

SECULARISATION IN SPAIN, PORTUGAL AND GREECE

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THE discussion of statist regimes of the right must turn on the same axis as discussion of statist regimes of the left: the monopoly of the means of power. By extension, this inevitably directs attention to the area of church-state relations. The state endeavours to include the church within its monopoly. However, it tries to do so at a point where the process of differentiation in the society at large gives leverage to the ancient symbolic tension between church and state, and allows it opportunity to express itself.

Furthermore the lesion between church and state is exacerbated by the fact that the Roman Catholic church at large, in Europe and elsewhere, has largely loosed itself free from statist entanglements, and exercises an external pressure on the pace of internal developments. Indeed, ecclesiastical leaders can easily draw appropriate lessons from the debacles attending such entanglements, notably in France. A liberal regime becomes an acceptable option as compared with the fate awaiting the church under totalitarian regimes. The freedom of the spiritual arm is at least a possibility under liberal aegis, and the chief danger of liberalism is its tendency to offer opportunities for take-over by disciplined minorities.

Such a drift is particularly likely to occur in countries where all the processes have been damned up by a 'reactive organicism'. The fear of anarchy or of a disciplined take-over from the left holds back sectors which might otherwise embrace the liberal option and lends colour to the accusation that the church clings to the old organic Baroque connection. On the other hand, the same fear also inclines other sectors to make an immediate alliance with the left to prevent the classic polarization occurring yet again. And this fear is conjoined with a genuine idealism, especially among younger and lower clergy, which takes a politico-religious form. The

fears of the right are thereby exacerbated, and the very alliances designed to prevent polarization then act to bring them into being. Yet these polar tendencies have not the force of the classic tension, because models of radical Catholicism are available to ameliorate them and because the enveloping atmosphere of religion can allow the early protests to utilize the church, and church buildings, as a symbolic and actual umbrella or refuge.

Since different parts of a country will be at different levels of development, the polarization will play up regional patriotism, some of an archaic, and some of a modern, variety. If large fissures are already present, based on regional sentiment, the polarization will partly turn on the axis of centre versus periphery. Spain provides the obvious instance, two of its regional areas being more developed than the centre, and one less.

The ideology of the right-wing conservative state tends to be an interim development and to occur as a reaction to an initial liberal phase or, more usually, phases. Each of these phases has exemplified accelerating hostilities between church and liberal state, in spite of major attempts to cross the divide. In the Spanish case, it was essentially the violence of the attack on the Church which sparked off the civil war. Once the organic state is restored, there cannot be a return to a straightforward traditional ideology, and there still has to be an interim hybrid form of legitimation incorporating a variety of tendencies, including the radical thrusts underlying the right-wing forces, as well as traditionalism. The uneasy alliance of the right is initially held together by the fact that its ideology turns less on ideas than on symbols and invocations. It is only afterwards that a centred focus of power crystallizes out and clips both its traditionalist and its radical wings. However, this crystallization means that its power rests more specifically on control of the state apparatus and less on a broad base, and this in turn makes the internal manipulation of élites all the more crucial. At the same time, the mass of the population continue to note the invocation of familiar symbols, including religious symbols, and prefer any kind of stability to civil war and anarchy. The 'ideology' thus contains at least one plank which is largely accepted: stability to create a form of mass support. Only a reckless misuse of force or violence will alienate this kind of support or else an egregious incompetence in the handling of economic development. In Spain, the élite committed neither mistake: in Greece the élite committed both.

No analysis of fascist ideology is required here, nor of conserva-

tive organicism but one or two points are worth noting by way of contrast with statist ideology of the left. The chief distinguishing characteristics of left ideology is that it is an intellectual construct, and can even be regarded as an ideology of the intelligentsia in its bid for power. Certainly, its call to certain sections of the working class can be regarded as a useful gesture en route to supreme power, however marked by the guilt and romanticism of middle class intellectuals. But the kind of ideology animating right wing organization is not so much an intellectual construction as an invocation of certain attitudes and symbols believed to inhere in the nation and believed to be capable of saving that nation at historic crises. Since these virtues are essentially military there is already present an incipient tension with Christianity. In Nazi Germany the Christian aspiration towards peaceability was regarded as a weak religious sentiment sapping the warrior virtue of the German spirit. Behind this militarism lies a less stark, because a more Christianized, tradition of aristocratic chivalry. At any rate, it is the military who project themselves as unphilosophic guardians of the national soul and its martial spirit. They are 'called' by crisis to exercise their historic function and to banish the corruption and venality of liberal democracy. They speak for history, and in Greece they claimed to speak very specifically for Christianity. The rhetoric is based on notions of historic destiny toned by religion. Here there appears a further contrast with statist ideology of the left. The right sees itself as propelled by history whereas the left claims to act as its midwife and to propel it forward by conscious decision.

All statist ideologies demand public adherence to their rituals and dogmas, but the right seeks a lesser degree of inward assent. The élite are openly willing to act on behalf of the masses, whereas élites of the left retire behind a dogma of universal support to which they endeavour to give a measure of reality by total socialization. The right wing élite tolerates apathy in the mass, and indeed can approve of it, and also allows itself discreet scepticisms provided they are not trumpeted abroad in a disruptive manner. How people think is less relevant than how they act. In Spain, for example, a degree of free speech and free circulation of books and ideas existed which compared very favourably with conditions obtaining in eastern Europe.

If leaders are forthcoming – and the right people in the right positions – then opinion need not be too grossly intruded upon. The crucial problem is the creation of a philosophy of development

which will relate to the objective conditions and consequences of economic change and progress. Once models of modernity are available, especially through the impact of tourism, then development is essential. So there appear right wing approaches to modernity, endeavouring to promote industrialization within a traditionalist format. The most obvious contemporary example is Brazil, where an expanding élite of many millions subsists over a mass of many more millions. As in Spain, the trans-Lusitanian church has proved a major source of opposition to this policy both with regard to its political and its economic brutalism. The philosophy of development applied in Brazil is essentially that utilized in the Soviet Union: the sacrifice of a generation or so of workers now for prosperity and – perhaps – liberty, later. The important point here is that in all instances of 'reactive organicism', in Brazil, Chile, Spain, and Portugal, and to a lesser extent in Fascist Italy and Greece, the Church shuffled out of the ancient right wing alliance. And, in spite of frequent governmental pressure on higher appointments, the ecclesiastical protest has come in some degree from the episcopate itself. In 1971 the Jesuit Assembly of Spanish Bishops and Priests actually issued a scathing indictment of Franco.

One further important religious aspect of development has been the spread of Protestant attitudes partly through pietist sectarianism, as for example in the Pentecostal movement, and partly through functional equivalents of the Protestant Ethic within the Catholic Church itself. In Chile and Brazil, from about 1950 onwards, there has been a steady, indeed accelerating, growth of Pentecostalism, more particularly perhaps among migrant workers. In both countries Protestants now comprise some ten per cent of the population. In Spain, the *Cursillos de cristiandad* have worked on a psychological basis quite similar to Moral Re-Armament or the Wesleyan class meeting, and have formed cadres of local leaders and activists. In both Spain and Greece, ascetic lay orders, operating among the highly placed, have penetrated the machinery of government: Opus Dei and Zoe. Opus Dei in particular was successful in providing a functional equivalent of the Protestant Ethic to channel the psychic energies for development and leadership. Indeed, the Spanish economic miracle, operative from about 1958 onwards, owed a great deal to the ideas of Opus Dei.

We now turn to the European cases of 'reactive organicism' which have been operative since the war, i.e. omitting Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany, which are briefly covered in the 'Latin' and 'Mixed' categories respectively. Spain provides the most complex and so-

biologically interesting instance, and it is appropriate to begin by noting a crucial aspect of the Spanish case, the complex pull over centuries of centralism and pluralism, centralism and regionalism. Mediaeval Spain was, in a limited sense, pluralistic; Baroque Spain was a monolithic entity deriving from a drive to the unitary state. Indeed, Catholicism itself was thoroughly subordinated under the enlightened absolutism of Charles the Third. Hence the Protestants are very few (some 50,000) and mostly of foreign origin: they are concentrated somewhat in Catalonia and are primarily urban. Such proselytising dynamic as there is can be found amongst such groups as Pentecostals and sectarians, operating amongst the poorer migrants in squalid urban areas.¹ But there are other sources of dissent, some old and some recent, operating within and without the Catholic Church and these may now be surveyed. Such a survey is best conceived within general remarks about the complex ambience of relations between religion and culture.

The traditional extra-ecclesiastical sources of dissidence are bourgeois rationalism, the spiritual illuminism of the free-masonry, Marxism (which is mostly not theoretical) and the various forms of anarcho-syndicalism and anarchism, the latter rooted in notions of the autonomous village. Spanish freemasonry played the same important anti-clerical role in the nineteenth century as it did in France. The spirit of autonomous community² (which one also finds, of course, in Russia and Greece) lies behind a variety of Christian humanism which is anti-clerical in its exaltation of the person and its opposition to all state absolutism. Perhaps one should emphasise that in a culture which is both orthodox and untheological intellectual dissent has traditionally had to express itself outside the Catholic Church, even though there are forms of historical romanticism (such as that of Menéndez y Pelayo) which emphasise the cultural role of the Church. The Spanish Church is historically not an intellectual church, any more than it is a lay church, and what is interesting about the present scene is the existence of progressive Catholic intellectuals and laity.³

The layers of Spanish piety correspond roughly to those to be found in Poland and Italy as well, of course, as elsewhere, and some of them are in varying senses, 'secular'. Thus the layer of superstitious magic is secular in that it represents proto-scientific manipulations, and the layer of simple piety is secular in its attention to 'material' objects, albeit imbued with divine, efficacious 'stuff'. And the layer of Baroque Catholicism is secular in its complete assimilation to the status quo and the world as given. One

makes this point here, though it could be made in most contexts, simply because the process of secularisation is too often expounded by reference to orthodox, theologically adumbrated norms whereby not only are rather a small number of people classifiable as religious today, but very few can have been classifiable as religious in the ages of faith. Another point worth emphasising in the Spanish context, since it is dramatically illustrated in the Spanish data, is that even reckoning by the usually accepted norms of institutional practice, secularisation in parts of Spain is a process, indeed has been a constant *condition*, over two centuries.

The layer of superstition, popular, manipulative and utilitarian, is enormously important in Spain and not merely so in country districts. There are, according to Jesús Marcos Alonso, two levels.⁴ The first is semi-magical and barely touched by Catholicism: the magic formulae of 'The Cross of Caravaca', and the spells, incantations and the like in which some Catholic element may be lodged, such as the sign of the cross. The second is best illustrated by the cult of the saints, and their respective fields of protective expertise. These are often survivals of older religions given a Catholic slant. Many people who are fanatically devoted to these patronal saints or procession societies are entirely unconcerned with communion, confessions or the moral precepts of the church. *Thus deviance from the moral precepts of the church, noted several times above, is no more a new phenomenon than is deviance from institutional practice.* Furthermore, even the more 'orthodox' rituals, devotions and spiritual associations are often recommended for 'secular' motives not far distant from those now so popular in the United States: peace of mind, family unity, relief of frustration.

A third level of ritual conformity and motivation exists which is less secular than sub-Christian: God is viewed as unapproachable, impersonal and capricious, especially in relation to untoward events. This leads to a propitiation of Him for basically utilitarian reasons, to the proliferation of less uncertain intermediaries, to excessive concern about the correct mechanics of the rite, to a disjunction between religion and morality, and to fatalism. In short, it has many characteristics in common with magic. It appears Catholic but is deficient by Catholic norms: its God is a disguise for the caprices of the phenomenal world and its ritual is a remedy limiting that caprice. The Church colludes in this because it colludes with an appearance of conformity, but under pressure of social change the exterior facade often collapses to the bare minimum of ritual acts involved in occasional conformity. Moreover, while internally

incoherent it is also capable of subsisting with inconsistent ideologies, e.g. communism. A non-theological Catholicism can cohabit with a non-ideological communism.

A level of religiosity which may include some or even all of the above is cultural Catholicism, whereby a non-Catholic is not a Spaniard, and a non-Spanish Catholic is a Catholic of the second class. The Church becomes a cultural service station for the nation, as well as being defined as guardian of the national essence. Such a version of civic religion can easily be reduced to social conformities and pressures and involves a subjection of religion to the ethical norms of the particular community. This means in effect a strict application of ethical norms within the family and little application at all within the realms of economic and professional life: this is, of course, a phenomenon not confined to Spain and derives from a fundamental recalcitrance of social relations above the level of the intimate and personal to ethical regulation. It is the obverse of the inability of political norms, as for example in eastern Europe, to have resonance at the personal level. Such a sanctification of local standards (or a secularisation and subversion of religious standards) makes all change equivalent to subversion. Hence the usefulness of this kind of religion to authoritarian regimes.

Such an identification of religion and caste is profoundly Durkheimian and breeds two dissident forms of religiosity: a non-church Christianity sitting loose to dogmas and institutions,⁵ and a Christianity which sees the Church as a specific distinct community of believers in personal relationship to God and committed to a common way of life which translates as far as may be the imperatives of the gospel, first internally and then externally. More can be said of this below in the course of examining the transitions occurring in the recent past from the rigidities immediately succeeding the civil war to the relative flexibility and openness of the post-conciliar period. The end of the Civil War marked a return to the Baroque State whereby the Church was rewarded for its part in the War, more particularly by control of education and the prohibition of civil marriage. The Church licked its wounds after the violent explosions of anti-clericalism under the Second Republic (1931-6). With one or two episcopal exceptions conformity reigned and church adherence became an index of conformity. The radical Catholic movements in Catalonia (parallel to the French J.A.C.) were forced underground, as radical separatist and foreign-inspired. The church however was not fascist: the fascists gestured towards it to

secure support, but the church remained simply conservative.

From 1950 to 1960 there were occasional and intermittent critical voices, sometimes of French inspiration: intellectual Catholics with more universalist perspectives and movements within Catholic Action. Religious renovation worked through the 'Courses in Christianity' for local lay leaders, the development of more specialised 'Catholic Action', movements of familiar spirituality, and the organisation called 'For a Better World'. All of these represented a desire for a more socially active religion, one which was more personal and thought out.⁶ Nevertheless, the Concordat of 1953 between the Vatican and the state remained conservative.

The post-war period of inflation in religious practice and priestly vocations then reached a plateau. 1960 marked a new era: the impact of the economic miracle, of accelerated tourism and above all migration, of elements of liberalisation, of the Vatican Council, and then of the general stirrings of dissent abroad, especially in France. The Council itself fed additional inflammable material into the new situation and made the Pope and Rome appear to conservatives as another channel of foreign, meddling influence. Many Catholics began to feel the need of a degree of independence from the State, especially so amongst workers, students and members of the liberal professions. Those who accepted the ideas of the Council favouring pluralism, liturgical reform and the replacement of authority by pastoral dialogue found themselves embattled in a generational struggle which was even more marked within the priesthood than elsewhere. This struggle contained echoes of the Dutch situation and of the much more minor disputes in Croatia: vocations fell, defections rose, some lost their faith, a few became Marxists. Various factors contributed to this, amongst them the shocks sustained by priests in working class areas, and an even more general sense that the traditional psychology and role of the priest was too constricting. Hence young would-be priests interrupted their studies and shifted into industrial or intellectual avocations. Ordinations fell by one third; vocations, which had climbed to a peak in 1967, also fell.⁷ Both the crisis in ordinations and vocations reflected a partial abandonment of the traditional anti-intellectual traditions of Spanish clergy and religious, a rejection of the principle of seniority, and an aspiration towards the expertise appropriate to specialist tasks. The latter ran *pari-passu* with a sense of displacement amongst the religious as the State absorbed their traditional functions in public health, social assistance and education. Underlying it all were new conceptions

of humanity, of Christ and of personal realisation which were seen as needing to be worked out through personal work and evangelical poverty within a communitarian setting. In short, the general crisis of identity and role in Western Europe, plus the aspiration to communal forms of existence, hit the Spanish Church a little later than elsewhere, but not much. Hence the disfavour into which the Concordat of 1953, tying the Church to the regime has fallen, even amongst moderate Catholics. Hence also, maybe, the statement by the new Prime Minister (1974), in his speech announcing a measure of liberalisation, that interference by the Church would not be tolerated. Presumably the association of radical Catholicism and both Basque and Catalan separatism in part lay behind this warning. Official uncertainty about the Church probably underlay the new 1970 education law giving the state an effective monopoly.

Opus Dei is a quasi-order, founded in 1928, operating a type of patronage system which has earned it the sobriquet 'Holy Mafia'. It is ascetic in discipline and aims to influence the world rather in the manner of Moral Re-Armament. The basic conception runs parallel to, and in imitation of, the Institución Libre de Enseñanza which was not only a seedbed of progressivism and agnosticism but also influential in distributing jobs. Though Opus Dei was originally unsuccessful the Civil War and its aftermath brought an opportunity to help fill the immense gap left by the exiled or liquidated Republican intelligentsia. The great success was Catalonia: the bourgeoisie was brought back to Hispanic piety and preferred the Opus, with its combination of the Catalan evaluation of hard work and loyalty to the régime, to the anti-capitalist slogans and centralist attitude of the Falange. Since then the Opus has infiltrated banks, bought shares in diverse companies, and has its members in key posts in industry and the ministries, though it is relatively unrepresented in the present government, (1974).⁸ The important point is that Opus Dei has found means, temporary maybe, of reconciling modernization and hierarchy, religion and rationalization and the public recognition of certain forms of hedonism. It constitutes a theo-technocracy and as such is a partial equivalent of the Protestant Ethic, albeit working within the élite levels of a hierarchical, Catholic society and specifically dedicated to élitist ideals. And in its concern for education, signalled in the creation of the new university of Navarre, it grasped at one of the crucial levers of power and influence.

This then is the wide spectrum of Spanish religiosity, running from manuals of incantation to the left-wing guerrilla priest in the

movement for Basque autonomy and the J.O.C., Juventud Obrera Católica.⁹ Thus William Christian in his description of religious life in the Nansa Valley of Northern Spain, more especially the apparitions of the Virgin and St. Michael in the early 1960s, can describe the coexistence of these levels even in one area.¹⁰ The oldest layer probably antedates Christianity and manifests itself in the shrines which influence specific areas, such as province, valley or village, and it corresponds to the local sense of identity. These shrines also help to deal with concrete problems: soliciting divine energy for human purposes and eliciting human energy for divine purposes. The next layer, deriving from the impulses of the Counter-Reformation, is characterized by a sense of sin and fear of purgatory and includes highly general devotions, such as the Sacred Heart and the Rosary, whose objective is personal salvation and the transformation of persons from one spiritual condition to another. The latest layer, barely laid down, derives from the initiative of young priests encouraging people to find God in one another rather than through intermediaries.

Portugal may be dealt with much more summarily from one point of view only: the repetition of a division between north and south, found also in Spain, and for exactly the same reasons, i.e. the imperfect christianisation of the Islamic south and the latifundia which the conquering Christians carved out for themselves. When the Portuguese South was reconquered the crown, the military orders and the nobility divided up the land between them thus bringing about an initial concentration of property. This frontier between north and south, roughly marked by the Tagus, is not merely an economic one, but can be traced along the whole march of Christian-Islamic coexistence and warfare, through southern Italy and Albania to the Bulgarian Black Sea coast.

The River Tagus is not simply a geographical but a social and religious boundary. A primary index of this difference is provided by the map of civil marriages. Civil marriage has been long recognised in Portugal, (1973), even between 1910 and 1926, and carried with it the legal possibility of divorce; those who were married canonically automatically renounced this legal possibility. Now divorce is open to those married in church. The map of civil marriages prior to 1974 therefore reflects faithfulness to the norms of official, institutional Catholicism though not necessarily religiosity in se. The whole of the north of Portugal constitutes a solid bloc in which Catholic marriage forms 90% – 100% of the total. In the south by contrast there is quite a large area in which Catholic mar-

riages run only at 40% – 50%, and in one municipality they sink to only 20% of the total. Infant mortality is higher in the north and the number of births per 1,000; illegitimacy is higher in the south. Communism and atheism are largely confined to the south, and both have drawn of the reservoir of radicalism laid down earlier by anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism.

The variations in moral style, of if you like degree of secularisation, are related to basic differences in social structure. The family in the north is patriarchal and deeply attached by kinship ties and personal ties to small holdings. The family in the south has been proletarianized and its relatively unstructured constituent members work for low pay in large scale holdings organised on capitalist lines. The equipment used in the north is more primitive and unmechanised. The farming of the north is basically for subsistence whereas in the south there is a degree of unemployment which contributes to social disintegration. Although Portugal as a whole is primarily agricultural (47% of its population works in agriculture) the industry of the north tends to be of the kind characteristic of the *first* industrial revolution (textile industries, personally owned, with a considerable artisanate) while the industry of the south is large-scale, impersonal industry. The latter is associated with a lower degree of practice than the former. Two further points are worth making since they bear on the issue of secularisation. First, there is a layer of religion below the Church, operated by female adepts. Second, the religion of the north, though practised by the majority is essentially a folk religion, whereas the ecclesiastical religion of the south, *where practised*, is sometimes closer to official Catholicism.¹¹ As in Spain some southern towns exhibit higher practice than the country: the towns contain the bourgeois, administrative and landed sectors.

These elements have, of course, all been reactivated by revolution. The Church initially welcomed the régime in cautious terms, and at least avoided any identification with the so-called Christian party of the right. It attacked atheism and totalitarianism, not agrarian reform or communist cooperatives. As the communist attempts at hegemony grew in vigour and determination, the Church was forced into a practical alliance with democratic forces, drawing on its northern strength especially at parish level to neutralise communist control of the levers of power. Thus the socialists found themselves demanding freedom both for their own paper and for Catholic radio. If the Portuguese struggle for democracy proves successful, this unique alliance will have had much to do with it. What

one has above all to remember is that the liberal régime of 1910 – 1926 acted against both the Church and the left. This did not join them together, but it did provide a common fate and thereby broke the worst spirals of left-wing-Church antagonism. The revolution, even in its extremist phases before November 1974 was *not* markedly anti-clerical. The Bishops repaid moderation with moderation, whatever local priests might say in their parish weeklies. Moreover, the corporatist union organisation of the right-wing régime 1926 – 1974 ensured that there was no specifically catholic unionism to confront left-wing unionism. The struggle in the unions is between a centralising communist thrust and the socialist and extreme left opposition. Church influence presumably leans towards the non-communist forces.¹²

When considering modern Greece, which is a country with high levels of belief and even to some extent of practice, one must remember history.¹³ Whereas Spain was divided in two by the Muslims, in Greece the Turks were dominant for several hundred years. However, the Greeks were not only dominated by the Turks but themselves became an instrument of Turkish domination through the Patriarchate of Constantinople and its relation to other Christian millets. The Greek hierarchy became *more* powerful and centralized under the Turks: it monopolised the highest offices and fully participated in the corruption of the Porte. The Turks effectively controlled appointments, and a corrupted simoniac Church became assimilated to national interests almost without remainder. Since in the period of national awakening the nation came to be conceived in terms of Hellenism the Church became a defender of non-Christian values including the lay and enlightened spirit of the Phanariot aristocracy. It was therefore triply secularised: by its identity with the nation, by secular power and corruption, and by the promotion of Hellenism. There remained the monastic tradition of spirituality and the liturgy, the former bitterly attacked and restricted by the 'enlightened'. And even these remains went into slow decline. The Church of independent Greece became helplessly dependent on the state and supported the government in the task of shaping Greece according to urban and middle class values. There is however a continuing sentiment at village level, also to be found in Spain, which comprises a tradition of human equality and brotherhood expressed in communal and economic forms.¹⁴

Two points are crucial for the present argument: the role of Zoe, parallel to Opus Dei, and the continuing struggles over appointment which carry on the age-old Byzantine and Turkish tradition. Zoe

was founded in 1913 as a monastic order in the world, dedicated in part to liturgical reform and especially to the elimination of the kind of priestly isolation symbolised by the iconostasis, and dedicated also to militant social action. This social action includes a notion of Graeco-Christian civilization which compounds the earlier conjunction of Orthodoxy and Hellenism. The role of Zoe became increasingly controversial with the appointment of Heronymos Kotsomis, one of its members, as Archbishop of Athens, and the penetration of the government of the colonels by other members of the organization. Dissident bishops were removed and the ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople was attacked in order to create a mini-Vatican in Athens. Indeed, these attempts are similar to those of the Moscow Patriarchate in trying to extend its ecumenical control, so that political ambition can be pursued in a wider context. What is interesting in the debate between governmental supporters and dissidents is the fact that the latter appeal to ancient precedent. As the ultramontane liberals in nineteenth century France appealed to the Pope against Gallican subservience so the Greek dissidents appeal to the ancient rights of the Ecumenical Patriarch: 'the bonds between the Church of Greece and the Patriarchate are unbreakable and sacred'.¹⁵

The Colonels corruption of the Church could not do away with the age-long identification of the Church and the Greek and Byzantine spirit. Yet it did contribute to a youthful alienation which saw the new appointees of the régimes as puppets of reaction. Only a very few dissident priests attracted torture at the hands of the régime, and the 'true' tradition perhaps passed into the hands of Makarios. As is well known, the Colonels and Makarios were more and more in conflict. His deposition and the Cypriot tragedy followed directly on this conflict, accelerated by the final desperate moves following the polytechnic events in Athens. Once the northern army removed the Colonels – after refusing to move against the Turks, – the appointees of the right were mostly retired, and the tarnished image of the Church hierarchy at least improved to some degree. What remained indestructible was the rural cycle of festival and rite, both personal and communal, carrying forward the heart of Greek culture in a manner almost Jewish in its intimate linkage of family, community, and religion. The Paschal Lamb in Greece symbolizes exactly what the Passover signifies in Israel.

The three oligarchic and – until recently (1974) – conservative cultures just discussed have characteristics which enable one to emphasise points of key importance. The first two points are about

history. The rhetoric of Spanish nationalism is in terms of historic destiny and identity; the rhetoric of Greek with Greek is in terms of an appeal to ancient practices and rights, including the practices of Byzantium. And just as the language of such cultures refers back to the past and mystical doctrines of the meaning of the past, so too the historic frontiers of the past underlie the patterns of contemporary religiosity, above all the age-old frontier with Islam. The strong religiosity of Cyprus (and indeed of Malta) is nourished by the existence of that frontier. The third point concerns the range of meaning behind the term secular in that it may denote assimilation to established power, an overtly materialist doctrine, hedonistic indifference, religious propaganda based on psychic utility, or manipulative, proto-scientific practices designed to conjure responses from nature. Such a range of definition allows one to see how beneath the apparently identical outward garment of religion, modern and ancient, there may be highly secular substrata, depending of course on the definition one chooses to employ. The Greek case is particularly dramatic insofar as the Greek Church, seemingly devoted to Orthodox spirituality, became, quite soon after the achievement of independence, closely identified with Hellenism, in many respects a secular doctrine and certainly one at odds with its own deposit of faith. Of course, the face of 'secular' will vary with the religion under review. When the religion is Christian, then there arises a contrast between a faith in 'signs' relating to God's Kingdom and magical manipulations for one's own benefit, so that faith in 'signs' is 'religious' and magicality 'secular'. Similarly for a religion whose fundamental deposit of faith puts secular authority under divine judgement, separates the community of faith from the ethnic or local community and reverses the status order in favour of the 'offscourings of the earth' most of the data presented above constitute secularisation. They do so because religion becomes almost isomorphic with social structure, local identity and secular moral and status evaluations. It is precisely this secularisation, whereby the institutionalisation of faith accelerates its assimilation to the world as given, which sparks off – in certain circumstances – the rejection of institutional Christianity *in se* and all its structures of authority. It is therefore arguable that 'progressive' forms of Christianity in (say) Spain are more religious than the ancient faith of that country. Indeed, there is one further point of interest here: in Spain and in Greece, and for that matter in Tsarist Russia, there existed and exists today a local level of equality, communal sensitivity and democracy, which stretches

back, like the foral traditions of the Basques, to medieval times and earlier. These very old traditions of communalism link with some of the progressive sectors of the church, but since such traditions occur within very hierarchical overall structures, the underlying impulse finds its modern realization in 'communautés de base', reclaiming derelict areas and setting up self-selected groups of radical dissenters. In so far as such groups are explicitly political, they can be labelled as 'secularized' but they are hardly more political than was the Baroque church and their relation to the foundation documents of Christianity is arguably closer. We have the paradoxes of secularization always with us. What more materialistic, in one sense, than agricultural magic, and what more materialistic, in another sense, than the total collusion of the church with the imperatives of power?

NOTES:

¹ Cf. P. Almerich, 'Spain' in H. Mol (ed.), *Western Religion*, The Hague: Mouton, 1972.

² Cf. M. Kenny, *A Spanish Tapestry*, New York: Harper, 1966.

³ R. Duocastella, 'Espagne: Société et Eglise en processus de change', *Actes de la 12e Conférence de Sociologie religieuse*, Lille: C.I.S.R., 1973.

⁴ J.M. Alonso, 'A social and psychological typology of religious identification in Spanish Catholicism', *Social Compass*, Vol. XII, Nos. 4-5, 1965.

⁵ Cf. for example the para-Christian influence of the minor German philosophical current associated with Karl Krause. R. Carr gives an account of this in his *Spain 1808-1939*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966, in which he underlines the mixture of Protestant Ethic motifs and subjective mysticism. What one finds especially interesting is the way the innovators reflect the structure and mode of traditionalism. As Carr puts it, 'The danger of Krausism lay precisely in that it was a quasi-religious movement with professors as its priests.' (p. 303).

⁶ R. Duocastella, *op. cit.* On the period of 'personal religion' in the 1950s, cf. A. Orensanz, *Religiosidad Popular Española 1940-1965*, Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1974. The *Cursillos de cristiandad* represented a version of the Wesleyan class meeting plus various socio-psychological techniques. It is as if Spain passes through hints of Protestantism very rapidly, as it were en passant, as it shifts between traditionalism and radicalism. Protestantism is implicit in aspects of Opus Dei, Krausism, and the *Cursillos* but never achieves full expression on classic Reformation lines. There are further references to the *Cursillos* and to Catholic Action in A. Orensanz, *Crisis Rural y Sociedad del Ocio*, Zaragoza: Prensa Aragonesa, 1974.

⁷ R. Duocastella, *op. cit.* For a survey indicating the degree of recent radicalization among the clergy, cf. J. Cazorla, 'Consensus et Conflit dans d'Eglise espagnole sous le régime de Franco', *Actes de la 13e Conférence internationale de Sociologie religieuse*, 1973: Lille, C.I.S.R., 1973. This showed that over one third of the priests surveyed were socialistic in approach. On a comparative note, one has the feeling that the tension which gradually developed in Fascist Italy between Church and State after the Concordat could have developed further along the lines now evident in Spain.

⁸ According to a report in *The Times*, January 3, 1974. Cf. various works which comment on the relation of politics and religion in Spain: J. Tusell, *Historia de la Democracia Christiana en España*, Cuadernos para el Diálogo, Madrid, 1974; J. J. Linz, 'An Authoritarian Regime'. In E. Allardt and S. Rokkan (eds.), *Mass Politics*, New York, 1970; and S. Giner, 'Spain', in S. Giner and M. Archer, *Contemporary Europe*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1971. Giner discusses such matters as the unrest among higher-paid workers and students, as well as the clergy (p. 149). Giner describes the Church as implicated in the political system and ruling élite up to 1951, and definitely split after 1968, more particularly along generational lines, between *conciliares* and *integristas*. He stresses the skill of Opus Dei in blending *integristismo* and *desarrollismo*. J. J. Linz provides an interesting analysis of the Spanish cabinet from 1938 to 1962 (p. 276). His reference to the acquiescent attitudes of technical élites fits in with the passive attitudes of such élites in many social contexts, left, right, or liberal. Technological Universities are a good investment against radicalism. For a comparison of Spain and Holland, cf. P. Alfonsi and P. Pesnot, *L'Eglise contestée*, Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1973.

⁹ A. Orensanz, *Religiosidad Popular Española*, *op. cit.*, p. 53. 'El movimiento jocista trata de aprehender la realidad del mundo obrero en su interna conformación 'sin' mediatizaciones estructurales'.

¹⁰ W. A. Christian, *Person and God in a Spanish Valley*, New York: Seminar Press, 1974.

¹¹ The data cited above are located in A. Querido, 'Portugal', in H. Mol, *op. cit.* Cf. J. Cutileiro, 'A Portuguese Rural Society', Oxford, O.U.P. 1971.

There is further background in H. Martins, in S. Giner and M. Archer, *op. cit.* I am particularly indebted to Dr. Cutileiro for a paper read at a seminar at L.S.E. and originally given in Rome, May 1976.

¹² I rely here on reports from *The Times*; on A. Hastings in *The Tablet*, April 12 and 19, 1975; and J. S. Monteiro, 'O dilema de Igreja em Portugal', *Expresso*, 19 April, 1975. It seems likely that the strength of northern Catholicism did, in the end, contribute to the relaxation and (perhaps) the end of communist hegemony in the summer of 1975. The situation also shifted further and more crucially in a non-communist direction in November, 1975.

¹³ For the history, cf. J. Campbell and P. Sherrard, *Modern Greece*, London: Ernest Benn, 1968, Chapter 6.

¹⁴ Cf. J. Campbell, *Honour, Family and Patronage*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964, which gives an excellent account of concepts of honour and the role of religion in a mountainous area of Greece.

¹⁵ Cf. 'Greek Report', April 1969, *Shadow over the Greek Church*, which discusses the role of Zoe (or Zoi). I rely partly on information provided by Dr. N. Kokosalakis. There has been material from time to time in the *Eastern Churches Quarterly*, and a special issue dedicated to Greece in *Social Compass*, XXII, No. 1, 1975. This issue contains a short history of Zoe, including its divisions, and an article by B. Jiovitsis on the Greek priesthood. The sociographic account of the priesthood shows it to be drawn more particularly from isolated island and mountain areas, where it exercises a clear and broad leadership role and provides a channel of mobility. The recruitment of priests declines with increasing size of town and is negatively associated with education. (It is perhaps of interest that Greece is the most 'believing' of European nations, more especially with respect to the existence of the Devil. Few countries rival Greek deference to the existence of the Devil, though Americans are much seized of his diabolic reality and have shown marked increases in their belief over the past decade.)