

Religion and Politics: **Emergence of Fundamentalism in Muslim Societies - The Turkish Case**

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INTRODUCTION

I. Religious Revivalism in General

It is a well known fact that religion is one of the substantial and major determinants which shapes or at least influences human behaviour. As an institution religion is something intensely personal but also unavoidably social at the same time. In other words religion is one of the basic socialization institutions or agents that reflects people's patterned social experiences. Therefore religion or religiously patterned human behaviours, which are closely interwoven with other social phenomenas, are the important field of inquiry for social scientists, whether they are sociologists, anthropologists, economists or political scientists.

It is also known that the major, universal monotheist religions that emerged in that certain part of the world geography, namely in the Middle East, offer their followers keys or premises to grasp the meaning of everything under the sun. Naturally this guidance includes a certain manner of life. For example Islam, Christianity or Judaism give their followers a strict order for the manner of life. However it could also be claimed that Islam displays a uniqueness which may be described as the most total teaching ever formulated by mankind in its known history. Although this totalitarian feature of Islam plays an important role in the contemporary revivalist movements, one can observe a universal religious revivalism all around the world during the last two or three decades.

Unique historical developments such as the emergence of the Reformation movement in the Christian world have changed religious teaching and secularized societies and politics in the West. But nevertheless there has been a distinctive and worldwide religious revival, particularly after the

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1960s. This is an undeniable universal phenomenon and one can observe the rise of religion in European countries and in the United States as well.

But it should be noted that the revivalist movements in Muslim countries have had far reaching influences on the social, political and cultural spheres of daily life. In addition to that, although this will not be covered in this paper, the fundamentalist or revivalist movements in Muslim countries have also had significant impacts in the arena of international relations. Different religious movements, whether in the United States or Islamic countries, their sources, pattern of motivations and messages vastly deviate from each other according to the social-economic setting in which they rise. But nevertheless it seems that religious revivalism has been an answer to general socialist challenge after the Second World War. For example there is a high correlation between these new religious waves and austerity economics that have become fashionable in the late 1970s and 1980s.

II. Islamic Revivalism

Religious revivalism in Muslim countries or societies attracts the special attention of academics as well as politicians. It seems that all Muslim societies, from the most developed or modernized to the least developed, have been experiencing Islamic revivalism or "fundamentalism" as generally called in the West.

Islam is a religion, but like all other religions it is a total ideology as well. The true followers of this faith and ideology interpret Islam to endeavour and regulate almost every aspect of social and individual life. Thus revivalists, when they propose substantial changes in life manner, do not have to re-interpret Islamic teaching; they could find remedies and programmes for the implementation of Islamic life in society.

There is no doubt that Islam as an ideology or discourse has varied with time, place, social classes, ethnicity and the level of material development or other similar variables. The diversity of Islamic revivalist movements reflects the diversity of social groups all using Islam as their legitimate base and the aspiration source. However Islamic revivalist movements, at least for the time being, could be labelled as revolutionary. In other words all kind of contemporary Islamic revivalist movements display the main characteristics of revolutionary movements such as mass mobilization, destruction of existing social and political order and establishment of a substantially new order. So there is no doubt that Islamic movement in general is revolutionary though it is regressive rather than progressive.

Islamic revivalism is a common feature of all Muslim countries. But these revivalist movements are highly fragmented not only on organizational

ground but also on grounds of tactics and goals. Another important character of revivalist movements is their transformation from marginal to mainstream politics. Revivalism is no more a marginal political actor in any Muslim country, and the movement is successfully entering into the political process and offering alternative ideology.

For example, despite its illegal status "Muslim Brotherhood" recently emerged as the main opposition force in Egyptian politics. As a matter of fact Muslim Brotherhood has been in Egyptian politics for more than fifty years. In 1954 the modernizing regime of Nassar purged an outlawed Brotherhood, but after more than three decades of this event President Mubarek reluctantly allowed the organization to run for election. Maybe the Egyptian government, by letting Brotherhood run for parliament, tried to divide the movement between moderates and radicals. However the undeniable fact is that Brotherhood has asserted itself in the mainstream politics of the country.

Muslim Brotherhood or "Ihvan-i Müslimin" was established in Egypt in 1928 by Hasan El-Benna. These years were marked as the era of turbulence in the Islamic world. The establishment of secularism in Turkey, the abolishment of the Caliphate, the emergence of secular movements such as nationalism or socialism, and British mandate over Egypt could be listed as the main causes of this turbulence. El-Benna raised three main premises as the ideological base for the Ihvan fundamentalists. These were:

1. Islam is an integrated and perfect system that regulates every aspect of human life.
2. The Quran and Prophet's Sunna (Prophet's deeds and sayings) are the main sources of Islamic life style.
3. Islamic life style or Islamic teaching is exempt from time and space dimensions; in other words Islam is a just and valid system at all times and everywhere.

These three principles are essential in all kind of Islamic revivalist movements. The logical conclusion of these principles is Islamic universalism and a worldwide Islamic state for all. However these principles are highly abstract and they require substantial human interpretation for their implementation. Contemporary societies, no matter how backward they are, have become highly complex and different than the societies of the seventh century. Even in single Islamic countries, as will be discussed later, there are different and contradictory interpretation of the Quran and Prophet's Sunna for the actual implementation.

Tunisia is another country deeply affected by Islamic resurgence lately. "The Movement of Islamic Tendency" is the most powerful revivalist

organization and ushered a turmoil in the well-established political regime of Bourgiba. Although Bourgiba has always been an ardent supporter of secularism and modernism his government had started to back up Islamic movement as a counter measure for the rising prestige of the left in the 1970s. However, Islamic Movement has grown rapidly and has become the main opposition. Eventually Bourgiba was deposed because of the turmoil created by Islamic opposition.

Religious revivalism is being experienced everywhere at present. Neither developed nor the Third World countries are exempt of this world-wide current. The last general election in Israel has proved the rapid rise of Judaist fundamentalism. For the present we do not have a general theory to grasp and explain this world-wide phenomenon. For the time being accumulation of empirical knowledge whereby a general theory would be formulated does not seem adequate. Therefore, as a preliminary step one should be focusing on individual cases. Without having detailed and thorough studies about individual countries it is impossible to formulate religious revivalism that has been emerging as one of the powerful ideological forces in the late twentieth century.

ISLAMIC REVIVALISM IN CONTEMPORARY TURKEY

I. Kemalist Interpretation of Islam and Secularism

Scholars of Turkish politics generally assert that "secularism" is the essence of Kemalist reforms or revolution. Secularism, as it had been defined by Mustafâ Kemal, could be taken as the starting point of all reforms introduced by himself. However, Kemalist interpretation of secularism or "laicism" is quite unique and rather different from secularism concepts that have been prevailing in contemporary Western countries. Secularism, as it is perceived in the West, is based on the idea of non-clerical state affairs and liberty of religion. This concept of secularism is a distinctive institution of the modern era. But it could be argued that the Kemalist interpretation of secularism does highly resemble the Jacobean interpretation of the concept during the French Revolution. Turkish conservatives persistently claim that secularism does not mean agnosticism or rejection of religion. But nevertheless it is clear that the Kemalist interpretation of secularism is mainly based on asserted anti-clericalism. According to ardent Kemalists secularism has had to be radically anti-clerical, because of profound intractability between Islamic teaching and the mode of modern, secular living.

Islam is not only a specific way of worshipping, but an extensive and integrated social system as well. Moreover "Jihad" (waging a holy war on infidels for either converting or killing them) could be considered as the

sixth principle of Islam. The other basic five principles concern faith and worship. The Prophet Muhammed, even before the completion of the revelation of the Quran, had established a political system (Islamic state) and propagated his teachings by force. Thus Islam has emerged as a total system. For instance, the political doctrine of Islam has prevented the formation of any different political thought in Muslim societies throughout the centuries.

It is true that in an Islamic state the Shariat must prevail. But it is also true that the Shariat is not an integrated and concrete system of norms. Naturally there are some concrete and undisputable rules or institutions in the system. But in general the many premises of the Quran and Sunna are likely abstract in nature and therefore require interpretation. Thus one can cite different interpretations of Shariat even in the same time dimension. From a doctrinal point of view, the Ottoman Empire had been an Islamic state in which the Shariat ruled. In other words civil and political affairs were supposed to take shape according to the rules of the Shariat. However, real life was different and due to the substantive changes in economic and social life styles or relations the Ottoman society as a whole underwent a profound transformation in the legislative system, political norms and legal practices. Thus the Empire had moved from the pure Shariat order to undeclared secularism. History shows that this process had gained momentum during the nineteenth century.

Actually modernization undertakings of the Ottoman Empire had started in the eighteenth century. Political, economic, cultural and military influences from the West were a very powerful impetus for the forced changes in the Empire. The story of Ottoman reforms or forced changes is a well documented historical fact. While in the political life Western institutions like representation and law-making were being established gradually, the transition and adaptation of Eastern legislation like the penal code of Italy, the maritime and commerce code of France, the land and property title law of Switzerland had marked the great diversion from the Shariat order. The same kind of transformation also occurred in the field of education and thus Shariat lost its influence in another field of the social system. In short, nineteenth century Ottoman society, because of social and political necessities, had to abandon the implementation of the Shariat in many areas of public life. But in spite of these cohesive changes Islamic ideology, or Islam in other words, had maintained its position as the sole source of legitimation in the Ottoman system. Officially the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic state and accordingly the political and social orders were legitimized on the basis of Islam.

Since Islam was interpreted and asserted as the main ideological basis of the old order, the revolution ushered by Mustafâ Kemal had to find another and contradictory base for the legitimization of the new order. As

is indicated by many students of the Turkish modernization movement, Kemalist revolution could be defined as a national, bourgeoisie-democratic movement. Therefore, it could be concluded that the sole and natural premise of such undertaking was secularism. In other words secularism had emerged as the basic feature of the Kemalist revolution. Islam was the ideology and also the legitimate base for the old order that was torn down by Kemal.

Thus it could be asserted that Kemalism had to interpret secularism rather in strictly anti-clerical manner, just like the French Jacobins had done. According to Mustafâ Kemal, as it had been stated many times, the counter-revolution would have come in the form of Islamic movement. That is why Islam was suppressed and put under the strict control of the state in the new order.

The main task or mission of the Kemalist revolution was rapid modernization and nation building. Atatürk and his followers identified Islam as the main obstacle on the path of development. In other words a modernizing and revolutionary elite had been assessing Islamic theology and ideology as the main source and reason of backwardness. From the historical point of view it seems possible to compare Kemalist secularism with Henry VIII of the Tudors or French Jacobins undertakings. But there is no doubt that subduing Islam to a secular republic was not a very easy problem to tackle. Nevertheless the history of Republican Turkey proves that Kemal Atatürk and his reform movement accomplished this hard mission of establishing a secular state in a Muslim society. In spite of some reactions such as Seyh Said or Menemen uprisings or the establishment of underground reactionary orders of Süleymanîs and Nurcus, Turkish society has accepted the Kemalist interpretation of secularism and Islam.

The first indication of secularism was the provisional constitution of 1921. The first article of this constitution states that "the whole sovereignty belongs to the nation". As was expected conservative circles in the great National Assembly raised very harsh criticism against this statement. For example, Hoca Raif, deputy from Erzurum, objected to this article and demanded that in Islamic society sovereignty belonged to Allah and only the Khalife could exercise sovereignty in the name of Allah. Article 7 of this constitution states that the implementation of the Shariat was entrusted to the Great National Assembly and thus tried to find a conciliation between modernists and conservatives. But it was very difficult to maintain that kind of compromise and immediately after the victorious conclusion of the Independence War the Sultanate was abolished by the Great National Assembly and the Khalifate was granted to one of the Ottoman princes, Abdülmecit Efendi.

This was an unprecedented radical move; the nationally elected body was

dismissing the Khalifate from all the Islamic world and appointing a person to that point. Actually with this move Kemal Atatürk inflicted a heavy blow to Islamic teaching. In the general elections held on 11th August 1923 all conservative Muslims in the Great National Assembly were eliminated and replaced by modernists following the reform ideas of Kemal Atatürk. The logical conclusion of these events was the proclamation of the Republic. However, the proclamation of the republican regime did not solve the problem of two-headed political authority and legitimacy. According to the Islamic political doctrine all the laws passed by the Assembly and all the actions of the republican government must have been submitted to the Khalifate for the final approval. In addition to that, many Islamic groups all around the world had taken a very critical stand against the developments in the young republic and they were trying to exert pressure on the Turkish government. So Mustafâ Kemal had to act very swiftly and determinedly.

On 3rd March, 1924 the Turkish Great National Assembly passed three important laws that determined the basis of Kemalist secularism. The first one of these laws was about the abolishment of the Khalifate and the expulsion of all members of the Ottoman dynasty out of the country. The second law was about the devolution of the ministry of Islamic affairs and the establishment of a religious affairs directorate under the prime minister's office. The third one was about the annulment of religious schools and teachings. With the provisions of that law a uniform and secular education system was established nationwide.

These major, revolutionary changes had been supplemented by new reforms such as the proscription of Islamic outfits and headgears, the repealment of the Islamic civil code (Mecelle), the adoption of Latin alphabets instead of the Arabic script and the closure of the convents of Islamic orders. All these things had happened between 1925 and 1928. In other words, rapid and revolutionary secularism had been introduced in the space of four years, and the drastic transformation of society was achieved.

Among these drastic reforms, the banning of orders and the closing down of convents (*tekke ve zaviyeler*) deserve attention. Orders are as old as Islam and these organizations have developed a kind of folk Islam. Official Islam was the faith and the ideology of elites. However, Islam introduced and interpreted by orders have appealed to the masses and thus have fulfilled the integration of society. When Kemalist secularism banned the orders, the influence of religious ideology among the masses drastically diminished. In 1925 orders were banned and their convents were closed down. Under this severe blow, the orders had to face the problem of survival. Some of them had completely disappeared, the rest had gone underground and new ones had also clandestinely been formed as an

Islamic opposition to Kemalist-Nurcu and Süleymanci orders. However it could be concluded that all orders (*sunnî*), new and old ones, had lost their influence considerably and their popular base substantially weakened.

II. Re-emergence of Islamic Ideology in Contemporary Turkey

It is a generally accepted fact that the Kemalist reforms based on secularism were accepted by Turkish society and religious reactions were rather marginal in essence. As was mentioned above, new orders as an opposition organization were formed. Süleyman Tunahan, a Quran course instructor, organized a new order, Süleymanci, clandestinely. Actually this man was a Meksibendi and there was no distinct difference between Süleymanci and Meksibendi teachings. However, political consideration for the Süleymanci order was of the utmost importance and the organization of the order resembled very closely a hierarchical secret political organization. The Nurcu order was also formed in a similar process by promoting the ideas of Saidi Nursî, an Islamic scholar and a man of action. Just after the death of Kemal Atatürk, the legal Islamic journal, *Hareket* (Movement), appeared in May 1939.

However with the establishment of a multi-party system the Islamic movement had gained a larger area of manoeuvre. Although the main organizational forms of the Islamic movement and orders were not legalized, they started to be treated more tolerantly; because in the multi-party system they started to exert an influence which might determine the fate of competition between parties. It was true that the total amount of the followers of Sunni orders was not very big. But nevertheless the hierarchy of orders secured that all members voted accordingly to the wishes of *seyhs*. Thus, Islamic movement, through order organization, acquired a position to negotiate with a party. Naturally the biggest conservative parties were the ones which the orders approached for negotiation. Thus, with the transition of political system a distinct pattern of contact between orders and conservative parties had been developed and elaborated. Through this bargaining process, orders have supported the party in terms of voting and as a return they acquired some kind of protection against state suppression.

While Sunni orders were enjoying their political influences and enlarging their activities, Alevis have taken side with secular, Kemalist party-Republican People's Party. Alevis have been a minority in Anatolia and throughout centuries they had been suppressed by the Sunni majority. For the first time in their seven hundred years' history they had got rid of this suppression through a secular Republic. Therefore they actively supported secularism and acted in the political process accordingly. First the Democrats Party (1950-1960) and then the Justice Party, inheritor of the Democrat party, have benefitted from the support of Islamic movement

in terms of voting in general elections. However it would be fair to emphasize that both parties have followed the lines of Kemalist secularism; in other words neither the Democrat Party nor the Justice Party tolerated the emergence of Islamic revivalism. Islamic revivalism only achieved a breakthrough after the 1980 *coup d'etat*.

It is possible to identify the history of the Turkish Republic as a rapid social change process. This change covers social, economic, political and cultural dimensions. From the economic aspect, it could be stated that closed and primitive village economy turned to integrated and developed market economy during the Republican era. At present only 20% of the GNP is coming from agriculture and the shares of industry and services are around 25% and 50% respectively. This massive change has brought a high rate of mobilization in every aspect of social life.

One of the important features of this massive change is urbanization. At the beginning of the Republican era the rate of urban population was about 10%. Presently this rate exceeds 50%. Rapid urbanization and immigration from rural areas to cities have marked the social and cultural life of the Turkish people, so that contemporary Islamic revivalism should be grasped and analyzed in that context. After a radically secularist era, a new and somewhat modern Islamic revivalism has been asserting itself in Turkish social and political life. Actually this is not a rural but an urban movement. Millions of immigrants coming to cities from their villages have taken to this new Islamic revivalism. Orders are the main organizational form of this new movement and as effective secondary social organizations they successfully fill an important psychological and cultural gap that emerges as an outcome of this urbanization process.

Is it possible to label all Muslims or faithful persons as the supporters of Islamic revivalism? The answer for this question is "No" and the main criteria for Islamic revivalism is the acceptance of Shariat order. In other words the basic, common characteristic of people who may belong to different revivalist groups is the aim of establishing Shariat order in the social and political life of the society. They all want to implement Shariat. However in contemporary complex social systems the implementation of Shariat requires extensive interpretation and analogies by Islamic scholars. This means that it is almost impossible to find common understandings of Shariat in the fields of social, political and cultural affairs. For example, the existence of conservative and liberal approaches to the meaning of Shariat could be cited. Liberal Islamic revivalists claim that all kind of civil liberties and rights are recognized and protected by the Quran and Sunna. There are some interpretations of Shariat which are close to socialist thinking. Thus one can hardly say that the Shariat as a political and social order is a unified system of thought.

Although from a normative and ideological point of view there are many, and sometimes controversial, Shariat interpretations in the contemporary Islamic world, it is still possible to talk about some general features of Islamic culture which have emerged through centuries. Submission to political authority is the most prominent feature of Islamic political culture. In other words Islamic Shariat requires unconditional obedience to political rulers by believers. There is no doctrine of upheaval in Islamic political teachings. Rulers, even when they rule unjustly, must be obeyed, so it could be asserted that "total submission" is one of the very basic components of Islamic politics.

Ascendancy of rulers to power, methods of popular election and the right to rise against unjust rulers are rather ambiguous issues in the political thoughts of "fundamentalism". In other words there is no substantial, theoretical attempt to synthesize Islam with popular democracy by forming a doctrine of election of rulers by the masses. The question of how the rulers must be elected, who are entitled to vote in these elections, the possibility of changing ruler (*imam*) by periodical and ordinary elections, the possibility of using force against unjust rulers, and similar ones are not tackled by Islamic scholars effectively.

There is no doubt that the rejection of popular democracy and accepting unlimited authority of the rulers is the basic component of the political doctrine of the Shariat. Islam accepts that the sovereignty belongs to Allah. Rulers exercise political authority in the name of Allah and this must be done accordingly to the provisions of the Quran and Sunna. Ordinary people can not decide or interpret what is compatible with these provisions. So, as Mevdudi has emphasized, in popular democracies ordinary man rules and ordinary man can and should not criticize men in power unless Islamic scholars (*ulema*) are against them. But contrary to the Catholic Church, Islamic ulemas are not autonomous people and they are dependent to the state or rulers.

General Sunna thought has rejected the idea of uprising or even popular criticism of unjust rulers and this deed (*fitna*) has been interpreted as the utmost sin. There are some marginal attempts to introduce the right to rise against unjust rulers in Islamic thinking. For example, the Egyptian Islamic scholar Muhammed Rashid Riza tried to introduce the right to rise against despotic khalifates. But that kind of attempt has not found serious appeal and in Sunna teaching acceptance of political authority under any type of circumstance has become dominant in Sunna revivalist movements. However the doctrine of Shia is different and in Shia teaching, as practice has proved, there is the right to rise against unjust rulers.

The holy Quran states that "whoever opposes and wages war against Allah and his prophet and causes *fitna* must be punished by death or hanging

or the cutting of hands and legs crossly" (5:33). This means that ordinary man, no matter how faithful he is, cannot question the deeds of the ruler, because the criticizing or questioning of the legalization of a ruler causes "fitna".

However we have been witnessing the rise of radicalism in Islamic movement in all Muslim societies. This radicalism accepts the premise that until the establishment of a universal Islamic state, all Muslims are sinners in front of Allah. There is no doubt that this radicalism is a type of reaction against secular developments that are the outputs of inevitable social change or modernization which occurred in Muslim societies. In addition to that, the Iranian revolution has deeply effected all kind of Islamic revivalist groups everywhere in the world. For the time being this premise of radicalism cannot fit in the general teachings of Sunna thought and this controversy could be defined as the hardest problem to tackle by the theoreticians of the Islamic movement.

During the 1960s or even in the 1970s, when the social sciences had been flowering in Turkey, very few scholars displayed an interest and attempted to make some inquiries on the relation between Islam and modern Turkish society. In other words, Islam and politics was a marginal topic in the general discourse of Turkish social science. However some scholars like professor Mardin or Dr. Yücekök have published important books and extensively cited pioneering books. But during that period the general interest of native social scientists was rather on the problems of social change and modernization without taking Islam as a component in the process. Prospects of reordering the Turkish social and political system according to Islamic principles were irrelevant for Turkish academics as well as politicians.

As indicated above, Turkey is a unique case among all Muslim countries. Although the great majority of Turkish people is Muslim (around 98 per cent), Turkey is the first and the only country that achieved the establishment of a secular political system. It could be argued that there is a sharp incompatibility between Islam and secularism to the extent that the latter has been derived from the historical experiences and conditions of Western societies. Actually Kemalist secularism on the basis of profound anti-clericalism could be compared to the emergence of protestanism in Christianity.

However, in recent years, particularly after 1980, Kemalist interpretation of secularism has lost its appeal gradually and Islamic fundamentalism or revivalism has made substantial progress. New Islamic political organizations, either originated by small groups of Muslim intellectuals or traditional Sunni orders, have been entering into mainstream politics and assuming ever-increasing roles. They are no more considered as marginal

groups or organizations and for the first time in the history of the Republic, they are effectively penetrating into society and into the state by offering alternative policies in every field of public and social life.

For the time being, Islamic movement in Turkey is far from unified and as a matter of fact it is highly fragmented. But naturally there are some common points for all these groups. First of all, orders or other independent groups in the Islamic movement, as the ardent supporters of Islamic revival, oppose any kind of undertaking which may bring about prospects of reforms in Islamic teaching. Thus it could be concluded that the contemporary Islamic movement is fundamentalist in a certain way. Secondly, all fragments in Islamic revivalism are radically against anything connected with the Western world except technology. The common goal of all these groups is the realization of salvation reconstructing the social and political life under the guidance of Islam. In other words Islamic revivalist movement bids for the power and the establishment of Shariat order in public, political and private affairs in society.

It is true that Islamic revivalism has achieved a breakthrough after the *coup d'état* of 1980, and although it is still illegal according to the laws of Republic Islamic, the revivalist movement has acquired *de facto* recognition and immunity. Generals who came to power after the coup tried to annihilate all kind of leftist ideologies and movements in Turkish society and for this aim they looked for the prospect of alliance with Islamist groups for promoting counter-ideology and movement in society. In other words, the military regime approached Islamic groups with instrumentalist premises. Kemalist secularism had meant the establishment of strict control over religion by the state. However, the penetration of Islamists into the state apparatus has changed the situation completely. Highly penetrated state agencies including police and administrative departments have developed rather tolerant attitudes on Islamic revivalism in general. For example, religious courses or, more correctly, courses on Sunni Islam became compulsory at all levels of primary and secondary education with the provisions of the Constitution drafted by the military regime. The Ministry for National Education, during the military government, was entrusted to Islamic groups, and these people have been firmly entrenched in the Ministry. It might be interesting to cite some quantitative data about the rise of Islamic ideology in Turkey during the military regime.

In addition to compulsory religious education in secondary schools the number of "Iman-Hatip schools" (vocational schools for educating Islamic disciplines teachers) have been rapidly increasing. Presently there are 371 "Imam-Hatip" high schools and the total enrolment in these schools has reached the figure of 350,000. The original purpose of these schools was to train professionals for religious services, so they were established as vocational schools. But with the great increase in their number, the

outputs of these schools exceeded the demand for religious teachers or other similar professionals. The graduates of these schools were granted the right to enter for university entrance examinations. Thus the majority of these graduates started to compete with other high school graduates in the university and Imam-Hatip schools, instead of being a certain type of vocational schools, have developed the tendency to be common secondary education institutions.

There is no doubt that the curriculum of Iman-Hatip schools basic teaching of Islamic ideology. However the main means to reproduce Islamic ideology in society are the Quran courses. There are around three thousand Quran courses run by the state. These are official courses on the curriculum where official state ideology is also being taught, or supposed to be taught. But there are 3,800 unofficial Quran courses run by mainly Sunni orders, and naturally in these courses official state ideology (secular republic) is not mentioned.

Another important indication of the substantial progress of the Islamic ideology is it publications. Presently there are three daily newspapers and twenty-seven weekly or monthly journals in the publication market, published by different Islamic factions or orders. The total circulation of the newspapers is around 250,000 dailies, and for the journals the figure is close to that number. For example, the total circulation of *Islam*, the main monthly journal of Naksibendis, is around 80,000. The more or less complete list of Islamic periodicals is given at the end of this paper.

As can be understood from these figures the Islamic movement and its development requires a lot to meet its costs. Actually, this cost is met by religious foundations. There has been a sharp rise in the number of Islamic foundations in recent years. Before 1980 the total number of these foundations was less than 200. But the number has risen to 350 in 1983, to 850 in 1985 and to 1,128 in 1987. These foundations generally build mosques, run schools, dormitories and Quran courses, and support publishing houses. The main cause of the recent boom in the number of foundations is the institutionalization of Saudi finance in Turkey.

With the passage of a law through parliament, two Saudi banking institutions acquired a very privileged position within the Turkish finance system. As it is generally known, the Finance Faisal and Al-Barak are Islamic banks; in other words, they do not charge interest but pay something to their customer in the name of profit-sharing. As a matter of fact the term "interest" is replaced by "profit partnership" or "profit sharing" in Islamic banking. But the mentioned law stipulates that Islamic banks are exempt from some kind of taxes. Therefore the rate of profit is quite high in these banks and they channel some part of their returns to Islamic foundations.

Islam as an ideology and different revivalist groups promoting such ideology have been displaying an increasing role in Turkish political life. This is one of the novel features of contemporary Turkish politics. Although it is highly fragmented it is possible to identify in it some common objectives of Islamic revivalism. For example, the erasure of all kind of authority except Allah and his prophet, the ruling out of the ideology of nationalism and the destruction of the national state with its main institutional framework, the erasure of all political, social and cultural influences of the Western world on Islamic civilization and the re-establishment and the dominance of an Islamic civilization in the world could be cited as the common aims of all Islamic revivalist groups.

There is no doubt that Islamic revivalism is an Opposition movement in Turkey and expresses the aspirations of social groups that challenge the established social order and power structure. The rise of the Islamist movement in the 1980s in Turkey is not at all a traditional upsurge or return to the medieval times, as many people think. Actually, this is rather a new phenomenon or, in other words, the reaction of a dissatisfied stratum or other social collectivities against the establishment. It could be asserted that this new Islamic movement is a kind of reaction against the national, republican government promoting national-secular ideology, rapid urbanization and social change, and strong Western impact and control.

It seems that there are three main lines of Islamic politics in present Turkey. In other words it is possible to classify Islamic revivalist groups into three main categories on the basis of political differentiations. These are the reactionary elitist line (Turkish-Islamic synthesis), the traditional line, and the radical line. As a matter of fact these three categories express three different ideological interpretations of Islamic revivalism. So they require some elaboration.

1. Reactionary-Elitist Line (Turkish-Islamic Synthesis).

Turkish-Islamic synthesis is rather a new ideological interpretation of reactionary groups in Turkey. It was formulated by a group of reactionary intellectuals organized in an association called "Aydinlar Ocagi" in 1975. This ideology tries to balance Islamic revivalism with nationalism. Promoters of this ideology have never sought popular support or tried to promulgate their teaching among the masses and this is the reason why it is an elitist movement. However Turkish-Islamic synthesis has become very influential among upper circles of conservative parties. For example, the leading cadres of the centre-right party (Justice Party) and also leaders of the extreme-right party (National Movement Party) were the ardent supporters of Turkish-Islamic synthesis.

This ideology has acquired esteem among conservative people because of the charisma of the words "Turks" and "Islam". However, the promoters of the ideology have deliberately refrained from discussing the premises of their teaching in detailed and systematic manner. Instead of designing an elaborate ideological system Aydinlar Ocagi preferred to promote policy guidelines for the holders of political power. They have avoided debating their propositions with their opponents and thus they have more or less concealed the element of "authoritarianism" in their system.

Turkish-Islamic synthesis argues that Turkish national identity is under attack from the West and this aggression threatens the existence of Turkish culture which is the essence of national identity. According to Aydinlar Ocagi Western cultural imperialism has been devastating Turkish cultural identity and policies formulated and implemented by Westernized elite (Atatürk is the most prominent among them) and has been causing an unending crisis in Turkish social life. So, in order to get rid of this permanent crisis and to heal the wounds of national culture the Turkish state ought to undertake protection and promotion functions as its primary tasks. For Aydinlar Ocagi the collapse or even the changing of this "national culture" is actually a threat to the existence of the nation and accordingly norms and values such as those of humanism or pluralism that are the products of Western culture are totally alien and also harmful to unique "Turkish culture".

This pseudo-theory of culture is complemented with a theory of history. "The history of mankind" according to this theory "is the history of unending struggles between nations and every nation has a unique fate determined by the essence of its own culture". So the concept of "national culture" is defined as a "social substance" that unites and integrates every individual person to national unity. For Aydinlar Ocagi the Turkish nation is endowed by a special fate that could be defined as "ruling of other nations". History determines this fate and for the realization of it Turkish culture must be protected and promoted. On that point the importance of Islam and the concept of synthesis is emphasized. It is asserted that Turkish national culture has two sources. One of them is composed of genuine values brought by Turkish tribes from Central Asia. However Aydinlar Ocagi and its theoreticians do not explicitly define and elaborate what these values are or what component of Turkish cultural values have been brought from Central Asia. The other component or source is Islam and it is argued that Turkish culture could only come into existence under the faith of Islam.

When the concept of national culture is defined in this context, preservation of it from any kind of change becomes an obligation or it could be stated that the "substance of this culture" remains independent from time and space. However national culture is something that could be enriched and

propagating the national culture is the basic function of the state. For Aydinlar Ocagi, democracy and political pluralism are acceptable as in limits of consensus firmly established on the national culture.

It is obvious that Aydinlar Ocagi follows a typical logical line like Rousseau. Like Rousseau's "volante general", "Turkish national culture" is something that cannot be reinterpreted or redefined by any group or even by a majority in the society. National outcome of that kind of approach is quite obvious. Democracy, political parties, individual liberties and similar things have secondary importance after national culture and even a political party with a solid majority will fall out of legality if it tries to redefine national culture. As can be seen clearly this ideology has been used to conceal authoritarian state longings and unfortunately this has become an official ideology of the state during the military regime. The proponents of this ideology do not pay attention to inner controversies. For example it is almost impossible to combine a sociological element (nation) with a theological element (religion). It rejects the idea of nationhood. But promoters of Turkish-Islamic synthesis do not care whether these conceptual problems could be tackled or not, because their primary interest is not to design logically and scientifically a sound theory but to prepare policy remedies for power holders.

2. Traditional line.

The term "Traditional Line" actually refers to Sunni orders (*tarikats*). Sunni orders are the organizational entities that support or at least develop a favourable outlook for Islamic revivalism or Shariat in other words. It seems that orders have grown in the last thirty years and their influence has been enlarged. Rapid urbanization is the main cause of this development. Masses migrating to cities from rural areas have been facing the problem of social identity and solidarity or, in other words, problems of reference group.

Rural masses, when they come to cities, find themselves in an entirely different position. They lose their social identity and all kind of established social ties and reference norms that order life in rural settings. Since the rate of industrialization is not sufficient, migrants could not have modern reference norms, for instance being an industrial worker and having that kind of social identity and solidarity with proper secondary organizations. This sociological gap provides a rather productive setting for the growth of Islamic orders. It is obvious that Islamic orders function as typical secondary organizations in that setting. However this partly explains the rapid progress of orders in recent years. As indicated above, political factors are as effective as sociological factors in that development.

Politically active and influential orders could be classified into two groups:

old, traditional orders and new ones. Naksibendi, Kadiri and Rifai are three, main politically active traditional orders. Naturally there are more than two dozen traditional orders such as Bayramiye, Mevlevi, Cerrahiye, Melamiye and so forth. However, only three of these traditional orders are influential in the political process.

Naksibendi, which was founded in the fourteenth century, is the most influential order among other Sunni orders. From the theological point of view Naksibendi teaching could be defined as the root and all other Sunni *tarikats* with the exception of Nadiriye are the derivatives of Naksibendi. The Shariat is the basic component of Naksibendi order and so it is highly active in politics. Although this order is the biggest, it is fractured and that is why its political influence is not as substantial as the new orders. For example there are fourteen branches of Naksibendis in Anatolia and there is no unitary structure in the whole system.

Traditionally Naksibendis have been providing political support for the biggest political party. However, since 1973, a faction of Naksibendi order have backed first the National Salvation Party and then the Welfare Party. But in fact the great majority of Naksibendis are supporting Motherland Party today and they are also firmly entrenched in the organizational structure of the party. It could be asserted that the Saudi capital plays an important role for the merging of Naksibendis into the Motherland party.

Kadiriye is also another very old and important order. They have a distinct teaching and religious rituals and politically they are for Shariat. It could be said that this order is particularly influential along the Black Sea coast and the Marmara region. They also traditionally support the biggest rightist party and presently they are backing the Motherland. However during the 1970s Kadiris had supported the pro-fascist National Movement Party in the 1977 election.

In addition to these politically active traditional orders, there are new Sunni orders which are propagating Shariat or Islamic revivalism. Süleymancis, Nurchus and Isikeis are the most important new orders. As a matter of fact these are not orders in terms of religious teaching and practice. From the religious point of view three of them, particularly Süleymancis and Isikeis are very close to Naksibendi teaching and rituals. However they have been formed as a political reaction to Kemalist secularism during the 1930s and 1940s and from the beginning they have been functioning as political organizations rather than orders. It is known that Süleymancis and Isikeis are backing the Motherland Party while Nurchus are behind the True Path.

Although some instances of radicalism are observed in the orders these mainly follow the course of the traditional line by tactically accepting the

existing political system. In other words all orders do not challenge the secular political system and they do not try to overthrow it. There is no doubt that they are in favour of Shariat, but at the same time they raise the very basic concept of "fitna" in Sunni thought. As was discussed above, Sunni thought rejects any possibility of popular uprisings against an existing political order or ruler. So it could be claimed that there is an unwritten agreement between orders and rightist political parties. Orders provide votes to these parties and do not force the functioning or the political system; in return they get some kind of tacit recognition from the state. When an order changes its political attitudes and starts, say, to support the rival rightist party then some kind of state prosecution may take place. For example during the by-elections held in 1986 Süleymancis supported the True Path instead of the Motherland. After the election there had been a series of police prosecutions against Süleymancis and they were accused of undertaking activities against the principles of secularism. After this repression the Süleymancis changed their direction again and started to support the Motherland Party, namely, the party in power.

3. Radical Line.

This is a rather new emergence in the Islamic movement. New groups have emerged, particularly after 1980, in Turkey, all proposing substantial change in social and political life and ready to use force for such undertakings. These groups, quite independent from each other, are organized around a journal. *Insan*, *Girisim*, *Yazi*, *Istiklal* and *Atilim* could be given as examples of these journals. The basic feature of these radical groups is their discontent for the traditional politics of the orders.

However, radical groups do not enjoy the mass popularity of the orders and their influence is rather limited. But it should be borne in mind that radical groups are now making inroads among university students, because they are radical and, maybe more important, since they are intellectually superior to the Aydinlar Ocagi or typical orders. In other words radical groups have been highly influenced by radical Islamic intellectuals such as Mevdudi, Ali Serhati, Seyid Kutup and so on. As a matter of fact the main activity of these radical groups is to translate and publish the major works of these Islamic intellectuals.

Radical groups generally recruit their followers from young university or high-school students and they organize around a journal. For the time being it seems that they are quite far from a unification movement and there are deep controversies among them. So it is possible to identify an ideological spectrum concerning the interpretation of Islamic revivalism. In this spectrum there are, on the one hand, revolutionaries advocating an Iranian type of takeover and moderate approaches on the other. However most of these radical groups pay attention to the question of modern

pluralist structure and they seek an answer for the question of whether Islamic ideology and groups can come into existence in such setting. In other words trying to adopt Islamic politics in a competitive, pluralist system is one of the issues of discussion for radical groups. There is also an attempt to establish a kind of "Marxist-Islamic dialogue" among these people. For example a new Islamic journal, *Di Politika*, published by the Risale Publishing House, calls for a dialogue with Turkish Marxists regarding problems of international relations.

CONCLUSION

The following is a brief and simple conclusion of this paper. The prospects of Islamic society and political structure or "Islamic" was an irrelevant topic for politicians, intellectuals and social scientists. However it is not so today.

The Islamic political movement is no more a marginal force and it is one of the nuclear central figures in contemporary Turkish politics. There is no doubt that socio-economic factors such as urbanization, rapid social change, rising expectations and so forth have been influential in the rise of Islamic revivalism. But there is also the international factor which is at least as much influential as the socio-economic factors. Social scientists generally do not look enthusiastically on conspiracy theories. But it should not be forgotten that conspiracy is part of the social phenomenon. In other words conspiracy exists inherently in the social process itself. This international aspect of Islamic revivalism is not covered by this paper but it could be asserted that this aspect should not be neglected if a complete explanation of the phenomenon is enquired into.

LIST OF ISLAMIC PERIODICAL PUBLICATIONS

1. Zafer (Victory). Monthly journal of Nurcus, circulation 10,000.
2. Sizinti (Grief). Weekly by Nurcus, cir. 80,000.
3. Köprü (Bridge). Weekly journal of literature by Nurcus, cir. 5,000.
4. Dogus (Birth). Monthly published by a faction in Nurcus, no cir. number.
5. Sur (Castle wall). Nurcu monthly for intellectuals, cir. 20,000.
6. Can Kardes (Brother Can). Children's weekly by Nurcus.
7. Mektup (Letter). Women's weekly by Naksibendis, cir. 30,000.
8. Altinoluk (Goldenconduit). Isiksis monthly, cir. 25,000.
9. Islam (Islam). Naksibendis main monthly published by Iskenderpasa Mosque Dergah, cir. 100,000.
10. Aiel ve Kadın (Family and Women). Naksibendis monthly for women and family, cir. 60,000

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11. .İlim ve İnsan (Science and Man). Naksibendis journal of science, cir. 5,000.
12. İnsan ve Kainat (Man and Universe). Naksibendi journal of philosophy, cir. 3,000.
13. Oğüt (Counsel). Monthly journal by Kadiris, cir. 30,000.
14. İmal (Assemble). Fortnightly Kadiris journal, cir. 70,000.
15. İnasn (Man). Published from time to time by a pro-Iranian radical group.
16. Ribad (Religious Duty). Fortnightly independent journal, cir. 20,000.
17. Tavir (Attitude). Moderate radical journal, published irregularly.
18. Mektep (School). Moderate radical, cir. 5,000.
19. Girisim (Enterprise). Radical monthly journal, cir. 7,000.
20. Yazi (Writing). Radical and revolutionary group journal, irregular publication.
21. Kitap (Book). Intellectual journal of independent group, cir. 10,000.
22. İktibas (Citation). Monthly journal about the citations from other Islamic publications, cir. 10,000.
23. İstiklal (Independence). Pro-Iranian radical weekly, cir. 3,000.
24. Türkiye Çocuk (Turkiye Children). Children's weekly by Isikeis. cir. 10,000.
25. Atılım (Forward). Anti-order radical journal, published irregularly.

In addition to these journals there are daily newspapers published by different groups. For example Isikeis that they publish Türkiye which has achieved a professional success with a circulation that has reached 130,000. Yeni Nesil is published by Nurcus and its circulation is around 14,000. Milli Gazette is close to the Welfare Party and its circulation is around 20,000. Zaman is another Islamic newspaper which had a success story beginning; however its circulation is around 18,000 and it is not very influential any more.