believers and unbelievers often talk past each other because their first principles are incommensurate with each other.

Nabe concludes by saying that we live our lives in mystery. Reason can make some sense out of that mystery, but we must be aware of the limits and limitations of reason. Another way of entering the mystery is by religious faith. The believer and the unbeliever will have trouble seeing eye to eye because their disagreement is on the level of first principles which cannot be fully analyzed. Both need to recognize the fact that no one is infallible in determining what is reasonable and what is unreasonable.[20]

18. Ibid., 21.

19. Ibid., 32.

20. Ibid., 59.

Nabe's essay on Newman's epistemology of religion is important for several reasons. First, Newman anticipates the concern of contemporary philosophers for hermeneutical questions, (that is to say, questions about the interpretation of a text), by his emphasis on first principles or antecedent probabilities. Today we would speak of presuppositions instead of antecedent probabilities. Second, in speaking about mystery, Newman reminds us of the fact that human reason is inadequate and limited and hence should not be deified, although human reason can provide some support for religious assertions.

Third, Nabe demonstrates how Newman's insights in the philosophy of religion still are valid today in understanding the meaning of religious faith and human reason.

In his book, *Rhetorical Thought in John Henry Newman*, Walter Jost argues that rhetoric is the lens through which Newman considers all problems. Rhetoric may be understood in many ways. Quintilian, for example, defines it as the science of speaking well. Newman understands rhetoric to mean the reduction of reasoning into the calculus of the tastes, opinions, passions and aims of a particular audience. Jost sees Newman as an opportunist inasmuch as Newman believed that questions should be raised and answered, problems located and solved by consulting the facts, circumstances and particulars of each case.[21]

How are religion and/or theology rhetorical for Newman? First, their content consists in the various kinds of persuasive appeals and arguments that people use in coming to the faith and that theologians employ in articulating the rational grounds of the faith and, second, the possibility of coming to any view of what religion is, says Newman, depends on assuming something which, in the final analysis, cannot be proven rigorously.[22] What Newman attempts to do in his writings is this: to enlarge the views of his audience using persuasive argument as opposed to logic or abstract science.[23]

Newman speaks of persuasion from the perspective of psychological processes that arguments never wholly express in contradistinction to rhetoricians who speak of persuasion from the standpoint of communication. Like Cicero, Newman emphasizes the rhetorical element in all knowing.

21. Jost, *Rhetorical*, 29.

22. Jost, 40.

23. Jost, 71.

Rhetoric remains the only legitimate mode of inquiry or proof for Newman and serves as the forms of his approach to all inquiry and argument. As such rhetoric furnishes a unique perspective on the human element in all knowing and believing. Newman manages to offer us a coherent rhetorical theory and an innovating rhetorical practice. By incorporating classical, empiricist and romantic interests in a theory of belief and practice of persuasion, Newman anticipates modern developments in rhetoric and hermeneutical philosophy/theology.[24]

What are we to say of Jost's thesis? Jost seems to be very well acquainted with the works of Newman, particularly the *Grammar of Assent* and the *Essay on Development*. He has certainly read the important secondary literature on Newman and is to be commended for the sweep of his vision without sacrificing profundity. It seems to me that he has certainly made his case for demonstrating how rhetoric is architectonic in Newman's thought.

However, I have a few observations to make on Jost's book. First, it does not seem quite right to call Newman an "opportunist." I feel that the word "opportunist" has a pejorative connotation to it. Would it not be more precise to call Newman a controversialist? In fact, I am surprised that Jost does not use the term, controversialist, in reference to Newman. Newman, like St. Augustine, wrote most of his works, (excluding his sermons) against the grain, that is, because of the controversies into which he was drawn.

I wonder if, at times, Jost reads too much into Newman. Jost states that for Newman language is ineluctably perspectival, sermonic or attitudinal. Things, facts, the concrete come to full existence only linguistically, hence rhetorically, argues Jost.[25] Jost provides no examples to make his point. It seems to me that Newman has a great deal of respect for individual facts, things and even persons. For Newman, a person's thought and speech are decidedly one-sided, perspectival and attitudinal. Newman believes that thought and speech, matter and expression cannot be separated from each other. Style is simply a thinking out into language.[26]

24. Jost, 211.

25. Jost, 26.

26. John Henry Newman, *The Idea of a University* (Longmans, Green and Company; London 1976) 232.

Areas for Further Research

There have been thousands of books and articles written about Newman, yet there are still several areas where further research is needed:

1) We have critical editions of the *Apologia*, the *Grammar of Assent* and *The Idea of a University* but still lack a critical edition of *The Via Media* and the *Essay on Development*.

2) In all his communities Newman had one close friend, Hurrell Froude at Oxford, Ambrose St. John in Littlemore, Rome and Birmingham and William Neville after St. John died.[27] Newman had a large capacity for friendship, hence the story of his friendship with Ambrose St. John and William Neville still remains to be written.

3) Newman's impact on rebels and outsiders needs to be studied, in the distant past on Leslie Stephens,[28] who wrote a neglected but important book on the Oxford Movement, nearer to our own time on Lytton Strachey, Gerard Manley Hopkins, Aldous Huxley, Colin Wilson and James Joyce, who called Newman the greatest prose writer in the English language. Colin Wilson, for example, says that in the twentieth century all the problems of which Newman treats, are still with us.[29] We also need to study the influence of other writers such as Addison, Hume, Gibbon, Crabbe and Bacon on Newman.[30]

4) Lest we fall into Newmanolatry, we need to be conscious of Newman's deficiencies and limitations. Newman was very shy and hence could often be seen as aloof, cold and indifferent to people. Moreover, Newman's historical sense was deficient. In his study on Chrysostom, for example, Newman leaves the background so meager that he does not even bother to give dates.[31] Furthermore, his elitism made him wary of democracy and Newman did not see slavery as intrinsically evil but only as an act of despotism.[32]

27. Owen Chadwick, *Newman* (Oxford University Press; New York 1983) 7.

28. Maurice Nedoncelle, "The Revival of Newman Studies: Some Reflections," *Downside Review* 86 (1968) 391.

29. Svaglic, "Man and Humanist," 165.

30. Joseph J. Reilly, *Newman as a Man of Letters* (The Macmillan Company; New York 1925) 156.

31. Ibid., 156.

32. Ker, *Newman*, 531.

Newman also had a negative view of the Reformers and of the Reformation. In this connection Newman was unduly influenced by his friend, Richard Hurrell Froude, who believed that the Reformers were responsible for the Erastian ideas (Thomas Erastus who lived between 1524-1583 argued for the ascendancy of the state over the church in ecclesiastical matters) which came into the Church of England. Newman neglected to see that Hurrell Froude was not a fair historian but a disillusioned churchman who saw history in terms of black and white, good and bad. Neither Froude nor Newman read extensively in the original documents of the Reformation.[33]

One should remember that many of Newman's works such as *The Present Difficulties of Catholics in England* and *The Difficulties Felt by Anglicans*, were controversial works, written in the heat of battle. In the latter work Newman was one-sided and made some harsh judgments about the Church of England. Newman was so single minded in the pursuit of the truth that he could bend the facts to suit his case. In the *Apologia*, for example, his tendency was to increase the age of those who collaborated in the production of the *Lives of the Saints* in order to rebut Kingsley's charge that he and his associates were young, headstrong people. Hence Newman claimed that in 1844 Marvel Johnson was 43 years old when he was, in actuality, only just 40.[34]

5) Newman's attitude toward ecumenism needs further investigation, particularly in the light of Dr. John Griffin's assertion that Newman is anti-ecumenical. Dr. Griffin bases his remarks on an analysis of the book, *Difficulties Felt by Anglicans*. It appears to me that Newman's attitude toward ecumenism is quite complex. Scholars need to sift through Newman's many writings especially the *Lectures on Justification* and the sundry volumes of Newman's *Letters and Diaries*. What would emerge is that it is simply unfair to speak of Newman as an anti-ecumenical figure.[35]

6) Another fruitful area of study would be a psychological analysis of Newman's self-concept understood as a mental blueprint of the self. Newman was, for instance, excessively hard on himself possibly as a result of his reading of such Calvinistic writers as Thomas Scott. As a youth, Newman says that "among the ordinary mass of men, no one has sinned so much...."[36] This was

33. William J. Baker, "Hurrell Froude and the Reformers," in *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 21 No. 3 (July, 1970) 254-55.

34. Nedoncelle, "Revival," 392.

35. John R. Griffin, "Newman – the Ecumenist?" *Faith & Reason* 8 (1982) 295.

36. Ker, *Newman*, 662.

certainly an over exaggeration. Because of his low opinion of himself, Newman often saw his life as a failure, as was noted in Chapter One.

7) Other areas for study would be an analysis of Newman's views on universal education which he did not understand, his use of aphorisms, such as the maxim, "Growth, the only evidence of life"[37] and his attitude toward the classics. Scholars would do well to take a careful look at Newman's detailed study guide of his readings in the classics which was written in Latin between March 18, 1817 and May 25, 1818.

8) To my knowledge, no study has yet appeared of Newman's views on eschatology, that is the last things death, judgment and after life. For such a study Newman's novel, *The Dream of Gerontious*, would be a good point of departure.[38]

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37. Apo., 19.

38. Charles S. Dessain, "Newman's Philosophy and Theology," in *Victorian Prose*, 184.

John P. Meier, *A Marginal Jew.* Rethinking the Historical Jesus, 1, The Roots of the Problem and the Person (Doubleday; New York 1991) x.484 pp.

The target audience of this first of a two-volume opus, as well as the Anchor Bible Reference Library, have been regaled in this book a provocative discussion of a number of introductory issues mainly to the study of Christology. The provocation comes not from some extreme position held by Meier concerning the historical Jesus; the author himself describes his work as "neither completely original nor in any sense definitive" (p. 13); this sample of brilliant research tends to steer equidistantly from both conservatives' reading of the available sources (basically the canonical Gospels cf pp.139-141) as strictly historiographical material [A good representative would be Roger T. Beckwith who in his study on the use of calendars and astronomy to determine the chronology of Jesus' passion "proves to be so uncritical in his use of Gospel material in the last part of his article" pp.430-431 note 111. For Beckwith's stance concerning the historical reliability of biblical material one should consult his major work *The Old Testament Canon of the New Testament Church* (SPCK; London 1985)9], and progressives' treatment of this material as ideological and theological constructions with slight or no historiographical worth [I would venture to mention Rudolph Bultmann and his demythologizing approach as representative of this group, cfr. p.28 note 25]. Meier's genius lies in his capacity to offer serene, simple, detached, honest, and more or less exhaustive exposition of complex issues; as his exposition of the various issues necessarily involved the employment of methodological strategies, it cannot but provoke debates especially from theologically minded readers and New Testament exegetes. In this review we shall go through Meier's contribution in this volume, and briefly expose some of its shortcomings in the hope of refining this excellent book of reference.

As stated by Meier in the Introduction to this volume (p. 13) and to the entire opus, the book under review constitutes the first half of a four-parts research project into the historical Jesus. Parts Three and Four will form the contents of the second volume which is yet to see the light of day. There the author will discuss Jesus' public ministry as well as the "momentous and tragic final days of his life". In this first volume we find Part One and Part Two besides the aforementioned Introduction (pp.1-17), two conventional maps of "Palestine in the Time of Jesus" and "The Galilee of Jesus' Ministry", two tables covering "The Family of Herod the Great" and "The Regnal Years of the Roman *Principes* (Emperors)" for the period 6-70 AD, a list of abbreviations (pp.439-457) and indices of Scripture references (pp.459-466), of authors (pp. 467-473) and of subjects (pp.475-484).

In Part One (pp.19-201) entitled **Roots of the Problem** Meier tackles "all those messy issues of definitions, method, sources that most people – even scholars – would prefer to bypass to get to 'the good stuff'" (p.13). Part Two (pp.205-433) is entitled **Roots of the Person**; in it the author attempts to deal with the "most intractable point" of the quest for the historical Jesus, that is, his birth, the years of his development and his cultural background. This volume carries the Introduction (pp. 1-17) to the whole enterprise, but not the Programmed Epilogue, thus generating some editorial handicaps to the present publication, as we shall comment.

In introducing his work Meier describes the nature of the project, narrates the saga of its origins, illustrates some of the difficulties when embarking on projects like this ["Why join the legion of scholars who have peered narcissistically into the pool of the historical Jesus only to see themselves?" (p.3)], as well as the reasons for which these slippery paths may not be left untrodden [The problem of the researcher's objectivity features among the principal obstacles: "There is no neutral Switzerland of the mind in the world of Jesus research ..... Whether we call it a bias, a *Tendenz*, a worldview or a faith stance, everyone who writes on the historical Jesus writes from some ideological vantage point; no critic is exempt" (p.5)]. He then illuminates the reader on two methodological options, on the concept "marginal" in the book's title (pp.6-9) and on why two currently fashionable New Testament exegetical methods (sociological analysis and the modern literary criticism) have exercised so little influence on his own research (pp.9-12). The last two pages (12-14) of the introduction are left for the structure of the project as a whole. It is at this stage that we are informed of a planned Epilogue wherein Meier hopes to offer "some initial reflection both historical and theological on all that we will have seen" (p.13). Our author considers his two-volume work as nothing else but a "prolegomenon and an invitation to theologians" to appropriate from this particular quest what may be useful to the larger task of present-day Christology (pp.13-14). In other words, is Meier hoping to offer theologians through his historical research enough material to rewrite Christology?

Part One runs into seven chapters, treating basically three introductory issues. The first chapter (pp.21-40) is dedicated to the definition of the 'historical Jesus'. The reader may experience this necessary discussion as hair-splitting. "The historical Jesus is not the real Jesus, but only a fragmentary hypothetical reconstruction of him by modern means of research"(p.31). The following four chapters have the available sources as their subject matter: the canonical books of the New Testament (chapter 2), Josephus (chapter 3), other pagan and Jewish writings (chapter 4), and finally, the *agrapha* and the apocryphal gospels [chapter 5: by the former Meier means "extracanonical sayings of Jesus" (p.112)]. It is from Meier's handling of the existent sources as he evaluates each source for its historiographical worth, as well as from the following discussion on the criteria of historicity (chapter 6) that the reader gets an insight into the author's mastery of his subject. Readers approaching the subject for the first time (supposing they survive the perusal of these pages rendered slow-paced by the many essential notes at the end of each chapter aimed at scholars), will find the survey of the sources "negative and disappointing" since the material available is not abundant: "The four canonical Gospels turn out to be the only large document containing significant blocks of material relevant to a quest for the historical Jesus. The rest of the N.T. offers bits and pieces, mostly in the Pauline Corpus. Outside the N.T., the only independent, non-Christian witness to Jesus in the 1st Century AD is Josephus...." (p. 139); but also his witnessing is not without its problems. Most other documents studied in the sources block (pp.41-166) carry no relevance to the research for the historical Jesus either because they are found unreliable or because they prove to be closely dependent upon the primary sources which are the canonical Gospels. Readers coming to this monograph after meeting any of the popularizing (and confusing) essays such as that of the journalists Michael Baigent and Richard Leigh, *The Dead Sea Scrolls Deception* (Corgi Books; Reading 1991) who link Jesus and his early Christian community to Qumran with its Essenes' movement; or essays and monographs of scholars who esteem as of great historiographical value the apocryphal gospels or the Nag Hammadi codices like the *Gospel of Thomas* (Here I would quote John Dominic Crossan, *Four other Gospels. Shadows on the Contours of Canon* (Winston; Minneapolis 1985); Id., *The Cross that Spoke. The Origins of the Passion Narrative* (Harper & Row, San Francisco 1988); such readers may either be relieved that things may not have happened in the manner these wild reconstructions of the historical Jesus have made the gullible believe, or take Meier as too conservative to have merited their attention. Concerning Jesus' relationship to Qumran Meier declares that "there is no indication that Jesus was ever directly connected with the Qumran community. It is never mentioned in the documents found at or near Qumran, and his freewheeling attitude toward the stricter interpretation of the Mosaic Law is the very antithesis of the superobservant Qumranites, who considered even the Pharisees too lax. All this has not kept some imaginative scholars from seeing Jesus and John the Baptist in certain Qumran texts. This simply proves that learned fantasy knows no limits" (p.94. cfr. 392). As regards the possibility that in the apocryphal gospels we may glean information about the historical Jesus that antedates the synoptic tradition and John, Meier writes on p. 123: "....we have probed enough representatives of the over-heated imaginations of various 2nd century Christians to show that critics like Crossan, Koestes, and James M. Robinson are simply on the wrong track. These apocryphal gospels are very important, but they belong in a study of the patristic Church from the 2nd to the 4th century. Unfortunately, the public and the press, not to mention publishers and universities, are much more interested in sensational studies about the N.T. then in 'dull' studies of the patristic Church. In recent years we have been witnessing the 'selling' of the apocrypha to those audiences under the guise of N.T. research and the quest for the historical Jesus. This is a misuse of useful material. There is nothing here that can serve as a source in our quest for the historical Jesus."

The present reviewer found Meier's discussion of the criteria of historicity (pp. 167-195) complete, serene and honest. He distinguishes between primary and secondary (or dubious) criteria; he considers as primary the criterion of embarrassment, of discontinuity, of multiple attestation, of coherence, of rejection and execution, while he included among secondary criteria those of traces of Aramaic, of the Palestinian environment, of vividness of narration, of the tendencies of the developing synoptic tradition, and that of historical resumption. During the discussion of the individual criteria Meier stresses the limits of each "lest any single criterion seem a magic key unlocking all doors. Only a careful use of a number of criteria in tandem with allowances for mutual correction, can produce convincing results" (pp. 183-184). Later on in the same page he cautions against a mechanical application of the criteria: ".....the use of the valid criteria is more an art than a science, requiring sensitivity to the individual case rather than mechanical implementation. It can never be said too many times that such an art usually yields only varying degrees of probability, not absolute certitude" (p. 184).

Part One dedicated to the discussion of theoretical issues comes to an end in chapter 7 (pp. 196-201) where Meier examines the validity of research for the historical Jesus, given the tenuous results of such an exercise as well as the irrelevance of the results of this historical critical study for faith in Jesus. He shares with Rudolph Bultmann and Martin Kähler the view that "the Jesus of history is not and cannot be the object of Christian faith" (p. 197), "...... The proper object of Christian Faith is not and cannot be an idea or scholarly reconstruction, however reliable. For the believer, the object of Christian Faith is a living person, Jesus Christ; who fully entered into a true human existence on earth in the 1st century A.D. and who now lives, risen and glorified, forever in the Father's presence" (p. 198). The historical Jesus has no usefulness to people of faith. Yet Meier maintains that this quest for Jesus of history "can be very useful if one is asking about faith seeking understanding, i.e. theology, in a contemporary context" (p.198). "Theology is a cultural artefact; therefore, once a culture becomes permeated with a historical-critical approach, as has Western culture from the Enlightenment onward, theology can operate in and speak to that culture with credibility only if it absorbs into its methodology a historical approach" (ibid). "For contemporary Christology, this means that faith in Christ today must be able to reflect on itself systematically in a way that will allow an appropriation of the quest for the historical Jesus into theology. The historical Jesus, while not the object or essence of *faith* must be an integral part of modern *theology*" (emphasis his) (pp.198-199).

Meier's own search for the historical Jesus starts in Part Two (pp. 203-433) wherein he attempts to "sketch a rough picture of Jesus' origins and background" "by carefully sifting the infancy Narratives of the Gospels and reviewing what we know about Palestine in gėneral and Galilee in particular at the time of Jesus" (p.205). Although he does not share with most "total scepticism" as to the possibility of reconstructing what really happened, Meier warns that some of the facts about Jesus "can be affirmed with fair certainty or at least high probability" (p.220). The implication is that complete certainty is a commodity out of our reach. Part Two is made up of four chapters (8-11) with the eleventh and last chapter (pp. 372-433) taken up with the discussion of the general chronology for Jesus' life. In chapter 8 Meier goes through the issues of Jesus' proper name (*Yēšuaʿ*) (pp.205-208), birth and lineage (pp.208-230). Under the subtitle 'birth and lineage' are discussed a number of difficult problems: the historiographical worth of the Infancy Narratives (Mt 1-2; Lk 1-2) [pp.208-214: ".....some of the points of agreement (between Matthew and Luke) are generally accepted by scholars as historical"]; Jesus' place of birth [pp.214-216 ".....Jesus' birth at Bethlehem is to be taken not as a historical fact but as a *theologoumenon*, i.e. as a theological affirmation (e.g. Jesus is the true Son of David, the prophesied royal

Messiah) put into the form of an apparently historical narrative"]; his descent from David [pp.216-219 ("Jesus' Davidic sonship should not be so quickly dismissed as a *theologoumenon* of the Infancy Narrative alongside his birth at Bethlehem")]; virginal conception [pp.220-222 ("Taken by itself, historical-critical research simply does not have the sources and tools available to reach a final decision on the historicity of the virginal conception as narrated by Matthew and Luke")]; and the question of Jesus' illegitimate birth, in other words, whether we can push back to the first century AD the charge of illegitimacy made later by Celsus and some Jewish writers. Some scholars believe that Mk 6,3 and Jn 8,39-41 may indicate that this charge existed in Jesus' lifetime. Meier discusses this question on pp.222-229 and arrives to a negative conclusion: "the theme of illegitimacy in John 8 – as in Mark 6:3 – must be judged a classic case of retrojecting later theological debates into an earlier text that shows no signs of such disputes" (p.229).

Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 have to be taken as one unit; they share a common title, and in both Meier tries to identify external and internal circumstances that could have exercised some influence on the formation and upbringing of this marginal Jew. A methodological caveat could not possibly fail to appear (pp.253-255): Given the problem of sources and our consequent nescience of Jesus' "hidden years" how can one hope to say anything worth-while about these years? Meier's method for his reconstruction of Jesus' "private" life in Nazareth appears on pp.253-254: ".....a certain interplay between salient aspects of his public ministry and well known facts about Judea, Galilee, and Judaism during the time of Jesus' "hidden years" allows us to make a few educated guesses about some of the circumstances surrounding his childhood, adolescence, and early adulthood." In Chapter 9 Meier ventures educated guesses on what language Jesus spoke (pp.255-268: Aramaic); on whether Jesus was illiterate (pp.268-278: "he was literate, and his literacy probably extended beyond the mere ability to sign one's name or to conduct basic business transactions ["tradesman's literacy"] to the ability to read sophisticated theological and literary works and comment on them ["scribal literacy"]); and on whether Jesus was a poor carpenter (pp.278-285: woodworker rather than carpenter). In Chapter 10 (pp.316-371) Meier tries to say something about the particular family relationships that moulded Jesus' individual experience. He first focuses on the immediate family of Jesus (pp. 316-332): his parents, and on whether Jesus had brothers and sisters ["Needless to say, all of these arguments, even when taken together, cannot produce absolute certitude in a matter for which there is so little evidence. Nevertheless, if – prescinding from fourth and later church teaching – the historian or exegete is asked to render a judgement on the N.T. and patristic texts we have examined, viewed simply as historical sources, the most probable opinion is that brothers and sisters of Jesus were true siblings" (p.331)]. He then reviews the possibility of Jesus having been married (pp.332-345), and his status as a layman (pp.345-350). Concerning the former Meier concludes that "we cannot be absolutely sure whether or not Jesus was married. But the various proximate and remote context, in both the N.T. and Judaism, make the position that Jesus remained celibate on religious grounds the more probable hypothesis" (p.345). As regards the latter, even though Hebrews developed the theology of Jesus' priesthood, the historical Jesus was in actual fact a layman. "We should think of Jesus as belonging to a pious Jewish laity that regularly went up to Jerusalem to worship even as it bewailed the failings of at least the upper-level priests who officiated there" (p.349). On pp.350-352 the author offers a summary of the origins and 'hidden years' of Jesus.

In the last chapter of this volume Meier tackles the thorny question of a chronology of Jesus' earthly experience (pp.372-433). He unravels the tangle by stages. In an initial survey he tries to establish the chronological termini within which the Jesus drama must have unfolded: AD 26-36 as the basic time frame for Jesus' ministry; AD 28-33 as the period during which took place the death of Jesus; a short period before the death of Herod the Great in 4 BC set as the time span for the birth of the Nazarene. These elements of the chronology are basically confirmed by the N.T. (pp.377-382) (Cf. p.382 for preliminary conclusions). In the remaining pages Meier attempts to be more specific by closely examining the importance of the chronological detail in Lk 3,1-2 about the fifteenth year of Tiberius (pp. 383-386) and by disentangling the complex datations of the Last Supper and of the crucifixion of Jesus found in the Synoptics and in John (pp.386-402). In the process he opts for the Johannine chronology over against that of the Synoptic Gospels. Some conclusions:

(a) Jesus died on April 7,30 AD;
(b) He was born ca. 7 or 6 BC, a few years before the death of King Herod the Great that happened in 4 BC;
(c) His ministry started around the year AD 27 or the beginning of 28;
(d) When Jesus died he was about thirty-six years old;
(e) Before he died Jesus celebrated "a solemn farewell meal with his inner circle of disciples on Thursday evening, 6th April". This meal was not a Passover

meal but only "a special farewell meal" (pp.398-399).

Critique

i. John P. Meier belongs to a circle of American Catholic N.T. scholars who honoured Academia and Church with balanced, very serious, profound, open-to-a-wider-readership works that left a trail of heated debate and controversy behind them. I cannot see how the present contribution of Meier will prove to be an exception. Another prominent member of this circle is Raymond E. Brown whose publications are constantly referred to in the volume under review and with whom Meier published *Antioch and Rome.* New Testament Cradles of Catholic Christianity (Chapman; London 1983).

ii. ***Some minor remarks***

(a) This elegantly and pleasantly printed monograph has its editorial Achilles' tendon in the present location of its abundant notes at the end of each chapter. Of course this is a feature of the literary genre termed "Doubleday Scholarly Publications". The current format facilitates reading by non-professionals but obstructs use of volume by "doctorial students and scholars" for whom the notes were compiled, and who will consult the book to see Meier's stance concerning the "more technical questions and detailed discussions" that have been relegated to the notes (p. 13).

(b) A more serious handicap for this volume has been the absence of a fully-fledged bibliography.

(c) However much one esteems Prof. David Noel Freedman, Meier's frequent references to private correspondence with this prominent scholar cannot be taken well. Checking of sources on one's affirmations or deductions are rendered very difficult in such cases.

(d) Pilate was "prefect or governor"? Cfr pp. 373.382.411.

iii) **Questions of Method.** Even if he considers most of the essays in Part Two as healthy discussions of the various issues that the same material give rise to, the present reviewer feels that Meier's exegesis leaves room for improvement.

(a) **Were Jesus' 'brothers and sisters' siblings?** Meier's treatment here seems to be following the pluridenominational collection of essays edited by Raymond E. Brown and Karl P. Donfield, *Mary in the New Testament* (Fortress; Philadelphia / Paulist Press; New York 1978), and is in dialogue with Josef Blinzler, *Die Brüder und Schwestern Jesu* (SBS 21; Stuttgart ^{2}1967) and John McHugh, *The Mother of Jesus in the New Testament* (Doubleday; Garden City NY 1975). His discussion is serene and raises above denominational concerns and positions. His strategy seems focused on eliminating as valid contender the meaning 'cousin' in the Greek term *adelphos* as employed in the N.T.

But his contribution limps under three aspects:

1. Meier underestimates the Semitic background of N.T. with its force to fashion thought-patterns as well as style – see especially his discussion under the rubric "The New Testament is not Translation Greek" (pp. 325-327). The N.T. *adelphos* inherited from its antecedent Hebrew *'aḥ* its ambiguity (Cfr p.325).

2. Meier almost ignores the other possibility for the term *adelphos* to mean 'kinsman' 'relative'. It is true that in note 45 p.363 he refers to and partially quotes Joseph A. Fitzmyer who concluded that the idea that the brothers of Jesus were kinsmen or relatives in the broad sense "is certainly not ruled out," *A Christological Catechism. New Testament Answers* (Paulist Press; Ramsay NJ1981) 73. Meier comments: "But to say that an opinion cannot be ruled out is not to say that it is the most probable solution on purely linguistic and historical grounds". However, once we admit the Semitic background for the N.T. especially for Matthew, and that *adelphos* may always carry the meaning 'relative' unless the context helps specifying further this meaning, Meier's discussion on the relevant texts in Matthew and Paul (pp.320-324.326) needs to be revised [I found Meier's handling of Mt 13,53-58 rather superficial. First, he has not noticed the presence of an ABA^1 structure: A = v.55a, B=vv.55b-56a; A^1=v.56b which shows that Matthew's characters are passing a judgement on Jesus himself not on his parents. Secondly, element B is itself an ABB^1A^1 structure: this would render Meier's apologetic note 26 on p.358 amusing and unnecessary. These global and particular structures show that Matthew's intention was not to separate the legal but not historical father of Jesus from Jesus' real biological mother (cf p.323) .

3. Perhaps the stress on the witness of Hegesippus (pp.329-331) was not its worth because all we get from him is that in the 2nd and 3rd century Christianity there existed this interpretation of the brothers of Jesus business. We cannot prove therefrom that such was Matthew's and Paul's intention when they used the phrase. In view of what the present reviewer wrote "the most probable opinion" is not that Jesus' brothers and sisters were siblings, but that the tradents knew that there were relatives of Jesus but they did not bother to specify their true relationship to Jesus because this was irrelevant; and it is this message that Mt 13,53-58 means to communicate. Had Meier applied his methodology consistently this topic would have followed that of virginal conception: "taken by itself, historical critical research simply does not have the sources and tools available to reach a final decision on its historicity (Cf p.222).

(b) **Fact or commentary?** Meier's elaborate argumentation in favour of the view that considers "the basic outline of the Johannine chronology as the most likely" (p.395) hinges on taking Mk 14,1a and Mk 14,12-16 as secondary or redactional (pp. 396-401). For the texts in Mark (and their parallels in the other synoptics which presumably depend upon Mark) are the only ones which describe Jesus' last meal with his disciples as a Paschal Meal. "Indeed, without 14,1+12-16 it would never cross the mind of the reader that this meal was supposed to be taken as a Passover meal" (p.39). John does not carry the episode though the consternation among the disciples on discovering that one of the twelve was to betray Jesus is also reported in Jn 13,21-30. It is also Mk 14,1a.12-16 that creates great difficulties for establishing a global chronology for Jesus' passion and death since the Paschal Lamb could be sacrificed on the 14th of Nisan to be eaten on the 15th starting on the evening of the fourteenth. How could Jesus hold the Paschal Meal without the Paschal Lamb [the solution apparently offered by Anne Jaubert, *Le date de la cène* (EBib; Paris 1957)])? So, if Meier could prove that Mk 14,12-16 (especially) was not an original story but only a commentary by the evangelist himself, he could disregard what Mark has to say on the preparations of the "paschal" meal for a reconstruction of what really happened, and rely solely on John who does not term this last meal of Jesus as a "Paschal Meal" but only as a solemn farewell meal given on Thursday evening. For a description of Mk 14,1a as coming from a secondary or redactional stage of the tradition Meier depends on a number of scholars cited in note 92 p.425. For a similar judgement on Mk 14.12-16 he relies mostly on Eduard Schweizer *Das Evangelium nach Markus* (NTDI, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht; Göttlingen ^{2}1968)169-170, while he is in dialogue with Joachim Jeremias, *The Eucharistic Words of Jesus* (CSM; London 1966) 15-88. Their arguments for this position are four:

(a) the use of "disciples" in this short episode whereas in the context Jesus' retinue are called 'the Twelve';
(b) lack of precision in the chronology of 14,1a.12 ["The examples of the loose application of the first day of unleavened bread" to mean "the fourteenth of Nisan are much later.....and occur in learned rabbinic discussions; they can hardly be presupposed in the popular parlance of a 1st-century Christian, be he of Jewish or Gentile origin" (Note 94 p.426). This led Meier to conclude "that whoever composed 14,12a not only was not an eyewitness to the original events but also cannot be trusted to give us exact detailed chronological information about the Last Supper" (Ibid.)];
(c) the absence of the preparations episode in John;
(d) that the general structure of the episode and whole verses (vv.13.16) echo the story of the finding of the donkey for Jesus' triumphal ride into Jerusalem in Mk 11,1-6; "the whole of Mark 14,12-16 may have been con-

structed on that model" (Note 94 p.426).

A few comments are in order:

(1) Meier would have struck a better balance had he, together with authors favouring his form and redaction critical analysis of Mk 14,12-16, included representatives of the contrary view.

(2) The distinction between the traditional and the redactional in the Gospels, though formally possible, is of little, if any, exegetical value since the author formed the whole into his own new literary creature.

(3) It is not clear what Meier is seeking when reading the canonical Gospels. If in these writings we should expect a theological presentation rather than a historical reconstruction of what really happened, the present reviewer cannot see why in Mk 14,12 we should pretend to find the contribution of an eyewitness or an "exact detailed chronological information about the Last Supper".

(4) Suppose Mark is offering commentary rather than a historical reconstruction of what really happened during Jesus' last meal with his own disciples. The problem is that Matthew and Luke, assuming neither is prior to Mark, follow his line of interpretation. Is it simply because they are reproducing Mark? Besides Matthew is supposed to have emerged from a Jewish context and would have noticed if Mark were not precise would have remedied. How are we to answer these queries? Shouldn't we instead ask why has John opted not to include the paschal dimension of Jesus' ultimate supper with his own?

(5) Perhaps the weakest aspect in Meier's discussion here is his failure to appreciate the literary dimension of the texts involved. This notwithstanding what he writes on pp. 11-2 on the contribution of modern literary criticism to the understanding of the text. Why should Mark choose to call Jesus' companions in 14,12-16 'disciples' while in the adjacent episode he calls them "the Twelve"? Is the only explanation possible the genetic one, that is, that Mark has employed a source with this characteristic word for feature? Is Mark a compiler of short episodes about Jesus or an author who employs material coming from different traditions to fashion something absolutely new and perhaps different? The historiographical approach, it appears from its application by Meier, reads the Gospels for whatever information of a historical nature it could glean, and pays little attention to the text in its globality.

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