



**L-Università  
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# **Clientelism or Corruption?**

## **The Pattern of Influence Trading in Maltese Politics and Government**

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A dissertation submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts in Public Policy Leadership at the University of Malta

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## Abstract

This study examines whether it is clientelism rather than corruption that accounts for the daily diet of accusations traded by the political parties and members of the public. This research investigates the distinction between clientelism and corruption and the confluence of factors that encourages or facilitates corruption. The research, therefore, lays the foundation for credible studies on the phenomena of clientelism, maladministration and corruption as they are manifested in Malta.

This research answers several questions, including: Is the influence trading that goes on in Maltese Politics and government a symptom of clientelism, or is actual corruption involved? What cases of clientelism and/or corruption have been alleged or identified in Maltese Politics? What cases of political clientelism and/or corruption are most evident in Maltese Politics? Is there a pattern of clientelism and/or corruption in Maltese Politics?

This study includes the collection of data from two local newspapers, namely, *In-Nazzjon* and *L-Orizzont* to uncover articles related to alleged clientelism or corrupt practices. Therefore, this study will mainly consist of a document-based research using qualitative methods by utilising primary and secondary sources, chiefly in the form of newspaper articles. This study further includes a closer look at one case study pertaining to such an alleged case as drawn from the data collected.

The notion of corrupt clientelism evident in this research is a vicious circle that facilitates the incorporation of corrupt exchanges revolving around three basic features, namely, resources, actors, and legality. Corruption and clientelism thrive on inequality, both in terms of power and resources.

*Keywords: Clientelism, Corruption, Maltese Politics, Influence Trading, Maltese Government*

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## List of Abbreviations

<b>ACFE</b>	Association of Certified Fraud Examiners
<b>AFM</b>	Armed Forces of Malta
<b>AG</b>	Attorney General
<b>AGI</b>	Africa Governance Indicator
<b>ARMS</b>	Automated Revenue Management Services
<b>BEEPS</b>	Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey
<b>BPI</b>	Bribery Perception Index
<b>BWSC</b>	Burmeister Wain Scandinavian Contractor
<b>DoC</b>	Director of Contracts
<b>EBRD</b>	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
<b>ECJ</b>	European Court of Justice
<b>EMC</b>	Enemalta Corporation
<b>ESTOC</b>	European Smokeless Tobacco Council
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FIAU</b>	Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit
<b>GCB</b>	Global Corruption Barometer
<b>GCC</b>	General Contracts Committee
<b>GRC</b>	Global Competitiveness Report
<b>GRECO</b>	Group of States against Corruption
<b>GRTU</b>	General Retailers and Traders Union
<b>GWU</b>	General Workers' Union
<b>IAID</b>	Internal Audit and Investigations Department
<b>ICRG</b>	International Country Risk Guide
<b>ICVS</b>	International Crime Victimization Surveys
<b>IMD</b>	Institute for Management Development
<b>LICUS</b>	Lower Income Countries Under Stress
<b>MCD</b>	Maltese Customs Department
<b>MEP</b>	Member of the European Parliament
<b>MEPA</b>	Malta Environment and Planning Authority
<b>MFSA</b>	Malta Financial Services Authority
<b>MLP</b>	Malta Labour Party

<b>MP</b>	Members of Parliament
<b>MPF</b>	Malta Police Force
<b>NAO</b>	National Audit Office
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>NIT</b>	Nation in Transit
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>OLAF</b>	European Anti-Fraud Office
<b>PAC</b>	Public Accounts Committee
<b>PBS</b>	Public Broadcasting Services Limited
<b>PCAC</b>	Permanent Commission against Corruption
<b>PL</b>	Partit Laburista
<b>PN</b>	Partit Nazzjonalista
<b>PSC</b>	Public Service Commission
<b>SCC</b>	Special Contracts Committee
<b>STV</b>	Single Transferable Vote
<b>UNECA</b>	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
<b>VOPS</b>	Voice of the People Survey
<b>WGI</b>	World Governance Indicators
<b>WVS</b>	World Value Survey

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# **Chapter 1 - Clientelism or Corruption?**

## **1.1 Introduction**

Clientelism and corruption are close relations, but while clientelism operates often unfairly and inefficiently, still within the reimits of the law, the latter is evidently a criminal activity transgressing the boundaries of legality. Clientelism pre-disposes a political or administrative system towards corruption, but is not the only cause of corrupt activities and behaviours. Factors contributing to clientelism include, but are not limited to, Malta's political economy, which encourages opportunistic behaviours, political tribalism, which alters attitudes towards public authority and law, the patronage in the State's gift, and finally, the robustness of governance systems, which include risk assessment and management, decision-making processes, oversight, and the balance of incentives and penalties for wrong-doing.

Therefore, this study examines whether it is clientelism rather than corruption that accounts for the daily diet of accusations traded by the political parties and members of the public. This research investigates the distinction between clientelism and corruption and the confluence of factors that encourages or facilitates corruption. The research, therefore, lays the foundation for credible studies on the phenomena of clientelism, maladministration and corruption as they are manifested in Malta.

With such an under-researched subject in the field of Maltese Politics, this research lays new ground by developing a unique conceptual framework which enables patterns to emerge amid the smoke and mirrors of this emotive field, where facts and perceptions

are sometimes inextricably confused. As for the basis of this study, this research focuses on Maltese Politics, mainly on the government and public administration.

## **1.2 Research Objectives**

This study includes the collection of data from two local newspapers, namely, *In-Nazzjon* and *L-Orizzont* to uncover articles related to alleged clientelism or corrupt practices. Therefore, this study will mainly consist of a document-based research adopting qualitative methods by utilising primary and secondary sources, chiefly in the form of newspaper articles. This study further includes a closer look at one case study pertaining to such an alleged case emerging from the data collected.

This research will answer a number of questions on the theme and concepts highlighted in the previous introductory section, including:

- Is the influence trading that goes on in Maltese Politics and government a symptom of clientelism, or is actual corruption involved?
- What cases of clientelism and/or corruption have been alleged or identified in Maltese Politics?
- What cases of political clientelism and/or corruption are most evident in Maltese Politics?
- Is there a pattern of clientelism and/or corruption in Maltese Politics?

### **1.3 Structure of the Study**

Chapter 2, the Literature Review, will provide a clarification of the core concepts on clientelism and corruption by drawing both the similarities and differences of these intertwined phenomena. This Chapter will further provide information on how corruption and clientelism are measured in the political world. Chapter 3, Research Methodology, will subsequently provide an understanding of how this study was conducted by explaining the implemented conceptual framework, how data was gathered and what this study will chiefly achieve. Furthermore, Chapter 4, Maltese Politics and Government, will initially provide information on the local context and how institutions and bodies seek to fight corruption. Finally, Chapter 5, Results and Discussion, will examine the gathered data in light of the literature at hand, while answering the research objectives highlighted earlier and Chapter 6, will take a closer look at one case study pertaining to such an alleged case emerging from the data collected from the previous Chapter.

## **Chapter 2 - Clientelism and Corruption – through the eyes of Scholars**

### **2.1 Core Concepts and Leading Issues**

Clientelism and corruption are often linked by conceptual comparisons and common grounds. Corruption, which is more commonly defined as the “misuse of public office for private gain”, can take many forms (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, p. 551). ‘Petty’ acts of corruption target individual citizens engaged in everyday ordinary transactions. Common examples include public officials asking for extra payments to issue licences or permits in a timely fashion and government inspectors extorting funds in exchange for necessary permits or access. Corruption can additionally function on a grand scale as political elites embezzle budgeted funds for private enrichment, or auction policy initiatives, or procurement contracts in exchange for financial rewards.

Corruption is commonly linked to economic inefficiencies and reduced levels of economic development as well as the undermining of democracy (Treisman, 2007). It is moreover commonly linked to clientelism, “the proffering of material goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is simply: did you (will you) support me?” (Stokes, 2007, p. 649), or “the direct exchange of a citizen’s vote in return for direct payments or continuing access to employment, goods, and services” (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007, p. 2). Clientelism can manifest in a wide variety of forms, from a one-time payment of a person’s vote, the distribution of jobs via patronage, to giving political allies access to welfare programmes, government subsidies, or other favours in exchange for electoral support from them and their networks (Piattoni, 2001; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). Therefore, this alters the scale of the phenomenon thereby increasing risks to general welfare.



Clientelism and corruption are likely to thrive in societies with high levels of poverty, weak democratic institutions, short democratic histories, and a large state economic presence (Treisman, 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). Therefore, countries that are heavily clientelistic tend to have corruption scandals, while countries where political competition is primarily around alternative programmatic policy proposals tend to have fewer corruption scandals (Papakostas, 2001; Muller, 2007). Furthermore, the two concepts are often linked theoretically as both involve political manipulation of public resources (Kawata, 2006).

The relationship between clientelism and corruption, however, remains relatively under-researched. Do clientelism and corruption coincide because they have similar structural causes, or do clientelist politics potentially contribute to an atmosphere where corruption flourishes? Research on these questions has been hampered by a lack of conceptual and evidential data on the extent to which politicians rely on clientelist methods to forge their political coalitions (Singer, 2014).

There are three potential ways how clientelism may lead to corruption (Singer, 2014). First, clientelist actions may themselves be corrupt. Second, clientelist politics may cumulatively undermine accountability and the rule of law, thus making it more difficult to fight corruption. Third, clientelism may increase the incentives for politicians to raise funds through corrupt methods. Each of these potential linkages has a different implication.

Other forms of clientelism that are often considered as corrupt practices include providing money or other material in direct exchange for a voter's support. Although laws vary from one country to another, vote buying is still illegal; however, enforcement of the law varies (Transparency International, 2004). Therefore, direct vote

buying is *ipso facto* corrupt. Other forms of clientelism which are considered corruption include patronage and the distribution of jobs to political supporters. Kawata (2006) includes both patronage and vote buying in his definition of corruption, which "...takes many forms. It appears as fraud, oblique voting, vote buying, patronage, graft, payoffs and bribery in the distribution and regulatory process of diverging interests, as well as in the electoral process itself" (p. xi).

'Pure' corruption, on the other hand, includes petty bribery payments to administrative staff for permissions, services, and 'expediting' administrative procedures, bribery of police officers, stealing from government funds, and accepting kickbacks for favourable regulatory decisions, contracts, and laws. As long as the money goes towards officials' consumption, these acts are purely corrupt because they may not bring any electoral benefits. These corrupt activities also generate resources that politicians do not consume but channel into electoral campaigns.

Clientelism is associated with corruption as it may contribute to the creation of a political system where corruption can flourish. Clientelism requires politicians and bureaucrats to have discretion in the allocation of resources and programmes and that these exchanges be made with minimal public oversight (Van de Walle, 2001; Muller, 2007). Clientelism, then, creates incentives for politicians to resist reforms that would increase transparency and accountability, or strengthen the rule of law (Brinegar, 2006). Another association between clientelism and corruption is that the former requires that parties have resources to distribute, thus raising the costs of campaigns and also the costs of maintaining the party base compared to appeals based on issues or identity (Shefter, 1994; Samuels, 2002). There are two ways how politicians can pay for materialistic handouts. The first is by directly tapping into the resources of the State,

such as, by manipulating the distribution of State welfare programmes and patronage assignments, or by diverting funds from State programmes into election coffers (Shefter, 1994).

This study probes Maltese experience in light of these theories in an effort to analyse the origin, presentation and consequences of the phenomena of clientelism and corruption, as well as to potentially contribute to the development of theory. As domestic studies are limited, a study in this regard would lay ground for a better analysis on the interrelated concepts of clientelism and corruption. Such concepts are interrelated as clientelism is unjust and inefficient, but sometimes excusable, while corruption is unjust, inefficient and, moreover, always illegal and never excusable. Nonetheless, both phenomena corrode government institutions, government officials and political parties (Moss, 1995).

## **2.2 Clientelism, a stepping stone to Corruption**

The relationship between clientelism and corruption is evident. Connections include the direct exchange of votes for favours (Graciano, 1974), and the misuse of public power for private or party gain (Huntington, 1968). For a long time, research considered corruption as one more component of clientelist exchanges. Even more so, the terms were commonly seen as interchangeable. Heidenheimer, Johnston and Levine's (1989) *Political Corruption, A Handbook* includes contributions referring to corruption and others referring to clientelism without corruption. Likewise, Cazzola's (1988, 1992) work on Italy placed a particular emphasis on the continuities between these two phenomena (exchanging favours, general distrust, absence of civic culture, etc.). However, more recent researchers in the field have conceptually separated the two

(Caciagli, 1996). In fact, Caciagli (1996) dedicates a whole book dissecting corruption, clientelism, and organised crime, distinguishing clientelism from corruption since clientelistic approaches generally respect the restraints of the law. Della Porta (1992), for example, emphasises “votes for favours in clientelism versus money for favours in corruption” (p. 262). Sajo (2003), on the other hand, contends that:

Corruption and clientelism are different notions. Clientelism is a form of social organisation, while corruption is an individual social behaviour (where you are your own client, trying to play patron to yourself) that may or may not grow into a mass phenomenon. One can imagine clientelism without corruption, although the two often go hand in hand. In post communist context, the two phenomena seem fused at the hip (p. 2).

In their paper ‘Clientelism as a Political Incentive Structure for Corruption’, Máiz and Requejo (2001) highlight three phenomena. The first phenomenon, clientelist linkage and indirect exchange, includes the exchange of favours or material benefits for votes for a politician or party, which contrasts with programmatic linkage, which includes distributing benefits among voters through policies as to whether or not to vote for a particular party. A party based on programmatic linkage relates to the indirect type of exchange, and thus, the party would need to promise certain policies to implement once in government. Incumbency would depend on keeping these promises (Klingemann, Hoffebert, and Budge, 1994). The clientelistic linkage, on the other hand, provides a direct exchange between someone who controls certain resources and someone who is unable to generate them autonomously. Here, friendship and close relationships need to be present. This also contributes to the concept of ‘personal voting’ (Cain, Ferjohn, and Fiorina, 1987). In other words, there is a mutual relationship between the politician and the voter which is powered by the exchange of favours.

The second phenomenon that was identified is patronage as an informal institution. Patronage is the support, encouragement, privilege, or financial aid that an organisation or individual bestows on another. In this sense, Flap (1990) and Roniger (1990) explain that clientelism performs many of the functions of a bureaucracy which include, but are not limited to, providing information, distributing scarce resources, social integration, and more. Therefore, it is being suggested that patronage may be conceptualised as an informal institution. For their part, Boissevain (1974) and Scott (1972) state that such a phenomenon is based on a specific structure of social networks which act as a mechanism, enabling the direct exchange of favour for votes to take place. Such clientelist networks act as political resources that become channels for obtaining individualised benefits that are otherwise made unavailable to receive or very difficult to acquire through the proper channels (Boissevain, 1974; Scott, 1972).

The third phenomenon discusses client and patron/broker dilemmas. While the clientelist structure tends to last, it is fairly short-sighted and unsustainable. The clientelist structure will, at a certain point, become exhausted once there is a limitation to fulfil a favour. Additionally, the clientelist linkage is unstable when faced with a number of factors, including exhausted or decreasing resources for the clientele, competition between patrons, and competition with parties involving programmatic links. A broker or patron must therefore invest extensive resources in order to maintain their network (Máiz and Requejo, 2001).

Therefore, the clientelist exchange will only take place if two conditions are met (Heath, 1976), namely, when contributions that the client provides to the clientelist party or the broker are less burdensome than those required by a programmatic linkage party or

collective mobilisation, and when contributions provided by the client are less costly for the clientelist party or broker than those that are obtained by an organisational effort and programme.

Undoubtedly, there is a need to capture certain resources for the clientelist approach to work out. There is an increasingly diffused border between the clientelist institution and that of corrupt exchanges as certain clientelist approaches, including the acquisition and distribution of resources, could ultimately lead to illegal characteristics. However, in their studies, Caciagli (1996), Della Porta (1992, 1995) and Johnston (1986) highlight significant differences between clientelism and corruption, namely:

- a. Resources employed: money versus votes
- b. Actors involved: voters–patron/broker versus civil servants
- c. Businesses/business politicians
- d. Presence of power: asymmetry versus equality
- e. Legality versus illegality
- f. Legitimacy versus illegitimacy
- g. Public versus secret

However, two factors provide continuity between clientelism and corruption, namely:

- a. Both are based on the direct exchange of material benefits
- b. Both are built around networks

Therefore, this literature provides another concept that can be identified which revolves around the notion of corrupt clientelism that constitutes a mechanism for facilitating the illegal provision of resources through a network of direct or indirect exchanges.

### **2.3 Corrupt Politics**

Corruption, similarly to clientelism, is often described as the ‘relationship’ where one trades power and influence. Corruption is derived from the Latin verb *rumpere*, to ‘break’ the law, making it an illegal act. In small states, this is mainly evident in post-colonial/post-independence agendas due to the “invitation for the creation of corrupt relationships” (Findlay, 1997, p. 31). Moreover, corruption occurs

[w]herever profit opportunities exist under regulated conditions which favour restricted access to profit opportunities, and where the accountability of regulators is limited or highly conditional, then criminal enterprise, because of its structure, will have a competitive edge over legitimate business because it is also not bound by the legitimate regulations of the market. Effective control strategies include the need to neutralise the relationships and conditions which make corruption and criminal enterprise commercially viable (Findlay, 1997, p. 31).

Political corruption therefore occurs when government officials use their powers through their pre-created networks for illegitimate gain. However, the challenge lies in distinguishing between systemic and individual corruption, petty and grand corruption, and also moral and legal corruption (Byrne, 2017). Forms of corruption vary, but may include bribery, extortion, nepotism, patronage, influence trading, embezzlement, and more. Such forms may also vary from one country to another, depending on the legal structure and jurisdiction.

If one looked at the difference between systemic corruption and sporadic corruption, one would conclude that the former takes place when corruption is essentially engrained and an essential aspect of the economic, social and political system. It is generally a situation where major institutions and processes of the state are captured by corrupt individuals or groups and the public has no alternative but to deal with these people. Sporadic corruption, on the other hand, is irregular and is not a threat to the mechanisms that control the economy (Byrne, 2017).

There is moreover a difference between political or grand corruption and petty corruption. Grand corruption occurs when there is a transaction between the private and public sector, where goods are illegitimately converted into private payoffs. The transaction often includes policies, rules and decisions which are formulated by politicians, where the same politicians enforce laws in the name of the people in order to sustain power and status. This not only leads to misappropriation of resources, but also the exercise of corrupt practices and encroachment by the leaders to ensure that the corrupt transaction is untraceable. This contrasts with petty corruption which is much smaller in scale, bureaucratic, and takes place at the implementation end of politics, also known as low level or street level corruption (Nieuwbeerta, Geest, and Siegers, 2003). This usually involves modest sums of money, daily services, and transactions, such as, public administration, schools, hospitals, licensing authorities and police.


Another form of corruption is also referred to as institutional corruption, which

...is manifest when there is a systemic and strategic influence which is legal, or even currently ethical, that undermines the institution's effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose, including, to the extent relevant to its purpose, weakening either the public's trust in that institution or the institution's inherent trustworthiness (Lessig, 2013, p. 554).



Another important aspect is that between the moral and legal approach to corruption. While the legal approach is complex and refers to public policies, institutions, laws and regulations, the moral approach is somewhat even more complex. This is when an act, despite committed within legal parameters, may still lie outside moral boundaries. Such acts generally include mis-governance and criminal corruption which is camouflaged by lawful justification (Lopez-Claros, Schwab and Porter, 2004).

The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) looks at corruption as an element of fraud (*Figure 1*). Types of corruption however also include bribery (a payment given to an official in exchange for their use of official powers), trading influence (a person selling their influence over the decision-making process to benefit a third party), patronage (favouring supporters), nepotism and cronyism (favouring relatives and/or personal friends), gombeenism and parochialism (when an individual is dishonest for personal gain), electoral fraud (illegal interference with the election process), embezzlement (theft of entrusted funds), and kickbacks (when an official share of the misappropriated funds is allocated to the person, directly or indirectly, mainly through corrupt bidding) (ACFE, 2013).



While literature focuses mainly on bribes and kickbacks, there is a grey area when it comes to other types and incentives for corruption (Palifka and Bonnie, 2016). Typical corrupt acts however are seen as illicit gains as previously mentioned. In *Figure 2* below, the researchers provide a diagram depicting flows of illegitimate gains, where the ‘Government Treasury’ represents all government funds from various sources. Therefore, this diagram illustrates outflows of resources between the Government and the receiver.




Figure 2: Corrupt Interactions (Adapted from Palifka and Bonnie, 2016, p. 13)

## 2.4 Measuring Corruption and Clientelism

There is no clear-cut way how corruption and clientelism are measured in a country as scholars have sought ways to identify and quantify these concepts.

The term ‘clientelism’ originates from the Latin term *cluere*, which means to listen, to obey. In fact, the term ‘clientele’ relates to a group of people who are on the receiving end of the line, hence patrons. Scholars, including Weber (2005), Scott (1972) and Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002), identify key characteristics of the relationship, namely:

- a) Dyadic – A social relationship between two persons (Landé, 1997);
- b) Asymmetrical – A vertical or hierarchical relationship, with one party having better access to information or resources than the other (Kischelt and Wilkinson, 2007);
- c) Personal and Enduring – A personal relationship which is not spontaneous or a mere business connection, but a loyal one (Mainwaring, 1999);
- d) Reciprocal – A relationship based on (unequal) exchanges from one party to the other (Schedler, 2002); and
- e) Voluntary – A relationship which is to an extent voluntary based on needs, power, demands and obligations (Lauth, 2004).

Studies have shown around three ways of studying clientelism, namely;

- a) The Traditional Approach of Sociology and Anthropology which investigates a limited number of case studies in detail (Auyero, 2000);
- b) The Quantitative Cross-Country Comparison Approach which uses proxies in order to grasp and measure clientelism (Manow, 2002); and
- c) The Survey Approach which uses surveys mainly to measure clientelism in cross-country comparisons (Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes, 2004).

The problem when analysing clientelism is that, in general, it is not against the law, unless it relates to corruption or fraud. Keeping in mind that clientelism is a personal relationship makes it far harder to quantify and observe as it is a very informal phenomenon.

Corruption, on the other hand, is mainly measured through the use of indices and indicators. Transparency International (1995) and the World Bank (1996) provided some of the first measures of corruption, while the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has endorsed one of the most inclusive (albeit type-specific) legislative instruments, the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions. On a European Level, the Council of Europe developed its anti-corruption policy in 1995. Subsequently, in 1999, the Committee of Ministers also approved the establishment of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), which is a monitoring mechanism to evaluate the level of corruption of each member state. These corruption indicators or measures can be mainly

classified into 3 types (Valentina, 2014), as per *Table 1*, *Table 2* and *Table 3* below, namely:

- 1) Survey-Based Measures
- 2) Indicators provided by Indices of Global Governance
- 3) Indicators provided by Indices of State Capacity

	<b>Provider</b>	<b>Measures</b>
<b>Survey-Based Measures</b>	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) & World Bank	Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)
	Gallup International	Voice of the People Survey (VOPS)
	Global Business Media Limited	Business International Index; Corruption Experience Index
	International Budget Partnership	Open Budget Survey
	Transparency International	Corruption Perceptions Index
	Transparency International & Gallup International	Bribery perception index (BPI); Global Corruption Barometer (GCB)

*Table 1: Measures of Corruption: Indices and Indicators (Adapted from Valentina, 2014)*

	<b>Provider</b>	<b>Measures</b>
<b>Indicators provided by Indices of Global Governance</b>	European Commission	Eurobarometer
	EU ICS Research Consortium	International Crime Victimization Surveys (ICVS)
	EU ICS Research Consortium	European Values Study
	Freedom House	Nation in Transit (NIT)
	Global Integrity & Mo Ibrahim foundation	Africa Integrity Indicators; Index of African Governance; The Corruption Notebooks; Global Integrity Index
	HIS Global Insight	Global Insight
	Institute for Management Development (IMD)	The Global Competitiveness Report (GRC)
	Latinobarometro Corporation	Latinobarometer
	Michigan State University	Afrobarometer
	The Political Risk Service Group	The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)	Africa Governance Indicator (AGI)
	World Bank	World Governance Indicators (WGI); WB Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
	World Economic Forum	Executive Opinion Survey; World Competitiveness Yearbook; Global Competitiveness Report (GRC)
	WVS Association	World Value Survey (WVS)

*Table 2: Measures of Corruption: Indices and Indicators (Adapted from Valentina, 2014)*

	<b>Provider</b>	<b>Measures</b>
<b>Indicators provided by Indices of State Capacity</b>	Brookings Institution	Index of State Weakness in the Developing World
	Brooking Institute, Institute for State Effectiveness, and Australian National University	Sovereignty Index
	Canadian International Development Agency	Country Indicators for foreign policy project
	Centre for Global Policy, George Mason University	Political Instability Task Force
	Center for Systemic Peace and Center for Global Policy at George Mason University	State Fragility Index
	Columbia University	State Capacity Survey
	Fund for Peace, Foreign Policy	Failed States Index
	World Bank	Lower Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS)

*Table 3: Measures of Corruption: Indices and Indicators (Adapted from Valentina, 2014)*

The latest report issued by Transparency International entitled ‘Malta, Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption’ (2017) highlights that both patronage and clientelism persist despite substantial legal mechanisms in place, most of which include procurement irregularities, conflicts of interest, especially among serving government ministers, and the only country in the European Union (EU) to have an encumber Minister who was named in one of the largest scandals in the Panama Papers revealed in 2016. The report further states that the current proportional representation within the



two-party structure has nurtured clientelism as political candidates seek canvassing volunteers and fund-raise their campaigns for favours and preferences for the future (Marmarà, 2005). Evidently, much of the power lies in the hands of the executive as the Prime Minister has the sole responsibility to appoint people in power, especially within the Justice framework, and while the Constitutional Court may declare such appointments invalid, it has no power to revoke such laws. According to its Corruption Perception Index 2018, Malta stands at its ever-lowest rank, which is 51<sup>st</sup> place out of 180 countries. The report identifies that Political Corruption, Business Corruption, Illicit Financial Flows, Judicial Corruption and Procurement Corruption are evident within the Maltese framework also through the controversial Individual Investor Programme and Sports.

The Eurobarometer (2017) further highlights some interesting facts, namely:

- 10% of the population believe that it is acceptable to return a favour for something from the public administration or public service;
- 83% believe that corruption is unacceptable;
- Respondents are increasingly believing that the only way to succeed in business is to have political connections;
- Most of the Maltese believe that there is no protection for those who report corruption, and reporting it would be futile as those responsible will not be punished, while those who report cases will get into trouble with the police or other authorities;
- 84% of businesses see corruption as widespread in Malta; and
- 70% of Maltese companies claim that the abuse of negotiated procedures is widespread in Malta.

The latest GRECO Report adopted in 2017 looks at corruption prevention in respect of Members of Parliament (MPs), judges and prosecutors (GRECO, 2017). It is noted that the critical challenges included interpersonal relationships, conflicts of interest, proper laws governing rules on gifts to MPs, and the misuse of public resources. GRECO (2017) aims to improve the capacity of its members to fight corruption by monitoring their compliance with anti-corruption standards. The recent recommendations mainly include;

1. The review of the Code of Ethics for Members of Parliament;
2. Appropriate supervision and enforcement related to:
  - a. The declaration of assets, financial interests and outside activities,
  - b. Standards of ethics and conflicts of interest, and
  - c. Effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions to be made available.
3. Dedicated source of confidential counselling to assist parliamentarians;
4. Formalised, objective criteria and evaluation procedures to be introduced for judicial appointments;
5. Strengthened judicial accountability to ensure better transparency and proportionality;
6. Compulsory induction training programme on judicial ethics, mentoring arrangements for new judges and a regular programme on in-service training for judges, magistrates and adjudicators of boards and tribunals;
7. Measures to strengthen the role of prosecutors:
  - a. Impartial, objective and transparent systems of appointment, discipline and dismissal,
  - b. Clear mechanisms and working procedures, and
  - c. Greater independence and impartiality of prosecutorial decisions.

8. A code of ethics for prosecutors and sufficient training; and
9. Formalised rules on recusal in relation to prosecutors.

## **2.5 Summary & Concluding Remarks**

The concept of corrupt clientelism has been drawn out from the available literature mainly revolving around the notion of corrupt clientelism that constitutes a mechanism for facilitating the illegal provision of resources through a network of direct or indirect exchanges. Reports covering Malta and governance have further highlighted key characteristics which could facilitate clientelism and corruption, mainly the need to keep client-patron relationships healthy for the main purpose of re-electing candidates and governments, and the unprecedented power which the Maltese Prime Minister holds, especially within the Justice framework, together with the continuous reference to more transparency, impartiality and accountability both within the public sector and judiciary.

The next Chapter will focus on the research methods employed in this study to chiefly bring out any patterns of influence trading in Maltese Politics and Government.

## Chapter 3 - Research Methodology

### 3.1 Introduction

This study includes the collection of data from two local newspapers, namely, *In-Nazzjon* and *L-Orizzont*. Therefore, it uses content which has already been published by these mass media sources to uncover articles related to alleged clientelism or corrupt practices. Mass media, and more specifically, newspapers, are ultimately one of the pillars of democracy. Therefore, this study will mainly consist of a document-based research using qualitative methods by utilising primary and secondary sources, chiefly in the form of newspaper articles.

The study revolves around cases that were published daily during the timeframe mentioned below, uncovering articles published on clientelism and corruption under different administrations, under different party leaders, and during different periods in their term in office. This research thus includes cases related to alleged political corruption and clientelism during the following timeframes:

- 6 months before the 2013 General Election (Dr. Lawrence Gonzi – Partit Nazzjonalista)
- 6 months after the 2013 General Election (Dr. Joseph Muscat – Partit Laburista)

### 3.2 Working Model

The two selected newspapers, *In-Nazzjon* and *L-Orizzont*, are affiliated with the two major political parties in Malta, that is, Partit Nazzjonalista (PN) and Partit Laburista (PL), respectively. While *In-Nazzjon* is owned by Media.Link Communications Co Ltd, a PN-owned media company, *L-Orizzont* is owned by Union Print Co Ltd, owned by General Workers' Union (GWU), which is a well-known PL affiliate. Additionally, both newspapers are published daily between Monday and Saturday (*Table 4*).


This research uncovers not only the number of alleged cases related to clientelism and corruption, but also the different types of clientelistic and corrupt behaviours, together with any emerging patterns. Moreover, this research includes the analysis of one case study aimed to bring out certain traits related to alleged corruption and clientelism. This qualitative content analysis was then tabulated containing a list of all the articles published on alleged cases concerning clientelism and corruption. The available literature then contributed to the development of a conceptual framework, which was subsequently used to further code the collected data to facilitate the interpretation and analysis, revealing the characteristic traits of such reported allegations that were made public during the established timeframes.

The 2013 General Election was selected as it is the most recent general election where political campaigns did not focus on corruption or clientelism, while bearing in mind that this election was not a snap election. In fact, such political electoral campaigns spanned for over two months. The General Election of 2013 additionally saw the fall of Partit Nazzjonalista and rise of Partit Laburista to power after 15 years in opposition.

<b><u>Newspapers Used</u></b>					
<b>Title</b>	<b>Published</b>	<b>Language</b>	<b>Est.</b>	<b>Owner</b>	<b>Notes</b>
<i>L-Orizzont</i>	Daily (except Sunday)	Maltese	1962	Union Print Co Ltd	PL Leaning
<i>In-Nazzjon</i>	Daily (except Sunday)	Maltese	1970	Media.Link Communications Co Ltd	PN Leaning

*Table 4: Newspapers Used*


The selection of two newspapers, namely, *In-Nazzjon* and *L-Orizzont*, with evidently partisan-party leaning content allowed for a balanced approach to the data collected. One can argue that the content made public in newspapers includes stories published primarily to engage readers and stimulate the political arena. However, for the purpose of this study, perception itself is already an indicator of the existence of corruption and clientelism. Therefore, even if clientelism or corruption practices are assumed, the assumption itself is as bad as its reality. The case study will further be cross-referenced with official reports, including National Audit Office (NAO) reports, international reports, such as, European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) reports, and court judgements if, and when, applicable.




*Figure 3: Triangulation Approach*

The triangulation approach in *Figure 3* outlines the design of this study. Once data was collected and coded from the two selected newspapers outlining alleged stories related to clientelism and corruption, the next step was to also take a particular case study and look into official reports, not excluding those published by any committees of enquiry. Finally, this case was additionally cross-checked with any court judgements pertaining to the alleged case. The coding itself gives insights into corruption and clientelism within the identified one-year period. *Figure 4* illustrates the implemented conceptual framework, while *Figure 5* outlines the workflow employed in this study. Furthermore, *Table 5* summarises how data was gathered and tabulated.

Data yielded by the documentary sources will disclose the pattern or patterns of these phenomena in the Maltese setting. Additionally, coding data over a span of one year gives an understanding of the incidence of such alleged cases and the timing when certain events occur. The case study specifically allows for a concise overview from when the alleged case made the headlines, leading to the investigation, and more. This study is therefore both conceptual and empirical since, on one hand, it organises such stories under the categories of corruption and clientelism, hence conceptual, while on the other hand, it is empirical since it is based on data collected, analysed and interpreted by the researcher using approved scientific methods.







<u>Newspaper</u>	<u>Page</u>	<u>Date</u> <u>Published</u>	<u>Article</u> <u>Title</u>	<u>Code</u>	<u>Personal</u> <u>Notes</u>
<i>L-Orizzont</i>	1	1/5/2013	Project to Start	Pork Barrel	Ministry X
<i>In-Nazzjon</i>	2	1/5/2013	Individual Involved in Corruption	Bribery	Member of Judiciary

*Table 5: Tabulated Data Template*

The conceptual framework portrayed in *Figure 4* has been drawn from research conducted by ACFE (2013), particularly that related to corruption (*Figure 1*), as well as research conducted by Ark-Yıldırım and Ceren (2017) on clientelism (*Figure 6*). Specifically, coding is being used to symbolically capture the data at hand to represent a salient theme or pattern (Saldaña, 2016). The process of coding through thematic analysis is widely-used in qualitative data analysis. For the purpose of this study, however, a deductive approach is adopted as the concepts and ideas have already been drawn. The data gathered from the newspapers will then be clustered according to the theme (*Figure 4*) to ultimately answer the research questions, namely:

- Is the influence trading that goes on in Maltese Politics and government a symptom of clientelism, or is actual corruption involved?

- What cases of clientelism and/or corruption have been alleged or identified in Maltese Politics?
- What cases of political clientelism and/or corruption are most evident in Maltese Politics?
- Is there a pattern of clientelism and/or corruption in Maltese Politics?

The collected data will subsequently be used to facilitate the choice of a case study to be conducted. The case study will in no way be representative of the other cases, or of Maltese politics, since it will provide insights into the events pertaining to the case at hand, the actors at play, the role of the media, and the instruments being used to uncover the truth. As Bryman (2008) explains, a case study examines a single case which is then supported by theoretical analysis. Such studies include a longitudinal element, which includes a study of a lengthy period to generate theories and patterns. This will be discussed further in Chapter 5 upon choosing the case study itself.

### **3.3 Summary**

The next Chapter will focus on Maltese Politics and Government by highlighting the core concept identified earlier in this study, namely, corrupt clientelism. Furthermore, the Chapter will include a list of anti-corruption actors in Malta, explaining their remit and role of promoting the principle of good governance. It will additionally set the scene leading to the General Election of 2013 given that the collected data includes alleged cases related to political corruption and clientelism during this time period.

## **Chapter 4 - Maltese Politics and Government**

### **4.1 Malta and Corrupt Clientelism**

Through her writings, the late Daphne Caruana Galizia sought to highlight and uncover corruption allegations against various prominent Maltese individuals, including politicians, judges, lawyers, businessmen, and various high-profile people. In fact, her work towards uncovering acts of corruption intensified during her last few years before her assassination in 2017. Her criticism touched upon Malta's electoral system, namely, the single transferable voting (STV) system. She believed that such a system was legitimising clientelism and corruption, hence, corrupt clientelism (Caruana Galizia, 2017).

In 1981, the Nationalist Party won the largest number of votes, while the Labour Party won the largest number of parliamentary seats, and thus, the Labour Government was constitutionally lawful, but politically illegitimate to govern. During this period, corruption was perceived to be institutionalised as various government officials were accused of colluding with various groups and partisan interests. Not many lobby groups existed at the time; however, patronage and clientelism were essentially exercised through the private networks of ministers and senior party figures. There seemed to be a culture of impunity surrounding various officials who were considered close to various key political figures (Howe, 1987). Dom Mintoff, who was Prime Minister during this period and then succeeded by Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici, led governments that put pressure on the Police Force to act, or rather, not pursue various cases which were related to criminal dealings, acts of corruption, and misuse of political power (Cachia, 2018).

In 1987, the Nationalist Party managed to win the election and govern through reforms in the electoral system made during the final months of the Labour Government. However, corruption on various levels continued to be a common practice (Pirota, 2006). There were various reforms initiated by the PN, including the ratification of the Convention of Human Rights in 1987, which was crucial during this period as the Government was preparing to join the European Community, the setting up of various parliamentary committees, Social and Economic Affairs Committee, the establishment of a Parliamentary Ombudsman, and the creation of a Permanent Commission against Corruption to protect public sector employees (Pirota, 2006; Warrington, 1990). Despite attempts to strengthen institutions, there were no arraignments of public officials and individuals who were known to be behind significant violent and corrupt practices. Daphne Caruana Galizia was one of the most vociferous critics of this failure to act. In 1993, Local Councils introduced a measure of decentralisation. It was debated between the two major political parties that political parties should not be involved at the local level (Pirota, 2006). Nonetheless, to date, all Local Councils are run by one of these two same parties, fuelling patronage and clientelistic approaches (Cachia, 2018).


Since the liberalisation of the broadcasting media introduced in 1992 by the Nationalist Government, mass media was used for political parties to engage with the people. The use of mass media facilitates the need for politicians to simplify their message and enhance their own propaganda (Scruton, 2007). To this day, political parties have their own mass media establishments, while some politicians are even directly associated with newspaper and media houses. While the media has helped the two main political parties to retain the status quo and a steady following, this has come at the expense of

smaller or emerging parties and independent politicians, who are unfortunately unable to compete with such organisations with so much media power. This has in fact naturally enhanced divisions and partisanship.

The electoral voting system through the single transferable vote enables political parties, through thirteen electoral districts, to secure strongholds and polarise the country even further. The need for politicians to create their own personal network, which is distinct from the party's, grows stronger with an electoral system that is sustained through patronage and clientelism. Therefore, the relationships between politicians and the electoral voter sustain such a system. Indeed, STV is characterised by:

(1) intense and pervasive partisanship; (2) concentration of political power in a single elective institution; (3) highly competitive elections resulting in one-party governments despite P.R.; (4) maximization of the impact of a single ballot because the number of votes a candidate needs to be elected is very low and because the voter's lower-order preferences count under STV, and (5) unusually intense campaigning by individual candidates because they compete against other candidates of the same party, and by parties because the electorate is polarized, which leaves few uncommitted voters while rendering voter conversion unlikely, thus making mobilization of all existing supporters vital to electoral success (Hirczy, 1995, p. 255).

Moreover, this system promotes the need to mobilise supporters who are rewarded for their votes through several ways, including that of party loyalists recruited within the public sector (Warrington, 1995). Clientelism becomes the object of market exchanges between supply provided by the political parties and candidates on one side, and the demand of clients willing to exchange their votes for goods and favours on the other side. This can be visualised in the form of a pyramid structure in *Figure 6* below (Ark-Yıldırım and Ceren, 2017).




Through this structure, politics is depicted as having three prominent participants, namely, the clients (electorate), which is a general group, including all voters, the party organisations that can also be seen as brokers, including party members acting as intermediaries also referred to as party loyalists or supporters, and finally, the politicians and party leaders (patrons) who, given their position, control and are able to distribute goods and services to their clientele (Ark-Yıldırım and Ceren, 2017).

## 4.2 The Fight against Corruption

In democratic countries, mechanisms are created to protect the legitimate order of a country. The following outlines the various bodies and institutions that are responsible for fighting corruption. Some of these are independent investigative bodies, while others are parliamentary scrutineers and prosecuting or judicial bodies.

As can be seen in *Figure 7* below, one can divide such anti-corruption actors into four main categories, namely, *Apparatus of Law, Order and Rule of Law*, *Scrutineers*, *Administrative Apparatus*, and *Political Actors*.



The *Apparatus of Law, Order & Rule of Law* refers to the Judiciary and the Police Force, amongst other instruments that are sought to be the official actors embodied in the law or Constitution to ensure good governance. The *Administrative Apparatus* refers to the public office and procedures that are in place to ensure fair and equal opportunities to all. Furthermore, *Politics* refers to the political parties, electoral systems, and legislative powers to ensure democracy and promote a culture of good



practice. Finally, *Scrutineers* refers to the public, the media, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), lobby groups, parliamentary scrutineers and active citizens who have the right and duty to speak up, make public, report and comment on anything which is flagged as corrupt.

The Malta Police Force (MPF) is essentially one of the main pillars of law and order. As stipulated by the Criminal Code (2010, Sections 246-366) and Malta Police Ordinance (Act, 2010, Cap 164), it has the duty to be the principal law enforcement authority on the island. Its main aim is to preserve public order and peace, prevent any offences, and enforce the observance of laws and action as needed through the judicial system. Moreover, the Police Force itself not only has a specialised unit focused on the investigation of corrupt offences, namely, the Economic Crimes Unit, but even its Internal Affairs Unit highlights that matters of corruption, from complaints, to allegations, should fall within the remit of the Force.

The Judiciary in Malta, an integral component of law and order, is the only institution having an adjudicatory function. As set out in Chapter VIII of the Constitution of Malta (2007, Cap VIII), it is made up of Judges and Magistrates who have been appointed to sit in the Superior or Inferior Courts. Their undertaking is in fact captured in the first sentence of their Oath of Office, that is, to

...faithfully perform the duties of Judge [Magistrate] without favour or partiality, according to justice and right, and in accordance with the laws and customs of Malta, to the honour of God and the Republic of Malta (Ministry for Justice, Culture and Local Government, 2019).

Both Judges and Magistrates have to comply fully with the Code of Ethics for Members of the Judiciary and ensure the highest standards of conduct to strengthen the trust in such an administration. The Courts are divided into Superior and Inferior Courts. Judges are to sit on the Superior Courts made up of the Constitutional Court, Court of Appeal, Court of Criminal Appeal, Criminal Court, and Civil Court. The Inferior Courts are the Court of Magistrates (Malta) and Court of Magistrates (Gozo). The latter Court has both a superior and inferior jurisdiction (GRECO, 2002).

The Attorney General (AG) holds both a supervisory and investigative role. This Office is regulated by the Attorney General Ordinance (Chapter 90 of the Laws of Malta) and provides powers to institute, undertake or discontinue criminal proceedings as conferred on him by law, which also gives him the power to act on his own deliberate judgement. In this prosecutorial role, which is assigned by the Constitution, the Attorney General is in fact not subject to the direction or control of any person or authority. The Attorney General currently holds a dual role, including that of Public Prosecutor. Therefore, the Attorney General is not only the legal counsel to the Government, but is also the Public Prosecutor before the Criminal Court and the Court of Criminal Appeal. At times, certain prosecutions necessitate the prior consent of the Attorney General to be initiated by the Malta Police Force (MPF). Very recently, the Venice Commission has in fact pointed out the vital need to separate such powers, and such recommendations are to be taken up by the Maltese Government (Venice Commission, 2018).

There are additionally other bodies and institutions whose functions serve to supervise and investigate alleged cases. The powers of the National Audit Office (NAO) are set out in the Constitution of Malta (Section 218) and the Auditor General and National

Audit Office Act (1999, Cap. 396). It allows the Auditor General to audit the accounts, performance of the Maltese Government, public authorities and any bodies, public funds, local governmental institutions, and any public and private entities receiving funds from the Government. The accounts of NAO are also audited by certified private sector auditors and are then presented to the NAO Accounts Committee of the House of Representatives for subsequent approval by the House. Furthermore, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and NAO have a complementary role in this regard since PAC scrutinises the Government's performance. However, its role is more political rather than technical, as shall be explained further in this Chapter (Warrington and Pirotta, 2014).

The Office of the Ombudsman, which is also considered a parliamentary scrutineer similar to NAO, also serves the function to supervise and investigate. It is fully independent and autonomous to other Commissioners as set out in the Ombudsman Act in Act XVII of 2010. The primary function of the Ombudsman is to defend individuals against acts of maladministration, injustice, improper discrimination and abuse of power by public authorities. The Ombudsman is also responsible to contribute towards the improvement of laws and administrative processes and procedures. In this case, the Ombudsman does not directly deal with cases of corruption, but could be more inclined to deal with cases related to clientelism and unjust practices against individuals.

The very recent Commission for Standards in Public Life as set out in ACT XIII of 2017 investigates breaches of statutory or ethical duties of categories of persons in public life or related matters. It aims to add a new layer of scrutiny and accountability for members of parliament as part of The Standards in Public Life Act as it empowers

the Commissioner to look into breaches of ethics committed by MPs and those appointed on a position-of-trust basis within the public service. Interestingly, the law only allows the Commissioner to take action on acts committed after October 2018.

The Permanent Commission against Corruption (PCAC), which also serves the function to supervise and investigate as established in Act No XXII of 1988 (Chapter 326 of the Laws of Malta), comprises a chairman and two members. The Commission itself could conduct investigations either on its own initiative, or following reports made to it by any person. PCAC is a specialised institution set up to fight corruption and investigate alleged cases. It is autonomous and independent of any body, and is not subject to any direction or control of any person or authority. However, while it may appear to be so from the strict letter of the law, political influence on appointments and the absence of any credible investigative apparatus means that, in practice, the Commission is a dead letter. Any findings are then brought forward to the Minister of Justice for a decision about whether to prosecute.

The Internal Audit and Investigation Department (IAID) seeks to provide the Government with a consultative and investigative function, embedded within public administration, to examine, inspect, scrutinise and recommend as needed. The Internal Audit and Financial Investigations Act in Chapter 461 of the Laws of Malta outlines the functions of this Directorate. IAID further provides its services through four Directorates, namely, the Internal Audit & Risk Management Directorate, Central Harmonisation Directorate, Financial Investigations Directorate, and EU Funds Audits Directorate. Similarly, the Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit (FIAU) was established by virtue of Legal Notice 297 of 2002. Its main responsibilities include collecting,

processing, analysing and disseminating information to combat money laundering and the funding of terrorism as per the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (ACT XXXI, 2001) as part of the Ministry responsible for Finance.

On the other hand, the Director of Contracts (DoC) is responsible for the administration of the procurement procedures as laid down in the Public Procurement Regulations (LN352/2016). Its supervisory role is to ensure that there is no discrimination between economic operators and that all economic operators are treated equally and in a transparent manner. The Public Service procurement in general is regulated through the Public Service Regulations (Procurement) (S.L. 174.04, 2018), and both the General Contracts Committee (GCC) and Special Contracts Committee (SCC) relate to the procurement of equipment, stores, works and services by the Government, or any other associated body mainly related to the issuing of tenders and abiding by such tenders. GCC assists DoC as needed, and at times, the tender requires specialised expertise and skills, which is done through SCC. The Maltese Customs Department (MCD) also has a vital role in the fight against corruption, especially given its unique mission to promote legitimate trade, while protecting the citizen, the territory and fiscal interests of Malta. In its most recent Malta Customs Business Strategy for 2017-2019, it makes direct reference to corruption and states that, together with the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), Ombudsman, NAO, and Internal Audit and Investigations Department (IAID), it will strive to ensure that proper administrative control and systems are put in place to enforce measures against corruption and collusion. However, investigations should fall within the remit of the Malta Police Force.

Conversely, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the House of Representatives scrutinises and assesses the financial administration of the public sector and promotes improvements where necessary. However, the PAC is bedevilled by partisanship given its composition as it reflects the proportions in Parliament (Peplow, 2011). As stated on the NAO Website:

Reports submitted to the Speaker of the House may be taken up by the PAC, which is empowered to examine the Reports and discuss their contents. In fact, most of the Committee meetings are focused on issues raised in the Annual Report by the Auditor General or Performance Audit Reports. The PAC thereby ensures that audit findings are given due attention. The Committee, through at least three of its members, may also request the Auditor General to enquire and report upon matters within his mandate (The Public Accounts Committee consists of not more than seven members, four from the Government side and three from the Opposition side. The Committee is chaired by a senior Opposition Member of Parliament nominated by the Leader of the Opposition). The Committee is also empowered to take evidence from senior officials of ministries and departments or other government related bodies. Moreover, the PAC can also review the activities of non-Departmental organisations that are required to present their accounts to Parliament (NAO, 2019).

The Public Service Commission (PSC) further serves to supervise and investigate. It is an independent statutory body established by virtue of Article 109 of the Constitution of Malta, and according to its mission statement, its main responsibilities are staffing and discipline in the Public Service:

...[t]o ensure, through ongoing monitoring and scrutiny, the provision of excellent public services in a delegated environment through an efficient public appointment process which upholds the principles of merit and equity, and the exercise of just and efficient disciplinary procedures in the public service (Public Service Commission, 2019).

On another note, there are other resources which ‘enable’ and potentially enhance the fight against corruption. For example, the Whistle Blower Act, which was enacted in 2013 (CAP. 527), allows for employees who work both in the private and public sector to disclose information of their own free will on improper practices. Here, citizens are given the right to report abuses while being protected by law. Additionally, the Financing of Political Parties Act (CAP. 544) sets out to regulate the formation, inner structures, functioning and financing of political parties and their participation in election, including General Elections, Local Council Elections, and European Parliament Elections. The Bill further introduced specific obligations and limits with regard to the financing of political parties, and increased the permitted spending on candidates’ electoral campaigns, while enforcing stricter controls on such expenditure and introducing more effective sanctions against overspending. Furthermore, there are a number of Codes which put into effect and emphasise the fight against corruption, amongst other principles, including the Code of Ethics for:

- i. Employees in the Public Sector;
- ii. Public Sector Board Directors;
- iii. Members of the House of Representatives;
- iv. Members of the Judiciary;
- v. Advocates and Legal Procurators; and
- vi. Notaries.

Although these could not be considered as anti-corruption *actors* per se, such codes of conduct define and prohibit corruption, conflict of interest, nepotism and abuse of office, amongst others. Specifically, the Code of Ethics for Employees in the Public Sector provides guidelines along the principles of efficiency, excellence, fairness,

impartiality and integrity, and underlines the values each public officer should comply with. It additionally provides guidelines related to conflicts of interest, acceptance of gifts or benefits, personal and professional behaviour, fairness and equity, public comment and the use of official information, the use of official facilities and equipment, and political participation.

The Code of Ethics of Members of the House of Representatives additionally notes that each member should not use any indecorous influence, threats or undue pressure in the course of their duties, while highlighting the need to record annually in a register a declaration of assets, shares, investments, etc. This register would subsequently be open for public inspection. The Code further states that any attempts at corruption, pressure or undue influence should be reported to the Speaker. The Code of Ethics for Public Sector Board Directors provides guidelines along the principles of integrity, honesty, loyalty, confidentiality, commitment, transparency, accountability and professionalism, while putting forward a strategy for prevention, deterrence, detection, investigation and prosecution of fraud and corruption, and encouraging and facilitating transparency and accountability. The Code of Ethics for Members of the Judiciary as set out by the Commission for the Administration of Justice by virtue of Article 101A(11)(d) of the Constitution of Malta includes 29 rules which all members of the Judiciary need to follow to ensure the highest standards of correct ethical behaviour. A set of guidelines also supplements the provisions of the Code of Ethics for Members of the Judiciary, particularly referring to financial interests, termination of professional and business contacts, social, cultural and other activities, board of inquiry, lecturing and writing, and finally, incompatible associations with masonic and secret societies.



On the other hand, the Code of Ethics for Advocates and Legal Procurators defines the requirements of professional conduct for advocates, outlining rules related to relationships between clients, obligations to others, main duties, professional fees, conflicts of interest, and confidentiality, amongst others. Most importantly, it highlights the values advocates should exercise, including that of independence, integrity, freedom to instruct, acting in the best interest of the client, and duty to the Court. Another significant Code is the Notaries' Code of Ethics, which follows on the principles of Conduct and Diligence, Independence and Impartiality, Professional Relations, Illegal Competition and Secrecy, and Professional Confidentiality. The importance of these principles lies in the fact that notaries are involved in all property transfers taking place in Malta, while the Code itself emphasises obligations to FIAU. Notaries are further required to register themselves on the FIAU website and are obliged to submit an annual report, including all deeds they publish in relation to the sale and transfer of property, including details of the client, risk assessments, and more.

It is additionally interesting to note that most of the committees and institutions mentioned above are either appointed by the President of Malta, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, including Members of Parliament, with the majority representing the Government, or appointed directly by the Prime Minister. The Ombudsman and the Auditor General are however appointed following an affirmative vote by two-thirds of the members of the House of Representatives. This is further highlighted in *Table 6* below, which summarises all the above mentioned institutions, bodies and instruments, including their main function and method of appointment.

Institution or Body	Function				Appointment
	Supervisory	Investigative	Adjudicatory	Enablers	
Judiciary			X		Appointed by the President acting on the advice of the Prime Minister.
Attorney General's Office	X	X			Appointed by the President acting on the advice of the Prime Minister.
National Audit Office & Auditor General	X	X			Appointed through a two-thirds majority of the members of the House of Representatives.
Office of the Ombudsman	X	X			Appointed through a two-thirds majority of the members of the House of Representatives.
Internal Audit and Investigations Directorate	X	X			Director General is appointed by the Prime Minister & Minister responsible for Finance.
Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit	X	X			The Board of Governors is appointed by the Prime Minister & Minister responsible for Finance.
Commission for Standards in Public Life	X	X			Commissioner for Standards in Public Life appointed through a two-thirds majority of the members of the House of Representatives.
Public Accounts Committee	X	X			Consists of not more than seven members, four from the Government side and three from the Opposition. The Committee is chaired by a senior Opposition MP nominated by the Leader of the Opposition.
Malta Police Force		X			The Police Commissioner appointed by the Prime Minister.

*Table 6: The Functions of Anti-Corrupt Actors*

Institution or Body	Function				Appointment
	Supervisory	Investigative	Adjudicatory	Enablers	
Permanent Commission against Corruption		X			Composed of a chairman and two members, appointed by the President of Malta, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister.
Public Service Commission	X				Appointed by the Prime Minister.
Director of Contracts, General Contracts Committee & Special Contracts Committee	X				Director General is appointed by the Prime Minister & Minister responsible for Finance.
Maltese Customs Department	X				Director General is directly appointed by the Prime Minister.
Whistle Blower Act				X	N/A
Financing of Political Parties Act				X	N/A
Code of Ethics Employees in the Public Sector				X	N/A
Code of Ethics Public Sector Board Directors				X	N/A
Code of Ethics Members of the House of Representatives				X	N/A
Code of Ethics for Members of the Judiciary				X	N/A
Code of Ethics for Advocates and Legal Procurators				X	N/A
Code of Ethics for Notaries				X	N/A

*Table 6: The Functions of Anti-Corrupt Actors*

A recent study by Mercieca (2011), which also looks at institutions and bodies that are responsible for countering corruption, outlines several characteristics related to the Maltese dimensions of corruption, including political polarisation, transparency of party funding, legislation and regulation, and the criminal justice system (Mercieca, 2011). Moreover, a densely populated and insular society such as Malta makes it even harder for certain obligations by these bodies and institutions to be met, given the strong ties between its inhabitants (Findlay, 1997). Therefore, Mercieca (2011) concludes that:

The closed nature of Maltese society further handicaps attempts at bringing instances of corruption to the attention of the relevant authorities (p. 20).

Another very recent study published by the Caruana Galizia family provides a fairly lengthy account of various cases, allegedly portraying the use of public power for private gain, and as they describe it, “the ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests” (Caruana Galizia, 2018, p. 2). In fact, this study makes reference to no less than fifteen public institutions which have been mis-used for private gain. This confirms the incidence of corrupt clientelism identified earlier in this Chapter, which seems to be evident throughout this study, as will be seen in the next Chapter, which will discuss this study’s findings.

While the foregoing account presents an array of mechanisms that are intended to uphold the integrity of public officials by setting standards, monitoring, investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating, anti-corruption mechanisms appear to be weak and ineffectual for a myriad of reasons, including:

- a) The absence of a coherent framework to deploy these instruments effectively;
- b) A lack of independence from ministers holding office;

- c) Weak administrative capacity;
- d) Conflicts of interest or of jurisdiction;
- e) An apparent political reluctance to take systematic action against corruption; and
- f) A clientelistic political culture, coupled with ‘spoils’ in the gift of ministers, regulatory authorities, and public officers.

### **4.3 Setting the Scene – The 2013 General Election, the End of the PN Era and Major Win for PL**

This section will set the scene leading to the General Election of 2013 given that the collected data includes alleged cases related to political corruption and clientelism during this time period.

With 2008 marking the third consecutive win for Dr. Lawrence Gonzi's Partit Nazzjonalista (PN), albeit with a very slim margin over the Malta Labour Party (MLP), Dr. Alfred Sant, then leader of MLP, resigned immediately. This called for a massive party re-haul, with Dr. Joseph Muscat being elected as the new MLP leader only a few months after the 2008 General Election. Dr. Joseph Muscat, who was currently occupying an EU seat, representing Malta as Member of the European Parliament (MEP), had to be co-opted in Parliament thereby leading to the resignation of Joseph Cuschieri to make way for Dr. Joseph Muscat. It is safe to say that Dr. Lawrence Gonzi had one of the hardest legislatures, with the world facing various difficulties amidst one of the largest economic recessions ever experienced to date.

In 2009, Dr. George Abela was elected President of Malta, marking the first time ever after 34 years when the nominated President was not an ally of the Government. In fact, Dr. George Abela himself was in the running to become the next MLP leader together with Dr. Joseph Muscat a few months earlier. In 2010, Dr. Michael Frendo was also elected Speaker of the House.

During this period, the Power Station project at Delimara was a highly controversial issue flagged with various alleged cases of corruption and inaccuracies by PL. Furthermore, PL put forward a motion in Parliament against this project, and asked for Hon. Charlo' Bonnici to be excluded from the vote due to a conflict of interest since he occupied the role of Human Resources Manager with Care Malta, a company owned by Vassallo Builders, which were awarded the Delimara project. This request was however overturned, and the motion was not approved with 35 votes in favour of the Government and 34 against. It is very important to note that PN in Government only had a one-seat majority. Shortly after, the Speaker of the House was accused by PL of partisanship and bias towards the Government, adding that PL was not going to accept such a vote.

This tenure further brought with it the heated debate with regards to the introduction of divorce. A Private Member's Bill was tabled by Dr. Jeffrey Pullicino Orlando, a PN representative, without any prior consultation with either the Prime Minister or the party structures. Such a subject gave rise to various discussions within Parliament, party structures, the media, and the public. Movements and pressure groups started to emerge both in favour and against the introduction of divorce. A referendum on divorce was subsequently held in Malta on the 28<sup>th</sup> of May 2011, with 53.16% voting in favour of the introduction of divorce. This was marked as a win for PL and Dr. Joseph Muscat, who had campaigned in favour of this law, contrary to Dr. Lawrence Gonzi, who voted against the introduction of this Bill.

With Dr. Gonzi and Dr. Pullicino Orlando already estranged, it was now Dr. Franco Debono's turn to rock the boat. The latter publicly declared that he did not have any

trust in Dr. Lawrence Gonzi as Prime Minister and asked him to resign. In 2009, Dr. Debono had already missed two parliamentary sessions in protest. In 2010, Dr. Debono was tasked with enacting the Party Financing Law, and while his proposals were put forward, he was taken aback when he learned that they had been amended by the Minister for Justice. In 2011, Dr. Austin Gatt launched the Public Transport reform; however, Dr. Gatt and Dr. Debono did not see eye to eye. Together with the Opposition, Dr. Debono became a harsh critic of this reform. At this stage, Dr. Franco Debono, Dr. Jeffrey Pullicino Orlando and Mr. Jesmond Mugliett, all of whom were PN MPs, began to publicly criticise the Government, especially with regards to a project related to St. John's Co-Cathedral, the right for lawyers to assist the accused, the public transport reform, the introduction of divorce, the increase in the ministers' salaries, the introduction of Automated Revenue Management Services (ARMS), and the substantial and bitterly resented rise in water and electricity tariffs.

During this turmoil period in 2011, the Opposition decided to present a vote of no confidence both in Dr. Austin Gatt and the Government. With 34 votes in favour, 34 against, and an abstention by Dr. Debono, the motions did not go through due to a casting vote by the Speaker. Nevertheless, Dr. Debono continued to criticise the Government, Hon. Dr. Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici, then Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs, and Richard Cachia Caruana, Malta's Representative for the EU in Brussels. The Opposition continued to ride the wave and present other motions, including another no confidence vote in the Government, which did not go through.

With the Opposition now presenting two separate motions, one against Richard Cachia Caruana and another against Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici, the political scene was at a



standstill since this was the first vote since Dr. Debono had abstained. Subsequently, the Opposition won both motions, and thus, saw the resignation of Dr. Carmelo Mifsud Bonnici and Richard Cachia Caruana. Later that year, the Budget for 2013 did not go through, resulting in the fall of the Government, and naturally, the call for a General Election.

The election held on the 9<sup>th</sup> of March 2013 saw the rise of PL winning with a margin of over 35,000 votes. Dr. Lawrence Gonzi conceded and resigned from PN to make way for a new leader.

#### **4.4 Summary & Concluding Remarks**

This surmounting evidence comes as no surprise, especially in light of the recent opinion published by the Venice Commission in 2018. The conclusions clearly demonstrate that the Prime Minister is at the centre of power, while all other actors are in a weak institutional position to provide sufficient checks and balances. The Commission additionally provides key recommendations, including judicial vacancies to be made public, vetted and ranked by a separate committee, and the Maltese President to propose such candidates directly, and the need for a constitutional amendment to ensure that any unconstitutional legal provision is automatically annulled without any intervention by Parliament, including that judges and magistrates are not to be dismissed by Parliament. The Commission further recommends the removal of the double role which the Attorney General currently occupies, thus having an independent public prosecutor, while the Attorney General remains a legal advisor to the Government, strengthening the position of the President, salaries for MPs to be increased for them to focus more on their parliamentary work, the need for better rules

related to conflicts of interest, especially related to appointments of MPs to official bodies, and the removal of the Prime Minister's power, especially in positions of trust, and more importantly, independent commissions and permanent secretaries (Venice Commission, 2018).

The next Chapter will discuss and analyse the results and key findings of this research. However, it will first set the scene, given that this research discusses data gathered daily between October 2012 and September 2013.

## Chapter 5 - Results and Discussion

### 5.1 Introduction

A total of 712 articles were captured between October 2012 and September 2013 published in both *In-Nazzjon* and *L-Orizzont* that made reference to, or whose context was related to either alleged clientelistic or corrupt practices. Each article was further coded for analysis purposes. The coding was based on the conceptual framework highlighted in the previous Chapter related to *The Corruption Tree* (ACFE, 2013) and *The Pyramid Clientelistic Structure* (Ark-Yıldırım and Ceren, 2017). It is highly important to note that each article was only given one code which was based on the perspective on which it was written. The coding consisted of either clientelist traits (pork barrel or personal favours), or corrupt practices (illicit gratuities, economic extortion, conflict of interest or bribery), as explained in greater detail in *Table 7* below.

<b>Clientelism</b>	
<b><u>Code</u></b>	<b><u>Meaning</u></b>
Pork Barrel	The utilisation of Government funds for projects designed primarily to please and entice voters or legislators and win votes.

*Table 7: Coding Explained (continued on the next page)*

<b>Clientelism</b>	
<u>Code</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
Personal Favour	An act done specifically to please a specific person or group with no material exchange.
<b>Corruption</b>	
Bribery	The offering of money (or something of value) in return for a favour (Individual without power asking help from someone with power).
Conflict of Interest	A situation where an individual is in a position to derive personal benefit from actions or decisions made in their official capacity.
Economic Extortion	Asking for money (or something of value) in return for a favour (It is usually more of a threat). (Individual with power demanding money in exchange for their influence.)
Illicit Gratuities	Paid after an act has been done as a form of tip or appreciative gesture.

*Table 7: Coding Explained*

## 5.2 Findings

Table 8 below explains how the articles captured in both *In-Nazzjon* and *L-Orizzont* were coded to facilitate the interpretation of the data collected between October 2012 and September 2013. Significantly, the number relates to each individual article published by the above mentioned newspapers and not a unique number of cases.

<b>Code</b>	<b>Number of Articles</b>
Personal Favour	341
Illicit Gratuities	144
Economic Extortion	87
Conflict of Interest	71
Bribery	41
Pork Barrel	28
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>712</b>

*Table 8: Number of Articles per Code Used*

### **5.2.1 Personal Favour**

Table 8 above demonstrates that, out of all the articles published by *In-Nazzjon* and *L-Orizzont* between October 2012 and September 2013, most were related to personal favours (which were not related to any material exchange), mainly between the Government and individuals or companies. These personal favours were mostly related to positions within the Government or its agencies, with particular emphasis on the Malta Police Force, Armed Forces of Malta (AFM), Mater Dei Hospital, Government Schools, and *Wasteserv en masse*. There were additionally several direct appointments within the Governments filling specific positions flagged as clientelistic in nature. Other articles included direct orders given to individuals or companies known to be close to the political party in Government, Malta Environment and Planning Authority (MEPA) permits issued and approved at an abnormally hurried rate, or controversial permits being issued and tenders being won by, yet again, individuals, or companies known to be close to the political party in Government.

Furthermore, Public Broadcasting Services Limited (PBS) is worth mentioning since it featured quite a number of times. In this instance, PBS was accused several times of employing individuals very close to the political party in Government and favouring companies, politicians and private companies when securing air times and television programmes, including the news, as well as alleged favoured use of the premises and studios themselves. It is important to note that for the purpose of this research, any transfers and/or appointments which were deemed as vindictive in nature were flagged and coded as personal favours since these positions were vacated either to make way for other preferred candidates in this position, or spiteful for one's own personal desire, and thus, both clientelistic in nature.

### **5.2.2 Illicit Gratuities**

Looking at illicit gratuities, most articles were dominated by mainly two alleged cases, namely, the Burmeister & Wain Scandinavian Contractor (BWSC) case and oil scandal. The BWSC case mainly relates to the Delimara power station extension contract, which was a tender awarded in May 2009 to BWSC. These articles allege possible corrupt practices, including insider information, unorthodox changes mid-way along the contract, serious plant faults, the controversial appointment of a foreign consultancy firm Lahmeyer International by Enemalta Corporation (EMC), and alleged millions being pocketed for this multi-million project to materialise. In this regard, an 87-page report published by NAO, specifically on the Delimara extension and its implementation concluded that:

Despite the fact that not all defects have been fully resolved, whether major or minor, these have or are being dealt with. Moreover, there does not appear to be enough evidence to suggest that EMC was hasty in the taking over process (NAO, 2013, p. 75).

On another note, the alleged oil scandal relates to email correspondence, bank transfers and online chats published primarily by MaltaToday, while being reported by all other news agencies, showing how a businessman and other EMC officials worked closely with companies Total and Trafigura to ensure the sale of oil to EMC, allegedly, with such officials receiving illicit gratuities. The articles published continue to allege further people and companies involved, including the Finance Minister, EMC Chairman, and consultants, amongst others. Although NAO published a report focusing mainly on the effectiveness of EMC's fuel procurement process and the Corporation's hedging function, there are still a number of ongoing cases in this regard. However, NAO highlights various facts, including that there was no policy framework between 2008 and 2010, and thus, the procurement function was in effect operating in a policy vacuum. The report further emphasises the lack of record-keeping, such as, minutes during procurement-related meetings, the availability of records and documentation, the lack of quality control, and more. Nevertheless, NAO concluded its executive summary stating that:

Finally, setting aside specific periods where substantial losses were incurred, NAO commends the positive performance registered by Enemalta with respect to crude oil and forex hedging undertaken throughout the period under review, that is, 2008 up to 2011 (NAO, 2013, p. 43).

### **5.2.3 Economic Extortion**

Most of the articles on economic extortion were dominated by the John Dalli case. Mr. John Dalli was appointed to the European Commission back in 2010 as the Commissioner for Health and Consumer Policy. In late 2012, however, OLAF accused an associate of Dalli for asking for more than €60 million from a company called Swedish Match, Sweden's main producer of snus (a tobacco product), in return for Mr.

John Dalli to change European regulations on tobacco in their favour. Mr. John Dalli was subsequently asked to resign. The OLAF report claimed that, although he was not involved in any monetary transaction, he was more than aware of what was going on. In fact, the OLAF report concluded that

...there are a number of unambiguous and converging circumstantial evidences gathered in the course of the investigation, indicating that Commissioner John DALLI was actually aware of both the machinations of Mr Silvio ZAMMIT and of the fact that the latter was using his name and position to gain financial advantages (OF/2012/0617, 2012, p. i).

Another case worth mentioning in relation to economic extortion is that related to GreenMT, which refers to alleged corrupt practices where GreenMT, a company owned by the General Retailers and Traders Union (GRTU), was promoting its services with various local councils in relation to waste collection. These articles refer to political pressure being exerted on local councils to use GreenMT and not GreenPak where, in return, they would receive a cash award of €2,000. In this particular case, the Government itself was also using the services of GreenMT allegedly to bail out GreenMT.

#### **5.2.4 Conflict of Interest**

Looking at conflicts of interest, most articles make reference to one-off cases related to such an alleged offence, including direct orders given to individuals who were known to be close to the political party in Government, or to officials closely involved in the tendering process, and direct orders issued to close relatives, friends or companies owned by or close to the same individuals involved in issuing such a direct order. More cases included appointments of friends and family, unethical use of funds or approval of such funds, individuals holding conflicting positions, the misuse of State-owned



property, including vehicles and premises, and the approval of Government-related tenders to companies that were known to be very close to the political party in power, particularly those related to consultancy.

### **5.2.5 Bribery**

Thirty-nine out of the 41 articles on bribery were dominated by two separate cases involving the Judiciary. One of the cases involved the investigation of Mr. Justice Lino Farrugia Sacco as head of the Malta Olympic Committee over serious allegations of the selling of tickets to third parties for resale on the black market. In fact, Mr. Justice Lino Farrugia Sacco was subsequently impeached. The other case relates to the late Mr. Justice Ray Pace, who was allegedly being accused of bribery and trading in influence. Judge Pace was being accused of trying to influence another member of the judiciary with the aim of inflicting a tougher sentence on an individual.


### **5.2.6 Pork Barrel**

Looking at articles on the utilisation of Government funds for projects designed primarily to please and entice voters or legislators and win votes, one comes across those related predominantly to the renting of St. Philip's Hospital. In this case, the Government was being allegedly accused by the opposition of renting out St. Philip's Hospital to ease the huge issues associated with the fairly new hospital, Mater Dei Hospital, which was already facing huge space shortage issues. The Government was therefore being accused of using Government funds to rent out a hospital which was much older, simply to be able to support more individuals in need of care just a few months before a General Election. It further transpired that St. Philip's Hospital was owned by Dr. Frank Portelli, a former candidate of the political party in Government at

the time. It was additionally alleged that Dr. Frank Portelli was experiencing financial difficulties and that this project meant more to Dr. Portelli than simply a project aimed to solve the state’s overcrowding problems at Mater Dei Hospital.

### 5.2.7 A Closer Look at the Data

Similarly to *Table 8*, *Figure 8* below portrays the number of articles mentioned pertaining to the codes as established initially in this Chapter.



*Figure 8: Number of Articles per Code Used*

It is evident that between October 2012 and September 2013, personal favours which were allegedly clientelistic in nature were the most prominent, followed by illicit gratuities, economic extortion, conflict of interest, and bribery, which are corrupt in nature. Lastly, pork barrel is seen as clientelistic in nature. When clientelistic traits are segregated from the corrupt ones, it can be concluded that during the undertaken

timeframe, there were more articles related to clientelistic practices than corrupt ones (Table 9).

<b>Code</b>	<b>Number of Articles</b>
Personal Favour	341
Pork Barrel	28
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>369</b>

<b>Code</b>	<b>Number of Articles</b>
Illicit Gratuities	144
Economic Extortion	87
Conflict of Interest	71
Bribery	41
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>343</b>

*Table 9: Codes and Number of Articles Segregated*

The objective of *Table 10* below is to segregate data according to the article content and cases, most of which have been mentioned earlier. It is important to emphasise that the term ‘other’ in the table below refers to other cases that are only mentioned once and specific in nature, while the term ‘general case’ refers to articles that are not referring to any specific case and are mostly directed to the Government, political party in power, ministry, or public office as a whole.

<b>Article/Case</b>	<b>Number of Articles</b>
Position within the Government	167
Oil Scandal	130
Other	74
John Dalli Case	71
Tender	50
Judiciary	40
General Case	38
PBS	30
Renting of St. Philip's Hospital	27
Direct Order	20
Car Park Privatisation Project	14
Malta Police Force	14
BWSC Case	10
GreenMT Case	9
Wasteserv	6
MEPA	6
MFSA	3
Housing	3
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>712</b>

*Table 10: Cases per Number of Articles*




Figure 9: Alleged Cases between October 2012 & September 2013 per Code

Figure 9 above illustrates how each of the alleged clientelistic and corrupt cases features between October 2012 and September 2013 thereby comparing each individual code corresponding to the numbers of articles published. Given this timeframe, most of these approaches are consistent; however, most of the sudden spikes illustrated suggest a publication of a scandal. The spike, as can be seen in December, reflects the publication of the aforementioned bribery allegations of the judiciary, while the spike in February reflects the publication of the alleged Enemalta Corporation oil procurement scandal. If one looks at the month of October, specifically at pork barrel and economic extortion, one notices a plunge going into November. The spike in October contributed to the emphasis made in the publication of articles on the renting of St. Philip’s Hospital for pork barrel related articles, and the resignation of Mr. John Dalli from European Commissioner in mid-October for articles related to economic extortion. Looking at

personal favours between October 2012 and September 2013, the plunge from October to November is associated with a particular case related to the car park privatisation project. The Government here was being allegedly accused of trying to privatise 34 car parks all over Malta through a public tender of 10 years, and its main intent was to allegedly award such a tender to a specific private entity; however, this was suspended during the month of October. The spike in February is mainly related to positions within the Government, tenders and direct orders. In the immediate aftermath of the General Election in March, most personal favours were related to positions within the Government, including the Malta Police Force, AFM, Mater Dei Hospital, Government Schools, and Wasteserv *en masse*. Such positions within the Government also include various boards, committees and councils. *Table 11* below provides a numerical representation, similar to *Figure 9* above, outlining how each of the clientelistic and corrupt traits features between October 2012 and September 2013.

	Bribery	Conflict of Interest	Economic Extortion	Illicit Gratuities	Personal Favour	Pork Barrel
October 2012	0	1	32	2	62	24
November 2012	0	7	12	2	29	2
December 2012	23	5	11	3	27	1
January 2013	6	7	4	26	24	0
February 2013	1	8	4	45	32	0
March 2013	1	7	3	23	20	0
April 2013	1	11	4	5	31	0
May 2013	4	11	4	6	28	0
June 2013	3	9	5	6	25	1
July 2013	0	1	5	7	33	0
August 2013	0	3	0	10	15	0
September 2013	2	1	3	9	15	0

*Table 11: Alleged Cases between October 2012 & September 2013 per Code*

### **5.3 The Pattern of Influence Trading in Maltese Politics and Government**

As identified in the initial Chapters of this research, this study aims to answer a number of research questions revolving around the notions of clientelism and corruption.

#### **5.3.1 Is the influence trading that goes on in Maltese Politics and Government a symptom of clientelism, or is actual corruption involved?**

Analysing the data collected between October 2012 and September 2013, the influence trading that goes on in Maltese politics and Government is a concoction of both alleged clientelistic and corrupt practices. Nonetheless, from a reporting perspective, cases of corruption take more time to investigate and prosecute, and thus, they take a longer timeframe to be reported when compared to articles on clientelism. Alleged cases of corruption practices are reported in the past, usually months, if not years, after the alleged crime takes place, while alleged clientelistic practices are easier to identify and are usually reported immediately, or very close to when the actual act occurs. Nonetheless, once again, from a reporting perspective, alleged clientelistic practices, unlike alleged corrupt cases, are reported over a much shorter timeframe, and while corrupt practices are usually reported for months on end, specific clientelistic cases usually span for a duration of a few weeks.

Furthermore, the articles are written from a very different perspective. Alleged corrupt cases are usually reported from a more investigative perspective, uncovering truths and facts as time goes by implicating the individuals involved, while slowly suggesting

ways how such alleged crimes are illegal. Contrastively, alleged clientelistic cases are often written in a way that portrays their unethical nature, providing the connections why they are truly cases of clientelism, but rarely proven to involve illegalities.

Referring to the research question at hand, one can say with great confidence that elements of clientelism are clearly evident in such cases, especially those related to positions within the Government taking an *en masse* approach both before and after the General Election of 2013. On the other hand, while these articles suggest corrupt practices, one cannot conclude with certainty that this is really the case as several cases reported to contain alleged corrupt practices are hardly proven. Such alleged corrupt practices rarely follow through, and at times, there are no investigations by the Malta Police Force. This phenomenon is evident in most of the cases involving alleged corrupt practices, portraying an absence of institutional capacity to respond to such cases, the true effectiveness of the Malta Police Force to prosecute, the slowness of progress, the difficulties in putting forward evidence related to the case, and the bureaucratic judicial procedures involved. At times, these same judicial procedures act as a loophole, making it even harder for individuals involved in alleged corrupt cases to be prosecuted.

The GRECO Report adopted in 2017 already highlighted various shortcomings, including the need for a strengthened judicial accountability to ensure better transparency and also strengthening the role of prosecutors to be impartial and objective, while adopting a transparent system, including greater independence and impartiality of prosecutorial decisions (GRECO, 2017). The Venice Commission of 2018 additionally opines that since the Prime Minister is at the centre of power, all other actors are in a weak institutional position to provide sufficient checks and balances.



Moreover, this opinion highlights amongst other issues the need for the removal of the double role which the Attorney General currently occupies, thus having an independent public prosecutor, while the AG remains a legal advisor to the Government.

### **5.3.2 What cases of corruption and clientelism have been alleged or identified in Maltese Politics?**

As outlined earlier in this Chapter, various cases were identified using the data collected between October 2012 and September 2013. Alleged clientelistic cases are more related to specific appointments within the Government, the issue of tenders or direct orders to family members or individuals known to be close to the political party in Government, the unethical use of the PBS, and the utilisation of Government funds for projects designed primarily to please and entice voters or legislators to win votes. On the other hand, alleged corrupt practices include kickbacks, commissions and embezzlement related to multi-million government tenders, bribes, mainly related to the Judiciary, extortion related to favouring policy to a company of over multi-billion Euros in net worth, and conflicts of interest arising mainly from officials taking decisions closely linked with the receiving end.

### **5.3.3 What cases of political corruption and clientelism are most evident in Maltese Politics?**

If one looked at the specific cases and not the number of articles published as depicted earlier in this Chapter, the cases which are most evident would be appointments within the Government, together with its institutions, and the alleged corrupt practices in multi-million projects. During the timeframe taken between October 2012 and September 2013, there were several cases of individuals being given a job in the public sector,

mainly falling under the Ministry for Education and Employment, Ministry for Home Affairs & National Security, and Ministry for Agriculture & Fishers, Rural Development & Environment. This excludes the number of direct appointments, consultants and persons of trust, amongst other highly paid positions. What is even more evident is that both before and after the General Election, such appointments occur in bulk, involving 100 or more transfers, promotions or newly filled positions, mainly within the Malta Police Force, AFM, Mater Dei Hospital, Government Schools, and Wasteserv. With regards to alleged corruption, this is clearly evident in projects involving millions of Euros. In the EMC oil scandal and the John Dalli case, the alleged corrupt cases refer to illicit gratuities and extortion and involve more than one person.

#### **5.3.4 Is there a pattern of corruption or clientelism in Maltese Politics?**

The patterns associated with corruption and clientelism within Maltese Politics are two-fold. On one hand, clientelism is evidently serving primarily to ensure the upkeep of relationships, networks and the mutual association between the politician and voter (whether an individual or group of people). This continues to fuel patronage thereby verging clientelism on corrupt practices. If one took the aforementioned alleged oil scandal, one could draw out two characteristics which contribute to corrupt clientelism, namely, the absence of corporate governance, which includes the lack of checks and balances which affect the institutional process, and the high stakes involved. In fact, the NAO report published in this regard, despite not going into the merits of the alleged scandal, highlights that there was no policy framework and that no records were kept in relation to minutes and quality control (NAO, 2013). These two characteristics are also

evident in nearly all the other cases featuring alleged corrupt practices related to direct orders and public tenders.

These clientelistic traits serve as a mechanism for the political party in Government to retain its power until it would eventually run out of resources to continue distributing. On the other hand, alleged corruption during this particular timeframe seems to be quite sporadic, allegedly involving millions of Euros in illegitimate payoffs between the private sector and high-ranking officials, mostly within the public sector or politicians. It is further evident how the private sector plays an important part in alleged corrupt practices involving Maltese Politics. Therefore, the trading of influence in Maltese Politics is mainly attributed to the clientelistic positions within the Government, together with its institutions, and also the power of the private sector to take hold of multi-million projects through alleged corrupt practices.

## **Chapter 6 - The Case of Mr. John Dalli**

### **6.1 Introduction**

The case of Mr. John Dalli was investigated in greater detail to better understand the course of events which made the headlines on both local and foreign media. While this case is still not *res judicata*, this case study recalls all the events that unfolded related to this specific case as published in local newspapers until the 3<sup>rd</sup> of May 2019. These newspapers include *In-Nazzjon*, *L-Orizzont*, *Times of Malta*, *The Malta Independent* and *MaltaToday*, which include verbatim citations in the references Chapter. The principal purpose of this account is to demonstrate, in a real scenario, the themes identified by this study, as well as insights into the complex phenomena of clientelism and corruption. It is important to clarify that this account does not pronounce on the merits of the case itself and it is compiled from newspaper articles. This case was chosen because it firstly involves Maltese politicians and individuals, secondly, it is being investigated locally, internationally and at European level, and thirdly, it is the longest case being investigated of all the data collected since October 2012. This case study concludes with an analysis of the events, the actors in play, the role of the media, and the instruments being used to uncover the truth. A full timeline of events can be viewed in *Appendix B*.

### **6.2 The Politician – John Dalli**

Mr. Dalli is no new face in Maltese Politics. After a successful business career, he was first elected to the House of Representatives in 1987 on behalf of Partit Nazzjonalista,

and served in several positions, including the Prime Minister's personal consultant, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Investment Promotion, Ministry of Finance, and his most recent position of Minister for Social Policy. In 2004, he also contested for PN leadership, which he lost to Dr. Lawrence Gonzi. In 2010, Mr. Dalli resigned as Minister and Member of Parliament on his appointment as European Commissioner, specifically as the Commissioner for Health and Consumer Policy. It is important to note that in 2004, he was appointed Foreign Minister, but resigned just after three months due to allegations about his conduct, more precisely, irregularities in the award of contracts for medical apparatus and airline ticketing.

### **6.3 European Commissioner for Health and Consumer Policy**

In the afternoon of October 16<sup>th</sup> of 2012, the Commission announced that Mr. Dalli had resigned from the European Commission following an investigation conducted by OLAF, the EU's anti-fraud office. On May 25<sup>th</sup> of 2012, OLAF opened an investigation concerning an alleged bribe demand to Swedish Match, a manufacturer of *snus*, a tobacco product, to obtain the lifting of the EU ban on snus. The OLAF report stated that on several occasions, Mr. Silvio Zammit, Dalli's former canvasser, had requested more than €60 million in return for changes to European regulations on tobacco in their favour. Reference was also made to Dr. Gayle Kimberley, a Maltese lawyer who later turned prosecution witness. Dr. Gayle Kimberley was in fact a local representative for the tobacco company Swedish Match.

The report itself emphasised that they were both acting on behalf of and for the benefit of the Commissioner, and hence, Mr. Dalli was aware of what was happening. A copy of the report drafted by Giovanni Kessler, an Italian prosecutor and Director General of the European Anti-Fraud Office of the European Commission, was sent to Dr. Peter Grech, the Maltese Attorney General, stating that Dalli, Zammit and Kimberley “could be qualified as allegedly committing the offence of trading in influence as per the Criminal Code of Malta” (OF/2012/0617, 2012, p. ii). The report itself included interviews, witnesses, telephone logs, emails and a copy of the recording file where Mr. Silvio Zammit requests money in exchange for a meeting to be scheduled between a representative of Swedish Match and Mr. Dalli. After Mr. Dalli’s resignation, it was now up to the Maltese policy and prosecuting authority to decide how to follow it up. On the other hand, for his part, Mr. Dalli categorically denied all accusations.

Immediately after this story broke on 16<sup>th</sup> October 2012, announcing Mr. Dalli’s resignation, Mr. Dalli sent a letter to Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission at the time, insisting that he had never resigned in writing and was waiting for an official request for him to do so. Mr. Dalli insisted that the OLAF investigation was not carried out fairly in his regard and that he was not made aware of any meetings or talks that were held between Swedish Match, Dr. Gayle Kimberley, and Mr. Silvio Zammit. In fact, he subsequently took this case to court for unfair dismissal. Mr. Dalli further wrote to all members of the European Parliament, demanding answers to 32 questions on his forced resignation. Many MEPs, NGOs and even the European Parliament itself joined Mr. Dalli’s cause, demanding the full facts on Dalli’s case leading to his resignation. In the meantime, the Chairman of the OLAF supervisory

board, Christiaan Timmermans, resigned over an alleged breach of procedure in relation to the handling of the case.

Subsequently, in October of 2012, the Attorney General passed the EU report to the Police for investigation. On the 13<sup>th</sup> of November 2012, Mr. Dalli, Silvio Zammit, and Gayle Kimberley were questioned by the Malta Police, and nearly a month later, Mr. Zammit was charged with bribery and trading in influence. On the other hand, Dr. Kimberley, who was being considered as the main witness, claimed that she was being blackmailed over what to say in court. On the 17<sup>th</sup> of January 2013, Magistrate Anthony Vella ordered that the OLAF report was to be presented as evidence, and a few days later, it was announced that Mr. Dalli was ill and consequently unable to travel to Malta for arraignment. On the 19<sup>th</sup> of February 2013, Mr. Dalli filed a lawsuit against the European Commission, calling for the annulment of his resignation and also demanding compensation.

This case was overshadowed by the General Election Campaign of 2013, when the Labour Party won the majority of seats on the 9<sup>th</sup> of March 2013, thus defeating the Nationalist Party with over 35,000 votes. On the 10<sup>th</sup> of March 2013, Mr. Dalli extended his medical certificate again. A few days later, this case made the headlines once again as Dr. Kimberley confirmed that Mr. Zammit had requested €60 million to assist in the lifting of the EU ban on snus. On the 20<sup>th</sup> of March 2013, Mr. Dalli was interviewed by the Belgian Police.

From a more local perspective, PN had refrained from commenting on or going into the merits of the case, while the newly elected Prime Minister of Malta, Dr. Joseph Muscat,

called for more transparency with reference to this case. On the 25<sup>th</sup> of March 2013, the Police Commissioner John Rizzo rejected claims that he had urged officials at Swedish Match not to tell the truth or to mislead the investigation in any way. A few weeks later, Peter Paul Zammit was appointed the new Police Commissioner, and during the same week, Mr. Dalli returned to Malta after recovering from a medical condition. On the 28<sup>th</sup> of April 2013, MaltaToday leaked the full OLAF report to the public. This report indicated that the case against Dalli rested particularly on phone calls and Dr. Kimberley's testimony.

In the meantime, MEP Inge Gräßle asked the European Commission to suspend the anti-fraud investigator Dr. Kessler after he was found to have had lunch with Dr. Kimberley. Barroso too was being urged to explain why he had forced Mr. John Dalli to resign before a proper investigation took place. While Dr. Kessler continued to deny that the agency's actions were illegal when it investigated Mr. Dalli, he was subsequently grilled by the EU Parliament, with the Supervisory Committee urging the European Commission to act on the alleged breach of human rights.

On the 8<sup>th</sup> of June 2013, Police Commissioner Zammit declared that there was not enough evidence to justify criminal prosecution of Mr. Dalli, adding that he was critical of OLAF's investigation. Dalli continued to reiterate his innocence and that Barroso had an interest in blocking the Tobacco Directive. On the 28<sup>th</sup> of July 2013, *The Sunday Times of Malta* published an article stating that the newspaper had seen emails showing that Dr. Kimberley had guided a second snus lobbying attempt. This led the police to reopen the investigation on her. Meanwhile, former Police Commissioner Rizzo stated that he wanted to arraign Mr. John Dalli and that the Attorney General was of the same



view. On the 1<sup>st</sup> of October 2013, Dr. Simon Busuttil, then Leader of the Opposition, accused the Prime Minister of interfering in Dalli's favour. Dalli in turn accused PN that, while in office, the Party had exerted pressure for him to be arraigned. On the 27<sup>th</sup> of January 2014, the Prime Minister denied the allegations while testifying before the Privileges Committee of the House of Representatives, which was probing a breach of privilege complaint by the Leader of the Opposition. Meanwhile, however, the Government objected to a request for the Attorney General to testify before the Committee.

While the proceedings continued, on the 13<sup>th</sup> of March 2014, Dalli categorically denied ever having discussed anything related to money with Silvio Zammit. Subsequently, on the 11<sup>th</sup> of April 2014, European Ombudsman, Emily O'Reilly, requested the Commission to publish all letters and internal notes on the investigation. In July 2014, the Corporate Europe Observatory, an influential transparency NGO, published a copy of a critical report by the EU Anti-fraud Agency (OLAF), questioning the legality of the investigation, while the Court case instituted by Dalli against Commission President Barroso began in Luxembourg. On the 3<sup>rd</sup> of July 2014, Police Commissioner Zammit resigned and was replaced by Acting Commissioner Ray Zammit. For his part, former Police Commissioner Rizzo informed the Privileges Committee that Dalli knew about everything, and that he wanted to conduct a final interview before arraigning him, but Dalli was sick and unable to travel, and subsequently, Rizzo was replaced as Police Commissioner.

In August of 2014, Kessler was asked to give evidence on John Dalli's case; however, his sitting was postponed. An issue arose related to foreign witnesses for this case as

they could not attend the sittings. In fact, Magistrate Vella declared that the witness in Silvio Zammit's case should be heard via video conferencing since the witness was reluctant to come to Malta. On the 28<sup>th</sup> of September 2014, new witnesses confirmed that Dalli had been enquiring about lifting the ban on snus during the time of the alleged attempted bribery. Michael Cassar who, at the time, headed the Economic Crimes Unit, told Parliament's Privileges Committee that the case against Mr. John Dalli could only be made if he was arraigned together with Silvio Zammit. Furthermore, on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of December 2014, former Deputy Police Commissioner Joe Cachia stated during a House Privileges Committee hearing that there was enough evidence to charge both Dalli and Zammit. Inspector Angelo Gafa' also claimed that the Police were given verbal and written advice by the Attorney General to charge Dalli. On the 12<sup>th</sup> of December, Mr. Michael Cassar was appointed Police Commissioner.

On the 14<sup>th</sup> of January 2015, Inspector Gafa' stated during a Parliamentary Privileges Committee hearing that European Smokeless Tobacco Council (ESTOC) Secretary General Inge Delfosse had recorded a phone call made between Silvio Zammit and herself, where she was asked for €10 million in return for setting a meeting with Mr. John Dalli. Following this statement, former Police Commissioner Peter Paul Zammit criticised Inspector Gafa' that he had been subjective in his evaluation. On the 17<sup>th</sup> of March 2015, Dr. Kessler testified in Malta in court against Mr. Dalli, who lashed back, accusing Dr. Kessler of perjury. On the 10<sup>th</sup> of May 2015, Belgian investigators asked the European Commission to lift the diplomatic immunity of officials from OLAF who were accused of recording phone conversations without judicial authorisation. These investigators were also looking into the legitimacy of the recordings with the Commission, allowing these Belgian prosecutors to investigate the EU anti-fraud chief,

Dr. Kessler. On the 12<sup>th</sup> of May 2015, Dalli lost the EU case for unfair dismissal by the EU General Court, and later appealed to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and lost again in 2016. On the 15<sup>th</sup> of March 2016, Silvio Zammit also filed a criminal complaint over alleged illegal phone call recording.

On the 27<sup>th</sup> of April 2016, Cassar resigned as Police Commissioner. Mr. Lawrence Cutajar was appointed Acting Police Commissioner, and later appointed Police Commissioner on the 1<sup>st</sup> of August 2016. On the 3<sup>rd</sup> of June 2016, Silvio Zammit condemned the AG for waiting for the foreign witness who, according to him, was refusing to testify and was therefore stalling proceedings. Zammit subsequently filed for a breach of his fundamental right to a fair hearing. On the 25<sup>th</sup> of October 2017, a recording of Mr. Silvio Zammit clearly asking for a €10 million bribe was leaked by a Swedish news portal.

On the 27<sup>th</sup> of April 2018, the Court ruled that the prosecutors' insistence on the key witness to testify was in breach of Silvio Zammit's right to a fair trial. However, on the 18<sup>th</sup> of October 2018, the Court also ruled that there were enough grounds for Silvio Zammit to be committed to trial. The next day, Mr. Silvio Zammit filed a judicial protest over the AG's discretionary powers. The case rests there for the time being.

## **6.4 Pandora's Box**

This sad and convoluted case study yields powerful insights into the trading of influence within Maltese Politics. These are no longer alleged corrupt practices referred to as 'street level corruption', involving ordinary people and low-ranking officials.

Rather, the case reveals the dynamics of ‘grand corruption’ which reaches to the highest levels of European Union governance. While street level corruption is usually related to routine administrative decisions, grand corruption refers to non-routine acts involving high-level officials or politicians exploiting their decision-making authority and large-scale public resources to undertake valuable transactions with large corporate interests (Treisman, 2000). Contrary to street level corruption, grand corruption is potentially harder to detect, investigate and prosecute, as the parties involved are usually well placed to hide evidence of the transaction (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Moreover, on account of the inter-linked governance and political systems operating within the European Union, grand corruption knows no boundaries, as the Dalli case vividly demonstrates.

The alleged case in relation to EMC’s procurement of oil narrated in the previous Chapter also relates to the involvement of international personas and companies thereby continuing to suggest that alleged instances of grand corruption outside the country’s immediate jurisdiction could be on the rise. When we refer to grand corruption, we must also look into the high-level positions these officials and politicians may be occupying. These positions could even include Members of Parliament or Members of the Judiciary, as has been seen earlier in this Chapter.

Another element which comes into play is the ineffective investigative and prosecutorial procedures related to these alleged cases. Institutional capacity seems inadequate to respond to such cases. While the Police does investigate allegations of corruption, the slow progress, difficulties in obtaining evidence and witnesses, and slow judicial procedures limit the number of successful prosecutions. Judicial safeguards are

exploited by the defence counsel, making it even harder for individuals involved in alleged corrupt cases to be prosecuted successfully.

Lastly, another evident element is the politicisation of allegations of corruption. It is rare for the leading political actors to think beyond the tactical partisan advantages that can be obtained from an allegation. Such politicisation distorts reality and debases popular perceptions of wrong-doing, which makes it much harder to debate the issues dispassionately and think of the cumulative effects of corrupt clientelism on Maltese public life. Politicisation is not only apparent in how people think and express themselves, but it is also transmitting itself onto institutions, thus clouding judgements and, in the long run, compromising anti-corruption initiatives and weakening confidence in the integrity of institutions.

## **6.5 Summary & Concluding Remarks**

Without going into the merits of any particular case, there are a number of issues one can highlight, possibly applicable to several other alleged cases accentuating characteristics in Maltese Politics. First and foremost is the importance and role of the media within a democratic society. If it were not for the media, only rumours would alert the public to these alleged cases related to both clientelism and corruption. The media itself should not be seen as a reporting element, but rather as an active actor to inform the public, investigate wrong-doing, and moreover, shed light and assist in uncovering the truth.

Political interference and political bias are another characteristic which is evident in most cases. It is indeed the other face of the deal-making which characterises clientelistic political systems. The political personas involved in any alleged case tamper and dampen the positive image the political party or Government is trying to portray. Therefore, at this stage, these political parties have an important decision of association or dissociation to take in relation to the political actors involved. One must also keep in mind that most of the actors involved in fighting corruption, including all the committees and institutions mentioned in the preceding Chapters, are either appointed by the President of Malta, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, including Members of Parliament, with the majority representing the Government, or appointed directly by the Prime Minister.

Another element which is evident is the slowness in pursuing accusations and allegations, the absence of institutional capacity to act, the comparative inefficiency in prosecution, and the vulnerability of judicial procedures to malicious delays. In some cases, it appears as though the systems used to prove allegations hinder the very same investigation. At face value, these allegations are so hard to prove that the existing systems in place make it at times impossible for the alleged perpetrator to be charged with a crime, let alone be convicted or exonerated.

Similarly, there is also the issue of time since most of the alleged cases are reported in the past, recounting acts that happened months before. Therefore, a long span of time elapses between the moment when an illegal act has allegedly happened and the moment it is reported. Similarly, long periods of time elapse between the initiation of police investigations and the final verdict, if any. This makes it even harder to uncover

the truth and possibly have a more accurate and comprehensive body of evidence of the incidence, magnitude, causes and consequences of clientelistic corruption.

Another element that comes to light is the role of corporate interests in Maltese Politics. The private sector is a powerful albeit underestimated actor in the political world. It can be seen as a client to the Government in offering various services, but it could also be seen as a partner to the Government. Moreover, the private sector sometimes appears to be the piper that calls the tune. Keeping in mind that politics is an extremely expensive activity and that corporate interests may exploit the financial needs of politicians and political organisations in return for material gains, it is evident that Maltese Politics is vulnerable to corruption. It is also evident from the data collected that alleged acts of clientelism or corruption involving companies or individuals from the private sector are identified in projects involving substantial sums of money, most of which entail multi-million Euros worth of contracts.

## Chapter 7 - Conclusion

Throughout this study, one evident and common factor related to clientelism and corruption is the interplay of power as both phenomena revolve around the exchange of resources and favours based on an exploitative relationship. Both ‘patron’ and ‘client’ seek an optimum between themselves in the exchange of resources for favours or both. Therefore, both parties have something to lose and gain out of this legitimate or illegitimate exchange. The phenomenon of corrupt clientelism, which emerges vividly in this research, is a vicious circle that facilitates the incorporation of corrupt exchanges revolving around three basic features, namely, resources, actors, and legality (Moss, 1995). Corruption and clientelism thrive on inequality and on the irregular or unjust uses of State power and resources.

Therefore, while this initial study has endeavoured to dissect clientelism and corruption, it is very difficult to isolate these entangled institutional mechanisms. On one hand, we have clientelism, which is evidently serving primarily to ensure the upkeep of relationships, networks and the mutual association between the politician and voter (whether an individual or group of people), and on the other hand, we have corruption which, during this particular timeframe, seems to be quite sporadic, allegedly involving millions of Euros in illegitimate payoffs between the private sector and high-ranking officials, mostly within the public sector or politicians.

Furthermore, this study sheds light on elements of clientelism that are clearly evident with positions within the Government taking an *en masse* approach both before and after the General Election involving 100 or more transfers, promotions or newly filled positions, mainly within the Malta Police Force, Armed Forces of Malta, Mater Dei



Hospital, Government Schools, and Wasteserv. On the other hand, alleged corruption is evident in projects involving millions of Euros, such as, the Enemalta Corporation oil procurement scandal and the John Dalli case.

While this field is highly under-researched, especially in the local context, it would be very interesting to conduct this research over a longer span of time. Given that this study has been conducted over a specific year, one could obtain better results when extending this research. Such a longitudinal study could uncover more patterns, provide better insights, unearth shifts in the pattern documented here, the emergence of different types of allegedly corrupt and clientelistic practices, and more. Any future research could also include a larger selection of sources, broadening the selection of *codes* used to classify alleged cases of corruption and clientelism, while even collecting data on alleged clientelistic or corrupt cases pertaining to specific ministers, ministries, institutions and other bodies. Therefore, an extensive and deeper study could provide highly valuable insights into the issues, such as, the weakness of corporate governance in Maltese public administration, and factors hindering the successful, systematic investigation and prosecution of accusations.

This study demonstrates the complexity of getting to the bottom of the truth, let alone proving it, or even understanding it. It illustrates too the inherent complexity of the phenomena of clientelism and corruption in contemporary Malta, with its booming economy, growing social disparities, and the vast concentrations of corporate and governmental power. It further demonstrates that clientelism and corruption are highly intertwined phenomena, and that both should be considered as serious threats to Maltese Politics and the fundamental concept of a level playing field. Additionally, this research

brings to light the interplay of power and the environment where clientelism and corruption function, and the elements of secrecy, unethical relationships, and the political culture in which they flourish.

Unfortunately, the same laws and instruments that were put into place more than 30 years ago are still being used to uncover the truths of today, and while it is very likely that both the patterns of clientelism and corruption have creatively evolved over time and become more pervasive and insidious, the same cannot be said for the structures devised to counter them. This thus gives rise to a series of questions. Should Malta consider a major electoral reform that would reduce the incentive to suborn voters? Could a decentralisation of government power benefit the fight against clientelism and corruption, or might it instead accentuate the influence of political and kinship networks on administrative decisions? Do politicians even want to take any bold steps in this regard, or are the country's major political parties taking it in turns to exploit State power and resources? To what extent could robust corporate governance reduce the incidence of corruption?

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## Appendices

### Appendix A

Data Collected from *In-Nazzjon* and *L-Orizzont* between October 2012 and September 2013 on cases related to alleged clientelism or corrupt practices.

Newspaper	Date Published	Page	Story Title
L-Orizzont	01 October 2012	14	X'inhu għaddej fix-xiri taż-żejt?
L-Orizzont	02 October 2012	4	Fi Stat tal-Biki
L-Orizzont	02 October 2012	4	Franco Debono lest anke jivvota kontra l-Baġit
L-Orizzont	02 October 2012	4	Gonzi jaħrab milli jwieġeb
L-Orizzont	02 October 2012	5	Il-Ħamis ikun magħruf meta ser tkun diskussa l-mozzjoni
L-Orizzont	02 October 2012	10	Il-Verita fil-Friża
L-Orizzont	02 October 2012	11	Is-saltna tal-gideb
L-Orizzont	02 October 2012	15	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont
L-Orizzont	03 October 2012	3	Is-sospensjoni tat-tender għall-privatizzazzjoni tal-parkeġġi
L-Orizzont	04 October 2012	3	JPO se jipprezenta l-petizzjoni kontra l-privatizzazzjoni tal-parkeġġi fil-Parlament
L-Orizzont	04 October 2012	14	Tal-Biki!
L-Orizzont	04 October 2012	15	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont
In-Nazzjon	04 October 2012	1	L-Awtorita' tax-Xandir aġixxiet ta' forċina għal Muscat
L-Orizzont	08 October 2012	4	Franco Debono: Ninsab lest għal din l-opportunita' Kbira
L-Orizzont	08 October 2012	6	Mugliett kien wissa li s-switwazzjoni politika ma tistax tibqa' tiġi injorata
L-Orizzont	08 October 2012	6	Sitwazzjoni delikata fil-Parlament
L-Orizzont	08 October 2012	15	Niddsikutu x'se niddiskutu
L-Orizzont	08 October 2012	16	Mossa arroganti, iżda xi darba jsir xi haġa
L-Orizzont	08 October 2012	16	Bini ġdid tal-PBS għall-użu tal-privat?
L-Orizzont	09 October 2012	4	F'għieh id-demokrazija?
L-Orizzont	09 October 2012	4	Migliett jikkonferma r-rizenja tiegħu
L-Orizzont	09 October 2012	6	Biex tiġi diskussa mozzjoni trid pjaċir
L-Orizzont	09 October 2012	8	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont

L-Orizzont	09 October 2012	13	Il-bidu tat-tmien
L-Orizzont	09 October 2012	16	Gideb u qerq rigward il-finanzi u l-ekonomija
L-Orizzont	10 October 2012	1	Investigat fuq Uzura
L-Orizzont	10 October 2012	3	Austin Gatt ikompli jiġbed lill-Kabinett miegħu
L-Orizzont	10 October 2012	5	Min ġie l-ewwel thalla barra
L-Orizzont	10 October 2012	6	Ħu s-Sindku allegatament kien jabbuza mill-kariga biex jinfluwenza lil dawk li kellhom jagħtuh il-flus
L-Orizzont	10 October 2012	10	Austin lest ikun il-ħaruf tas-sagrifiċċju
In-Nazzjon	10 October 2012	1	Tmexxija żbaljata u abbużiva mil-Labour f'Hal Safi
L-Orizzont	11 October 2012	1	L-Awtorita' Bil-Grazzja
L-Orizzont	11 October 2012	5	Ħadd ma nformani b'xejn
L-Orizzont	11 October 2012	5	Il-petizzjoni tar-Rabtin deskritta bħala "Stalinista"
L-Orizzont	11 October 2012	6	Dr Portelli bla kumment għalissa dwar allegat ksur tal-liġijiet finanzjarji
L-Orizzont	11 October 2012	6	Franco Debono jressaq mozzjoni oħra fil-Parlament
L-Orizzont	11 October 2012	13	Parkeġġ jew ingann u arroganza?
L-Orizzont	12 October 2012	4	X'wiċċ Tost!
L-Orizzont	12 October 2012	5	Ebda Sindku jew kunsillier m'għamel dak li għamilt jien
L-Orizzont	12 October 2012	14	Soap Opera' f'Santa Venera
L-Orizzont	12 October 2012	21	Kollox irid ikun sospiż
L-Orizzont	12 October 2012	1	Dejn kollu Skansat
L-Orizzont	13 October 2012	4	Għad iridu joħorgu ħafna aktar affarijiet gravi fuq dan is-sindku
L-Orizzont	13 October 2012	4	Bużullotti F'Londra
L-Orizzont	13 October 2012	9	Ftehim "bizzilla"
In-Nazzjon	13 October 2012	2	l-MLP jaddotta politika ta' klijenteliżmu
L-Orizzont	15 October 2012	1	Gonzi Kodard
L-Orizzont	15 October 2012	5	Muscat jinsisti li l-ftehim mas-St Philip's ikun diskuss b'urgenza
L-Orizzont	15 October 2012	14	Sfida lill-Awtorita' tax-Xandir
L-Orizzont	16 October 2012	4	Issospendi l-kuntratt!
L-Orizzont	16 October 2012	6	Muscat: Waqqfu l-proċess u ressquha quddiem il-PAC
L-Orizzont	16 October 2012	10	Tiela' San Filep
L-Orizzont	16 October 2012	14	Nippreparaw ruġna

L-Orizzont	16 October 2012	17	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont
In-Nazzjon	16 October 2012	32	Esponenti tal-MLP riedu jixtru l-Isptar St. Philip's
L-Orizzont	17 October 2012	1	John Dalli jirriżenja minn Kummissarju Ewropew
L-Orizzont	17 October 2012	1	Il-Bejgħ Miżmum
L-Orizzont	17 October 2012	5	Ma kienx San Filep!!
L-Orizzont	17 October 2012	5	Jinhatar bord "bl-ghagġla"
L-Orizzont	17 October 2012	5	Il-PBS mimli b'diversi eks impjegati ta' Net TV
In-Nazzjon	17 October 2012	1	John Dalli jirriżenja minn Kummissarju Ewropew
L-Orizzont	18 October 2012	1	Dikjarazzjonijiet kontrastanti
L-Orizzont	18 October 2012	4	Bla sens ta' bilanċ
L-Orizzont	18 October 2012	12	Kultura tar-riżenji
L-Orizzont	18 October 2012	13	Lura bħal granċ
In-Nazzjon	18 October 2012	1	John Dalli ħa sehem f'zewġ laqgħat ma' lobbyists tal-kumpanija Żvediza
In-Nazzjon	18 October 2012	5	Silvio Zammit jiċhad l-allegazzjonijiet fil-konfront tiegħu
In-Nazzjon	18 October 2012	5	Dalli jsostni li ma kien jaf b'xejn dwar korrispondenza b'emails
In-Nazzjon	18 October 2012	11	Ir-Riżenja ta' John Dalli
L-Orizzont	19 October 2012	1	Pjan biex jaqbduni f'nassa
L-Orizzont	19 October 2012	8	Dr Frank Portelli mingħajr kummenti
L-Orizzont	19 October 2012	9	M'attendejtx laqgħa tal-bord għax ma rridx inkun kompliċi
In-Nazzjon	19 October 2012	1	513 Miljun Kroner Żvediz biex jiltaqgħu ma' Dalli u tinbidel id-direttiva
L-Orizzont	20 October 2012	1	Jissemew 60 Miljun Ewro
L-Orizzont	20 October 2012	7	L-Opożizzjoni tittama li mhix xi "kummiedja"
L-Orizzont	20 October 2012	12	Is-saħħa tiġi qabel il-politika
L-Orizzont	22 October 2012	1	John Dalli jgħid li nkisru d-drittijiet kollha tiegħu
L-Orizzont	22 October 2012	15	Tal-PN ma jinbudlux
L-Orizzont	22 October 2012	16	Ħalluhom l-impjegati
L-Orizzont	22 October 2012	16	Iktar 'chiefs' milli Indjani
L-Orizzont	23 October 2012	1	Irrd Riżenja bil-Miktub
L-Orizzont	23 October 2012	6	Il-kuntratt ta' St. Philip jista' jiġi ffirmat fis-siġħat li ġejjin
L-Orizzont	23 October 2012	12	Meta Frank kien "frank"

L-Orizzont	23 October 2012	13	Il-kamp tal-battalja
L-Orizzont	23 October 2012	14	Demokrazija Farsa
L-Orizzont	23 October 2012	15	St Philip's b'nuqqas ta' sens komun
In-Nazzjon	23 October 2012	1	Dalli jikteb lil Barroso
In-Nazzjon	23 October 2012	5	Dalli jibgħat ittra lill-MEPs
L-Orizzont	24 October 2012	8	Gonzi: Kwistjoni ta' inkwiet kbir għall-poplu Malti
L-Orizzont	24 October 2012	8	Fil-5 ta' Lulju l-Prim Ministru kien jaf li Dalli qiegħed ikun investigat
L-Orizzont	24 October 2012	13	Power station fid-dlam
L-Orizzont	24 October 2012	15	Nesiġu rispettt
In-Nazzjon	24 October 2012	3	Il-Parlament se jiddiskuti l-każ ta' John Dalli fi żmien opportun
L-Orizzont	25 October 2012	4	Riżenja irrevokabbli
L-Orizzont	25 October 2012	5	Il-kwistjoni dwar il-ħatra ta' segretarju eżekuttiv f'Santa Venera
L-Orizzont	25 October 2012	8	Il-kontroversja tal-Isptar St Philip's quddiem il-Kumitat Parlamentari tal-Kontijiet Pubbliċi
L-Orizzont	25 October 2012	9	Il-privatizzazzjoni tal-parkeġġi
L-Orizzont	25 October 2012	9	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont
L-Orizzont	25 October 2012	11	Veru beżżul Miskin
L-Orizzont	25 October 2012	15	Meta l-BWSC Rebħet il-Kuntratt
In-Nazzjon	25 October 2012	1	Barroso jwissi lil Dalli u jgħidlu jgħib ruħu b'integrita'
In-Nazzjon	25 October 2012	3	Botta u risposta bejn Barroso u Dalli
In-Nazzjon	25 October 2012	9	Il-Gvern se jippreżenta l-kuntratt mal-Isptar St.Philip's lill-PAC qabl jiġi ffirmat
L-Orizzont	26 October 2012	5	Il-każ tar-riżenja ta' Dalli
L-Orizzont	26 October 2012	11	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont
L-Orizzont	26 October 2012	12	F'Dalli sabu beċċun
L-Orizzont	26 October 2012	16	Kunsill Lokali Safi diskriminat
L-Orizzont	26 October 2012	22	PL: Pożizzjoni b'meritokrazija u mhux skont lil min taf
In-Nazzjon	26 October 2012	4	John Dalli jgħid li t-twissija ta' Barroso ma tbiddel xejn
L-Orizzont	27 October 2012	6	Paul Borg Olivier talbu jiffavorixxi kumpanija tal-GRTU
L-Orizzont	27 October 2012	7	Rita Schembri tirtira mil-Kumitat tal-OLAF
L-Orizzont	27 October 2012	17	San Filippu vs San Luqa

L-Orizzont	29 October 2012	12	Il-'Lobbying'
L-Orizzont	29 October 2012	13	Hadd wara Hadd
L-Orizzont	29 October 2012	15	Il-każ ta' John Dalli, min jaf x'għad johroġ
L-Orizzont	30 October 2012	1	Espert tal-Qorti involut f'allegat każ ta' frodi fl-Air Malta
L-Orizzont	30 October 2012	5	Il-Gvern b' "influenza qawwija" fuq TVM
L-Orizzont	30 October 2012	9	L-investigazzjoni dwar il-każ John Dalli tolqot tliet persuni
L-Orizzont	30 October 2012	10	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont
L-Orizzont	30 October 2012	13	Reazzjoni qawwija
L-Orizzont	31 October 2012	1	L-Awditur Ġenerali janalizza kuntratti li ħarġu dipartimenti tal-Gvern u jirriżultawlu nuqqasijiet serji
L-Orizzont	01 November 2012	1	Terz ta' miljun ewro f'direct order waħda
L-Orizzont	01 November 2012	15	Dalli - Tymoshenko
L-Orizzont	01 November 2012	17	Promozzjoni fuq Skala 8 f'Għawdex
L-Orizzont	02 November 2012	4	L-Istimi Minfuhin
L-Orizzont	02 November 2012	10	L-Ombudsman mitlub jinvestiga
L-Orizzont	02 November 2012	15	Investigazzjoni Ivvizzjata
L-Orizzont	02 November 2012	16	GonziPN ma jistax isib serħan f'Tas Sliema
L-Orizzont	02 November 2012	21	Jidhlu għal kuntratti b'telf?
L-Orizzont	03 November 2012	1	Investigazzjoni oħra fuq Malta mill-OLAF
L-Orizzont	03 November 2012	5	Naqas milli jwettaq il-wegħdi li għamel
L-Orizzont	05 November 2012	9	L-Isptar San Filippu minflok dak ta' Karin Grech
L-Orizzont	05 November 2012	13	Demokrazija jew dittatorjat?
L-Orizzont	05 November 2012	14	Kaçça għall-voti, wegħdi u pjaçiri tal-aħħar
L-Orizzont	05 November 2012	1	Medjatur tal-PN?
L-Orizzont	05 November 2012	6	Promozzjonijiet fil-Korp tal-Pulizija
L-Orizzont	06 November 2012	11	In-nefqa ta' 300,000 ewro mill-Pulizija fuq manutenzjoni ta' 'software'
L-Orizzont	06 November 2012	21	L-Awditur Ġenerali mitlub jintervjeni
L-Orizzont	08 November 2012	4	Kxif ta' snin fil-PBS!
In-Nazzjon	08 November 2012	2	Kunsillier Laburista investigat mill-Pulizija
L-Orizzont	09 November 2012	1	L-Allokazzjoni ta' postijiet mill-



			Awtorita' tad-Djar
L-Orizzont	09 November 2012	5	Għal John Dalli mhux każ magħluq
L-Orizzont	09 November 2012	16	Il-problemi ta' dejjem
L-Orizzont	12 November 2012	8	MPE urtati li r-rapport ta' Dalli baqa' mistur
L-Orizzont	12 November 2012	16	'Close-up' ikompli jsodd it-toqob
L-Orizzont	13 November 2012	10	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont
L-Orizzont	14 November 2012	1	Dalli miżmum għal 34 Siegħa
L-Orizzont	14 November 2012	8	Mitluba investigazzjoni dwar każ ta' allegat kunflitt ta' interess fl-MFSA
L-Orizzont	14 November 2012	15	Parlament b'saħħtu għal pajjiż b'saħħtu
In-Nazzjon	14 November 2012	7	John Dalli interrogat mill-Pulizija
L-Orizzont	15 November 2012	3	Il-Bord tal-Mepa johroġ permessi għal vilel fir-Rabat
L-Orizzont	15 November 2012	10	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont
L-Orizzont	15 November 2012	15	Ħadd wara Ħadd
L-Orizzont	16 November 2012	5	Bannister jiċhad, Bartolo jisfidah bil-fatti
L-Orizzont	16 November 2012	10	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont
L-Orizzont	17 November 2012	1	Inghataw 376 post tal-Gvern bil-kera fl-aħħar sentejn
L-Orizzont	17 November 2012	15	Bdew iroxxu l-bżar
L-Orizzont	19 November 2012	6	Sentejn wara li Tonio Fenech ċahad li sar xogħol "bi pjaċir" f'daru
L-Orizzont	19 November 2012	7	L-Ombudsman imwaqqaf milli jagħmel xogħol għaċ-ċentru tal-Arbittraġġ
L-Orizzont	19 November 2012	16	Ġurnalisti sfiduċjati
L-Orizzont	20 November 2012	9	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont
L-Orizzont	20 November 2012	13	Il-kultura tar-regħba
L-Orizzont	21 November 2012	1	2,000 ewro "LIXKA"
L-Orizzont	21 November 2012	3	Kważi 40 miljun ewro fi hlasijiet pendenti minn tliet ministri
L-Orizzont	21 November 2012	4	Il-ħmar iwahħal f'denbu
In-Nazzjon	21 November 2012	2	Sandro Schembri Adami mitlub jikkunsidra ammissjoni
L-Orizzont	22 November 2012	4	IL-GRTU twissi mara li kienet membru fi ħdanha
L-Orizzont	22 November 2012	4	A tempo vergine, Ċens!
L-Orizzont	22 November 2012	9	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont
L-Orizzont	23 November 2012	10	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont
L-Orizzont	23 November 2012	17	Ħela ta' Flus
L-Orizzont	24 November 2012	10	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont

L-Orizzont	26 November 2012	8	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont
L-Orizzont	02 December 2012	11	L-esigenzi politiċi fil-Korp tal-Pulizija jidher li qed jirbhu fuq dawk tas-servizz
L-Orizzont	03 December 2012	16	Il-magna tal-PBS kienet wara Busuttil
L-Orizzont	04 December 2012	1	L-eks Sindku Slimiż ikkundannat sena ħabs
In-Nazzjon	04 December 2012	1	Sena ħabs għal Nikki Dimech
L-Orizzont	05 December 2012	1	Ir-rapport tal-Awditur, Benefiċċji sproporzjonati
L-Orizzont	05 December 2012	6	Investigat jekk Rita Schembri marritx kontra l-kodiċi
L-Orizzont	05 December 2012	29	Nuqqasijiet fit-tmexxija tal-Wasteserv
L-Orizzont	06 December 2012	5	Il-kredibbiltà tal-Gvern tintrabat mal-ittri BWSC
L-Orizzont	06 December 2012	6	Bżonn ta' bidla ta' sistema u ideat
L-Orizzont	07 December 2012	6	Tkompli tikber il-perċezzjoni dwar il-korruzzjoni f'Malta
L-Orizzont	07 December 2012	17	Il-Kunsill ta' Santa Venera mill-ġdid f'kontroversja
L-Orizzont	08 December 2012	2	Il-Ministeru ta' Pullicino ma jikkonvinċix
L-Orizzont	10 December 2012	8	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont
L-Orizzont	10 December 2012	14	Simon Busuttil...politika skaduta
L-Orizzont	10 December 2012	16	Il-beatifikazzjoni ta' Busuttil fuq il-PBS
L-Orizzont	11 December 2012	5	Debono: Privileġġ li nivvota kontra l-Baġit
L-Orizzont	12 December 2012	1	Silvio Zammit jibqa' arrestat wara li kien mixli b'tixhim
L-Orizzont	12 December 2012	20	L-Ombudsman jitlob għas-sospensjoni ta' mħallef
In-Nazzjon	12 December 2012	7	L-Ombudsman tal-parir lil Farrugia Sacco jiġi sospiż sakemm isiru l-investigazzjonijiet
In-Nazzjon	12 December 2012	32	Silvio Zammit jinżamm arestat wara li ġie mixli b'tixhim
L-Orizzont	13 December 2012	1	Imħallef arrestat dwar "reat serju"
L-Orizzont	13 December 2012	8	L-investigazzjoni dwar Dalli għadha għaddejja
L-Orizzont	13 December 2012	16	Ix-xandir tal-istat ma jibqax sfaċċat taht il-PL
L-Orizzont	13 December 2012	18	Imħallef se jagħmell libell kontra eks Prim Imħallef
In-Nazzjon	13 December 2012	7	Xhieda ta' tliet sigħat mill-Pulizija dwar

			kuntatti bejn Silvio Zammit u l-kumpanija Żvediza
In-Nazzjon	13 December 2012	7	Farrugia Sacco jiftaħ kważa ta' libell kontra l-Ombudsman
L-Orizzont	14 December 2012	1	Imħallef Involut F'Korruzzjoni?
L-Orizzont	14 December 2012	4	Il-Kummissarju tad-'Data' jgħid li se jinvestiga
In-Nazzjon	14 December 2012	1	L-imħallef Pace mixli b'tixhim u influwenza dwar sentenza
In-Nazzjon	14 December 2012	2	Il-President jgħaddi l-ittra tal-Ombudsman lill-Prim Imħallef
In-Nazzjon	14 December 2012	5	Akkużat li kien se jinfluwenza terza persuni fi hdan il-ġudikatura
In-Nazzjon	14 December 2012	5	L-istituzzjonijiet se jwettqu d-dmirijiet tagħhom
L-Orizzont	15 December 2012	4	Fil-Qorti kulhadd kien taħt xokk
In-Nazzjon	15 December 2012	1	Iż-żewġ Imħallfin jingħataw fit sigħat biex jirriżenjaw
In-Nazzjon	15 December 2012	5	Riżenja fl-interess tal-ġudikatura
In-Nazzjon	15 December 2012	5	L-Ombudsman mhux se jagħti kummenti ulterjuri dwar il-każ tal-Imħallfin
In-Nazzjon	15 December 2012	5	L-investigazzjonijiet qed jindikaw xibka ta' kriminali
L-Orizzont	17 December 2012	9	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont
L-Orizzont	17 December 2012	16	Il-waqgħa tal-Gvern u l-PBS
L-Orizzont	17 December 2012	18	Sensiela ta' Pjaçiri
In-Nazzjon	17 December 2012	1	Xhieda importanti fil-Qorti llum b'rabta mal-allegat tixhim tal-eks Imħallef Pace
In-Nazzjon	17 December 2012	4	Muscat reċti u paroli biss
In-Nazzjon	17 December 2012	5	Il-każ tal-eks Imħallef Pace jibda jinstema' fil-Qorti għada
In-Nazzjon	17 December 2012	5	Kandidat Laburista hati li abbuża mill-kariga ta' uffiċjal tal-immigrazzjoni
L-Orizzont	18 December 2012	15	Wiċċek qagħad daqshekk??
In-Nazzjon	18 December 2012	1	Provi fil-Qorti jiżvelaw li l-eks Imħallef Pace kien igawdi minn pjaçiri
In-Nazzjon	18 December 2012	4	Recording ta' telefonati bejn l-akkużati u l-eks Imħallef
In-Nazzjon	18 December 2012	5	Il-Proċeduri kontra Mħallef jittieħdu biss mill-Parlament u l-President
L-Orizzont	19 December 2012	4	L-eks Imħallef Pace Jingħata l-ħelsien mill-arrest

L-Orizzont	19 December 2012	6	Tkompli tinstema' l-kumpilazzjon ta' Silvio Zammit
L-Orizzont	19 December 2012	15	Kelli raġun
L-Orizzont	19 December 2012	19	Tibda l-kumpilazzjoni tal-eks Imhalled Raymond Pace
In-Nazzjon	19 December 2012	1	L-imhalled Ray Pace jinghata l-liberta' proviżorja
L-Orizzont	20 December 2012	20	15 il-Miljun Ewro Kuntratt għal Żaren
L-Orizzont	20 December 2012	5	Il-MEPA wkoll tħabrek biex tfittex taqdi lil Żaren
L-Orizzont	20 December 2012	8	Il-każ għadu f'kontroversja f'Malta
L-Orizzont	20 December 2012	14	97% tal-wegħdi GonziBusuttilPN, twettqu jew ma twettqux?
L-Orizzont	20 December 2012	1	Approvazzjoni Mgħagġla!
L-Orizzont	21 December 2012	4	Flimkien, sa l-aħħar nifs!
L-Orizzont	22 December 2012	4	Il-kultura tar-riżenji
L-Orizzont	22 December 2012	4	Il-Partit Laburista jemmen fil-kontabilita'
L-Orizzont	22 December 2012	8	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont
L-Orizzont	22 December 2012	28	Jistenna li l-kuntratt ta' St Philip's jibqa' għaddej
L-Orizzont	24 December 2012	14	Franco Debono...serju, kuraġġuż u ta' principju
L-Orizzont	28 December 2012	14	Xiri ta' oġġetti, kuntratti u 'direct orders'
L-Orizzont	29 December 2012	4	Ikonsistenzi 'galore'!
L-Orizzont	29 December 2012	8	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont
L-Orizzont	29 December 2012	12	Qerq u gideb
L-Orizzont	31 December 2012	3	Il-PBS irid id-dibattitu f'Xarabank u mhux f'Dissett
L-Orizzont	31 December 2012	9	Meritokrazija
L-Orizzont	02 January 2013	7	L-allegazzjonijiet fuq il-ġudikatura tappnu r-reputazzjoni tagħha
L-Orizzont	02 January 2013	12	GonziPN jilgħab karta
L-Orizzont	03 January 2013	1	Il-PBS imwiddeb u ordnat biex "Dissett" isir bejn Grech u Busuttil
L-Orizzont	03 January 2013	1	Involut ukoll Uffiċjal ta' TM
L-Orizzont	03 January 2013	8	Għada se jsiru 95 kunstisabbli ġdid fil-Korp tal-Pulizija
L-Orizzont	03 January 2013	8	Jibqgħu jinharġu promozzjonijiet mal-Gvern
L-Orizzont	03 January 2013	8	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont
L-Orizzont	04 January 2013	6	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont

L-Orizzont	04 January 2013	15	Froġa oħra f'Santa Venera
L-Orizzont	05 January 2013	6	Tar mar-riħ id-diskors tal-Prim Ministru tal-2011
L-Orizzont	05 January 2013	10	Tlaqna
L-Orizzont	05 January 2013	11	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont
L-Orizzont	07 January 2013	9	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont
L-Orizzont	07 January 2013	14	Minn kelma ta' raġel għal waħda ta' tifel
L-Orizzont	07 January 2013	15	Huma joffru l-biża', ahna t-tama
L-Orizzont	08 January 2013	18	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont
In-Nazzjon	08 January 2013	9	L-eks Imħallef Ray Pace jitpoġġa taht att ta' akkuża
L-Orizzont	10 January 2013	4	Idħak / ibki bl-addoċè!!
L-Orizzont	11 January 2013	3	300 ħaddiem fil-Mater Dei jibqgħu jiġu diskriminati
L-Orizzont	11 January 2013	16	Is-sitwazzjoni tas-Segretarju Ezekuttiv
L-Orizzont	12 January 2013	12	Ir-responsabilitajiet ta' gvern proviżorju
L-Orizzont	12 January 2013	12	Ittra miftuħa lill-Ombudsman
In-Nazzjon	12 January 2013	9	Sindku Laburista investigat dwar ħlasijiet li jlaħħqu 18,400 ewro
L-Orizzont	13 January 2013	3	Ernest Tonna jieħu fidejħ is-sigurta' tad-DC
L-Orizzont	13 January 2013	6	Jintużaw fondi pubbliċi biex isir rapport mill-Enemalta għall-PN
L-Orizzont	15 January 2013	12	Libsa tal-Imperatur
L-Orizzont	16 January 2013	4	Cacopardo jikkritika lill-PN talli qed juża fondi pubbliċi għall-kampanja tiegħu
L-Orizzont	17 January 2013	4	Uffiċjali ma kinux jafu li sar...l-Enemalta siekta
L-Orizzont	17 January 2013	7	Il-Ministru George Pullicino "jaħrab" minn "Reporter"
In-Nazzjon	17 January 2013	8	L-Imħallef Farrugia Sacco f'kawża kontra l-Kummissjoni għall-Amministrazzjoni tal-Ġustizzja
L-Orizzont	18 January 2013	1	Ir-rapport tal-OLAF se jiġi esebit fil-Qorti
L-Orizzont	18 January 2013	16	Ikomplu l-abbużi fil-Kunsill Lokali ta' Santa Venera
L-Orizzont	18 January 2013	26	L-IOC "jehles" lill-Imħallef Farrugia Sacco
L-Orizzont	19 January 2013	8	Jitwaqqaf il-proċess tal-promozzjonijiet fil-Habs
L-Orizzont	19 January 2013	16	Dawl l-4 Miljun Ewro!

L-Orizzont	19 January 2013	1	Eks maniger fl-Enemalta jizvela x'gara mill-pjani tal-pajp tal-gass...
L-Orizzont	21 January 2013	1	Il-kummissjonijiet li nghataw fuq ix-xiri taz-zejt mill-Enemalta
L-Orizzont	21 January 2013	9	Zvelata korruzzjoni fix-xiri taz-zejt
In-Nazzjon	21 January 2013	9	Il-Kummissarju tal-Pulizija mitlub jinvestiga allegazzjoni ta' korruzzjoni
L-Orizzont	22 January 2013	1	L-iskandlu tal-kummissjonijiet fuq ix-xiri taz-zejt mill-Enemalta
L-Orizzont	22 January 2013	5	Muscat "ixxukkjat imma mhux sorpriż" bir-rapport dwar korruzzjoni fix-xiri taz-zejt
L-Orizzont	22 January 2013	6	Investigazzjoni fqasir żmien
L-Orizzont	22 January 2013	12	Tahraq
In-Nazzjon	22 January 2013	4	Frank Sammut inhatar Direttur Manigerjali tal-MOBC taht Gvern Laburista
L-Orizzont	23 January 2013	1	Interrogat mill-Pulizija
L-Orizzont	23 January 2013	5	Il-PM ghandu hafna mistoqsijiet xi jwiegeb
L-Orizzont	23 January 2013	9	"Ghaliex il-Gvern ma qalibx ghall-gass?"
In-Nazzjon	23 January 2013	2	Il-PBS se tiftah proceduri gudizzjarji kontra l-Awtorita' tax-Xandir
L-Orizzont	24 January 2013	1	Tawh permess ghal garaxx bi trakkijiet tal-fjuwil fl-abitat!!
L-Orizzont	24 January 2013	1	Il-każ ta' korruzzjoni fix-xiri ta' zejт fl-Enemalta
L-Orizzont	24 January 2013	20	Joseph Muscat jappella ghall-prudenza rigward il-każ Frank Sammut
In-Nazzjon	24 January 2013	4	Frank Sammut kien membru tal-Fuel Procurement Board taht Gvern Laburista
In-Nazzjon	24 January 2013	6	Muscat diga' identifika nies u jaf liema kariga se jaghtihom
L-Orizzont	25 January 2013	6	Permessi abbużivi bhal hames snin ilu
L-Orizzont	28 January 2013	1	Mhux każ Wahdieni
L-Orizzont	28 January 2013	8	Il-każ Frank Sammut
L-Orizzont	28 January 2013	9	Mhux eskluż li sar minhabba kunflitt ta' interess
L-Orizzont	28 January 2013	29	Hawn min ghandu jdejh imcappsin biz-zejt
In-Nazzjon	28 January 2013	40	Addio Tenders? Direct Orders issa?

L-Orizzont	29 January 2013	9	Każ inkwetanti li jqajjem ċerti domandi
L-Orizzont	29 January 2013	10	L-avukati jinsistu għar-rapport tal-OLAF
L-Orizzont	29 January 2013	14	Il-qarnita
L-Orizzont	29 January 2013	15	Meta ż-żejt jibda tiela f'wiċċ l-ilma
L-Orizzont	30 January 2013	6	IL-PL jishaq fuq it-trasparenza u l-iggvernar aħjar
L-Orizzont	30 January 2013	7	Austin Gatt fid-Depot tal-Pulizija ma jgħidx jekk marx minn jeddu
L-Orizzont	31 January 2013	11	Il-każ ta' Silvio Zammit diferit għal darb oħra
L-Orizzont	31 January 2013	11	Tkompli l-kumpilazzjoni ta' żewġt irġiel mixlijin li pprovaw ixaħħmu mhallef
In-Nazzjon	01 February 2013	8	Ir-Rapport tal-Olaf jigi prezentat lid-difiża fuq ordni tal-Qorti
L-Orizzont	04 February 2013	9	Jiggedded iċ-ċens tal-MFCC għal 65 sena
L-Orizzont	04 February 2013	14	Il-veru prezz tal-korruzzjoni
L-Orizzont	04 February 2013	22	350,000 ewro mil-MFCC ta' Żaren għall-Partit Nazzjonalista
In-Nazzjon	04 February 2013	3	Kuntratturi kbar involuti fil-finanzjament tal-MLP
In-Nazzjon	04 February 2013	3	Ma jwegibx min huma l-kuntratturi
L-Orizzont	05 February 2013	1	It-talba għal maħfra presidenzjali b'rabta mal-iskandlu dwar ix-xiri taż-żejt mill-Enemalta
L-Orizzont	05 February 2013	5	Hu Gonzi li jrid iwieġeb dwar ir-relazzjoni tiegħu ma' Żaren Vassallo
L-Orizzont	06 February 2013	7	Il-btala ta' żewġ segretarji tal-PN fuq il-jott ta' Żaren Vassallo
In-Nazzjon	06 February 2013	1	Il-PN jippublika l-finanzi marbuta mal-kampanja elettorali
In-Nazzjon	07 February 2013	1	Bil-Labour fil-Gvern il-GWU tagevola lil negozjanti
L-Orizzont	08 February 2013	13	Ir-Re tal-Korruzzjoni
L-Orizzont	08 February 2013	14	PBS ta' għajb
In-Nazzjon	08 February 2013	1	Għandu jirriżenja minnufih
L-Orizzont	09 February 2013	1	Jirriżenja mill-Kamra tal-Kummerċ
L-Orizzont	09 February 2013	1	F'sena 27 Kuntratt Prekarju
L-Orizzont	09 February 2013	2	Mill-Armata għall-MTA 'fast-track'
In-Nazzjon	09 February 2013	1	Il-kabinett jilqa' t-talba tal-AĠ u l-Kummissarju tal-Pulizija għal proklama
In-Nazzjon	09 February 2013	1	Aġir li jnaqqas mid-dinjita' tal-

			ħaddiema u t-tredjunjonizmu
In-Nazzjon	09 February 2013	6	Il-konversazzjoni kienet dwar ftehim bejn il-kuntrattur u l-GWU
In-Nazzjon	09 February 2013	6	Tancred Tabone jirriżenja minn President tal-Kamra tal-Kummerċ, l-Industrija u l-Intrapriża
In-Nazzjon	09 February 2013	40	Toni Abela għamel pressjoni biex żewġ persuni ma jittressqux il-Qorti
L-Orizzont	11 February 2013	1	Min hu Aust?
L-Orizzont	11 February 2013	7	Muscat jitlob li l-PM u 'l Gatt jagħtu spjegazzjoni
L-Orizzont	11 February 2013	11	Konferma kemm il-PBS tilgħab parti importanti mill-magna tal-Partit Nazzjonalista
In-Nazzjon	11 February 2013	1	Maħfra kkundizzjonata lil George Farrugia
In-Nazzjon	11 February 2013	4	Id-diskors partigġan ta' Muscat ma jwassalx biex tiġi miġġielda l-korruzzjoni
L-Orizzont	12 February 2013	1	L-Awditur Ġenerali Jeħtieġ Jinvestiga
L-Orizzont	12 February 2013	8	Gatt jerga' jiċħad kuntatt ma' Farrugia
L-Orizzont	12 February 2013	21	Il-Prim Ministru jevita li jitkellem dwar l-iskandlu tax-xiri taż-żejt
In-Nazzjon	13 February 2013	1	Recordings jikxfu li Toni Abela għamel pressjoni fuq pulizija
L-Orizzont	14 February 2013	1	Bejn Fatti u Interpretar
L-Orizzont	14 February 2013	4	Il-Korruzzjoni u l-PBS
L-Orizzont	14 February 2013	4	Wara li kienu żvelati aktar imejls b'rabta mal-iskandlu taż-żejt
In-Nazzjon	14 February 2013	1	Toni Abela kellu suspetti ta' attivita' illegali f'Ħ'Attard u ma qalx lill-Pulizija
In-Nazzjon	14 February 2013	6	Muscat jiddefendi l-aġir ta' Toni Abela
L-Orizzont	15 February 2013	7	Intervent ta' Ministru biex persuna tinħareġ mil-'lock-up'
In-Nazzjon	15 February 2013	1	Austin Gatt qatt ma tkellem ma' ħadd dwar tenders għax-xiri taż-żejt
In-Nazzjon	15 February 2013	6	Gejtu Mercieca jingħaqad ma' Muscat jiddefendi lil Toni Abela
In-Nazzjon	15 February 2013	6	Ebda komunikazzjoni dwar allegazzjonijiet
In-Nazzjon	15 February 2013	8	Inswinwazzjonijiet bla bażi
L-Orizzont	16 February 2013	6	Gonzi ma kienx jaf bih
L-Orizzont	16 February 2013	21	Aktar ismijiet ta' persuni prominenti



L-Orizzont	16 February 2013	21	Impjegati 'casuals' mal-Gvern saru tal-post lejliet l-elezzjoni
In-Nazzjon	16 February 2013	1	Tkompli tinkixef il-maskra tal-MLP
In-Nazzjon	16 February 2013	1	Jaħbi każ ta' abbuż ta' droga f'każin Laburista
In-Nazzjon	16 February 2013	2	Il-Ministru Gatt jitlob lill-Kummissarju jinvestiga l-kont fl-Iżvizzera
In-Nazzjon	16 February 2013	3	Louis Grech isostni li kien jaġixxi differenti minn Toni Abela
In-Nazzjon	16 February 2013	6	Muscat ma jiħux mistoqsijiet mingħand il-ġurnalisti
In-Nazzjon	18 February 2013	1	Toni Abela b'kontradizzjonijiet kbar
In-Nazzjon	18 February 2013	1	In-Negozjant Keith 'tal-Kasco' propjetarju ta' diversi negozji
In-Nazzjon	18 February 2013	8	John Dalli jitlob li r-riżenja tkun revokata
In-Nazzjon	18 February 2013	1	Muscat kien jaf bil-każ tad-droga
In-Nazzjon	18 February 2013	1	Il-Prim Ministru jibqa' impenjat li jiġġielel il-korruzzjoni
In-Nazzjon	18 February 2013	1	Tancred Tabone u Frank Sammut akkużati l-Qorti b'tixhim u hasil ta' flus
L-Orizzont	19 February 2013	1	Il-Ministru Tonio Fenech kien jaf
L-Orizzont	19 February 2013	7	Dokumenti jikxfu l-konnessjoni
L-Orizzont	19 February 2013	10	Xhud iqajjem dubju dwar L-imħallef Lawrence Quintano
L-Orizzont	20 February 2013	1	Fil-Qorti akkużati bl-iskandlu ta' korruzzjoni fix-xiri taż-żejt mill-Enemalta
L-Orizzont	20 February 2013	6	Is-segretarjat ta' Tonio Fenech kien intalab tagħrif dwar min hu azzjonist ta' Aikon
In-Nazzjon	21 February 2013	8	L-Avukat Ġenerali appella dwar il-liberta' proviżorja
L-Orizzont	22 February 2013	1	Negozjanti mixlijin li kkorrompew lil Tancred Tabone u lil Frank Sammut
L-Orizzont	22 February 2013	1	Il-Pulizija mitluba tieġu passi kriminali kontra Austin Gatt
L-Orizzont	22 February 2013	1	Riġal ta' 5,000 ewro
L-Orizzont	22 February 2013	9	L-Iskandlu tax-xiri taż-żejt mill-Enemalta
L-Orizzont	22 February 2013	12	Enemaltagate
In-Nazzjon	22 February 2013	1	L-Amministratur Finanzjarju tal-MLP wara l-iskandlu taż-żejt

In-Nazzjon	22 February 2013	1	Tnejn oħra akkużati b'rabta mal-każ dwar ix-xiri taż-żejt
In-Nazzjon	22 February 2013	5	Preżentati dokumenti jikkonfermaw involviment ta' Joe Cordina
In-Nazzjon	22 February 2013	40	Liberta' proviżorja fuq depożitu ta' 20,000 u garanzija personali ta' 20,000 ewro oħra
In-Nazzjon	22 February 2013	1	Il-Labour Party jigdeb fl-iskandlu tax-xiri taż-żejt
L-Orizzont	23 February 2013	1	Jammetti li Rċieva Rigal
L-Orizzont	23 February 2013	8	Fenech ma jiftakar xejn dwar ir-rigal
L-Orizzont	23 February 2013	24	Joe Cordina: Jien qatt ma kelli x'naqsam mal-iskandlu taż-żejt
L-Orizzont	25 February 2013	1	Wara li tajjar anzjan u ordna lill-Pulizija biex ma jiddux passi
L-Orizzont	25 February 2013	2	Vittmi tal-korruzzjoni
L-Orizzont	25 February 2013	2	L-Olaf mitluba tinvestiga lil Michael Fenech Adami
L-Orizzont	25 February 2013	5	Manuvri biex jakkomodaw anzjani qabel l-elezzjoni
In-Nazzjon	25 February 2013	8	Muscat ma jwegibx mistoqsijiet dwar ir-rabta tiegħu ma' Joe Cordina
L-Orizzont	26 February 2013	4	Korruzzjoni Fl-Enemalta
L-Orizzont	26 February 2013	4	Kuntratt ta' 150-il miljun ewro
L-Orizzont	26 February 2013	11	Ma kontx naf bl-irregolaritajiet
In-Nazzjon	26 February 2013	1	Tibda l-kumpilazzjoni ta' Tancred Tabone dwar il-każ ta' tixhim fix-xiri ta' żejt
L-Orizzont	27 February 2013	1	Kuntratt ta' Nofs Miljun
L-Orizzont	27 February 2013	10	L-Iskandlu tax-xiri taż-żejt
L-Orizzont	27 February 2013	26	Kampanja ta' L-Orizzont
In-Nazzjon	27 February 2013	1	Jitressqu l-Qorti eks kontrollur finanzjarju tal-Enemalta u eks membru tal-kumitat tax-xiri taż-żejt
In-Nazzjon	27 February 2013	2	Il-kumpilazzjoni ta' Tarcisio Mifsud tibda bħal-lum ġimgħa
L-Orizzont	28 February 2013	1	Skwalifikat b'20 sena speċjalizzazzjoni
L-Orizzont	28 February 2013	1	Ksur ta' Liġijiet
L-Orizzont	01 March 2013	1	Aktar min nofs miljum lill-kumpanija Evolve Ltd
L-Orizzont	01 March 2013	1	L-Iskandlu tal-korruzzjoni fix-xiri taż-żejt kuljum mill-Enemalta
L-Orizzont	01 March 2013	6	Allegatament Farrugia kien ta' platt tal-

			fidda lil Ferris
L-Orizzont	01 March 2013	7	Kien jiehu 75c għall kull tunellata metrika
L-Orizzont	01 March 2013	12	Ħmieg u korruzzjoni
In-Nazzjon	01 March 2013	9	Jitressaq il-Qorti eks Chief Projects Officer tal-Enemalta
In-Nazzjon	01 March 2013	9	Ripetizzjoni tax-xhieda li saret fil-każ ta' Tancred Tabone
L-Orizzont	02 March 2013	1	Ebda rapport lill-Pulizija
L-Orizzont	02 March 2013	1	Il-PN Imgiddeb
L-Orizzont	02 March 2013	11	Tancred Tabone jitqiegħed taħt att ta' akkuża
In-Nazzjon	02 March 2013	2	Biżżejjed provi biex Tancred Tabone jitpoġġa taħt att ta' akkuża
In-Nazzjon	04 March 2013	6	Il-każ tad-droga li heba Muscat kixef l-ipokresija tal-MLP
L-Orizzont	05 March 2013	6	Gonzi: M'għandix dettalji
L-Orizzont	05 March 2013	6	Austin Gatt: Iż-żejt ma jinxtarax bil-ħbieb tal-ħbieb
L-Orizzont	06 March 2013	1	Self Misterjuż
L-Orizzont	06 March 2013	3	37 anzjan iddaħħlu fl-aħħar jiem
In-Nazzjon	06 March 2013	2	B'Muscat Prim Ministru Norman Hamilton isir Kummissarju Għoli Malta fir-Renju Unit
L-Orizzont	07 March 2013	1	Poter Maħmuġ
L-Orizzont	07 March 2013	3	Austin Gatt innegozja bil-moħbi ma' Grimaldi sena qabel "żarmaha"
L-Orizzont	07 March 2013	8	Ammetta li rċieva tliet "rigali" tal-fidda
In-Nazzjon	07 March 2013	10	Il-Kummissarju għall-Protezzjoni tad-Data jikkundanna lill-MLP
In-Nazzjon	07 March 2013	9	Ammetta li rċieva tliet "trays" tal-fidda iżda jiċhad li talab 40,000 ewro
L-Orizzont	08 March 2013	1	Kumpanija biex inixxfu l-MOBC
L-Orizzont	08 March 2013	7	F'Tas-Sliema jrid jerga' joħroġ it-tender għat-tindif
L-Orizzont	08 March 2013	9	L-ewwel rigal ta' Frank Sammut kienet karozza b'valur ta' Lm12,000
In-Nazzjon	08 March 2013	5	George Farrugia kien jgħaddi l-"commissions" lil Alfred Mallia li kien jaqsam ma' Tarcisio Mifsud
L-Orizzont	09 March 2013	29	Indhil fil-proċess tax-xiri tal-ħelikopter
In-Nazzjon	12 March 2013	2	Għażla partigjana għat-tmexxija taċ-civil

L-Orizzont	15 March 2013	1	L-allegat tixhim li wassal għar-riżenja ta' John Dalli
L-Orizzont	15 March 2013	11	Xhud isemmi nuqqasijiet fl-Enemalta
L-Orizzont	15 March 2013	11	Kunflitt ta' interess fl-MOBC b'rabta ma' kiri ta' vapur
In-Nazzjon	15 March 2013	4	Silvio Zammit ried 60,000,000 Ewro biex titneħħa r-restrizzjoni fuq is-SNUS
In-Nazzjon	15 March 2013	6	Frank Sammut kien jeżamina l-offerti li jmorru l-MOBC
In-Nazzjon	15 March 2013	3	Muscat se jagħmel distinzjoni fl-għażla tas-Segretarji Permanenti fil-Ministeri
In-Nazzjon	18 March 2013	2	Żewġ konsulenti mal-Kabinett enormi ta' Muscat
In-Nazzjon	21 March 2013	1	Kjuwijiet twal barra l-bieb tal-Ministeri
In-Nazzjon	22 March 2013	2	Biżżejjed provi biex Tarcisio Mifsud jitpoġġa taħt att ta' akkuża
In-Nazzjon	22 March 2013	32	L-Imħallef Farrugia Sacco kellu jissospendi l-illuminazzjoni minn dmirijietu fil-Qorti
In-Nazzjon	22 March 2013	1	Ħatra ta' Kap Eżekuttiv tal-Partit Laburista fi Transport Malta fuq parir ta' Muscat
L-Orizzont	23 March 2013	6	Id-dokument li jixkef negozju bil-moħbi mill-eks Ministru Austin Gatt sena qabel giet likwidata s-Sea Malta
In-Nazzjon	23 March 2013	32	Jason Micallef jinsisti għal riżenja fil-PBS
In-Nazzjon	25 March 2013	2	Persuni validi għandhom ikomplu jaħdmu ma' kull gvern
L-Orizzont	26 March 2013	1	Klijentelizmu Ministerjali!
In-Nazzjon	26 March 2013	1	Anġlu Farrugia jgħid li se jkun L-Ispiker tal-Parlament
In-Nazzjon	26 March 2013	1	Issa Malta tal-Laburisti Biss
In-Nazzjon	26 March 2013	1	Theddid ta' transfers minn nies Laburisti
In-Nazzjon	26 March 2013	3	Il-Ministru Godfrey Farrugia jibqa' jżur il-pazjenti
In-Nazzjon	26 March 2013	3	Ġurnalista tas-Super One jinħatar Ċermen tal-KMS
In-Nazzjon	26 March 2013	7	Nikki Dimech mixli mill-ġdid il-Qorti dwar każ ta' Frodi
In-Nazzjon	27 March 2013	2	Il-Gvern Laburista keċċa s-Segretarji Permanenti li ma tefgħux ir-riżenja
In-Nazzjon	27 March 2013	2	Pass lura b'Segretarjat Parlamentari

			għall-Ġustizzja
In-Nazzjon	28 March 2013	1	Il-Gvern Laburista jippoliticiżza s-servizz pubbliku
In-Nazzjon	28 March 2013	7	Il-Klinika tal-Ministru Farrugia għadha tilqa' l-appuntamenti
L-Orizzont	30 March 2013	3	Miżapproprijazzjoni fl-ARMS Ltd
L-Orizzont	01 April 2013	12	Komplott ieħor kontra John Dalli?
In-Nazzjon	02 April 2013	1	Is-sieħba tal-Ministru b'kariga fil-Ministeru
In-Nazzjon	02 April 2013	5	Iktar ħatriet mill-Gvern Laburista
In-Nazzjon	03 April 2013	1	Muscat b'komma wiesgħa biex ma jiksirha ma hadd
In-Nazzjon	04 April 2013	1	Tirriżenja wara 23 siegħa
In-Nazzjon	04 April 2013	5	Riżenja wara kritika qawwija
In-Nazzjon	05 April 2013	5	Musumeci flok Chairman, jinħatar konsulent
In-Nazzjon	05 April 2013	5	Nuqqas ta' konsultazzjoni dwar il-ħatra tal-Bord tal-MEPA
In-Nazzjon	09 April 2013	8	Lili hadd ma jindaħalli fis-sentenzi
L-Orizzont	11 April 2013	1	Aktar prattiċi irregolari minn Gafa' Saveway
L-Orizzont	11 April 2013	1	Kuntratt Oxxen
In-Nazzjon	11 April 2013	4	Jinħatru b'mod uffiċjali s-Segretarji Permanenti magħżulin minn Muscat
In-Nazzjon	11 April 2013	4	Abbużi serji fis-servizzi ta' detenzjoni
L-Orizzont	12 April 2013	1	Tkaxkir tas-saqajn mill-manigment
L-Orizzont	12 April 2013	7	Tkompli l-kawża ta' Tancred Tabone
In-Nazzjon	12 April 2013	1	Indħil mis-Segretarju Parlamentari
In-Nazzjon	13 April 2013	1	Segretarju Parlamentari wkoll baqa' jara l-pazjenti fil-privat
In-Nazzjon	13 April 2013	1	Jinħatar l-eks Supretendent Peter Paul Zammit li kien jahdem fl-uffiċċju legali tal-President tal-PL
In-Nazzjon	16 April 2013	2	Sindku Laburista Chairman tal-ARMS
In-Nazzjon	16 April 2013	6	Uffiċjal f'Ministeru tagħmel xogħol f'Mater Dei li jista' jsir minn haddieħor
In-Nazzjon	17 April 2013	2	Sindku Laburista Chairman tal-ARMS
L-Orizzont	18 April 2013	8	Smajna li nħafnu Miljun Ewro f'tariffi tal-MEPA
In-Nazzjon	18 April 2013	1	Sitwazzjoni Skandaluża
In-Nazzjon	18 April 2013	8	Mitluba informazzjoni dwar l-involviment ta' Anthony Valvo mal-PL

L-Orizzont	19 April 2013	1	Tqabbel Fejn Jaqblilha
L-Orizzont	19 April 2013	6	Ikompli jinstema' l-każ ta' Silvio Zammit
In-Nazzjon	19 April 2013	1	"All in the Family" mal-Ministru Godfrey Farrugia
In-Nazzjon	19 April 2013	5	Kessler qal lil Kimberly biex toqgħod 'il bogħod minn Dalli u Zammit
L-Orizzont	20 April 2013	1	Uffiċjali fis-Segretarjat tal-eks Ministri b'kuntratti fenomenali qabel l-elezzjoni
L-Orizzont	20 April 2013	8	Il-Każ tas-Segretarju Privat tal-eks Ministru Tonio Fenech
L-Orizzont	20 April 2013	9	Salarju ta 52,000 ewro
L-Orizzont	20 April 2013	1	Il-każ tal-ħruġ tal-iskema ta' scholarships SAR b'valur ta' 15-il miljun ewro
In-Nazzjon	20 April 2013	2	Franco Mercieca jikkontradixxi lilu nnifsu
In-Nazzjon	22 April 2013	1	Paul Bonello jinħatar Chairman ta' Melita Investments
In-Nazzjon	22 April 2013	6	IL-PN jiċhad li de Marco għamel xogħol legali waqt li kien Ministru
In-Nazzjon	23 April 2013	1	Il-Ministru tas-Saħħa jmur kontra l-ispirtu tal-Kodiċi ta' Etika
In-Nazzjon	23 April 2013	2	Ikomplu l-ħatriet mill-Gvern Laburista li tela' bl-għajta tal-meritokrazija
In-Nazzjon	23 April 2013	2	Il-PM se jithallas 7,000 ewro kull sena talli juża l-karozza tiegħu
L-Orizzont	25 April 2013	7	Ikompli jinstema' l-każ ta' Francis Portelli u Tony Cassar
L-Orizzont	25 April 2013	3	Jitfgħu dubji dwar il-kuntratti f'San Ġiljan
In-Nazzjon	25 April 2013	1	Żewġ kandidati Laburisti jmexxu l-Gozo Channel
In-Nazzjon	26 April 2013	1	Mart l-eks Deputat Jeffrey Pullicino Orlando fuq il-Bord ta' Transport Malta
In-Nazzjon	27 April 2013	1	Kienet infurmata mill-midja li postha ħadulha s-Sindku Laburista ta' Haż-Żebbuġ Alfred Grixti
In-Nazzjon	27 April 2013	2	Kontrollur finanzjarju tal-Kasco jinħatar Chairman tal-Awtorita' għar-Riżorsi
In-Nazzjon	27 April 2013	5	Keith Schembri se jinħatar fil-bord ta' SmartCity
In-Nazzjon	27 April 2013	6	L-uffiċjali tal-PL jiddefendu l-ħatriet

			"tal-ħbieb" tal-Partit
L-Orizzont	29 April 2013	8	Dalli joġġezzjona għal kif tmexxiet l-investigazzjoni
In-Nazzjon	29 April 2013	1	Deċiżjoni tal-Prim Ministru li tista' twassal għall-abbużi
In-Nazzjon	30 April 2013	1	Tkompli x-xalata ta' ħatriet għal-Laburisti
In-Nazzjon	30 April 2013	2	Eks Sindku Laburista Chairman tal-bord tal-Eżamijiet
In-Nazzjon	30 April 2013	2	Irrifjuta d-dritt li jkollu avukat
In-Nazzjon	30 April 2013	5	Il-Ministru Refalo jahtar lill-kuġina fil-Bord tal- Gozo Channel
L-Orizzont	01 May 2013	4	Is-CEO tal-Wasteserv jinjora l-istruzzjonijiet tal-Ministeru
L-Orizzont	01 May 2013	4	Nuqqas ta' Trasparenza fl-għoti ta' Fondi
L-Orizzont	01 May 2013	5	L-eks Ċermen tal-MCESD kellu karozza li ma kienx intitolat għaliha
L-Orizzont	01 May 2013	8	L-MOBC kienet tħalli il-kumissjonijiet lill-aġenti lokali ta' Trafigura u l-ELF
In-Nazzjon	01 May 2013	4	Kienet johorġu kummissjonijiet lill-aġenti lokali ta' Total u Elf
L-Orizzont	02 May 2013	10	Eks direttur tal-MTA l-Qorti minħabba l-kont tal-mara
L-Orizzont	02 May 2013	12	Ir-rapport tal-OLAF dwar Dalligate 'biased'
In-Nazzjon	02 May 2013	2	Yana Mintoff Bland u Toni Abela konsulenti tal-Gvern
In-Nazzjon	02 May 2013	2	Muscat jiddefendi l-ħatriet fil-bordijiet
L-Orizzont	03 May 2013	1	Allegati abbużi mis-Segretarju Permanenti Chris Ciantar, li holoq kariga ġdida, taha lil martu fuq tliet snin approvalha 12,000 ewro f'sahra
In-Nazzjon	03 May 2013	7	Tiċhad li ssuġġeriet l-ammont ta' tixhim fiċ-ċifra ta' 60 miljun ewro
In-Nazzjon	04 May 2013	7	Eks Ministru Laburista Chairman tal-Awtorita' tat-Turiżmu
In-Nazzjon	06 May 2013	1	L-eks Imħallef Ray Pace jinstab mejjet f'daru
L-Orizzont	07 May 2013	1	"Fort Knox"
In-Nazzjon	07 May 2013	5	Żewġ kunsillieri Laburisti fil-board tal-KMS
L-Orizzont	09 May 2013	1	Il-każ tas-Segretarju Permanenti

			Investigat
L-Orizzont	09 May 2013	4	Gonzi heba wkoll zieda lill-Assistant Personali tieghu
In-Nazzjon	09 May 2013	7	Il-każ tal-Imhalled Ray Pace jista' jaqa' nhar it-Tnejn
L-Orizzont	11 May 2013	1	Ħallsulha wkoll kors bil-barka ta' żewġha
In-Nazzjon	14 May 2013	1	91 l-impjegat minn barra ċ-ċivil f'għaxar Ministeri
In-Nazzjon	14 May 2013	4	Kritika lis-sistema burokratika tal-Qrati
In-Nazzjon	14 May 2013	8	Iktar ħatriet "tagħna lkoll"
L-Orizzont	15 May 2013	5	Tiĥallas għal xogħol li m'għamlitx
L-Orizzont	15 May 2013	40	Meta Tonio Fenech kien Ministru tal-Finanzi
In-Nazzjon	15 May 2013	2	Is-Sindku Laburista ta' Ħal Luqa jippremja lil ibnu
In-Nazzjon	15 May 2013	4	Nikki Dimech jippreżenta rikors kontra l-aħwa Polidano għal 70,000 ewro
L-Orizzont	16 May 2013	1	Propoganda tad-Dejn!
L-Orizzont	16 May 2013	1	L-arloġġ "tal-Lira" li nġhata lill-eks Ministru Tonio Fenech
In-Nazzjon	16 May 2013	3	Jingħata kariga oħra mill-Gvern Laburista
In-Nazzjon	17 May 2013	1	146 impjegat fil-Ministeri li ma kinux parti miċ-ċivil
In-Nazzjon	17 May 2013	4	Ma kien hemm l-ebda rabta bejn in-negozju u l-arloġġ mogħti
L-Orizzont	18 May 2013	1	"Żvelati" 40,000 elf ewro
L-Orizzont	18 May 2013	36	5 Miljun Ewro taru mar-riħ
In-Nazzjon	18 May 2013	32	Eks assistant ta' Joseph Muscat maħtur Chairman tal-Wasteserv
In-Nazzjon	20 May 2013	1	Bdew it-transfers vendikattivi
In-Nazzjon	21 May 2013	1	Mhux ċar jekk il-Kummissarju tal-Pulizija inġatarx bil-kunsens tal-PSC
L-Orizzont	23 May 2013	3	Prassi li kienet issir ukoll mill-PN u li ma tiksirx il-Kodiċi tal-Etika
In-Nazzjon	23 May 2013	3	Tiżdied il-lista ta' ħatriet "Tagħna Lkoll"
In-Nazzjon	23 May 2013	2	Aktar ħatriet "Tagħna Lkoll" stil il-Gvern Laburista
In-Nazzjon	23 May 2013	3	175 minn barra s-servizz pubbliku impjegati fil-Ministeri
L-Orizzont	24 May 2013	6	Il-każ ta' John Dalli



L-Orizzont	24 May 2013	1	L-Infieq "Sfieg"
In-Nazzjon	24 May 2013	32	Pulizija jammetti li ha l-flus biex jahfer xi citazzjonijiet
In-Nazzjon	27 May 2013	2	Aktar hatriet "Tagħna Lkoll"
In-Nazzjon	28 May 2013	1	Terremot ta' 90 transfer fjumejn
In-Nazzjon	29 May 2013	1	Numru kbir ta' haddiema jintlaqtu hazin
In-Nazzjon	29 May 2013	5	Transfers li jaġevolaw attivisti Laburisti
In-Nazzjon	30 May 2013	1	Aktar transfers mill-Gvern lill-membri tal-UHM
In-Nazzjon	30 May 2013	32	Il-Ministru Coleiro Preca tfarfar ir-responsabilita' tat-transfers fuq il-management
L-Orizzont	31 May 2013	35	Kessler mistoqsi dwar il-każ Dalli...
In-Nazzjon	31 May 2013	1	Muscat jinsisti li l-hatriet qed isiru fuq il-meritokrazija
In-Nazzjon	31 May 2013	2	Transfers lil haddiema fil-Ministeru tas-Saħħa
In-Nazzjon	31 May 2013	3	Transfers politiċi anke fil-qasam tal-ambjent
In-Nazzjon	01 June 2013	2	Aktar Transfers u hatriet politiċi fis-settur tas-saħħa
In-Nazzjon	03 June 2013	5	Mill-programm 'Affari Tagħna' għal CEO tal-WasteServ
L-Orizzont	04 June 2013	1	25 Kuntratt, ieħor ta' 9.5m
In-Nazzjon	04 June 2013	2	"Malta Tagħna Lkoll" għall-eks President tal-Partit Laburista
In-Nazzjon	04 June 2013	3	108 transfer fil-Korp tal-Pulizija
In-Nazzjon	04 June 2013	3	Jirċievi t-transfer minn messagġier meta kien marid id-dar
L-Orizzont	05 June 2013	3	Miltuba investigazzjoni urgenti mill-Aġ dwar kif kien amministrat il-Fond għall-Kawzi Ġusti
L-Orizzont	06 June 2013	7	B'reazzjoni għall-kritika tal-PN dwar hatriet ta' Membri Parlamentari Laburisti fuq il-bordijiet...
L-Orizzont	06 June 2013	7	Tabone u Sammut tawna l-gambetti
In-Nazzjon	06 June 2013	4	Il-Kap tal-Privatisation Unit jixhed dwar l-ostakoli fil-privatizzazzjoni tal-MOBC
In-Nazzjon	06 June 2013	4	It-transfers fil-Korp tal-Pulizija jaqbzu l-190
L-Orizzont	07 June 2013	1	Aktar Sahra milli Paga!
L-Orizzont	07 June 2013	4	Thallsu 54 Miljun Ewro għal art li giet

			esproprjata
L-Orizzont	07 June 2013	8	Tkompli l-kumpilazzjoni ta' Tarcisio Mifsud
In-Nazzjon	07 June 2013	7	George Farrugia jgħaddi aktar minn 93,000 ewro lil Mifsud u lil Mallia
In-Nazzjon	07 June 2013	7	Rapport miċ-Chairman tal-Privatisation Unit fil-każ kontra Tancred Tabone
In-Nazzjon	08 June 2013	1	Iktar ħatriet għall-persuni qrib il-Partit Laburista
L-Orizzont	10 June 2013	1	Triplu għal Viżas Malajr
In-Nazzjon	10 June 2013	1	Il-każ "Franco Mercieca" hu ipokresija kbira
In-Nazzjon	10 June 2013	7	M'hemmx każ kontra John Dalli
In-Nazzjon	11 June 2013	1	Is-Segretarju Parlamentari Franco Mercieca qed jibqa' jiċhad is-sewwa magħruf
In-Nazzjon	11 June 2013	2	Irrid li l-verita' toħroġ kollha
In-Nazzjon	12 June 2013	1	Il-Prim Ministru ma jwegibx u jaħrab lill-Oppożizzjoni
In-Nazzjon	12 June 2013	5	Jidhlu fis-seħħ it-transfers f'Mater Dei
In-Nazzjon	13 June 2013	5	Irtirati trasferimenti f'San Vincenz de Paule
In-Nazzjon	13 June 2013	32	207 minn barra ċ-ċivil impjegati mal-Ministeri
L-Orizzont	14 June 2013	8	Dr Chris Ciantar u martu Eleanor jiċhdu u jwissu
L-Orizzont	14 June 2013	36	Eks ministru f'kuntratt ta' konsulenza meta kien għadu fil-kariga
In-Nazzjon	14 June 2013	5	Franco Mercieca se jibqa' jikser il-kodiċi ta' etika
L-Orizzont	15 June 2013	1	Silvio Zammit jitlob li l-investigazzjoni fil-konfront tiegħu tiġi riveduta
L-Orizzont	15 June 2013	4	L-eks kandidat tal-PN Georg Sapiano ngħata 900,000 ewro f'Konsulenti
In-Nazzjon	15 June 2013	1	Kariga f'xi entita' tal-gvern għal John Dalli
In-Nazzjon	15 June 2013	2	Silvio Zammit irid li l-każ tiegħu jerġa' jiġi eżaminat
In-Nazzjon	17 June 2013	1	Il-Gvern Laburista jagħzel tobba tal-qalba f'bord importanti
In-Nazzjon	17 June 2013	2	Joseph Cuschieri jehodha kontra deċiżjoni ta' Muscat
In-Nazzjon	17 June 2013	4	Muscat jgħid li l-Ministru tas-Saħħa li

			ppropona lil John Dalli
In-Nazzjon	17 June 2013	32	Skont il-Minsitru Coleiro Preca t-transfers saru biex il-ħaddiema jkunu ferħanin
In-Nazzjon	18 June 2013	1	L-Oppożizzjoni tikkritika t-transfers mill-Gvern
L-Orizzont	20 June 2013	1	Tlajjar bi Skop?
L-Orizzont	20 June 2013	6	Psaila jirritorna l-karozza li kien xtara qabel beda l-każ
In-Nazzjon	20 June 2013	2	Il-PN jappella lill-Gvern jirtira t-transfers
In-Nazzjon	20 June 2013	5	Diżappunt dwar ħatriet fil-Kunsill tal-Universita'
L-Orizzont	24 June 2013	32	Austin Gatt investigat mit-Tax Compliance Unit
L-Orizzont	25 June 2013	7	Jingħalaq il-każ kontra l-eks Imħallef Ray Pace
In-Nazzjon	25 June 2013	3	Il-każ tal-eks Imħallef Pace jaqa'
In-Nazzjon	28 June 2013	3	Kunsilliera Laburista ssejjaħ transfer kattiv u bi ħdura
In-Nazzjon	28 June 2013	7	54 transfer 'vendikattiv' fil-Korp tal-Pulizija
In-Nazzjon	28 June 2013	32	F'idejn in-nies biex jiġġudikaw jekk id-deċiżjoni hix abbaži ta' meritokrazija
In-Nazzjon	29 June 2013	5	It-transfer ta' Norman Vella ma kienx mitlub mill-PBS
L-Orizzont	01 July 2013	1	Vit Miftuħ taħt il-PN
In-Nazzjon	01 July 2013	1	Il-Parit Laburista jabbuza mill-poter
In-Nazzjon	01 July 2013	1	Deputat tal-Gvern tikkritika t-transfer ta' Norman Vella
In-Nazzjon	01 July 2013	5	L-infermiera tagħti l-verżjoni kif sar it-transfer lejn Boffa
In-Nazzjon	02 July 2013	1	L-OLAF tista' terġa tiftaħ il-każ kontra Dalli
In-Nazzjon	02 July 2013	1	Laqgħa urgenti illum dwar is-Servizz Sigriet
In-Nazzjon	02 July 2013	3	Iż-żjara fil-Bahamas saret fis-sajf li għadda
L-Orizzont	03 July 2013	2	Inkjesta ġdida mill-OLAF dwar John Dalli?
In-Nazzjon	03 July 2013	1	Ikomplu t-trasferimenti fil-Pulizija u fil-FAM
In-Nazzjon	03 July 2013	5	Indħil mill-GWU fir-Residenza San

			Vincenz
In-Nazzjon	03 July 2013	32	Tinbidel il-prassi kif jintgħazlu l-Assistenti Diretturi
L-Orizzont	04 July 2013	4	Spiza żejda ta' 300,000 ewro fuq kiri ta' trakkijiet
In-Nazzjon	04 July 2013	2	Jakkuża lill-Kummissjoni Ewropea li qed tibbaża gidba biex isaħħaħ il-kredibbilta'
L-Orizzont	05 July 2013	5	Il-Prim Ministru qed jistenna lil John Dalli jispjegalu
In-Nazzjon	05 July 2013	1	Infermiera tiftaħ protest ġudizzjarju kontra l-Ministru Godfrey Farrugia
In-Nazzjon	06 July 2013	7	Is-Sitwazzjoni ta' transfer lil nursing officer trid tiġi rrangata
In-Nazzjon	08 July 2013	2	Il-PM ta raġun lil Simon Busuttil dwar l-indħil tal-Ministru Mallia
L-Orizzont	10 July 2013	4	6.3 Miljun Ewro minn ministeru wieħed fi tmien snin
L-Orizzont	12 July 2013	1	Rapport investigattiv jizvela abbużi fit-tmexxija tal-Waste Serve
In-Nazzjon	15 July 2013	1	Skandlu iehor mill-Gvern Laburista
In-Nazzjon	16 July 2013	1	Indħil f'awtoritajiet li nħatru biex ikunu indipendenti
In-Nazzjon	16 July 2013	32	Aktar ħatriet għal tal-qalba fl-Isptar Mater Dei
L-Orizzont	17 July 2013	1	Il-kundanna tal-Awditur Ġenerali dwar ix-xiri taż-żejt
In-Nazzjon	17 July 2013	1	Muscat jiddefendi lill-Ministru Cardona
L-Orizzont	18 July 2013	1	Wara r-rapport tal-Awditur Ġenerali fuq ix-xiri taż-żejt
L-Orizzont	18 July 2013	6	Norman Vella jitlob spjegazzjoni lill-PM
In-Nazzjon	18 July 2013	3	Ġurnalista fi protest kontra l-Prim Ministru
In-Nazzjon	18 July 2013	3	Ma jara xejn ħażin li jahtar eks impjegati tal-PL bħala Ambaxxaturi
L-Orizzont	19 July 2013	1	Gonzi u Fenech taw bi 350,000 ewro konsulenzji legali b'"direct order"
L-Orizzont	19 July 2013	1	Il-Ministru Konrad Mizzi dwar ir-rapport tal-Awditur Ġenerali
In-Nazzjon	19 July 2013	1	224 transfer fil-Pulizja
L-Orizzont	22 July 2013	1	Tawhom Anke B'Telefonata!
In-Nazzjon	22 July 2013	1	L-MEA tishaq li l-għażla tal-Gvern

			tiffavorixxi lill-GWU
In-Nazzjon	22 July 2013	1	Ħaddiema qrib il-PL agevolati fl-Isptar Ġenerali ta' Għawdex
L-Orizzont	25 July 2013	1	Telf Bl-Indhil tal-Ministru
L-Orizzont	25 July 2013	1	Kien kontra l-hedging
In-Nazzjon	25 July 2013	3	Manager fid-Dipartiment tal-Protezzjoni Ċivili jagħmel protest ġudizzjarju dwar transfer li qala'
In-Nazzjon	26 July 2013	4	Chief of Staff u Deputat Chairman tal-Gozo Channel
In-Nazzjon	26 July 2013	5	Avukata fil-kumpanija ta' Manuel Mallia tmexxi bord tal-ħabs
In-Nazzjon	26 July 2013	6	Favuri politiċi ma' health assistant
L-Orizzont	27 July 2013	1	Super Noel
L-Orizzont	29 July 2013	1	Talba biex l-investigazzjonijiet dwar ix-xiri taż-żejt jitwessgħu għal qabel l-2008
L-Orizzont	29 July 2013	18	2 Miljuni aktar fi ħlasijiet f'restawr tas-swar u s-salini
L-Orizzont	29 July 2013	1	Spejjeż ta' 40% aktar fil-proġett
In-Nazzjon	29 July 2013	1	Ingustizzja mal-ħaddiema fil-Faċilita' Korrettiva ta' Kordin
In-Nazzjon	31 July 2013	3	Ministeru "iffullat" b'ħaddiema ġodda
L-Orizzont	02 August 2013	1	L-aħħar "Ċejċa"
In-Nazzjon	02 August 2013	32	Każ ieħor ta' kunflitt ta' interess għall-Ministru Mallia
L-Orizzont	05 August 2013	3	Aktar avukati qrib il-PN gawdew b'ordinijiet diretti
In-Nazzjon	06 August 2013	1	Il-Gvern ikeċċi lill-Kap Eżekuttiv tal-Awtorita' tad-Djar
L-Orizzont	08 August 2013	8	Abbużi regolari mill-karozza uffiċjali tal-Ombudsman
L-Orizzont	08 August 2013	6	Esperjenza u memorja "friska" ta' transfers vendikattivi mill-PN
In-Nazzjon	08 August 2013	1	Ir-rapport dwar ix-xiri taż-żejt diskuss fuq insidenza tal-Oppożizzjoni
In-Nazzjon	10 August 2013	10	Vendikazzjoni Politika
In-Nazzjon	10 August 2013	3	Il-Kumitat Permanenti dwar il-Kontijiet Pubbliċi jiltaqa' t-Tlieta
L-Orizzont	14 August 2013	8	Simon Busutil, Austin Gatt u Lawrence Gonzi fost dawk li se jixhdu
In-Nazzjon	14 August 2013	5	60 imsejha jixhdu b'rabta mar-rapport dwar ix-xiri taż-żejt

In-Nazzjon	15 August 2013	1	Eks Chairman tal-Union Press jinġatar CEO tal-Awtorita' tad-Djar
In-Nazzjon	16 August 2013	3	Ħatra partiġjana fl-Enemalta
L-Orizzont	17 August 2013	3	Lawrence Gonzi: Xhud tal-ahħar mument?
In-Nazzjon	17 August 2013	1	Talba biex l-Awditur Ġenerali jinvestiga ndhil fl-għoti ta' kuntratti
L-Orizzont	19 August 2013	13	Il-każ tal-karozza tal-Ombudsman
L-Orizzont	20 August 2013	18	L-Enemalta u l-ħwienet tal-merċa
In-Nazzjon	20 August 2013	3	Id-Deputat Laburista Deo Debattista jinġatar Chairman tal-OHSA
In-Nazzjon	20 August 2013	5	Il-Prim Ministru warrab kull kunċett ta' kontabilita', standards u għaqal fit-tmexxija
L-Orizzont	27 August 2013	1	"Attakk Sfaċċat" kif kien mistenni
L-Orizzont	27 August 2013	6	Austin Gatt ma jmissux intervjiena fix-xiri taż-żejt
L-Orizzont	27 August 2013	32	Proġett ta' 13m ewro bla tender lil Żaren Vassallo
L-Orizzont	28 August 2013	5	Kumpanija ta' attivist tal-PN tingħata 51 dieċt order
L-Orizzont	29 August 2013	1	Il-PAC ikompli jisma' l-każ tax-xiri taż-żejt...
In-Nazzjon	29 August 2013	3	Mitluba investigazzjoni dwar tender lil Kunsillier Laburist
L-Orizzont	30 August 2013	32	Kunsillier fil-Munxar b'sub contracting' mill-Kunsill
L-Orizzont	31 August 2013	1	Kuntratt li juri prattiċi ħżiena
In-Nazzjon	31 August 2013	32	Wieħed mill-"elves ta' Sant" għal CEO tal-Korporazzjoni tal-Freeport
L-Orizzont	02 September 2013	4	Indhil minn Austin Gatt
In-Nazzjon	03 September 2013	1	Transfers politiċi lill-għalliema Għawdxin
In-Nazzjon	04 September 2013	1	Ma jwegibx mistoqsijiet dwar kunflitt ta' interest fil-Bord tal-Pulizija
L-Orizzont	09 September 2013	4	Il-minuti mħażzin imorru lura għall-2004
L-Orizzont	11 September 2013	1	Skomdu bir-rapport
In-Nazzjon	11 September 2013	1	Deċizjoni f'Ottubru dwar jekk jibqgħux jew jastjenux fil-każ ta' Farrugia Sacco
In-Nazzjon	11 September 2013	5	Ebda dominju taċ-Chairman
In-Nazzjon	11 September 2013	7	Malta tal-Labour biss
In-Nazzjon	12 September 2013	7	Malta tal-Labour biss

In-Nazzjon	13 September 2013	7	Malta tal-Labour biss
In-Nazzjon	14 September 2013	3	Jitkeċċa mill-Pulizija u l-Gvern jaħtru Logutenent Kurunell fl-Armata
In-Nazzjon	15 September 2013	1	Żewġ impjegati tal-Ministru Mallia fil-Bord għall-promozzjonijiet fl-Armata
L-Orizzont	17 September 2013	1	L-Enemalta kienet Gravi
L-Orizzont	18 September 2013	6	Il-każ dwar l-allegat tixhim tal-eks Imħallef Ray Pace
In-Nazzjon	18 September 2013	1	Take-over mill-PL fl-Armata
L-Orizzont	20 September 2013	1	TOTSA lmentaw mal-Enemalta meta ma ħadux tender taż-żejt
In-Nazzjon	20 September 2013	7	Ebda ndhil biex jintrebaħ tender għax-xiri taż-żejt
L-Orizzont	21 September 2013	1	Dokumenti Jigru
In-Nazzjon	21 September 2013	7	Ma kinux jingħataw offerti lil min ma kellux l-irħas offerta
L-Orizzont	23 September 2013	1	Aċċess Abbużiv
In-Nazzjon	23 September 2013	2	Maġġuri fl-Armata se jibdew proċeduri fuq ingustizzji
In-Nazzjon	25 September 2013	1	L-aktar livell baxx ta' nepotiżmu
In-Nazzjon	25 September 2013	8	Gvern għal tal-qalba biss
L-Orizzont	27 September 2013	7	Mitluba pożizzjoni ċara dwar Dalli
In-Nazzjon	27 September 2013	1	Kien hemm biżżejjed provi biex John Dalli jitressaq il-Qorti
In-Nazzjon	28 September 2013	2	Il-ħatra ta' mart Konrad Mizzi saret miċ-Chairman tal-Malta Enterprise
In-Nazzjon	28 September 2013	3	L-OLAF se tibda investigazzjoni ġdida fil-każ ta' John Dalli
In-Nazzjon	28 September 2013	3	Il-Gvern ta' Muscat jikkonkludi t-takeover tiegħu tal-Armata
In-Nazzjon	29 September 2013	5	Trattament ingust ma' membri tal-Korp tal-Pulizija
In-Nazzjon	30 September 2013	2	Gvern Laburista li jmessi b'nuqqas ta' trasparenza

## Appendix B

Timeline of events related to the case of Mr. John Dalli. The dates mentioned below pertain to when the event actually took place as extracted from the articles published in local newspapers and not related to when the article was published.

<b><u>Timeline of Events</u></b> <i>(as published in local newspapers)</i>	
16 <sup>th</sup> October 2012	Mr. John Dalli verbally resigns from the European Commission.
22 <sup>nd</sup> October 2012	Mr. John Dalli writes a letter to Mr. Jose Manuel Barroso that he never sent his resignation in writing and is waiting for an official request for him to do so.
22 <sup>nd</sup> October 2012	The Chairman of the OLAF supervisory board, Mr. Christiaan Timmermans, resigns over alleged breach of procedure in relation to the handling of the John Dalli case.
23 <sup>rd</sup> October 2012	Mr. John Dalli writes to all members of the European Parliament, demanding answers to 32 questions on his forced resignation.
24 <sup>th</sup> October 2012	Mr. John Dalli announces that he will be taking this case to court for unfair dismissal.
25 <sup>th</sup> October 2012	Attorney General passes EU report to police.
26 <sup>th</sup> October 2012	The European Parliament asks for further information on John Dalli's resignation from Health Commissioner.



6 <sup>th</sup> November 2012	A group of NGOs working for transparency in EU institutions calls for the full facts on Mr. John Dalli's case leading to his resignation.
7 <sup>th</sup> November 2012	OLAF nominates one of its members to compile a report on the investigations leading to the forced resignation of Mr. John Dalli.
8 <sup>th</sup> November 2012	Mr. Jose Manuel Barroso turns down the request by MEPs to access the investigation report as it is now part of an ongoing investigation in Malta, highlighting that only the Attorney General in Malta can release it.
13 <sup>th</sup> November 2012	Mr. John Dalli, Mr. Silvio Zammit and Dr. Gayle Kimberley are questioned by the Malta Police Force.
12 <sup>th</sup> December 2012	Mr. Silvio Zammit is charged with bribery and trading in influence.
13 <sup>th</sup> December 2012	Dr. Gayle Kimberley states that she was blackmailed over what to say in court.
12 <sup>th</sup> December 2012	Johan Denolf, Chairman of the Supervisory Committee of the anti-fraud body (OLAF), writes to MEP Michael Theurer (ALDE), Chairman of the Committee of Budgetary Control (CONT) of the European Parliament, raising questions on the legality of the OLAF proceedings against Dalli.
17 <sup>th</sup> January 2013	Magistrate Anthony Vella orders that the OLAF report is to be presented as evidence.
20 <sup>th</sup> January 2013	It becomes public that Mr. John Dalli is of ill-health and is

	not able to travel to be arraigned.
19 <sup>th</sup> February 2013	Mr. John Dalli files a lawsuit against the European Commission, calling for the annulment of his resignation and demanding compensation.
10 <sup>th</sup> March 2013	Mr. John Dalli extends his medical certificate again.
14 <sup>th</sup> March 2013	Dr. Gayle Kimberley confirms that Mr. Silvio Zammit requested €60 million to assist in the lifting of the EU ban on snus.
20 <sup>th</sup> March 2013	Mr. John Dalli is interviewed by the Belgian Police.
23 <sup>rd</sup> March 2013	Prime Minister of Malta Dr. Joseph Muscat calls for more transparency in Dalli case.
25 <sup>th</sup> March 2013	Police Commissioner John Rizzo rejects claims stating that he urged officials at Swedish Match not to tell the truth or to mislead the investigation in any way.
12 <sup>th</sup> April 2013	Peter Paul Zammit is appointed new Police Commissioner.
13 <sup>th</sup> April 2013	Mr. John Dalli is reported to have arrived back to Malta a few days before after recovering from a medical condition.
18 <sup>th</sup> April 2013	Dr. Gayle Kimberley reveals that she had lunch with OLAF investigator, Giovanni Kessler.
19 <sup>th</sup> April 2013	MEP Inge Gräßle asks the European Commission to suspend anti-fraud investigator Giovanni Kessler after Dr. Kessler was found to have had lunch with a witness involved in John Dalli's case.
23 <sup>rd</sup> April 2013	Dr. Kessler urges Malta to publish the OLAF report.

24 <sup>th</sup> April 2013	The EU Commission defends Dr. Kessler and the agency's work.
28 <sup>th</sup> April 2013	The OLAF report is leaked by MaltaToday.
29 <sup>th</sup> April 2013	The published report indicates that the case against Mr. John Dalli rests on phone calls and Dr. Gayle Kimberley's testimony.
2 <sup>nd</sup> May 2013	Dr. Gayle Kimberley denies that she was the one who asked for €60m bribe.
8 <sup>th</sup> May 2013	Barroso is urged to explain why he forced Mr. John Dalli to resign before a proper investigation took place.
21 <sup>st</sup> May 2013	Police Commissioner Peter Paul Zammit meets with Mr. John Dalli.
22 <sup>nd</sup> May 2013	Commission members back Barroso on decision taken with regards to Dalli.
24 <sup>th</sup> May 2013	Dr. Kessler is confident that none of the agency's actions were illegal when it investigated Mr. John Dalli.
26 <sup>th</sup> May 2013	Dr. Kessler is to face grilling in EU Parliament.
29 <sup>th</sup> May 2013	Supervisory Committee urges European Commission to act on the alleged breach of Human Rights.
8 <sup>th</sup> June 2013	Police Commissioner Peter Paul Zammit states that there is not enough proof for a criminal case against Mr. John Dalli.
10 <sup>th</sup> June 2013	Mr. John Dalli reiterates his position that he is innocent and that he feels vindicated.

12 <sup>th</sup> June 2013	Mr. John Dalli attacks EU president's role over OLAF's probe and states that Jose Manuel Barroso had an interest in blocking the Tobacco Directive.
13 <sup>th</sup> June 2013	The European Commission states that any matters related to the legality of OLAF's actions are to be discussed in court.
14 <sup>th</sup> June 2013	OLAF shifts responsibility to the local authorities with regards to phone call records.
15 <sup>th</sup> June 2013	Police Commissioner Peter Paul Zammit is critical of OLAF's Dalli investigation.
15 <sup>th</sup> June 2013	Mr. John Dalli is to head the Mater Dei reform – executive position given by Dr. Joseph Muscat.
16 <sup>th</sup> June 2013	Silvio Zammit states that Dr. Kimberley told him to ask for money.
4 <sup>th</sup> July 2013	Police probe into Dalli's trip to the Bahamas.
2 <sup>nd</sup> September 2013	Police reopen an investigation of Gayle Kimberley, the prosecution witness, due to fresh emails suggesting that she guided the lobbying attempts made by Silvio Zammit.
1 <sup>st</sup> July 2013	Trip to Bahamas is marked as shady trip to transfer large amounts of money. A Seaview Villa was rented under one of Dalli's daughters. Dr. Dalli states trip was for a personal project to help people in Africa.
2 <sup>nd</sup> July 2013	Mr. John Dalli tells MEPs that he will keep on pursuing Kessler, the Commission and the Tobacco lobby.
3 <sup>rd</sup> July 2013	Mr. John Dalli's daughter issues a statement stating that

	Bahamas landlord used to threaten her after turning down his efforts to set up financial transactions in Malta.
4 <sup>th</sup> July 2013	Police to look into trip to the Bahamas.
15 <sup>th</sup> July 2013	Brussels to investigate ethics of Dalli's trips.
28 <sup>th</sup> July 2013	E-mails seen by The Sunday Times of Malta show that Gayle Kimberley guided second snus lobbying attempt.
2 <sup>nd</sup> September 2013	Police to reopen investigation on Gayle Kimberley amidst new evidence on witness.
26 <sup>th</sup> September 2013	Former Police Commissioner John Rizzo states that he wanted to arraign Mr. John Dalli. Same view is shared by Attorney General.
1 <sup>st</sup> October 2013	Dr. Simon Busuttil accuses Dr. Joseph Muscat of interfering in John Dalli case.
6 <sup>th</sup> October 2013	MEPs ask for more details on Dalli's trips to the Bahamas.
7 <sup>th</sup> October 2013	Mr. John Dalli states that the PN in Government exerted pressure for him to be arraigned.
10 <sup>th</sup> November 2013	Mr. John Dalli accuses the European Commission of applying two weights, two measures with reference to De Cucht case. The European Commission denies.
27 <sup>th</sup> January 2014	Joseph Muscat testifies before the privileges committee probing a breach of privilege by Simon Busuttil and denies allegations of interfering in Dalli case.
31 <sup>st</sup> January 2014	Mr. John Dalli asks Speaker of the House to give him the opportunity to question Giovanni Kessler when he is called to testify before the Privileges Committee.

11 <sup>th</sup> February 2014	Government objects to Attorney General to testify before the Committee.
27 <sup>th</sup> February 2014	PN asks Giovanni Kessler to testify before the parliamentary committee.
13 <sup>th</sup> March 2014	In court, John Dalli denies ever having discussed money with Silvio Zammit.
6 <sup>th</sup> April 2014	Dr. Chris Fearne, Parliamentary Secretary for Health, states that Mr. John Dalli is no longer an advisor of Mater Dei Hospital.
11 <sup>th</sup> April 2014	European Ombudsman, Emily O'Reilly, requests the European Commission to publish all letters and internal notes.
3 <sup>rd</sup> July 2014	Peter Paul Zammit steps down, and Ray Zammit replaces him as acting police commissioner.
4 <sup>th</sup> July 2014	Silvio Zammit claims that he turned down a Presidential pardon in 2012.
7 <sup>th</sup> July 2014	Corporate Europe Observatory, an influential transparency NGO, publishes a copy of a critical report by the EU Anti-fraud agency OLAF, questioning the legality of the investigation.
7 <sup>th</sup> July 2014	Court case instituted by Mr. John Dalli against Commissioner President Jose' Manuel Barroso starts in Luxemburg.
8 <sup>th</sup> July 2014	Mr. John Dalli refers to the OLAF report as fraud.
9 <sup>th</sup> July 2014	Mr. John Dalli seeks €1.9m in damages from the European

	Commission.
10 <sup>th</sup> July 2014	Mr. John Dalli states that Barroso should be arrested if he came to Malta.
10 <sup>th</sup> July 2014	Magistrate Anthony Vella states that witnesses in Silvio Zammit case should be heard by video conferencing as the witness is reluctant to come to Malta.
31 <sup>st</sup> July 2014	Former Police Commissioner John Rizzo tells the Privileges Committee that Dr. Dalli knew about everything, and that he wanted to conduct a final interview before arraigning him before the criminal court, but Dr. Dalli was sick and unable to travel.
24 <sup>th</sup> August 2014	Kessler is to give evidence on John Dalli's case via video conference.
29 <sup>th</sup> August 2014	Court sitting to hear Kessler is postponed.
28 <sup>th</sup> September 2014	New witnesses state that Mr. John Dalli enquired about lifting the ban on snus.
15 <sup>th</sup> October 2014	Michael Cassar who, at the time, headed the Economic Crime Unit, tells Parliament's Privileges Committee that the case against Mr. John Dalli could only be made if he was arraigned together with Silvio Zammit.
16 <sup>th</sup> October 2014	One out of 11 audio tapes on which the police recorded Silvio Zammit's statement is found empty.
3 <sup>rd</sup> December 2014	Former Deputy Police Commissioner Joe Cachia states during a House Privileges Committee that there is enough evidence to charge both Dalli and Zammit.

12 <sup>th</sup> December 2014	Michael Cassar is appointed Police Commissioner.
14 <sup>th</sup> January 2015	Inspector Angelo Gafa' states that the police were given verbal and written advice by Attorney General Peter Grech to charge Mr. John Dalli.
14 <sup>th</sup> January 2015	Inspector Gafa' states during a Parliamentary Privileges Committee that ESTOC secretary-general Inge Delfosse recorded a phone call made between Silvio Zammit and herself, where she was asked for €10 million Euros.
14 <sup>th</sup> January 2015	Inspector Gafa' states during a Parliamentary Privileges Committee that the police felt that an arrest warrant could be issued against John Dalli.
16 <sup>th</sup> January 2015	Former Police Commissioner Peter Paul Zammit states that lead officer Inspector Angelo Gafa' was subjective in his evaluation.
15 <sup>th</sup> March 2015	Kessler is to testify in Malta against Silvio Zammit.
17 <sup>th</sup> March 2015	Dr. Kessler is not authorised by the European Commission to testify before the Privileges Committee.
17 <sup>th</sup> March 2015	Kessler testifies in Malta against Dalli in court. John Dalli accuses Giovanni Kessler of perjury.
17 <sup>th</sup> March 2015	Speaker turns down Dr. Dalli's request to confront Kessler during Privileges Committee.
10 <sup>th</sup> May 2015	Belgian investigators ask the European Commission to lift the diplomatic immunity of officials from OLAF. Accused of recording phone conversations without judicial authorisation.



12 <sup>th</sup> May 2015	Mr. John Dalli loses EU case for unfair dismissal by the European Court of Justice. Considers appeal.
28 <sup>th</sup> July 2015	Mr. John Dalli appeals ECJ unfair dismissal ruling.
6 <sup>th</sup> September 2015	Belgian investigators look into the legitimacy of the recordings.
10 <sup>th</sup> March 2016	Commission allows Belgian prosecutors to investigate EU anti-fraud chief.
15 <sup>th</sup> March 2016	Silvio Zammit files a criminal complaint over ‘illegal’ phone call recording.
14 <sup>th</sup> April 2016	Mr. John Dalli loses appeal case against Barroso.
27 <sup>th</sup> April 2016	Michael Cassar resigns as Police Commissioner, and acting police commissioner Lawrence Cutajar is appointed.
3 <sup>rd</sup> June 2016	Silvio Zammit condemns Attorney General for waiting for a foreign witness who is refusing to testify, and therefore, stalling proceedings. Files breach of fundamental right for a fair hearing.
1 <sup>st</sup> August 2016	Lawrence Cutajar is appointed Police Commissioner.
16 <sup>th</sup> June 2017	The contract of veteran investigator Jonathan Ferris, previously employed within the Criminal Investigation Department and later joining FIAU, is terminated during probation.
31 <sup>st</sup> July 2017	Jonathan Ferris claims that Attorney General kept Bahamas report on John Dalli for weeks before it was sent to the police.
18 <sup>th</sup> August 2017	John Dalli revives dismissal suit with €1 million damages

	claim.
25 <sup>th</sup> October 2017	Silvio Zammit recording asking for a €10 million bribe is leaked by a Swedish news portal.
2 <sup>nd</sup> November 2017	Daughters of Mr. John Dalli question and face money-laundering charges related to a Ponzi Scheme.
8 <sup>th</sup> January 2018	Daughters of Mr. John Dalli appear in court accused, together with other foreign nationals, of fraud, money laundering, misappropriation of funds, false declarations and falsification of documents. One of the daughters is also charged separately with breaching the Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Act.
27 <sup>th</sup> April 2018	Court rules that prosecutors' insistence on key witness to testify is in breach of Silvio Zammit's right to a fair trial.
18 <sup>th</sup> October 2018	Court rules that there are enough grounds for Silvio Zammit to be sent to trial.
19 <sup>th</sup> October 2018	Silvio Zammit files a judicial protest over AG's discretionary powers.
4 <sup>th</sup> February 2019	Case related to John Dalli's daughters fails to make any progress.