ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS
AND PUBLIC POLICY

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Experiences of Landscape

In a famous letter of 26th April 1336, addressed to Francesco Dionigi da Borgo San Sepolcro, an Augustinian professor of theology, Petrarch recounts his ascent of Mont Ventoux made that day in the company of his brother and two servants. After describing his preparations for the climb and its early stages he turns to religious matters drawing parallels between the difficulties of the physical ascent and the process of spiritual formation. Having reached the highest summit he reflects on his recent past and then, as the sun begins to set he looks around again in all directions:

I admired every detail, now relishing earthly enjoyment, now lifting up my mind to higher spheres after the example of my body, and I thought it fit to look into the volume of Augustine's Confessions ...
Where I fixed my eyes first it was written: "And men go to admire the high mountains, the vast floods of the sea, the huge streams of the rivers, the circumference of the ocean, and the revolutions of the stars – and desert themselves." I was stunned, I confess. I bade my brother, who wanted to hear more, not to molest me, and closed the book, angry with myself that I still admired earthly things. Long since I ought to have learned, even from pagan philosophers, that "nothing is admirable besides the mind; compared to its greatness nothing is
"great" [Seneca, *Epistle 8. 5*]. I was completely satisfied with what I had seen of the mountain and turned my inner eye toward myself. From this hour nobody heard me say a word until we arrived at the bottom.²

This is an interesting passage and for more than one reason. It belongs within a corpus that bears the marks of the emerging renaissance humanism, and the letter itself has often been referred to as anticipating later European mountaineering interests; but what I think we should be struck by is the unironic willingness with which Petrarch sets aside his aesthetic delight as unworthy of the human mind. We have become accustomed to praising natural beauty and to thinking of its appreciation precisely as a mark of a refined sensibility and as something to be approved of and cultivated. Thus the implicit opposition of aesthetic and spiritual concerns is hard for us to accommodate. Consider how unexceptional (and congenial to modern environmentalism) seem the ideas, if not the form, of Hopkins' sonnet "God's Grandeur".³

The world is charged with the Grandeur of God.  
It will flame out, like shining from shook foil;  
It gathers to a greatness, like the ooze of oil  
Crushed. Why do men then not now reck his rod?  
Generations have trod, have trod, have trod;  
And all is seared with trade; bleared, smeared with toil;  
And wears man's smudge and shares man's smell: the soil  
Is bare now, nor can foot feel, being shod.

And for all this, nature is never spent;  
There lives the dearest freshness deep down things;  
And though the last lights off the black West went  
Oh morning, at the brown brink eastward, springs –  
Because the Holy Ghost over the bent  
World broods with warm breast and with ah! bright wings.

Of course Petrarch was writing over six hundred and fifty years ago, long before romantic quasi-panentheism, and addressing a theologian with whom he shared an admiration for Augustine. This large historical and intellectual gap helps to explain the otherwise puzzling deprecation of the aesthetic

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appreciation of nature. Yet even in more recent times sensitive and thoughtful authors have dismissed what are now canonised landscapes in terms which are at least striking and which some will regard as blasphemous. Consider, for example, the following description from the pen of Dr Johnson writing of Scottish scenery:

[The hills] exhibit very little variety; being almost wholly covered with dark heath, and even that seems to be checked in its growth. What is not heath is nakedness, a little diversified by now and then a stream rushing down the steep. An eye accustomed to flowery pastures and waving harvests is astonished and repelled by this wide extent of hopeless sterility. The appearance is that of matter incapable of form or usefulness, dismissed by nature from her care and disinherited of her favours, left in its original elemental state, or quickened only with one sullen power of useless vegetation.

It will very readily occur, that this uniformity of barrenness can afford little amusement to the traveller; that it is easy to sit at home and conceive rocks and heath, and waterfalls; and that these journeys are useless labours, which neither impregnate the imagination, nor enlarge the understanding.⁴

This text and Petrarch's letter should serve as reminders that there is nothing perennially obvious about the present-day reverence for nature and the elevation of its appreciation to the higher categories of human consciousness. The "aesthetics of the environment" is like the "politics of the home" a term of art invented to label a set of concerns and an associated field of academic study each developed over time and out of particular cultural histories. In what follows I sketch something of the relevant philosophical

4. S. Johnson, A Journey to the Western Islands, (R.W. Chapman ed.) (Oxford University Press; London 1944) 34-35. It is interesting to compare these remarks with those of Thomas Gray: "I am returned from Scotland, charmed with my expedition: it is of the Highlands I speak: the Lowlands are worth seeing once, but the mountains are ecstatic and ought to be visited in pilgrimage once a year. None but those monstrous creatures of God know how to join so much beauty with so much horror. A fig for your poets, painters, gardeners and clergymen, that have not been among them, their imagination can be made up of nothing but bowling greens, flowering shrubs, horse ponds, Fleet ditches, shell grottoes and Chinese rails. Then I had so beautiful an Autumn. Italy could hardly produce a nobler scene, and this so sweetly contrasted with that perfection of nastiness and total want of accommodation that only Scotland can supply." Letter of 1765, T. Gray, Correspondence of Thomas Gray, (P. Toynbee/L. Whibley eds.) (Clarendon Press; Oxford 1935) 899. I am indebted to Christopher Smout for this quotation. He uses it to introduce a fascinating discussion of attitudes to Scottish landscape; see C. Smout, "The Highlands and Roots of Green Consciousness, 1750-1900," Raleigh Lecture, Proceedings of the British Academy, 1990.
background and then consider, though only briefly, some of its implications for environmental policy questions.

Recent years have seen the rapid rise to prominence of a range of studies, policy directives and initiatives concerned with the environment. These are sometimes unphilosophical, pragmatic responses to perceived threats arising from, for example, heavy industrialisation and increasing levels of human activity. Very often, however, they are presented through patterns of judgment and justification that are avowedly moral, not to say moralistic. Those involved in such presentations are then liable to speak in terms of "environmental ethics", or more likely of "an environmental ethic". Although there are reasons for doubting whether values can be thought of in compartmentalised isolation I want for present purposes, and so far as is possible, to place ethical concerns on one side and to focus on aesthetic considerations. More precisely my interest is in whether, and if so how, philosophical aesthetics might be brought into contemporary thinking about the natural environment.

In advance one might suppose that the effect of introducing any kind of objective aesthetic element into the discussion of environmental values (what might be termed "environmental axiology") would be to strengthen the case for "deep" ecology. It is, after all, a common plea made by those concerned with protecting the natural environment from the effects of industry, say, that these deface the landscape, transforming what is naturally beautiful into something ugly. How then could an interest in the aesthetic qualities of nature be other than an instance of respect for the environment considered as something valuable in and of itself? To answer that question I need to say something about the general character of aesthetic theory.

Some Elements of Aesthetic Experience

From antiquity, through the middle ages, the renaissance and the enlightenment, to the present day, there has been a movement in philosophical discussions of beauty and other aesthetic values (such as the sublime — and in later periods the picturesque) from attention to the objects of aesthetic experience to the character of the experience itself, and of the modes of attention or attitudes it involves. Although there is no agreed inventory of the elements or aspects of aesthetic experience, and certainly there is no agreement on their

The Elements of Aesthetic Experience

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aesthetic Object</th>
<th>Aesthetic Value</th>
<th>Aesthetic Response</th>
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<tr>
<td>Anything at all</td>
<td>Specific things</td>
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<td>Detachment;</td>
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<td>Reality;</td>
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Figure 1

interrelationships, the following schema (Figure 1) sets out something of the broad range of favoured possibilities.

Again considered historically, the focus of interest has moved from left to right. Thus in pre-modern aesthetics (to the extent that one can reasonably speak in these terms of a subject that is often thought to have originated only in the eighteenth century^6) aesthetic objects and values are generally taken to be prior, with aesthetic responses and attitudes being held to be posterior to and explicable in terms of these. So, for example, it might be argued that the 'objects' of aesthetic experience are the forms of natural entities, and that aesthetic value consists in the harmonious organisation of parts realised in such forms. An aesthetic experience will then be any experience in which these forms and values are attended to and appreciated, and an aesthetic attitude will be an (or perhaps the) attitude induced by such experiences.

Clearly any view of this sort, if it is to avoid explanatory circularity, must postulate certain objective features that are the basis for our experiences of beauty. The task of doing so is a challenging one and though there are still

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6. The first philosophical use of the term “aesthetics” to identify a (more or less) autonomous field of experience is to be found in Alexander Baumgarten Reflections on Poetry (trans. K. Aschenbrenner/W. Holther) (University of California Press; Berkeley 1974). Baumgarten claims that the subject is the science of sensitive knowledge, “scientia cognitionis sensibilis”.
efforts to complete it many have come to think it is impossible. Such scepticism together with other factors led, in the modern and enlightenment periods, to the development of broadly subjectivist accounts of aesthetics. By "subjectivist", here, I do not mean arbitrary or idiosyncratic. Rather, the unifying feature of such accounts is that the direction of explanation runs from the attitude or experience to the value or object. One might, for example, identify the aesthetic attitude as one of detachment from theoretical and practical concerns or of disinterested contemplation, thereby specifying the character of aesthetic experience as being that of expressing or being conditioned by such an attitude. Following this one might then say that an aesthetic object is any object attended to in that kind of experience, and an aesthetic value is any feature singled out in such an experience as rewarding of attention, or, and more likely, any feature of the experience itself which is found to be pleasant or beneficial. Once again explanatory circularity will only be avoided so long as one does not at this point appeal to aesthetic objects in order to specify the relevant class of attitudes and experiences.

Even if that can be done, however, it is tempting to suppose that a consequence of a subjectivist approach is that there can then be no question of correct or incorrect aesthetic judgements, or relatedly of better and worse judges; for without autonomous aesthetic objects surely there can be no aesthetic objectivity. One familiar reaction to this thought is to welcome it, arguing that one of the main reasons for favouring subject-based approaches is precisely that aesthetic judgements lack criteria by which to be assessed. However, a subtler response recognises that in giving explanatory priority to the aesthetic attitude and aesthetic experience one is not wholly precluded from having external criteria of greater or lesser, courser and more refined aesthetic sensibility; for one may hold that there are intersubjective standards. 7

Consider the case of table manners. At the level of serious reflection we should not be tempted to suppose that there are objectively offensive modes of eating. Rather we should say that manners are a function of culturally shared interests. A mode of eating is offensive for a given community if in normal circumstances it would be judged offensive by a competent member of that community. Competence here being explained not in terms of an ability to discern objectively offensive eating practices but by reference to mastery of certain social conventions governing public eating. Although these norms are

7. This in effect the position advanced by D. Hume in his classic essay "Of the Standard of Taste" (1757) in Of the Standard of Taste and Other Essays (John W. Lenz ed.) (Bobbs-Merrill: Indianapolis 1965) 3-24.
subjective, in the sense of being rooted in the dispositions of subjects, none the
less their existence allows for the idea that some member of that community
can go wrong in his style of eating, and thereby correctly be described as
ill-mannered.

It should be clear then that the resources of certain 'subjectivist' aesthetic
theories are more considerable than might initially be supposed. Moreover, as
Figure 1 indicates, there are many different elements and combinations that
might be included in an aesthetic theory of either objectivist or subjectivist
orientations. Rather than pursue these possibilities in detail, however, I want
to consider next how the aesthetics of the environment is likely to fare when
considered from these perspectives. An objectivist approach will look for
certain features of environments which will serve as the basis for aesthetic
experience and evaluation. Immediately, however, various difficulties suggest
themselves. To the extent that we think of artworks as the paradigm class of
objects involved in aesthetic experience we will see a problem in seeking for
beauty in nature. If, like Hopkins, one were a creationist, holding that the
universe is an artefact fashioned by God, then of course one could treat it
formally in just the same way. But traditional theists are likely to be cautious
of aestheticising Divine creation; and others will find the theistic assumption
at least unwarranted and perhaps incoherent.

However, while denying that the natural world is the product of deliberate
design one might nevertheless regard it as if designed, and maybe even speak
of "Nature" itself as the source of aesthetic order. This move, however,
generates problems of its own. Consider the question how many pictures are
there in a given art gallery, or performances in a particular concert hall? Notwithstanding elements of the avantgarde this would, in principle, be a
relatively easy matter to settle by reference to the form, content, matter and
source of the works. However, if one eschews any claim of literal creation it
seems in principle impossible to say where one work of nature begins and
another ends. The category of the scenic view, for example, is all too obviously
one of our own fashioning. If there is any element of art-making in nature it is
surely present through the selective attention of spectators to aspects of a
continuous realm. Furthermore, in deciding where to locate the boundaries of
one scene our designs are influenced by the experience of actual artworks. In
short, the effort to identify aesthetic objects in nature tends quickly to return
one in the direction of the subject of experience and of his or her interests,
cultural presuppositions and classifications.

Whether for these or other reasons, an objectivist might not choose to
employ the artwork model but try instead the sort of approach I described as
being characteristic of pre-modern thinking. That is to say, he or she might hold that the objects of environmental aesthetic experience are natural forms, by which I mean, primarily, the forms of organisms and derivatively those of non-organic entities. Something of this view is suggested by the fragmentary but very interesting remarks made by Aquinas in his discussions of beauty. He explicitly denies the claim that something is beautiful simply because we like it, insisting by contrast that our appreciation is directed towards the beauty of things, and that a thing is beautiful to the extent that it manifests its proper form or natural structure. He writes:

Three things are required for beauty. First integrity or perfection (integritas sive perfectio), for what is defective is thereby ugly; second, proper proportion or consonance (proportio sive consonantia); and third clarity (claritas).8

The background assumption is that each substance or individual is possessed of a nature which, in the case of living things, is at once a principle of organic structure and a determinant of its characteristic activities. Integrity and proper proportion are directly related to this nature or form (forma rei) and the issue of clarity arises from them. Integrity consists in the possession of all that is required by the nature of the thing, such and such limbs and organs, active capacities and so on; while proportion includes both the compatibility of these elements and their being well-ordered. These two factors are then presupposed in the idea of clarity, for that concerns the way in which the form of a thing is manifest or unambiguously presented.

This neo-Aristotelian account has certain merits from the point of view of those interested in developing an objectivist environmental aesthetic. Forms are real, mind-independent entities, there to be discovered and contemplated. Thus the question of whether one member of a natural kind better realises the species’ common nature is one that it makes sense to ask and one which informed attention can hope to answer. Also values and policies seem to be implicit or rootable in such facts. A ‘good’ specimen is ontologically better than a ‘poor’ one; and it is clear enough how industrial practices can be detrimental to these natural values by causing harm to individual organisms and injuring the species. Thus, unlikely as it might have been supposed given the tone of Petrarch’s fourteenth century reflections, it may seem that in the thirteenth

century writings of Aquinas there is a promising source for a deep ecological aesthetic, i.e., one in which the relevant values owe nothing to man's interests save of course where the forms in question are human ones.

However, this conclusion would be a mistake and it is important to see why that is so. First, although Aquinas is insistent that beauty is not simply a function of subjective preference his account of its conditions indicates that there is a subtle form of subjectivity, in the sense of relativity-to-a-subject, in its very constitution. Recall that beauty requires perfection, proportion and clarity. The last of these I glossed as unambiguously presented or manifest form. The existence and character of a given form may be a wholly mind-independent affair, but to speak of its presentation implies actual or possible knowers. Furthermore whether something is unambiguous or clear is in part a function of the cognitive powers and accomplishments of the actual or imagined subject. So to say that something is beautiful if the perfection of its form is clearly presented indicates that, of necessity, beauty is something which involves a spectator. It is also apparent both from what Aquinas says and from the logic of his position that the spectators in question require the sort of intellectual capacity which there is little reason to think is possessed by any other creature lower than man. In short, natural beauty is constitutively tied to human experience.

Second, on Aquinas' view there is an equivalence between goodness and beauty known as the "convertibility of the transcendentals". What this means is that in thinking or speaking of these attributes one is referring to the same feature of reality, viz., the condition of the natural form that constitutes an item's essential nature. Thus a thing is good and beautiful to the extent that its form is perfected. This is an interesting thesis, and on reflection a plausible one with relevance for environmental philosophy. But it has a corollary that moves aesthetics deeper into the territory of humanistic ecology. If the referents of "good" and "beautiful" are one and the same how do the terms differ? Aquinas answers that each expresses a distinct kind of interest in, or concern with, the forms of things.

The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the notion of good is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful is that which calms the desire by being seen or known. Consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful which are the most cognitive, viz., sight and hearing, as ministering to reason; for we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds ... Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive faculty: so that good means that which simply
pleases the appetite; while the *beautiful* is something pleasant to apprehend.⁹

Thus although Aquinas roots his account of beauty in objective fact, the existence of aesthetic objects and values involves human subjects taking delight in perceptually and intellectually discernible structures. His view should be congenial to those concerned with environmental axiology in general and with aesthetic values in particular. It accords a major role to natural forms and can accommodate within this classification entities more extensive than individual organisms, such as species and even eco-systems. Further, unlike the aesthetics of the scenic it need not confine itself to the ‘visible surface’ of the world. It can, for example, allow the aesthetic relevance of ecological history and of the sorts of environmental structures to which Aldo Leopold’s *A Sand County Almanac* did much to draw attention. In “Marshland Elegy” Leopold writes:

> Our ability to perceive quality in nature begins, as in art, with the pretty. It expands through successive stages of the beautiful to values as yet uncaptured by language. The quality of cranes, lies, I think, in this higher gamut, as yet beyond the reach of words.

> This much though can be said: our appreciation of the crane grows with the slow unravelling of earthly history. His tribe, we now know, stems out of the remote Ecocene. The other members of the fauna in which he originated are long since entombed within the hills. When we hear his call we hear no mere bird. We hear the trumpet in the orchestra of evolution. He is the symbol of our untamable past, of that incredible sweep of millennia which underlies and conditions the daily affairs of birds and men.¹⁰

It should be clear, however, that like the earlier attempt to conceive an aesthetics of the natural environment along the lines of a philosophy of art, an element of which is also present in Leopold’s thinking, Aquinas’ theory of natural beauty has an ineliminable subjective aspect. My general conclusion, then, is that whichever side of the diagram one starts from – focusing on the aesthetic attitude or the aesthetic object – one should be led to think that

⁹. Aquinas, 1914 (c.1270) Ia, IIae, q.17, a.1, ad. 3.

human experience plays a constitutive role in environmental aesthetics.

**Environment and Public Policy**

Contemporary discussions of the environment are apt to focus almost exclusively upon the realm of the natural; or to the extent that the built environment features it is viewed as a threat to nature, as part of the environmental problem. However, if any serious headway is to be made in working out legitimate policies for the environment one needs to recognise that a concern for the aesthetics of human surroundings will have to consider the natural and the built as inter-related elements in a total context. With that thought in mind, and recognising that public policy has to be attentive to individual rights as well as to general benefits, there needs to be an examination of the proper limits of environmental control.

This is not the occasion to conduct that examination, but in concluding I want to offer for consideration a version of a principle which I first proposed in discussing the politics of architecture (Haldane, 1990). Modelled on Joel Feinberg’s reflections upon the problem of “offensive public nuisances” it takes the form of an ‘aesthetic offence condition’:

Proposed behaviour affecting the natural or built environments provides grounds for restricting liberty if the relevant actions or their products cause serious aesthetic offence to others; providing (1) that this response is not eccentric (in a non- or minimally normative sense) i.e. it could reasonably be expected from almost any person of normal intelligence and sensibilities, chosen at random from the community as a whole, who was also apprised of relevant facts; (2) that people cannot reasonably avoid the offensive behaviour or objects; and (3) that those who produce them are permitted allowable alternative forms of activity.

A good deal could be said in elaboration and justification of such a policy principle, but rather than try to defend it in the abstract I would rather that those concerned about the issue of environmental degradation, those accused of contributing to it and those charged with the tasks of making and enacting public policy, each and jointly considered this principle in relation to real life

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situations such as those currently prevailing in Malta. In doing so they would undoubtedly expose various inadequacies in its conception and formulation, but that is a necessary preliminary to working out a more adequate principle of intervention on aesthetic grounds.

The aesthetic is a fundamental and value-laden mode of human experience; the political is concerned with the promotion and protection of basic human goods. Even if it did not follow from reflections of an ethical kind, therefore, the necessity of a politics of the environment is entailed by the conjunction of these facts.

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