


MELITA THEOLOGICA

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HEGEL'S NOTION OF GOTHIC ARCHITECTURE

Lino Bianco

Introduction

In an age when the ideals of the Enlightenment were giving way to the Romantic Movement's revival of mediaeval civilisation, Gothic art was coming back into fashion. By the nineteenth century, Gothic architecture became the form of art most admired. It was regarded as an expression of the aspirations of the Christian religion and the embodiment of truly Christian values. Hegel's philosophy and writings were produced within this context and thus ought to be read within this historical environment.

In an effort to look at Hegel's thoughts about Gothic architecture and their limitations, this paper examines his aesthetic theory, his theory of art history and the fine arts, and 'romantic architecture' in the *Aesthetics*. The most important notion in Hegel's aesthetic theory is the idea. It 'gives art its subject matter and its meaningfulness'.¹ His philosophy of art history is based on the symbiotic relation between art and religion, intrinsic expressions of the spirit. A review of Hegel's views about romantic architecture is also included, together with an exposition of Gothic architecture proper. By way of concluding this paper its author includes also a critique of various aspects referred to in dealing with the above themes.

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1. J. Kaminsky, *Hegel on Art*, (The Comet Press; New York 1962) 3.

Periodization of Aesthetics

In his lectures on aesthetics, Hegel develops his theories of art history and aesthetics. In earlier works, namely, the *Phenomenology* and the *Encyclopedia*, he discussed the nature of art and beauty. Art, together with religion and philosophy, are intrinsic socio-cultural expressions of spirit. Both art and religion are grounded in sensation. Hegel's theory of art history is constructed on the relation of these two expressions. The notion that beauty is the link between the sensational and the rational, was borrowed and modified by Hegel from Schiller's *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Mankind*. Hegel argued that beauty is the 'godlike' rendered sensible. Beauty 'is the perceptual presentation of what his [Hegel's] metaphysical theory affirms to be unconditional or absolute - that 'what is conceptual' (that is, what is rational) is the driving force intrinsic to a self-conscious universe. ... Since... the self-conscious human being most clearly embodies this conceptual, rational principle, he concludes that the highest beauty resides in the artistically perfected appearances and actions of the rational human being'.²

Art, religion, and philosophy are the underlying fabric of any culture. They share the same human aspirations to express the unconditional and the unlimited. Their respective media are sensation, mental imagery, and pure conception. Thus, the movement from sensation to conception reflects transition from art to philosophy, via religion. This inherently Platonic theory of culture underestimated the value of sense perception in favour of pure conception. Hegel's theory goes further than Plato's. Hegel held that, through logic, pure concepts reveal themselves through the course of history. He believed that 'the logic of pure thought determines the course of history'.³

History 'is the development of Spirit in Time, just as Nature is the development of the Idea in Space'.⁴ His philosophy of history is grounded in idea, nature and

2. R. Wicks, "Hegel's Aesthetics : An overview" in F. C. Beiser (ed), *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge 1993) 349.

3. *Ibid.*, 352.

4. G.W.F. Hegel, *Reason in History*, (tr. R.S. Hartmant) (Bobbs-Merrill; Indianapolis 1976) xxi.

spirit. The idea is the energiser behind the world.⁵ Its antithesis, namely space, is nature. Nature develops into man in whom the idea becomes conscious of itself. This self-consciousness is the spirit, the synthesis of idea and nature. The maturity of this consciousness is history. Thus, history and idea are interrelated. Now, since the idea is the nature of God's will, then history is the reality of God. For Hegel, history is divine. Spinoza's 'Deus sive natura' became for Hegel 'Deus sive historia'.⁶ God and the world are inseparable. God would not be God if the world did not exist.⁷ God can be known through the understanding of history. History is the unfolding of God's plan. Hegel's view of history is essentially optimistic because, by definition, God is good.

"History, through national culture, is the process of Spirit progressing to its own self, its own cumulative concept of itself from nation to nation."⁸ Spirit is the idea concretized. Hence, the progression of historical facts is temporal and logical with respect to the self development of spirit and idea respectively. Temporary progression is of primary importance to the historian, while logical progression is primary to the philosopher. The former is keen on how the development of the idea transforms temporal to logical progression, while the latter's interest is the transformation of logical to temporal progression.⁹

In Hegel's thought, history can be divided into three periods - the pre-Greek, the Greek, and the post-Greek. These correspond respectively to the symbolic, classic and romantic styles. Each period gives rise to the next. The pre-Greek is the most primitive while the post-Greek, the Christian period, is the most recent. Art,

5. Kaminsky suggests that the best way to comprehend Hegel's notion of idea is to think of it as being analogous to Aristotle's notion of the unmoved mover. An acorn results from an oak. To explain the change which an acorn undergoes, one must consider the oak which the acorn grows to become. The end of an oak is to make an acorn. Such ends can be traced back to one ultimate end, the unmoved mover. 'The Unmoved Mover is the source of motion for natural objects, the Absolute Idea is the source of motion in experience'. Thus, in Aristotelian terminology, 'the Absolute Idea is to be equated with the efficient and final causes of all the changes in experience from infancy to maturity', Kaminsky, *Hegel on Art* 18 and 19.

6. E. Cassirer, *The Myth of the State*, (Yale University Press; New Haven 1946) 262.

7. Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, 1985, vol. 1, p. 200 cited in G.W.F. Hegel, *Reason in History*, xxii.

8. G.W.F. Hegel, *Ibid.*, xxix.

9. *Ibid.*, xxiii.

10. Following from fn. 5 above, every field of knowledge is an aspect of the idea as each phase in the development of the acorn is a manifestation of the oak (Kaminsky, *Hegel on Art*, 20).

religion, and philosophy all progress through these periods.¹⁰ Art is the first to evolve followed by religion and philosophy. Art reached its climax during the Greek period while religion and philosophy did so during the Christian period.

Theory of Art History and the Fine Arts

Art and religion are grounded in sensation. Hegel's theory of art history is based on the symbiotic relation between these two modes of socio-cultural expressions. Artistic expression is the form through which the 'godlike' is expressed. It may be more fitting for the 'godlike' to be expressed in one form of artistic expression rather than in another. Hegel held that only three principal artistic expressions are possible, namely, symbolic, classic, and romantic. The symbolic is the least adequate while the romantic is the most adequate form of expression. These varying forms account for the stylistic division of art history into symbolic, classic and romantic stages, characterised respectively by Ancient Egypt, Ancient Greece, and Christianity.

In comparison to later artistic expressions, the symbolic is the form through which the 'godlike' is expressed indirectly and approximately. What is 'godlike' is implied through generic conception. The 'godlike' was life and the elements, not human nature. In this context, a work of art vaguely abstracts, and hardly transforms and transcends the 'godlike'. Courage may be symbolised by a lion as cowardice by a deer. Such symbols portrayed the Egyptian belief in what is 'godlike'. Hegel observed that though symbolic art is the least effective tool to express the 'godlike', it sometimes attains the sublime.

The transition of Egyptian to Greek understanding of the 'godlike' marks the transition from the symbolic to the classic stage. Classic artistic expression is more suited to express distinctly the 'godlike'. It has an independence and completeness that when created, 'it seems that there is nothing more left to be done'.¹¹ In Greek sculpture, the 'godlike' ideal is realized in material form, whether in limestone or marble, and not merely hinted at. Man was the main theme in Greek culture. A sculpture of an athlete expressed more adequately the 'godlike' than Egyptian

11. Acton, H.B, 'George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel' in P. Edwards (ed), *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 3 (Crowell Collier & Macmillan; 1967) 447.

symbolic sculpture. Classic art transformed the generic, undetermined conception of the 'godlike', characteristic of symbolic art, to a more specific, anthropomorphic one. Similar to the former transition from Egyptian to Greek conception of the 'godlike', the transition from Greek to Christian understanding of the 'godlike' marks the transition from the classic to the romantic stage. The emergence of Christianity transformed the Greek conception of the 'godlike' into an interpersonal, intangible conception. The proportioned, well built athlete was no longer the object of admiration. Christianity rendered the living presence of human beings into merely souls alien to the physical bodies which house them. The soul is the inner character of a human being. It is immortal. The body, together with sense perception, were put aside as mere objects of contempt. Hence, the dimension that made it possible for the Greek religious beliefs to be harmonised and be in phase with what is 'godlike', is no longer present. Christianity emphasized the subjective freedom and the unlimited value of individualism. When self and inner life are considered of such value, 'the forms of art must move on from balance and harmony to the storm and turmoil of the subjective'.¹² Subjectivity and individual consciousness are attained in romantic art. Thus, Christianity distinctly belongs to the romantic style - a style where artistic expression aims at reaching deeper into the inner nature of man's subjectivity. The romantic style is the peak of ideal artistic expression. As an artistic expression, romantic art is more profound than symbolic art because the thought process underlying it is more refined and developed. Although, *prima facie*, such forms of art seem similar, the mind of 'romantic' man is more complex than that of 'symbolic' or 'classic' man.

The symbolic, classic, and romantic styles are expressed through art history, through the various forms of artistic expressions. The system of arts in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century was based on the five fine arts. Architecture is one of these five arts, the others being sculpture, painting, music and poetry. Hegel adopted this system of classifying the arts in his philosophy of art. His three theses were stated by Wicks thus:¹³

Thesis 1: 'Art's prime subject matter historically develops from sensuous conceptions to non-sensuous conceptions';

Thesis 2: 'Art in general grows, flourishes, and declines in accord with the historical development from sensuous to non-sensuous conceptions';

12. Ibid.

13. Wicks, "Hegel's Aesthetics", 355.

Thesis 3: 'Each individual art grows, flourishes and declines in accord with the historical development from sensuous to non-sensuous conceptions of the divine'.

With respect to each fine art, Hegel inquired whether the particular medium was able to express metaphysical knowledge in a form adequate to such knowledge itself and in a sensory form.¹⁴

Each individual art may be produced in either one of the three styles. Hegel held that, while painting, music, and poetry are appropriate to the romantic style, architecture and sculpture are more appropriate to the symbolic and classic style respectively. Thus, architecture attains its ideal form during the symbolic stage. Architecture is the first and most inadequate product of art. The limited purpose of architecture, together with building construction, hinder it from the ability to express fully the 'godlike'. Gravity and solidity - the essentials of building construction - are too basic and mechanical to reflect the nature of the 'godlike' in any particular way. Architecture is external and impersonal. It does not transform or transcend to express the 'godlike'.¹⁵

Romantic Architecture in the Aesthetics

Gothic architecture is the centre of Romantic style. Hegel acknowledges Goethe's contribution in bringing this architecture to 'honour'.¹⁶ In his chapter on 'Romantic Architecture', Hegel deals with the general character of Romantic architecture, the

14. Ibid., 365.

15. Hegel further argues that the limited purposes of architecture do not correspond to art's principal task (Wicks, "Hegel's Aesthetics", 356)

16. A dimension to Hegel's concern with Gothic is Goethe. Goethe's writings on Gothic architecture were known to Hegel both for their focus on Gothic architecture per se, as for their elucidation of the concept of romanticism in relation to this form of architecture. Hegel was certainly aware of the way late Goethe came to sell Romantic style. Early Goethe despised romantic attitude to life in favour of a classical one: 'Classical, to me means healthy, and romantic means sick. ...Most of what is new is not romantic because it is new, but because it is weak and sickly and ailing. And what is old is not classical because it is old, but because it is strong, fresh, joyful and healthy' ("Conversations with Eckermann", 2 April 1829, as reproduced in N. Pevsner, *Studies in Art, Architecture and Design* Vol. 1, (Thames and Hudson; London 1969) 171.

particular architectural formations, and the different styles in Romantic architecture.¹⁷ The general character of building types in Romantic style is ecclesiastical. In this context, architecture is specifically for a particular, well-defined need. 'It has and displays a definite purpose; but in its grandeur and sublime peace it is lifted above anything purely utilitarian into an infinity in itself. This elevation above the finite and this simple solidity, is its one characteristic aspect'.¹⁸

Under the heading of 'Particular Architectural Formations', Hegel considers the fully enclosed house as the fundamental form, the form of the interior and the exterior, and finally, the mode of decorating. The enclosure is intended to create a place of worship away from the distraction of the material world. The basic form of Romantic architectural construction is characterised by pitched roofs rather than the post and lintel, the classic solution.

The Gothic interior is a complete enclosure for the spirit. The form of the interior is determined by dimensions and their character. Walls are high and columns are slender. Their structural purpose of carrying the load from the roof to the ground, though readable, is not emphasized. Furthermore, the pointed arch gives columns, in particular, different form and purpose.

"The interior glints... through the shape of the exterior and determines its form and arrangement in detail".¹⁹ The exterior envelops the interior. In Gothic architecture, the exterior is characterised by verticality. The external form, including decoration, is "determined from within outwards, since the exterior is to appear as only an enclosing of the interior".²⁰ External form reflects the interior with respect to the separation of the various parts forming the church, especially emphasized by their respective heights.

In Romantic architecture, the main purpose of decoration 'is not to destroy or conceal the outlines by the mass and diversity of ornamentation but to let them, as the essential thing on which all depends, permeate this variety through and through

17. G.W.F. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, (tr. T.M. Knox) (The Clarendon Press; Oxford 1975) 685-700. In an appendix to this chapter, Hegel refers to horticulture, 'an environment... for the spirit [and] draws into its sphere and reshapes the natural landscape itself, treating it architecturally as an environment for buildings' (Ibid., 699).

18. Ibid., 685.

19. Ibid., 687.

20. Ibid., 693.

and completely'.²¹ Decoration in this style gives maximum sense of lightness and grace known through history. Forms of decoration are essentially simple and organic in origin. Pointed arches, columns, and circles may be the exception. When Gothic was at its best, simple organic forms were also preserved in decoration, say, of pointed arched windows.

The different styles which Hegel identifies in Romantic architecture are the Romanesque, Gothic, and secular architecture.²² Romanesque architecture is pre-Gothic. It originated from pagan Roman buildings. Gothic architecture proper knows its origin in the thirteenth century. Its association with Arabic architecture in Spain is denied. Besides the fact that Gothic and Arabic buildings are different due to the different religions in which they respectively sprang up, Gothic architecture is characterised by the pointed arch while Arabic architecture is characterised by the horse shoe arch. In secular architecture, 'walls, doors, towers, bridges, etc., are dictated by need and are decorated and beautified by art'.²³ Such architecture has to fulfil a number of needs. Utility is the main parameter determining the architecture, aesthetic being secondary. Art is therefore mere decoration.

Gothic Architecture

It was only in the eighteenth century that Gothic architecture started to be taken seriously. The strong desire of late eighteenth century Christians to rediscover and return to traditional Christian values exemplified in the Gothic style led to the reconsideration of the arts of the Gothic period. Due to the lack of sound theoretical grounding of this architectural style, many efforts were made to investigate and sell the style. Some of the ideas generated were quasi mythical. Such was the idea developed by Worbutom, a bishop in the mid-eighteenth century. He held that

21. Ibid., 696.

22. The term Romanesque was first applied to eleventh and twelfth century architecture in 1819 by Gunn and de Gerville. Since then, the term Gothic has been used only with its contemporary meaning. It was in this sense that Hegel used the term in his *Aesthetics*.

23. G.W.F. Hegel, *Aesthetics*, 698.

Hegel was well aware that Gothic is essentially an ecclesiastical style. It worth noting that this section is about secular architecture of the Gothic period rather than about secular Gothic Architecture. For the distinction between terms see P. Frankl, "Gothic Architecture", in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, vol. 10, (William Benton; London 1964) 604.

since the Goths were used to worship in sacred groves, they built churches which looked like an avenue of trees. Although this presumed origin of Gothic architecture is historically unfounded, the link which it suggested between Gothic and nature was of significant value to eighteenth century thought. Though frequently speculative and vague, the contribution of eighteenth century enthusiasts to the quest of Gothic culture, in particular its architecture, is impressive. Serious investigation of the topography and history of the style began in the nineteenth century.²⁴ Hegel can be perceived as one of the pioneers who was seriously and professionally struggling to give a philosophical basis to Gothic style as manifested in the five fine arts popular at his time.

The Gothic style gave Christianity a distinctive architecture. It remained distinctively Christian. Its original meaning was lost with time until its renaissance brought about by the romantic revival. The language used in describing Gothic dates back to 1817 when Rickman, a chemist by profession, gave a descriptive analysis of Gothic in terms of its vocabulary, namely, portals, windows, arches, piers, buttresses, etc.²⁵ On the stylistic transformations of these members, he identified various phases in the evolution of the English Gothic. Hegel noted that several important innovations helped overcome the problem of giving the impression of great height. These are the use of the groined vault with pointed arch, the use of the flying buttress, and the emphasis on vertical rather than horizontal features.²⁶ Pointed arches made interiors seem larger. Furthermore, the pointed arch, coupled with slender piers, caused the eye to raise upwards. 'The pointed form of the windows, the spires, the towers, and the buttresses with their gables and pinnacles all contribute to the impression of great heights reaching into infinity'.²⁷ These ideas of Hegel were popular at his time. In 1835, Wetter, in a footnote in a guide to Mainz Cathedral, stated four main architectural features of Gothic churches, namely, the pier, buttressing system, the pointed arch, and the ribbed vault.²⁸ These relate to

24. By this time, scholars were aware that the adjective Gothic bears historically no reference to the Goths.

25. Frankl, "Gothic Architecture", 598

26. Kaminsky, *Hegel on Art*, 60 ff.

27. *Ibid.*, 60.

28. Frankl, "Gothic Architecture", 599.

Ribs were accepted and their potential exploited, because the culture at the time accepted the belief that the individual is part of a transcendent whole, a fragment of the universe and of infinity (*Ibid.*, 605).

the stylistic elements of slenderness of columns, disappearance of walls, verticality, and structural roofing solution respectively.

Hegel's discussion of Gothic architecture is more profound than these observations. He argues that such architecture can only be appreciated by individuals who are conscious of the philosophical leap from Greek to Christian thought. To the Christian, God is perfect and rational. Man is full of desires and passions. He is suffering the consequences of original sin and struggling to attain, after his death, access to eternal life. The Gothic ideal man was the suffering Christ.²⁹ For the Greeks, rational man, free from desires and passions, was the ideal. The Christian finds in Gothic architecture a symbol which personified his desires to move upwards to a higher truth.³⁰ Symbolism is best signified in Gothic architecture. Historically, the Gothic style was already at its peak when the fine arts started to be integrated with the architecture which they intended to embellish.

Final Comments

The movement from sensation to conception inspired the progression from art to religion to philosophy and from symbolic to classic to romantic. Culture progresses from sensation to mental imagery to pure conceptions, while art history progresses from a style which is hardly subjective to a highly complex subjective one. Similarly, the artistic media of fine arts progress from three-dimensional to two-dimensional and finally to non-spatial ones.

Hegel's theory of art history and the fine arts is defined by two structural patterns - a linear development pattern and a pattern of 'growth and decline' which is partly developmental and partly retrogressive.³¹ With respect to the limitations of Hegel's aesthetic theory, Wicks puts forward various arguments.³² The arguments worth mentioning are the following: Hegel's theory was based on the 'five fine arts'.

29. P. Frankl, *The Gothic: Literary Sources and Interpretations* (Princeton 1960). In this work, mainly concerned with Gothic architecture, Frankl holds that the person of the suffering Christ was the Gothic man's model.

30. Gothic architecture always leads one's mind to a higher reality, namely, God.

31. Wicks, "Hegel's Aesthetics", 372 and 373.

32. *Ibid.*, 371.

Since the nineteenth century, the system of classifying the arts was drastically expanded. For the theory to be valid, it 'must be flexible enough to maintain an expression to accommodate new and previously undervalued arts'.³³ Furthermore, the theory is concerned not with aesthetic criteria but with artistic beauty. Hegel's metaphysics of self-consciousness is highly questioned and thus his reasons for believing that art is the medium for metaphysical knowledge are doubtful. Also, his tripartite division of history of art is too simplistic. Finally, one may question Hegel's thesis whether choosing the appropriate subject matter of an artwork does have any bearing on the artwork's aesthetic value. A number of critics argue that the converse is true.

Hegel's notions of periodization and his categories of periodic time are central to his philosophical thought. History is a temporal thing, unfolding in time. He assesses events in the past in order to show their relevance to the present and the future. His approach is teleological since historical events are assessed and interpreted not with respect to their own time but in terms of what happened later. It is nonsense to speak of Caesar's invasion of England in this sense because at the time of the invasion, Caesar had no knowledge of what was to happen later. Also, the notions of symbolic, classic, and romantic are used in different ways. They are both media and phases. As phases, reference to the notion of time is clear. The three distinctive categories of architectural history are symbolic architecture, classic architecture, and romantic architecture. Architecture is most adequately suited for the less adequate stage of artistic expression, namely, the symbolic stage. Each architectural phase corresponds to a historical expression of the symbolic art of architecture dominant at the time. Hence, romantic architecture is the romantic expression of the symbolic art of architecture.

The greatness of romantic style cannot make up for the limitations of architecture as a form of art. Kaminsky argues that architecture can never be as important to art as the contents which it encloses. Bound by materialism, architectural forms can never have a deep insight as that present in sculpture and painting. 'Architecture can at most suggest life and power... Architecture can only express divinity as an abstract intangible Being'.³⁴ In this sense the romantic style cannot make good for the limitations inherent to architecture.

33. Ibid., 371.

34. Kaminsky, *Hegel on Art*, 62.

The tripartite structure of Hegel's thought, whether with respect to his aesthetic theory (art-religion-philosophy) or his theory of art history (symbolic-classic-romantic), is not new to Western thought. Since ancient times, philosophy was always conceived as based on a tripartite structure. Aristotle classified sciences in terms of theoretical, practical and productive, while the Stoics divided philosophy into physics, ethics and logic. Kant has three critiques - the critique of pure reason, the critique of practical reason, and the critique of judgment.³⁵ Furthermore, Hegel's association of the natural with the more primitive and less profound, was not original. Laugier had made such an association several decades earlier. So were Hegel's concepts of the beautiful and the sublime and their identification with the classic and non-classic respectively.³⁶ In 1768, Gilpin had already associated Gothic with the aspiration of man towards the sublime and the unlimited.³⁷ Since the nineteenth century, scholars have been arguing whether Gothic 'Zeitgeist' manifested itself in all fields.

The Gothic revival in architecture fostered German enthusiasm for a national Christian architecture. Enthusiasm ran so high that Cologne Cathedral was completed in the nineteenth century according to the original plans of the thirteenth century. In this context one may read Hegel as an architect devising a philosophy for the strong Prussian State. Nationalism in Prussia was at its peak especially in confrontation with France. For Goethe, Gothic was German.³⁸ With reference to Strasbourg Cathedral's west facade, Goethe states that 'This is German architecture, this is ours... quickening out of the strong, rough German soul'.³⁹ Hegel's

35. The *Anthropology*, the fourth critique, is actually an integration of these three critiques.

36. W. Dynes, 'Concept of Gothic', in P.P. Wiener (ed) *Dictionary of the History of Ideas* vol. 2 (Charles Scribner & Sons; New York 1973) 370.

37. Although Gilpin's, metaphysically supported, grounding of Gothic was of great significance, the pointed arch continued to remain the main diagnostic feature of this style (Frankl, "Gothic Architecture", 598).

38. Goethe's *Von deutscher Baukunst* (1772) is partly aimed at addressing the French rationalist architectural theorist Laugier's publications of 1753 and 1765 which included a discussion on the development of Gothic. The arguments and judgments on the evolution of Gothic put forward by Laugier are more rational and objective than Goethe's. His attitude and approach to judging Gothic architecture changed significantly as is evident in his essay of 1823 bearing the same title of his 1772 work.

39. Reproduced in Pevsner, *Studies in Art*, 167. Actually the Strasbourg Cathedral exhibits strong French influence (Dynes, "Concept of Gothic", 371).

philosophy, as with the architecture of Schinkel, may be read as an expression of the strong authoritarian Prussian State. For Hegel, Prussia was not the absolute culmination of world-historical process. It was only relative. In America he saw 'the land of the future'.⁴⁰ In the Prussian State of his time, the existing spirit is the relative and not absolute reality of the spirit. Thus, within this context, Hegel's spirit is best read as the spirit of the age.

In Popperian terminology, Hegel, the background to early Marx, is totalitarian.⁴¹ The human subject is conditioned and determined by circumstances in which he/she is nurtured. Thus, why have theorists nowadays turned again to Hegel? This may be due to the renewed interest in individualism and human subjectivity, a way of thinking of the individual in non-totalitarian terms. Determinism in history, or the 'wickedness of Hegel in Carr's terms, influenced rigorous art-historical scholarship.⁴² Most of Hegel is in Mies van der Rohe's theory and notion of architecture.

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40. G.W.F. Hegel, *Reason in History*, xiv

41. Hegel's philosophy is totalitarian although not as much as it is often portrayed. Certainly, besides influencing Marxist totalitarian regimes, Hegel's philosophy influenced Whitman, the forerunner of American democracy.

42. Carr distinguished 'Determinism History, or the Wickedness of Hegel' from 'Chance in History, or Cleopatra's Nose', E. Carr, *What is History?* (Penguin Books; 1977) 91.

MEALS AS TYPE-SCENES IN THE THIRD GOSPEL

A.M. Okorie

Luke includes a reference to food in many chapters of the Third Gospel. It is obvious that meals play an important part in the Lukan presentation of the story of Jesus. The meals of Jesus have profound theological significance, and this significance mounts as each scene is carefully unfolded by the author. This paper is directed towards the establishment of a fixed pattern or type-scene which will serve to identify those scenes that can technically be called meal-scenes.

The Type-Scene Genre

The rationale for paying close attention to repeated type-scene patterns, or micro-structure, is that they help the reader to recognise what is similar and what is dissimilar, what is expected and what is unexpected. Similarity aids one in knowing what turns the story is going to take so that one can be prepared for them ahead of time. The dissimilarities, or breaches in the pattern stand out starkly as points of significance in their deviation from the norm. The paradigm of genre of a type scene, then, consists of fixed situations recounted in conjunction with a set of ordered motifs.¹ These two ideas (fixed situations and a set of ordered motifs) may be further

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1. Robert Alter, *The Art of Biblical Narrative* (Basic Books; New York 1981) 50

distilled to mean story and theme. Hence, where story and theme are repeated with close approximation to other scenes, this can be designated as a type-scene.

The very existence of type-scenes suggests repetition of various stock elements and patterns. Repetition, or redundancy, has several key functions to fulfil in a narrative. It facilitates recognition. Susan Wittig notes that repetition promotes the "establishment of psychological anticipation, resulting in a greater efficiency (increased speed and accuracy) of recognition."² Again, repetition creates expectations that similar scenes will be recounted in similar ways. The similarities between episodes are important in their own right. They engage the implied reader's memory and at times emphasized an aspect of characterisation or an element of the plot. Redundancy initiates anticipation in the mind of the reader who is, as it were, looking for familiar literary landmarks. In addition, repetition highlights variation through subverted expectations. Variation contributes to the macro-structure movement of the narrative; the story introduces new elements, and the reader is required to integrate the new elements into the previous patterns.³ With the variation in patterns the author creates deeper meanings so that form interprets and defines content. Repetition of individual scenes in a type-scene complex operates covertly to convey nuances and subtleties, not conveyable through single, isolated scenes.

Furthermore, type-scenes are not used frivolously. They are used with great care because of the import that accumulates around what is repeated and redundant. Robert Alter states, "since biblical narrative characteristically catches its protagonist only at the critical and revealing points in their lives, the biblical type-scene occurs not in the rituals of daily existence but at crucial junctures in the lives of the heroes."⁴ The meal-scenes that Luke records are purposely set at crucial junctures in the narrative.

The defining characteristics of the meals in the Gospel of Luke that constitute them as type-scenes can best be shown by analysing a representative example of an incontestable meal-scene, the meal of Jesus with Simon the Pharisee found in Luke 7, 36-50. The story-line of a meal-scene contains six main ingredients. First, there is the invitation to dinner, such as Simon's invitation in 7, 36. Second, the meal-

2. Susan Wittig, "Formulaic Style and the Problem of Redundancy," *Centrum* 1 (1973) 128.

3. *Ibid.*

4. Alter, *Art of Biblical Narrative*, 51

scene is always cast with specific individuals, who are identified either by name, position, or description, e.g., Simon the Pharisee, or the woman of the city who is a sinner. Third, the meal takes place in a house, as it does in Simon's house. Fourth, Jesus does something that initiates a conflict in such a way that he is seen as the catalyst of the disturbance. In the case of Simon's example, Jesus is criticized for allowing the woman to touch him. Fifth, this conflict leads to teaching on the part of Jesus directed at his opponents, as when Jesus addresses the parable of the debtors to Simon. Sixth, the meal type-scene always includes the reaction of the antagonists to what Jesus has said. The dinner guests say among themselves, "Who is this, who even forgives sins?" (7, 49). These six elements constitute the meal type-scene, and a convincing majority of these elements must be present.

The second trait of a type-scene is that it has a set motif or theme. In the meal with Simon this theme is christological in orientation. Who is Jesus? It is on the lips of Simon as he reasons to himself that Jesus could not be a prophet. It is on the guests' minds as they question Jesus' authority to forgive sins. The recurring theme of all the meal-scenes is the revelation of who Jesus is, his identity being uniquely discovered in the context of table-fellowship. An ancillary phenomenon is that as the essence of Jesus is illuminated, so also the true nature of his table-companions is brought to light.

In the light of the foregoing criteria for determining what meals are to be included as type-scenes, seven meals have been selected as type-scenes. They are the meals with Levi (5, 27-39), Simon the Pharisee (7, 36-50), another Pharisee (11, 37-52), and the ruler of the Pharisees (14, 1-24). These four meals comprise the first cycle of meal-scenes which will be referred to as the Pre-Jerusalem meals. The second cycle of meals include those meals eaten only with disciples; they are the Last Supper (22, 14-38), the meal with the disciples on the way to Emmaus (24, 13-33) and the meal with disciples in Jerusalem (24, 33-53). These meals will be referred to as the Jerusalem-Emmaus meals.⁵

5. The feeding of the five thousand (Lk 9,10-17) is excluded from the first cycle of meals because the table-companions are not specific characters, named or described, but rather the cast of thousands. Jesus is not the catalyst of a conflict and there is also an absence of his teaching. This feeding is a miracle story involving food, and not a meal-scene. Other cases are the stories of Jesus being received by Mary and Martha (10, 38-42) and Zacchaeus (19, 1-10), which meet some conditions of the type-scene pattern, since the characters are specifically named. But, beyond the vague hints that meals are in mind, they do not come to pass explicitly in the texts.

Pre-Jerusalem Meals

The first cycle of meal-scenes, the Pre-Jerusalem meals, appear at fairly regular intervals through the narrative encompassed within the Galilean ministry and the travel narrative. Two kinds of meals develop in the Pre-Jerusalem cycle, the meals that are eaten with people whom Jesus has called to discipleship, and the meals eaten with Pharisees.

The disciple meal with Levi is striking. One can identify several of the main strands. The meal-scene is preceded by a miraculous healing, the paralytic whose sins are forgiven (5, 18-26). The miracle is followed by a joyful praising of God by the people. As the scene begins Jesus is going somewhere (5, 27). Jesus takes the initiative in calling Levi, who is a tax-collector; the latter responds affirmatively to this call by giving a great banquet. Jesus' eating with tax-collectors gives rise to an objection. The objection in the story is addressed to the disciples by the Pharisees and scribes. Jesus responds with a brief defence, and concludes with an "I have come to..." saying describing his ministry. The meal-scene concludes with Jesus being on the road again, heading towards conflict and the grain fields.

The meal-scene of Levi establishes the start of the Pre-Jerusalem meals. The predominant motifs of Jesus as the one who accepts sinners by eating with them, and his mission to save, sound familiar chords in the Lukan symphony. Then come three meals with Pharisees who will not respond positively to Jesus as did the sinners. The progression that takes place between these scenes betrays the mounting intensity as Jesus approaches Jerusalem.

The second set of meals in the first cycle of type-scenes includes the meal at Simon's house (7, 36-50) and the Sabbath Day meal at the Pharisee's house (14, 1-24). These two meals are characterised by the presence of a foil who elicits a response from Jesus, which in turn generates conflict between him and the Pharisees.

The similarities between these two meal-scenes is extensive. Both are preceded by a teaching scene that makes reference to the Jewish rejection of Jesus. The introductory context for the meal with Simon the Pharisee is the rejection of John, who is accused of having a demon, and Jesus, who is accused of being a glutton (7, 21-35). Directly before Jesus eats with the Pharisee on the Sabbath, Jesus laments over Jerusalem's failure to embrace and accept him (13, 31-35). These stories begin with Jesus entering the house of the Pharisee and immediately, the foil is introduced. Each of these foils, the sinful woman and the man with dropsy, is seen as immoral

by the Pharisees. Howard Marshall cites other sources positing that the woman was likely a prostitute and the man suffered from a disease usually connected with immorality.⁶ Jesus' reaction to these two outcasts sparks off controversy. Allowing the woman to express her affection aroused Simon to conclude who Jesus could not be, i.e. a prophet. Healing the man of his disease on the Sabbath places Jesus and his ministry over against the Sabbath tradition. Jesus responds to the unspoken objections of his table-companions with a story in each case (7, 41-43 and 14, 5-6). Each foil receives grace from Jesus; the woman is forgiven and the man healed, but the Pharisees are closed to Jesus and his gift. The meal-scene is followed by mentioning Jesus' followers. In 8, 1-3 the twelve disciples and some women who supported his ministry are identified in a section summarising his travel and teaching. The same is true in 14, 25-35 with the exception that the followers become more abstract (great multitudes) and the teaching more concrete.

In turning to the variations, an increasing sense of hostility becomes evident. Initially, one notices that there is no specific mention made of an invitation in the second scene. Simon the Pharisee is replaced by the ruler of the Pharisees. Jesus remains unchanged, being omniscient in both stories. The foils are also very similar. The effect is to dramatise the change in the Pharisees, their identity and responses to Jesus. The most radical changes are visible in the plot. Whereas earlier Simon dialogued with Jesus, responded to his questions, now the Pharisees are withdrawn and silent. Their increasing scepticism comes before the introduction of the foil (14, 1-2), while in the earlier scene Simon takes offence at Jesus only after the introduction of the foil (7, 37-39). Likewise, while Jesus appears to be only reactive in the first story, he is blatantly confrontive in the second. The teaching section generated by this healing is much longer and sharper in tone. The discourse is radically different. The story of Simon closes with the blessing of peace upon the woman, while the sequel scene concludes with a parable of judgment (14, 24). The reaction of Simon's guests is one of questioning who Jesus is, but there is no narrated reaction to Jesus in the second meal. They are silent, having already made up their minds about him. The importance of the foregoing divergent points is that the number of Jesus' followers increases proportionally to the measure of hostility exhibited by the Pharisees. The few followers mentioned after the meal with Simon became great multitudes after the more vehement conflict of the second meal.

6. I. Howard Marshall, *The Gospel of Luke* (The Pater Noster Press; Exeter 1978) 308, 579. See also, Joseph A. Fitzmeyer, *The Gospel according to Luke* (Doubleday; Garden City 1981) 689.

The fulcrum of the Pre-Jerusalem meals is found in 11, 35-52, Jesus eating with unwashed hands. In this scene the Pharisee cross the Rubicon in their relationship to Jesus. If there was any kind of openness before, there is none after this meal; the hostility between Jesus and the Pharisees reaches its climax.

The characters act in isolation from each other. The Pharisees are completely silent, and the scribes only speak once, allowing Jesus to aim his vitrolitic vituperations at them. Jesus is scathing in his rebuke of these religious leaders. With the absence of foils, the conflict is head-on with nothing to deflect it. The plot follows the established sequence. There is an invitation to dinner which Jesus accepts. He stirs up conflict by eating without first washing his hands. The Pharisees react, setting the stage for Jesus' teaching which spawns a decisive reaction on their part.

Again the variations between this central scene and the scenes that frame it are in terms of intensification. The conflict rises not around what Jesus does, but what he does not do. The normal teaching scene following the inception of the conflict has become a pronouncement of judgment. The scene closes with the Pharisees' plan to trap him (11, 53-54). The discourse is stripped of dialogue. This scene portrays a verbal cleansing of the Temple, driving the money-changers out with a lash.⁷ The christological motif seems to be missing at first glance, but such is not the case. Though it does not appear on the lips of Jesus because of the close-mindedness of the Pharisees, the christological theme is maintained by the narrator's calling Jesus, Lord (11, 39). This is the only time it appears in the Pre-Jerusalem meal-scenes.

The preceding context is integrally related to what follows in the teaching section. Luke's literary similarities make it clear that Jesus's speech in 11, 29-34 is to inform the reader of the teaching section that follows the meal. In 11, 29.31.32.51.52, judgment is pronounced on "this generation". They will be judged because of their blindness, which surpasses even that of the Ninevites who recognised who Jonah was and the truth of his preaching. Still, God's people, Israel, are blind to God's messenger. The discourse in 11, 33-36 corresponds to that in 11, 42-44, which castigates the Pharisees for their hypocrisy.

Luke always maintains an equivalence between the hostility of Pharisees and Jesus' popularity among the ordinary people. The Pre-Jerusalem meals, therefore, contrast the rancour of the Pharisees with ranks of excited followers, the close-

7. See also, Robert J. Karris, *Luke: Artist and Theologian* (Paulist Press; New York 1985) 49-51.

mindedness of the Pharisees with the openness of sinners, the blindness of the insiders with the sightedness of the outcasts.

Jerusalem-Emmaus Meals

The second cycle of meal-scenes in the Third Gospel is the Jerusalem-Emmaus Meals. The three meals include the Last Supper, the meal with the travellers on the road to Emmaus, and the farewell meal with the disciples back in Jerusalem.⁸ Thus, a geographical pattern is seen in that the first and last meal-scenes take place in Jerusalem, while the middle scene takes place in Emmaus.

These meal-scenes conform to the type-scene pattern established in the Pre-Jerusalem meals; the characters are specific (Jesus and the disciples); there is a christological conflict involving Jesus and the disciples; this leads to a teaching section which is concluded by the reaction of the disciples. So, the Jerusalem-Emmaus meals are closely related to the Pre-Jerusalem meals in form and content. The first cycle of meal-scenes anticipate the second cycle of meals, and the latter recalls the former. The implied reader reads each episode in the light of the other, in prospect and retrospect.⁹ Specifically for Luke, the Pre-Jerusalem meals set-up the implied reader with presupposed expectations for how the Jerusalem-Emmaus meals ought to proceed. The two kinds of meals, disciple meal-scene and Pharisee meal-scene, established in the first cycle of meals are present in the second cycle, but the Jerusalem-Emmaus meals move ironically and in unexpected directions.

As Jesus gathers in the upper room with his disciples, immediately one begins to conclude that the Last Supper will be reminiscent of the preceding disciple meal (Levi). Those who are called in the first cycle recognise who Jesus is and respond to his call obediently and joyfully. Even as the previous disciple meal, the Last Supper is preceded by a directive of Jesus who instructs Peter and John about making Passover preparations. They find everything just like he has said. At this juncture

8. On the inclusion of *ichthuos meros* as one of the meals of Jesus, see further, G.W.H. Lampe, "Luke", in *Peake's Commentary on the Bible*, (eds. Matthew Black and H.H., Rowley) (Van Nostrand Reinhold; Berkshire 1982) 842; I. Howard Marshall, *Last Supper and Lord's Supper* (Eerdmans; Grand Rapids 1980) 124-125; and cf. Fitzmeyer, *Luke*, 1577.

9. Cf., R. Alan Culpepper, "The Pivot of John's Prologue," *New Testament Studies* 27 (1981) 6.

in the story everything points to a disciple meal, in which Jesus is portrayed eating with those who know him and love him. This notion crumbles as the disciples are shown to be equally blind.

As with the first cycle, blindness to Jesus is demonstrated in conflict. Directly following on the Eucharistic words of Jesus comes the announcement that a betrayer is at the table with Jesus. The implied reader quickly flashes back to Judas' meeting with the religious leaders to find an opportune time to betray Jesus. The plot against Jesus that is initiated after the climatic meal in the Pharisee's house (11, 53-54) begins to be set in motion by the scheming of one of his own disciples. Yet the other disciples are as blind as his opponents. Jesus' teaching after the meal reiterates particular motifs from the earlier Pharisee meals. The dispute about greatness reflects Jesus' words to the Pharisees in 11, 43 and 14, 7-14. Jesus' remarks concerning the kingdom are inversely paralleled in the parable of the great banquet (14, 15-24). Jesus' discourse with Simon Peter echoes the scene at Simon the Pharisee's house where Jesus teaches about forgiveness and repentance (7, 41-43). Finally, Jesus warns the disciples about coming persecution which has been foreshadowed in 11, 47-51.

All of this works together to create an ironic scene in which the disciples are blind to Jesus. Their blindness is demonstrated in their misunderstanding of the significance of Jesus' final warning about persecution. Charles Talbert adds, "Failing to grasp the point, the disciples take Jesus' words literally and produce two swords. Frustrated, Jesus breaks off the conversation: 'Enough of this'."¹⁰ The tragic irony of this meal is brought to a head in the concluding context. In the first cycle the level of hostility is balanced by the number of followers recounted at the end of the scene. The context subsequent to the Last Supper in which the hostility is most intense finds Jesus praying alone, not teaching, with the eleven sleeping disciples near by. This tragic failure of the disciples grows through the trial and crucifixion scenes, and reaches its epitome in the disciple's disbelief of the women's witness to the empty tomb (24, 11).

The other Jerusalem-Emmaus meals are the twin meals with the Resurrected Lord. The meal with the Emmaus travellers (24, 13-33) and the one with the disciples in Jerusalem (24, 34-53) are tightly structured as single units and as a composite

10. Charles H. Talbert, *Reading Luke: A Literary and Theological Commentary on the Third Gospel* (Crossroad; New York 1982) 211.

unit. As single units each shares a pattern. Each begins with some disciples travelling, away from Jerusalem (24, 13) and towards Jerusalem (24, 33). There follows a conversation about Christ and events related to him. Jesus, then, comes to them, introduced by a temporal clause, lining his coming with their discussion. Soon after Jesus draws near, the narrator tells the reader that they do not recognise him (24, 16. 37). Each scene presents a meal-scene during which Jesus teaches from Moses and the prophets (and the psalms, 24, 44).

As a composite, the variations between the meals clarify Luke's message. The discussion between the disciples changes from disappointment over the death of Jesus (24, 14-17) to excitement over the resurrection appearances (24, 34-35). It is also worth noting that the blindness of the disciples takes different forms. They simply do not recognise him, but in the second story they think he is a spirit. Even as in the climatic meal of the first cycle, so now in the farewell meal-scene Jesus asks a question, but no response is given (24, 38. 41). He dominates the scene while the disciples are silent.

A significant omission occurs at this point. In the Emmaus meal the disciples recognise who Jesus is when the blessing is spoken. Their christological blindness is transformed into sightedness. But in this final meal there is no clear statement that the disciples recognise Jesus. It is possible that the phraseology, "he opened their minds" (24, 45) serves this purpose. A more plausible solution is that it is intentionally omitted so that the implied reader must struggle with the question personally: "Do I recognise who Jesus is?" In this way Luke brings the reader to a point of decision. Thus, this twin meal complex functions through variation to confront the implied reader with the moment of decision, the moment of recognition of who Jesus is, which has been the theme of each meal-scene.

The relationship between this complex of meals and the Last Supper is a reversal of ironic tragedy into ironic relief. The prior blindness of the disciples warns the reader not to expect too much from these disciples who continue to be closed to Jesus and the new possibilities he has initiated (24, 11). The conflict is not hostility but ignorance. The reader is prepared for a Pharisee style meal, eaten in christological darkness. But, the reader who concludes this has missed a clue. As the earlier disciple meals are introduced by a miracle, so also these last two meals are introduced by the greatest of all the miracles, the Resurrection. As each scene unfolds, the disciples, through the grace of Christ who is present with them in teaching and fellowship, have their sight restored. Not only do they now see, but also they are commissioned to be witnesses of what they have seen.

Conclusion

Throughout Luke's presentation of the meal-scenes, they are first and foremost revelations of who Jesus is. They are revelations of salvation and judgment. So in the meals, those who are open, ready to receive, become more open; but those who are closed, unwilling to accept, become more closed. For the disciples of Jesus, table-fellowship with the Risen Lord is a time when blind eyes are opened and sinners find grace.

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HEBREWS 11,1 - 13, 24: A SUGGESTED STRUCTURE

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Two previous articles by the present writer have suggested a structure for the Epistle to the Hebrews which takes in the first ten chapters.¹ The present article will attempt to finish the project by suggesting a structure for the remaining portion of the writing.

Perhaps it would not be out of place to emphasize again the tentative nature of this enterprise. And its importance. The Epistle to the Hebrews has been a conundrum from the early days of Christianity, and it would take more optimism (or naïveté) than the present writer can muster to be able to claim a definitive solution to even one of the many problems connected with the ordering of this conundrum. But the project is important: if any real progress is to be made in the understanding of Hebrews it will have to be based on attempts to come to grips with the way in which the writing is organised, either by way of a more persuasive justification of structures already proposed, or by way of justification of structures which are new². For only by focusing on structure will the basic perspectives which underlie the text of the epistle be discovered. Only by focusing on structure will the contexts intrinsic to the epistle be revealed, as a whole and in their several parts. In brief, only through a satisfactory structure will the epistle really make sense.

1. J. Swetnam, "The Structure of Hebrews 1, 1-3, 6", *Melita Theologica* 43 (1992) 58-66; idem, "A Possible Structure of Hebrews 3, 7-10, 39", *Melita Theologica* 45 (1994) 127-141.
2. For excellent introductions in English to the problem of the structure of Hebrew see especially: H.W. Attridge, *The Epistle to the Hebrews* (Philadelphia 1989) 13-21; W.L. Lane, *Hebrews 1-8* (Dallas 1991) lxxxiv-xcviii; P. Ellingworth, *The Epistle to the Hebrews* (Grand Rapids, Michigan/Carlisle 1993) 50-58.

The Priority of Content as a Criterion of Structure

The present attempt to structure the epistle tilts more toward content than to form in the classic form-content spectrum often used to evaluate approaches in understanding the way writings are organised.³

After the prologue (Heb 1, 1-4), the present outline sees the *gezerah shawa* linking Ps 110, 1 (at Heb 1, 13) and Ps 8, 5-7 (at Heb 2, 6-8) as crucial for structuring the section Heb 1, 5-3, 6.⁴ Through the mutual illumination of these two psalm passages the one Christ is presented as both Son of God and Son of Man.⁵ In the former role he is seen as being of a like nature with God himself on the basis of the implications of the semitic idiom involving "son". In the latter role, as Son of Man, he is presented as the new Isaac, like to men and especially like to his father Abraham, and as such heir to the two promises made to Abraham, of land and of progeny. Transformed as heavenly rest and as spiritual offspring - the two are intrinsically related in their Christian fulfilment - these two promises play a central role in the entire epistle.⁶

With Heb 3, 7 a new development takes place: the subject matter centres around entrance into the promised land viewed as God's Rest. In the structure being presented here, this discussion is viewed as culminating in 4,12 with the famous image of the Word of God as a "two edged-sword". Two images are discernible in 4, 12-13, corresponding to the two edges of the "sword" (*machaira* - better translated

3. Cf. Ellingworth, *Hebrews*, 50.

4. On the *gezerah shawa* as an exegetical method see Attridge, *Hebrews*, 128-129, n. 77.

5. More work needs to be done on the two psalm passages in question, in particular with regard to the nature of the enemies mentioned in the psalms. In Ps 110 the enemies have yet to be placed under Christ's feet; in Ps 8 the enemies (presumably not the same enemies) have already been placed under Christ's feet. The distinction would seem to be important, for the chief enemy placed under Christ's feet in Ps 8 is death.

6. The promises, of course, are transmitted through Christ as heir. The theme of Christ as heir appears already in the prologue of the epistle (1, 2) and reappears in the discussion of Jesus as Son of Man (2, 5-17 with 3, 1-6 as paraenesis) in which Jesus is portrayed: as the new Moses who acts as the pioneer of salvation and as the apostle announcing the true name of God (2, 10-11; cf. 3, 1) as he sets out, like Moses, to lead his brothers to the Promised Land; and as the high priest who, under God, fathers a new dynasty through his conquest of death (2, 13b-18; cf. 3, 1).

as "knife"): 4, 12 refers to the knife of circumcision which failed to initiate a definitive entrance into the land under Joshua (cf. 4, 8); 4, 13 refers to the knife of sacrifice which remained ineffectually poised over the throat of Isaac but which was not withheld (metaphorically speaking) in the case of Jesus.⁷ The first use, in 4,12, looks back and serves as justification for claiming that the people of God under the Word will enter God's Rest because of the circumcision of the heart which he brings. The second use, in 4,13 looks ahead to the discussion of Jesus as the new Isaac, really sacrificed and really risen from the dead, the embodiment of the definitive perfection of a new priesthood through which the new people (definitive realization of one promise made to Abraham) are finally able to reach the spiritualized fulfilment consonant with the spiritualized land (definitive realization of the other promise made to Abraham).

The discussion of Christ as priest and victim takes up the central part of the epistle. Christ's priesthood has two stages: the earthly or preliminary (discussed in 5, 1-10 with following paraclesis at 5, 11 - 6, 8 [negative] and 6, 9-19 [positive]); and the fulfilled or definitive, presented under the legitimizing comparison with Melchisedek (discussed in 7, 1-26). The central part of the epistle is concerned with the relation of this second, definitive stage of Christ's priesthood to the new covenant (8-1 - 10, 18 - cf. the frame created by the citations from the new covenant passage in Jeremiah at 8, 8-12 and 10, 16-17). The second, definitive stage of Christ's priesthood is achieved through resurrection, a resurrection which transforms his mortal body into a spiritualized body in which his unique sacrificial death at the first stage of his priesthood can be translated into multiple sacrificial deaths at the second stage (cf. 2, 9 and 9, 23). The eucharist, in other words, is an essential complement to the second stage of Christ's priesthood, for it is the heavenly counterpart to Christ's earthly body and blood just as Christ's heavenly priesthood is the complement to his earthly one. It is Christ as victim in the second stage of his priesthood who is the New Covenant, definitively taking away sins i.e., transforming the Old Covenant with its blessings and curses into the New which consists only of

7. If this should be the right interpretation of 4, 12 it would constitute another argument that the death of Christ was viewed as a sacrifice in Hebrews.

blessings.⁸ This extended central part of the epistle closes with a paraenesis, 10, 19-30a (negative) and 10, 30b-39 (positive).⁹

The above rehearsal of the postulated structure of the epistle sets the stage for the third and final installment, which will attempt to place Chapters 11-13 in the context of the whole.

A Key to the Interpretation of Chapters 11-13

A key to the interpretation of Chapters 11-13 - possibly **the** key - occurs in the very first verse of the section, 11, 1. There occurs the famous description of faith - *pistis* - as *hypostasis*. Since faith is clearly the theme of Chapter 11, as indicated by the stylized repetition of the word in key places throughout the passage, an attempt to arrive at a plausible solution of faith as *hypostasis* is crucial for the meaning of what follows.¹⁰

The heart of the crux is the statement that faith (*pistis*) is an *hypostasis*. The meaning of faith is illumined by its use in what follows. But the immediate context specifies that faith is understood as the *hypostasis* "of things hoped for" (*elpizomenon*). Thus, hope is viewed as a goal of faith viewed as *hypostasis*. Furthermore, faith is a "proof" (*elenchos*) "of things not seen" (*ou blepomenon*). Thus, faith as proof of what is not seen is compatible with the view that faith is an *hypostasis*. And faith is that "in which" (literally, "in this", *en taute*) the ancients - those about to be cited in the following verses - "were approved" (*emarturethesan*).¹¹ Finally - and this is a point which does not always figure significantly in an attempt to settle on an explanation of faith in 11, 1 - the word *hypostasis* occurs in two other

8. Cf. J. Swetnam, "The Old Testament and the New Eternal Covenant", *Melita Theologica* 46 (1995) 65-78.

9. Cf. J. Swetnam, "Hebrews 10, 30-31: A Suggestion", *Biblica* 75 (1994) 388-394. It should be noted that the two famous passages in Hebrews dealing with the impossibility of forgiveness are thus located in the negative paraenesis involving the priesthood of Christ: 6, 4-6 in the negative paraenesis 5, 11-6, 8, and 10, 26-29 in the negative paraenesis 10, 19-30a. The first passage concerns the earthly priesthood of Christ; the second passage, the definitive or heavenly priesthood.

10. Cf. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 307-311, for an initial presentation of the role of *hypostasis* in the verse.

11. Cf. Ellingworth, *Hebrews*, 567. Another translation could be "received attestation" (cf. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 305; W.L. Lane, *Hebrews 9-13* [Dallas 1991]325).

places in Hebrews: 1, 3 and 3, 14.¹² The solution will come only when some meaning for *pistis* is elucidated which fits snugly into the contours of all these limiting perspectives.

A number of important insights into the meaning of *pistis* at 11, 1 seem necessary for any attempt at an interpretation of its role in the structure of the epistle. One insight is that the word in some way must be understood in its context: what is being given is a view of faith which is very much a part of the epistle.¹³ Hence the criteria for judging an abstract definition of faith which would be appropriate in the context of a treatise on dogma for example, would be out of place.¹⁴ Another insight sees in the equation of *pistis* and *hypostasis* a type of metonymy.¹⁵ Finally, 11, 1 should probably be also viewed as an example of oxymoron: *pistis* as *hypostasis*, something presumed to be safely at hand, is something "underlying" what is being discussed; yet it is the basis for that which not in hand but only hoped for - the *elpizomena*. *Pistis* as *elenchos*, "proof", is something eminently "seen" in the sense that it is intelligibly convincing; yet *pistis* is the proof of things "not seen" (*ou blepomena*).

The varied meanings which have been put forward in the history of exegesis for the word *hypostasis* in Heb 11,1 are well known.¹⁶ The meaning adopted here will be that of "underlying reality".¹⁷ In the context here, faith is viewed as being in

12. Cf. the useful comments of Attridge, *Hebrews*, 308. His point is that whatever the precise meaning of *hypostasis* in 11, 1 it is going to be complex.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., 310. But the precise way in which the metonymy is exercised should be carefully discerned.

16. Cf. the survey referred to in Attridge, *Hebrews*, 308-310. And cf. especially the article "Hypostasis" by H. Köster in *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* VIII (Stuttgart 1969) 571-88. The interpretation given here of the word as used in *Hebrews* will largely follow the latter's lead.

17. For the *hypostasis* with this meaning in non-biblical Greek usage cf. Köster, Ibid., 578. This meaning is found also in Septuagint: "...der Gebrauch von *hypostasis* in der Septuaginta doch ein bestimmtes Verständnis des Wortes voraussetzt, das dem aufgezeigten griechischen Sprachgebrauch der gleichen Zeit recht genau entspricht. Abgesehen von den wenigen Stellen, an denen das Wort in sekundären Sinne etymologisch verstanden wird, ist mit *hypostasis* die *dahinter stehende, grundlegende Wirklichkeit* gemeint: Im Sinne von *Plan*, *Absicht* und ebenso als Bezeichnung des *Dauerhaften* das in Gott beschlossen liegt, entspricht *hypostasis* dabei oft recht genau verschiedenen hebräischen Äquivalenten" (Köster, Ibid., 581). In the Septuagint the word can be translated in various ways, according to the context. The basic idea can be traced to the etymological "that which stands under", but according to varying contexts it can have the idea of "plan" or that which "endures". In Hebrews

some way an underlying reality which leads to things hoped for: "Now then faith is an underlying reality for things hoped for:..."¹⁸ The things hoped for presuppose faith viewed as an *hypostasis*. With regard to the things hoped for, faith is an objective reality as opposed to a subjective conviction; faith is something which the discourse views as leading to the future things which are hoped for. The second half of the verse can be translated advantageously, "a proof of things not seen". Thus the verse implies that the actualisation of things hoped for is objectively connected with the underlying reality which is faith, just as the existence of unseen things is objectively related to the fact of faith looked on as a proof. The oxymoron should be honoured. The objective fact of faith, of its nature something identifiable at hand and thus tangible; points the way to things hoped for, which, by their nature, are as yet not tangible; the objective fact of faith, of its nature something not proved, is a proof of the reality of things not seen, which are not otherwise provable. The idea is not that hopes are actualized and unseen things are proved just because persons believe, but that the objective fact of faith is its own warrant for the eventual actualization of hopes and the proof of the existence of what is unseen. Faith is being considered as an objective reality which is ordered as proof to things which are hoped for and not seen.

The Objective Nature of Faith

Once the objective nature of faith is recognized, things seem to fit into a coherent configuration in the context of Heb 11, 1-3. For this faith is the means of divine approval for the people from the old dispensation who are about to be named. They were approved by God, and this approval is known from Scripture by the simple, objective fact that they had faith.¹⁹ Thus a key insight into solving the crux of Heb

it seems to be fundamentally patent of the basic, etymologically grounded meaning. But other connotations are also at work, which further study of the word *hypostasis* in the context of Hebrews would undoubtedly reveal.

18. The meaning assigned *pistis* as *hypostasis* here is somewhat different from that given by Köster 584-86. He interprets Heb 11, 1 as being in a dualistic context, which to the present writer does not seem appropriate. Rather, the things "hoped for" are eschatological.
19. On the relation in Hebrews of *martureo* to Scripture cf. Ellingworth, *Hebrews*, 368: "*Martureo* in Hebrews (7, 17; 10, 15; 11, 2, 4, 5, 39...) always refers to the witness of scripture".

1, 1-2 is that faith is not being considered primarily from a subjective psychological standpoint of a believer, subject to more or less, but from an objective, constative standpoint of an observer: it is an objective reality, a given in the scheme of things, which has its own intrinsic implications with regard to hope and knowledge. It is a reality used by God to indicate his approval.

But more seems implied by the objective, underlying nature of faith in Heb 11, 1-2: as an underlying reality it is associated in the author's mind with creation. To separate the underlying reality which is faith from creation would be to ignore the context. In v. 3 creation is specifically mentioned in relation to a pragmatic verification involving faith: through the fashioning of the "ages"²⁰ things apparent have "come to be seen" (*blepomenon* - an allusion to one of the key aspects of faith mentioned in 11, 1). It is by faith that this creation of the various stages of God's "word" (*rhemati*)²¹ is known so that as a result the unseen objects of faith can become seen. Again, faith is an underlying reality, but in the context of creation it vindicates itself even apart from its value as a witness. V. 3 thus stands partially outside the pattern of what precedes, because in addition to using the word *pistis* to indicate that which is an underlying, objective reality as in vv. 1-2, it also introduces the element of verification:²² in the context it is faith in creation which enables the addressees to perceive faith's own validation.

The connection between faith and creation seems important for understanding the nuances associated with *hypostasis* in 11, 1. The faith which is operative all through Heb 11 is an objective reality which is part of the creation of God affected through the Son. Therefore *hypostasis* in 11, 1 is associated with the Son in a special way. It is associated with his creation, and functions as a "given" which enabled not only those of the Old Testament who possessed it to advance in hope, but also the Christian addressees (*nooumen*, v. 3) to be in touch with things unseen on the level of the assurance which goes with proof. And for the addressees, it is also the touchstone which shows that the ancients mentioned in Scripture were approved by God (v. 2).

20. A temporal meaning is called for in the case of *aiōn*, as elsewhere in Hebrews.

21. This, of course, is to be understood in relation to the creative action of God through the Son, as mentioned in 1, 3.

22. This element of verification in v. 3 has clouded the analysis of vv. 1-2. V. 3 stands as a transition verse, linking the introductory verses on faith with the rest of the chapter, which is going to give a long listing of things seen (the word *blepo* in Hebrews seems to refer to what is intellectually or physically present - cf. 2, 9; 10, 25; 11, 17) which have come to be from things not seen.

Given this view of *pistis* in 11, 1 as *hypostasis*, i.e., an objective reality underlying things hoped for and, in addition, implicitly related to the Son as agent in God's creation, it is instructive to see how the other uses of *hypostasis* in Hebrews are related. For it would seem odd if they were unrelated, given the care with which Hebrews is written.

God is "Underlying Reality": The Prime Analogue

In Heb 1, 3 the meaning of *hypostasis* is clear enough: it refers to the underlying reality of God so that the Son is presented as his "imprint" (*charakter*). The verse seems to be related to Wis 7, 26, with its mention of wisdom as God's *apaugasma*.²³ Here again, the word "underlying reality" would not be out of place for *hypostasis*. It is an "inner" reality which corresponds to the Son as "imprint", just as the outer "glory" of God (*doxa*) corresponds to the Son as "radiance" (*apaugasma*).²⁴ Hebrews begins with Christ as the imprint of the underlying reality which is God. This nuance is appropriate in the context, which has God "speaking" (*laleo*) "in" the Son and creating through him (1, 2). God is the reality which underlies the Son who is related to this reality as an imprint is to a stamping device which gives it its image.²⁵ God is thus the unquestionable, unequivocal basis, which supports everything else in the epistle, through the Son.

The third occurrence of *hypostasis* is at 3, 14, where the word is found in the sentence: "for we have become partakers of Christ, if we hold firm the beginning of the *hypostasis* until the end." Here the choice of many commentators for the meaning of *hypostasis* is "confidence".²⁶ Much depends on the interpretation of the similarly-worded 3, 6. Many authors hold for a subjective meaning for the expressions *parresia* and *to kauchema tes elpidos* in this verse.²⁷ But more appropriate seems the view that they are objective realities in the sense that they

23. Cf. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 42.

24. Köster, "Hypostasis", 584, gives too much weight to possible relations with Philo and interprets the use of *hypostasis* in 1, 3 in too dualistic a sense.

25. Cf. Attridge, *Hebrews*, 43-44.

26. Cf. Ellingworth, *Hebrews*, 227.

27. So, for example, Attridge, *Hebrews*, 112.

are something to be "held fast to" (*katecho*).²⁸ This suggests that something more objective than "confidence" is needed at 3, 14 to account for a word used with a meaning so radically different elsewhere in the epistle.²⁹ Such an objective meaning fits in well with the meaning of *hypostasis* in 1, 3 and 11, 1. Hence the present article will assume that the occurrence of *hypostasis* in 3, 14 is of a piece with its occurrence in 1, 3 and 11, 1 that is, an underlying, objective reality.

In 3, 14, there is question of the addressees being "sharers in Christ" (*metochoi tou Christou*) provided they keep the "beginning of the underlying reality valid until the end" (*ten archen tes hyposteos mechri telous bebaian*). The *hypostasis* is viewed as something allowing of a beginning and being essential until some kind of end - almost certainly the entrance into the Land of God's Heavenly Rest which is the point of the passage in 3, 7 - 4, 12. The *hypothesis* is closely connected with Christ, but different enough to warrant the observation of the main clause as something which needed to be pointed out. Finally, the *hypostasis* is something which can be lost by an individual through sin (cf. 3, 13).

The immediate context of 3, 14 specifies the boldness and hope of 3, 6 even more: it is faith viewed as an underlying "bold hope" (cf. 11, 1), and specifically, faith connected with Christ. For the passage warns against the failure of entering the Land through faithlessness (3, 19), and it is through faith in Christ as the Word (4, 12) which enables entry into God's Rest.³⁰ But unlike 11, 1, the context of 3, 14 is not of the Son and his creation but of the Holy Spirit and his admonition through the inspiration of Ps 95[95] (cited *in extenso* at 3, 7b-11 and all through 3, 7-4, 12).

28. Cf. H. Schlier, "*parresia, parresiazomai*", *TWNT* V, 882 "*Parresia* hat, wie man mit Recht gesagt hat, 'einen eigenartig gegenständlichen Charakter'. 'Man "hat" sie nicht bloß als subjektive Haltung, sondern als Aneignung eines Vorgegebenen. Man hält sie fest, indem man nicht nur sich selbst als Glaubenden, sondern indem man die Voraussetzung des Glaubens in der Verheißung festhält'." (The citations are from E. Käsemann, *Das wandernde Gottesvolk* [1938], 23.) Cf. the justification for the objective meaning of *parresia* at 10, 19 given by C. Spicq, *L'épître aux Hébreux*, II, *Commentaire* (Études Bibliques; Paris 1953) 315.

29. Ellingworth, *Hebrews*, 227. 565 finds it unnecessary to try to find the same basic meaning for *hypostasis* in its three occurrences in Hebrews. But the occurrences seem so strategically placed and so weighty that unrelated meanings - equivocations - would be hard to explain in the context of a document so carefully crafted as Hebrews. The reason why the author resorted to such a technical word in such carefully chosen positions would go unanswered if they were not closely related in meaning.

30. Cf. the similar views of several Fathers as expressed in Attridge, *Hebrews*, 119, and 119, n. 85.

Faith here is viewed from the standpoint not of the Son's creation but of the Spirit's inspiration. The fact that the *hypostasis* in 3, 14 can have a beginning, and the fact that it can be lost by an individual, imply that it is a gift, i.e., it is not something intrinsically owed by someone.³¹ This is appropriate for an underlying reality which is used for divine purposes, as in 11, 1-2. The point in 3, 14 of the use of the *hypostasis* which is faith is to stress that this bold faith-trust is an objective, underlying reality, to be maintained once it is accepted if its purpose is to be achieved. That purpose, by implication, is entrance into the Land.

Faith in Hebrews: An Objective "Given"

Thus the word *hypostasis* in Hebrews emerges as an indication of a profound view of faith in Hebrews. The first occurrence sets the stage, in which *hypostasis* is used to indicate the underlying reality of God with relation to the Son: the objective "given" which is God, underlying the Son as creator and therefore underlying all reality, is being used as an analogue for faith. In 3, 14 the first application of the analogy occurs: faith is an underlying reality which is a gift of the Spirit, a gift which can be forfeited through sin. Finally, in 11, 1, *hypostasis* is used to describe faith as the underlying reality leading to things which are hoped for, a reality which is associated with God's creation through the Son.

Thus there would seem to be more to the use of the word *hypostasis* in Hebrews than its relation to God and to faith. The word seems to be used in contexts designed to establish a relation first with the Spirit (as his gift) and then with the Son (as that which is associated with what he creates). And because the relations to God, Spirit, and Son are found at strategic places in the epistle, the word seems to be used as an indication of structure. *Hypostasis* is used towards the beginning of the two major sections covered so far in the present attempt to structure the Epistle to the Hebrews: 1, 1 - 3, 6 and 3, 7 - 10, 39. In the first of these sections the word denotes the underlying reality of God; in the second, the reality of faith as a gift of the Holy Spirit. In 11, 1 it would thus seem to be used to point out the beginning of the third and final section of Hebrews, denoting faith as an underlying, objective reality, an

31. Thus the suggestion by Attridge, *Hebrews*, 119, n. 84 with reference to Heb 6, 4 is not out of place, that the Christian participates in the *hypostasis* mentioned in 3, 14 through a sacramental act related to baptism.

enduring given associated with God's creation through the Son. The implication would seem to be that in the first section of Hebrews (1, 1-3, 6) God figures in a special way, as the one who speaks in the Son who is, as it were, his imprint (1, 2). In the second section of Hebrews (3, 7-10, 39), the implication would seem to be that faith as a gift of the Spirit has an important bearing on what is being discussed.³² With relation to the section 3, 7-10, 39, faith is seen as the underlying reality which must be preserved at all costs if the Spirit's gift is to bear fruit. Finally, the implication would seem to be that faith as an underlying reality associated with God's creation through the Son has an important bearing on the third section of Hebrews 11, 1-13, 17. It is this implication which will be taken as the basis for what follows.

Heb 11, 1-13, 17 seems to be divided into three subdivisions: 1) that which regards the past (11, 1-40); 2) that which regards the future (12, 1-29); 3) that which regards the present (13, 1-17).³³ Specifically, faith seems to be a factor in all three sections. In 11, 1-39 faith is the theme word, found at the beginning (11, 1) and repeated at 11, 3.4.5.6.7 (2x).8.9.11.13.17.20.21.22.23.24.27.29.30.31.33.39. There is no explicit *paraenesis* in this section, which confirms the view that it is treating with something beyond the power of action of the addressees, i.e., it is treating the past.³⁴

12, 1-29 is looking toward Christ as originator and perfecter of faith (12,2). The chapter is strongly eschatological in tone at the end, which is appropriate for a section which seems to view faith with especial regard to what is future.³⁵ The view

32. All the references in Hebrews to "the Holy Spirit" or "a holy spirit" are in this section, except for 2, 4 (cf. 3, 7; 6, 4; 9, 8. 14; 10, 15. 29). It is in this section that the "unforgivable sin" is twice discussed (6, 4-6 and 10, 26-30a), the nature of which would seem to be a deliberate rejection of the gift of faith. Cf. also above, n. 9 (p. 30).

33. This arrangement may be alluded to at 13, 8

34. Chapter 11 of Hebrews seems to be a type of Christian *peshet*, with Heb 11, 3 being the verse introducing the interpretation and serving as a bridge between vv. 1-2 and the examples which follow, which are understood as referring to Christian realities. Cf. J. Swetnam, "Hebrews 11 - An Interpretation", *Melita Theologica* 46 (1990) 97-114, for a preliminary attempt to work out an interpretation along such lines. Cf. R. Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period* (Grand Rapids, Michigan 1975 [second printing, 1977]) 38-45; D. Dimant, "Pesharim, Qumran", *The Anchor Bible Dictionary*, 5 (New York 1192) 244-51.

35. Cf. Heb 11, 1 with its emphasis on faith underlying "things hoped for", a strongly eschatological orientation, which is found not only in 11, 1-39, with regard to the ancients, but especially in 12, 1-29, with regard to the addressees. This eschatological orientation is alluded to also in 13, 14.

of Christ as “originator” or “initiator” (*archegos*) recalls the use of the latter word to describe him in 2, 10, a verse which occurs in a section which seems to be linking Jesus with Moses as the one leading the sons of the promise to the definitive possession of the Land.³⁶ The theme of Moses and the quest for the Land is brought to climax in 12, 24-25 with the approach of the addressees to the Jesus who is mediator of a new covenant, with blood speaking better than that of Abel’s. Here is the Jesus who is the “perfecter” of faith (*teleiotes*), i.e. bringing it to its intrinsic conclusion. Just as Moses was “sent” by God, so Jesus is an “apostle”, assigned to announce the name of God (i.e., “Father”) to his brothers (Heb 2, 12).³⁷ Now the long exodus which began with that announcement is at an end, and the addressees have reached the “unshakeable kingdom” (12,28) which is theirs as grace, given by the new covenant which is Christ himself. Thus faith is working itself out to its divinely-appointed conclusion for the future, as the “underlying reality of things hoped for” with relation to its creation by the Son.

Finally, the section 13, 1-17 looks at faith from the standpoint of the present. The section gives indications for comportment in the here and now. The addressees are called on to “recall your leaders, who spoke to you the word of God, to look upon the outcome of their conduct, and to imitate their faith” (13, 7). The verse parallels 12,2,³⁸ and has the same function for 13, 1-17 as 12,2 has for 12, 1-29: it shows the relevance of faith. In 12, 1-29 it was the relevance of the initiator and perfecter of faith, Jesus, who as the new Moses is to bring faith to its ultimate term; in 13, 1-17 it is the relevance of the leaders of the addressees, whose faith is to be imitated in all things relative to their function of transmitters of God’s word. It is this word, here and now, which must be lived in a variety of ways in the present, as the verses indicate.³⁹

36. Cf. Swetnam, “Hebrews 1, 1 - 3, 6”, 65.

37. Ibid., 62-63

38. “The call to ‘contemplate’ (*anatheorountes*) these leaders recalls the advice to look to (*aphorao*) the initiator and perfecter of faith (12, 2). The parallel is hardly accidental. Like the following summons to ‘imitate’ (*mimēisthe*) the faith of the leaders, the call to observe them is part of common early Christian advice to follow those who follow Christ”, Attridge, *Hebrews*, 392.

39. At 13, 14 there is an allusion to the eschatological term of faith, the city which is to come.

Announcement of Themes and the Three-Fold Division of Hebrews

The use of *hypostasis* at Heb 1, 2; 3, 14 and 11, 1 has been taken here as a confirmation that the epistle is divided into major sections at 1, 1 - 3, 6 and 3, 7 - 10, 39, and as a guide for the discernment of the beginning of a major division at 11, 1 - 13, 17. But the word *hypostasis* is not the central point being made in these sections. More indicative of the occurrence of major divisions would seem to be the use of key words as announcements of themes to come. The first such key word is *onoma* at 1, 4: the section 1, 5 - 3, 6 discusses the name "son" as applied to Jesus, both as Son of God and as Son of Man. The second such key word is *Christos* at 3, 5-6: the section 3, 7 - 10, 39 discusses Christ precisely as the Christ,⁴⁰ in relation to the second and definitive stage of his priesthood and victimhood, alluded to in 3, 5-6 through the phrase *eis marturion ton lalethesomenon*, which, in turn, alludes to the eucharistic connotations of the word *laleo* in Hebrews.⁴¹ The third such key word is *pistis* at 10, 39: the section 11, 1-13, 17 discusses the virtue in relation to the past, future, and present.

This brings to a conclusion the attempt to structure an enigma. As the present series of articles has attempted to argue, the Epistle to the Hebrews is a bold outline of Christian faith. With an audacious adaptation of the word *hypostasis* to Christian realities, the author links the objective reality of faith with the very reality of God. It is the reality of God which underlies the Son and all that the Son achieves as agent of creation (1, 2). Faith is introduced as being analogous to this fundamental underlying reality (3, 14); it comes as a gift of the Spirit, and serves as a guide to understanding Christ as High Priest and Victim in his two stages of priesthood (3, 7 - 10, 39). This gift of the Spirit is a creation of God through the Son (11, 1), and as such it is a guide to seeing God's approval in the past (Ch. 11) in those who lived by it. It is a basic virtue with which all who look on Christ gird themselves for the future (Ch. 12). And it is a basic virtue of those Christians who live in the present, mindful of the example of their leaders (Ch. 13).

40. Jesus becomes fully the Christ in Hebrews at the moment of his resurrection, alluded to through a citation from Ps 45 at Heb 1, 9 by the verb *chrío*. Cf. the discussion in A. Vanhoye, *Situation du Christ: épître aux Hébreux 1 et 2* (Lectio Divina 58; Paris 1969) 191-192.

41. Cf. J. Swetnam, "Christology and the Eucharist in the Epistle to the Hebrews", *Biblica* 70 (1989) 84-87.

There remains the task of filling in the details of this structure, seeing how the outline sheds light on all the individual verses of the epistle, and how the individual verses of the epistle shed light on the structure.

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THE INFLUENCE OF THE WORLD OF WORK ON FAMILY LIFE

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The year 1981 was an important year for the history of the social discourse of the Catholic Church. Two significant documents were released, one commemorating the hundredth anniversary of *Rerum Novarum* and another one on the problems of contemporary family, which was supposed to present a synthesis of the conclusions of the Synod of Bishops held in Rome the previous year.

The coincidence of the publication of these documents on the same year gives us a clue about the importance that the Catholic Church gives to these topics as well as the close relationship existing between them. In fact, the Church proclaims in these documents the absolute priority of labour over capital and of the family over any other social institution. The Church's social teaching and its whole strategy of evangelisation and pastoral care are focused around the family. The social conditions that surround the family are, therefore, a major concern of evangelization.¹ A serious consideration of the dignity of the human person and of the common good, must start from the family which stands as a mediation between these two basic principles of Catholic social doctrine. "The well-being of the individual person and of human and Christian society is intimately linked with the healthy conditions of that community produced by marriage and family."²

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1. cf. Steidal-Meier Paul, *Social Justice Ministry: Foundations and Concerns* (Le Jacq Publishing Inc; New York 1984)
2. Pastoral Constitution on the Church and the Modern World of the II Vatican Council: *Gaudium et Spes* (GS), 47.

Laborem exercens (LE), the Encyclical Letter of Pope John Paul II on Human Labour, is in line with the tradition of social discourse started in its systematic form by *Rerum Novarum*, but goes far beyond, thus constituting an extraordinary contribution to the understanding of human work in its most profound sense. Leo XIII expressed his concern about the conditions of salaried work which was a novelty in European society subjected to the effects of industrial revolution at the time. Opposing the ideology hidden under emerging capitalism, the Encyclical Letter insists on the social dimension of the working person, not ignoring his or her individuality, and perceives the intimate relationship between two basic rights: the right to work and the right to form a family. Thus, from its early beginnings Catholic social doctrine assumes a dialectical form which is rooted in work and the family.

In its early stages Catholic social thought insisted on the economic aspect of work as a necessary means for survival, thus underscoring the importance of just wages, a question which has not as yet found a satisfactory solution. A new aspect was added to the question, namely the so-called family wage, an even more complex issue from a practical standpoint. This issue was raised as a consequence of the consideration of the family as the "foundation of society" (GS, 52).

*Laborem exercens*³, making a synthesis of the new and the old, not ignoring the economic aspect of human work (the Pope claims that the fairness of a social system can be judged according to the way work is remunerated), makes a greater emphasis on what John Paul II calls the "subjective dimension of work". With an insight whose roots are to be found in Christian Revelation, but using an analysis which in some ways resembles the Marxian conception, the Pope presents work as the means through which man and woman attain their full realisation as human persons. This way it can be better understood that work constitutes an inalienable right of the person, as Catholic social doctrine has taught since the times of Pius XII. Therefore, denying the right to work means the denial of the right to become a full person.

At the very origins of our own existence there is the family, understood by Catholic teaching as the stable and permanent union of husband and wife. Man and woman, in fact, are unthinkable outside the family. Therefore any discourse on

3. Encyclical *Laborem Exercens* (LE) Addressed by the Supreme Pontiff John Paul II to His Venerable Brothers in the Episcopate, to the Priests, to the Religious Families, to the Sons and Daughters of the Church and to all Men and Women of Good Will on Human Work on the Nineteenth Anniversary of *Rerum Novarum*, September 14, 1981).

human activity must in some way be related to the reality of the family. The family is the very beginning of all human societies. This idea is taken by John Paul II when he speaks of the “family nature of human life” (*LE*, 10).

The human person is called to communion with others and to the gift of self, which is the theological foundation of the social dimension of the person. Society is both the fruit and the sign of this social dimension and thus it is considered as a community of persons, not a simple aggregate nor only a statistical reality. The family, in society, is the fundamental expression of the person. “God did not create man a solitary, for from the beginning «male and female» he created them. Their companionship produces the primary form of interpersonal communion” (*GS*, 12).

This conception is rooted in the Church’s tradition about the human person: “The fact that man «created as man and woman» is the image of God means not only that each of them individually is like God, as a rational and free being. It also means that man and woman, created as a «unity of the two» in their common humanity, are called to live in a communion of love, and in this way to mirror in the world the communion of love that is in God, through which the Three Persons love each other in the intimate mystery of the one divine life.”⁴

The relationship between work and family is clearly expressed in the Encyclical Letter *Laborem exercens* where the Pope says that “work constitutes a foundation for the formation of family life, which is a natural right and something that man is called to. (...) Work is a condition for making it possible to found a family, since the family requires the means of subsistence which man normally gains through work. (...) It must be remembered and affirmed that the family constitutes one of the most important terms of reference for shaping the social and ethical order of human work. (...) In fact, the family is simultaneously a community made possible by work and the first school of work, within the home, for every person” (*LE*, 10).

When the Pope speaks of the working person he seems to be referring to that fundamental aspect of the person’s vocation to be the head of a family. The understanding of this call leads us to the logical right that has to be respected. Such conception is clearly expressed in *Familiaris Consortio*⁵ in which the Pope proclaims

4. Apostolic Letter *Mulieris Dignitatem* (*MD*) of the Supreme Pontiff John Paul II, on the Dignity and Vocation of Women on the occasion of the Marian Year, August 15, 1988, n. 7.

5. Apostolic Exhortation *Familiaris Consortio* (*FC*), of the Supreme Pontiff John Paul II, on the Scope of Christian Families in today’s world, November 22, 1981.

the right of every man and woman to found a family and to own all the means adequate to sustain it (*FC*, 46). This intimate, interactive link between family and society is at the base of some important considerations.

The Family and the World of Work.

The Second Vatican Council had already declared that God had made the marriage the founding principle of human society. Thus the family becomes the first and basic cell of society. The family is both foundation and nourishment to society, being by its nature at the service of life (*FC*, 42). However, the family not only contributes to the demographic growth of society. The family is the first and basic educator to the extent that it has become almost a common place to say that what the person has not learned in the family, he or she will not learn elsewhere. As a matter of fact, the person *learns how to learn* in the family, that is, we all acquire the ability to incorporate and to adapt ourselves in an appropriate way to the social group.

The family, and more explicitly, the couple, is seen as the basic sphere of social commitment. This congregation presupposes, of course, the certitude about the unique and irreplaceable value of the family for the development of society.

Man and woman are defined by work in the proem of *Laborem exercens*. In these opening lines, in fact, work is defined as: "any activity by man, whether manual or intellectual, whatever its nature or circumstances; it means any human activity that can and must be recognised as work, in the midst of all the many activities of which man is capable and to which he is predisposed by his very nature, by virtue of humanity itself." The image of the Creator making a pause after having completed his work on the seventh day is there to indicate that God delegates on man and woman the continuation of his work. "The word of God's revelation is profoundly marked by the fundamental truth that man, created in the image of God, shares by his work in the activity, and perfects it as he advances further and further in the discovery of the resources and values contained in the whole of creation" (*LE*, 25). Thus from the beginning human beings appear as workers. Work constitutes their very life in spite of the fact that sometimes, because of sin, it will be arduous.

The presence of every man and woman in society is, therefore a contribution to its growth and elevation through work. The family has the obligation to prepare its

members to assume this task responsibly. Within the prevailing social cultural context the family is seen simply as the supplier of man power to society. This conception becomes more and more prevalent in the dominant economic model and yet, nothing could be more contrary to revealed truth.

This way of seeing work leads to the identification of the persons with other instruments of production. In fact, working men and women are considered elements of production at the same level with other inanimate tools which become more sophisticated every day and end up by superseding direct human work. This conception ignores the subjective dimension of work and tends to forget that whoever performs the action is a person. This way the sacredness of the human dignity is ignored or even worse, violated. Work should be accomplished under those conditions that allow the persons that performs it to grow up, to achieve full realisation, to experience personhood, to discover that through his or her action he or she is contributing with its own being manifested through work, to the continuation and perfectioning of the great work initiated by the Creator.

The family has to accomplish a mission which is imperative in order to render this vision of work real. It is precisely in the context of the family that each one must discover and understand what it means to be a person. "The family constitutes the natural habitat and the most efficient instrument of humanisation and personalisation in society; she cooperates in an original and profound way to the construction of the world, making human life possible, especially through the custody and transmission of virtues and values" (*FC*, 43). Each family must be a school where each person be allowed to express freely him or herself, to grasp his or her own dignity, and to respect others. It is necessary to discover the true objectives of each family, its real values, the type of relationships existing among its members. A truly free person will resist slavery and to this purpose the family has to train its members. It must be remembered however, that, more than through words we educate through our own example. No one who is a prey of consumerism will be able to transmit to others the true sense of freedom. This much is also true of those who are slaves of the thirst for immediate enjoyment beyond control, for money and power.

To work, according to the Christian conception, means to perform an action together with others and for the benefit of others. In other words, in community and in a spirit of service. This is a formidable challenge that the family in the modern world has to face.

Living with others and for others is the most beautiful expression of true

community, of *communio* in the Christian sense. "In the family the mutual gift of self by husband and wife creates an environment in which children can be born and develop their potentialities, become aware of their dignity and prepare to face their unique and individual destiny."⁶ Unfortunately we must admit that we live in a society for which all this is pure absurdity. Once more we must remember that present day society, dominated by the economic value sees in the family a simple supplier of man power. The sense of the other, self denial, solidarity, are virtues which contradict the ideal of power and dominion over others. Such conception of life and work is seen as a challenge to the spirit of competition, the very heart of the system of production. It is necessary to gain awareness of this fact assuming with courage the mission to educate solitary men and women.

Solidarity is learned by living in solidarity. Sharing is learned through sharing. Magnanimity is acquired through the struggle against one's selfishness. The family has to develop the context for and become a living experience of communion and participation. "The very experience of communion and participation which should characterize the daily life of the family, constitutes its first and foremost contribution to society. The relationships among the members of the familiar community must be inspired and guided by the law of «gratuitousness» which respects and favours in each and everyone personal dignity as the only value title and thus becomes cordial welcome, encounter and dialogue availability free of any personal interest, generous service, deep solidarity" (*FC*, 43). This way the family will assume its function as primary and irreplaceable school where people learn to live socially. "In order to overcome today's widespread individualistic mentality, what is required is a *concrete commitment to solidarity and charity*, beginning in the family with the mutual support of husband and wife and the care which the different generations give to one another. In this sense the family too can be called a community of work and solidarity" (*CA*, 49). The solitary person becomes the cornerstone of society, the solid foundation of the common good through a realistic commitment with the weaker members of society, with those which are left aside, margined for reasons of race, colour, age, sex or religion.

In the intimacy of the home, through the relations between parents and children, between brothers and sisters, it is necessary to learn to experience the joy of self

6. Encyclical Letter *Centesimus Annus* (*CA*) addressed by the Supreme Pontiff John Paul II to his Venerable Brothers in the Episcopate, the Priests and Deacons, Families of Men and Women Religious, all the Christian Faithful, and to all Men and Women of Good Will on the Hundredth Anniversary of *Rerum Novarum*, May 1, 1991, n. 39.

gift without any interest for personal gain. This way it will be understood that the creation of a favourable milieu for the growth of all, is the result of the contribution of all. It will become evident that the first ones to benefit from it will be those that have contributed to its development. This supposes, of course, that each member of the family group be given the opportunity to assume his or her own responsibility without undue pressures that will slow the process of growth. There is a need to create spaces for personal expression that has to be encouraged and respected.

A family where these values are experienced will be making a positive contribution to the creation of a society where work will be free, responsible and shared. A society in which each person can be and fully express him or herself through his or her own activity.

In contemporary society where everyday work becomes more impersonal and depersonalising, working men and women must be able to find in the family the appropriate environment where they can express their affectivity and at the same time feel that they are loved by the other members. This is indeed one of the functions of the nuclear family. Enriching this sociological vision with the Christian conception we come to the conclusion that the family must become a true school where each member learns to contribute to the coming of the civilisation of love. What we have said up to this point must be accomplished in a context of mutual love which will give its full meaning to the life of each person as well as of the whole family.

Society and the Family

Primary and fundamental duty of society is that of creating an environment which favours the realisation of life that it be truly human. "Man receives from God his essential dignity and with it the capacity to transcend every social order so as to move towards truth and goodness. But he is also conditioned by the social structure in which he lives, by the education he has received and by his environment. These elements can either help or hinder his living in accordance with the truth. The decisions which create a human environment can give rise to specific structures of sin which impede the full realisation of those who are in any way oppressed by them. To destroy such structures and replace them with more authentic forms of living in community is a task which demands courage and patience" (CA, 38).

"The first and fundamental structure for «human ecology» is *the family*, in which man receives his first formative ideas about truth and goodness, and learns

what it means to love and to be loved, and thus what it actually means to be a person" (CA, 39).

Salaried work is performed, usually outside the home. It is important to create those conditions which are necessary in order to make the work an activity that allows each person to attain full realisation and to fulfil his or her vocation.

The conditions under which work is performed must be such as to allow for the creation of a human environment. Unfortunately under present conditions work, especially industrial work, has become dehumanising. It is not possible in many instances to discover the sense of one's activity, especially in as much as it is related to one's growth and to the service of society. In the words of John Paul II: "In today's world, the majority of people do not have the means which would enable them to take their place in an effective and humanly dignified way within a productive system in which work is truly central. They have no possibility of acquiring the basic knowledge which would enable them to express their creativity and develop their potential" (CA, 33).

The problem of wages represents one of the hardest challenges in the search for a just society. The Pope recognizes, however, that so far there seems to be no better way of doing justice to the working person, at least on theoretical basis. The main difficulty is the fact that it is not possible to measure the amount to be paid from the quantity produced alone. From the first social Encyclicals the concept (not necessarily the term) of family wage appears. Bypassing technical aspects, it must be underlined that according to the Church's social teaching, the person that works has the right to perceive for his or her work, a remuneration that may suffice to restore his or her strength as well as to provide for the needs of his or her family. It is not possible to measure with mathematical precision the fruits of the work of a person even in those cases in which the contract is based upon the amount of matter which is produced or transformed. It would be unfair to retribute the worker with one amount that will not allow the person to form or maintain a family.

Another important issue is that of the work of women, be it performed outside the home, or as part of the daily tasks of a house wife. One of the most significant changes that have taken place in Europe in recent times is the work of women outside the home. Statistics show an increase and the effects of this new trend on child care, family relationships and the democratisation of the family structure, among others, cannot be ignored. The Church is often misinterpreted about the defence of the right of the woman to work in the house so as to render her roles of mother and worker compatible. Employment should be organised in a manner that

make it compatible with child-rearing. Furthermore, women should not in any way be discriminated against in the workplace because of their family responsibilities nor, indeed, because they are women. This viewpoint does not mean condemning the woman to make of the home some sort of prison. The woman has the same right to work as the man for there is no difference between them from the standpoint of personal dignity. The Church recognises that widespread social and cultural traditions have reduced the role of the woman in the family only to being a mother and a wife, not allowing space for public roles reserved exclusively to males. However, the Pope recognises that today in many societies women work in nearly every sector of life.

The teachings of the popes stress the fact that the woman seems to be better fitted to understand and solve certain delicate problems of family life which is the foundation of social life. What the Church affirms is that the woman should not be obliged to work outside the home. The work of the woman in the household is not a humiliation but rather a consecration. In fact, the woman cooperates directly with the good functioning of the family and this is a great task which could be seen as a true mission which requires a proper preparation in order to be competent for the various activities. The woman has to be able to rationalise her activity, she must understand the psychology of the family in order to learn the "pedagogy of the effort" which allows for a better organisation of her own contribution to the welfare of the family, as well as for the accomplishment of her function as an agent of education. The defence of the work of women in the house implies the elaboration of a new conception of work which may stress the dignity of this type of work, as well as the struggle for some form of remuneration for this activity, at least under the form of social security which will guarantee health care, the necessary attention in old age, and other types of protection.

Society and the State, therefore, must develop those conditions and mechanisms that guarantee the just remuneration of work. In spite of the dominating ideology the principle of ancient capitalism according to which the market possesses the necessary elements to regulate itself and to guarantee justice, is not acceptable from an ethical point of view. As the Pope reminds us once again, this principle favours the creation of an institutional, juridical or political vacuum which will penalise the worker on the long run. He concludes that "the principal task of the State is to guarantee individual freedom and other conditions that allow those who work to enjoy the fruits of their labours and thus be encouraged to work efficiently and honestly" (*cf. CA, 48*). Even though the State cannot ensure the right to work to

all citizens, it has however, the duty to create conditions which will ensure job opportunities (*Ib.*).

We cannot simply identify the State with society. The conclusion is not however, to disengage oneself from any responsibility thus leaving all decisions to the State. The true way is one of solidarity and responsibility which will lead to the political commitment of all members of society. Instead of spending our lives criticising the State; it is necessary to take things seriously, exercising the right to vote with intelligence and responsibility, participating actively in politics, not in search for power and personal gain, but at the service of the community, even with one's sacrifice when this would be required. Christians must be present on the political arena with a clear project towards a society characterized by solidarity and brotherhood, where justice may reign and the rights of all be respected. Only thus will there be space for the necessary conditions for a stable and just peace that the world of today so badly needs.

QUR'ÂNIC EXEGESIS: MUHAMMAD & THE JINN

Edmund Theuma, O.F.M. Conv.

Readers of *Melita Teologica* may now be familiar with my articles treating the spiritual beings - non-human, non-angelic - which the *Qur'ân* calls *jinn*. This time we shall treat two main problems which concern Muhammad directly, the prophethood of whom had at a point in history to be defended against accusations of *jinnî* possession. The *Qur'ân* presents Muhammad not only as "the seal of the prophets" (*Khâtam al-anbiyâ*) i.e. the last prophet in a long series and the one who sets the divine message on a definitive basis; but it also pin-points him as the universal prophet, i.e. the one whom the Most High has sent to all peoples in any future time since the foundation of *Islâm*. His universality extends to all beings even to *jinn*.

This brings us to the enunciation of the two main problems forming our topic:

(a) Was the Prophet of Islâm possessed by *jinn*? This question amounts to the quest whether Muhammad was merely an inspired poet, or an authentic Prophet of God upon whom revelation came down.

(b) Muhammad's special mission to the *jinn*. This includes the quest whether any special prophet, besides Muhammad, was ever sent to the *jinn*, and whether among the *jinn* there exist any faithful Muslims. It should be made clear from the very beginning that here we shall take into account only what is narrated in the *Qur'ân* text; other elements on this subject which have their origin in Muslim tradition will be exposed in a future study.

Muhammad was neither a possessed person nor a poet

Contrary to the accusation advanced by the Prophet's enemies, the *Qur'ân* insists that Muhammad was not a person possessed by *jinn*. "Have they not reflected? No

madness (*jinna*) is in your comrade; he is naught but a plain warner"¹. If according to the *Qur'ân* Muhammad was not possessed, it will therefore follow that neither was he a poet, for there is an intimate connection between possession by *jinn* and poetic muse.

It was a current idea among the *Jâhiliyya* Arabs - an idea which continued to circulate long after the advent of *Islâm* - that the poet was one who, through connection with *jinn*, used to acquire cognizance of unseen knowledge. In fact the word for poet in Arabic is *shâ'ir*, present participle of verb *sha'ara* or *sha'ura*, meaning "to know; to have cognizance of". It was not the poet who chose his *jinnî*; on the contrary, it was the *jinnî* who chose his poet among men of his liking. This happened by means of an initiation ceremony; when the *jinnî* threw the man of his choice to the ground, knelt upon his chest, and forced him to become his mouthpiece to the world. After this act of possession there was established between the *jinnî* and the poet an intimate relationship, and at intervals *jinnî* used to "send down" upon his poet poetic inspiration. This poetic inspiration was somehow felt to be coming down from above and was thus called *nuzûl*, verbal noun from *nazala*, meaning "to descend". But even *Qur'ânic* revelation is called *nuzûl*, and it seems that in moments of prophetic inspiration the Prophet of *Islâm* gave certain symptoms which were common to those manifested by *jinnî*-inspired poets. Add to this the fact that, according to the pagan mentality, every spiritual and invisible being, including God Most High, was "*jinn*"², and out comes the reason why Muhammad was often called *majnûn* by those who could not understand his revealed message. Apart from the two citations we reported above, the *Qur'ân* mentions six other instances when the Prophet was accused of possession³. But it is clear that Muhammad's fate with the enemies of God is a repetition of that suffered by the Prophets that came before him - they were all accused of magic or possession: "...not a Messenger came to those before them but they said, 'a sorcerer, or a man possessed!'"⁴. The *Qur'ân* mentions the particular instances when Noah and Moses were both accused of possession by *jinn*.⁵

1. Q. 7: 184; cfr. also Q. 34: 46; on both occasions Arberry renders Arabic *jinna* with "madness", but properly speaking the word in these contexts "possession of *jinn*"
2. Cfr. Edmund Theuma, "Philological Survey of Arabic Root 'JNN'", *Melita Theologica* XLIV (1993/1) 21-31.
3. Cfr. Q. 15: 6; 37: 36; 44: 14; 52: 29; 68: 2; 81: 22.
4. Q. 51: 42.
5. Cfr. Q. 23: 25; 26: 27; 51: 39; 54: 9.

Although in the eyes of pagan Arabs a prophet might have been just another version of a poet, there is of course a great difference between the two “inspired” media. The poet is proclaimed by the *Qur’ân* to be a “guilty imposter.”⁶ Now the Arabic word which Arberry rendered “imposter” is *affâk*, which also means “liar”. i.e. one who refers *ifk*, a lie. But *ifk* is the kind of lie with a much wider sense than is usually attached to a common lie, which is otherwise called *kidhb*. *Ifk* is better conceived as an affirmation with no basis in reality or truth (*haqq*). When the *Qur’ân* says that a poet is an *affâk* it means that a poet refers irresponsibly and without reflection the whisperings of his protective *jinnî*. But Muhammad and the other Prophets receive revelation from God through his Messenger-Angel; and since prophetic inspiration comes ultimately from God, and is thus called “revelation” (*wahy*), it must therefore contain truth (*haqq*) out of necessity: “We send not down angels, save with truth (*haqq*).”⁷

Muhammad's special mission to the jinn

The first problem discussed by scholars is whether there arose among the *jinn* some messenger or prophet that was sent especially to them by God. The polemic is provoked by Q. 6:130: “Company of *jinn* and mankind, did not Messengers come to you from among you, relating to you my signs and warning you of the encounter of this your day?...” There are two schools promoting contrary opinions regarding this problem:

a) The group guided by *al-Dahhâk* retains that from this verse it becomes clear that messengers of the *jinn* were sent to the *jinn*, just as messengers of mankind were sent to mankind. The adherents to this group base their arguments on Q. 10: 46; 16: 35 and 35:23, where it is stated that every nation has its messengers. The word for nation is *umma* which is more exactly a “community” and has also the sense of English “kingdom” in such expressions as “the animal, vegetative, spiritual,

6. Q. 26: 222.

7. Q. 15: 8, cfr. T. Izutsu, *God and Man in the Koran: Semantics of the Koranic Weltanschauung schavving* (Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies; Tokyo 1964) 169-175, where the author explains also in what manner Muhammad cannot be called a soothsayer (*kâhin*); for which see Q. 52:29: “...by thy Lord’s blessing thou art not a soothsayer neither possessed,” and Maxime Rodenson, *Mohammed* (trans Anne Carter) (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth 1976) 94-96.

etc... kingdom". In this sense the *jinn* are included with those communities, the totality of them, to whom some Messenger of God was sent.⁸

(b) The other group, led by *Ibn 'Abbās*, holds that to be Messenger of God is a special prerogative of man; and if in Q. 6:130 God did not clarify the distinction between *jinn* and mankind, that happens because, as He was speaking about His Messengers, it was natural that He meant His selected Messengers from mankind. But owing to Q. 46: 29: "...Then, when it (the reciting) was finished, they (the *jinn*) turned to their people, warning", it is clear that the *jinn* are messengers of the Messenger of God. This is the opinion of the majority. On the other hand, however, both groups seem to agree that Muhammad was sent to both *jinn* and men. *Al-Kalbī* says: "Before Muhammad, may God bless him and keep him, was sent, the Messengers used to be sent only to mankind, but the Messenger of God, may God bless him and keep him, was sent to both mankind and *jinn*."⁹

That some of the *jinn* (a company of them) heard the Prophet reciting the *Qur'ân* is quite clear from what is narrated in Q. 46: 29; 72: 1. What remains unclear, however, is in what manner did this happen. The *Qur'ân* remains silent on this subject, but, relying on the *hadīth*, scholars are divided into two opinion groups!

(a) Some think that Muhammad did not see *jinn*, neither was he ordered to recite the *Qur'ân* for them, but they eavesdropped him while he was performing the *salât* (ritual prayer) and reciting the *Qur'ân*. Their presence was then revealed to him: "Say: 'It has been revealed to me that a company of *jinn* gave ear...'"¹⁰ Heading this group is *al-Hasan*.

(b) Others hold that the Prophet was expressly sent to the *jinn* by God to call them to *Islâm* by means of *Qur'ânic* recitation. This means that he saw them and talked to them and sent a delegation of them to announce *Islâm* to the other *jinn* and to warn the unbelievers among them. "...Then, when it was finished, they turned

8. The Authors of *Tafsîr al-Manâr* explain how some of *sūfî*, basing themselves on Q. 35: 23, retain that animals are morally responsible (*taklîf al-hayawân*). One wonders whether they also hold that messengers were sent to animals and to other inferior beings!

9. Cfr. *Tabarî*, Vol. 8, pp. 35-37; *Zamakhsharî*, vol. 2, p. 52; *Râzî*, vol. 13, pp 194-195; *Baydâwî*, vol. 1, p. 403; *Alûsî*, vol. 8, p. 25; *Al-Manâr*, vol. 8, pp. 105-107.

10. Q. 72: 1; cfr. also Q. 46: 29.

back to their people, warning".¹¹ This opinion is held by a group headed by *Ibn 'Abbās*.

What is the most interesting in this narration is perhaps the fact that the *jinn* who heard the *Qur'ân* being recited believed in it, and they seem to have surrendered immediately to God's will, thus becoming Muslims. "We have indeed heard a *Qur'ân* wonderful, guiding to rectitude. We believe in it, and we will not associate with our Lord anyone. He - exalted be our Lord's majesty! - has not taken to Himself either consort or a son".¹² They seem to have immediately understood what Islamic preaching is all about: the absolute uniqueness of God; and they straight away entered into polemic against those who hold that God has sons and consorts.

It is against the fool among them, that "spoke against God outrage" (Q. 72: 4), proclaiming against Him this abominable doctrine, that they now have to fight.¹³

(Q. 46: 29-32) confirm that the *jinn* made it a point that they should give a helping hand to Muhammad, announcing the new religion to their companions: "...Then when it was finished, they turned to their people, warning. They said, 'Our people, we have heard a Book that was sent down after Moses, confirming what was before it, guiding to the truth and to a straight path. Our people, answer God's summoner, and believe in Him (God), and He will forgive you some of your sins, and protect you from a painful chastisement. Whoever answers not God's summoner cannot frustrate God in the earth, and he has no protectors apart from him; those are in manifest error.'"¹⁴ In these verses the very primitive kerygma of *Islâm* is put on the *jinn*'s lips. The *jinn* did not only believe in God's message, but they also cooperated with His Messenger to spread *Islâm* even in the invisible kingdom of the spirits. The universality of *Islâm* is thus reached.

A curious question arises regarding the religion of these *jinn*. In Q. 46: 30 they said: "...We have heard a Book that was sent down after Moses..." Why did they

11. Q. 46: 29; cfr. *Tabarî*, vol. 26, pp 30-55; *Râzî*, vol. 30, p. 152; vol. 28, pp. 31-33.

12. Q. 72: 1-3.

13. Cfr. *Tabarî*, vol. 29, p. 107; *Zamakhsharî*, vol. 4, p. 498-506; *Baydâwî*, vol. 2, p. 553-557; *Alûsî*, vol. 29, p. 85; commentators agree that the expression "the fool among the *jinn*" (Q. 72: 4) refers to *Iblîs* (the Devil) from whom any calumny emanates. For more about *Iblîs* cfr. Edmund Theuma, "The Nature of *Iblîs* in the *Qur'ân* as interpreted by the Commentators", *Melita Theologica* XXXI (1980/2) 10-21

14. Q. 46: 29-32.

not mention Jesus, who was the last Prophet before Muhammad upon whom revelation came down? According to the commentators three might be the reasons for this. The most plausible one is perhaps the first one:

(a) the Book that was sent down to Moses is the most ancient of revelations and it includes in it the message preached by Jesus.¹⁵

(b) Others think that those *jinn* were Jews and the only revelation they accepted was that contained in the Book of Moses (*al-Tawrât*). (c) Still others retain that those *jinn* totally ignored Jesus: they had never heard about him.¹⁶

To sum up we give the five parenthetical conclusions reported by *Râzî* which explain the purpose of the *Qur'ânic* pericope of Muhammad and the *jinn*. The author says that these narrations want to show the *Quraysh*:

(a) that just as the Prophet of *Islâm* was sent to Mankind, he was also sent to the *jinn*;

(b) that the *jinn*, in spite of their rebellion, recognised the wonder of the *Qur'ân* and believed in it;

(c) that the *jinn* are held morally responsible just like mankind;

(d) that the *jinn* eavesdrop our talk and understand our language;

(e) that he who believes must call others of his tribe to faith.¹⁷

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Republic Street,
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15. Cfr. Matthew 5, 17.

16. Cfr. *Zammakhasharî*, vol. 4, pp. 246-248; *Baydâwî*, vol. 2, p. 432; vol. 28, pp. 31-33; *Alûsî*, vol. 26, p. 28.

17. Cfr. *Râzî*, vol. 30, p. 153.

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D'HERBIGNY'S SOLOVIEV¹ THE LURES OF UNIVERSAL HERMENEUTICS

E. G. Farrugia, SJ

A discussion of Michel d'Herbigny, SJ's interpretation of Vladimir Soloviev (1853-1900) may seem trite and even inopportune. For one thing, it may be argued, d'Herbigny is a second-rate, if not third-rate, figure with a tragic finale who has never been really rehabilitated. It may thus not be quite so clear, after all, what he stands for, not to say anything of the fact that his perspective itself, as it may be recovered from his writings, is questionable and has been challenged on several important counts. All in all, there seem to be more valid viewpoints than d'Herbigny's which have a claim on our attention. Besides, his interpretation has been laid to rest and, in the long run, certainly has found no great favour among critics. Of late, it has been demolished, for example, by L. Tretjakewitch's work,²

1. Abbreviations:

1. *Un Newman russe* = M. d'Herbigny, *Vladimir Soloviev (1853-1900): Un Newman russe*, (Paris '1934).
2. SAINT GEORGES - AAVV, *Saint-Georges: De Constantinople à Meudon (1921-1992)*, (Bibliothèque Slave de Paris, Collection Simvol No 4; Meudon 1993).
3. TRETJAKEWITSCH - L. Tretjakewitsch, *Bischof Michel d'Herbigny SJ and Russia: A Pre-Ecumenical Approach to Christian Unity*, (Augustinus Verlag; Würzburg 1990).
4. WW = *Deutsche Gesamtaufgabe der Werke von Wladimir Solowiew I-XV* (Hrsg. v. W. Syzlkarski) (Erich Wewel Verlag; München 1978-1980).
2. TRETJAKEWITSCH, pp. 36-39, Tretjakewitsch's judgement may be summarized as follows. Written in a lively style, *Un Newman russe* had the merit of being the first general treatment of the life and thought of Soloviev in any language other than Russian. It thus handsomely contributed to making the great Russian thinker known in the West, as testified by the various translations of d'Herbigny's work that followed. Though generally favourably received by Catholic and Jesuit journals in Western Europe, critical voices were not lacking. On a number of points d'Herbigny was unfair, as with Dostoevsky and with the Slavophiles. Most of all, however, the comparison with Newman misses the point of Soloviev's original approach: as an Orthodox he considered

only as part of the more englobing project of overhauling d'Herbigny's outdated ecclesiological viewpoint. So, runs the argument, why bother to repeat already-known second rate facts.

Leaving the case outlined above at that, at least for the sake of the argument,³ it would still be useful to review the case once more, and this for the following reason. Not primarily with an eye to rehabilitations - neither of the controversial figure d'Herbigny was, nor of the questionable interpretations he gave taken by themselves - but rather with a view of the temptation which Soloviev presents for his interpreters and of which d'Herbigny's interpretation affords an excellent example. Therefore, the accent of our considerations lies all along on VI. Soloviev, at least as the negative norm of the interpretations given his thought.

The theme falls into two sections: (1) first, a brief critical review of d'Herbigny's interpretation; and (2) secondly, the kind of temptation that Soloviev presents for many would-be interpreters of his, and whose general pattern may be elicited from the Jesuit's attempt at understanding the Russian thinker.

1. D'Herbigny's Interpretation Re-Visited

Michel d'Herbigny's rise in Rome was spectacular, and so was his downfall. Remarkably enough, his career may be said to be spanned by the first edition of *Newman russe*, which first appeared in 1911, before he started his last year of

himself member of the universal Church and consequently in union with Rome; the schism was never consummated anyhow, it was at most a juridical issue. As Tretjakewitsch could have added, Soloviev's example served as example for Vjaceslav I. Ivanov (1866-1949); See B. Schultze, *Russische Denker*, (Wien 1950) 430-432; M.I. Rupnik, *L'arte: memoria della comunione*, (Roma 1994) 19-50; and for Fr Lev Gillet (1893-1980); cf O. Rousseau, "Le moine de l'Église d'Orient," *Irénikon* 53 (1980) 174-194.

3. V. Poggi, SJ, however, who has undertaken extensive research on the history of the Institute, including the d'Herbigny case, has subjected Tretjakewitch's interpretation to a sustained criticism. Poggi claims that one cannot try to interpret everything in terms of d'Herbigny's unionistic ecclesiology; see Poggi's review of Tretjakewitsch in *OCP* 57 (1991) 446-449; idem, *La Civiltà Cattolica* 1993, II, 405-407.

formation as a Jesuit,⁴ and the sixth and last edition of it in 1934, when d'Herbigny's career was by now prematurely but definitely doomed.⁵ Born in 1880, his ideas about Russia and the Christian East seem to have been formed on models of Russian converts, in the nineteenth century, who became Jesuits, such as Prince Ivan Gagarin (1814-1882), Ivan Martynov (1821-1894)⁶ and Evgenij Balabin (1815-1895), and on that of other experts on Russia such as Paul Pierling SJ⁷ (1840-1922), whom d'Herbigny had known personally.⁸

Within a short time of his arrival in Rome he managed to concentrate in his hands unparalleled powers, being at the end responsible directly to the Pope, at that time Pius XI, for the "Commissio Pro-Russia." He has been rightly described as the one responsible for shaping Rome's new politics towards nascent Soviet Russia.⁹ Becoming president of the Pontifical Oriental Institute in 1922,¹⁰ d'Herbigny resigned shortly before Christmas 1931, and was replaced at the beginning of 1932.

But aside from such factors as Aristotle would have included under the *alagon ti*, that is, factors not readily amenable to a rational explanation, d'Herbigny's rise to power was handsomely abetted by his interpretation of Soloviev, later crowned, as a book, with the prize of the Academie Française (1912). In effect, it established him in the eyes of many as an authority on Russian thought. Writing years after d'Herbigny's downfall, F. Muckermann could still describe the former's work as

4. TRETJAKEWITSCH, 40. Actually, the idea of the book was found in nuce in an article with the same title he published in 1909: "Un Newman russe - Vladimir Soloviev (1953-1900)" *Études* 120 (1909) 767-786; 121 (1909) 51-75; TRETJAKEWITSCH, 36.

5. TRETJAKEWITSCH, 277. 1933 marked d'Herbigny's fall from favour, but he was confined to barracks in a sort of house arrest only in 1937.

6. *Un Newman Russe*, p. v.

7. *Ibid.*, p. ix; SAINT-GEORGES, 79.

8. TRETJAKEWITSCH, 32.

9. A. Tamborra, *Chiesa cattolica e ortodossia russa*, (Ed. Paoline; Milano 1992) 428-429.

10. A. Raes, "Pour les cinquante premières années de l'Institut Pontifical Oriental," in: E.G. Farrugia (ed.), *The Pontifical Oriental Institute: the First Seventy-Five Years (1917-1992)*, (Pontifical Oriental Institute; Rome 1993) 112. D'Herbigny was president of the Pontifical Oriental Institute, which at the time had its premises at the Pontifical Biblical Institute, Rome, until 1926, when his title was changed to that of rector.

the best biography of Soloviev to date.¹¹ And, putting together the old evidence with the new, H. Falk, while deepening some of the juridical aspects of the case¹² found himself in a basic agreement with d'Herbigny.¹³ If Soloviev received the sacraments, on his deathbed, from an Orthodox, this was in tune with the Catholic Church's position on the moribund.

1.2 The Interpretation itself

The one point of Vladimir Soloviev's "conversion to Catholicism," as the main thesis of the work, though central to d'Herbigny's work, has absorbed so much the critical attention that its place within the architectonic of the book is not infrequently ignored. And yet, what d'Herbigny says and what he leaves unsaid is of paramount importance to understand his interpretation of Soloviev. So, in order to do justice to both d'Herbigny and Soloviev, we have to look into how d'Herbigny goes on to thematize (a) Soloviev's life, (b) his conversion and (c) his thought.

(a) *Soloviev's Life*. D'Herbigny offers us a detailed version of Soloviev's life. He made extensive use of archives, especially of the Jesuit-run *Bibliothèque Slave* in Bruxelles.¹⁴ Thus, he was able to use Soloviev's own marginal notes as found in a manuscript of his brochure *Le judaïsme et la question chrétienne*, found in that library,¹⁵ published for the first time the whole text of the letter of Mgr Strossmayer¹⁶

11. F. Muckermann, *Wladimir Solowjew: Zur Begegnung zwischen Rußland und dem Abendland*, (Olten 1945) 202.

12. Another Catholic scholar who basically agreed with H. Falk was B. Sultze S.J., "Die Papstakklamationen auf dem 4. und 6. ökumenischen Konzil und Vladimir Soloviev," *OCP* 41 (1975) 224-225.

13. H. Falk, "Wladimir Solowjows Stellung zur katholischen Kirche," *Stimmen der Zeit* 144 (1949) 421-435, especially 421. 430 and 434-435.

14. R. Marichal and F. Rouleau, "La Bibliothèque Slave," *SAINT-GEORGES*, 77-84. As Jesuits had been expelled from France in 1901 the Bibliothèque Slave was moved to Bruxelles, only to return to Paris in 1923; *ibid.*, 79.

15. *Un Newman Russe*, 186-188.

16. On J.J. Strossmayer see A. Suljak, "I meriti di Strossmayer per il culto e lo studio dei SS. Cirillo e Metodio," in: E.G. Farrugia, G.K. Piovesanna and R. Taft (ed.s), *Christianity among the Slavs*, (Pontifical Oriental Institute; Rome 1988) 305-313.

to P. Pierling,¹⁷ and exploited the fresh material which Nicholas Tolstoi, a Catholic priest of the Eastern rite, who had given Soloviev communion on February 18, 1896, when Soloviev pronounced his profession of faith in favour of the Church of Rome,¹⁸ published in 1910. All this makes d'Herbigny's biography readable, and, in spite of lacunae, still somewhat useful. Even then, d'Herbigny offers no in-depth analysis of the text of the profession of faith pronounced by Soloviev.¹⁹ And yet Soloviev's recognition of the Pope as "the supreme judge" is intriguing. The title as such was used without any special reference to the pope for an imperial committee in Byzantium.²⁰ But, could it not be an allusion to the Synod of Serdica,²¹ held in 343-344, and the famous right of appeal to the Pope?²² If so, this would

17. *Un Newman russe*, 221-222

18. *Un Newman russe*, 314-315

19. *Un Newman russe*, 260.

20. A. Khazdan explains "universal judges" (*kritai katholikoi*) as follows: "a college of judges, secular and ecclesiastical, which served as a supreme court in the Palaiologan period. In 1296 Andronikos II created a tribunal of 12 members consisting of ecclesiastics and senators; its decisions could not be appealed. In 1329 Andronikos III replaced this tribunal with the college of four judges called *kritai katholikai*; one of them was supposed to be a bishop;" A. Khazdan, "Kritai 'katholikoi,'" in A. Khazdan (ed. in chief), *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium* II, (Oxford 1991) 1158; P. Lemerle, "Le juge général des Grecs et le réforme judiciaire d'Andronic III," in: AAVV, *Mémorial Louis Petit*, (Bucharest 1948) 292-316.

21. It is interesting to note that Soloviev, in his *Rußland und die universelle Kirche* speaks at length of the Council of Chalcedon, but nowhere mentions the Council of Serdica; see "Das Konzil von Chalkedon. Folgerungen aus dem Zweiten Buch," *WW*, II, (1954) pp. 319-324. For the original of this work which Soloviev wrote in French see idem, "Le Russie et l'Église universelle," in: *Vladimir Soloviev, La Sophia et les autres écrits français*, (édités et présentés par F. Rouleau (SJ) (La Cité - L'Age d'Homme; Lausanne 1978) 235-239.

22. Leslie W. Bernard, *The council of Serdica 343 AD*, (Synodal Publishing House; Sofia 1983) 97-118. See, however, the three theses of the second book of *La Russie et l'Église Universelle*, pp. 194. 208. 214, which d'Herbigny summarizes in the following way: '1. La primauté de Pierre comme institution permanente;" *Un Newman russe*, 267; "2. Le magistère irréformable de Pierre;" *ibid.*, 268; and "3. L'assistance divine pour que ce magistère soit infaillible;" *ibid.* However, one needs only make a comparison with Soloviev's original text to see the difference. Thus, Soloviev argues by examining the procedure of the early Church councils, Ephesus, Chalcedon, and what not, therefore in a historical way, before he reaches conclusions; see "La Russie et l'Église russe", in F. Rouleau, *La Sophia*, 235-239. D'Herbigny, on the contrary, not only does not analyse critically these interpretations by Soloviev, but he does not even mention them. And yet, Soloviev's position is thoroughly open to criticism of monophysites, he nowhere mentions the role of Basil of Seleucia (+c. 459) in the formulation of the dyophysite formula of Chalcedon, but gives all the credit to Leo; *ibid.*, 236. For the results of modern research, see A. de Halleux, "Le concile de Chalcédoine,"

nuance the import of Soloviev's creed: with an eye to the spontaneous union of faith in early patristic times. Soloviev would be offering an ecumenical formula which might become once more at the centre of modern-day ecumenism.

A careful look at the structure of d'Herbigny's book shows that its main divisions are conceived of in terms of the various chores Soloviev was supposed to perform, from the time he was in formation (chapter 3),²³ to his duties as university professor (chapter 4),²⁴ as a writer (chapter 5),²⁵ as a philosopher (chapters 6: a. the logician²⁶ and 7:b. the moralist²⁷), and as a theologian (chapters 8: beginnings,²⁸ 9: evolution²⁹ and 10: conclusions³⁰), with a last chapter on the ascete³¹ to round off Soloviev's image and draws some conclusions about his spirituality.³² Now, it is true that these divisions follow largely chronological lines, but the very absence of a more methodic periodization hinders d'Herbigny somewhat from being able to perceive changes, dovetailing of interests and certain recurrent patterns in Soloviev's life. Instead, he takes everything as if it were one big lump, a life without development, linear or otherwise. For example, he dismisses shifts of emphasis in his position on Church union merely as "a tactic" due to censorship,³³ without bringing this in line

Patrologie et oecuménisme, (Leuven (Belgium) 1990) 467-470; G. A. Martzelou, "The Contribution of Basil of Seleucia to the Formation of Christological Dogma," *Orthodox Dogma and Theological Problematics* (Modern Greek), (Ek. P. Pournara-Thessaloniki 1993) 155-218.

23. *Un Newman russe*, 32-58.

24. *Ibid.*, 59-87

25. *Ibid.*, 88-103.

26. *Ibid.*, 104-130

27. *Ibid.*, 131-155

28. *Ibid.*, 156-193

29. *Ibid.*, 194-220

30. *Ibid.*, 221-284

31. *Ibid.*, 285-334.

32. The same lines of interpretation appear in d'Herbigny's "Lettre adressée au traducteur," published in *Les fondements spirituels de la Vie*, (Casterman; Tournai-Paris 1930) 7-11. On p. 8 Soloviev is described as "ce Russe extraordinaire, qui, avant même d'être devenu catholique, rappelle souvent Joseph de Maistre."

33. *Un Newman Russe*, 275: "La réserve des derniers ouvrages de Soloviev ne signifie donc aucunement que ses convictions aient changé. Il modifiait seulement sa tactique."

with other major shifts in Soloviev's last period. Thus, after the failure of the dream of Church union, Soloviev turned more and more to philosophy and, in his final phase, to an apocalyptic worldview,³⁴ and this reflects itself in the final setup of his system.³⁵

Even then, besides the absence of a clear periodisation, the data culled by d'Herbigny are somewhat selective. Thus, we hear of a vow of chastity, but we hear nothing of Soloviev's having been several times close to marriage.³⁶ One cannot help thinking that all was grist for d'Herbigny's mill: whatever did not fit into the preconceived picture of Soloviev, greatest Russian philosopher, a convert to Catholicism and a holy man,³⁷ was simply ignored, an impression which is all the more strengthened when it comes to d'Herbigny's additions to his sixth edition, which shows how little he had learnt from what scholarship had brought to light in the meantime.³⁸

(b) *Soloviev's "conversion" to Catholicism.* This part of d'Herbigny's work is perhaps the most debatable. The apologetic horizon of the time has come to dominate.

34. On the apocalyptic meaning of *Drei Gespräche* see the notes supplied by the editors WW, vol. VIII, pp. 586-587: 1. The Historical process cannot overcome evil. 2. If the apocalyptic dimension means that God intervenes into History's mess, this in itself goes to show that the ways of history do not lead directly to the kingdom of God. 3. It is not only impossible to overcome all evil, but this may even have a more primordial force than the good, something symbolised by Christ's being overwhelmed on the Cross. - All these elements are not simply a change of tactic on the part of Soloviev, but also a substantial change of position.

35. There is much in favour of the argument that Soloviev's *Three Talks on War, Progress and the End of World History. With an Appendix on the Antichrist* (1899-1900) represent a kind of "retractationes;" see "Vorwort," in WW, VIII, 117-128, especially p. 128: "Wird mir noch Zeit für neue Arbeiten geschenkt, so auch für die Vervollkommenung der früheren."

36. TRETJAKEWITSCH, 36. 38; thus L. Wenzler, *Die Freiheit und das Böse nach Vladimir Soloviev*, (Freiburg i. Br./München 1978) 369, speaks of the deep love Soloviev felt for Katja Romanova, his cousin, with whom he carried on a correspondence (1871-1873). See Serge M. Solowiew, *Vie de Wladimir Solowiew par son neveu*. Preface, notes et traduction de J. Rupp, (Paris 1982) 76-89.

37. D'Herbigny describes him as "le plus grand penseur de la Russie," *Un Newman russe*, I, and quotes approvingly L.M. Lopatin's judgement of Soloviev as "le plus grand philosophe de l'Europe au dernier quart du dix-neuvième siècle, le plus original, et le créateur du premier système véritablement russe" *Ibid.*, 57; and the description of Soloviev which Mgr Strossmayer sent to Cardinal Vannutelli: "Soloviev anima candida, pia ac vere sancta est;" *ibid.*, 286.

38. *Un Newman russe*, i-iv.

One needs only reflect on a point of d'Herbigny's procedure, all the more outstanding because he must have been familiar with it at close quarters. Nowhere does he draw comparisons with other converts, neither from such among the *intelligentsia* of the Russian diaspora who returned to the Orthodox Church³⁹ such as S. Bulgakov⁴⁰ and P. Florenskij,⁴¹ nor among those Russians who became Catholics.

The case of Ivan Kologrivov (1891-1955) is particularly embarrassing, since he not only became a Jesuit,⁴² in 1921, shortly after his conversion, but was also to become, in 1947, the first holder of the chair of Russian spirituality at the Pontifical Oriental Institute.⁴³ Precisely the comparison with Kologrivov would have helped d'Herbigny to see the difference. Soloviev wanted, in his awareness of being a Catholic as a member of the universal Church, to retain at all costs the Slavic rite, whereas Kologrivov adamantly refused to ask to celebrate in the Slavic rite, since he believed in the isomorphism of Eastern and Western spiritual realities, namely the saints (*sancti*) and the rites (*sancta*).⁴⁴ Soloviev was eager to retain his culture, because precisely that would be a betrayal of his beliefs, Kologrivov was eager to show that what he did in Rome was exactly the same as if he still were in Russia.

39. Depicted so vividly in N. Zernov, *The Russian Religious Renaissance of the Twentieth Century*, (Harper & Row; N. York and Evanston 1963).

40. One need only peruse S. Bulgakov's *The Holy Apostles Peter and Paul: Two leading Apostles* (Russian), (Paris 1926) to persuade oneself of what a revulsion Bulgakov had for d'Herbigny's apologetical approach; *ibid.*, 6. 8. 11. 22-23. 29. 31-34. 36. 46. (where Bulgakov challenges d'Herbigny's interpretation of Soloviev; see also pp. 86-87. 73. 84. 85. However, Bulgakov and others have insufficiently appreciated the fact that, through his recurrent appeal to Scriptures and the Fathers, besides Russian authors, d'Herbigny's ecclesiology, though unitist in inspiration, i.e. operating on the basis of the wayward's return to the fold of Peter, represented something new for the theology of his day; see E.G. Farrugia, SJ, "La dogmatica al Pontificio Istituto Orientale," in R.F. Taft SJ and J.L. Dugan (ed. s), *Il 75° anniversario del Pontificio Istituto Orientale*, (PIO; Roma 1994) 100.

41. D'Herbigny's inadequate appreciation of F. M. Dostoevskij prevented him from gaining access to the important strand of Russian thinking represented by S. Bulgakov and P. Florenskij: see TRETJAKEWITCH, 180. 181.

42. Kologrivov had been received in the Catholic Church already in 1918.

43. I. Kologrivov, *Santi russi*, (La Casa di Matrona; Milano 1977) 467-469.

44. *Un Newman russe*, 312-314. On I. Kologrivov see D. Kets' doctoral thesis, *Ivan Kologrivov S.J. Témoin du Verbe incarné et de la Sainte Russie*, (Pontificio Istituto Orientale; Roma 1994) (not yet published).

And this brings us to the whole delicate issue of Soloviev's conversion. H. Falk is quite right when he denies that Soloviev believe in a kind of "überkonfessionelle Kirche".⁴⁵ This would be tantamount to a Church without clear doctrinal contours, what K. Rahner has pillorized as "dritte Konfession."⁴⁶ But to call Soloviev's move "conversion to Catholicism" (in this Falk agrees with d'Herbigny)⁴⁷ is to do some violence to the facts. What Soloviev believed was, on the contrary, that, since the schism between Rome and Russia had never been consummated, he could, in good conscience as an Orthodox, also consider himself united with the Church of Rome.⁴⁸ As the wording of Soloviev's confession says, he, as an Orthodox, sees no difficulty in recognising the authority of the Pope. That is to say, d'Herbigny made that heavy weather out of Soloviev's conversion which F. Coplestone has expressly condemned.⁴⁹

The comparison with J.H. Newman (1801-90) limps completely.⁵⁰ Newman

45. H. Falk, "Wladimir Solowjews Stellung zur katholischen Kirche," *Stimmen der Zeit* 74 (1949) 435.
46. K. Rahner, "Dritte Konfession?", *Schriften zur Theologie* XII, (Benzinger; Einsiedeln 1975) 568-581. Rahner defines it this way: "Menschen, die in ihrem christlichen Bewußtsein, in Lebensstil und Selbstinterpretation kaum Unterschiede erkennen lassen und die auch gar nicht voneinander unterscheiden wollen trotz ihrer religionsgeschichtlich, 'standesamtlich' verschiedener Zugehörigkeit zu dieser oder jener Konfessionskirche;" *ibid.*, 571. Whereas for Soloviev, "(c) C'est le sens de l'Église indivise qui est retrouvé: sens plénier de l'orthodoxie et du catholicisme," F. Rouleau, "Vladimir Soloviev," *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité*, 14 pp.1026, 1027.
47. With reference to *Un Newman russe*, Falk, in "Wladimir Solowjews Stellung zur katholischen Kirche," p. 430 sums up the circumstances of death as follows with regards to a document of which N.A. Tolstoi was one of the signatories: "Unfortunately, we possess no detailed account, but it may be taken as certain that reception of the sacraments was included in it, especially those foreseen for the moment of death" (translation my own). One must add, however, that Falk's own presentation is somewhat vitiated by the apologetic trend at the time he wrote.
48. This transpires clearly from the credo Soloviev pronounced for the occasion. See, besides, Serge M. Soloviev, *Vie de Wladimir Soloviev par son neveu*, 383-394, especially pp. 388-389.
49. F. Copleston, *Philosophy in Russia* I, (Search Press, University of Notre Dame; Notre Dame, Indiana 1986) 209-210.
50. In his *Message ecclésial de Soloviev: Présage et illustration de Vatican II*, (Lethielleux; Paris 1974) 110, Mgr J. Rupp says: "Nous ne consacrerons pas un paragraphe spécial à Mgr Michel d'Herbigny parce que nous l'avons appelé au secours plusieurs fois dans le corps de notre exposé. Il le mériterait cependant car son livre de 1911 réédité chez Beauchesne (Paris) en 1934 est un petit chef-d'oeuvre dont je regrette seulement le titre (*Un Newman russe*). Il y a un abîme entre ces deux hommes de génie."

had become convinced that the Anglican Church, like the monophysites of Chalcedon (451), had chosen *the middle way* between Rome and the followers of Eutyches, whose position corresponded to that of the Protestants, whereas Rome remained where it always was, and that, consequently, the *via media*, backbone of the apologetics of the Anglican Church, was untenable. So he decided to leave his Church and become a Catholic.⁵¹ One could not, in the same breath, accept Chalcedon and reject Trent. At the same time, this move implied the complete rejection of the three-branch theory of Christianity (Anglicanism, Catholicism and Orthodoxy) as exposed by the Oxford Movement.⁵²

(c) *Soloviev's thought*. Again, d'Herbigny gives a one-sided interpretation of Soloviev's thought.⁵³ Everything contributes to the one theme of conversion, or rather, of having become a Catholic, understood in the unilateral way just described. That d'Herbigny's summation of Soloviev's shifting of accents at the end as a change of tactics, not of convictions⁵⁴ is inadequate may be gathered from the fact that Soloviev seems to be living *diesseits des Guten und des Bösen*, i.e., has abandoned utopia for a more realistic appraisal of Church reality. This is heartily ignored, because it would have entailed a painful reinterpretation of d'Herbigny's main thesis.

It would be hard, in this compact space, to do justice to Soloviev's thought. So we may resort to a favourite and wise stratagem of Eastern theology: apophaticism, i.e. negative theology, and try to delineate what Soloviev's thought is not. For all its vaunted attempt at synthesis, in itself something highly laudable, Soloviev did

51. J.H. Newman, *Apologia pro vita ipsius*, chapter 3; H. Fries, "Die Dogmengeschichte des 5. Jahrhunderts und J. H. Newman," *Das Konzil von Chalkedon III*, (Echter; Würzburg 1954) 428-429; O. Karrer, "Newmans Weg in die Kirche und sein Weg in der Kirche," J. Daniélou u. H. Vorgrimler (eds), *Sentire ecclesiam*, (Herder; Freiburg i. Br. 1961) especially pp. 704-717.

52. See O. Chadwick, *From Bossuet to Newman: The Idea of Doctrinal Development*, (University Press; Cambridge 1957); A. Nichols, *From Newman to Congar: The idea of Doctrinal Development from the Victorians to the Second Vatican Council*, (T&T Clark; Edinburgh 1990) 17-70.

53. For example, there is no mention, in the part on Soloviev's life, of the three visions he claimed to have had of Sophia, *Un Newman russe*, 66-70, and scarcely any discussion of his so important sophiology as such, *ibid.*, 113. 116, not even, in the context where he speaks of Mary, the Mother of God, *ibid.*, 147. 202-203, although much more recently H.U.v. Balthasar could still raise the question whether Soloviev's visions were not actually visions of Our Lady; H.U.v. Balthasar "Solowjew," *Herrlichkeit* 2, (Johannes; Einsiedeln 1962) 659.

54. *Un Newman russe*, 275-276.

not succeed except very partially, and he knew it. For example, his aesthetics, which was meant to cap the whole system, actually remained unfinished if not in some golden fragments such as "Art in Nature".⁵⁵ The disappointment which characterized the last period of his life came from precisely this source. His reverting to a more apocalyptic vision was initially occasioned by his clash with K. Leontiev,⁵⁶ but it went far deeper. Paradoxically, it led Soloviev to abandon that cavalier *Fortschrittsglaube* which had led to the clash in the first place. Whatever his thought amounts to, it is so much characterized by the tension between apocalyptic thought and *Fortschrittsglaube* in a would-be synthesis, that no Soloviev study could do justice to him unless it considers this point. All this, however, is lost on d'Herbigny, who seems to be pointing to the culmination in Soloviev the ascete.

Most of all, however, hardly a word falls about Newman's theology,⁵⁷ although precisely here the comparison would have been interesting and revelatory. Even if the first chapter is entitled "Newman et Soloviev: Contrastes et analogies",⁵⁸ everything rotates on the one theme of conversion, except for such differences as that Newman was a churchman whereas Soloviev a layman. Otherwise, no comparison is made between the different epistemologies, intuition in Soloviev⁵⁹ and illative sense in Newman,⁶⁰ the different approaches to Church Fathers, their various appraisals of councils, the different ways they approached their respective

55. In WW, VII we find "Schönheit als Offenbarung der All-Einheit," pp. 117-189. I: "Die Schönheit in der Natur," pp. 119-167, and "Der allgemeine Sinn der Kunst," pp. 168-169.

56. I. v Kologrivov, *Vom Hellas zum Mönchtum: Leben und Denken Konstantin Leontjews (1831-1891)*, (Regensburg 1948) 284-286, Cf *Un Newman Russe*, 168-169.

57. See *ibid.*, 170. 182 and 305.

58. *Ibid.*, 1-9

59. "...in the *Philosophical Principles* ...under the obvious influence of Schelling (and his doctrine of 'intellektuelle Anschauung'), Solovyov still holds that 'ideal intuition' - direct 'intuition of an idea'. 'more precisely, direct intuition of the Absolute in its 'essence' - is real and accessible to all men. It appears that what is 'given to this 'ideal intuition' comprises the 'true primary form of integral knowledge:'" V.V. Zenkovsky, *A History of Russian Philosophy*, II, (Columbia University Press; New York 1967) 489-490.

60. With "Illative sense" Newman does not mean some special faculty, but rather its normal use in matters which call for personal commitment. It thus corresponds to a *real* rather than a *notional*, or purely conceptual, assent.

Churches. There is no discussion of the manner of Newman's conversion and the content of Newman's theology, history and what not, although the comparison of Soloviev with Newman in the title awakened precisely such expectations.

2. D'Herbigny's interpretation as a temptation

The kind of temptation Soloviev presents to his would-be interpreters can perhaps be best gauged if we try to work our way back from d'Herbigny to Soloviev following the three criteria of Soloviev's life, conversion and works.

(a) For somebody whose life was an endless search for truth, it is very easy to leap the process of reaching the conclusions for the sake of the conclusions alone, or at least shorten the distance, as if the labyrinthian ways of soul-searching follows the same route as the crow flies. It is exactly what d'Herbigny does. His underlying assumption seems to be: Soloviev is a Catholic and he should be exploited to the hilt for his immense apologetical potential. Actually, this interpretation falls in line with the kind of monism typical of not a few interpreters of Soloviev. But the monism which besets as a temptation whoever tries to reconstruct his life is to ignore the valuable information that developments, reverses, hesitations, afford. Did not Soloviev say that much of God's plan in the world is carried out also by the evil?⁶¹ Precisely counter-movements on the part of Soloviev are completely absent in d'Herbigny's interpretation.

(b) With regard to his "conversion," if this word is not the right word, what would be right word? It is hard to say. However, we may call it an attempt at synthesis, at personal synthesis in view of the good of the whole. One must actually add a word of caution: synthesis is perhaps too neutral a word. We think that the many values of this change can be grasped only by the word "integration", because the conversion in question was an attempt at unity at various levels, including the search for good and for truth at a personal level. Indeed, the best way to put it is to say that Soloviev felt a member of the universal Church, and it was this awareness that put together his search for truth, good and beauty.

(c) Finally, the works of Soloviev suggest that his attempt at intellectual and

61. See "Kurze Erzählung vom Antichrist," WW, VIII, 285-294.

personal synthesis must be described by the word "plurality".⁶² Not to respect this plurality of pursued but not fully achieved synthesis, cognate, on an intellectual level to moral concupiscence or lack of integration in the one human being, is to succumb to a monism of sorts.

a. The first monism is of a *philosophical* kind. It consists in reducing Soloviev to one line of thought, while forgetting V.V. Zenkonvsky's structures, especially those regarding the several roots and influences of his system. No concern is shown, in this monism, as to growth and changes, various periods in Soloviev's life, various influences. Soloviev's "Russian idea" is to be contextualised in the one period in which it was written, though it may be profitably read from the viewpoint of the other periods as well.

b. The second monism is of a *theological* kind. It consists in reducing Soloviev to a *single theological hermeneutics*, thereby implying that the object of his interpretation was univocal. Not much concern is showed here as to styles, literary genres and differentiated problematics in the theological realm.

c. The third monism is *religious*: it forgets to see that tension is the resultant of an insufficiently harmonised system, and thus takes away from Soloviev the inherent tension between the progress he sees history striving after and the apocalyptically interpreted end of the world. Not much concern with the dialectic of utilitarian progress and non-utilitarian apocalyptic; one need only remember that a work of art is defined as that which anticipates the end.⁶³

Now this brings us to the problem of interpreting Soloviev. Would he not have manifested this healthy pluralism in his conversion?

With Hans Urs von Balthasar I agree that it is the tension between the aesthetical and the apocalyptical aspects in Soloviev which make up the fascination and the

62. It is true that Soloviev repudiated metaphysical pluralism (see V.V. Zenkonvsky, *A History of Russian Philosophy* II, p. 512), but, as the same historian emphasizes, Soloviev's thought cannot be reduced to one root. To borrow S. Bulgakov's well-known saying, "Solovjov's philosophy is the most full-sounding chord..." For an evaluation of Zenkonvsky's book see J. Rupp, *Message ecclésial de Soloviev*, 11-113.

63. See my review of M. Tenace, *La Beauté, Unité spirituelle dans les écrits esthétiques de Vladimir Soloviev* (Fates; Troyes, France 1993) in *OCP* 59 (1993) 591-593.

central logic of the system. Given the unresolved systematic plurality, whose resultant is tension, the temptation to reductionism is great.⁶⁴

3. Conclusion: The Comparison with Newman re-proposed

The criticism we have offered of d'Herbigny's interpretation of Soloviev may seem to be too hard. Of course, one cannot ignore the fact that he was a pioneer, and that in this sense it was no mean achievement to have stimulated a discussion and thus paved the way for others. One can rather blame him, with greater objectivity, for having failed to learn, in his later editions, when his thesis had already been shown to falsify somewhat the state of affairs regarding Soloviev's conversion.⁶⁵ But, even in this criticism, one should not ignore the apologetic times in which he lived, and that this forced him into a model which might not have been his had the times been more auspicious for ecumenism, at least within the Catholic Church.

In my opinion, however, d'Herbigny failed to exploit a possible point of comparison, which, though mistaken under the terms in which he proposed it, could prove fruitful for a better understanding of East-West correspondences. It is remarkable, for instance, that d'Herbigny nowhere discusses, in his two-volume ecclesiology, Newman's grammar of assent, both notional and real; indeed, he barely mentions Newman at all. Actually, the comparison of the thought of both authors, Newman and Soloviev, would perhaps help us understand better not only both thinkers, but also the epistemological process of faith assent, and this in terms of that integrity and fullness which so much tantalised Soloviev, without his being able to reach it. A comparison-contrast between Newman and Soloviev could thus be re-proposed with regard to their ways of ordering a plurality of views within a single integrated vision of Christianity.

64. In the study to which we have already referred (*Herrlichkeit* II, 540-615, H.U.v. Balthasar has given us an unusually perceptive account of Soloviev's thought from the viewpoint of theological aesthetics, that is to say, from a theology of divine beauty, or rather splendor, which takes its cue from revelation.

65. For favourable and more critical reviews of d'Herbigny's book see TRETJAKEWITSCH, 37. According to the last mentioned author, "(a)s late as 1921, d'Herbigny saw the problem only in terms of the doubtful antithesis 'Catholic or Orthodox?' and was unable to perceive Soloviev's very original third way, his claim to be a 'Catholic-Orthodox' member of the Universal Church," TRETJAKEWITSCH, 39.

Yet the very possibility of such a comparison-contrast depends heavily on our own view of unity and plurality. To those to whom it may seem unfeasible to understand a philosopher from the outside it may be added that Russia's philosophy has borrowed so much from the West that it would be thoroughly in style to compare an Eastern and a Western thinker. Eastern thinking emphasizes that man is a person, not merely an individual; that he lives in relating, not in isolating himself. Certainly, this lesson could be drawn from Soloviev's writing, without forgetting that the borrowing goes both ways. If this is the case, then purist attempts to identify Russian thinking with "pure non-foreign Slavic elements" is doomed from its inception. When humanity shall have grown up more, as a whole, to appreciate interdependence as being more congenial to the integrative view of the person rather than to the isolated qualities of the individual, then people will rejoice that there was so much commerce between East and West in Russian thinkers, and that precisely this formed an inalienable part of their identity, much to their credit. Of this the universal thinker Soloviev was, and whose universality d'Herbigny failed to appreciate completely, sacrificing it to a somewhat parochial catholicity, is a case in point.

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ERRATA CORRIGE

For E. G. Farrugia S.J. "*D'Herbigny's Soloviev*" (1996 no1)

1. On p.61, footnote 10: D'Herbigny was president of the Pontifical Oriental Institute, which at the time had its premises at the Pontifical Biblical Institute Rome, until 1926, when he became rector of the Jesuit community but retained the title of president of the Institute. In the 1964 **Catalogus Domorum Romanorum Interprovincialium Societatis Iesu** (ineunte anno MCMLXIV) the latter title becomes that of rector of the Institute.

2. p.60, footnote 2: Soloviev's example served as model (NOT: example)
3. p.60, footnote 3: history of the Institute: ADD: of the Pontifical Oriental Institute
4. p.62, footnote 12: NOT: Scultze, Sj; BUT: Schultze, SJ
5. p.62, footnote 13: "Wladimir ... katholischen..."
6. p.63, footnote 21: présentés
7. p.63, footnote 22: part of the sentence is left out: (...open to criticism), at least from the viewpoint of recent research: in his criticism (of monophysites ...)
8. p.64, line 2: comma, instead of fullstop
9. p.64, Patrologie: instead of: Patrilogie
10. p.65, footnote 34: historical & history (lower case)
11. p.65, footnote 37: véritablement (NOT: véritablenet)
12. p.65, line 2: believed (NOT: believe)
13. p.65, footnote 49: Philosophy (NOT: Philosphy)
14. p.69, footnote 56: Friedrich Pustet ((= Verlag))
15. p.70, line 10: labyrinthine (NOT: labyrinthian)
16. p.69, line 21: (be) the (right word) (ADD: the)
17. p.72: Zenkovsky, NOT: Zenkonvsky ((thrice))
18. p.72, line 18: (Not much concern) is shown for (the dialectic... ((instead of: with)
19. p.72, line 21: interpreting, NOT: intepreting
20. p.72, line 6. (...was) a (no mean achievement): ADD: a
21. p.72, footnote 64: close bracket: 615)

• Please note that no 2 of 1996 was Vol XLVII and NOT Vol XLVIII as indicated.

ANNOUNCING THE GOSPEL IN EUROPE FACING THE CHALLENGES OF CULTURAL CHANGES AND RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC DIVISIONS

Hervé Legrand OP

I. Relaunching the Evangelization of the European Continent, an initiative of John Paul II in his meeting with the Bishops of Europe

1.1 A phrase of John Paul II, explained by himself.

“The evangelization of the European continent” is a phrase first used by John Paul II at the IVth symposium of European bishops in Rome in 1979.

He had just chaired the plenary assembly of the Latin American Bishops' Council in Puebla. The theme of this assembly was “the evangelization of Latin America, today and tomorrow.” When John Paul II addressed the CCEE, which is the European equivalent of the CELAM, although in a far less structured manner - it was natural that he drew the bishops' attention to the “evangelization of the European continent.” This relaunching was to turn out to be one of the great design's of his pontificate. Afterwards, John Paul II also spoke of the new evangelization, or even of re-evangelization. In these words, especially in the term “re-evangelization”, a pejorative judgement of the recent style of the evangelization of the Catholic Church, or even of other Churches, was sometimes perceived. In fact, the word re-evangelization” is very rarely used by John Paul II, who essentially envisages a “new quality of evangelization”, new in its capacity to reformulate the message of salvation for our contemporaries.

It is thus worthwhile to take very precise note of the exact terms with which the Pope envisages the evangelization of Europe the first time he speaks of it to the representatives of the bishops of this continent. He emphasized four essential points

which constitute a sort of charter of the way in which he himself and the bishops of Europe have viewed evangelization till now.

These four essential points are the following: in the spirit of Vatican II, he reminds bishops that collegiality implies responsibility, born in common, towards evangelization. Evangelization requires analyses, and must be conducted within the framework of ecumenical cooperation. And lastly, evangelization must look towards the future. Let us take a closer look at that with the terms used by John Paul II.

1.2 The collegiality of bishops is a responsibility for evangelization

"It is not only each bishop in his diocese, but it is also the different communities of bishops and especially the national conferences of bishops who can and must make the key theme (evangelization) a subject of reflection about the society toward which they have the pastoral responsibilities of evangelization."

In fact, the first symposium that was to follow, in 1982, was devoted to "the collegial responsibility of bishops and episcopal conferences of Europe in the evangelization of the continent." This first step proved to be decisive for the organic development of the reflection of the CCEE concerning the ongoing evangelization of the decade to come.

1.3 An appeal to analyse situations in view of the complexity of the task

"I consider," says John Paul II again, "this theme to be complex, extremely complex... We must draw the vision of the future from the analysis of the present situation... This analysis must include every country, every nation of our continent... and must take into account each one of their situations."

This papal invitation to analyse the complexities of Europe had an impact on the 1985 symposium, at which a critical approach of the phenomenon of secularization preceded theological statements. In the same way, at the 1989 symposium a constant coming-and-going was established between the analysis of the growing medicalization of life and death in Europe and the practises of evangelization of these decisive stages in people's lives.

1.4 Evangelization must be linked to ecumenical cooperation

“I think that at present, at the time of ecumenism,” adds John Paul II again, “the moment has come to look at these questions in the light of criteria elaborated by the Council in a spirit of fraternal cooperation with the representatives of the Church and communities with whom we are not in full unity.”

This desire to link evangelization to ecumenical cooperation, expressed by John Paul II, is very largely implemented in the repeated meetings between the CCEE and the KEK (which means Konferenz Europäischer Kirchen). This sister organization brings together all the Christian churches of Europe, Protestant and Orthodox. You all remember that the meeting at Basel in May 1989 was a great success: justice, peace and the safeguarding of creation. You will also have some echoes of the meeting at Santiago de Compostela in November, 1991, which provided the opportunity for a public and open dialogue, in particular between the representatives of the Pontifical Council for promoting Christian unity and those of the Russian Orthodox Church, although the Russian Orthodox Church did not accept the invitation of John Paul II to the special synod on Europe.

1.9 Evangelization must turn the Church toward the future

“Our mission,” says John Paul II on the same occasion, “is always and everywhere turned toward the future: both toward the eschatological future, the future of which we are certain in our faith, and the future of which we cannot be humanly certain”.

This emphasis placed on the future in evangelization clearly shows that this outlook does not aim at restoration, characterized by nostalgia for an idealized European past. To be sure, the Pope frequently appeals to the Christian memory of the continent, but this is in order to move forward today.

II. How do the Catholic Bishops of Europe, meeting together on the continental level, view the evangelization of Europe?

The 1982 symposium

When the Catholic bishops reflected together at their 1982 symposium on their responsibility in the evangelization of Europe, for the first time in a formal manner,

they chose the vocabulary of John Paul II. But what did they mean by continent? In their eyes, who is to revive the evangelization? The answer to all these questions will undoubtedly be enlightening about the evangelizing activity of the Catholic Church in today's Europe.

2.1 Why insist on speaking in terms of a continent?

A word like "continent" can easily be misunderstood. Let us suppose that a reader with no historical education comes across it in twenty years. He might understand that in the 1980s, the Catholic Church, which is a minority relation in Europe (we represent only 47% of all persons baptized on this continent), and geographically limited to certain regions, had set on a religious reconquest of Europe!

In the texts themselves there is not trace of such a desire for reconquest. "Continent" should not be understood here in its territorial sense (in which case it would be absurd for English-speaking people!), but it is rather the political situation of the Europe of that time that led to choosing the term. He is thus the carrier of a twofold message:

- the Catholic bishops thus say clearly that they do not intend to limit their reflection to the Europe in the process of uniting, that of the Europe of Nine at that time which was soon to become the Europe of Twelve, and of fifteen today.

- at the same time, the Catholic bishops take an ethical position: they refuse, already on the level of language, the inhuman division imposed on Europe by violence and terror. Two other expressions, "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" or "the Europe of the West and the East," which we also encounter in the vocabulary of the CCEE, have exactly the same ethical function, as the frequent references to the Helsinki agreements show.

2.2 Who is to receive evangelization?

Who are the groups and people of this continent who are to receive evangelisation? As Cardinal B. Hume says, "the local Churches and the episcopal conferences have the responsibility to bring the Gospel of Jesus Christ to their own peoples. By "their own peoples" the cardinal deliberately designates the secularized and non-

practising population. He adds that in the latter case that it will be “less an initial proclamation of the Gospel, which is necessary, than a very vigorous catechizing, so radical and so steady that we could call it permanent evangelization.” But there is the need to evangelize in the strict sense of “those who practice non-Christian religions, who are atheists or agnostic humanists”.

In all that, as Cardinal F. König (Vienna) emphasizes, “we must not begin by the evangelization of institutions, but rather of people.” By “evangelization of Europe” we should understand that of Europeans. Such precision is not useless when suspicions still remain about the political Catholicism of yesterday, which sought to place the power of the State in the service of Christians faith and mores.

2.3 The acceptance of a religiously and culturally pluralist Europe

In three reports of cardinals Hume, König and Etchegaray at the 1982 symposium, we find no nostalgia for a Christian Europe, which formerly possessed an ideal unity to which we should return. On the contrary, Cardinal R. Etchegaray refuses to:

“Be too quick to say that what makes Europe are its Christian roots... We cannot annex the spiritual destiny of Europe, but we have to respect its original and present complexity... At the sources, we find the three great Jewish, Hellenistic and Roman currents, symbolized by... Jerusalem, Athens and Rome. We must not forget... the great tears in the seamless tunic: Constantinople, Canterbury, Wittenberg, Geneva. We must view Islam with a friendly eye. Many Moslems meet only Christians in Europe (and often very closely) who are often not sufficiently aware of the importance of such contact.”

This acceptance of cultural and religious pluralism is based on the theology of evangelization proposed in the apostolic exhortation of Paul VI, *Evangelii Nuntiandi*, the result of the Roman synod of 1974.

2.4 The theological understanding of evangelization

From the quantitative point of view - and this can also be measured qualitatively - *Evangelii Nuntiandi* is the document which is most often referred to in the CCEE, far more than any other document of Paul VI, John Paul II, or of Vatican II itself.

We can say of this document that it was very widely received and that it functions as a privileged theological reference.

Evangelization has as a “base, centre and summit... a clear proclamation that, in Jesus Christ, the Son of God made human being, who died and resurrected, salvation is offered to every man, as a gift of the grace and mercy of God. Not an immanent salvation... but a transcendent, eschatological one, which of course begins in this life, but which is completed in eternity.”

In this perspective, “evangelizing is the grace and vocation specific to the Church, its deepest identity. The Church exists to evangelize.”

But this vocation of the Church to evangelize encounters great difficulties in Europe. We are going to make a survey of those difficulties based on some of the reflections of Catholic bishops on this subject on the European level. In a somewhat technical manner, we will first deal with the global orientation which emerges concerning the evangelization of secularized European societies (III). Then we will look into several specific cases of the evangelization of a Europe that is also characterized by religious, denominational and ethnic tensions (IV), which let us say in passing, show that an authentic secularization of Europe remains debatable.

III. Some approaches concerning the evangelization of the secularized societies of Europe.

The symposia of 1985 and 1989

In the course of the last decade several relatively firm approaches seemed to arise from the reflection of the bishops on the European level. These reflections invite us not to remain satisfied with the diagnosis of secularization concerning these societies. The bishops observed the widening gap between some sectors of the population and the groups of believers and practising persons which themselves have undergone a certain erosion. But the bishops did not confine themselves to an attitude of deploration or denunciation of this situation. They invited us to meet this challenge through the pursuit of an active inculturation of Christian faith and life. This attitude also implies that the evangelizers should pay far greater attention to people's everyday life and believe less that the broad trends in thought rule the world. As concerns the change in mentalities, television, which is part of the everyday world, has much more influence than the works of Nietzsche or Freud!

3.1 *From the diagnosis of secularization to the need for the inculturation of the Gospel, particularly in everyday life.*

3.1.1. *The use of the term “secularization” is often insufficiently critical in Catholic theological and religious circles.*

To interpret the ebb of religion, or of some of its forms or functions in European society since the early 19th century, Catholic pastors often resort to the category of secularization. Following the example of most theologians, whose favourite references are usually philosophical, the pastors usually limit themselves to a global approach to this development. When they speak about it, they do not deal with it as researchers in the social sciences would. These researchers would be careful to establish precisely the multiple and complex causes of this phenomenon, as these causes should be established in order to possibly affect them, be it in the long run. The theologians' concerns are different; they are religious and moral, as is natural. Hence also their desire to make an immediate value judgement on secularization, a rather negative one among Catholics (whether they are of the “left” or the “right”), and rather positive among Protestants. This desire is also the reason for the success in the same circles of the distinction between secularization (which is perhaps acceptable or even good) and secularism (which is certainly bad). However, we must ask whether making a moral judgement about this phenomenon before analyzing it empirically does not further complicate the objective understanding that is appropriate.

However that may be, many of the participants in the VIth symposium of European bishops were probably drawn spontaneously to an interpretation in terms of the metaphysical destiny of a culture. They thus remain dependent in fact on the Enlightenment philosophy which they criticize under other circumstances. The major positive outcome of this symposium was a more empirical and more historical understanding of the relations that are created between religion and society.¹ There is probably no secularization per se, but only various balances resulting from

1. It is interesting to note that the current sociology of Catholicism has clearly shown that explanations based on external factors - economic, demographic, geographical - are unsatisfactory. “The most influential factor is to be sought in the history of pastoral activity,” D. Hervieu-Léger, *Toward a new Christianity?* (Le Cerf; Paris 1986) 52.

complex social compromises which always involve the initiatives, communication and transaction capacities of the various partners. So this involves the responsibility of the participants, which excludes an interpretation in terms of destiny or an outside plot, although there have actually been political plans to eradicate religion, like those carried out by communists.

3.1.2 In the social sciences, the term "secularization" is very vague.

If this is the case, the concept of secularization, which is too quickly considered as clear ("one of the main obstacles to evangelization"), does not constitute a tool for rigorously analyzing the relationship between a religion and the surrounding society. In fact, most researchers in the social sciences agree in deploring the many meanings simultaneously given to this term in the various European linguistic environments.

In the French-speaking zone, F.A. Isambert writes in the *Encyclopedia Universalis*: "The vicissitudes of the word "secularization", so often used nowadays in discussions about religion, the coming and going of this word between French, English and German, have succeeded in inflicting a polysemy upon it... resulting from oppositions, exclusions and doctrinal distortion". The term is no clearer in English than in French, especially since the fashion theologies of secularization of American origin. It is revealing that the international programme of "conceptualization and measurability", adopted at the symposium of Rome in 1969, organized jointly by the Secretariat for non-believers and the University of California, never materialized.² In the German-speaking world, M. Heckel also observes a widespread conceptual vagueness: "Since the beginning of the 19th century, the notion of "secularization" has been broadened and has become a fashionable word after a sort of semantic explosion: it has multiple and elusive facets due to fallaciously appealing connotations... The term 'secularization' has

2. See Ch. Y. Glock, "Lo studio delle noncredenze: orientamenti per la ricerca" in R. Caporale & A. Grumelli, *Religione e ateismo nelle società secolarizzate*, (Il Mulino; Bologna, 1972) 129-159. The proceedings of the same symposium were published in English the previous year under a slightly different title, *The Culture of Unbelief* (The University Press of California; Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1971) - As soon as review of this book was published, a reviewer, J.P. Deconchy expressed his scepticism about this project: "The scientific' key concept, that of "secularization", is a mythical one' in *Archives des Science Sociales des Religions* 18 (1973) 152

become a widespread cliché in every analysis, every criticism, every cultural policy, based on a very broad and extraordinarily complex meaning.”³

In the same vein, according to an expert from the University of Rome, the term “secolarizzazione” is characterized in Italian, too, by “the ambiguity of terminological adventures.”

I believe that it would be a good idea for pastors and theologians not to use the concept of secularization - which has an extended meaning and therefore lacks precision, as sociologists recognize - instead of the necessary analysis. Indeed, “secularization” is no more rigorous, scientific or operational than other expressions like “contemporary man”, “the modern world”, “Medieval Christianity” or “urban and rural civilization.” So if we do not want to give an answer like the famous one in the Molière comedy, “that is why your daughter is deaf,” we must, for the sake of method, explain secularization by this or that concrete change in society which leads to a given group of Christians to move away from the traditional image of Christian life.

3.2 *Secularization or social change?*

At the 1985 symposium, a consensus was established not to resort to this pseudo-explanation. Cardinal Danneels noted that the terms “secularization” and “secularize” are too ambiguous and imprecise to be used as conceptual keys in a survey of the religious dimension remains very present in European cultures, although it is not very clear whether it is a return or a distortion of the sacred. John Paul II also observes that:

3. M. Heckel, “Säkularisierung. Staatskirchenrechtliche Aspekte einer umstrittenen Kategorie”, in *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stift. f. Rechtsgeschichte K.A.* 97 (1980) 4-5 We may take the following methodological observation: “There is no secularization per se, but a multitude of heterogeneous and divergent secularizing processes, and partly antagonistic ones. In each case they have their own purpose, their own function and especially their own limits which are rarely specified and clearly defined. So the concepts mainly dissolve because of unreflected meanings and analogies” (ibid.)

“a thorough analysis showed the ambiguity, and even the equivocal character of the term, which is so polysemic, imprecise and elastic that it covers multiple and even opposite phenomena.”

The awareness of this ambiguity, like any phenomenon of this type, was not universal, of course. Indeed, we can see that since then a whole Catholic literature continues to denounce secularization, along with “materialism”, “hedonism”, “individualism”, etc. However, many pastors now pay greater attention to everyday life in order to encourage the inculturation of Christian life in Europe. It would be best to show this through two examples that were studied by the bishops themselves.

3.2.1 An initial case study: the growing secularization of women in Europe.

For the sake of method, I will discuss the first survey a bit further. For what reason are a certain number of Catholic women in France and in Northern Europe, as in North America, moving away from the Church? If we are too inclined to believe that ideas rule the world, we will say: it is because of feminism! In reality, this is due to objective factors, mainly non-ideological, like the progress of medicine and women in the work force in post-industrial societies.

Indeed, the progress of medicine has in 50 years made it possible to limit the mortality rate of women giving birth as well as that of infants. Medical progress also makes responsible parenthood possible, as the popes themselves desired. More broadly speaking, it is now enough to have two or three children to be sure to keep them. The average European woman is 32 years old when she puts her last child into kindergarten. Thanks to medicine, she can live till an average age of 80 years and 3 months, if she is French (whereas her husband lives till 73). So how could she not want to work, especially in a post-industrial society where male muscle power no longer plays practically any role? But here we introduce the financial independence of women in their household, the need to share household and child-rearing tasks, the possibility for working women to broaden their social relations beyond their husband. What is the result in the consciousness of women on our societies? Women are going to feel increasingly like partners of men, and not dependent on them. The search for a new social and psychological balance between men and women is therefore linked to the technical development of our societies, and is not due to “feminist ideas”. We can go even further - it is feminism itself that is an effect and not a cause of these developments...

We are thus not dealing with a passing fashion, or just the dissemination of false ideas, although this may turn out to be the case. We are basically facing an important fact: many women increasingly feel like partners of men in their social life. So more and more they are leaving the social and mental universe in which women are defined by men, but not vice-versa to the same degree. In short, they are leaving what is called the androcentric world. That is, the world that places men in the centre instead of viewing really human existence as reciprocity between men and women.

In this situation, the danger of secularization, i.e. of considerable proportions of women moving away from the Church, is great. Especially so if the Church preserves, or even legitimizes, an androcentric discourse and mores, because today's women would not feel recognized. They might even feel like outsiders.

How can this danger of secularization be avoided? Will it be enough to refute possible feminist errors? To deplore, or even to denounce, the secularization of "modern" women? The task will be more difficult and more complex. It will be to return to the heart of the Biblical and evangelical message at the precise point where it makes men and women fully-fledged partners.

Speaking concretely, the answer to secularization in this specific case is based on collective learning. In this process, the transformations experienced in everyday life must be understood. The impact of these changes on language (or even stereotypes) must be analyzed as well as a spirituality, catechesis, ways of functioning and practices marked by a certain stage of culture, which is now archaic for many people. And all of that cannot become a criterion for announcing the Gospel,⁴ according to Saint Paul's warning: "Do not be conformed to this world" (Romans 12,2). The main task of the pastors will be to make the Gospel audible to today's European women, without forcing them, in the name of the Gospel, to live the same mental life as their grandmothers. This requires that pastors be more deeply converted to this message, that they understand it anew and accept or promote the necessary changes.

4. Indeed, European culture does not offer a satisfactory partnership between men and women. The divorce rate is rising. In most European countries, the birth rate does not ensure renewal of generations. There is an alarming rise in non-marriage everywhere: in France, 37% of all persons old enough to be married are not. In Sweden, the figure is 48%. In Paris, one fiscal household out of two consists of a single person.

3.2.2 The second example: contemporary attitudes towards birth and death as challenges to evangelization.

This second example occupied the entire 1989 symposium.

Over the past thirty years, technical and scientific innovations have radically changed the concrete conditions in which human beings are born and die in Europe. And the very conception of life has also changed, albeit at a slower pace, because symbolic representations change more slowly than practices.

Here again it is the progress in medicine far more than ideas that influences the way of seeing the beginning and end of human life. In former times, procreation and the birth of a child depended much more on chance, and parents placed their trust above all in Divine Providence in this matter. Today, with contraception and immense possibilities of biology, a child is "planned". Well before his birth we have pictures of him, we know whether he will be a boy or a girl, and he is born in a medical environment, far from the family home.

In the same way, at the other end of existence, no society before has ever seen such longevity, such a high proportion of elderly people. And none has taken death away from the family environment to such an extent: 70% of all Europeans die in a hospital, in a medical and technical environment.

So it was logical to verify the relevance of the previous symposium through these examples. That symposium had concluded that there should be less talk about secularization and more importance should be attached to inculturation. We would thus go beyond talk about change in general, and we would understand specific changes. And most of all, in this new context what is a better way to announce the Gospel to our contemporaries at these crucial moments of their existence since the Church continues to meet the great majority of them on the occasion of birth, marriage or death, for baptisms or funerals?

So once again, we see that what is required is a deep understanding of these changes. Whoever wants to evangelize cannot be satisfied with deploring or denouncing them.

In this context, Cardinal C.M. Martini, s.j. president of the CCEE, refused "fatalism and intellectual laziness" in the face of the changes analyzed. These changes must be the occasion for "active learning on the part of the faithful as well as the pastors to live and announce the Gospel in a changing world."

In order to announce the Word, we must deepen the theology of creation and of eschatology. In particular, in these fundamental areas of theology, an effort of thought is required, both in the direction of scientists and the population at large. Christian scientists carry out their research in the field of human sciences as well as the exact sciences just as their non-believing or agnostic colleagues “*etsi deus non daretur*”. It is obvious that theological epistemology still does not take this fact into account sufficiently, and that fundamental theology must pursue hermeneutics of statements about creation and eschatology that respect different levels, statuses, and types of knowledge.

Other epistemological treatments are appropriate for the questions of the population at large. For most people, questions of meaning are determined more at the ethical level (standards) and of rites than for intellectuals. This is why, in his conclusion called “Strengthening hope and resisting evil in today’s Europe,” Cardinal Martini rightly emphasizes that evangelizing is “becoming close to people, to their demand for rites, standards, and meanings, to which our diacony, our liturgy and our announcing of the Word must correspond.”

I have tried to show how the European bishops’ reflection moved, in their desire to evangelize, from the denunciation of secularization to the more positive and active perspective of a new inculturation of faith in Europe. In this way, they placed themselves in the perception that John Paul II expressed in the letter that he wrote to the chairmen of the episcopal conferences of Europe after the closing of the VIth symposium:

“Your reflection... particularly in the course of the last two symposiums, have clearly showed that European society has entered a new phase of its historical development. To the deep and complex, cultural, political, ethical and spiritual transformations that finally gave the European social fabric a new configuration, a new quality of evangelization must correspond, in which we find the way to reformulate the everlasting message of salvation in a convincing way for contemporary man.”

IV. Several challenges for announcing the Gospel in a religiously and ethnically divide Europe

Perceptions common to the CCEE and the special Synod for the Europe of 1991

The main purpose of the Synod of bishops for Europe, announced by John Paul II

at Velehrad on April 29, 1990, held in Rome late in 1991, was not to reflect on the evangelization of Europe. In the Pope's mind, the purpose was to determine the meaning of the exceptional moment that the continent was experiencing and to encourage an exchange of gifts between the Churches. But the Synod was aware of the urgency of the situation, and it focused most of its attention on the new evangelization. We find a rather broad convergence in the work of the CCEE, which was more reflective and long-term. The Synod also linked evangelization to inculturation. For the Synod, too, evangelization cannot be separated from ecumenical cooperation and inter-religious dialogue, especially with Judaism and Islam. Lastly, the Synod also found that it was urgent for those who announce the Gospel to help to calm ethnic tensions, which often have a religious component.

4.1 Evangelization requires a new inculturation of Christian life in Europe.

Now that this aspect has been abundantly illustrated in the works of the CCEE, it will be enough to quote the conclusions of the 1991 Synod:

"Evangelization must reach not only individuals as such, but also cultures. The evangelization of a culture implies the "inculturation" of the Gospel. The mission of inculturing the Gospel within Europe's new cultural environment, marked by modernity but also by what is called "post-modernity", raises a challenge which we must answer with all our strength: to succeed, the contribution of the men of the world of culture and that of theologians whose hearts are in communion with the Church is necessary."

Here we see an appeal for the cooperation of theologians, and this deserves our attention. In fact, this cooperation was expected with optimistic encouragement on the part of the chairman of the CCEE, Cardinal C.M. Martini:

"The bishops feel a sense of solidarity with the theologians, whose task appears especially difficult and urgent in today's Europe. So let us encourage all those, theologians, preachers and catechists, who are engaged in a task like the inculturation of the faith in Europe. So let us encourage all those, theologians, preachers and catechists, who are engaged in a task like the inculturation of the faith in Europe. The Holy Spirit who teaches, corrects, activates and leads will not fail to support the efforts of all in the proclamation of what "the eye has not seen, the ear has not heard", but that 'God has prepared for those who love him,' and who was 'revealed by the Spirit' (cf. 1 Cor 2, 9-10)."

To be objective, we must acknowledge that the Synod is less certain of being able to count on the cooperation of theologians: "If theology rooted in the Word of God and faithful to the teaching of the Church is very useful for the mission of evangelization, we are indeed forced to admit that theological "disagreement" is an obstacle to carrying out this evangelization."

The difference in tone is certain. But on the one hand there is no contradiction here, and on the other this can easily be explained by the difference in status between the two bodies: whereas the CCEE is not a magisterial body, a Synod presided by the Pope obviously is.

4. Evangelization and ecumenical cooperation are inseparable for the Catholics of Europe.

The CCEE has constantly aimed its efforts at the evangelization of Europe in close cooperation with the KEK (Conference of European Churches), a sister organization that includes all the other Christian churches of Europe. The VIth meeting between those two bodies was held in November 1991, just before the Synod, whose title was "Mission and evangelization in Europe." The conclusions of this meeting invite us to give up all proselytism and adopt a resolutely ecumenical attitude, thus avoiding any semblance of support to current ethnic conflicts in Ireland, the Balkans, or the rest of Europe. Such support would obviously be a major contribution to the dechristianization of our continent.

4.2.1 Evangelization requires the refusal of proselytism and ecumenical cooperation.

The main divisions affecting Christianity in our world are a European heritage: division between Orthodox Christians and Catholics; between Catholics and Protestants; and between the different Protestant denominations. The Christians of Europe, who have exported their divisions all over the world, also have the duty to heal these wounds. The continent of the division of Christians must also become the continent of their reconcillation.

Now that the other Christians have been recognized at Vatican II as our brothers

by baptism, and in particular now that the Orthodox Church has been recognized as our sister Church, with true sacraments, including the Eucharist and the orders, our relations can in no way be those of proselytism or even of mission.

This question is very relevant today. After the revival of the united Oriental Churches and the renewed presence of apostolic workers who call themselves 'missionaries' in countries that are historically Orthodox, the Orthodox Church felt threatened on the concrete level as no longer being considered a sister-Church by us.⁵ And it is thus that former tensions arose again before our eyes. In this situation, Cardinal Ruini very rightly declared that as Rapporteur of the Roman Synod: "Ecumenism must be promoted, not only for pastoral reasons, but especially because it responds to the will of the Lord" (IInd Report, n. 5). And the same Synod devoted its entire n. 7 to supporting "the close cooperation with the other Churches and Christian communities."

5. The desire to revive uniatism would be extremely unrealistic, as would be the desire to "convert Russia", even if we claim to base this wish on the private revelations of Fatima. The review *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* has just published the spiritual Testament of a French Jesuit, Philippe de Régis, who anticipated around 1954, with a true prophetic intuition, the disaster that such a revival would bring. It is enough to listen to his words to be convinced:

"The temptation could be great, on the day that Russia opens up, to rush into this vast apostolate field and view it as virgin land to be cultivated. Some will be dying to convert this people. Holy souls will pray for this in cloisters. And ardent hearts of apostles will be impatient to get to work. They will necessarily conceive of their task as the predication of the universality of the Church. They will stress the question, which will seem paramount to them, of the supremacy of the pope. They will speak of this dogmatic truth "at the right time and at the wrong time." They will repeat that outside the Catholic Church there is no salvation. They will create parishes or groups to serve as centres from which to disseminate this truth. They will probably have some limited successes, and moreover quite modest ones, with some people. Large sums as well as undeniable energy and zeal will be spent. The result will surely not be in proportion to all this. Furthermore, it is not less obvious that this activity will provoke a violently hostile reaction on the part of Orthodox circles. The clergy will feel threatened. It will have a strong effect on the great mass of believers. And once more the Catholic Church will appear in the eyes of the Russian people as a muddle-headed foreigner, a ravisher of simple souls, an enemy of the national faith. The gap will be widened, and even made deeper, between the two halves of Christendom, formerly united, and which were to be brought back to the unity of a single faith, and not to be pitted one against another. And who knows if we will ever bridge the psychological and emotional gap which would be worsened by the many mistakes made and abundantly repeated? May God save us from such a deed!" V. Poggi, "*Le Travail Futur*", by Philippe de Régis, s.j." OCP 58 (1992) 13-14.

At Santiago de Compostela, a formally ecumenical meeting, the two chairmen declared: "our Churches pledge to renounce all competitive evangelization that would reflect a spirit of competition between them."

They also indicated the path to take: "speak of everything that is a problem and extend our hand." Concretely speaking, we must mutually inform each other of all our evangelization plans, and we must do nothing without the local Churches, and especially nothing against them. Let us also remember the conclusion of the Chairmen, which is important for those who want to contribute to the evangelization of Europe: 'Without ecumenical peace, there will be neither evangelization nor common witness in Europe.'

4.2.2 Avoid any semblance of religious support to current ethnic tensions and develop the positive Christian appreciation of the other.

In all of Europe, the media report on the current ethnic conflicts, and observe that religion constitutes a factor in their aggravation. This is obvious in Ireland and in former Yugoslavia. But this observation also applies to conflicts between communities of Eastern rite Catholics, or even Latin Catholics, on the one hand, and the Orthodox Church, on the other hand, in Rumania, Slovakia and Ukraine. The tensions between the patriarchate of Moscow and Rome are also related to this context. The suspicion thrown by the Enlightenment on the dark social functions of religions takes on its full strength again, combined with the public image of Islam. Religions are not free of violence, or even fanaticism. The argument in favour of God based on the fall of communism convinces only half of the sceptical Europeans of the idea that appeal to God alone can bring harmony among men.

People expect the Churches and Christians to go into action, fast if possible. A happy event: the meeting in June 1993 of the international commission for the Orthodox Catholic dialogue in Balamand, Lebanon, put an end to uniatism in the following terms: "Because of the way in which Catholics and Orthodox once again consider each other in their relationship to the mystery of the Church and discover each other once again as sister Churches, this form of "missionary apostolate" described above, and which has been called 'uniatism', can no longer be accepted either as a method to be followed or as a model of the unity of our Churches are seeking."

The Gospel will lose credibility, and one of its core ideas, that of the love of

others, if the leaders of the Church do not quickly find the means to encourage the respect of those who are different because of their religion, ethnic group, nationality (the migrants!), or gender (man/woman relationships)! In fact, as the assembly of Santiago de Compostela noted: "the tensions between Christians are greatest where ecumenical education has been the weakest."

In the same way, "the Christians of the minority Churches have seen, regardless of the Church they belong to, that they suffer from quite analogous difficulties, whatever the dominant religion of the country."

In these examples we see a tragic illustration of the fact that Christianity has given rise to national Churches instead of creating Churches for the nation. By strengthening national identities, the Church would allow itself to be secularized from within, and would renounce one of its specific principles, the love of others. However, the Church in Europe is simultaneously making a great effort to develop inter-religious dialogue.

4.3 Evangelization in Europe must go hand in hand with the inter-religious dialogue.

4.3.1 The Judeo-Christian dialogue

The need for the dialogue with the Jews and the need to find the special links that unite us is largely developed in the Declaration of the Synod of 1991 in n.8 Such an attitude is necessary because of the anti-Judaism pursued by Christianity until the tragedy of the Holocaust. Tragic anniversaries occurred only a short time ago. In 1492, 500 years ago, Isabella the Catholic expelled all the Jews from Spain. In 1942, 50 years ago, the meeting of Wannsee (Berlin) decided the "final solution" of the Jewish question!

4.3.2 The Islamic-Christian dialogue

The Islamic-Christian dialogue is no longer an exotic one. Islam has become the second largest religion, after Christianity, in Europe, where 23 million Moslems live. This is the major change in the religious geography since the Reformation.

There is a convergence between the final declaration of the Synod and the work of the CCEE on the importance of this dialogue. It is a fact that Islam constitutes a formidable challenge on the pastoral level, as Christians known much better the Christology of Arius than that of Mohammed. And above all Islam questions their fundamental theology (the status of the revealed Scriptures) as well as their dogmatic theology (Trinity and incarnation), and Islam raises new practical problems (mixed marriages and conversions).

But Islam is an even more formidable challenge for divided Christians, in their division itself. Indeed, the Koran says in Sura V, verses 16 and 17: "The Christians move the words of the Scriptures and forget a part of what was taught them... This is why, We (=God) have aroused hate and division among them till the day of resurrection. God will teach them what they have done."

The Moslem exegetes are rather unanimous in the interpretation of these verses: what they hold against Christians is that Christians falsified the divine Revelation of which Jesus was the prophet, especially when the Christian community made Christ divine, and even later, corrupted monotheism by inventing the Trinity. It is this deviation from the message of Christ that made it necessary on the one hand to send another prophet, who will finally be the seal of prophecy, namely Mohammed, and on the other hand to constitute a new people of God, that of the Submissive ones (the name for the Moslems). The consequence was the rejection and division of the former people, who was thus to bear witness, through its division till the day of resurrection, that God had withdrawn his election from the Christians.

From this point of view, we see in an expected but rather eloquent way the need for ecumenical cooperation to bear witness to the Gospel. Because for Moslems our division functions as the experimental proof of the truth of their faith.

V - Conclusion

The Future of the Church and the Gospel in Europe

I repeat that I have been far from exhaustive: the work of the bishops on the European level includes many other insights like the emphasis on complementarity between the kerygma and the didascalia in evangelization. We should also take note of the large number of dossiers that were opened on tourism, migrants, the media, etc.

But I hope that these several reflections taken from the approach of the CCEE will confirm, if need be, your belief in the importance of the survey conducted on evangelization and the future of the Church in Europe.

We can conclude on a note of confidence.

The work of the CCEE has succeeded in breaking with a pessimistic discourse on the Church in Europe which is viewed as ageing, decadent, without vocations for the priesthood, more and more a minority in increasingly secularized societies. This discourse is worsened by a parallel portrayal of the Churches of the Third World as young, joyful, full of vocations. The CCEE found the way to say that the task for the Church of Europe is to meet an exciting call: to meet the challenge of a new inculturation of the faith in hitherto unknown societies, highly scientific and technical, having mastered their basic needs. To take up this challenge is also to serve the Gospel in other continents and in a way that nobody else can do, because the Churches of other continents must face too many urgent problems. They do not have the time to try to solve the constantly recurring question of the relationship between faith and the different forms of knowledge, or to raise deep theological questions of the ecumenical and inter-religious dialogue.

The task of meeting the challenge of a new inculturation of the faith in Europe is a medium-term one. This is natural. As Christians, we transmit the Good News which came long before us and whose course will continue long after us. This challenge is real, because history teaches that no regional Church holds the promise of eternal life: the Christian faith has completely disappeared from North Africa, almost completely from Asia Minor and to a large degree from the Middle East. And these are Churches that have given us so many great saints and prodigious theologians!

But in the short run, the presence of the Gospel is linked to that of a sufficient number of Christian men and women in companies, administrations, universities and institutes, in trade unions and associations, and even in parliaments and parties. Not to exert a sort of clerical supervision of these different sectors of life, or even to "Christianize" them, but to share responsibilities and to help spread healthy forces and the potentialities they contain. If the Church lacks these men and women, all the efforts and all the teachings will remain mostly with no effect.

But evangelization will also remain with no effect without a real theocentric dimension, of which the life of priests and nuns seeks to be a reminder. Indeed, the centre of evangelization is not the Church, but God, the creator and saviour who

calls us to communion with Him. It is He who gives to us to live in such a beautiful and complex creation, of which we are the guardians. It is He who leads us through History. It is He again who gives us to live with close brothers and sisters, but also ones far away where it is also so urgent to show respect, solidarity, justice and love.

If we are seen as the true sons of God, grateful, creative, conciliatory, knowing how to contemplate, to hope and to believe in Him, many will no doubt find the path to the Father.

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Johannes P. Louw (ed.) *Meaningful Translation*. Its Implications for the Reader (UBS Monograph Series 5; Reading 1991) vii. 3 pp. ISBN: 0-8267-04-55-7

For books to emerge from seminars and congresses has become a constant tradition. So this volume is no isolated exception; rather it fits perfectly the tradition behind this monograph series of the United Bible Societies. In the Introduction (p. vii) the editor informs us that what prompted this anthology of essays on problems of Bible translation was a convention of translators held in 1985 in Pretoria and organised by the Bible Society of South Africa. The aim of the gathering, convened under the auspices of the Institute for Interlingual Communication at the University of Pretoria, was to focus on problems receptors often have in understanding a translated text. "The chapters of this book have been written by the lecturers at this convention on the basis of the joint discussion with the various participating translation teams during both the theoretical and practical sessions, and contain the results of research and experience in Bible translation in Africa over a number of years" (p. vii).

The review of this volume in *Melita Teologica* comes rather late with the publication of the monograph in 1991. But with the republication of two

versions of the Bible in Maltese during 1995-1996, the issue of functional translation of Scripture becomes topical. One of these Scriptures follows the literary principle and attempts to reproduce the Biblical text in the literary Maltese of the first half of this century; its new edition in 1995 attempts to adjourn the language by severely changing its vocabulary. Whether this has been a service or a disservice to the original translator and his opus magnum and to the general public remains to be seen. Surely, classics are not normally treated in this manner.

To return to our volume, we find in it five studies, the first two offer theoretical considerations, the last three describe practical exercises, carried out during the convention, on how to tackle particular texts of the Bible in the light of the theoretical apparatus offered in the first part of the book.

The editor himself opens the discussion with a short paper entitled "Bible Translation and Receptor Response" (pp. 1-7). He situates the agenda of the convention, and of the book, within the current debate about the preferability of literal over against dynamic or functional translations of Holy Scripture. Professor Louw himself and his team mince no words as to their option of functional translations. But in this paper he expresses criticism of those Bible translators who in their work "have taken meaning seriously", but failed "to avoid misunderstandings on

the part of the receptor" whether he be reader or listener of the Scriptural text (p. 2). He forcefully reminds us that whoever approaches a text is *de facto* a translator, and this should open the eyes of any potential translator, that he/she ensures that the receptor would not mistranslate the translator's own text. Louw provides a list of factors that may lead to such mistranslations (pp. 2-4) and ends the discussion of this point by stating that "meaningful translation has to take cognisance of the response of the the receptors" (p. 4). This principle of course encounters resistance from readers who are after literal renderings of texts such as Scripture (pp. 4-6).

The second theoretical essay in this collection is that of Ernst R. Wendland, a UBS translation consultant serving Africa. His contribution entitled "Culture and Form/Function Dichotomy in the Evaluation of Translation Acceptability" (pp. 8-40) is the book's principal essay. Four are the main criteria on "mutually interdependent factors" that have been identified for judging whether a translation has been successful or not: fidelity, intelligibility, proximity and idiomaticity (pp. 8-9). In his paper Wendland focuses on intelligibility "which concentrates on the comprehensibility of the message in the receptor language" (p. 9). His understanding of intelligibility had to operate within the parameters set down by the general editor in the previous paper: "Translation should not aim at

producing a rendering that people can understand, but rather producing a rendering that will cause people not to misunderstand the message" (p. 7). It is within this narrow framework that Wendland starts by weaving first a short grammar of what constitutes meaning on the lexical and social level (pp. 8-11), and defines his option of concentrating on two of the four "variables" mentioned above, proximity and idiomaticity. Here the cultural element in translation is more directly involved. In his discussion Wendland cites examples from two languages/cultures of Central Africa, the Chichewa and the Chitonga, in order to "illustrate a number of factors which can help one to measure the amount of distortion in form and/or function that results from a literal rendering as compared with a cultural adaptation in specific biblical contexts" (p. 9). Eugene Nida's theories of componential analysis developed in his book *Componential Analysis of Meaning* (Mouton; The Hague 1975) and the essays in J.P. Louw (ed.), *Lexicography and Translation* (Bible Society; Cape Town 1985), provide Wendland with the tools for his analysis of the cultural set up into which the receptor language operates; this compositional analysis breaks down discrete aspects of social life and behaviour into various components of meaning in order to compare them to counter parts in the culture of the source language, the biblical text in this case,

and to monitor their equivalence or otherwise with regard to form or/and function. On pp. 11-15 Wendland cites examples from the entire form/function continuum in order to illustrate the range of difficulties the translator meets as he/she seeks to transfer cultural components of the Source language (or culture) into that of the Receptor Language (or culture). The writer next focuses on translation difficulties that result from the presence of some element of inequivalence between Source and Receptor languages/cultures; these difficulties may be overcome through the introduction of "cultural substitutes", though Wendland cautions would-be translators that a cultural substitute "always involves divergence", whether major or minor, from the original form or function: the translator should aim to keep similar deviations to a minimum with respect to the central aspects of meaning of the original.

The most useful part of Wendland's discussion is his tackling an inventory of eight "components" of equivalence offering biblical examples for each component. The eight components are *form* (pp. 18-20), *meaning* (pp. 20-21) [These two are regarded as the "most general categories that apply to cultural substitutes"], *impact* (pp. 21-23), *connotation* (pp. 23-25), *naturalness* (pp. 25-27), *history* (pp. 27-28), *lifestyle* (29-30), and *world-view* (pp. 30-35). The last three components are linked

rather to the original text, and their translation through cultural substitutes may prove to be difficult; the penultimate triad on the other hand "require a local adaption (of the original message) in order to be reproduced in the reception language," otherwise they get normally lost if translator resorts to a literal rendering". "Any translational solution, from the most literal correspondence to the free type of cultural substitute, may be evaluated with respect to these eight semantic features and then compared with any other available option in the Receptor Language. The results would then have to be related to a similar componential profile of the source language expression under consideration. Both the textual as well as the extra textual contents need to be taken into account in order to get a more complete picture of the difficult factors of form, function, association and usage involved. The goal, as always, is to determine in the Receptor Language, the closest, natural communication equivalent of the Source Language message" (pp. 33-34).

Louw's and Wendland's contributions so far reviewed offer very interesting reading, useful not only to translators, current or would-be, of the Biblical text, but also to exegetes and the biblical scholars in general. The present reviewer recommends the perusal of the ensuing three practical exercises, involving two narrative texts, one from the Old Testament [Genesis

15, 1-21, work on which was directed by Theo R. Schneider (pp. 41-67)], one from the New Testament [Luke 1, 1-25] and another from the NT but of different genre, "reasoned discourse" [Romans 8, 1-17]. The last two studies were directed by the general editor of the monograph,

Johannes P. Louw who also penned their description for this monograph.

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Carlo Buzzetti, *4x1 Un Unico Brano Biblico e Vari 'Fare'*. Guida pratica di ermeneutica e pastorale biblica (Edizioni Paoline; Milano 1994) 7-287 pp

An extremely practical manual for exegesis and pastoral biblical theology. This volume which we owe to CB's long experience in teaching and study, is not what we usually term an 'introduction' to either the OT or the NT. It's rather an introduction into method, the method of approaching the text of the Bible. And yet the word 'method' needs qualifying since what we are offered are not the standard ingredients we encounter in methodology manuals. These manuals normally address would be exegetes and biblical scholars, whether professional or simply general practitioners like preachers. But these manuals never take for their readers *the general reader*, the reader without professional training; they never consider the performer of the interpretation of Scripture as being himself the would-be addressee of the book he wants to interpret. The model presumed to be operative for exegetes and Scriptural interpreters is that of the objective researcher in the fields of nature sciences. It has served no purpose to insist that this model illfits humanities where biblical reading and interpretation belong.

Besides being professor of introductory subjects in more than one teaching institution, CB is also

Translation Consultant for the United Bible Societies. So he no mere *dilectant*, non-professional writer of general books. He is an expert in the field of hermeneutics and is conscious of the rigors of biblical sciences. The perusal of this monograph addressed for a wide audience will convince of this. His addressees are supposed to live within a believing Roman Catholic context where this act of communication which is Scripture is read as inspired literature. And to such readership CB offers an all-inclusive approach to Scripture reading and interpretation.

This monograph consists of four parts. In the first part or introduction (pp 9-38) CB addresses the issue of the relationship between plurality of approaches in Scripture study and the need, strongly felt, of unity. Scripture after all appears as a unity from three perspectives: historical-literary, theological and pastoral (cfr. pp. 28-38). Here comes a methodological option: "Il messaggio della Bibbia può essere realmente ricevuto da loro soltanto a condizione che esso sia formulato in maniera notevolmente unitaria, cioè mediante una lingua e uno stile che siano per loro di fatto accessibili e retamente comprensibili" (p. 37). "...Chi presenta la Bibbia (a se o ad altri)... costui non può non tener conto della sua unità" (p. 38).

In the second part (pp. 39-60) CB examines "a great paradigm of the past", that is the theory of the four senses

developed by patristic and medieval hermeneutics. The author offers first a short presentation of each of the four senses and then examines their interconnections and mutual dependence. These senses *concatenati sunt ad invicem* (pp.54-57). For this part one can feel the influence of Henri de Lubac's monumental work *Exegese Medieval. Les quatres sens de l'Ecriture*, 1& 2 (Aubier; Paris 1959-61) upon CB.

Our author's own contribution is to be found in part three entitled "Un quadro, pratico, per oggi". Here he offers his paradigm of an interdisciplinary, integrative approach to Bible reading and interpretation. His model encroaches upon the hermeneutical as well as the pastoral fields, not to speak of the spiritual / mystical area.

CB consciously addresses the non-professionals but not sheer beginners. The writer distinguishes four 'levels' within this hermeneutical exercise he terms "guida, quadro, schema, esercizio" or less technically four "fare", ways of doing, operating with the text (pp. 63). To each level he assigns a letter of the alphabet. In each level he identifies ten "tappe" or stages although he insists that this number is not exhaustive of all possibilities; none of the ten stages is to be considered in absolute isolation. The same holds for the levels. These four "doings" are those of exegesis, theology, meditation, and catechesis/homiletics. The ten stages

identified for the exegesis level touch upon the following aspects: 1) the text, 2) context, 3) the literary genre, 4) philology, 5) structure and movement, 6) close parallels, 7) distant parallels, 8) primary meaning, 9) redactional significance, 10) biblical significance (cfr. pp. 67-81). In discussing the level of theology CB distinguishes between "biblical theology" and "systematic theology". The first four stages concern situating the text under study within the wider biblical context, the remaining six within a church tradition, the Roman Catholic. Stage 1 examines the relationship between the primary meaning of the text and the significance given to it by the redactional activity; stage 2 situates the pericope within either the Old Testament or the New Testament context while the third stage sets it within the continuum of salvation history. Stage 4 focuses on the text in itself: the reader is supposed to make explicit what in the text is still implicit. Stage 5 invites the interpreter to rehearse his "preconceptions" while stages 6 asks him/her to compare or contrast the text under study with other non-biblical texts in order to situate it within a wider human and cultural context. It is in stage 7 that the reader fits the text within his Church tradition: does the text feature in any Church document and how? In stage 8 instead the reader is questioned about the possibility that the text would be beneficial to some traditional theological tractate. This is perhaps

asking the normal practitioner too much, but at least it constitutes a plea to be creative in one's own exercise with the text. The ecumenical dimension of the whole approach appears in stage 9 while establishing the possible relevance of the text to the reader's life context is the content of the 10th stage.

Professional exegetes and teachers would tend to stop with these two levels of the hermeneutical cycle; CB's paradigm has another two levels before it comes to a complete round. The third level CB terms "fare meditazione" and explores how the text may solicit a response from the performer himself of the interpretation exercise. For the first five stages of this level the performer is seen as a single individual while for the next five he is perceived as a collective (CB experiments with a group of young people). The ten stages on this level address the issues of: identification of the original addressees of the text (1), possible parallels between this situation and that of the present reader-performer (2), possible integration of the text's message with modern life experience (3), tracing ways the text may solicit *metanoia* in the reader's ways of thinking (4) and actual living (5). The remaining stages of this level deal with identical aspects but the subject is a "we" who are asked to try and draw parallels between their situation and that of the original community who may have been the first target audience of the text (5), to situate the text's message within the

life of the group who does or for whom the interpretation exercise is being done (6), to identify concrete intellectual and practical responses to the text's provocation (7-10).

The fourth level is more complicated. CB touches upon a number of theoretical issues he chooses not to discuss in depth as for instances the passage from the third level to the fourth: is this passage *sine qua non*? In other words, can one help others to grasp the full meaning of the text without being himself personally involved by its message prior to the application of this level? CB calls this level "fare catechesi" but is conscious of how complex such term "catechesis" is (cfr. pp. 120-124 for the discussion of these issues). For CB only after one passes through the first three levels which he describes as "l'area della conoscenza del testo in se stesso", "l'area dell'organizzazione e della sintesi", "l'area del coinvolgimento personale", respectively may be able "prolungare l'esperienza della lettura di un brano biblico per comunicarlo anche ad altri" (p. 121). CB understands catechesis in a very wide sense: "Indica il fenomeno del far comprendere ad altri, dopo aver compreso" (p. 122). Here he distinguishes between a 'general' application and a 'specialised' one. The first three stages address a general situation of application: the original pastoral situation for which the text was written (1), the ways this Word of God

approached this original situation (2), parallels between that situation and ours (3), manners this Word may address our own situation, in general and in particular if the addressees are a well defined community (4); in stage 4 CB chooses for his target audience a community of youngsters, in stage 5 he tried to identify the concrete situation of this community to which this Word would be addressed, while in stage 6 the performer will be asked to crystallize the message contained in the text and which is relevant to the target community and how to ask this community to apply this content to their life situation; stages 7 & 8 repeat the previous two stages but the target audience is a group of beginners in Christian living. This means that although a 'decatalogue' of stages is quoted for this level there are in fact only six different stages.

The fourth part of the book CB dedicates it to offering samples of application of the method on a number of biblical texts. Naturally the entire method is applied to each text; this may sound boring to professionals, but it is useful and enlightening for readers who may be concerned as to how they would teach Scripture to others in an effective manner. The texts CB applies his approach upon are varied: Genesis 45, 1-15 (pp. 141-161); Isaiah 5, 1-7 (pp. 162-183); Psalm 130 (pp. 184-201); Galatians 4, 1-11 (pp. 202-223); Matthew 18, 10-14 (pp. 224-241);

Revelation 3, 1-6 (pp. 243-260). As appendix we have the four 'decatalogues' printed together to facilitate their use (pp. 261-264); indexes come next (pp 265-271). One may be tempted to leave out reading CB's application of his method on these texts which are well known to the average user of the Bible; the present reviewer considers reading this part as a useful exercise.

The publishers of this book have set it together with a number of their publications they dub "un ponte per" because it helps bridging the gap between the Word of God which is Scripture and the expectations of modern man. And this classification suffices to describe the service rendered by CB to any reader of Scripture. Of course one may pinpoint weak spots in his method as stages 9 (exegesis level), 6 and 7 (theology level) are not so easy to be applied by the average performer as CB envisages him/her; likewise the distinction between stages 4 and 5, 9 and 10 (meditation level may be infinitesimal and too intellectualistic). But CB is aware that what he offers is a tool. And this tool may operate wonders in the hands of a master workman.

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