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## Managing Security Challenges in the Euro-Mediterranean Area

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**Prof. Stephen Calleya**

Director, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC),  
University of Malta

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Throughout history the Mediterranean has continuously been at the centre of international relations. The end of the Cold War led some pundits to believe that the Mediterranean would be marginalized in global relations. The enlargement of the European Union towards the east, the rise of China in Asia and the emergence of India and Brazil as leading economic developing countries further cemented this perception.

Yet the process of globalization has not shifted international attention away from the Mediterranean. Three decades since the end of the Cold War it is clear that the Mediterranean remains an essential strategic theatre of operation linking Europe, North Africa, the Balkans, the Middle East and the Black Sea together.

Anyone questioning the strategic relevance of the Mediterranean in contemporary international relations must be careful not to confuse the rise of China and the Asia Pacific in general with a diminishment of the Euro-Mediterranean sphere of influence. While the East-West dynamic pattern of relations and the North-South dynamic pattern of relations continue to shift in different directions, the physical importance of the Mediterranean as a geo-strategic waterway remains a constant.

The Mediterranean continues to be a region of instability in international relations. It is the location of the more than six decade old conflict between Israel and Palestine. In addition to the continuous hostilities between these two peoples, this conflict also attracts the attention of Euro-Mediterranean regional actors and international great powers. The Arab Spring of 2011 has also unleashed a moment of upheaval that is resulting in a realignment of strategic interests across the Mediterranean.\*1

The post Cold War Mediterranean is a geographical area where the majority of contemporary soft and hard security challenges are present including ongoing conflicts in each sub region of the basin primarily over territorial claims, the proliferation of weapons, terrorist activities, illegal migration, ethnic tensions, human rights abuses, climate change, natural resources disputes especially concerning energy and water, and environmental degradation.

The long list of threats and risks that need to be addressed and managed in a more coherent manner requires an institutional design that can cope with such serious demands. The absence of a regional security arrangement in the Mediterranean that includes all riparian states continues to be a major handicap prohibiting the effective management of contemporary security challenges. With no Mediterranean regional security arrangement on the horizon, better coordination between the multitude of sub regional groupings across the basin through a security dialogue is a prerequisite to achieving a more stable security environment across the Mediterranean.

The absence of a security dialogue in the Mediterranean has facilitated the emergence of a security vacuum in this geo-strategically sensitive part of the world. As Henry Kissinger pointed out during an international lecture 'nature is against vacuums and will seek to correct such a situation'.\*2

A security vacuum in the Mediterranean is therefore a conducive context within which forces of instability can upset co-operative relations and enhance power shifts that could trigger further rounds of arms races

in an area where military procurement is already one of the highest in the world.

The main factor that should move European and Mediterranean states closer together in future are the mutual security interests they share: common Euro-Mediterranean political, economic and cultural interests must form the basis of any eventual security dialogue if stability is to be secured.

Given the indivisibility of security in Europe and the Mediterranean and the transitory times that are resulting in a realignment of geo-strategic interests across the Mediterranean, the EU must continue to adopt a more proactive stance when it comes to influencing and managing the international relations of the Mediterranean area.

Geographical proximity and increasing instability in the Mediterranean dictates that the EU needs to try and influence regional dynamics in the Middle East more systematically than it has been in recent years. Failure to do so will continue to stifle attempts to strengthen Euro-Mediterranean relations through the Euro-Neighborhood Policy agenda that now also encompasses the Union for the Mediterranean.

The time has come for a new Euro-Mediterranean declaration to be announced to build upon the co-operative perspective that was put forward in the Barcelona Declaration of November 1995. A new Euro-Mediterranean narrative that focuses on a common Euro-Mediterranean agenda must address real time urgent issues that are undermining the fabric of every country across the Mediterranean. Priority issues should include youth unemployment, education reform, counter radicalization and better management of the migration phenomenon. A new Euro-Mediterranean declaration must also consist of a Marshall Plan type model of development that provides economic support to each developing country across the southern shore of the Mediterranean carrying out such reforms.

All extra regional actors, with an interest in ensuring that future Euro-Mediterranean relations become more peaceful and more prosperous,

including the United States, must act to ensure that the Middle East is not left to collapse as a result of an attitude of indifference. International organizations must guard against adopting a complacent attitude when it comes to addressing the multitude of security challenges present across the Mediterranean. \*3

The outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and other regional conflicts across the Middle East will have a major bearing on the future direction of twenty-first century international relations, including of course, those of the Mediterranean. One cannot over emphasize the strategic significance of this region when providing an assessment of the sources of insecurity in post cold war relations.

When it comes to identifying a way forward to enhancing regional cooperation in the Mediterranean both the European Union and the Arab world would benefit from a Euro-Mediterranean security dialogue mechanism to identify a common Euro-Mediterranean agenda. Regional cooperation is not an aim in itself. It has to be pursued with a clear strategy, clearly defined objectives and instruments to advance long-term objectives, and a clear sense of priorities. A Euro-Mediterranean security dialogue will enable regional and international actors to identify more clearly what sort of regional cooperation makes sense and where there is a chance of advancing?

A plan of action that stipulates short, medium, and long-term phases of region-building is necessary if progress is to be registered in establishing a Euro-Mediterranean community of values. All international institutions with a Mediterranean dimension should provide their support to establish a Euro-Mediterranean security dialogue that focuses on addressing the urgent issues of youth unemployment, education reform, counter radicalization and the better management of the migration phenomenon.

As the third decade of the new millennium beckons, the Mediterranean must avoid becoming a permanent fault-line between the prosperous North and an impoverished South. The key development to watch in the emerging Mediterranean in the next decade will be to see whether

the phase of cooperation between Europe and the Arab world that has taken place since the end of the Cold War is consolidated by tangible measures to enhance political and economic reform that is underway as a result of the Arab Spring of 2011. If such an opportunity is not grasped, political paralysis coupled by economic stagnation could lead to a scenario where a clash of cultures takes hold and disorder dominates Mediterranean relations. Such a scenario of instability and uncertainty will stifle the economic growth and political stability that is necessary to improve the standard of living of all peoples across the Mediterranean.

The only way this negative future can be avoided is if the European Union's external policy towards the Mediterranean succeeds in attracting the interest of international institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the OECD, and the IMF. Collectively the international community needs to urgently launch a Marshall Plan type model of development that addresses in a meticulous manner the urgent issues of youth unemployment, education reform, radicalization and the management of migration. International financial institutions need to put their money where their mouth and become more altruistic in their dealings with the region if economic growth is to be registered on a sustainable basis. The Mediterranean countries themselves must also adopt more of a self-help mentality. Rather than undermine or diminish the significance of the EU in the Mediterranean, the growing socio-economic disparities across the Mediterranean underlines further the important role that the EU and other international actors should play to promote a more stable Mediterranean.

## **A New Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue**

The heterogeneous nature of the Mediterranean represents a great challenge when it comes to managing the security challenges present in contemporary international relations. The Mediterranean Sea connects three continents. In the words of Fernand Braudel: The Mediterranean is not even a single sea, it is a complex of seas; and these seas are broken up by islands, interrupted by peninsulas, ringed by intricate coastlines.\*4

From a strategic perspective one notes at least four different “seas”: the western Mediterranean from Gibraltar to the Gulf of Sirte, linking southern Europe to the Maghreb; the Adriatic Sea, linking Italy to the Balkans; the Aegean Sea connecting Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus; and the eastern Mediterranean basin also in the vicinity of the Israeli-Arab conflict. \*5

An analysis of the pattern of relations in the different sub regions of the Mediterranean a decade into the new millennium reveals that while Southern Europe states have become more deeply integrated into the European sphere of influence, similar to their counterparts in Eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War, no similar pattern of unity is noticeable across the other Mediterranean sub regions. Actually several Arab states in the Maghreb and Mashreq resisted the option of embracing the global trends of democracy and liberal values until the Arab Spring of 2011 changed the equation completely. It remains to be seen if most states along the southern shore of the Mediterranean opt for a process of political and economic reform that includes guaranteeing freedom of expression and gender equality.

The struggle of radical Islamists against the powerful forces of modernization, capitalism and globalization is not a new phenomenon. Resistance to change has taken place at regular intervals. However, even the Chinese have understood that while it is possible to have capitalism without political liberalization, it is much more difficult to have capitalism without cultural liberalization. This is a lesson that all southern shore Mediterranean states would be wise to grasp.\*6

The very fluid nature of international relations since the start of new millennium has resulted in an ever-changing global security landscape. Perceptual changes taking place in the Euro-Mediterranean security environment demand a strategic re-think when it comes to addressing and managing more effectively sources of instability. The continuous emergence of different sources of insecurity demands a more flexible modality of regional security management as states in the international system seek to limit the ramifications from the permanent insecurity landscape we find ourselves in.



The Second Working Group Session on 'Managing Security Challenges in the Euro-Mediterranean Area' at the Malta, Arraiolos Meeting 2017, Mediterranean Conference Centre, Valletta.



Introductory Remarks to the Second Working Session delivered by Prof. Stephen Calleya on the theme 'Managing Security Challenges in the Euro-Mediterranean Area'.



Discussion following the Introductory Remarks by Professor Stephen Calleya addressed by H.E. János Áder, President of Hungary.



Round Table discussion following the Introductory Remarks by Professor Stephen Calleya addressed by H.E. Andrzej Duda, President of Poland.





Round Table discussion following the Second Working Group Session addressed by H.E. Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, President of Portugal.



Round Table discussion following the Introductory Remarks by Professor Stephen Calleya addressed by H.E. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, President of Germany.



H.E. Marie Louise Coleiro-Preca, the President of Malta, addressing the Second Working Group discussion.



Professor Stephen Calleya addressing the Second Working Group Session discussion on Managing Euro-Mediterranean Security Challenges, Malta Arraiolos Meeting 2017.

Successive EU enlargements, the expansion of NATO and the evolution of America's security doctrine in the aftermath of the September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 terror attacks dictate that a more coordinated approach towards contemporary security challenges in the Mediterranean should be adopted if sources of insecurity are to be more effectively addressed in future.

Three decades since the end of the Cold War the concept of security is also under review. In the post-Cold War world there has been a gradual shift away from traditional security concerns that focus exclusively on military threats to so-called soft security risks and threats. This category of security challenges includes organized crime, drug trafficking, illegal migration, terrorism and climate change.

Given the fluid nature of security after the first decade of the new millennium what strategic policy needs to be implemented to minimize the level of turbulence between different states across the Mediterranean area? Can a regional Mediterranean security dialogue be established to address security challenges in a more consistent and coherent manner? Given the heterogeneous nature of the Mediterranean system of states is it more feasible to address security challenges through smaller sub regional groupings of states? Does the diversity of security interests especially along the north-south axis of Mediterranean relations dictate that security issues can only be contained effectively through the active engagement of extra regional actors such as the United States, European Union, the United Nations and the Group of 20?

In the post-Cold War the main actor that has sought to increase its influence in the security agenda of the Mediterranean is the European Union. Since the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in November 1995 the participating European and Mediterranean states have consistently agreed to introduce and develop confidence building measures in an effort to reduce already existing tensions and especially as a mechanism to prevent additional clashes from emerging. While recognizing the different perceptions that exist due to ongoing conflicts

in the region, in particular the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the process of Euro-Mediterranean dialogue has yet to result in the emergence of a common security culture that focuses on preventing an escalation of hostilities.

Ongoing conflicts in the Mediterranean in particular the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, have not allowed the political will necessary to advance such a security blueprint from being nurtured. In the absence of a dramatic breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, rather unlikely given the hardening of extreme positions over the past decade, a more short-term Mediterranean security management framework should be sought. A new Euro-Mediterranean declaration that focuses on urgent contemporary issues such as youth unemployment, education reform, counter radicalization and the better management of migration offers such an opportunity.

Such a regional security mechanism would seek the establishment of an enhanced political dialogue in an appropriate institutional framework and seek to introduce on an on-going basis partnership building measures, good neighborly relations, sub-regional co-operation and preventive diplomacy measures.

The absence of a security arrangement to address the long list of security challenges in the Mediterranean is certainly a recipe for an increase of sources of insecurity as this strategic waterway becomes further identified as a zone where illicit activity can take place unchecked. It is quite ironic that the more interdependent the global security theatre of operations has become, the less connected security mechanisms in the Mediterranean have become. If such a trend continues it is clear the Mediterranean will be an area where a security vacuum becomes more dominant.

The setting up of a regional security dialogue will also dispel perceptions that the Mediterranean has largely been neglected by the international community since the end of the Cold War. The risk that such a perception becomes further entrenched is particularly high at the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century given that post-Cold war

great powers have continued to upgrade their attention towards other regions adjacent to the Mediterranean such as the Balkans, the Arabian Gulf and sub-Sahara Africa, but not the Mediterranean basin itself.

One of the post-Cold War lessons that is already clear is that it is a strategic error to concentrate your security forces in one region at the expense of securing stability in others. International attention on the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe during the past decades seems to have taken place at the expense of developing a comprehensive security structure in the Mediterranean. The resultant security vacuum has witnessed a multiplication of sources of insecurity thrive across the Mediterranean including illegal migration, drug trafficking and other types of organized crime.

Foreign policy strategists that are seeking to establish peace and security around the Euro-Mediterranean area should introduce policies that seek to balance sub-regional interests and not turn regional security into a zero-sum game where sub-regions compete for attention.

When addressing the plethora of security issues in the Mediterranean international actors such as the European Union must guard against promising more than they can deliver. The post-Lisbon Treaty implementation process, the management of the global recession's impact on the Euro, and the continuation of the EU enlargement process means that the EU plate will remain very full for most of the decade leading to 2030. The EU must therefore be prepared to work more closely with other security institutions and states such as NATO, the OSCE and the United States and China, to develop a functioning security framework in the Mediterranean.

If such an exercise is to be successful it is essential that all Euro-Mediterranean countries become more vocal, transparent and engaged in the post-Cold War security environment that is evolving around them. Otherwise they will have no one to blame but themselves for becoming further marginalized from the wider security framework that is emerging globally.

Political will must of course be coupled with further economic cooperation between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, including a sustained effort to strengthen further south-south cooperation. The establishment of a free trade area between the so-called Agadir Group of countries, namely Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan provides a common ground upon which further south-south cooperation can be encouraged. All four countries are also members of NATO's Mediterranean Partnership. The Agadir initiative should facilitate the task of enhancing further integration between North African states and provide a conducive context within which reactivating the moribund Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) that was created in 1989, and seeks to create a common market between Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Libya can take place.

Since the so-called 'Arab Spring' in 2011, when a number of countries in the Arab world, including Tunisia, Egypt and Libya experienced revolutions that saw the removal of regimes that had been in power for decades, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has been politically and economically more unstable. This has resulted in the emergence of a weak economic outlook in all of the countries with very high unemployment registered throughout. In fact, in the last six years unemployment has increased among the youth (18 years old to 30 years old) in every Arab country in the MENA region. \*7

If the goal of fostering economic development is to take place across the MENA region then a 'Marshall Plan' type of policy framework should be created. This Investment and Development fund which will require tens of billions of dollars to be effective and could be financed by the G20 countries and also include the rich Gulf States, would be geared towards restoring ailing Arab economies over a period of five to ten years.

Such a Development and Investment Fund would provide vital support for Arab states to undertake the necessary reforms in a socially sustainable manner and ultimately help in stimulating economic growth and job creation. Development of the hinterland vis-à-vis the coast in all of the Arab countries along the southern shore of the Mediterranean is essential as the living conditions will become more unbearable by

2025. It is imperative to develop the hinterland by upgrading the infrastructure in general, building schools, hospitals and housing for millions of people every year. Funds would be allocated only to those countries that sign up to a rigorous process of international monitoring that ensures transparency and accountability in all reform projects undertaken. One country that has taken significant strides since 2011 to reform its public and private sectors and should be considered as a primary candidate in such an endeavour is Tunisia.

As Malta has consistently advocated, the indivisibility of security in Europe and the Mediterranean, dictates that the EU should adopt a more proactive stance when it comes to influencing and managing the international relations of the Mediterranean area if it wants to successfully project stability in the area. While the intensity of political and economic relations across Europe has resulted in it becoming one of the most advanced regionally integrated areas of the world, the Mediterranean remains the least integrated.

The upheavals in the Arab world since 2011 have resulted in a period of tremendous uncertainty that has impacted negatively in political and economic terms all of the Arab countries concerned. While the Mediterranean EU member states, including Malta, have so far been able to largely avoid being negatively influenced by developments in the MENA region, it is clear that the volatility being experienced is undermining any potential to promote economic ties with neighbouring countries in the MENA region. Instability in Libya and uncertainty in Egypt and Tunisia has undermined completely economic relations with all EU countries and prohibited any outlook that envisages closer political and economic relations between the EU and the MENA region.

Malta's geographical proximity to the Middle East and North Africa and Malta's foreign policy track record as a promoter of peace and stability in the Mediterranean as witnessed through such historical milestones as the CSCE Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, positions Malta well to be an active partner in any future political, economic and cultural relationships between the international community and the MENA region.

As a member of the European Union Malta is in an advantageous position to work with other EU members and its Mediterranean southern neighbours to champion political and economic initiatives that promote regional cooperation between Europe and the Arab world. Specific sectors where Malta can play a significant role could include economic initiatives taken to upgrade the education sector, the youth employment sector and the migration sector in each respective country.

A robust Development and Investment Fund will assist in attracting the necessary resources to stimulate economic growth and create productive jobs in the MENA region by facilitating the necessary transfer of technology required and providing long-term financing to start ups and public and private projects. One example where immediate action should be taken is in the education sector. The target should be to ensure that all children have access to primary education. A concerted effort also needs to take place to reduce the number of secondary school leavers in all Euro-Mediterranean countries. This can only happen if massive investment in teacher training programmes takes place. Malta can certainly contribute to such an undertaking. Other areas where cooperation can take place include initiatives that champion addressing youth unemployment, counter radicalization, better management of migration, women empowerment and cross-cultural exchanges. Malta can also partner with others in the EU when it comes to realizing the creation of an integrated Euro-Mediterranean energy market and transport regional network as envisaged by the EU Commission.

At this moment of turbulence and transition across the Euro-Mediterranean region it is essential that the European Union and all other international actors with a capability to influence Euro-Mediterranean regional dynamics seek to steer relations in a cooperative direction instead of a clash that some are seeking. Navigating relations requires an effort to influence them and not just assume an observer status stance. The arc of instability that has emerged in the Mediterranean demands a strategic re-think that seeks to suppress forces of instability.



More than six years since the revolutions swept across the Arab world in 2011 the EU must come to terms with the fact that it has so far not succeeded in putting forward a Euro-Med strategy that offers the Arab world an opportunity to cooperate more closely with Europe. Failure to propose a collective security paradigm that reflects the interdependent and indivisible nature of Euro-Mediterranean relations is resulting in a return to fragmentation of embryonic regional relations nurtured since the 1990s and the emergence of a number of failed states as seen in Libya and Syria.

Twenty years after it launched the Barcelona Process the European Union must realise that if it is serious about wanting to contribute towards restoring stability in the Mediterranean it is imperative that it adopts a holistic approach towards security along the lines it had when launching the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995.

Rekindling a comprehensive strategy that offers political, economic and socio-cultural support to neighbouring countries across the southern Mediterranean would provide the European Union with precisely the type of narrative that has been absent since 2011. The EU should adopt a more visible approach towards the Mediterranean and unequivocally support political and economic reforms that are based on a functioning rule of law system of governance. Such a modality must be inclusive in nature and integrate civil society into the fabric of decision-making. While such a strategy could form part of an over-arching Neighbourhood Policy the time has come to admit that the security challenges facing the EU on its eastern and southern borders require separate and more intensive mechanisms that are able to address the fast changing realities on the ground. Adopting a Euro-Med strategy that focuses on socio-economic trends in the region is essential if the European Union wants to be a credible actor in the Mediterranean.

## **Euro-Mediterranean Scenarios 2030**

Looking ahead towards 2030 the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) will remain an important geopolitical location due to the large oil deposits in this region of the world and the region's potential as a source of instability. The MENA's near future will be determined by how the leaders of these countries decide to manage political reform, energy profits, demographic changes, and open conflicts.

The first major immediate challenge Arab states in transition are facing is of achieving growth rates above six per cent annually to absorb the new workforce generation and provide a completely different narrative to the high number experiencing youth unemployment. \*8

If serious economic, educational, social and legal reforms are implemented and law and order are restored then international investors will be prepared to invest in these states. This process must include integrating moderate Islamic political parties that are certain to multiply during the next two decades.

A ring of failed states in this part of the Mediterranean area would severely undermine the stability necessary to attract foreign direct investment on a large scale and to ensure the safe passage of commodities through the global supply routes of the Red Sea and the Straits of Hormuz. The emergence of an arc of crisis across the southern Mediterranean will ultimately impinge upon all states across the Mediterranean and undermine their position in the global political economy of the twenty-first century.

Since the end of the Cold War the global economy has drawn the majority of states in the international system closer together. Yet growing interdependence has not affected all parts of the globe to the same extent. In fact, while the intensity of political and economic relations across Europe has resulted in it becoming one of the most advanced regionally integrated areas of the world, the Mediterranean remains the least integrated.

The European Union's Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) launched more than twenty years ago in November 1995 and EMP Barcelona Declaration held great promise of creating a more peaceful, stable and prosperous Euro-Mediterranean region in the twenty first century. Instead the opposite has happened. The time has come to reflect upon the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 and refocus the EU's energy on specific short-term oriented goals that were already highlighted in the Declaration.

In many ways the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has diluted the EU's focus towards the Mediterranean. The time has come for the European Union to shift from being a passive observer of the historical moment taking place in the Mediterranean since 2011 and to become an

active player that nurtures confidence across the Mediterranean and supports seriously a Euro-Mediterranean cooperative security agenda.

It is also important for the European Union to recognize its limitations. The EU on its own lacks the political and economic means to correct the socio-economic and political disparities in the Mediterranean. This is even more the case now that the EU is confronted by the challenge of managing the exit of its first member state from the Union after the Brexit vote of June 2016.

The United States can certainly help make up for some of Europe's shortcomings along its southern periphery. After all, co-operating with Europe in the Mediterranean could be a decisive foreign policy mechanism that assists in strengthening the transatlantic partnership at a stage in history when its entire *raison d'être* is being questioned.

After the tragic events of September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 and subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is in the international community's interest to avoid the emergence of new fault-lines such as the one that is settling between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. Improving the livelihood of the millions of people along the southern shores of the Mediterranean must emerge as a concerted transatlantic foreign policy goal if such a division is not to become a permanent feature of the Mediterranean region.

If the 'clash of civilisations' scenario is not to attract tens of thousands of recruits in the years ahead the West must find ways of opening further channels of communication with all governments in the Mediterranean, including possible Islamic regimes. Otherwise the slow process of democracy building in the Maghreb and the Mashreq will come to a halt and the wave of anti-Western radicalization may increase. \*9

Some estimates envisage as many as twenty million people in North Africa opting for emigration into Europe in the coming few years, where salaries are anything between eight to ten times higher than in the South. The emergence of a "Fortress like Europe" where borders are sealed in an effort to discourage possible migrants would only exacerbate this problem further. European policy-makers should recall

that large communities of workers originating in the sub region of the Mediterranean namely the Maghreb, have already made a significant contribution to the success of European industry.\*10

While the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the subsequent Union for the Mediterranean have sought to arrest the process of polarisation between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, the post-Cold War era has so far not seen a significant reversal of this trend. This structural development is what is stifling the establishment of a co-operative Mediterranean region.

It is also worth noting that political will on its own will not be enough to influence geopolitical relations on such a large scale. Economic support must also be forthcoming. The Americans had spent the equivalent of 125 billion euros in the Marshall Plan towards western Europe between 1947 and 1951 compared to the 20 billion that Brussels had devoted to the Euro-Med Partnership between 1995 and 2005.\*11

If the goal of fostering economic development is to take place across the MENA region then an 'Arab Marshal Plan' should be created. This fund which will require tens of billions of dollars to be effective could be financed by the rich Gulf States and would be geared towards restoring ailing Arab economies over a period of five year. Such a Fund would provide vital support for Arab states to undertake the necessary reforms in a socially sustainable manner and ultimately help in economic growth and job creation. \*12

A quarter of century into the post-Cold War era there are clearer signs that the East-West divide of the past is being replaced by an international security system where North-South divisions are becoming the dominant feature. Unlike the European continent where the fall of the Iron Curtain ushered in a period of reconciliation, the Mediterranean remains a frontier area of divisions. European and Middle East economic disparities and political differences continue to be the hallmark of Mediterranean interchange.\*13

A number of indicators extant today can be used to project the strategic environment in the Mediterranean to 2030. Unless these indicators change significantly, the environment for during the next two decade can already be identified. The United States and Europe will continue to depend on the Gulf and Maghreb for much of their energy supplies. They will however be joined by the likes of China and India that will need to satisfy their growing energy demands and therefore access to these areas will remain a high foreign policy priority.

If European Union efforts to foster inter-Mediterranean political and economic co-operation are to succeed they must be complemented by initiatives that Mediterranean states themselves initiate as part of a process that aims to create a transnational network upon which cross-border types of economic and financial interaction can take place. To date, the Mediterranean has not succeeded in creating an environment where people, products, ideas and services are allowed to flow freely. A Marshall Plan for the Mediterranean provides an opportunity that will allow the Mediterranean to compete and prosper in the global village of tomorrow.

In the Mediterranean the EU is already seeking to project prosperity and resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict but much more needs to be done if a more effective Mediterranean policy is to be achieved. The main challenge for international organisations is to match their policy statements with action on the ground. Given the fact that Europe's security is indivisible from that of the Mediterranean, the EU must continue to adopt a more proactive stance when it comes to influencing and managing relations in the Mediterranean area.

As the sole superpower, the United States continues to play a leadership role in the Middle East. But it is in the EU's interest to adopt a more active diplomatic role in seeking to restore stability in the Middle East. An external relations policy that focuses on trying to help Israel and the Palestinians forge a common ground despite their clear differences should be the driving force of such a re-think.

Geographical proximity and stability in the region dictates that the EU needs to try and influence regional dynamics in the Middle East more systematically than has been the case in recent years. Failure to do so will stifle attempts to strengthen Euro-Mediterranean cooperative relations. The Middle East cannot be left to collapse as the outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will have a major bearing on both Mediterranean and international relations of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. \*14

The EU must also recognize that the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together the EU and U.S. will be a formidable force of security in world affairs. The convergence of American and European interests in the Mediterranean and the fact that both the United States and Europe have significant resources in the area could lead to a more cooperative approach between the transatlantic partners when it comes to Mediterranean security in future.

Numerous other trends also point towards an improved climate within which an enhanced Euro-American strategic partnership in the Mediterranean in forthcoming decades should take place. The much improved relationship between the United States and France and the latter's rapprochement towards NATO, the mutual interest in promoting south-south integration across the Mediterranean, and shared interests in the future of Turkey are all factors underlining the relevance of such a trend. Mutual concerns when it comes to the plethora of security risks and threats in the Mediterranean, and the more multi-polar strategic scene that is emerging in international relations further cement such a scenario.

The launching of an enhanced political and economic dialogue in the Mediterranean would provide the EU with an excellent opportunity to introduce two basic features that have been absent from the EMP: responsibility and accountability. Responsibility and accountability will provide the Mediterranean with a sense of ownership of cooperation with the international community.

Given the state of international relations in the Mediterranean and the more multilateral shift in the international system since 2011, the EU

must become more aware that it cannot influence relations significantly in the Mediterranean without dedicating more resources, both human and financial, to the area and also be being more prepared to forge strategic partnerships with other international actors with an interest in the region.

In the post-Cold War world there is also a tendency for the process of globalisation to focus too exclusively on economic growth at the expense of the sacrifices that have to be made at a social level. International financial organisations are more often than not showing no pity with the poor sectors of society.

As successive G8 summits have highlighted, especially since the Gleneagles summit of 2005, very little attention is also being dedicated to the quality and quantity of international assistance that is being offered. International assistance, including that being offered within the Euro-Mediterranean process, needs to focus more on the human dimension of this equation. It is ridiculous to blame the victim for shortcomings of the economic model that is being established.

The age of globalisation has brought a fifteen-fold increase in world trade, a fourfold increase in production, and a doubling of per capita income. Such economic benefits have yet to be realised in the Mediterranean area. The Barcelona Process followed by the European Neighborhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean projects were expected to assist in improving the Mediterranean socio-economic outlook. In reality, the EU's Mediterranean policy has yet to achieve such an objective.

The Arab uprisings of 2011 highlight that no programme will be sustainable in the long-term unless it is based on consensus, legitimacy and pays attention to the limits of tolerance of society. Policymakers need to pay more attention to what people want and what is preventing them from obtaining their goals. It is not really a question of time limits but which policies are required to achieve the goals being sought. A gradualist approach is perhaps a better option as it will allow reasonable time for society to be able to adapt and cope with the changes that are

being proposed and introduced. It is crucial for policy-makers to create win-win situations where all sectors of society are able to benefit.

More than two decades have passed since the signing of the Barcelona Declaration in November 1995, when the Foreign Ministers of the EU and their counterparts from twelve Mediterranean countries pledged to progressively establish a Euro-Mediterranean area of peace, stability and prosperity at the horizon of 2020. Since then, profoundly asymmetrical developments in the EU and the Mediterranean have taken place: an EU frantically struggling to keep up with the constraints of globalisation, a Mediterranean falling further behind.

The concept of regionalism in international relations denotes an intensity in the pattern of relations between states that are geographically proximate to one another. Such a pattern of interaction can take place at different levels including the political, economic or cultural level.

In the Mediterranean such patterns of interaction have largely taken place at a sub-regional level, that is, not across the Mediterranean basin but in different pockets of this geographical space. Thus while an increase in the intensity of interaction has been evident in southern Europe, the Balkans, the Maghreb and the Mashreq, there has been no major trend towards an intensity of interaction between the sub regions of the Mediterranean.

Before closing the gap between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean can be successfully implemented there is thus a necessity to build and nurture both a mental conceptual blueprint and physical infrastructure of regionalism in the Mediterranean. In other words, the peoples of the Mediterranean need to believe that they share more than a common history, but that they also share a common destiny, be it at a political, economic or cultural level of analysis. To date, this is not the case.

If more attention towards the Mediterranean is to be forthcoming it is crucial that more awareness is raised about the reality that there can be no security and stability in Europe if there is no security and stability



along the southern shores of the Mediterranean. If the European Union cannot successfully project policies of stability in its immediate neighbourhood across the Mediterranean, its more ambitious goal of becoming a global source of stability will remain a fallacy.

Economic development as envisaged by a Marshall Plan type model of development will only take place if investors believe they are committing themselves to a strategic environment where the rule of law and security are guaranteed. The re-launching of a political and economic dialogue that seeks to build a common security platform to address the long list of security risks and threats including terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, organised crime, and environmental degradation, will create a more conducive strategic context within which UfM goals can be pursued and achieved.

If the EU wants to increase security in the Mediterranean at a human level its needs to decide whether it is going to export more jobs to its southern neighbours or whether it is prepared to absorb some of the excess employment capacity that is due to grow further in the next decade. Current projections estimate that the population of North Africa and the Middle East is due to grow from 200 million to 300 million by 2030.

Unless the countries along the southern shores of the Mediterranean are able to significantly increase their economic growth to above six per cent per annum, unemployment figures in this part of the world are scheduled to increase rapidly in the next ten years. This demographic time-bomb is therefore certain to be a source of instability in the Euro-Mediterranean area if not addressed in a concerted manner in the near future.

A new Euro-Mediterranean declaration that champions a robust political and economic dialogue and action plan towards the Mediterranean will introduce a very important perspective that to date has largely been absent when it comes to promoting regional integration in the Mediterranean. The political, economic and socio-cultural driven initiative

will enhance Euro-Mediterranean interdependence, a prerequisite to being able to encourage confidence and eventual trust between states in the area. The raising of political and economic interests and stakes will serve as an insurance policy against self-centred and myopic policy making that for too long has hindered trans-Mediterranean integration. Looking ahead to 2030, integrating the Mediterranean into the global political economy is the ultimate challenge facing the international community.

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Valletta Cultural Tour. Walk through Valletta – Merchants Street.



H.E. Sergio Mattarella, President of Italy together with H.E. Ambassador Giovanni Umberto De Vito, Ambassador of Italy, being greeted by the Italian community in Valletta.



Valletta Cultural Tour - In front of Auberge de Castille, the office of the Prime Minister of Malta.



Upper Barrakka Gardens – panoramic view to the Grand Harbour and Three Cities.



H.E. Marie-Louise Coleiro Preca, President of Malta, welcoming the distinguished guests at the Official Dinner at Verdala Palace.



Verdala Palace, Buskett Gardens.



Visit to School Children Project. H.E. Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović with children displaying their poster about Croatia.



H.E. Marie-Louise Coleiro Preca, President of Malta and H.E. Rumen Radev, President of Bulgaria with school teachers and students.





H.E. Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, President of Portugal interacting with Maltese students displaying their poster about Portugal.



H.E. Alexander Van der Bellen with students sporting Austrian flag hats.



Malta Arraiolos Meeting 2017 – Concluding Press Conference.



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**T**he Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC) is an institution of higher learning at the University of Malta offering advanced degrees in diplomacy and conflict resolution with a focus on Mediterranean issues.

MEDAC was established in 1990 pursuant to an agreement between the governments of Malta and Switzerland. The Academy is currently co-funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation (SDC) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malta. The Geneva Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (HEID) was among MEDAC's first foreign partners. More recently in 2009, MEDAC concluded an agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, represented by the Foreign Office, in turn represented by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and established a German Chair in Peace Studies and Conflict Prevention.

In 2015 MEDAC celebrated its 25th anniversary. Since its inception, MEDAC has acquired a solid reputation both as an academic institution and as a practical training platform. We are fortunate to count over 700 alumni from 59 different countries who have completed successfully the post-graduate courses offered by the Academy. The EU's enlargement towards the Mediterranean, that included Malta in 2004, and the recent transformation of the political landscape throughout the Arab World have resulted in an ever increasing demand for MEDAC's programme of studies.

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**Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies  
University of Malta  
Msida MSD 2080, MALTA  
Tel: (+356) 2340 2821, Fax: (+356) 2148 3091  
e-mail: [medac@um.edu.mt](mailto:medac@um.edu.mt)  
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