# CORE VALUES
# FOR
# DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION
# IN
# LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC STATES

Carlos Grima

A dissertation presented to the Faculty of Education in part fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master in Education at the University of Malta

February 2008

ABSTRACT

Carlos Grima

Core Values for Democratic Citizenship Education in Liberal Democratic States

Objectives: The overall aim of this thesis was to identify the core values of liberal democratic states that could serve as a basis for the provision of Citizenship Education. The first objective was to define liberal democratic states. The second objective was to understand what is meant by Citizenship Education in such states, to analyse its justification and legitimacy. Finally, the third and major objective was to provide an overview of the common core of values on which liberal democratic states, and consequently Citizenship Education are instituted. Chapter one provides an introduction. Chapter two clarifies what is understood by the term "liberal democratic state" and chapter three describes the citizenship education provision that ought to be found in such states taking into consideration the many trends in liberal political philosophy. In chapter four, the study focuses in detail on the values that ought to be taught through Citizenship Education for the construction of a conception of citizenship as a political identity that could be shared by all citizens despite their diverse conceptions of the good life. It is being suggested that the core values that underpin Citizenship Education in liberal democratic states should be: freedom, rights, responsibility, democracy, tolerance for diversity, individual autonomy, law-abidingness, political equality, respect for other and an effort to be impartial. The suggested values are open to interpretation and meant to be generic enough to fit all trends of liberalism and be considered as the least common factor that belongs to all liberal democratic states. The values being proposed are meant to help the democratic process through which liberal democratic states interpret their own core values. It is acknowledged that the public values proposed in this study might conflict with personal values of some citizens and that this must be accepted with regret due to the fact that the state would simply not be able to hold together without a common core of public values. The proposed values should be of interest to policymakers responsible for civic education programmes, curriculum developers, school administrators, institutions responsible of teacher training, teachers, representatives of organisations concerned with values education, students and scholars who have an interest in the values taught in liberal democratic states.

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Keywords:

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| Liberal Democratic States | Citizenship Education | Values Education |
| Public Values | Liberal educational policy | Liberal Political Philosophy |

Acknowledgements

Foremost thanks go to Professor Kenneth Wain and Dr. Joseph Giordmaina, for their guidance throughout the course of this study. Heartfelt gratitude also goes to all who have walked with me the path of life during the four years of this course.

Dedication

To Our Lady of Mount Carmel

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Statement of Authenticity

This work is original. All references made to the work of other authors have been duly acknowledged.

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Dedication

To Our Lady of Mount Carmel

Core Values for Citizenship Education in Liberal Democratic States

## Chapter 1: Introduction

### 1.1 Objective of this study.

The overall aim of this study is to identify a specific set of core values, based on liberal democratic principles that can be taught as part of a citizenship education curriculum in liberal democratic states. The first objective is to define liberal democratic states. The second objective is to understand what is meant by Citizenship Education in such states including its justification and legitimacy. The third and major objective is to provide an overview of the core of values on which liberal democratic states, and consequently Citizenship Education, are instituted.

This study identifies the values considered to be natural extensions of liberal democratic political philosophy, which are meant to be critically taught as part of the citizenship education provision in liberal democratic states. These values are meant to serve as "the shared boundaries within which we all are obliged to live, precisely in order to preserve our right to our own different faiths, races and creeds." (Blair, 2006, para17) The proposed values should be of interest to educational policy makers responsible for Citizenship Education programmes, curriculum developers, institutions responsible of teacher training, teachers, parents, students and individuals who have an interest in values taught in liberal democratic states.

By proposing the teaching of core public values through citizenship education, this study endorses the critiques of theorists who suggest that, liberal democratic states can sustain the teaching of a common core of values in spite of the diverse views of the lives worth living that citizens hold. The arguments put forward in this study are congruous to what is proposed by political theorists such as William Galston in, "Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State" (1991) and Liberal Pluralism (2002); and Stephen Macedo in "Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism" (1990) and in Diversity and Distrust (2000) with Kymlicka's viewpoints in "Multicultural citizenship" (1995), Patricia White's arguments so ably put forward in "Civic Virtues and Public Schooling: Educating Citizens for a Democratic Society" (1996) and Levinson's "The Demands of Liberal Education" (2002) amongst several others.

The scope of teaching public values for a common citizenship originates from the fact that "Ideally, we want a society that, for all its diversity and difference of opinion, lives in harmony and mutual respect and that equally provides a sense of identity and belonging to all citizens. We therefore want to ensure some basic shared values, an ability to cope with the strange, unusual or different, and respect for persons." (Barrow, 2007, p.562) A sense of identity might also be given by nationality and religion in mono-cultural democratic states, but such unifying sources might not be strong enough in contemporary liberal democratic states due to

pluralism. In states where not all citizens share a common nationality, political values that shape the structure of the state might be able to accomplish the job previously done by nationality or religion.

The suggested values are meant to be able to fit the different ideologies within liberalism and be considered as the least common factor that equally belongs to all liberal democratic states. The 'minimum indispensable' that a state requires to merit the name "liberal democratic". The values being proposed are meant to help the democratic process through which liberal democratic states interpret their own core values since they can provide at least a beginning to a discussion about values. Due to diverse interpretations of core values between different trends within liberalism, this dissertation's intentions cannot be anything but modest. This study aims to shed some light on core liberal democratic public values. Specifically it tries to provide an overview for choosing adequate values for the teaching of Citizenship Education in liberal democratic states. It would be then up to each liberal democratic state to develop such values for curricular use, through a democratic process of discussion between stakeholders. The deep differences of what sort of liberalism different liberal democratic states endorses, is a key factor that would play a major role at a later stage, once stakeholders start to discuss about which values to teach and the public democratic discussion evolves.

### 1.2 Reasons for selecting this topic.

Several personal beliefs led this particular topic to be chosen. First of all, the conviction that "The greatest threat to children in modern liberal societies is not that they will believe in something too deeply, but that they will believe in nothing very deeply at all." (Galston, 1991a, p. 255) Due to the fact that children are continuously being exposed to contrasting values by the media, adults have now an added responsibility, they should help children in making sense of all the raw information they are bombarded with. A second conviction that led to the choice of this topic is the fact that, not coming from a liberal state myself, I was always intrigued by liberal political philosophy, especially notions about respect, limited state action and the belief that only each individual knows what is best for oneself. Being more familiar with paternalistic societies where everyone seems to know what is best for everyone else without even bothering to ask, I chose to study the values of liberal democratic states because they are so different from a grandmotherly attitude of 'the state knows best'. Liberal democratic values do not embrace a paternalistic approach, but push forward a policy that emphasizes the importance that citizens are free to choose for themselves what they think is best for them and that the state should institute rights to allow citizens to choose for themselves even when in doing so they disagree with the opinion of the majority. Thus, I chose this topic because I wanted to study liberal political theory and see which core values would be reflected in their Citizenship Education provision.

Citizenship Education and the values taught through it vary according to the society where it is being taught. Public values in communist states differ a great deal from those taught in fascist or Islamic states or in others. The topic of teaching Citizenship Education including values was also chosen because values seem to be of growing relevance in contemporary liberal democratic states characterised by diversity and distrust. A reason why the teaching of public values might be able to go a long way in improving social conviviality is because "there are attitudes and capacities that liberals ought to have and develop, and that when people do have and develop them, a liberal regime will flourish." (Macedo, 1990, p. 2) These public values are also important because, "liberal politics depends on a certain level and quality of citizen virtue, which is in many ways promoted by life in a reasonably just and tolerant, open liberal regime." (Macedo, 1990, p.2)

Incommensurable points of view should not be allowed to discourage the teaching of values as Galston wrote; "Despite the pluralism of liberal societies, it is perfectly possible to identify a core of civic commitments and competences, the broad acceptance of which undergirds a well-ordered liberal polity." (Galston, 1991a, p.255) Teaching public values should therefore not be discouraged because of the different views about the life worth living present in pluralistic liberal democratic states. As Standish remarks, "the question 'whose values are we to install?' " (Smith and Standish, 1997, p. 139) has been "Put in a rhetorical way as if to defy any attempt to answer it." (Smith and Standish, 1997, p.139) Liberal democratic states should not let the issue of "whose values?" stop them from actually seeing which values might actually form a common citizenship and hopefully foster a sense of belonging.

### 1.3 Division of chapters

This first chapter has provided an introduction to the whole study and provided the reader with reasons why the chosen questions are being asked in the first place. In the following chapter, Chapter Two, the study clarifies what is understood by the term "liberal democratic state" and in Chapter Three it describes the citizenship education provision that ought to be found in such states taking into consideration the many trends of liberal political philosophy. Chapter Three also discusses the justification for teaching citizenship education and civic values and the legitimacy of doing so. In Chapter Four, the study focuses in detail on the values that ought to be taught through Citizenship Education for the construction of a conception of citizenship that could be shared by all citizens despite their diverse conceptions of the good life. Chapter Four focuses on the values that form the common core in liberal democratic states, which are: freedom, rights, responsibility, democracy, tolerance for diversity, individual autonomy, rule of law, political equality, respect for others and an effort to be impartial.

## Chapter 2: The distinctiveness of liberal democratic states.

### 2.1 Introduction

Distinguishing liberal democratic states in this chapter refers to the identification of the salient features which characterise liberal democratic states from very different ideas of state such as communist, fascist and Islamic. Additionally, one must acknowledge the fact that there are different conceptions within liberal political philosophy of how precisely should liberal democratic states be and which policies should be enforced in the best ways. This study took great care to acknowledge these differences within liberalism and has formulated a common core of values that accommodates for the several ideologies within liberalism.

Firstly, liberal democratic states are democracies, with the absolute majority of them being representative democracies because of practical reasons due to their size. In representative liberal democracies "citizens recognize that they cannot all participate directly and so they choose a smaller group of representatives to act on their behalf". (Williams, 1998, p.20) yet it should be noted that "democracy is distinguished by its values -- justice, freedom, and respect for personal autonomy" (White, 1996, p.1) and not by its, "bits of machinery like fixed term governments, free elections, a legal opposition and free trade unions. " (White, 1996, p.1) Liberal democratic states are characterised by; "Political toleration, multi-party competition, a free press, a constitutional commitment to abide by the results, and of course the ability to vote for representatives to fill offices that actually have some power..." (Williams, 1998, p.20) Liberal democratic states are thus characterised by all the features that characterise any democracy and additionally they incorporate notions from liberal political philosophy. Notions such as priority of the individual over the community and rights based conception of justice distinguish liberal democracies from other regimes. The aim of this chapter is precisely that of identifying the major characteristics of liberal democratic states as states where "the flourishing of human beings taken one by one is ... prior to the flourishing of the state" (Nussbaum, 1997, p.62)

### 2.2 Characteristics that distinguish liberal democratic states.

A first major characteristic of liberal democratic states is their being based on liberal political philosophy. Now, "Of course, there are many kinds of liberal theory" (Bull, 2008, p.449) and on trying to define liberalism one realizes that the term liberalism is like a "surname" and the theories and principles that go by this name "often do not have much more in common with one another than the members of a widely extended family." (Waldron, 1987, p.127) "In fact, one can categorize different liberal theories according to what [value] is placed at the top of the order; typical candidates include equality, autonomy, liberty, and freedom." (Talisse, 2007, p.1).

To continue on Waldron's metaphor, it is true that they do not have much more in common then relatives of a widely extended family and that "liberal thinking has many variants. Some...more in harmony with core liberal values than others." (White, 1999, p.185) yet there are also foundational commonalities which characterise all of them such as the conception of a state that is limited, the idea of a public and a private sphere, and of course they are linked by their core values such as a belief in democratic systems, a tolerant attitude towards diversity, individual rights, at least political equality and some other common features.

On asking "What is liberalism?" (Crowder, 2002, p.22) Crowder answers that "The idea of liberalism is, of course, complex and contested" (Crowder, 2002, p.22) and one notices that contestations do not only come from opponents of liberalism but that "liberals are themselves often the liveliest critics of other liberals."(Simon, 2002, p.197) In such a context that portrays liberalism as a theory that holds diverse trends, the resulting definition of liberal democratic states must be informed by the fact that "many different versions of liberalism exist." (Halstead, 1996, p.17) There are different versions of what the central tenets of liberalism stand for, of the basic structure on which the different liberal interpretations are founded, which are "freedom, toleration, individual rights, constitutional democracy and the rule of law." (Waldron, 1998, p.598) Conway also emphasis the centrality of the role of values in liberal political theory, he explains that the political tradition of liberal democratic states is based on liberal political practices and "A mode of political practice qualifies as liberal if it embodies and promotes liberal values, paramount among which are the values of liberty and equality, as liberals understand them. Thus liberalism provides some favoured interpretation of liberty and equality, plus an explanation of why, as interpreted, these values are worthy of realization." (Conway, 2003, p.10) A most important feature regarding liberal values is the fact that "Each value admits of a wide variety of interpretations. Consequently a large part of liberal ideology is given over to arguments in favour of some particular interpretations of these values, plus attempts to demonstrate why, according to whichever is their favoured interpretation, some particular mode of political practice better embodies these values than do any others." (Conway, 2003, p.10) Liberalism can support several trends within it because the common core of values allows for "a variety of interpretations." (Conway, 2003, p.10) The diversity of interpretations is mostly evident when one compares social concerns of social liberalism and political liberalism with the liberal minimalist approach of classical liberalism, neo-liberalism and libertarianism.

Two clear manifestations of the influence of liberal political philosophy in liberal democratic states are obviously the liberal values that are manifest through the institutions of the state and also on the characteristics of its Citizenship Education which would also feature particularities that distinguish it from other approaches to the subject. On defining the values

that belong to liberal democratic states, one must cater for the fact that "The liberal tradition divides into its two great streams." (Crowder, 2002, p.24) Two streams that portray "more or less consistent set of beliefs about the nature of the society in which individuals live and about the proper role of the state in establishing or maintaining that society" (Johnston, 2001:119) These two major trends can be categorised as the classical/neo liberal minimalistic view and the social/distributive liberal view. "Classical or laissez-faire liberalism (Locke, Adam Smith, Friedrich Hayek, Robert Nozick) emphasizes individual rights of non-interference with private property and market outcomes, and consequently insists on a minimal or highly restricted role for government." (Crowder, 2002, p.24) While on the other hand "Social or egalitarian liberalism (T.H. Green, L.T. Hobhouse, John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin) connects personal autonomy with redistribution and consequently with a more interventionist role for government." (Crowder, 2002, p.24) Liberal democratic states thus feature different interpretations of the core values, interpretations that affect the importance given to values of freedom (positive/negative), equality (political/of opportunity) and autonomy (private/public) and others.

In spite of the different trends of liberalism, one can still try to pinpoint a common core of values that can be owned by liberalism as a whole and that can serve as a least common factor of liberal political theory. In order to accommodate for the different views within liberalism and for the variety of interpretations of core values, the values suggested in this study are those that belong to all trends in liberalism such as political equality. It is a value that is endorsed by both liberal minimalism and by social liberalism. Social Liberals would then reinterpret the value in an extended way to mean "equality of opportunity" if not "equality of outcomes", yet for the scope of this study, it is still reasonable to claim that value of "political equality" forms part of the common core of values on which liberal democratic states are founded irrespective of the dominant ideology they endorse. The same is true for the value of freedom. Both liberal minimalists and social liberals believe in the value of freedom. Liberal minimalist who envisage that the "State should be nothing more than a police organisation to enforce, protect property, keep peace, punish crime, and defend society against foreign aggression and when this is done, its functions are exhausted." (Garner, 1935, p.453) would interpret the value of freedom as negative liberty, (freedom from coercion) while social liberals see freedom as positive liberty and suggest ways in which the state could better help individuals in reaching their potential. Yet it can safely be said that freedom is a core value of all liberal democratic states.

A second major characteristic that distinguishes liberal democratic states is the effort made by the state to be equally respectful towards all citizens while realizing that the notion of "state neutrality" is untenable. It could be said that the 'inability to be impartial despite real efforts' is a characteristic that distinguishes liberal democracies. As Crowder explains, liberal

democratic states cannot remain neutral because, "The enforcement of liberal rules and procedures, rights and liberties, does not affect all ways of life equally. Inevitably, those conceptions of the good that do not share the core liberal commitments to equal concern and respect, personal autonomy, toleration and private property will be more restricted; will have less room in which to flourish, than those ways of life that lie closer to the liberal outlook." (Crowder, 2002, p.30) The core values are neither neutral nor universal. The value of autonomy is not endorsed by all citizens. The value of equality, even if only presented in a limited conception of, might still not be acceptable to some gender differentiated vision which holds that punishments should be proportional to the gender of the offender. Barcley explains that liberal democratic states "should certainly not aspire to be neutral" because "liberalism cannot be all things to all people, and it is defined by its very non-neutral commitment to some notion of individual freedom. That commitment brings it directly into conflict with many illiberal groups and practices, and no amount of doctoring of liberal theory will eliminate the conflict" (Barcley, 2007, p.177).

In full realisation that neutrality is impossible; a belief in impartiality arises from the wish to be equally respectful towards all citizens. While it is true that "The citizens of modern pluralist societies disagree on almost everything, but particularly on issues of faith, philosophy and value" (Craig, 1998, p.818) liberal democratic states try to "stay out of all such controversies, and to refrain from throwing the weight of its authority - or worse still, the coercive power at its command - behind any particular view about what makes life worth living." (Craig, 1998, p.818) One should notice that even Ronald Dworkin, who sustains the importance of the state's efforts to be impartial between different visions of the good life, clarifies that "Political decisions must be, so far as possible, independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life." (Dworkin, 1985, p.191) "So far as possible" in liberal democratic states means as far as the law permits, as far as core of values consent and as far as the harm principle allows. Most of all, the effort to be impartial towards different views of the good life stops short when it starts to hamper the states' ability to sustain this (all be it limited) policy of impartiality built on equal respect towards all citizens. Yet, the different views of the good life still allows liberal democratic states to construct "a shared citizenship....a set of political institutions and principles" (Galston, 1989, p.93) in the sense that "what we share, beyond all our differences, provides the basis for a civic education valid across the boundaries of our differences." (Galston, 1989, p.93)

The effort made to be impartial is a very limited effort indeed since "even such mundane matters as co-education or the identification of a language of instruction and school holidays transmit the importance of certain pervasive values (e.g. the equality of the sexes, the religious

traditions worthy of public recognition)." (Reich, 2007, p.719) The ability to be impartial is also limited by the fact that "...liberalism necessarily contains its own standards of excellence - standards that prevent it from being neutral in any robust sense" (Dagger, 1997, p.117) these same standards are reflected in the impossibility of neutrality of Citizenship Education since as Barry writes, the "decisions about what the publicly run schools are going to teach, must obviously involve a view about the value of learning some things rather than others, and that for this reason it would be absurd to suggest that there is some way of determining a curriculum that is neutral between all conceptions of the good." (Barry, 1995, p.161) The same absurdity is recognised by Gier, when he writes that "Those liberals who say that political theory must be morally neutral will not only lose badly on this point in the cultural wars, but they also misrepresent their own liberal tradition as well." (Gier, 2003, p.76) William Galston adds that "There is a gap between rights and rightness that cannot be closed without a richer vocabulary, one that invokes principles of decency, responsibility, and the common good, among others." (Galston, 1991b, p.8) Galston directly refers to the need that liberal democracies have to sustain a set of public values that form a common ground of understanding between diverse citizens. Galston also shows that the requirement for a common core of values is more important than the quest for neutrality, a characteristic that is reflected in liberal democratic states.

Thus, one can distinguish liberal democratic states by their inability to be neutral and yet an effort to be 'as much as possible' fair and impartial towards citizens. Even if the effort of being impartial is strong, the very notion of "'Neutrality' itself, one may say, stands for a bundle of value commitments" (Crowder, 2002, p.30) and "a particular ranking of goods" (Crowder, 2002, p.30) making it thus impossible to be realistically achieved. Furthermore, the common core of values is so essential to liberal democratic states that parents "are not free to impede the child's acquisition of a basic civic education - the beliefs and habits that support the polity and enable individuals to function competently in public affairs." (Galston 1998, p.52) Parents are not free to impede such acquisition of values because "in cases of conflict this civic core takes priorities over individual or group commitment." (Galston, 1989, p.101) Such views highlight the inability of liberal democratic states to be neutral towards diverse conceptions of the life worth living.

A third characteristic that distinguishes liberal democratic states is the nature of its legitimacy. A legitimacy founded on popular consent through reason. When by legitimacy we also mean, "adherence to the formal process of decision-making, i.e. that the law makers abide by the law when making laws." (Eriksen & Fossum, 2000, p. 149) then reasoned consent of as many citizens as possible is the perpetual aim of liberal democratic states in order to guarantee its own legitimacy. Legitimacy is important because it "has considerable instrumental value... legitimacy confers on states a right to exist and a right to rule. A legitimate state is one which

may do what it is authorized to do; that is, its lawful acts are all permissible." (Kühnelt, 2008, p.26) This continuous aspiration for reasoned consensus shapes the legitimacy that institutes liberal democratic states and while unanimous consensus is unreachable, citizens ought to be able to concur upon a set of principles that could establish the general public framework within which citizens might pursue their private ends or at least enable citizens to engage in an ongoing dialogue to reach such purpose. For this to be possible, it must first of all be agreed that there is a rights protected "private dimension" and a "public dimension" to which different rules of conduct apply. The liberal democratic state is by its nature limited to the shaping of the public sphere in ways agreed upon democratically by the majority of citizens. The public sphere is also shaped by the fact that "The liberals insist that intelligible justifications in social and political life must be available in principle for everyone, for society is to be understood by the individual mind, not by the tradition or sense of community. Its legitimacy and the basis of social obligation must be made out to each individual." (Waldron 1993, p.44) Since different citizens have a different vision of how things should be, for the state to be legitimate in the eyes of as many citizens as possible, the state must learn to speak a language that is understood by most, a language of reason. Religious people, who do not publicly speak the language of reason should make an effort and learn the language to be able to participate in a more productive way in the public square. Furthermore, "A liberal political culture can even expect that secularized citizens take part in efforts to translate relevant contributions from the religious language into a publicly accessible language." (Habermas, 2005, p.28) Although far from being a universal language, the language of reason is usually understood by most of those who make an effort to understand it, thus it is hoped that indeed most would make an effort and eventually learn to communicate through reason in the public sphere and try to reach agreements strong enough to be able to legitimize state actions.

Liberal democratic states are most prominently characterised by "the fundamental liberal principle - that all interferences with action stand in need of justification." (Gaus, 2006, p.272) The liberal state cannot arbitrarily interfere in decisions made by citizens without proper justification. They all need justification in order to make the state a legitimate one and maintain its right to rule. Legitimacy provides the state with "the moral right to use coercion against those citizens who refuse to obey." (Quong, 2007, p.320) Liberal democratic states accept citizens' consent as the only source of legitimacy that justifies state action. The importance given to the requirement of legitimacy for the use of coercive power is a distinguishing feature of liberal democratic states. Liberal democratic states could never endorse a single unjustified conception of the good life because of their fundamental commitment to state legitimacy which demands justifications endorsed by most citizens. Thus, given the citizens diversity at the level of fundamental moral, religious and philosophical commitments, liberal democratic states must be

justified by reasons that are "independent of controversial philosophical and religious doctrines" (Rawls, 1985, p.388) Justifications based solely on reason in the public sphere are a fundamental characteristic of liberal democratic states. Kymlicka explains the importance of legitimate coercion that must be approved by most citizens on the premise that "Liberal citizens must give reasons for their political demands" he also explains that "Moreover, these reasons must be 'public' reasons in the sense that they are capable of persuading people of different faiths and nationalities. Hence it is not enough to invoke Scripture or tradition." (Kymlicka, 2003, p.50)

Even though only motivations based on reason are valid for the public sphere in liberal democratic states, religious citizens can still contribute. It must be realised that in the public sphere "Citizens have to reach a view on what to do about such issues as abortion, euthanasia, the regulation of sexuality, social justice, the regulation of war and so on." (Waldron and Williams, 2008, p.7) Such issues, while being public issues, are seen from the very private conception of the good life that every citizen holds, and indeed, "On issues like these, religious arguments are among the most powerful considerations that can be cited for positions on one side or another of the debates that citizens face" (Waldron and Williams, 2008, p.7) Since religious motives are invalid because they are unintelligible and do not appeal to every citizen, religious citizens should make an effort to translate their points of view in ways that can be understood by most. The rest of the citizens should make an equal effort to try and understand what is being proposed. This effort to engage each other in democratic deliberation is a key requirement if a liberal democratic state that takes its legitimacy seriously. In fact, the particular nature of legitimacy demanded by liberal democratic states means that "Liberal citizens must justify their political demands in terms that fellow citizens can understand and accept as consistent with their status as free and equal citizens. It requires a conscientious effort to distinguish those beliefs that are matters of private faith from those that are capable of public defence..." (Kymlicka, 2003, p.50) State legitimacy demands that citizens participate with contributions that can be understood, debated and engaged with by most citizens. For this to happen, even if the motivation to participate in the public square is religious in nature it must be adapted to fit the public dimension.

A fourth characteristic that distinguishes liberal democratic states is the fact that they are "limited states", in the sense that they respect the (imperfect) separation between a public and a private sphere and choose to be restricted to the public sphere and respect the rights of individuals that protect the private realm. "The state in liberal political philosophy constitutes the supreme political authority within precise limits." (Held, 1989, p.12) Precise limits that include: the democratically chosen laws, the formulation of a constitution, legal precedents, the recognition of rights, a private sphere, the harm principle, core values and the liberal belief that

the state is made out of individuals and it is towards each individual that the state's first loyalty lies. The liberal state is limited in the sense that it itself institutes a sphere through the establishment of rights that defines its pertinent role, while, "...the public/private distinction is not as simple as many liberals portray it" (Spinner, 1994, p.6) at least in the private sphere, individuals are free to follow personal choices without bothering to explain them to the community to be understood, free to follow heteronymous lifestyles and free to follow any lifestyle as long as they do not harm others. On the other hand, in the public sphere citizens are meant to explain their actions through reason and choose on their own. "This dividing line is important to liberals because it represents the line beyond which the state cannot interfere with the precious right of individual liberty of conscience, association, or expression. Liberal tradition is based in maintaining and monitoring that important dividing line between the public, that which the state can guide or govern, and the private, where individuals can pursue their own visions of the good." (Abowitz, 2008, p.365) Galston affirms that "The proposition that some matters are none of the state's business carries an important discursive consequence: With regard to those matters, individuals and civil associations are not regarded to give an account of — or justify — themselves before any public bar" (Galston, 1999 p.40) such a situation is better understood in the context that the exact opposite counts for the public sphere, where citizens are expected to give an intelligible account of their actions.

The public/private divide affects the educational provision in liberal democratic states and it also affects the role of religions. Liberal democratic states are secular states based on a 'laïcité' that prohibits official support to a specific religion. There are different interpretations of this notion, some liberals suggest that Muslim women have a right to wear the hijab due to the freedom of expression and the fact that the way one attires oneself falls under the protection of the private sphere. Others think that religion must be in all circumstances relegated to the private sphere. Macedo thinks that it is a misconception that religious motives should be restricted exclusively to the private sphere and explains that "Secularists are wrong when they ask believers to leave their religion at the door before entering into the public square." (Macedo, 2008, p.1) while religions have a major role to play in the private sphere, they can also contribute to the public one. Macedo explains that "There may be a variety of ways, indeed, in which religious speech can support political liberalism by clarifying the depth of one's commitment to liberal principles and the political authority of public reasons." (Macedo, 2000, p.172) The argument presented by Macedo recognises the cautious advice given by Habermas when he writes that "the liberal state must not transform the requisite institutional separation of religion and politics into an undue mental and psychological burden for those of its citizens who follow a faith." (Habermas, 2006, p.25) Restrictions on religious argumentation are problematic for religious citizens because they approach the public sphere with an ideal of

rationality that seems to exclude their own religious arguments as irrational. This feeling that arguments based on faith do not qualify as valid and legitimate is a very dangerous sentiment that makes some citizens feel like "second-class citizens". Liberal democratic states must avoid such feelings if they are to strengthen social cohesion.

"Liberal politics stand, first and foremost, for...limited and accountable government." (Macedo, 1990, p.2) Limited to act in the public sphere and limited by the harm principle. The harm principle restricts the power of governments to interfere with private decision on the belief "That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant." (Mill, 1991 [1859], p.14) It holds that governments should not coercively interfere with persons unless doing so is necessary to prevent them from causing clear and direct harm to others. Thus, a citizen is meant to lead his life on his own terms and according to "his own mode of laying out his existence" (Mill, 1991 [1859], p.75). In liberal democratic states the harm principle is a principle "that regards the prevention of harm to anyone as the only justifiable ground for coercive interference with a person" (Raz, 1986, p.412-13) because "Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign." (Mill, 1991 [1859], p.14)

The concept of a public/private divide is also applied to Citizenship Education in the sense that it is an educational provision specifically designed to shape the public relationship between citizens and state, namely citizenship. Thus Citizenship Education is more interested in the public dimension of citizens so much so that if stakeholders were to be concerned with the morality or character of learners they ought to institute a separate educational provision to be taught along with citizenship education since Citizenship Education does not adequately cater for the private dimension, while it might affect it. When referring to Citizenship Education as applied to citizens of minority groups, Halstead mentions that, "The ultimate aim of citizenship education on this approach is to help the minority group to develop an internalized commitment to the laws and values of the broader society, so that these are accepted as guides in their social, political, and economic life [the public sphere] though not, of course, their cultural, personal, or religious life, where they would be free to pursue their own goals [the private sphere]." (Halstead, 2003, p. 292) Halstead is very clear about the purpose of Citizenship Education, that it is a business that has to do with what is social and political, not personal and religious. The effect of the public/private divide on Citizenship Education is also mentioned by Parekh in reference to the legitimacy of teaching values, he acknowledges that since the values taught through Citizenship Education only refer to the public sphere and citizens can indeed "disregard them in their personal and interpersonal lives" (Parekh, 1994, p. 215) he concludes that "... the coercion

is not moral in nature..." and so "no moral enormity is committed against it." (Parekh, 1994, p. 217) While many liberals admit that the public/private divide is not as clear cut as they would wish and perhaps realistically untenable, it must be realised that it would be quite difficult to comprehend most liberal intensions without realising the importance that the divide between the public sphere and the private sphere has in liberal political philosophy.

A fifth characteristic of liberal democratic states is their relationship with the fact of pluralism that is characterised by a real effort to accommodate and find compromises. The values of freedom, tolerance and respect lead citizen to choose the most diverse of life options. Some opt for atheist ways of life, others opt for liberal values of equality and diversity in full harmony with the core values of the state, others yet are members of "religious orthodoxy" (Blacker, 2007, p.9) and hold "a worldview or outlook that supplies answers to final questions about human existence and the cosmos, orders the virtues, and otherwise supplies to adherents something substantive and determinate toward ultimate meaning and purpose." (Blacker, 2007, p.9) Citizens have a right to follow their conception of the life worth living, this right to choose has led liberal democratic states to be characterised by "An acceptance...of the fact of deep and irremediable pluralism in modern society." (Levinson, 2002a, p.117) In Liberal democratic states it is taken as the norm that "People subscribe to a huge range of values, sources of identity, and conceptions of the good that often conflict with each other and are as often incommensurable." (Levinson, 2002a, p.117) The fact of pluralism is a clear feature of liberal democratic states.

The case in liberal democratic states is that the state tries hard to accommodate illiberal citizens in the name of its own values of respect, freedom and rights which are meant to be equally enjoyed by all citizens. "Obviously the citizens of any modern democracy do not share specific conceptions of the good life, but they may share certain political values." (Kymlicka, 1995, p.187) Liberal democratic states should try to build on these political values and leave private conceptions of the life worth living up to individuals to decide. Yet, citizens should be aware that along with the rights that protect citizens from state interference all citizens are also vested with a duty to integrate based on respect for the core values of the state they live in.

The effort to accommodate has its limits. Accepting the fact of pluralism does not mean that every choice is equally valid in a liberal democratic state, as Parekh explains, "No society can tolerate every practice, thus raising the question as to how a liberal society should determine the range of permissible diversity" (Pharek, 1994, p.214) Thus, accommodation of diversity is restricted by the harm principle, "If a practice harms others, it should be banned." (Pharek, 1994, p.214). The core values of the state are the provisional ruler with which to

measure acceptability of cultural practices, these core values do not accommodate all citizens and are a reminder of the impossibility of neutrality in liberal democratic states since not even seemingly reasonable values such as "equality" (opposed by racists, sexists and religious orthodoxy) and "respect" (opposed by racist, fascists, and adherents to caste systems) can unite all citizens to from a unanimous consensus to fully validate the legitimacy of the state. Yet, as Parekh explains, "A society has a body of values which are enshrined in its constitutional and political institutions and structure the conduct of its collective affairs." (Parekh, 2000, p.14) Public practices which do not respect the core values have to be regrettably stopped. They have to be stopped because despite the effort to be impartial and the effort to accommodate "Liberalism is a substantive doctrine advocating a specific view of man, society and the world and embedded in and giving rise to a distinct way of life. As such it represents a particular cultural perspective and cannot provide a broad and impartial enough framework to conceptualise other cultures or their relations with it" (Parekh, 2000, p.14) Indeed, a liberal democratic state without the values of freedom, rights, autonomy and political equality would cease to be liberal democratic and yet Parekh might be underestimate the flexibility of the trends that form liberalism. Liberalism is a survivor. It is possibly the regime that best adapts to rapid change, its sincere effort not to back a single view of the life worth living, its efforts to be equally respectful, its commitment to tolerance towards for diversity and respect to others and an inherent belief in democracy should be able to establish a temporary modus vivendi while at the same time providing all citizens with the ability to participate in the democratic decision making process with the sole purpose to bring real change.

This fifth characteristic, the recognition of the fact that "there is an irreducible plurality of reasonable values and reasonable conceptions of the good" (Kekes, 1997, p.6) which in turn leads to "many kinds of human flourishing, some of which cannot be compared in value." (Gray, 2000, p.6) ensures the recognition of diversity, and while it is not the case that "the liberal state be understood as an arena for the unfettered expression of "difference." because "In the very act of sustaining diversity, liberal unity circumscribes diversity." (Galston, 1991a, p.4) since "No form of social life can be perfectly or equally hospitable to every human orientation." (Galston, 1991a, p.4) Yet, values of equal respect for humans as free agents and values of tolerance and autonomy, condition the states relationship with pluralism in ways that make the state accept pluralism as a fact of life so that, "the Sikhs are permitted to wear their turbans on motorcycles and carry their ritual dagger in public; Muslim women and girls may keep their "headscarves" on in the workplace or in school; Jewish butchers are allowed to slaughter livestock and poultry according to kosher methods; and so forth." (Habermas, 2005, p.14) Compromises are "the consequences from the fact that Sikhs, Muslims, and Jews enjoy the same religious freedom..." (Habermas, 2005, p.14) Such an accommodating approach should be only limited by the state's

duty to protect citizens from harm, from unwanted interference in their freedom and when such pluralism breaches core values. As regards schooling including the status of denominational schools, Reich gives very sound advice when he says that, "In the end, multicultural accommodation in education...is justifiable" (Reich, 2003, p. 319) but "accommodations that mean the state may no longer regulate schooling are not." (Reich, 2003, p. 319) Regulating in the sense that along with the parents' view of the life worth living, which should be taught to children in respect to their cultural heritage, children as members of the state and future citizens should also be critically taught the core public values of the state, the minimum indispensable of citizenship that will give them a real opportunity to flourish.

## 2.3 Conclusion to Chapter Two

For the purpose of this study, "liberal democratic states" refer to states that "promote people's interest by letting them [citizens] choose for themselves what sort of lives they want to lead". (Kymlicka, 1990, p.199) For citizens to be able to do so, they "must be democratic, limit state power via a formal or informal constitution, protect a wide range of individual liberties, tolerate and respect individuals' differences over a vast array of measures, promote non-discrimination... and be consistently justifiable on grounds that can appeal to all reasonable citizens." (Levinson, 1999, p.42) Some distinguishing features of liberal democratic states therefore include their (1) adherence to an ideology that is included within liberalism ranging from social liberalism to liberal minimalist views, resulting in a recognition of the fact that there are certain values that are inherent in the political philosophy of liberal democracy, which lead to the general prevalence of the individual over the collectively and a specific educational system that prepares citizens for their essential roles as citizens which include the teaching of the common core of values to all citizens. Other characteristics include (2) an effort to be impartial despite the awareness of the impossibility of neutrality, (3) a deep concern with state legitimacy whose validity originates from public consent (4) self-imposed restrictions that include distinctions between a public and a private sphere and observance of the harm principle(5) an effort to accommodate for the fact of pluralism and incommensurable values. The states the come closer most to the definition of liberal democratic states are France, Canada and the United States. These countries recognise individual rights, try to show equal respect towards all citizens, recognise a private sphere, do not adopt an official state religion and they make an effort to accommodate for pluralism.

## Chapter 3: Citizenship Education.

### 3.1 Introduction

Chapter three examines what is meant by "Citizenship Education" in liberal democratic states. It also points out the reasons why such educational provision is needed and discusses the nature of its legitimacy.

### 3.2 Citizenship Education in Liberal Democratic States

Citizenship Education in liberal democratic states is of course specifically designed to meet the particular needs of such a state. Citizenship Education ensures that all citizens are equipped with the knowledge, skills and values required to understand their roles, rights and responsibilities bestowed on them in virtue of their citizenship. As Carr and Hartnett explain "the primary aim of education is to ensure that all future citizens are equipped with the knowledge, values and skills of deliberative reasoning minimally necessary for their participation in the democratic life of their society." (Carr and Hartnett, 1997, p.192) Thus, while liberal democratic states provide citizens with a real possibility to participate in politics and choose, Citizenship Education equips citizens with the ability to do so.

Although the knowledge, skills and values taught through Citizenship Education are meant to be restricted to the public dimension, such teachings might still clash with some personal conceptions of the life worth living. Consequently, a system of compulsory education adequate to perform its role as demanded by liberal democratic states will prove non-neutral in its effects. Non-neutral because it unintentionally hinders some doctrines and facilitates others. Nevertheless, "it is the proper task of the liberal state to set regulations on all forms of schooling so that the common educational goals are met". (Reich, 2007, p.712) As with the precise format of liberal democratic states, citizenship education varies according to differences in the liberal ideology followed. Social liberalism would expand the jurisdiction of education to ensure equality of opportunity while liberal minimalist views might limit its scope to political skills or less.

A provision for citizenship education would form an integral part of the educational system of any liberal democratic state. An analysis of liberal citizenship education must include a definition of the term "citizenship". "Citizenship is one of these elusive, contested and multifaceted concepts, which is used to describe different phenomena (legal status, membership, political identity) and receives diverse meanings in different societies and eras. One of the

difficulties in defining this concept is that it embodies tensions, between individual rights and responsibilities, between freedom and order, and between equality and difference" (Pinson, 2008, p.211) Citizenship deals with the interaction between citizens and their state since it "denotes membership in a community of shared or common law." (Pocock, 1992, p.37) Citizenship also refers to rights and duties, as Galston explains "If citizenship means anything, it means a package of benefits and burdens shared, and accepted, by all." (Galston, 1998, p.51) The use of the term citizenship in this study refers to "...a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed." (Marshall, 1950, p. 28-29)

Liberal democratic citizenship is equally bestowed on all citizens, it provides equal rights and equal duties, it belongs in the same way to those who contribute more and those who contribute less, to the patriot and to citizens who are non-nationals but acquired such status through marriage or other means. Citizenship is not meant to assimilate individuals but it requires equipping all citizens with a political identity, a language that gives them the ability to dialogue with each other. As Heater warns, "Citizenship cannot perform its vital integrative function if it is group-differentiated" (Heater, 1990, p.295) because "it ceases to be a device to cultivate a sense of community and a common sense of purpose" (Heater, 1990, p.295) While legally citizenship is "a legal category, identifying one's legal status, entitled rights and responsibilities, as a member of a society." (Althof and Berkowitz, 2006, p.500) in pluralistic liberal democratic states citizenship acquires a "deeper sense" (id.) that makes it "much more than that" (id.) citizenship becomes, "fair procedures (the rule of law) and constitutional rights...designed to maintain equality among citizens but also to ensure the active role of citizens in contributing to society, partly through participation in democratic decision-making." (Althof and Berkowitz, 2006, p.500)

Because of their particular conception of 'state' and 'citizenship' liberal democratic states require an education that "will teach the young the virtues and abilities they need in order to participate competently in reciprocity-governed political dialogue and to abide by the deliverances of such dialogue in their conduct as citizens." (Callan, 1997, p.28) For this aim to be reached, whatever else it does, Citizenship Education must ensure that children both "develop the capacity for a threshold level of autonomy that, if they exercised it, would allow them to make important decisions on their own" (Eichner, 2007, p.17) as well as "develop sufficient civic virtues necessary to perpetuate a liberal democracy." (Eichner, 2007, p.17) Furthermore, Eichner explains that "In addition, the state must confine civic education to teaching political rather than comprehensive doctrines, and must justify its actions based on public reason rather than comprehensive rationales." (Eichner, 2007, p.17) The confinement of teaching that pertains

to the public sphere is an evident feature of liberal democratic education. These values include, but might not be limited to, freedom, rights, autonomy, effort to be impartial, democracy, rule of law, respect for others, political equality, tolerance for diversity and responsibility. Citizenship education is meant to transcend ethnic, national, religious or other social or cultural identities and allows diverse citizenry to converse with each other in the sense explained by Green, where "education must remain the public arena where tolerance, mutual respect and understanding and the ability to co-operate are cultivated. Just as it offers opportunities for individual development and advancement, it must also strive to promote civic identity and civic competence and to make possible a democratic and cohesive society." (Green, 1997, p.186) Thus the final aim of citizenship education is to provide citizens with the ability to communicate with each other in a constructive manner. When communication leads to disagreement the core values can function as a temporary settlement that stops the resulting social chaos so that citizens will still be able to continue to debate and deliberate in the public square in the hope that a public settlement is possible.

Citizenship Education is an essential part of the education provision in a liberal democratic state. As Gutmann explains, "a society...must educate all educable children to be capable of participating in collectively shaping their society." (Gutmann, 1987, p.39) Citizens have a right to expect that educational systems make real efforts to provide them with the knowledge, skills and values necessary for living well in a democratic state. Citizenship Education should, "encourage the political virtues so that they (citizens) want to honour the fair terms of social cooperation in their relations with the rest of society'. (Rawls, 1993, p.199) Citizenship Education is also related to the multiple roles that individuals have in society; as citizens, as consumers and as contributors to cultural development and social change. "Citizenship education is not simply a matter of knowledge of political institutions and constitutional institutions. It is also a matter of how we think about and behave towards others, particularly those who differ from us in their race, religion, class and so on" (Kymlicka, 1999a, p.88)

Citizenship Education is meant to teach the fundamental principles of democracy and to prepare members of a society to take on the rights and responsibilities given by their legal status as citizens. While it should instruct students on the facts, perspectives, procedures of government, history, law, rights and other topics, Citizenship Education should extend far beyond questions like "What is the role of the minister?". Citizenship Education should encourage students to practice democratic processes; it should invite critical thinking and discuss public issues. Citizens should be taught how to participate politically and they are to be in a condition that they want to do it through their understanding of the state's core values.

Citizens ought to realize that it is their right to participate and that by participating they might be able to improve their social situation, they also ought to feel responsible about providing their share in the public domain as conscientious citizens.

The characteristics of Citizenship Education in liberal democratic states are related to the preparation of individuals for their roles as citizens, the promotion of individuals' public autonomy and the fulfilment of their public responsibilities. As Galston explains "Its [citizenship education's] purpose is not the pursuit of truth, but rather the formation of individuals who can effectively conduct their lives within and support their political community." (Galston, 1989, p.90) Due to the purposes defined by Galston, the primary aims also include teaching the necessary knowledge, skills and values that would enable citizens to freely make sound political choices. Additionally, "The citizen of a democracy must also be a man [woman] of independent judgement, he must respect the individualities of others and therefore be tolerant of opinions in conflict with his own, and s/he must prefer methods of discussions and persuasion to methods of force." (Milford, 1936, p.8)

First of all, Citizenship Education is a preparatory education for political participation. It prepares citizens to become effective participants in the economic, social and political life. "Education should equip children with the skills and knowledge necessary for them to be effective participants in the economy, so that they can have a good range of options in the labour market, and have access to the income necessary to flourish in a market economy" (Brighouse, 2007, p.577) explains Brighouse and the same flourishing is also enhanced through political participation. Brighouse also explains that "Education should prepare children to be responsible and effective participants in political life—good citizens. It should do this both for their sakes, because a flourishing life is more secure if one is capable of making use of the rights of citizenship; and for the sake of others, because a flourishing life is more secure if others are capable of abiding by the duties of good citizenship." (Brighouse, 2007, p.577) As Brighouse clearly indicates, an aim of a civic education is also that of making citizens responsible since responsible citizens are more inclined to see to their duties. Regarding the duties of citizens, "education has a vital role to play in creating an informed and educated public who can exercise their collective choice about the future direction that their society should take." (Carr and Hartnett, 1997, p.63)

The state requires the widest possible public participation of its citizens to secure its legitimacy as a democracy. Liberal democratic citizenship education equips citizens with the ability to participate in an informed and responsible way, capable of effective action and deliberation because they are much more then 'spectators who vote'. (Walzer, 1995, p.165)

Since citizens have the responsibility to take very important decisions regarding the state because it is only through such decisions that they can safeguard their individual autonomy, they need a good education that sustains them in this process. Indeed "good citizens are not simply born that way" (Macedo, 2000, p.16) additionally, "individuals are not by nature ready to participate in politics. They have to be educated in democratic politics in a number of ways. Including normative grounding, ethical behaviour, knowledge of the democratic process and technical performance" (Torres, 1998, p.11). Citizenship Education is a means through which the state tries to activate the political potential in every citizen and make them politically aware enough to, at the very least, see that their representatives are being held accountable for their actions.

Secondly, Citizenship Education is meant to enhance the concept of citizenship from simple legal status into a source of common identity since, Citizenship Education endevours to create "common ground between different ethnic and religious identities." (QCA, 1998, p.22) Citizenship education in liberal democratic states is meant to strengthen understanding between citizens, in his book, "Diversity and Distrust" Macedo explains that "Citizens owe each other common and non-religious reasons for shaping the shared political morality needed for a stable democracy." (Macedo, 2000, p.21) Hence, one of the major objectives of citizenship education in liberal democratic states is to help in constructing the "common...political morality" (Macedo, 2000, p.21) which refers to points of agreements (core values) on which a democratic dialogue of understanding between very diverse citizens can thrive. Citizenship meant to be a source of unity should be based on the spirit of "reasonableness and a sense of fairness, a spirit of compromise and a readiness to meet others half way." (Rawls, 1987, p.21) This effort to meet others half way, to be accommodating and able to compromise, would greatly benefit liberal democratic states especially those marked by very diverse citizenry where despite of their diversity citizens still have to pay taxes for the basic needs of the state, volunteer for enrolment in the army, serve as jurors in courts and perform other public duties. The sense of personal responsibility needed should originate from the values taught through Citizenship Education in accordance with "Liberalism's views of pluralistic nation-states with looser forms of national identity and civic affiliation — citizenship based on democratic principles rather than a cohesive national identity... indicate one contribution that the liberal tradition might make to greening public life and public education." (Abowitz, 2008, p.17) Indeed the contribution that Citizenship Education can do to liberal democratic states can be real and deep in the sense that citizenship education could be a viable alternative (along with not instead of) traditional sources of identity such as nationality and religion.

Because of realities marked by pluralism, basic democratic principles have become in some cases more important for social cohesion then traditional emblems of nationality, such as, common history, norms and culture. While some misguidedly suggest that in liberal democratic states "Nationality is much like religion. It does not matter to many people, nor do these people have any good reason why it ought to matter to them. Nationality is simply not a public value." (Morgan, 2005, p.120) I would not go that far and dismiss nationality completely. It might be more correct to say that "...national identity is one of several identities whose acquisition could be included among the aims of education" (Enslin, 1999, p.108) its acquisition could be beneficial because "without a common national identity, there is nothing to hold citizens together, no reason for extending the role just to these people and not to others." (Miller, 1992, p.94) it should thus be one of the purposes of liberal citizenship education to enhance the concept of nationality and where this is not possible due to diversity between diverse nationalities that cohabitate in the same state, to strengthen the concept of citizenship. In liberal democratic states where there is a very different meaning attached to terms "national", "citizen" and "resident", nationality does not have the gravitational pull it used to have on citizens before the fact of pluralism became so tangible, thus liberal democratic states have to make do with a conception of citizenship that provides a concept of political identity that can be equally upheld by liberal, illiberal, citizens who are also nationals of the state and citizens who are non-nationals (acquired citizenship through marriage or years living in the country). In liberal democratic states, the feeling of national identity is not always present because of social, cultural and ethnic differences deriving from residents of different nationalities. In spite of the lack of common sources of identification, liberal democratic states still require a sense of belonging in order to secure citizens in their roles as political participants, voters, law-abiding individuals, soldiers and taxpayers. All citizens ought to hold a common citizenship in spite of opposing conceptions of the sort of life worth living. National identity is still a relevant unitary force to be reckoned with, and when this fails, citizenship might be of assistance. In spite of the "new structures of political-legal organization or thinking about transnational connections." (Calhoun, 2007, p.171), nationalism has not become irrelevant in liberal democratic states. Calhoun makes a very valid contribution when he explains that, "Nationalism still matters, still troubles many of us, but still organizes something considerable in who we are" (Calhoun, 2007, p.171)

A third characteristic of Citizenship Education in liberal democratic states is its effects on the character of individuals through its not fully intended function as moral education. To be sure, "both moral education and civic education are sub-categories within the larger category of values education" (Torney-Purta, 1996) and it would be very short-sighted of education providers if they thought that Citizenship Education would limit itself only to public matters even if it tried really hard. Even if personal choices and character are perceived as something

that intimately belongs to the individual and therefore to the private sphere out of state jurisdiction, yet liberal democratic citizenship education cannot but acknowledge its effects on the learners' characters and its implications to moral education. As Williams wisely advises "... it is next to impossible to separate the teaching of values from schooling itself; it is a part of schooling whether people are willing to acknowledge it or not. The question ... is how the educator can influence students' character development effectively so that the impact is positive." (Williams, 2000, p.34) Indeed, educators teaching Citizenship Education cannot avoid "doing" character education because they influence students through their own behaviour, teachings, reasoning and opinions. Citizenship Education influences citizens of liberal democratic states to form a character that is particularly appropriate for a liberal democracy and conducive to liberal democratic values. Citizenship Education affects the learners' character through the exposure of the public values that are endorsed by the state which, although not forced on pupils, although taught critically, and meant only to affect the public realm, they inescapably trickle into the private and the personal.

Yet, Citizenship Education would not be very good moral education on its own because the guidelines it provides, while appropriate for the public sphere, would not adequately fit the private sphere because only intended as general guidelines. Parents might demand stronger moral education for their children's character education which should be offered along with citizenship education provision. Citizenship Education in liberal democratic states would not shape individuals' characters as if they were some substance poured into a mould to be casted in the desired shape. Liberal democratic states accept several conceptions of the good life therefore Citizenship Education is only meant to inform individuals of the parameters of what is accepted and loosely expected also because "there are numerous reasonable and decent ways of being a good citizen in a representative democracy" (Scorza, 2008, p.5). Davies et al. suggest that "character educators insist on the acceptance of 'right' answers by learners. There are no correct answers in Citizenship Education. Citizenship Education is meant to stimulate questioning and critical thinking in full respect of the individuals' diversity." (Davies et al., 2005, p.350) Citizenship Education would be at its best when it provides students as many opportunities as possible to reflect upon their place as citizens. Citizenship Education could help character education in liberal democratic states but only through a liberal interpretation, it could never "insist on right answers" especially regarding facts that clearly fall in what is seen as the private realm. Character education would create fewer issues in states that endorse a faith-based perspective and accept character modelled on gospel values which enable individuals to act "in the right way". In liberal democratic states there is no single right way, most ways are "right ways" as long as they do not harm others, do not impede others' freedom, abide by the rule of law and follow the loose parameters of the common core of values.

Citizenship Education effects the individuals' character but it does not abide to the practice of "brainwashing citizens to be acquiescent pawns for a totalitarian regime" (Althof and Berkowitz, 2006, p.511) Citizenship Education is linked to character education in the sense that there is "a necessary relationship between character education and citizenship education." (Althof and Berkowitz, 2006, p.511) since "citizenship education actually needs a character education foundation" (Hoge, 2002, p.106) a foundation that helps to foster the personal autonomy and critical thinking of individuals as opposed to indoctrination. Yet, citizenship education should not be conflated with the provision of character education. There are significant differences of emphasis and prominence given to different aspects. As Althof and Berkowitz perfectly explain "Citizenship education requires a strong academic grounding in content areas such as government, civics and history. It also requires certain procedural and social skills that are less central to character education; e.g. communication, civic and political literacy. Plus there are differences in emphasis, as citizenship educators tend to be less interested in personal morality and more in public morality, focus more on community service and service-learning and emphasize critical thinking more heavily." (Althof and Berkowitz, 2006, p.511) While having different emphasis and different priorities, there is definitely genuine overlapping between the two approaches to values education, which is advantageous for both. An important fact that both approaches have in common is that the "instilling the values" (Halstead and Pike, 2006, p.44) never takes "priority over respecting the students and helping them to become autonomous moral agents." (Halstead and Pike, 2006, p.44) and that they never "lack respect for the individual by failing to encourage understanding and critical reflection and the exercise of free will." (Halstead and Pike, 2006, p.44) But, "Whereas the values with which Citizenship Education is concerned are the public values of society, Moral Education is just as concerned with private virtues or qualities of character as with public values." (Halstead and Pike, 2006, p. 40) This means that if a liberal democratic state is interested in the teaching of morality to pupils it would need to institute a moral education provision along side citizenship education because as long as Citizenship Education is concerned; gluttonous, sex-maniacal heavy-drinking porn actors could indeed be excellent citizens.

A fourth key aspect that characterises Citizenship Education in liberal democratic states is its content (distinct body of knowledge). While not meant to be "an endless procession of inert facts, but to achieve a conversance with alternative styles of life in the shape of alternative clusters of values." (Tarrant 1989, p. 168) and to achieve its aims of political participation, of being a source of common identity citizenship education requires a conspicuous amount of specific content meant to be taught to learners. This content includes a good amount of knowledge, a particular set of skills and a core of values. Citizenship Education is characterised

by a distinctive set of knowledge that is conductive to its aims, the ability of citizens to use rights and the ability to participate politically. On this point, Galston explains that, "Civic knowledge promotes political participation" and that "the more knowledge people have, the more likely they are to participate in civic and political affairs". (Galston, 2001, p. 217) Citizens also need to know about the rules of collective life, how these rules develop, their origin and purpose. As Rawls explains, education in liberal democratic states should include, "such things as knowledge of their constitutional and civic rights so that, for example, they know that liberty of conscience exists in their society and that apostasy is not a legal crime, all this to insure that their continued membership when they come of age is not based simply on ignorance of their basic rights or fear of punishment for offences that do not exist." (Rawls, 1993, p. 199) Citizens can never be in a situation where they can flourish if they are ignorant of their rights and opportunities, this concern demands for a "Citizenship education [that] instructs citizens about the legal and constitutional background of the juridical status of citizenship as well as the machinery and processes of government and voting and the development of virtues of local and immediate focus". (McLaughlin, 1992, p. 235)

Liberal democratic states need to teach literacy, since there is limited political participation if one is not able to read newspapers, numeracy, since there is limited political understanding if one has not mastered well the concept of percentages, cultural competence as well as historical, philosophical, political, and scientific knowledge. Citizenship Education should "include an examination of the diversity of views about the good life and of the kinds of controversies this diversity tends to generate." (Costa, 2004, p. 14) Citizens should understand the role of media in democracy, the fundamental principles of democracy, the structure of the government; the nature of the law, the role of government and opposition, the role of political institutions, knowledge about the legal system and the rights of citizens, such as freedom of religion, speech and association, in balance with the responsibilities of citizens, knowledge about ideologies and other bases on which political parties are formed, which also shape interest groups or the media, disagreements as well as consensus on issues of public concern, the very concept of liberal citizenship as the political identity that each citizen holds, political institutions, the reasons behind public values, contemporary social issues and opportunities, information about the theory of democracy and the government, the law, the role of the citizen and all information that might increasing the individuals' ability to be better citizens for their own and their states development.

Along with a body of knowledge, Citizenship Education also needs to equip learners with a good set of skills. "It is now a consensual idea that a competent, engaged and effective citizenship – necessary for full political, economic, social and cultural participation – requires a

set of competencies...the ability to understand, analyse and check the reliability of information about government and public policy issues...the ability to reason, argue and express own views in political discussions... knowing how to influence policies and decisions by petitioning and lobbying, build coalitions and co-operate with partner organisation" (Althof and Berkowitz 2006, p. 510) Along with this list others add "the ability to listen attentively to others and attempt to understand their point of view, the ability to express one's own point of view so that others can understand, mutual respect, and helping others feel validated and valued" (Burbules and Rice, 1992, p. 35)

Citizens in liberal democratic states require the skill of empathy, the ability to put themselves on others people's shoes, they should be able to empathize and to see things from other citizens' point of view. This ability might also help citizens to better evaluate different opinions and to challenge what they are exposed to, through investigation. Evaluation would in turn help them to monitor their state's public policies and political parties' activity in a more accurate way. They also require the skill to be independent learners. Often, citizens do not have all of the relevant information about issues or situations to be able to really take an autonomous decision. Another skill to be taught through Citizenship Education ought to be that of deliberation. As Gutmann explains, "decision making and accountability presuppose a citizenry whose education prepares them to deliberate, and to evaluate the results of the deliberations of their representatives. A primary aim of publicly mandated schooling is therefore to cultivate the skills and virtues of deliberation."(Gutmann, 1987, p. xiii)

The skill of skills learned through Citizenship Education is critical thinking. Winch writes that critical thinking "could be defended as a substantive liberal value, necessary to the exercise of autonomy" (Winch, 2006, p. 28). Being able to think critically means developing judgements on the basis of evidence and being able to explore opinions and values that contrast with one's own. Indeed "Critical thinking has engaged the attention of many educators in recent years, representing almost a kind of Promised Land, p. learners with critical minds will no longer be passive vessels of knowledge, but they will become active performers of successful tasks." (Papastephanou and Angeli, 2007, p. 604) The skill of critical thinking will not solve all conflicts in liberal democratic states but it could do a great deal to help. Critical thinking is the skill through which one questions one's own "truths" and consider fairly and open-mindedly the "truths" of others. The value of critical thinking involves the ability to skilfully "conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication, as a guide to belief and action" (Scriven and Paul, 1992). Critical thinking is a way for each citizen to rationally think about what to believe, by doing careful deliberation on whether to accept or reject choices.

Other skills learned through liberal democratic citizenship education include the ability to raise awareness and influence public policy. Such skills could include the ability to present a case to others about a particular issue; vote and organise elections; organising a meeting to debate issues; representing the views of others at a meeting or event; lobbying and communicating views effectively to different audiences. The skill to raise awareness also includes the ability to set up an action group or network and to train others in democratic skills such as campaigning. Due to the importance of communicating in a liberal democratic state, Citizenship Education should teach citizens the skill of articulating; the ability to express their thoughts clearly. Citizenship Education should also equip citizens with the ability to deal with conflict in a rational way. Additionally, Citizenship Education should teach the skill of monitoring, which involves abilities needed to track the work of political leaders and institutions of government.

Furthermore, Citizenship Education should teach the values that shape the public sphere. "Citizenship Education does not merely involve civics as an unreflective socialization into the political and social status quo, because it would be inadequate." (McLaughlin, 1992, p. 237) Citizenship Education instructs citizens about knowledge and skills and also teaches public values. It is through these values that what is learned through Citizenship Education is meant to have a long lasting effect. O'Shea explains that "the development of values and attitudes is a key learning outcome for an education for democratic citizenship". (O'Shea, 2000, p. 9) Liberal democratic citizenship education is thus characterised by teaching and learning that develop the ability to respond thoughtfully to public values that are part and parcel of political, economic, social and cultural life. Frazer also adds that, "values such as justice, non-violence, autonomy, and democracy itself are a necessary background to political engagement." (Frazer, 2000, p. 100) An adequate set of values that characterise the educational provision in liberal democratic states includes, "personal autonomy, critical openness and free critical debate, the autonomy of academic disciplines, equality of opportunity, rational morality, the celebration of diversity, the avoidance of indoctrination and the refusal to side with any definitive conception of the good". (Halstead, 2007, p. 832) These values are the purpose of the contribution that this study wants to make, that there is a core of public values in liberal democratic states and it should be taught to citizens.

To conclude, Citizenship Education entails "explicit and continuing study of the basic concepts and values underlying the democratic political community and constitutional order" (Butts, 1988, p.184) it is the educational provision meant to prepare individuals for their roles as citizens, where they are taught about the important roles they have to play, they are taught

about their rights and are provided with the knowledge, skills and values required to participate in the public sphere. Citizenship Education in liberal democratic states try to be a unitary force in a society by involving citizens in the decision making processes thus strengthening their sense of belonging. While not trying to replace the nationality, it aims at creating a conception of citizenship that can be shared by all citizens including non-nationals. Citizenship Education in liberal democratic states teaches a specific body of knowledge that has to do with citizens roles in the public sphere and with explaining the mechanics of politics.

It goes without saying that all this teaching and learning takes place in full respect of the very values taught, thus the values of tolerance, equal respect and diversity make sure that Citizenship Education is respectful of the conflicting nature that values like autonomy, freedom and political equality might have with some learners. The following chapter will provide the reasons why Citizenship Education in liberal democratic states needs to cater for values and the legitimacy in doing so despite the fact that the teaching of values such as individual autonomy, freedom and equality might conflict with the personal values of some individuals.

### 3.3 The justification for the Teaching of Core Values in Liberal Democratic States.

After an overview of what is meant by Citizenship Education has been given, we now proceed to provide reasons why "The development of values and attitudes is a key learning outcome for an education for democratic citizenship" (O'Shea, 2002, p. 9) There are many reasons why teaching values is important. Teaching values is important because there would be no point in teaching citizens an important amount of civic knowledge and a good amount of related skills, if then, "fully equipped" citizens refuse to participate in politics, if they do not realise that it is in their own best interest to participate and that there are core values that are essential boundaries which prevent freedom from turning in to chaos. This chapter discusses why citizens should be educated about the, "values relevant to the nature and practices of participative democracy; the duties, responsibilities, and rights." (QCA, 1998, p.22)

Firstly, liberal democratic states have a duty to teach Citizenship Education including the core public values because citizens have the right to know. As Amy Gutmann clearly warns, "The most devastating criticism we can level at primary schools, therefore is not that they fail to give equally talented children an equal chance to earn the same income or to pursue professional occupations, but that they fail to give all educable children an education adequate to take advantage of their political status as citizens." (Gutmann, 1987, p. 71) Secondly, besides the duty to teach Citizenship Education, the requirement to teach values also rises from the need to reinforce the sense of belonging that leads diverse citizens to look for commonalities instead of differences. "The natural outcome of the use of human reason within free political and social

institutions is a multiplicity of values and ways of life." (Reich, 2007, p. 711) and "as a result, liberal societies house citizenries divided by religious and philosophical traditions that are sometimes in conflict or even incompatible. It is the distinguishing feature of liberal societies that they attempt to secure the legitimacy and stability of political institutions amidst such pluralism." (Reich, 2007, p. 711) Teaching a core of values might be a good way to "attempt to secure" a common identity. The values that guide everyday life in liberal democratic states could be used as a common source of identity that might enhance state stability.

Thirdly, educational provision in liberal democratic states should cater for the teaching of the core values so that citizens better exercise their rights and perform their duties. Rights would be useless if citizens do not even know of their existence and the reason of their importance, additionally citizens cannot really be expected to perform their duties adequately if they do not believe in the importance of such duties. The value of responsibility should make citizens aware of the duty to paying taxes, serving in the country's armed forces when called upon, obeying laws enacted by one's representatives in government and constructively criticising the conditions of political and civic life. Most importantly, liberal democratic states have to teach citizenship education because they require the political participation of the largest possible number of citizens in order to function correctly and sustain their legitimacy. As Colby explains; "Recognition of the obligation to prepare citizens for participation in a democratic system implies that certain values, both moral and civic ought to be represented in these institutions' [schools] educational goals and practices." (Colby, 2003, p. 13)

A fourth concern to consider is that liberal democratic states need to teach values because they require a very specific kind of citizen. Citizens who understand what is happening around them and why things occur the way they do. Citizens need to know how to monitor their own representatives and at least a minimal awareness of their state's political issues. If citizens do not understand the importance of the process of democracy, they cannot be expected to be aware of the importance of their own involvement in the process. Reidy explains that "The long-term stability of a just pluralist liberal democracy depends to a significant degree on the extent to which citizens, over successive generations, come to possess certain capacities, dispositions, virtues, and affections." (Reidy, 2001, p. 585) One way that citizens might learn to become active citizens and perform their duties would be thorough the university of life but "The trouble is that there is no reason to think that most humans will inevitably acquire these capacities, dispositions, virtues, and affections as a matter of either natural endowment or natural development." (Reidy, 2001, p. 585) Yet, the ability to be a good citizen is too important to be left to chance and the state must act because "without significant contributions from a system of compulsory education." (Reidy, 2001, p. 585) "...this achievement is most unlikely in any modern

pluralist liberal democracy" (Reidy, 2001, p. 585) Liberal democratic states need specific citizens. They require citizens who "have not only the capacity to recognize the rights of others, but the restraint to respect those rights." (Tomasi, 2001, p. 60) For this to happen they should embrace the value of rights. Liberal democratic states also require citizens "who have developed the skills and habits needed to critically evaluate candidates for office." (Tomasi, 2001, p. 60) who are able "to understand problems and formulate solutions in the distinctive terms of public reason." (Tomasi, 2001, p. 60) and the formation of such citizens requires the teaching of values.

Citizenship education that is needed to teach about the ability to "formulate solutions in the distinctive terms of public reason" must take into consideration feminist critique of the concept of citizenship and make sure that females are equally able to participate in public reason as much as males are. Citizenship Education has an important role to perform against discrimination, including an active effort to prepare female citizens to participate in the democratic processes of the state. While statements like; "Although women have now been granted citizenship in the liberal democracies, it is still widely believed that they are unfitted for political life and that it would be dangerous if the state were in their hands." (Pateman, 1989, p. 17) cannot be honestly accepted today since people like Margaret Thatcher, Angela Merkel, Hilary Clinton and Sarah Palin are remarkable examples that indeed citizens of both genders can be actively involved in politics, not to mention the Italian trans-gender parliamentary deputy elected recently in the Italian parliament. Yet, feminist critique cautions that the liberal democratic conception of citizenship discriminates against women because of its emphasis traits typically associated with males. Indeed, the liberal democratic conception of citizenship gives great importance to reason, defining it as the only acceptable argument because only reason can be understood by most as opposed to emotions and faith. Since "Men possess the capacities required for citizenship, in particular they are able to use their reason to sublimate their passions, develop a sense of justice and so uphold the universal civil law." (Pateman, 1989, p.4) then women might seem to be at a disadvantage.

Without a doubt, the importance of teaching citizenship education is realised even more when through feminist critiques one understands better how easy it is to discriminate and how important democratic deliberation is to stop discrimination and how essential is the role of women in democratic deliberation. The liberal democratic conception of citizenship must of course accommodate for feminist views that might not hold the same esteem towards "reason". Feminist critiques also provide invaluable contribution about the presumed public/private divide in liberal democratic states. Feminist theorist Carole Pateman rightly comments that "The liberal-democratic citizen does not vote as a political actor, but in defence of private interest..." (Pateman, 1989, p. 104) reminding liberals that "The distinction between public and private"

(Baubock, 2000, p.97) which "has been historically associated with gender discrimination," (id.) is not written in stone and that as Baubock explains "it is indeed possible to modify it so that it no longer perpetuates gender inequality." (Baubock, 2000, p.98) I think that the a most insightful view about the relationship between citizenship and the feminist point of view is the one proposed by Jones, when she explains that "Neither citizenship nor the experience of woman should be seen as static and fixed by nature" (Jones,1998, p.244) but rather as "part of an ongoing historical process of the transformation of modern society and modern political communities – a process that continually renegotiates the boundaries of public space and redefines the characteristics of those who occupy it as full members – as citizens. (Jones, 1998, p.244) Redefining the characteristics of citizens is also done by "Expanding what counts as a public reason [which] presupposes that the parties admitted to the public sphere are worthy of at least being listened to in their own terms" (Ivision, 2000, p.138) One party that has an inalienable right to be listened to is surely that portraying the feminist point of view. Citizenship Education should be taught to make sure that no one, including females, is left out from being able to actively participate in the public square. Female citizens are to be equally helped in participating in the public sphere and the process of public reason. Just as public deliberation tries to include illiberal religious views it should also be flexible enough to include female views of "responsibility, intimacy, connection, an ethic of care and nurturance." (Roach Anleu, 2000, p.67)

A fifth reason to teach values is to compensate for a feeling of apathy characteristic of contemporary liberal democratic states. "One significant cause of political apathy among liberal democratic citizens may be their sense of having too many choices and too little guidance." (Scorza, 2001, p. 39) thus Citizenship Education needs to provide general guidelines. Such states need to compensate for apathy towards politics and to act against alienation from political life. As Putnam rightly observes; "citizenship is not a spectator sport" (Putnam, 2000, p. 265) it is a real relationship between individual and state that needs to be sustained. Unfortunately, as the thorough research of Steele and Brown (1995) clearly indicates, in contemporary liberal democratic states young people now spend more time alone or watching television than at school or with their parents. A similar study also showed that citizens in early adulthood "simply will or cannot find time to read newspapers, follow national politics, or get involved in crusades" (Brooks, 2001, p. 47). On the same lines, Bok argues that "Citizens have not only become less interested in voting over the past thirty years" (Bok, 2002, p. 384–9) but also "newspaper readership has declined, and media coverage of politics and government is shrinking for want of interest . . . In contrast to the pattern in earlier generations, young people today have less knowledge of public affairs than their parents or grandparents had at the same age." (Bok, 2002, p. 384–9). It thus goes without saying that the duty to teach values is even more evident in

liberal democratic states suffering form political apathy, because it is difficult to expect serious involvement in state business from citizens who thank that in the end it is all useless.

A sixth reason to teach values is the fact that not teaching values would have even worse effects on the state. The liberal democratic state has to compensate for anti-social values allowed by freedom, freedom is of major importance in liberal democratic states but some citizens abuse of it through hate speech and through anti-social behaviour. Particularly in pluralistic states, communities simply cannot afford not to teach the core values because it would be difficult then to expect responsible behaviour from citizens who are continuously being bombarded by the media's use and abuse of sex and violence and extreme forms of materialism. If citizens are only exposed to anti-social values such as irresponsibility, indifference, intolerance, abuse, discrimination, disrespect and illegality, they cannot be expected to cultivate at the same time values of law-abidingness, respect and tolerance. It is up to the state to teach values that will provide citizens with choice. A case in point would be for example the issue of gender equality and equal human dignity. If citizens are only exposed to television programmes which portray men as "intelligent-looking well-suited conductors" and woman as "silly looking, half-naked cheer-leaders" one cannot expect citizens to be equally respectful of men and women. Such a gender biased bombardment of media through one's life must be balanced by an education that provides the whole picture and teaches that the "silly-looking, half naked cheer-leader" is actually a final-year law student and that the "intelligent-looking suited conductor" is actually only reading what the female authors of the programme wrote. They can only learn such things through proper citizenship education that explains the core values of the state.

A seventh reason why liberal democratic states need to teach core values is because without their core values liberal democratic states would simply not be able to exist. Liberal democratic states inherently breed diversity within their very nature because freedom leads citizens in very, very different directions. How could liberal democratic states ever survive their citizenry diversity without its values of tolerance, at least political equality and respect? How would liberal democratic states preserve their validating legitimacy without citizens who participate in politics? It would indeed be difficult. They would collapse under the first breeze of minor disagreement.

It could be said that the justification of the teaching of the core values of the state rests on seven major motives. On a deeper consideration of the political situation of liberal democratic states one realises that there never was a real choice of teaching or not teaching values because the need to teach the core values is fundamental. The reasons include (1) the citizens' right to know about their status as citizens (2) the strengthening of a sense of belonging and (3) the

preparation of citizens to exercise rights and perform duties including political participation (by males and females). Liberal democratic states also necessitate the teaching of values because they (4) need citizens to have specific capacities and dispositions; they also need (5) to counter alienation from political life and (6) to compensate for anti-social values. Above all, (7) for self preservation, since where there is no tolerance, political, individual autonomy and respect there is no liberal democratic state.

### 3.4 The legitimacy of the Teaching of Core Values in Liberal Democratic States.

Once the motivation to teach the core values of the state has to be acknowledged, there is the issue of the legitimacy that must be reckoned with. The question to answer is; "Can liberals actively promote civic virtue and the practice of good citizenship, either through government mandated civic education or through universal national service programs, without violating their own prohibitions against state intrusion into the domain of private character?" (Scorza, 2001, p. 2) In answering this question this section proposes five conditions that if respected, citizenship education could be said to be legitimate and therefore permissible.

While it must be admitted that "...the characteristically modernist project of justifying liberal democratic values theoretically is problematic." (Bridges, 1994, p. 29) and that "Civic education is problematic because legitimacy deprives governments of the authority to condition the consent of future citizens." (Brighouse, 1998, p. 720) The issue of legitimacy does not dismiss the teaching of Citizenship Education but it shapes it in a way to make it permissible and to make it respect the very values it teaches. Without doubt, recognising the fact that there is a real need for Citizenship Education, does not give the state carte blanche to indoctrinate citizens in its own image and likeness. Citizenship Education is only legitimate when it shows real efforts to avoid indoctrination and when "Democratic values education... maintain the precarious balance between not violating individual freedom and yet encouraging moral commitment to democratic values" (Puolimatka, 1997, p. 461)

Firstly, liberal democratic states may teach values having accepted that it is within the states' duty to prepare individuals for their roles as citizens due to the absolute need of citizens' involvement and because of the view that "children are not only members of their family, but they are also members of the polity" (Eichner, 2007, p. 21). As members of the polity, citizens have a valid claim to be educative accordingly, while the state has a duty to educate citizens in "the beliefs and habits that support the polity and enable individuals to function competently in public affairs." (Galston, 1998a, p. 52) Galston explains that even if the values taught by the state clash with values of the child's parents, the state may still require prospective citizens to participate in civic education that seeks to inculcate, "the disposition to respect the rights of others, the capacity to evaluate the talents, character, and performance of public officials, and

the ability to moderate public desires in the face of public limits."(Galston 1991, p. 246) Because a child is "at once a future adult and a future citizen." (Galston, 1998a, p. 52) "The state may act in loco parentis to overcome family-based obstacles to normal development. And it may use public instrumentalities, including the system of education, to promote the attainment by all children of the basic requisites of citizenship." (Galston, 1991, p. 255) The prerogative of the state is also recognised by Eicher when she explains that "parents must yield to civic education programs necessary to achieve these qualities, even when they conflict with parents' fundamental beliefs. Furthermore, the state has the responsibility to provide this basic education even over parents' objections." (Eicher, 2007, p. 46) while not hindering in any way the parents' rights to pass their own values to their children and ultimately leaving the choice up to the child's decision when she comes of age.

Secondly, the teaching of values is justified if there is a reasoned consent by most citizens. Liberal democratic states may teach values if they "confine their education to lessons that can be justified by public reason, as opposed to comprehensive rationales." (Eicher, 2007, p. 46) In this way curricula of Citizenship Education in liberal democratic states have to "put aside the many religious and philosophical questions about which people have long differed and instead attempt to justify the most basic matters of justice on grounds widely acceptable to reasonable people – and not only to those who share our particular view of the truth." (Macedo, 2000, p. 168) Citizenship Education can be taught only if it is legitimate, it can be taught only if there is a strong enough consensus. Therefore to secure such consensus the values taught should be limited to the core, the minimum indispensable for the state to survive. Then, values should be based on reason since it has the best claim to unify all citizens. Therefore, motives such as "because the Pope said so" or "because that's what written on the sacred texts" cannot be valid reasons provided by schools to teach values.

Reasons like "because that's what written" would not be a valid enough reason on which to base teachings of values because it endorses one single view of the life worth living that is most probably not endorsed by all citizens although not necessarily so. Even if it were to be accepted by a majority, it would still be illegitimate because liberal democratic states care for minorities and do not coerce them in ways that are not at least based on empirical facts and logical reasoning. As Eicher explains "The government, in this view, has no business teaching comprehensive doctrines, but must confine itself to those doctrines that can be justified" (Eicher, 2007, p. 44) thus values are meant to be supported by reasons (empirical, scientific) but not by sacred texts. Having said this, one should also note that "Secularists are wrong when they ask believers to leave their religion at the door before entering into the public square." (Macedo, 2008, p. 1) In fact, liberal democratic states only ask citizens who are adherents of

comprehensive doctrines or religious orthodoxy to translate their values into reasonable accounts so that other citizens can understand their views better.

Thirdly, Citizenship Education is legitimate if there are real efforts to confine it to the public sphere and if there is honest respect for the private sphere of the individual. The values taught through Citizenship Education must relate to state business not views on which life is worth living, "they must confine the scope of their teaching to political doctrines". (Eicher, 2007, p. 46) Furthermore "Regardless of what the majority ...desires ... a liberal democracy... must ... reserve a wide swath of freedom from the state." (Eicher, 2007, p. 46) Freedom from state interference is better guaranteed when the teaching of values through Citizenship Education is limited to public values. Although even if the intention to limit such teaching to public matters does not guarantee at all that what is learnt for the public domain does in fact not infiltrate into the private sphere. Yet, liberal democratic states must try to keep their place, the public sphere. While the teaching of Citizenship Education itself means that "A society has a body of values which are enshrined in its constitutional and political institutions and structure the conduct of its collective affairs." (Parekh, 1994, p. 215) Liberal democratic states stand for the fact that "Not all its members need or do as a matter of fact believe in them. But that does not detract from the fact that these values inform their collective life and that in that sense they [citizens] are all publicly and as a community committed to it." (Parekh, 1994, p. 215) The teaching of values through Citizenship Education is legitimate because citizens are at all times completely free to "disregard them in their personal and interpersonal lives" (Parekh, 1994, p. 215) In liberal democratic states, "The obligation is not moral in nature, for the minority does not have to believe in these values and accept them in foro interno [privately]. All that is required of it, is that it behaves in conformity with them. Insofar as it does not believe in them, there is a regrettable but unavoidable hiatus between its beliefs and conduct, and the minority in question is subject to coercion. But since it does not have to believe in them, the coercion is not moral in nature. Its integrity is inviolate and no moral enormity is committed against it." (Parekh, 1994, p. 217) The fact that all ten values proposed by this study are values taught for their instrumental contribution deemed as essential for the legitimisation of that state reinforces this argument of the effort done by the state to remain in the public sphere.

Fourthly, teaching values is legitimate if presented in a critical manner not as facts for rote memorisation. Brighouse concisely explains this when he says that "...civic education is permissible only if it includes elements that direct the critical scrutiny of children to the very values they are taught". (Brighouse, 1998, p. 720) This means that "The capacities, dispositions, virtues, and affections of liberal democratic citizenship must be encouraged and effectively socially reproduced over time without injustice and without recourse to either an overly

manipulative sentimentalist civic education or a civic education intentionally aimed at leading all citizens to a particular conception of the good life." (Reidy, 2001, p. 585) The teaching of liberal democratic values should not lead to a particular conception of the good life, but it offers parameters through which diverse conceptions of the good life could coexist in a liberal democratic state. The educational provision that includes the core values must be taught in a critical manner. Critical thinking is part and parcel of Citizenship Education in liberal democratic states because teaching public values is in no way meant to be an officialised indoctrination. Public values cannot be forced on citizens and are meant to concern the so-called public sphere of the individual. These values are meant to be taught along with the skill of critical thinking so that if they influence the private sphere of the individual it is because they are indeed chosen by the individual amongst many other values, and not through any kind of state indoctrination.

Liberal democratic education should indeed equip citizens with the ability to think freely. It may advocate those public values that strengthen social conviviality. What liberal democratic education may not do is to indoctrinate citizens or make citizens "accept a fixed body of rules by the use of techniques which incapacitate them from adopting a critical autonomous attitude toward them" (Peters, 1973, p. 71). No liberal democratic education would be valid if it tries to indoctrinate citizens in choosing its own values. "Democratic values cannot be effectively transmitted through indoctrination because they lose their original character in the process. Freedom, equality, justice and truth, cannot be communicated through processes that violate them." (Puolimatka, 1997, p. 461) A state that makes the teaching of its public values obligatory cannot be accused of indoctrination if these teachings are justified, backed by reason, open to public criticism and teachings can be democratically changed. Indoctrination only happens when one is ordered what to do, when the values provided are not justified, and when no other alternatives are given. As Tan explains, "an indoctrinated person not only lacks good reasons for holding to beliefs; he or she is unable to justify these beliefs" (Tan, 2004, p. 1) As long as liberal democratic states provide reasons and explore alternatives alongside the teaching of its public values, it may have explicit public values education without indoctrination.

Additionally, the teaching of values through Citizenship Education is legitimate if it respects the core values of the state, therefore itself. Just as all civic educational provision in liberal democratic states must respect the core values of the state, the teaching of the core values would only be legitimate if it does not violate any of the beliefs it professes. How could liberal democratic citizenship education teach tolerance, if it were intolerant towards opposing views? How could the value of freedom be taught, if learners were not allowed to speak their minds in class? How could the value of diversity be taught if the whole approach would stereotype

citizens in unfair collocations? Therefore Citizenship Education is legitimate when the pedagogy used respects the values taught.

Five reasons that legitimise the teaching of values in liberal democratic states have been discussed in this section. It was essential to legitimise the teaching of values because it would have been paradoxical if a state that professes the need of legitimacy then chose to ensure its existence in an illegitimate way. It has been concluded that it is legitimate for liberal democratic states to teach values through Citizenship Education since (1) it is within the state's duty to prepare individuals for their roles as citizens due to the absolute need of their key roles and their being members of that state. Such teaching is also permissible and legitimate when a (2) reasoned consent is given by the majority of citizens, (3) when the values taught are respectful of the private sphere, (4) when value are presented in a critical manner and (5) when the pedagogy used respects the values taught.

### 3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed Citizenship Education, what does it consist of, why should it be taught and the issue of its legitimacy. Essentially, it has been suggested that there are indeed "certain positive dispositions...that citizens require if democratic institutions are to flourish" (White, 1996, p. 2) and that "The educational task of preparing students for citizenship of such a state [liberal democratic] thus involves encouraging them to develop a substantive commitment to the public values and the civic virtues or dispositions which allow the public values to flourish" (Halstead and Pike, 2006, p. 37) This chapter also stated that there is indeed a real need for the teaching of values and that such teaching can occur in a legitimate manner. The following chapter proposes the ten public values that form the common core of values of liberal democratic states that are meant to be taught through the kind of citizenship education described in this chapter.

## Chapter 4: The Core Values

### 4.1 Introduction

In this study, it is being suggested that there are core values in liberal democratic states that are so relevant that citizens ought to "accept and seek to live by them, and even those who do not live by them know what they are, and acknowledge their authority - at least in public." (Parekh, 1996a, p. 259) It is thus being suggested that a 'liberal democracy...expects teachers to promote procedural values which includes applying democratic principles within the community." (Arthur and Wright 2001, p. 76) Individuals living in liberal democratic states might hold a number of personal values originating from their own life experience, faith, family, social environment or the media. Liberal democratic states voluntarily choose to be silent about

the values belonging to the private sphere, seen as being outside of state jurisdiction. On the other hand, liberal democratic states have everything to say about "a set of public values that are alleged to lie at the very core of" liberal democratic states. (Morgan, 2005, p. 35) While "arriving at a list of these public values is a somewhat more contentious process than some political philosophers like to acknowledge" (Morgan, 2005, p. 35), this study's aim is exactly that of initiating an ongoing democratic process, by proposing a set of values which leads to the teaching of a common core of values through Citizenship Education. A common core that is acceptable to all liberals because democratically chosen and because it reflects the essentials all liberals endorse like rights, freedom, tolerance, respect and the rule of law.

While the values forming the common core might be classified as intrinsic values, because for some citizens they might be seen as valuable in their own right, their rightful place as part of the citizenship education curriculum originates from their instrumental significance. Thus, the values of Citizenship Education are not presented as ends but as means to achieve an end which in the case of Citizenship Education is the formulation of a conception of citizenship that protects individual freedom, prepares individuals for their role as citizens and is able to provide a public identity and a sense of belonging to as many citizens as possible. While one must acknowledge that indeed "the distinction between instrumental and terminal values blurs on closer examination" (Gecas, 2000, p. 96) because in reality "An instrumental value then has the intrinsic value of being the means to an end." (Dewey, 1916, p. 358) yet, if one was to classify the nature of the values taught through Citizenship Education, classifying them as "instrumental/means values" would be a more suited description since "The realisation of mean values is instrumental for the realisation of the more fundamental values known as end values." (Pandey, 2004, p. 72) the ten values analysed by this study are all instrumental values that are required for the social contribution they provide. Liberal democratic common values might thus be interpreted as "procedural values" (Kekes, 1996, p. 82) which are "not intrinsically valuable but valuable because they make it possible to pursue and to realize intrinsically valuable values." (Kekes, 1996, p. 82) The intrinsic worth of public values comes form the fact that they make it possible to realise, the master value of all trends within liberalism, individual freedom, which is in turn also an instrumental value because free citizens are indispensable to legitimise the very existence of the state. Thus in the end, all ten values serve an instrumental function.

Teaching the common core of values is meant to help guide citizens to better understand the order of things in liberal democratic states. Public values clearly indicate the expected and accepted norms which all citizens ought to acknowledge, they are meant to define the parameters of accepted actions through the differences of opinions held in states that favour freedom as their most fundamental value. In such circumstances, it must be realised that

"controversies arise and these values should be used as the basis of a searching dialogue rather than as a blunt instrument that forecloses their further development. " (Primoratz and Pavkovic, 2006, p. 46) Thus the scope of suggesting a liberal democratic core of values is only meant to be used as an introduction to the discussion, the initiation of a process that for all intents and purposes forms part of what Rawls would call "Public reason." (Rawls, 1999b) Public values should be taught so that they can be critically endorsed and recognised by most and yet "To say that public values are held in common does not mean that they are universally embraced or that people agree on the exact nature or content of public values." (Bozeman, 2007, p. 14) All that is being suggested by this study is that "we can begin by positing certain public values as fixed points of agreement ...from which we can develop a provisional account of public justification. The content of these public values must however remain open on due reflection to modification whether by subtraction or addition." (Morgan, 2005, p. 35) in this way liberal democratic states would be able to construct an "open-minded inter-communal dialogue' governed by a society's 'operative public values". (Parekh, 1996, p. 25)

All liberal democratic states cherish values such as "respect for and protection of individual freedoms, the rule of law, the equality of citizens before the law, limited government, an autonomous civil society, and the maintenance of the open society; as well as such elements of 'democracy' narrowly conceived, as the conduct of free, fair, and regular elections, the secret ballot, and universal adult suffrage" (Bahmueller, 1997, p. 101) and "peace through toleration, law-bound liberty, and a rights-orientated conception of justice." (Macedo, 1990, p. 40) in spite of the many trends within liberalism a common core of values valid for social liberals and liberal minimalists can still be formulated. The interpretation of these core values would then vary from state to state. The value of political equality becomes equality of opportunity and will involve state intervention in social liberal approaches, while it will be limited to strict political equality in sates that are more inclined to follow the liberalism of Nozick and Hayek. In the same way, freedom is more interpreted as negative liberty in liberal minimalist states, while social liberal states would sustain a positive liberty. The core values suggested here should be able to be endorsed by all trends within liberalism; they "are generic because they distinguish liberal democracies from other sorts of regimes but not one liberal democracy from another." (Carens, 2000, p. 9)

In the same way that the state expects that members of religious orthodoxy to make an effort and try to 'translate' their beliefs into reasonable assumptions that can be understood by most, liberal democratic states also offer their reasons for the values taught in a way that respects individuals as autonomous agents who are able to reason for themselves. Thus for every value on which policies are based, and for every value taught in schools, the state must

offer tangible, empirical motives that help strengthen the legitimacy of such values. Barber affirms that "There is nothing supererogatory about liberal tolerance, nothing altruistic about mutual respect, nothing other-regarding about self-restraint, nothing communitarian about pluralism. They are all devices by which the individual can assure that others will be restrained." (Barber, 2004, p. 18) Indeed the common core of values has an instrumental function of restraining the behaviour of citizens in a way that allows the liberal state to fulfil its only scope of existence: to defend citizens from being coerced by others in doing things they do not want to do.

4.2 The Value of Freedom

The value of freedom in liberal democratic states refers to a personal liberty that gives each citizen the power to exercise choice and make decisions, the right to act according to their will, subject only to the harm principle. "Freedom is the quintessence of liberalism...for the liberal it is the individual that counts not society at large or segment of it, for only by pacing priority on the rights of the individual can freedom be ensured" (Heater, 1983, p. 22-23) Freedom refers to the state of being free to do what one's reason chooses, without having to answer to higher authority about how and why such choice was taken, as Mill clearly explains "the only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it" (Mill, 1991 [1859], p.17) Citizens in liberal democratic states are considered to be free when they do not find themselves under the domination of others and are only subject to their autonomous free-will and thus able to choose freely. Freedom in liberal democratic states is essential because only free citizens can authentically legitimise the states.

Freedom in liberal democratic states is considered to be the founding value to which all other core values are related. The value of equality is important in liberal democratic states because we equally respect and protect the freedom of each individual. Autonomy refers to the independent freedom of citizens to choose on their own (positive interpretation of freedom). The value of respect refers to the respect the state holds towards the freedom of citizens also through the respect towards their rights (negative interpretation of freedom), whose primary scope is to protect citizens' freedom from state intervention.

It should be noted that the claim for freedom in liberal democratic states is not unconditional, there are restrictions on the freedom such as not harming others or interfering with the freedom of others. Freedom enables individuals to choose among very diverse conceptions of the life worth living. All citizens, including those endorsing illiberal values, need to be aware of the value of freedom and the rights in place to preserve it, if wish to integrate well

in liberal democratic states. Teaching the value of freedom will lead citizens to know how their freedom affects their lives. Citizens should be aware of their obligation to respect the freedom that all citizens equally enjoy and should also be able to protect their own freedom from government and other citizen's interference. As explained in "Two concepts of liberty" (Berlin, 1969), freedom, like a coin, has two faces: a negative and a positive one. Negative freedom has to do with factors that are external to citizens while positive freedom has to do with factors that are internal to them. Both conceptions of freedom are relevant in liberal democratic states. Negative freedom, the freedom from coercion, is important because in safeguards citizens' ability to act while positive freedom as self-determination motivates citizens to better support the value of personal autonomy.

Negative freedom refers to the absence of interference, coercion, oppression or arbitrary exercise of authority on other citizens. In Berlin's words, "liberty in the negative sense involves an answer to the question 'What is the area within which the subject -- a person or group of persons -- is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?" (Berlin, 1969, p.121) Because of this, negative liberty requires actions on the part of the state to prevent some individuals from taking away the freedom of others. These actions take the form of rights that shield citizens from interference. Interference as in the prevention of a course of action and acts of coercion that limit with citizens personal autonomy. The negative conception of freedom leads to the freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of movement, freedom of the press, freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, freedom of thought, private property, freedom to participate in political processes and of course by recognising a private sphere within which citizens can pursue their own projects subject only to the harm principle.

On the other hand, positive freedom emphasizes the importance of the internal factors affecting the degree to which individuals act autonomously. According to Isaiah Berlin, the positive concept is used in attempting to answer the question "What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?" (Berlin, 1969, p.121-22) Positive liberty refers to the opportunity and ability to act to fulfil one's own conception of happiness. The positive conception of freedom is the principle on which schools, through the teaching of critical thinking and the value of personal autonomy, actively aim to create the conditions necessary for individuals to be self-sufficient and able to exercise their free will. Thus it refers to having the opportunity to exercise one's right to choose. Meaning that the state ought to teach the ability to make a free choice and obviously to provide choices since it would be useless to be able to choose if there is no choice.

Positive freedom is one's power to make choices leading to action, rather then freedom from outside coercion. While more minimalist oriented liberal democratic states support a negative conception of liberty, others show greater concern for a positive interpretation. According to the social liberal trend, the state has "the capacity and the duty to remove constrictions such as those caused by lack of education, poor health and bad housing to promote the positive liberty of the individual." (Sawer, 2003, p.9-10) Sawer explains that in social liberalism "The central liberal value of liberty was reinterpreted in terms of opportunity for self-development rather then freedom of contract." (Sawer, 2003, p.9-10) Positive freedom refers to inner free-will of each individual, a freedom to act, a will to choose and a critical personal autonomy that enable one to choose freely. A sense of self-determination, when individuals are able to control their own lives according to what they think their best interests are. The positive conception of freedom emphasizes the presence of self-determination without excluding the importance of minimizing state coercion. It should be noted that even if a social liberal state embraces the concept of positive liberty it does not immediately transform it into a welfare state. As Kelly explains, "if I cannot run a five-minute mile, my incapacity does not abridge my freedom to do so; it is simply a fact about my nature" (Kelley1998. 69) Therefore, rather than the equal right to go on a cruise, social liberal states stand for a basic help of providing opportunities to individuals who are identified as having a genuine need.

Citizens in liberal democratic states have the right not to be coerced into doing things they do not want and also the right to act on what they think is right, even by following the urges of their own desires, as long as they do not harm others or come in a situation where they end up very prone to harm others, like in the case of drug addicts, most of whom end up stealing. Drugs ought to be illegal in liberal democratic states not because of a grandmotherly choice of the state to know what is best for citizens, but because empirical evidence shows that it is a direct threat to the personal autonomy of individuals and seriously impairs their ability to decide for themselves. On the other hand adult muslin females might choose to undergo female circumcision if so they wish, even if for all intents and purposes such practice is a self-mutilating act. The interpretation of freedom between social liberal states and those following classical liberalism or neo-liberalism might differ substantially since for the former citizens might be limitedly coerced into paying taxes for a greater good to be achieved while followers of liberal minimalism would not allow such practices.

In its negative or positive conception, teaching the value of freedom is essential because through freedom citizens are given the opportunity to choose. The ability to choose freely strengthens the state's legitimacy. Thus citizens should be free "to order their actions...as they think fit...without asking leave, or depending on the will of any other man" (Locke, 1960 [1689],

p.287). The state can do a great deal to help in this process of freedom. A first important step could be to make sure that all citizens are being given the opportunity to learn about the role of freedom in liberal democratic states through Citizenship Education.

4.3 The Value of Rights

Since liberal democracies require that all citizens receive the resources necessary for them to make meaningful use of their freedom, they require an educational system that teaches all citizens the ability to avail themselves of their rights. They require Citizenship Education to teach the value of rights, their importance and the effect rights have in defining citizenship. As with all other core values, there is a difference of interpretation between the social liberal view and the liberal minimalist view regarding rights. Some rights might be given more importance in some states and less in others. Social liberals might see the right to an education as essential, others less so, yet all liberal democratic states believe in a set of rights, including private property and in the essential need of rights to protect the private sphere.

Being aware of rights is very important for citizens since, "To begin with the obvious, in a liberal democracy, the concern for individual rights and for what is sometimes called the private sphere entails limits on the legitimate power of majorities" (Galston, 1989, p.94) Tyranny of the majority is excluded from liberal democratic states through the real effort to maintain individual rights of citizens. The concern for individual rights according to Galston suggests that "cultivating the disposition to respect rights and privacies is one of the essential goals of liberal democratic education." (Galston, 1989, p.94) hence the rightful place of the value of rights among the core values of citizenship. In essence no liberal citizenship education could be complete without suitable provision concerning the teaching of rights and duties. Since as Barber explains, "the logic of democracy begins with public education, proceeds to informed citizenship, and comes to fruition in the securing of rights and liberties" (Barber, 1993, p.44) liberal democratic citizenship education has to make sure that citizens are informed enough about their rights and have learned to enjoy them in harmony with freedoms of other citizens. For citizens in liberal democracies, "The formal rights of individuals secure the private sphere from outside interference, allowing the free pursuit of their particular interests" (Dietz, 1998, pp. 380–81) Citizenship education upholds its duty when it provides citizens the ability to have full access to their own rights.

Rights in liberal democratic states are seen as "necessary for individual freedom." (Marshall, 1977, p.78) It is because liberal democratic states want to secure the freedom of all citizens that a major responsibility of their governments "is to create and maintain a system of rights and to undertake activities required by this." (Parekh, 1993, p.159) Rights are of vital

importance since liberal democracies are ruled by a democratic majority tempered with a special attention towards minorities. This special attention is provided by the array of rights. Citizens in liberal democratic states enjoy human rights, civil rights, minority rights and also political rights, including a right to vote and participate in the democratic decision making processes. Political rights refer to "the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body." (Marshall, 1977, p.78) The right to participate in state politics is a major right enjoyed by the citizens of liberal democratic states.

Rights should be understood as guarantees of the empowerment of citizens to act without interference by the government since "The attribution of any right... is typically an act of faith in the agency and capacity for moral thinking of each of the individuals concerned" (Waldron, 2001, p.250) The rights most central to effective citizenship are those that make effective political participation possible such as freedom of speech, press and assembly. Rights should be acknowledged and understood by citizens in order to be exercised. It would be useless for states to protect and finance rights, if citizens are not adequately informed about the rights they have. Citizens should know that as citizens of liberal democratic states, they have a claim to many rights. All these rights together give citizens the ability to develop their freedom, to maintain their individual autonomy and hopefully flourish according to their personal conception of success. Rights are indeed essential in a liberal democratic state, so much so that "there cannot be a democracy unless individuals possess and regularly exercise ... 'the right of rights' – the right to participate in the making of the laws." (Waldron, 2001, p.282)

The rights recognised in liberal democratic states include (1) the right to life, as the right not to be killed by another human being which also entails a right of refugees who are not to be forcibly returned to countries where their lives may be in danger and other situations. Another right that protects the private sphere is (2) the right to freedom which allows citizens to think independently, it also means freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a sufficient measure of liberty of to marry whom one wishes, to develop their own conceptions of happiness. Liberal democratic states also recognize the right of (3) the freedom of thought. This right includes freedom to seek, access, receive, and impart information and ideas. Consequently, (4) the right to freedom of expression; allows the holder to express her thoughts either through speech, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of her choice without state censorship. This right is limited to restrictions of "hate speech". Freedom of the press is part of the freedom of expression, it consists of legal protections of the media and published materials. The right to (5) the freedom of conscience permits individuals, in public or private, to manifest beliefs in teaching, practice, worship, and observance. It is generally recognized to also

include the freedom to change one's view of the life worth living or to choose not to follow any. In liberal democratic states, freedom of conscience is generally considered to mean that the government permits religious practices of all sects even though there is no state religion. The right to freedom of conscience means that "Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and other faiths have a perfect right to their own identity and religion, to practice their faith and to conform to their culture." (Blair, 2006, para12)

Another right concerns (6) the freedom of movement, were citizens are free to travel within a nation and across national borders. (7) The right to association gives all citizens the right to marry who they want, to assemble and meet in groups with whoever they want. It also provides citizens with the right to form trade unions. Another right that most liberal democratic states recognise is (8) the right to education. Some say that if liberal democratic states expect duties from citizens, such as paying taxes, going for war, paying for basic state needs such as a judiciary system and an army and most importantly participate in the political life of the state, then it needs to impart to citizens the knowledge, skills and values they shall need to perform these duties. The lack of access to educational opportunities would limit citizens' abilities to participate fully and effectively in the political and economic life of their country. Furthermore, ignorance is a barrier to the realization of civil and political rights because uneducated people often do not know what rights they have and what they may do to use and defend them. As Katz explains "The principle of the right to be adequately educated leaves the goals and content of education open to debate and to revision" (Katz, 2008, p.40) yet "one goal is central to being adequately educated - namely having acquired the ability and inclination to think critically for oneself and to make informed reasoned decisions in one's own interests." (Katz, 2008, p.40)

Other rights might include (9) the right to privacy which might refer to the wish to remain unnoticed in the public sphere. The claim of individuals to determine for themselves to what extent information about them is communicated to others and possibly a limit to government surveillance on citizens. Citizens in liberal democratic states also benefit from the (10) freedom to enter contracts as formal agreements recognised by the law regarding, business, property exchange or other forms of contracts such as freedom to engage in occupations. Citizens also enjoy (11) the right to a fair trial by a competent and independent court and receive due process of law and the (12) rights to own property. Additionally, citizens have (13) the right to political participation which allows them to participate freely in the government of their country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the provisions of the law and most importantly 'within a civil public space of multicultural understanding and confrontation' (Benhabib 2002, p. 130) Educating individuals to be democratic citizens involves making them aware of the right of political participation, the right

to hold certain offices and perform certain tasks, and the right to deliberate and decide upon certain issues. This right "is a direct manifestation of the core values of political autonomy and equality." (Lang Brettschneider, 2007, p.144) Because "When citizens participate in political decision-making, they exercise their autonomy in the very fact that they have made a decision. Their equality is recognized when their vote is regarded as equal to all of their fellow citizens' votes" (Lang Brettschneider, 2007, p.144)

In addition to the extensive rights mentioned above, liberal democratic states are also characterised by (14) minority rights. Special rights intended to safeguard group identity of citizens who are part of minority cultures, but which might also be claimed by females if they feel discriminated in any way. Treating minorities with extra consideration is one of the defining principles of a liberal democratic state. This extra care is provided through minority rights and strict anti-discriminatory policies. The term minority rights embodies collective rights as applied to members of racial, ethnic, class, religious and linguistic minority groups. Through the value of minority rights, citizens make sure that civil rights are not denied to citizens on the basis of membership in a minority group. Minority rights ensure that a specific vulnerable group is able to achieve equality, is protected from persecution and better able to preserve their cultural institutions and practices and to exercise some measure of political autonomy.

The values of liberty and equality in liberal democratic states require "group-differentiated rights" (Kymlicka, 1995, p.45). The importance of minority rights is increasingly relevant to liberal democratic states because of the ever increasing multicultural realities. Minority rights are important because "minority peoples ... have become the principal victims of gross human rights violations" (Gurr, 1993, p.314) As Kymlicka clearly states, "Group rights are permissible if they help promote justice between ethno-cultural groups, but are impermissible if they create or exacerbate gender inequalities within the group." (Kymlicka, 1999b, p.73) Kymlicka distinguishes two types of minority rights "external protections" which are required in liberal democratic states and "internal restrictions" which are incompatible with liberal democratic values and therefore cannot be allowed.

The minority rights that Kymlicka defines as "Internal restrictions" (Kymlicka, 1995, p.152) cannot be accepted in liberal democratic states because the aim of such rights is to restrict the ability of individuals to question, revise, or abandon practices. Such internal restrictions cannot be permitted because, "they violate the autonomy of individuals, and create injustice within the group." (Kymlicka, 1999, p.73) However, Kymlicka explains that liberal democratic states can accept a second type of minority rights, "rights which are claimed by a minority group against the larger society in order to reduce its vulnerability to the economic or

political power of the larger society." (Kymlicka, 1999, p.73) Such "external protections"(Kymlicka, 1995, p.152), can take the form of "language rights, guaranteed political representation, funding of ethnic media, land claims, compensation for historical injustice, or the regional devolution of power." (Kymlicka, 1999, p.73) All of these can contribute to promote justice towards minority groups, by ensuring that members of the minority have the same effective capacity to promote their interests as much as members of the majority can.

The issue with rights in liberal democratic states concerns the problem to finance them and situations where values conflict. The economic problem with rights depends entirely on the interpretation that citizens of a particular liberal democratic state decide to give to each right. Some citizens say that rights are worth every penny taken from the taxes collected. Some say that they are too expensive to maintain and agree with Nozick that "Taxation of earnings from labour is on a par with forced labour." (Nozick, 1974, p.169) Some liberal states might perceive rights as an illegitimate burden on taxes; it is up to citizens to democratically choose the best interpretation of rights through dialogue and democratic decision making process. For example, "the right to life" can mean freedom from slavery, but it could also mean the right to be sustained and become a 'burden' on society. The second interpretation is of course more demanding on the resources of the state.

Another issue with rights, beside their drain on states' resources, is when minority rights clash with other rights that equally belong to all. The issue with minority rights is that even a small amount of group autonomy might lead to women's abuse and curtailment of some members' liberties. While minority rights are meant to "compensate for unequal circumstances which put the members of minority cultures at a systemic disadvantage in the cultural marketplace" (Kymlicka 1994, p.25) they are not meant for society in general to turn a blind eye to individual needs of members of minority groups. Yet, "there are certain rights against oppression, exploitation, and injury, to which every single human being is entitled to lay claim, and...appeals to cultural diversity and pluralism under no circumstances trump the value of basic liberal rights" (Barry, 2001, p.132) Thus, when decisions must be taken, it is usually the basic individual rights who have the final say regarding individuals wellbeing.

This section about rights has explained that in a liberal democratic states "individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights)" (Nozick, 1974, p. IX). Yet, not all rights are binding in the same way for all liberals, while no state should violate the right to life, it could limitedly infringe on the right to private property when it taxes citizens for the maintenance of a police force, an army, a judicial system and other basic requirements that state existence needs. As it infringes on the right to privacy to combat

terrorism and on the freedom of expression to stop hate-speech that is considered to be a direct threat to democracy. Such measures are demanded by the circumstances and the state would be failing its duty as guardian of rights if it did not support them. Any infringement of individual liberties must be accepted with regret as necessary exceptions due to particular circumstances. Rights have an important contribution to give in liberal democratic states, as Blair stated in a speech about the right to be different; "We have a very established set of rights that constitute our citizenship. We should not be shy to teach them. That is why citizenship became part of the statutory national curriculum in secondary schools in 2002." (Blair, 2006, para25) It is herby being suggested that liberal democratic states follow the advice given by Blair.

4.4 The value of Individual Autonomy.

Teaching the core values in liberal democratic states includes teaching the value of individual autonomy. The value of individual autonomy is required to help individuals become "a reflective self who is able to stand back from his values, ideals, and commitments" (Aviram and Yossi, 2004, p. 15 ) intended as self-governing free agents who value their right to choose and want to make it a central feature of their life. The liberal democratic state "like every other political community.... embraces a view of the human good that favours certain ways of life and tilts against others." (Galston, 1991a, p.3) Liberal democratic states tilt towards giving importance of the value of autonomy. Autonomy is seen as important both as an end as a means value. It is intrinsically important because "The ideal of personal autonomy . . . holds the free choice of goals and relations as an essential ingredient of individual well-being." (Raz, 1986, p.369) and it is also instrumentally valued because it allows the formation of autonomous citizens, who are as essential components of the legitimisation of the state. Thus even "children who are raised in illiberal cultures within liberal states must none the less be subject to a liberal education." (Levinson, 2002a, p.7) and be taught about the importance of the value of autonomy in the public sphere. As White explains "Personal autonomy is a central liberal value. It rests on an even more fundamental value in human life - personal well-being." (White, 1999, p.192) Autonomy is thus seen as an integral part of personal well-being and is required to enable citizens to develop a personal conception of the good life, to be able to adapt to a quickly changing modern society and to be able to participate in state politics as free agents.

The conception of individual autonomy in liberal democratic states is "a conception of freedom and of respect for the capacities and the agency of individual men and women" (Waldron, 1993, p.36) since it "rests on the belief that the individual is largely responsible – in the sense of being the main active agent – for constructing meaning" (Haste, 1996, p.48). Indeed, citizens of liberal democratic states are expected to be at least politically autonomous and able

to decide independently thus "Education should prepare children to become autonomous, self-governing individuals, capable of making good judgments about how to live their own lives, and to negotiate for themselves the complexity of modern life." (Brighouse, 2007, p.577) The value of individual autonomy alludes to the view of human freedom that consists in allowing "people to choose a conception of the good life" (Kymlicka, 1995, p.82) and furthermore it also refer to their right "to reconsider that decision, and adopt a new and hopefully better plan of life." (Kymlicka, 1995, p.82) Citizens are not only expected to be autonomous and choose for themselves from diverse options but it is also expected that they "act on principles . . . that are one's own because one has made them so by a process of rational reflection on the complex principles and values that one has assimilated from one's social environment" (Benn, 1985, p.803)

Liberal democratic states want to help citizens "to choose and follow their own conception of a life that they deem to be suitable for themselves" (Winch, 2006, p.6). The respect that liberal democratic states have towards each individual as a rational being leads the state to believe in the value of autonomy as the value that will endow the citizen with a real right to choose their own plan of life. This choice must be made by individuals themselves because as Mill explains "He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation." (Mill, 1991 [1859], p.65) The idea of the non-autonomous individual lacking in her humanity is also conveyed by Berlin, when he explains that "I wish to be the instrument of my own, not other men's, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object... deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them." (Berlin, 1969, p.131) There is nothing more to add to show the importance of individual autonomy in a political theory when it has been described as being essential to the very nature of being human.

A citizen can be said to be autonomous when she is living a life based on values that were chosen independently by herself. As Rawls explains "a person is acting autonomously when the principles of his action are chosen by him as the most adequate possible expression of his nature as a free and equal rational being." (Rawls, 1999b, p.222) Additionally, "...the autonomous individual, is a socially embedded individual, one who understands his intellectual and cultural inheritance but is determined to make that inheritance his own by fashioning an individual character and life plan..." (Macedo, 1990, p.219) It is in this sense that liberal democratic states proposes the value of autonomy to liberal and illiberal citizens in the same manner, because through he value o f autonomy each citizen would be able to detach herself from her surroundings, rationally understand why she does things they way she does and then be able to

formulate her actions conscious of the true motives behind her free choices. The value of autonomy effects the citizens both privately since it effects the individual's freedom to decide which way of life is most worth pursuing and it also effects the individuals public choices since the individual's freedom to participate in the formation of public opinion and society's collective decisions is also affected making citizens "co-authors" of the conditions under which they live.

Citizenship Education reaches its scope in teaching the value of autonomy when each citizen "identifies with his desires, goals, and values, and such identification is not itself influenced in ways which make the process of identification in some way alien to the individual" (Dworkin, 1988, p.61). If the process of what Dworkin calls "identification" were to be unknown to citizens, then there would be no real choice because real choice only occurs when the individual makes a conscious decision after understanding why some alternatives are chosen and others are not. Choices done without rational reflection are usually the result of indoctrination which would be exactly what Citizenship Education in liberal democratic states wants to avoid. As Barrow explains, "To be autonomous means to be free from external interference or control. It is to be master of one's own fate rather then subject to other individuals or groups of people." (Barrow, 1975, p.131) Thus, all autonomous citizens should be able to collect fruits out of their rights and be free to live their life the way they choose to within the parameters allowed by the rule of law and the harm principle. Citizens of liberal democratic states should decide for themselves, basing their political decisions on reason. "The autonomous person must be subject to his reason rather then...his emotions. The reasoning he acts in accordance with must be reasoning to which he is sincerely committed ... And he must have the strength of will to act as his reason dictates" (Barrow, 1975, p.131) It is this kind of citizen, who has the strength to act on her reason, that is essential for the legitimisation of the liberal democratic state.

Liberal democratic states require the core value of autonomy for several reasons. Raz explains that autonomy is 'particularly suited' (Raz, 1986, p.370) to 'cope with changing technological, economic and social conditions' (Raz 1986, p.370) where there is need 'to acquire new skills, to move from one subculture to another, from one subculture to another, to come to terms with new scientific and moral views'. (Raz 1986, p.370) In short, autonomy may be valuable because it allows citizens to better cope with life. Furthermore 'in liberal democracies... the capacity for autonomy is an indispensable feature of a worthwhile life. In order for lives to be worthwhile, individuals should be able to choose their values, beliefs and the kind of life that they would like to lead through the exercise of their rational capacities' (Winch, 2006, p.17) Additionally, "by insisting on providing all children... with the training to become autonomous individuals we give them, upon reaching the age of majority, the choice of either leaving or

continuing to be a part of their community of origin." (Wolfe, 1999, p.427) Individual autonomy is one of the values that best allows liberal education to reach its scope to indeed liberate and set citizens free as "A general liberal education ...characterized most centrally by its liberating aspect indicated by the word 'liberal'....What it liberates the person from is the limitations of the present and the particular." (Bailey, 1984, p.20) The teaching of the value of autonomy might also have positive effects on the trust that citizens have towards the state. Trust is earned not given away and the state might earn the citizens trust since "knowing that the state has increased my ability rationally to criticize its structure and policies may diminish my suspicion of its motives in inculcating the virtues." (Brighouse, 1998, p.735)

Another reason for the importance of teaching the value of autonomy has to do "with the function of autonomy in the justification of the liberal state." (Alexander, 2007, p.17) Accordingly, autonomy is important in liberal democratic states because only autonomous citizens who can freely vote, participate in democratic processes without restrains, liberally elect, get elected and validly monitor political representatives can perform their indispensable roles as citizens. This means that only autonomous citizens can make the state a legitimate one in a democratic sense, thus the teaching of the value of autonomy is vital for the liberal state's very existence because without teaching the value of autonomy there cannot be free choice, without free choice there cannot be a legitimate government, and without a legitimate government there cannot be a liberal democratic state. Indeed, as Brighouse explains "It is empty to claim that a state is legitimate because its coercive actions would have been accepted by autonomous citizens unless that same state has ensured that each person has been able to become autonomous. So the state has an obligation to ensure that all future citizens have the opportunity to become such citizens" (Brighouse, 1998, p.734)

It is difficult for liberal democratic states to accommodate for illiberal citizens where the value of autonomy is concerned, even if the Citizenship Education "does not try to ensure that students employ autonomy in their lives" but only "live autonomously should they wish to." (Brighouse, 1998, p.734), yet "Accepting the value of autonomy for political purposes enables its exercise in private life" (Kymlicka 1995, 162) and on the whole, a system that promotes autonomy will favour "those who endorse autonomy as a general value." (Kymlicka 1995, 162) Liberal democratic states must accept their inability to be impartial when teaching the value of autonomy. Yet, the liberal democratic state, as a state "whose commitment to majoritarian rule is tempered by the understanding that some personal rights and liberties should not be subject to the majority's preferences." (Eichner, 2007, p.1) is still the most religious friendly polity that the faithful could inhabit despite its non-neutrality. Liberal democratic states, as states based on

liberal political theory, are the states that try hardest in accommodating illiberal citizens through values of impartiality, tolerance, diversity and political equality.

If liberal democratic states want to be accommodating states capable of compromising, then the message to illiberal citizens must be clear and it must not be "Welcome to the liberal democratic state. Please replace your own value system with ours. Thank you" but it should read something like "In full respect of your intelligence and cultural heritage please see that at least where the public life is concerned you try to be reasonable and limit your actions within the parameters of the common core of values which you will be asked to learn. It is not the state's intension to influence your private lifestyle, but we must all follow the state's public values because it is the best way to insure healthy conviviality despite our differences" Of course, if illiberal citizens are expected to follow such advice they are to be taught what a great deal about the common core of values, what is meant by the public/private divide, what is meant by reasonable, and several other concepts so familiar to liberal democratic citizens and so alien to others.

Like all public values taught through citizenship education, the value of autonomy is intended to be taught critically, which criticism of course includes the feminist critique of autonomy amongst others. According to feminists "the individualistic emphasis on independence and emotional detachment from others" is "merely one way to conceptualise autonomy: it is a traditional, mainstream or masculine way." On the other hand feminists offer a "... feminist conception of autonomy, one that presupposes the relational nature of human beings and emphasize the social context required for the realization of autonomy." (Friedman, 2003, p. 84) According to such conception, "What makes autonomy possible is not separation, but relationship." (Nedelsky, 1993, p.8) Feminist contribution to the continuous democratic dialogue regarding the core values would propose that "while autonomy must be fundamentally altered and shaped by the normative concerns of feminism, it should nevertheless be included among the full array of values and ideals such concerns motivate." (Christman, 1995, p.33) Additionally Cooke explains that "... the notion of autonomy is not necessarily connected with conceptions of self-identity that are unacceptable to feminists, and that it can be interpreted in a way congenial to feminist concerns." (Cooke, 1999, p. 277) The feminist conception of autonomy is not incompatible with the teaching of autonomy in liberal democratic states, indeed liberal democratic states expect citizens to critically engage with what the public values taught through Citizenship Education and by discussion and democratic deliberation core values could be changed accordingly to reflect the resulting process of debates in the public sphere and a new conception of core values that accommodates and compromises as far as possible for most views.

To conclude, this section has discussed why "A primary aim of schooling in liberal democracies...is to promote the rational autonomy of students." (Alexander, 2007, p.609) It has been said that the value of autonomy is not only beneficial for the state's legitimacy; it is also of good use to citizens who are to cope well with the many choices that liberal democratic states provide. Citizens who are not equipped with the value of autonomy and thus unable to decide autonomously are ill-equipped to cope well with the many choices that will inevitably confront them in liberal democratic states. A heteronymous private lifestyle is not incompatible with living in liberal democratic states as long as decisions in the public sphere can be explained rationally. Heteronymous public decisions cannot be accepted as valid if they cannot be explained rationally and most importantly they were not freely chosen by individuals but indoctrinated into them. This emphasis on the value of individual autonomy has strong political implications for liberal democratic states because it means that views of the life worth livings that favour faith and obedience are at a disadvantage to other rational doctrines. Yet, liberal democratic states cannot reject the teaching of individual autonomy as a goal of public policy only because it is too controversial among members of illiberal comprehensive doctrines. The solution to the conflicts that teaching autonomy might create could be minimised through policies of accommodation, compromise, active effort towards (as far as possible) impartial policies and a set of minority rights that strengthen the private sphere for those who need.

### 4.5 The value of making an Effort to be Impartial

A core value that ought to be taught in liberal democratic states is impartiality. This value is related to the wish to better respect the value of equality, the values of respect for others, of tolerance and a wish to respect citizens' ability to decide for themselves. Yet, it must be accepted that liberal democratic states are founded on values that are not endorsed by all citizens and that "the liberal state is not simply neutral among all values" because "certain ideas of human virtue are inherent in the public philosophy of liberal democracy." (Bahmueller, 1997, p.101) Additionally, the public philosophy of liberal democracy cannot do without citizens who value individual autonomy and are able to choose freely, it also cannot do without citizens who value at least political equality and tolerance. Liberal democratic states require an educational system that promotes such values although "A fundamental challenge to liberal education comes from those who do not share its basic values. In particular, the values of liberalism and liberal education are broadly incompatible with Marxism, radical feminism, postmodernism and various religious world views, including the Roman Catholic and the Islamic, which claim that liberalism lacks a moral and spiritual foundation." (Halstead, 1996, p.120)

In spite of the many dissenting citizens, liberal democratic states "like every other political community.... embrace a view of the human good that favours certain ways of life and tilts against others." (Galston, 1991a, p.3) It embraces a liberal way of life based on freedom and on being flexible in order to be able to accommodate and tilts against those who profess totalitarianism, discrimination and those who profess there is one single way of life which should replace all the others. According to different trends within liberalism there are several varied ways to view what best ought to be, and all of these ways have in common a core of values made out of respect towards the individual as an autonomous free agent, tolerance towards difference and political equality. Values that are non the less disputed since there are "some groups which challenge the underlying liberal values, and who view liberal norms of secularism, tolerance, individual autonomy and public reason as a threat to their way of life." (Kymlicka, 2003a, p.48) Still, the genuine respect towards individuals as humans who are able to decide for themselves leads liberal democratic states to "show respect for citizens by creating and protecting spaces in which they [citizens] can live according to their own views." (Nassbaum, 2008, p.2) The effort to create spaces where citizens can follow their own laws is the effort that the state makes to show equal respect towards all citizens' conceptions of the good life and in respecting the rights that form the private sphere. An effort made with an awareness that no state could possibly be neutral regarding all conceptions of the good life but yet with a determination to "take no stand on opposing convictions about the virtuous life, allowing its citizens to make of themselves whatever they choose within very loose boundaries fixed by law". (Callan, 1997, p.4)

The effort to be impartial means that "While schools may endorse views either because they are the established results of scholarly inquiry" (Strike, 2007, p.706) and based on reasoning that can be accepted by most "or are expressions of liberal democratic norms" (Strike, 2007, p.706) as natural extensions of the common core of values, yet "they may not prevent alternative views from being heard." (Strike, 2007, p.706) According to strike, the effort to be impartial should be seen in the fact that learners in schools are presented with the different alternatives allowed within the rule of law in liberal democratic states in respect of the many different conceptions of the good life. Following this interpretation of impartiality "Schools may endorse evolution, but may not require students to believe it... Schools may endorse equal rights for homosexuals, but may not sanction students for holding that homosexuality is a sin." (Strike, 2007, p.706) The (unsuccessful) effort to remain impartial in the issue of teaching the contested value of autonomy goes parallel to the argument made by strike as explained by Brighouse who shows that the liberal democratic state 'does not try to ensure that students employ autonomy in their lives, any more than Latin classes are aimed at ensuring that students employ Latin in their lives. Rather it aims to enable them to live autonomously should they wish to' (Brighouse, 1998,

p.734) The liberal democratic state, as a state that exists to protect individuals should have no business in imposing its view and as MacMullen explains "...the liberal state should affect a citizen's ethical choices only by providing her with better tools — information and the skills, inclinations, opportunities to use it — with which to decide for herself how to live her life." (Mac Mullen, 2007, p.210) The state's effort to be impartial towards views of the life worth livings is also strengthened by the belief that "We have no right to look upon future citizens as if we were master gardeners who can tell the difference between a pernicious weed and a beautiful flower." (Ackerman, 1980, p.139)

When in an effort to be impartial the state decides to "be neutral on what might be called the question of the good life." (Dworkin 1985, p.191) it effectively leaves many significant decisions in the hands of individuals, allowing the fruition of their individual autonomy. Yet even when "political decisions [are] so far as possible, independent of any particular conception of the good..." (Dworkin 1985, p.191) with the scope of being impartial, it ends effecting negatively those who do not support autonomy. Indeed, liberal democratic states might host many citizens who believe that an individual is "unable to act according to universal reason, must be subjected to a law, strange and superior to him" (Tillich, 1960, p.56) Such citizens would rather choose a heteronymous lifestyle based on values of some comprehensive doctrine or religious orthodoxy then on values they choose themselves through critical thinking skills and for such citizens the value of autonomy is a treat to their way of life. This fact squarely leads to what Mason warns about when he advices that "if respect for autonomy requires the state to promote autonomous action, then it will be required to be non-neutral between conceptions of the good that value autonomous choice and those that do not." (Mason, 1990, p.252) Mason's point shows the precarious nature of the effort to be impartial. However, knowing that it cannot accommodate for citizens who do not believe in the value of autonomy, the state can still make an effort to be impartial and try not to "influence its citizens' choices for or against certain religious or secular systems of belief, either by imposing burdens on them or by granting advantages to them. [but be] even handed toward people of all faiths and of none." (Monsma and Soper, 1997, p.6) In this way, 'no one set of religious beliefs can be shown to be objectively true'. (McLaughlin, 1984, p.76) consequently, it limits advantages or disadvantages to citizens who are members of particular religions.

Not only the responsibility of sustaining a single conception of the good would be an unbearable responsibility for liberal democratic states since only individuals know what is best for them. It would also be extremely difficult to do considering that humans seldom accept things that are simply imposed on them. As Kymlicka explains, "You can coerce someone into going to church and making the right physical movements, but you won't make someone's life

better that way. It won't work, even if the coerced person is mistaken in her belief that praying to God is a waste of time. It won't work because a life only goes better if led from the inside" (Kymlicka, 1989, p.12) The impossibility of making citizens' lives better by enforcing on them a conception of the good makes the effort to be impartial a valid effort.

Although the effort to be impartial might allow for a great deal of accommodation and compromise, it must still be understood that "The values and virtues of the liberal democratic community impose constraints on the forms of diversity that can be expected to flourish; that fact must be accepted." (Macedo, 2008, p.1) Macedo explains that liberal democratic states "should insist on fairness in negotiating those tensions" and "should listen carefully to the voices of those who feel marginalized and silenced." Yet, Macedo is equally specific when showing the end of our effort to be impartial; he says that "At the end of the day, we have every right to insist that the negotiation of policies and accommodations will take place on the basis of our fundamental political values, fairness, equal freedom, and reasonable expectations of reciprocal support for shared institutions. Whatever else it might be, liberal democratic neutrality is not neutrality toward our own deepest public values." (Macedo, 2008, p.1) It could be safely said that liberal democratic states' ability to compromise is restricted within the parameters defined by the common core of public values omni-present in the liberal democratic state, within this core of values, "all conceptions of the good (consistent with justice) are considered equally worthy, not in the sense that there is an agreed public measure of intrinsic value or satisfaction with respect to which all these conceptions come out equal, but in the sense that they are not evaluated at all from a social standpoint." (Rawls, 1982, p.172 his brackets) Clearly liberalism does not advocated that all comprehensive values are equally valid, but only that all citizens, as free moral agents, merit equality of respect and the state also shows respect through knowing when not it is not its business interfere.

The effort to be impartial shows the nature of the relationship between citizen and state, the nature of liberal citizenship, which gives space to the citizens to exercise individual autonomy. The effort to be impartial and allow individuals to, as much as possible, decide for themselves, is the exact opposite to statements like, "There is no doubt that the life of a music composer is superior to the life of a rancher." (Arneson, 2003, p.197) The effort to be impartial goes directly against illiberal attitudes that assume that there is one single ideal of what the good life is and that for example, music composers are nearer to the good life than ranchers are. This sort of presumption is incompatible with the belief that private choices should be equally respected, because different individuals have different conceptions of the good life, hence why; "The scholar who values a life of contemplation has such a conception; so does the television-watching, beer-drinking citizen who is fond of saying 'This is the life' " (Dworkin 1985, p.191)

and it is in this spirit of equal respect that liberal democratic states sustain the effort to be impartial.

4.6 The Value of Democracy.

The value of democracy is a defining feature of the way of life of citizens in liberal democratic states. Although taught for its precious instrumental value of procuring legitimacy also has an intrinsic value of fairness due to the inherent respect it equally shows towards all individuals as rational agents, respect shown by treating every participant in the democratic process in an equal manner. It is difficult not to admire this value of fairness and not to implement it in one's life. Thus the value of democracy is one of those values in Citizenship Education which mostly shows the state's inability to keep citizenship education relegated to the public sphere. The value of democracy easily percolates into the private realm. Citizenship Education in liberal democratic states ought to teach that the relevance of the value of democracy for citizens is in the getting involved, and there would be no point in teaching democracy if citizens did not bother to get involved at least by keeping themselves updated with the current political issues of their state, while the endorsement of the value of democracy would fully flourish when citizens actually participate and engage in bringing progress. Indeed, the value of democracy is also in the ability to ensure that only worthy people get to the important political offices and when they have been given the opportunity but proved unaccountable for their actions and generally incompetent, democracy provides the best way for a quick change.

The value of democracy needs to be taught in liberal democratic states because democracy is seen as the best way to legitimise the state since it is a fair and transparent decision making process. Most importantly for the liberal democratic states educational system, "democracy conceptually presupposes critical citizens; since the latter do not develop spontaneously...education is a precondition of democracy" (Puolimatka, 1995, p.1) meaning that Citizenship Education is a necessary tool to help individuals for their roles as citizens and a necessary tool to perpetuate democracy in the long run. Schumpeter explains that "democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." (Schumpeter, 1956, p.269) This is a good, all be it partial, definition of what the actual role of democracy in liberal democratic states is meant to be. The emphasis besides a responsible political leadership should be a responsible citizenry that bothers to be informed about state business and once representatives are chosen, monitor their performance. Citizens should not only participate in the process of competition by voting but also effectively show their opinion, discuss and contribute effectively to the decision making process of society.

Democracy provides the state with the legitimate authority to administer coercive laws, to the extent that it is justified in imposing laws on all citizens. When citizens participate in the democratic processes, by their act of participation they consent to the outcome, even if they happen to disagree with it. The fact that participation lends legitimacy to the outcome shows the importance of state policies that encourage the participation of all citizens in the democratic decision making process. The acts of voting and participating are also acts of consent to the outcome of the voting so that even minority citizens are thereby obligated to comply with the decision made by the majority along with their many rights to protest and to continue on their quest where from a minority their concerns become concerns of the majority and eventually manage to bring about real social change. While, minorities are expected to comply with the majority decision but they are not to be stopped in any way from actively working in favour of what in their opinion is the greater good. Liberal democratic states are characterized by a democracy that is shaped with the liberal political philosophy which provides all citizens with a set of rights that protect their many freedoms from what some call a tyranny of the majority. In liberal democratic states there is a substantial set of restrictions in the shape of a list of individual or group rights that are constitutionally specified in the laws and which may not validly be altered by majority-will vote. The greater the extent of these limits on majority rule in the form of rights, the more the democratic system qualifies as liberal.

Democracy is also the preferred decision making process in any liberal state because it is a process that is built directly on the interests of the single individual. 'The thought is that unless people have a say in the making of the laws that apply to them, then their most vital interests will be ignored...' (Weinstock, 2006, p.20) and since all citizens have a fundamental interest in security, education, health care then the democratic process is able to attract the active interest of most to participate in state politics. Democracy is the best means to reliably deliver these goods to citizens because individuals are the best judges of what their real interests are.

The value of democracy in liberal democratic states is primarily needed because it provides the state with a legitimate decision making process. It has an advantage on other systems because it forces citizens and their representatives to take into account the interests, rights and opinions of all citizens. Since democracy gives some political power to each, more people are taken into account. Amartya Sen, winner of a Nobel Prize for economics, argues that "no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press" (Sen, 1999, p.152). On careful consideration one can indeed understand that politicians in democracy with free elections and a free press have incentives to respond to the expressions of needs of citizens and are less likely to care

exclusively for their private interests then in non-democratic structures. Thus, democracy is generally more reliable in helping participants discover the right decisions. Since democracy brings most citizens into the process of decision making, it can take advantage of many sources of information and critical assessments.

The value of democracy is taught to citizens to enable them to contribute to the collective effort towards agreement and understanding, citizens and politicians should not simply present policies, but also support them with reasons and invite counter-arguments. Without education citizens would lack the capacity to take part in the process of shaping public policy and thus they would be denied of their fundamental right of political participation. Education is, therefore essential to democracy, indeed "A society committed to the democratic ideal is one that makes peculiarly difficult and challenging demands on its members; it accordingly also makes stringent demands on those processes through which its members are educated." (Scheffler, 1985, p.122) Thus, liberal democratic states ought to give important prominence to the development of citizens' democratic abilities through Citizenship Education since "It would be a negation of the democrats' own values not to equip succeeding generations for the performance of an act that was a logical condition of democracy." (Tarrant, 1989, p.160) The value of democracy is thus one of the reasons why educational provision has such an important role in liberal democratic state.

In conclusion, in liberal democratic states that strive hard to be equally respectful towards all citizens, "democracy is one of the requirements of justice, so that other things being equal, the more democratic the society, the more just it is." (Arneson, 2004, p.40) It thus can be safely said that liberal democratic states that strive to be just, need to cherish the value of democracy. The value of democracy is properly cherished when it is adequately taught to citizens, when it is used as a way to legitimise political decisions, when the process is transparent, accountable, leads dissenting minorities to abide by the final decisions and when it respects the rights that temper the decisions of the majority. The value of democracy stands for the citizens' faith in the legitimacy of group decision making that is characterized by equality among the participants and freedom. The value of democracy provides great contributions to the stability of liberal democratic states and it ought to be supported by a consonant citizenship education.

### 4.7 The Value of the Rule of Law

While the rule of law has been described as "a rare and protean principle" (Hutchinson and P. J. Monahan, 1987, p.1) and there are truly diverse aspects to it, yet it can safely be said that "the rule of law is a long-standing, powerful, and important component of liberal democracy." (Rose, 2004, p.458) In liberal democratic states, the "rule of law" refers to the

legitimate rule of citizens justified through laws, a state of affairs consisting in political power being exercised through rules that have been previously settled and that are accepted by citizens. The legitimate coercive powers of liberal democratic states must follow the rule of law. Such rule-based legitimate power is the preferred alternative to arbitrary man based decisions. In this way "the rule of law" is "a law of rules." (Scalia, 1989, p.1175) which allows the decision making process to be equally fair and legitimate because based on fixed rules that provide consistent treatment for similarly-situated circumstances. Consequently, the rule of law in liberal democratic states "means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand – rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge." (Hayek, 1944, p.76)

Thus, the function of the rule of law is to create "A government of laws not men. This means that laws will be applied in a predictable manner by neutral judges and all citizens can rely on equal treatment from the courts." (Williams, 1998, p.173) The rule of law is indeed instrumental in several different ways, it allows citizens to better plan their lives and actions, it requests the establishment of a fair judicial system, it strengthens states' legitimacy through a better guarantee of political equality, furthermore it strengthens individual freedom and most importantly it circumscribes state action concerning individuals.

Respecting the rule of law is one way to guarantee the freedom of citizens which in the end is the sole purpose of liberal democratic states' existence. As Locke perfectly explains "the end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom. For in all the states of created beings capable of laws, where there is no law there is no freedom. For liberty is to be free of restraint and violence by others, which cannot be where there is no law." (Locke 1960 [1689], p.31) Thus the rule of law which stops violence and abuse by others is a precondition to freedom and as Garcia Manrique explains "the rule of law is a necessary condition for the respect and promotion of autonomy..." (Garcia Manrique, 2007, p.281) The essentiality of freedom and autonomy, being two core values, implies the fundamental role of the rule of law, a role that is of central importance because the final authority rests solely in the law which is equal for everyone. The state provides protection to citizen through fair justice as defined by the rule of law and as Kekes explains "All citizens are equally subject to its authority, and it is reasonable for them to accept it because the law guarantees the rights of individuals to life, liberty, and property." (Kekes, 1997, p.2)

The rule of law is a means through which liberal democratic states ensure that the rights of individuals are protected while it notifies citizens of responsibilities for the observance of

those rights. The rule of law co-ordinates the free choices of all citizens and helps impart order to freedom by imposing on all free actions, certain general conditions that together create a system of mutual self-restraint, thus harmonizing the freedom of each individual with the freedom of all. As Zywick explains "The lesson is simple but important—the rule of law is the underpinning of freedom and prosperity...and a society that seeks freedom and prosperity must also seek the rule of law." (Zywicki, 2003, p.18)

As stated above 'The rule of law' means literally what is says: the rule of the law. "Taken in its broadest sense this means that people should obey the law and be ruled by it. But in political and legal theory it has come to be read in a narrower sense, that the government shall be ruled by the law and subject to it" (Raz, 1977, p.195) Liberal democratic states safeguard individuals from abuse and violence of other citizens while and the rule of law safeguards individuals from illegitimate abuse and violence of the state. This is also related to the characteristic of the rule of law as constitutionalism, where it helps to constrain arbitrary governmental action because it is easier to monitor the government and to determine if it has misbehaved if the scope of governmental activity is circumscribed by black on white laws. Thus a major function of the rule of law is to involve procedural and substantive limitations on the exercise of state authority. State power is constrained by the rule of law, a force to which political decision making must abide. State action that is limited by the rule of law legitimizes the state and preserves individual freedom; while a state without the rule of law becomes a totalitarian state ripe for tyranny leaving citizens subject to the will of rules. As Reynolds has noted, "The rule of law is a solution to a problem, and as the classical tradition has always recognized, the problem is tyranny—the social relationship in which some people can command the lives or property of others at will and in pursuit of discretionary ends." (Reynolds, 1989, p.16)

The rule of law is also instrumental to allow citizens to better adapt their objectives since as Galston explains, the rule of the law can "minimize arbitrariness and create a framework of reasonably stable expectations conducive to the planned pursuit of individual purposes." (Galston, 1991a, p.301) The rule of law helps to make individual purposes of different citizens to be able to exist along with different scopes of other citizens, in this way the rule of law "does not tell a man what he should do to accomplish specific ends set by a lawgiver" (Fuller, 1981, p.234) but it surely "furnishes him with baselines against which to organize his life with his fellows." (Fuller, 1981, p.234) Citizens are provided, through the rule of law a framework against which to freely construct lawful lifestyles. Under the rule of law, citizens are provided with an opportunity to predict the use of political power to some degree and thus, to act accordingly. In such a situation people are able to plan their lives and helping citizens in their ability to arrange

their lives as they see fit, is instrumentally valuable because it enhances personal autonomy. For this to occur, the rule of law requires that the regime of rules governing behaviour be sufficiently stable so as to allow individuals to form expectations about the likely behaviour of other individuals in society.

The rule of law is indeed instrumental in allowing citizens to better plan their lives and actions, it also reinforces individual freedom and autonomy and most importantly it is the best way to limit state action and help social stability therefore "... we must demand allegiance to the rule of law. Nobody can legitimately ask to stand outside the law of the nation". (Blair, 2006, p.para28 ) Thus "the rule of law ... remains the most civilized and least burdensome conception of a state yet to be devised." (Oakeshott, 1983, p.11) and it amply satisfies the prerequisites of being recognised as a core value which all citizens should be well acquainted with and thus it has a rightful place in the Citizenship Education curriculum.

4.8 The value of Political Equality.

At the heart of the common core of values lies the value of political equality. Citizenship Education in liberal democratic states must teach political equality intended as "...equal political rights, equal protection of law, equality before the law....absence of all types of discrimination." (Arora, 2007, p.122) This study is suggesting political equality as a core value because it respects the two major trends within liberalism; social liberalism and liberal minimalism (classical liberalism, libertarianism) on the other. It is acknowledged that social liberalism, while endorsing the value of political liberalism, would enhance it into equality of opportunity and an equality that would need stronger state intervention. The interpretation of the value of equality in liberal democratic states would obviously depend on the democratic decision taken by citizens. It is being suggested in this section that "Liberal democratic polities are grounded on their commitment to ... political equality, p.to equality before the law and the equal right to vote and stand for elections for all citizens." (Dryzek et al., 2008, p.472)

Political equality refers to several features. It refers to the fact that each citizen holds (1) one equal vote. The right to vote is a common characteristic of all representative democracies, and "All forms of democracy must respect the principle of equality, p.one person-one vote." (Arora, 2007, p.122). Verba has noticed that in some contemporary liberal democratic states "There are some who denigrate the importance of voting, since voting rights and voting participation, when achieved, (as among blacks in the American South or in South Africa) does not bring with it the solution to all or even most problems. But those who denigrate the importance of the vote are almost certainly people who already have the right to vote." (Verba,

2003, p.663) The right to an equal vote is a great achievement in the history of liberal democratic states and should be treated with due respect while acknowledging the fact that "'political equality' means far more than everyone having the vote. It extends to collective decision-making in the widest political sphere, not only having the opportunity to collect together to form associations but having the will to do so," (O'Kane, 2004, p.28)

Apart from one person-one vote, the value of political equality also means (2) equality before the law, meaning that the law is equally applied to everyone in the same manner. Hayek was adamant on the importance of such aspect of equality he explained that "The great aim of the struggle for liberty has been equality before the law." (Hayek, 1960, p.85) and that "It is of the essence of the demand for equality before the law that people should be treated alike in spite of the fact that they are different." (Hayek 1960, p.86) Thus, equality before the law means that among citizens the law should be equal and administered in the same manner. The value of equality before the law prohibits judges in liberal democratic states to "interpret" laws for friends of friends and only execute them fully on common citizens. Equality before the law means that none are not subject to law, and the all are subject equally. Additionally, Dyzenhaus and Ripstein explain that "In its proper meaning equality before the law means the right to participate in the making of the laws by which one is governed. It means a constitution which guarantees democratic rights to all sections of the population, the right to approach the court for protection or relief in the case of the violation of the rights guaranteed in the constitution, and the right to take part in the administration of justice as judges, magistrates, attorney-general, prosecutors, law-advisers and similar positions." (Dyzenhaus and Ripstein, 2001, p.564)

Additionally, the value of political equality also means that (3) citizens as holders of political rights cannot be discriminated by the laws of the state and all laws should apply equally to all citizens, whatever their origin, race, sex, creed, wealth or power, so that no one is above the law. As Spinner explains; "Political equality means that all citizens, formally at least, have the same political rights, regardless of their identity or group membership. All citizens can run for office and vote; they have free speech, the right to assembly, and so on. In public institutions, the standards of non-discrimination ought to apply." (Spinner, 1994, p.6) The value of political equality ought to help against the problems of discrimination which are prone in pluralistic polities like liberal democratic states. Discrimination, as the disadvantageous treatment of persons due to a wrongful denial of civil rights of some citizens in a context where others enjoy their full set of rights. In this sense of equal political rights, the value of political equality is related to the value of respect for human dignity. Citizens have a right to equal respect because we equally respect their human dignity which equally belongs to all regardless of the colour of their skin, gender and other sources of difference. Group identity and social class should have no

significance over citizens' rights. Every citizen, regardless of background or status, is entitled to an equal say in the political democratic process and entitled to the same standards of justice and it could be said that "There is no political equality if there are severe restrictions on the freedom of franchise, thought and expression, or where such privileges are available to a very limited section of the community." (Sharma, 2007, p.219)

The importance of equality is derived from the fact that in liberal democratic states, citizens as free agents have an equal right to govern themselves. Thus, they have an equal right to voice their concerns in the process of democratic deliberation. Since, "One of the bedrock principles in a democracy is the equal consideration of the preferences and interests of all citizens" (Verba, 2003, p.663) through political participation. Then, the value of political equality is required to express this consideration through "such principles as one-person/one-vote, equality before the law, and equal rights..." (Verba, 2003, p.663) Thus it could be said that the value of political equality is a precursor of the right to political participation. The equal right to participate also has repercussions on the importance given to an adequate educational system and consequently to an adequate citizenship education. "Political equality means, at a minimum, that all persons are treated equally before the law, that all citizens share the same rights and liberties, and that no one can be excluded from the public business either by personal barriers (race, gender, ethnicity, and so on) or by lack of resources. Since part of the public business is to educate all of our children, all of our future citizens, we need to do so equally so as to assure that no child fails to develop the skills to participate simply because he lacks pencils, papers, books, fields, labs, and windows." (Crittenden, 2002, p.216) The relationship between the value of political equality and a common educational provision might be interpreted differently by social liberals and liberal minimalists but one can conclude that liberal democratic states require participation by citizens, which requires political equality because citizen would not participate knowing that they would eventually not be heard, and citizens have a right to equal help in being prepared for their political participation through a citizenship education that prepares them for their equal role as citizens with equal dignity, rights and duties.

Teaching the value of political equality to citizens is meant to make it clear to all citizens that their political equality, especially in states with a classical or neo liberal approach, is not designed to guarantee identical economic and political conditions but rather to protect economic and political freedoms. It recognizes that citizens are different and that objective standards must therefore allow for different results amongst them. Political equality ultimately means that all citizens are treated with respect and dignity as free individuals with equal rights. Citizenship Education is in charge of teaching the value of political equality to ensure that every citizen, irrespective of her social class or view of the life worth living, knows that all citizens have equal

dignity and equal rights and that their work and ingenuity might result in unequal wealth. Thus, educational systems in liberal democratic states would not be as uncomfortable as a socialist system would be, with statements such as "let our children grow tall and some taller than others if they have the ability in them to do so. Because we must build a society in which each citizen can develop his full potential, both for his own benefit and for the community as a whole, a society in which originality, skill, energy and thrift are rewarded, in which we encourage rather than restrict the variety and richness of human nature." (Thatcher, 1975, para40) In essence, the value of political equality manifested through equal rights, equal voting, equal political participation and non-discrimination, recognises the equal dignity that citizens inherently have in virtue of their humanity.

Teaching the value of political equality allows citizens to equally respect all other citizens despite conspicuous differences. Through the value of political equality citizens learn to give a chance to those who differ from them to voice their concerns. Political equality is indeed a healthy ingredient for every liberal democratic polity and it would be difficult to imagine how citizens could be able to flourish in liberal democratic states where such a value is not sustained and promoted. Furthermore, the promotion of political equality might have beneficial effects on social cohesion since citizens who feel equally respected might be better disposed to contribute socially. As Verba explains, "Political equality is a valued good per se. The ability to express one's political views is constitutive of membership in the polity. It confers a sense of selfhood, of agency, of belonging." (Verba, 2003, p.663) The higher the sense of belonging that citizens have towards their state, the easier would it is for that state to solve conflicts arising from different points of views.

### 4.9 The Value of Respect for Others

Respect in liberal democratic states refers to a kind of esteem that all citizens are owed just because they are persons, regardless of their social position, individual characteristics or achievements. The idea is that every individual has a distinctive moral status in virtue of which the state has special obligations to treat them in ways that are respectful and considerate of them as free agents worth of respect. Citizenship Education should emphasise the importance of teaching respect towards citizens' opinions no matter how opposing they are to one's own.

In liberal democratic states citizens are respected as individuals even when their own values do not deserve any respect because sexist, racist or homophobic. Respect also means acknowledging diversity. Raz explains that 'respecting people is a way of treating them... It is a way of conducting oneself, and more indirectly, of being disposed to conduct oneself, towards the object of respect' (Raz, 2001, p.138). To show respect to each other, citizens should be aware

of how their speech and actions are perceived by others and control themselves accordingly. Respect for citizens includes respect for what these citizens believe in, and the values they cherish. Parekh explains that 'We can hardly be said to respect a person if we treat with contempt or abstract away all that gives meaning to his life and makes him the kind of person he is' (Parekh, 2000, p.240). What Parekh suggests has implications on the fact that citizens should ideally try to show consideration towards values that are not theirs when interacting with all citizens. It is easier to respect individuals whose beliefs perfectly match one's own. Yet, citizens should try to publicly show respect towards those with whom they disagree, that respect that an atheist has for a believer.

Learning to show respect towards human dignity is a pre-requisite of all anti-discrimination policies. As Gutmann explains, "A government cannot effectively enforce non-discrimination in hiring, in a social context of widespread disrespect among members of different races, ethnicities, religions or genders. Even the minimalist understanding of fair equality of opportunity as non-discrimination in hiring is therefore unachievable without mutual respect among citizens." (Gutmann, 1995, p.561) Respect is a building block of the liberal democratic states policies of anti-discrimination related to issues of gender, age, race, faith and other origins of profound diversity. As Gutmann explains, even a minimalist libertarian approach would need to teach the value of respect because non-discrimination in hiring would be unachievable without mutual respect among citizens.

The higher the diversity between citizens in liberal democratic states, the more the teaching of the value of respect is needed. Torres explains that for liberal democratic states to function properly, "mutual respect is necessary so that differences in choices, lifestyles, or consumer preferences are not interpreted as challenging the social order or specific individual interests." (Torres, 1998, p.78) Respect in liberal democratic states is essential because it might lead to citizens who feel more included despite their difference. Citizens who feel respected, despite their differences might try harder to integrate in the political public domain and be better active citizens. Integration in the public sphere occurs when citizens "translate" their personal values into reasonable language that might be better understood.

In a liberal democratic state, respect towards citizens is also shown through the effort made by citizens to the duty to be reasonable in the public sphere. In liberal democratic states, citizens have complete freedom of choice in their private sphere and can choose to privately live a heteronymous lifestyle if they wish. Liberal states respect private choices; it is why they are called liberal in the first place. This respect that such states show towards citizens' private sphere is only limited by the harm principle. While the state allows illiberal private choices, it

expects that all citizens' public choices are tempered with reason and can be explained to most citizens. Trying to be reasonable and explain one's choices reasonably in ways other citizens can try to understand would be a great sign of respect towards the state and fellow citizens.

Respect in liberal democratic states is shown when very diverse citizens try to reason with each other and try to understand each other through listening and making an effort t be understood. Teaching respect matters because it motivates citizens to treat one another with respect, and an important part of that respect is captured by the practice of public reason. Trying to justify oneself in the public realm is an important part of the value of respect and such justification based on intelligible reasoning is essential for liberal states' existence because it strengthens social conviviality. It is through the value of equal respect that in a liberal democratic state, the appeal to one's own controversial conception of the good may be adequate to justify how one conducts one's private life, if the same values are endorsed critically and autonomously, the pursuit of public policies can also be conducted on specific personal comprehensive values, as long as they are autonomously chosen and explained to other citizens through reason. In a liberal democratic state, acting on one's own conception is considered to be reasonable but imposing one's conceptions on others coercively make such values unreasonable and so unacceptable because disrespectful towards citizens as individuals who deserve respect because as humans they have an inherent ability to choose for themselves.

Citizens cannot be respecting other citizens if they do not show at least a minimal of consideration towards beliefs of the others. Atheist individuals cannot simply disregard the opinions of religious people labelling them backwards and out-dated only because they might consider religions as something of the past. Atheist should try to show courtesy by being respectful and try to dialogue with believers not dismissing them with complete disregard of what they have to say. Respect for citizens means respect for their personal beliefs which means that citizens must make an effort and try to understand other citizens' cultural background in all their diversity. Thus, in order to teach the value of respect well, Citizenship Education must teach knowledge about diverse cultures.

Knowledge about cultures is essential in order to be able to respect others. A case in point would be the event when a Danish newspaper (September 2005) published cartoons that ridiculed Prophet Muhammad, in one case depicting the prophet as a terrorist. These cartoons led to protests in several Muslim countries. There was widespread media coverage of the protests, on all major newspapers and on the internet. Protests led to violence and people died. It could be said that the cartoons were disrespectful towards Muslims because they were insensitive towards Islamic faith. More knowledge about Muslim religious and cultural heritage

might have helped the editor of the newspaper to adapt her conception of "freedom of expression" to be more respectful of Muslim religious sensitivity.

Respect in liberal democratic states is shown through laws and public policies that are open to accommodation and compromise. Public schools are part of the effort to accommodate, the acceptance of denominated schools, all be it with some conditions, are also part of an effort to accommodate. This effort is also shown in other ways, such as when "The Sikhs are permitted to wear their turbans on motorcycles and carry their ritual dagger in public; Muslim women and girls may keep their "headscarves" on in the workplace or in school; Jewish butchers are allowed to slaughter livestock and poultry according to kosher methods; and so forth" (Habermas, 2005, p.27) Schools should try to compromise in the same way.

The value of respect towards others is a key learning outcome of any citizenship education provision in liberal democratic states because, "Liberal education is committed to the liberal idea that all learners regardless of background or affiliation have the capacity for free agency and so are inherently equal and worthy of respect." (Alexander, 2007, p.611) Respect in liberal democratic states should be taught because it has tangible political consequences on the life of citizens. Citizens have complex relations with one another, relations on which their attitudes and actions have serious effects. Respect should help to minimize undesirable repercussion of social interactions.

4.10 The Value of Tolerance to Diversity.

As Henley explains "The principle of tolerance is, if not the only thing liberals share, at least a touchstone of liberalism." (Henley, 2000, p.1) In deed, perfectionist, anti-perfectionist, social liberals, libertarians and other liberals all agree that liberal democratic states need to foster the value of tolerance to try to compensate for the incompatible differences that naturally grow in states where respect for the individual as autonomous and free agent are so dominant.

Parekh describes cultural diversity "as a positive value to be cherished and fostered" (Parekh, 2000, p.12) and tolerance is a way to live with diversity. Tolerance is not meant to lead all citizens to become happy culture enthusiasts who "feast" for diversity like children at a birthday party. Such an interpretation would be very disrespectful of the real, deep and tangible diversity of opposing views that have to live together in a liberal democratic state. Tolerance simply refers to the conditional acceptance of an approach of non-interference with practices that the majority of citizens consider to be wrong but still "tolerable," such that they should be allowed to exist even though they could in practice be banned, outlawed and stopped. There are many contexts in which citizens in liberal democratic states can choose to be tolerant, p.they

tolerate certain behaviour of certain citizens, they tolerate (to a certain extent) the "weaknesses" of a minority group regarding the status of women, they tolerate perverse sexual behaviour between adults. Citizens are meant to also tolerate minority religions, superstitions and sometimes even deviant behaviour. Thus, the value of tolerance is required because, in liberal democratic states marked by strong diversity "The melting pot does not melt" (Buell, 1994, p.130) and the state needs the value of tolerance to cope with the fact that citizens are bound to have very different ideas due to a wide variety of beliefs, due to gender differences, to different sexual orientations, socio-economic backgrounds and also due to cultural, ethnic and racial diversity that might originate from citizens of other nationalities. A society marked by such great diversity should not frighten citizens but provide them with additional opportunities of political participation in a way to try and foster social cooperation.

Tolerance is meant to signify a patient forbearance, a permission given by liberal citizens for illiberal doctrines to be present in a liberal democratic state, even though looked upon with disapproval as mistaken. Tolerance is an instrumental value that allows better conviviality between citizens. Tolerance is not an easily endorsed value and indeed "To be tolerant of someone who holds strongly to a different ideology or religion needs considerable understanding and empathy." (Crick, 2003, p.26) Developing the concept of tolerance into respect towards all views of the life worth livings might not only be impossible but also undesirable since liberal democratic states might accommodate diverse views that do not merit any respect because racist, sexist and intrinsically discriminatory. Therefore, citizens in liberal democratic states are expected to be patient, to control their instinct of disliking what they do not understand, to be aware of diversity in the state and embrace the concept of diversity.

Tolerant citizens know that they are indeed being tolerant towards others when their "forbearance" is addressed towards objectionable behaviour because they cannot tolerate behaviour they agree with, but can only tolerate undesired behaviour, as crick explains "Toleration is the degree to which we accept things we disapprove of. It is often confused with permissiveness. The need for toleration would not arise if there were not disapproval." (Crick, 2003, p.25) Then, once citizens have come to terms with the fact that different people make different choices, no matter how shameful they might feel for the former, the majority of citizens are meant to accept these differences without being expected to make them theirs. Tolerance towards behaviour one has not bothered to understand simply becomes indifference, thus liberal democratic citizens, through the value of tolerance, are expected to make an effort and try to understand the nature of diversity. Another characteristic of the value of tolerance is that it must be freely chosen by citizens. Tolerance simply cannot be imposed, one can only speak of tolerance when it is practiced voluntarily and not compelled by the state. Forced tolerance

would become frustrating forbearance towards actions that one deeply rejects but against which one is powerless. Citizens who tolerate although they object to the tolerated behaviour, have tried to understand the abnormal behaviour carefully and are free to act against but refuse to do so. Instead of banish and send away the perpetrators, liberal citizens are expected to chose to be tolerant because they respect individuals as rational agents who are able to decide, because they respect that value of autonomy and see citizens as free and as having an right to choose.

"Tolerance of diversity," says Galston, is "important for the successful functioning of contemporary liberal democracies" (Galston, 2002, p.107) it is important because it is meant to strengthen social conviviality and social conviviality is needed because the state needs all citizenry despite diversity to contribute. Citizens need to perform their duties for the benefit of all citizens of the state, when they vote, when they enrol in the army, when they pay taxes for infrastructure and police force, they also help the citizens whose values oppose their own. In order for the state to help citizens in performing their civic duties, it should teach the value of tolerance.

Liberal democratic states prone as they are to differences cannot do without the value of tolerance. The state's equal commitment to values of freedom, respect, autonomy and equality encourage the state to be tolerant in an equal way towards all citizens, therefore make an effort to show tolerance to intolerant citizens. The intolerant are to be tolerated until they are harming others or imposing on the liberty of others, as Scorza explains "as long as they do not impose their civic ideals through coercion, or deny their members free exit, we may have to tolerate them (i.e. accept their existence and right to promote civic values without necessarily endorsing them or any of their policies or beliefs.)" (Scorza, 2001, p.39) The harm principle applies to conceptions of tolerance too, thus the state, whose sole purpose is to defend the rights and freedoms of citizens is duty bound to interfere when citizens are harming others or restricting their freedom. As Bair explained, "A good example is forced marriage. There can be no defence of forced marriage on cultural or any other grounds." (Blair, 2006, para24) The practice of forced marriage is intolerable because it is disrespectful towards humans as free agents able to decide for themselves, it disrespects individual autonomy, freedom, treats females in an unequal way and impose choices on individuals against their wish.

Liberal democratic states have a reasonable right of self-preservation that supersedes the principle of tolerance. Hence, the intolerant should be tolerated but only insofar as they do not endanger the state and its institutions and in such instance the state ought to follow Poppers advice and "claim that any movement preaching intolerance places itself outside the law, and we should consider incitement to intolerance and persecution as criminal, in the same way as we

should consider incitement to murder, or to kidnapping, or to the revival of the slave trade, as criminal." (Popper, 1971 [1945], p.296) Indeed, one has to make a distinction between citizens who are trapped in their own intolerance and citizens who incite other citizens to become intolerant. Even if illiberal and intolerant citizens through freedom of thought have the right to think what they like and talk negatively about values they find obscene, yet when they come to their proper contribution to the political sphere they should be aware that intolerant, discriminatory, racist behaviour cannot be accepted. Illiberal citizens are thus meant "to moderate these views, at least in the public realm, and limit oneself to their being expressed sensitively and respectfully" (Waldron and Melissa, 2008, p.7) In the long run, by being tolerated in the liberal democratic state, intolerant citizens are continuously being exposed to tolerance and somehow might learn to moderate their intolerant instinct. In this way, in being tolerant and allowing denominated schools and also by accommodating illiberal parents in public schools. Future citizens continue to have the opportunity to learn about individual autonomy and have an exposure to living examples of tolerance. Furthermore, by enabling children of illiberal parents in public schools, all children gain an opportunity to learn about the nature of diversity. Thus, "the toleration of the intolerant is not just a moral duty of the liberal state, but it also can have significant educational consequences as well." (Bull, 2008, p.499)

The value of tolerance also helps to provide citizens with opportunities of multicultural realities which are essential because if the state does not offer alternative options then it is not being conducive to the value of autonomy since without opportunities to choice differently one simply cannot be autonomous. It is through the value of tolerance, respect and minority rights that denominational schools are welcome in liberal democratic states, also in the hope that, "There is no reason to suppose that denominational schools are any less effective at teaching the value of mutual respect or promoting tolerance." (Dagovitz, 2004, p.178) There is no reason to suppose their inability to teach tolerance especially if their curriculum taught in such schools is adapted to accommodate for the core public values needed by the liberal democratic state. Dagovitz also states that "Parents' desire to pass their religion on to their children is not illiberal, and it should be accommodated through the public funding of faith schools. Schools do not need to serve as a context for choice to receive the support of political liberalism; they need only serve as a context for teaching liberal values." (Dagovitz, 2004, p.178) These views are especially relevant when the pupils concerned are children of taxpayers. Indeed, the teaching of liberal values should be enough to ensure politically autonomous citizens who can fully participate in the political sphere. What renders liberal democratic states particularly suited for diversity is its ability to compromise and accommodate for difference, limited only by the harm principle. Tolerance is what allows illiberal citizens to enjoy their own schools and minority rights that respect their cultural heritage, thus they have a vested interest to teach tolerance not only to

respect the liberal democratic states in which they live but also for their own good because it is through it that they are allowed to teach their own views of the life worth living.

In liberal democratic states, tolerance refers to the acceptance of the fact that different individuals make very different choices. These different choices do not refer to choosing cars of different colours but to very diverse ideas of proper living and life choices considered morally very objectionable by other citizens. Thus, tolerance involves practices that do away with discrimination against those whose life choices can be a cause of disapproval. The liberal democratic conception of tolerance is an awareness that individuals rationally choose very different choices and that citizens as free agents can rationally agree to disagree. Tolerance also refers to 'the principled refusal to use coercive state instruments to impose one's own views on others.' (Galston, 2002, p.126) Such refusal to use coercive actions is possible through a genuine "commitment to the broadest possible toleration of rival religious and moral conceptions of the worthy way of life." (Henley, 2000, p.1)

Galston explains that "Liberal pluralism requires a parsimonious but vigorous system of civic education that teaches tolerance so understood, and helps equip individuals with the virtues and competences they will need to perform as members of a liberal pluralist economy, society and polity." (Galston, 2002, p.126) Thus citizenship education, as an education that prepares citizens for the public dimension needs to teach the value of tolerance as tolerance will enable citizens to handle diversity better, tolerance will allow most views of the life worth living to be accommodated in the liberal democratic state, but not all. Tolerance has limits. As Moller Okin explains, "The liberal state, I conclude, should not only not give special rights or exemptions to cultural and religious groups that discriminate against or oppress woman. It should also enforce individual rights against such groups when the opportunity arises, and encourage all groups within its borders to cease such practices. Not to do so, from the point of view of a liberal who takes women's, children's, and other potentially vulnerable persons' rights seriously, is to let toleration for diversity run amok." (Moller Okin, 2003, p. 346)

### 4.11 The Value of Responsibility.

The value of responsibility in liberal democratic states translates into a set of civic duties. Liberal democratic states are characterised by duties, duties that the state has towards its citizens and duties that individual citizens have towards and their state. Liberal democratic states have the duty to defend the rights and freedoms of citizens, institutionalise and maintain a police force a court system and armed forces, encourage political participation and set up an educational system that equips each citizen with knowledge, skills and values that enable them to participate fully in the public sphere. The duties performed by the state increase the citizens'

sense of responsibility towards their civic duties such as paying taxes, voting and enlisting in the army. Furthermore, the fact that political involvement requires the citizen to actually decide in favour or against policies, cultivates even further the sense of responsibility that citizens share in the public sphere. Along with the many rights that citizens of liberal democratic states can claim, they are also bestowed with a number of duties. Kymlicka explains that in liberal democratic states, "...our duties as citizens are quintessentially liberal duties e.g. the duty to be tolerant, to accept the secular nature of political power and hence the separation of church and state, and to exercise our individual autonomous judgement and critical reasoning when engaging in voting or public reasoning" (Kymlicka, 2003, p.47) The first duty of a citizen is of course that of protecting their rights through political participation. Citizens also have a duty to use their rights for their own and their communities benefit. The highest duty of all liberal democratic citizens is the vital contribution they give in the decision-making process of the state. Citizens in liberal democratic states are expected to perform the following duties;

1. The Duty of political participation.

If citizens do not enter the political arena, vote or campaign themselves, they are abdicating their democratic sovereignty. If citizens fail to govern themselves, they risk that some other power will rise up to govern them. The best way to ensure their freedom is to exercise actively their rights and duties that best secure their freedom. Additionally, "Political participation creates legitimacy: Democracy depends on voluntary acquiescence to the government: obedience to laws without constant police control, acceptance of election outcomes by the losing side, etc..." (Verba, 2003, p.663) without political participation and involvement in state business it would be more difficult to help citizens to become conductive to the democratic process and in doing so legitimise that state.

2. Duty to be informed about state politics.

Citizenship requires being informed. Political campaigns are meant to enable citizens to become informed as to what policies are best for themselves and for their country, in order that they may vote to elect those who from their past record they know will put such policies into effect. All the speeches, all the literature, all the effort, time and money would have been wasted if citizens do not care to be informed.

3. The Duty to vote

Citizens who have the right to vote are trustees for the benefit of the state. Citizens are charged with an important trust that should be done seriously, in accordance with its importance.

4 Duty to be loyal to the state

Loyalty as a duty refers to the belief that citizens are defenders of the rights granted to them by the state. This loyalty is shown when citizens show respect towards the democratic process, the law, and the liberties that help establish the basic structure of the liberal democratic state. Loyalty is meant to bind together diverse citizenry by fostering mutual respect as members of the same state. Loyalty accepts criticism and opposition to government policies as part of the fundamental values of democracy, freedom, critical thinking and personal autonomy.

5. Duty to be moderate and non-violent

While adherence to the rule of law is essential, and it automatically settles disagreements between fellow citizens in an efficient way, liberal democratic states still require the duty of moderation to strengthen social cohesion. Citizens should be aware that even if they might be right according to the law, disputes should always be solved through reason and in a non-violent approach because violence limits the freedom of citizens. Citizens should be committed to non-violence and strive for a culture of peace, cooperation and respect for human rights. Moderation helps to set fair terms of cooperation among citizens. When it is not possible to ground social cooperation on a shared comprehensive view of the good, moderation lessens the political discord that would result. Moderation based on reason is also a way of respecting fellow citizens because effectively it acknowledges the fact that that there are many legitimate reasons why citizens may disagree in their judgments. In liberal democratic states moderation is "justified by the respect due to our shared reasonableness and the difficulty of occupying a common moral standpoint, of exercising our common capacity for reasonableness in the same way." (Macedo, 1990, p.72)

6. Duty to be responsible of one's choices.

The right of individuals to shape the course of their own lives results in the responsibility of their choices. The link between freedom and rights on one hand and individual responsibility on the other is unavoidable. To advocate freedom without holding people responsible for their actions would be to promise all the benefits of personal liberty without any concern for the potential consequences on other citizen and the state.

7. Duty to educate oneself.

Society requires skilled citizens and "education is an obligation because it is the means to understand and perform all other citizens' obligations". (Janowitz, 1980, p.18) It is the duty of citizens to engage in educational practices that develop their ability to perform the numerous duties mentioned in this section. Feinberg had gone as far as saying that, "...each person has a right that all the other persons are educated, and in virtue of the right that the others have that

he be educated, he has himself a duty to attend school." (Feinberg, 1978, p.105) While I would like to think that, such a suggestion might also be seen as wishful thinking.

8 Duty to abide by the lay

All citizens share the equal duty to obey the law that equally applies to everyone. Laws should not be implemented for the common citizen and interpreted for the influential ones. Laws should be equally applied to all citizens and all citizens are equally duty bound to live in a law-abiding way.

9. Duty to be reasonable

Liberal citizens are expected to make cases for their claims about truth through reason. Liberal democratic states set constraints on public discourse by insisting on logical reasoning and evidence rather than feelings. Reason helps citizens to negotiate differences while maintaining peace. Reason needs the ability to make valid arguments and articulating in a clear way. Liberal democratic states cannot force the value of reasoning on all citizens because this might go contrary to some citizens' personal views on for example religion. All citizens should be aware of the fact that in the public sphere, using moderation based on reason fosters understanding and that reason in the public sphere is expected out of all citizens.

10 The duty to pay taxes.

Even the most minimalist of liberal democratic states would need to collect taxes because at the very least it needs to maintain a police force for internal order, an army for defence, a political system, a penitential system, a judiciary system and infrastructure. The more a state's democratic system decides to go into what is known as "social rights" the more taxes would have to be paid. Such choice is to be taken democratically by all citizens after very careful considerations. Interpretations of this duty differ substantially in social liberal states and in states that adopt a classical or neo liberal approach that might see taxes as theft.

11 The duty to defend the nation.

Citizens should be aware that there has to be military service in case of war. It is the state that provides the many rights that citizens enjoy, if the state is in danger, then rights of citizens are in danger too. Citizens should see that they help their state when it is threatened by outside forces.

12 The duty to be honest and transparent

All agreements in liberal democratic states make sense only if based on honesty and made in good faith. Without honesty there cannot be a valid democracy, there cannot be proper political participation or social conviviality because citizens would feel cheated and betrayed and would not really care about being cooperative. The basic idea of transparency is simple:

things go better when processes are open. Opaque processes are likely to bring corruption since secret decision-making facilitates bribery. Transparent government is required by the rights of citizens to meaningfully participate in democratic self-government. Additionally, if public officials conduct business in private, then it becomes more difficult for citizens to make meaningful decisions at the ballot box.

13 The duty to be autonomous

If citizens do not make their political choices independently they make the whole democratic process null. Citizens, once they have listened to every opinion and person they wanted, have an important duty to perform, they have to take decisions on their own, solely basing their decisions on their own values and critical thinking skills. Without such a commitment, liberal democratic states would end up being illiberal states.

14 The duty not to discriminate.

In liberal democratic states marked by diversity, citizens are to expect differing opinions. They are to respect diversity and not discriminate on race, sex, sexual orientation, gender or other sources of diversity.

15 The duty to serve on juries.

The right to a fair trial needs fair juries in order to function properly. Citizens are meant to help in this process.

16 The duty to protect one's own rights.

If rights are indeed precious to citizens, than it stands to reason that they ought to protect them. Citizens should oppose all threats that diminish the strength of their rights.

17 The duty of respecting other's rights.

One cannot really expect to have her own rights respected if one does not respect the rights of others first. Thus all citizens are duty bound to respect the rights of all the other citizens.

18 The duty of civility

Rawls explains that citizens who perform the duty of civility are those who are "able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions [regarding constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice] how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason" (Rawls, 1993, p.217) Through the duty of civility, citizens are meant to show respect to each other by explaining the motives of their own

actions not through their unintelligible irrational values which others might not be able to understand, but through motivations that can be understood by most reasonable citizens. This explanation is of course only expected in the public sphere, in matters "regarding constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice"; no explanation needs to be given or is even expected on matters that fall under the private sphere protected by rights. Calhoun explains civility as the disposition "to communicate basic moral attitudes of respect, tolerance and considerateness." (Calhoun, 2000, p.255) Thus, the disposition of citizens to follow standard democratic processes of decision making can be understood as an effort to be civil, expressing respect to all citizens especially in contexts of pluralism. The duty of civility can also be interpreted as the effort that is expected to try harder to understand each other. The harder effort that liberal citizens make to try and comprehend the points of view of illiberal citizens in their contribution in the public sphere, and also the effort made by the illiberal citizens who bother to "translate" their views in ways that can be comprehended by as many citizens as possible.

19 The duty to monitor politicians' performance.

All citizens have the important duty to see that the politicians they entrusted with decision making are in fact performing in the way they had said they would perform when they were being chosen. Citizens thus have a duty "to evaluate their [representatives] performance in office soberly." (Galston, 1998, p.48) The duty of citizens to monitor the performance of their representatives includes the duty to check if they are being honest. Citizens do not simply appreciate honesty; they have a right to it at every level of the political process, from representatives and from the media. In order to guarantee that citizens can indeed take prudent decisions in the public sphere, the government should make sure that the facts on which citizens base their decisions are true.

20. The duty to integrate.

Citizenship Education in liberal democratic states should teach about the duty to integrate. "Integration is principally the process that ensures new residents and existing residents adapt to one another." (Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 2007, p.38) This process of adaptation is important for social cohesion as both hosts and guests are meant to make a real effort in moderating their diversities and finding compromises. As Callan explains; "Future citizens need to develop some imaginative sympathy for compatriots whose experience and identity incline them to see political questions in ways that differ systematically from their own. A respect for reasonable differences and a concomitant spirit of moderation and compromise." (Callan, 1997, p.8) In an important speech, Blair explained that "Integration, in this context, is not about culture or lifestyle. [The private sphere] It is about values. It is about integrating at the point of shared, common unifying British values. It isn't about what defines us

as people, but as citizens, [the public sphere] the rights and duties that go with being a member of our society." (Blair, 2006, para11) The duty to integrate in liberal democratic states would also be more related to the public dimension then to private realties while acknowledging the fact of course that both effect each other and in practice an education could never be just limited to the public sphere.

In conclusion, while the duties are more similar to suggestions for a better living, then law-enforced laws, citizens should be responsible enough to attend to them conscientiously. The performance of one's duties will not turn liberal democratic states into utopias even if everyone acted diligently, conflicts and misunderstandings crop up in the most homogeneous of states let alone in those prone to diversity, yet liberal democratic states would function better if citizens performed their duties. The liberal democratic state, whose final purpose of existence is the protection of individual rights, needs citizen's cooperation, if they do not cooperate then the state is weakened and as a result their rights are weakened too. If citizens do not want her rights weakened, therefore all citizens have a vested interest in aiding the state through the duties they perform.

Citizens need to be aware of what is going on in the public sphere and should contribute to the political decision making process, which will in turn help participating individuals to understand why taxes need to be paid and why the core values have to be observed. Duties in liberal democratic states are meant to strengthen social coherence and state legitimacy. Citizens are meant to pay taxes, help in the war effort, participate in politics, be loyal and non-violent, be law-abiding, honest, and non-discriminating. All duties that help the state to take care of its basic needs and that help citizens to flourish in pluralistic and multi-cultural societies. If the public duties needed by the states incidentally conflict with the individuals view of the life worth living , then an effort should be made by both state and citizen to find a mutually acceptable compromise especially where individual choices are not being forced on others and not harming anyone.

## 4.12 Conclusion

Accepting that, "Public values are those which, in virtue of their fundamentality or inescapability, are seen as binding on all persons." (McLaughlin, 1995, p.26) this chapter has proposed ten public values, which due to their essentiality, are believed to be binding on all citizens in spite of the many different views on the good life. This study has given due regard to the warning given by Noddings when she wrote that "When virtues are identified within a particular society, they may escape critical examination." (Noddings, 2007, p.167) While Noddings was referring to the teaching of virtues through character education, and this study is

about public values through Citizenship Education, there is enough correlation between the two notions to make Citizenship Education give due regard to her warning and for the need to make it very clear that not only the chosen core values are not to escape critical examination but that actually the scope of teaching them is in fact to get better acquainted with them and critically engage with them with the sole purpose of bringing positive change. The teaching of a defined set of values is meant to be the beginning of deliberation about values not its closure.

While all ten values might include an intrinsic value, it is in virtue of their instrumental value that they find their rightful place in the Citizenship Education curriculum. It could not have been otherwise since liberal democratic states expect everyone to provide tangible reasons for chosen acts, thus the state must also abide by its own rules and provide reasoned purposes why a set of ten core values are seen as essential and thus be taught to all citizens. Essentially these core values had to be chosen because it could not be conceived how any liberal democratic state could exist without them. The value of freedom was deemed as essential since it allows citizens to be responsible of their actions since it was they themselves who chose them. No liberal public official and thus state would want such a huge responsibility, additionally when citizens choose for themselves they potentially increase their well-being by choosing options according to their preference. The importance of the value of rights derives from the rights function to create a private sphere where citizens enjoy their freedoms. Autonomy allows citizens to detach themselves from their reality, try to recognize themselves in a reasoned perspective and in doing so legitimise and validate their own choices. The effort to be impartial by state and citizens shows equal respect towards all citizens and stops any citizens from feeling like "second-class citizens". The value of democracy is needed to understand the nature of the decision making processes in liberal democratic states, encourage participation and legitimise the state's very existence. The value of law-abidingness makes sure that what was democratically chosen is respected. Respect for others and tolerance for diversity are values that enhance social cohesion and finally the value of responsibility through citizens' duties strengthens the state and therefore its ability to protect personal freedom and individual rights. All together, the ten core values should be strong enough to allow a stable dialogue between citizens, so that when "controversies arise... these values should be used as the basis of a searching dialogue rather than as a blunt instrument that forecloses their further development." (Primoratz and Pavkovic, 2006, p.46) The search for the core values of the state is never over because that state changes continuously and so do its values and so must citizenship education change accordingly especially when one considers that schools are mostly preparing future citizens not present day ones.

So, the whole aim of recognising core values in liberal states is to foster their own further development and to strengthen social dialogue through discussion, debate and democratic deliberation. First of all, identifying the core values and teaching them results in citizens who better comprehend the public sphere, because they understand the values on which it is founded. The 'always-provisional' core public values provide a framework which allows all citizens who have a difference of opinion about the life worth living, to work together with others, while continuously participating in the process of public reason whose aim is to alter the core values accordingly to better suit the needs of most citizens. The aim of pointing out the core values in liberal democratic states is not to have ten commandments to adhere to but to sustain the ongoing dialogue conducive to change. The final aim of identifying the core values and teaching them to citizens is not reproduction of a status quo but change that better adapts to new political realities, the only way to be able to continue to dialogue in the public square and bring about change is when all citizens are provided with the ability to contribute to this public effort of deliberation. Citizenship Education is the means that provides such ability in liberal democratic states. Citizenship Education and the teaching of the public values are two important tools that enforce the democratic process of deliberation for change. That is why the values of responsibility, respect and tolerance encourage liberal citizens to make an effort to understand illiberal citizens. This is also why simultaneously, members of comprehensive doctrines are encouraged to translate their views into rational discourse in the public square, so that they can be comprehended by most and therefore facilitate discussion and deliberation. This is also why the views of all reasonable citizens should be taken into consideration including feminist views that want to reinterpret core values such as autonomy in a less "mainstream" format to better suit attitudes of care and relationality. The values of respect for other and tolerance for diversity, responsibility and the effort to be impartial all lead to an endeavour to sustain dialogue with the hope that dialogue brings change for the better and understanding. If dialogue was to bring a greater disagreement, then the same core values that lead to dialogue could function as borders that show what is acceptable and what is not and prevent freedom from turning into chaos. Dialogue is also the reason why the value of autonomy is so important in liberal democratic states. Dialogue is only possible between autonomous citizens (who are aware of why they are proposing what they are proposing) and on the other hand pawns, mindless automatons of comprehensive doctrines who have "no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation." (Mill, 1991 [1859], p.65) While of course citizens can privately choose to follow a heteronymous lifestyles, where they choose to obey and follow laws that they do not help to construct themselves, in the public sphere at least, until other better solutions can be found, and indeed for better solutions to be found, they shall have to provisionally endorse the value of autonomy and to respect the core values.

## Chapter 5: Conclusions

### 5.1 Conclusions

This study began with defining liberal democratic states as particular democracies "whose commitment to majoritarian rule is tempered by the understanding that some personal rights and liberties should not be subject to the majority's preferences." (Eichner, 2007, p.1) On defining liberal democratic states it became evident that "Democratic institutions do not work by default. Their operations require a citizenry with particular habits of mind and particular commitments." (Fullinwider, 1996, p.16) These habits of the mind and commitments, especially since liberal democratic states are very prone to generate diversity, must be catered for by the state. Chapter three thus sustained the point of view that "It is a part of education's moral role in a democratic state to acquaint the members with its laws, civil processes, institutions, and existential conditions." (Heslep, 1989, p.179) This chapter also defined liberal democratic citizenship education, explained why public values are needed and also discussed the nature of the legitimacy of teaching core values.

Chapter four asked a fundamental question "Which values should be cultivated through citizenship education in liberal democratic states?" In doing so and dealing with "The question 'whose values are we to install?'" (Smith and Standish, 1997, p.139) the study has tried to overcome the fact that this question is too often been "Put in a rhetorical way as if to defy any attempt to answer it." (Smith and Standish, 1997, p.139) In answering it, the study proposes a set of values made out of ten public values, to serve as a common core that can be engaged in all liberal democratic states, despite the different trends of liberalism in each. The study provides several reasons for the requirement of teaching values. The emphasis on the importance of the common core of values was done in full awareness that "The best option for building moral consensus in post-modern, pluralistic democracies is not agreement on a laundry list of absolute values that all citizens should subscribe to." (Smith, 2000, p.405) but by establishing "processes whereby citizens engage questions of moral and civic virtue together, through discussion, debate, and deliberation". (Smith, 2000, p.405) And it is exactly to start the process of debating questions of moral and civic virtue that liberal democratic states need to identify their core values, as the best way to guarantee this "dialogue between the members of the society's diverse communities about the nature and justification of their shared civic language" (Bull, 2008, p.449) Of course, deliberation does not automatically lead to agreement and "Genuine discussion promotes mutual understanding but it may only sharpen the disagreements as a result of a better self-understanding." (Puolimatka, 2002, p.273) In such cases of conflict, core values become even more important because, being the result of a democratic process, they can legitimately delineate the perimeters of accepted action. If this ongoing dialogue leads to deeper

disagreements, then a proper citizenship education provision has an additional motivation to use "schools, as sites where individuals from most traditions are present... as ...ideal sites from which to initiate such deliberations." (Stout, 2002, p.437)

Identifying the core values to be taught through Citizenship Education is beneficial for the initiation of public dialogue regarding the matter of which values to teach, and it is also beneficial for the strengthening of the concept of citizenship intended as a common political identity. Citizenship Education should include public values because "these are the shared boundaries within which we all are obliged to live, precisely in order to preserve our right to our own different faiths, races and creeds." (Blair, 2006, para17) A common citizenship intended as a common political identity would be able to perform this function of being aware of the shared boundaries within which citizens could best coexist with others. Citizenship intended as a common political identity that is able to provide a feeling of belonging could also encourage participation in the democratic processes of the states and in doing so providing the state with the much required legitimacy. This sense of identity and belonging might also originate from a common feeling of nationality but one must admit that with the ever growing number of citizens who are non-nationals, the idea of nationality (or religion) as sources of common identity is becoming increasingly unlikely. Thus it is up to citizenship as loyalty towards a common core of public liberal democratic values, to serve as "a shared civic identity that can sustain the level of mutual concern, accommodation, and sacrifice that democracies require." (Kymlicka, 1995, p.174) If it is agreed that liberal democratic states require citizenship to serve as a common political identity, then the teaching of public values has a unique contribution to give to the subject of citizenship, to the educational provision at large, to the citizen and of course to the state. Through this critically acquired citizenship that also serves as a political identity, very diverse citizens might be able to participate in a more productive way in the public sphere to discuss, deliberate and bring about change. The teaching and learning of liberal democratic values will not turn the public square from being an "an inharmonious melange of ill-assorted fragments" (MacIntyre, 1984, p.10) into being "An ordered dialogue of interested viewpoints." (MacIntyre, 1984, p.10) yet, equipping all citizens with an education that provides them with knowledge, skills and values for political participation and the ability to exercise their rights and perform their duties, should hopefully help citizens to contribute in a better way to the process of public reason and bring about positive change that is able to better accommodate for the needs of different citizens.

Like others who have tried to venture in this same topic, when trying to draw some conclusions one must admit that "a number of questions still remain: Can democracy be shaped in such a way as to be fully inclusive of and responsive to all members of society? Is there a form

of civic education (and correlatively, a sense of civic identity) that can enable all students (and all citizens) to be responsive and responsible democratic citizens?" (Levinson, 2002b, p.269) Just like Levinson I must answer that "I do not know the answers to these questions" and like Levinson I also consider that "—they are some of the reasons that it remains interesting to be a teacher. But I hope that the answers to these questions are (or can become) "yes," ... because we want all future citizens ultimately to view citizenship positively, as an opportunity to participate in political deliberation and to enact positive political change. (Levinson, 2002b, p.269) On my part, I would like to suggest that teaching citizenship and core values might contribute positively to the strengthening of social cohesion because the feeling of political equality along with the fact that all core values try to eliminate the feeling of being a second-class citizen, ought to have beneficial effects on social cohesion because citizens who feel equally respected should be better disposed to socially contribute. Even if "there is, as yet, no evidence that the free, open and public exercise of reason among citizens will overcome certain "burdens of judgment" or "reasonable disagreements". (Reily, 2001, p.585) Yet, if it is considered that "Cohesion is principally the process that must happen in all communities to ensure different groups of people get on well together" (Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 2007, p.38) there is no reason to believe that teaching public values that try hard to be respectful of diversity, might not eventually be able to contribute positively to social unity.

If it is agreed as McLaughlin noted, that "The liberal project is to specify a range of public values, free of significant controversial assumptions and judgements, which can generate principles for the conduct of relations between people who disagree." (McLaughlin, 1995, p.27) Then it could be concluded that this study has been successful in specifying a range of public values that should be able to guide public conduct of relations between citizens. Of course with one "minor" detail, it is rife with conflicting "significant assumptions and judgements." A very strong effort has to be made in order to be able to accommodate for all ideologies and trends within liberalism, let alone the infinite disagreements and incommensurable values that need to be reckoned with in multi-cultural liberal democratic states. In spite of such a situation, it was decided to follow Galston's advice that "Despite the pluralism of liberal societies, it is perfectly possible to identify a core of civic commitments and competences whose broad acceptance undergirds a well-ordered liberal polity. The state has the right to ensure that this core is generally and effectively disseminated." (Galston, 1989, p.101) The right of the state to teach a common core of values is also legitimised through the conviction that the taught values "should be used as the basis of a searching dialogue rather than as a blunt instrument that forecloses their further development." (Primoratz and Pavkovic, 2006, p.46) In hope that this dialogue leads to some sort of compromise and in full realisation that legitimacy gives the state not only the right to take decisions about the core binding values but also the duty to do so. Then, "The

unavoidable consequences of reasonable requirements for children's education may have to be accepted, often with regret" (Rawls, 1993, p.200) since a unanimous consensus could only be achieved in a utopia (or would it?), then liberal democratic states have to have the courage to accept their imperfections and see how to best deal fairly through accommodation and compromise with the citizens that dissent of the public values taught through Citizenship Education. What sustains such courage is the fact that the teaching the core values is being proposed as a means to bring about change and not as a way of supporting social reproduction.

## 5.2 Implications of the Study

This study has several implications including consequences for schools and for the state in general. The civic implications refer to the fact that if values have been identified even if prone to change, then it is the state that has to show respect towards its own values in the first place by enacting policies that are consonant with the core values. The pedagogical implications refer to the fact that if values have been identified, then the teaching must reflect the values taught, it could hardly be said that Citizenship Education is reaching its goal in preparing autonomous citizens, if learners are indoctrinated into a perfect ideal, simply cast into pre-defined moulds. Citizenship Education is meant to inform the relationship between citizen and state, and this "cannot be achieved by controlling or directing what pupils think." (Carr and Hartnett, 1997, p.63) Rather, it should "provide a democratic culture in which pupils are encouraged to resolve practical, moral and social problems through joint activities and collective decision-making" (Carr and Hartnett, 1997, p.63)

## 5.3 Limitations of the study

A first limitation to this study is the fact that; "...we cannot have utter confidence that an education for critical reason, toleration, and commitment to freedom and equality will actually produce these virtues in individuals." (Williams, 2003, p.223) Additionally, "It is difficult to encourage commitment to something and [maintain] an open-minded, critical attitude to it at the same time" (McLaughlin and Halstead, 1999, p.152) Furthermore, the problem of measuring the success of the proposals is further complicated by the fact that it is difficult to assess the teaching of values. Citizenship Education goes far beyond "measurable political literacy" and includes the "aim to combat racism, cultivate democratic feelings and communal spirit, and prepare the pupils for their life in a multicultural society." while "these educational objectives display considerable resistance to standard assessment techniques" this resistance "does not hinder their being more valuable than mere proficiency in political terminology" (Papastephanou and Angeli, 2007, p.261) Thus, it is up to teachers to device ways in which they

can assess the effects that Citizenship Education has on learners even though it might not be an easy task.

## 5.3 Suggestions for Future Research.

Also on the tutor's advice, this dissertation has not ventured into the pedagogical aspect of the teaching of values. How to teach public values in liberal democratic states would make for a very interesting academic work but there simply was no space for it to be tackled adequately in the present study. The pedagogy of values education is such a vast, intricate, interesting and important subject that it deserves a study on its own. Another interesting study directly related to this would be "Assessing the teaching of liberal democratic values." Additionally, since this study is titled "Core values for democratic Citizenship Education in Liberal Democratic States" there seems to be the need of a volume two: "Skills for Citizenship Education in Liberal Democratic States" and volume three "The Knowledge that pertains to Citizenship Education in Liberal Democratic States."

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