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EDITORIAL

A WELCOME TO NEW STUDENTS:

THE Law Society welcomes all the new students who intend to take up law as a career and we assure them that "their society" is always ready to help with their difficulties and to encourage that "earnestness and assiduity" which are the basis upon which the legal prestige and the social advancement of a country are based.

Very unfortunately indeed we are still at a loss as to what will finally be endorsed in, the now notorious Chapter XIII of the New Statute. All responsible opinion is agreed that the degree of Bachelor of Laws after a comprehensive and detailed study of the various branches of law extending over a period of five years, not to mention the two-year preparatory course belongs to-day to the realm of absurdities.

The position now stands thus. Ordinance No. XXXII of 1947 was a year later published as the New Statute of the Royal University of Malta. As soon as this Society learned of the new commitments our predecessors resorted to the polite way of sending a letter of protest and justifying their reasons. This was in 1948 other letters, protests and reminders were sent periodically and at last a sub-committee was appointed to study the question. We were never told who were the members of this sub-committee, when and how often did it meet, by whom was it appointed or whether a representative of the students was to be heard. Then some time ago it was rumoured that this sub-committee had reported to the Faculty Board but apparently the Faculty did not agree to the sub-committee's proposals whatever they might have been and a new sub-committee has been newly appointed. Again nothing substantial was communicated to the Law Society or to the students themselves although this matter does concern their interests. In November, 1951, the Society again wrote to the authorities asking for a statement on the position but so far no new developments have materialised.

Some of our fellow-students will look back we know, to thirty years ago, when a similar attempt was made and when the innovation which so relegates the position of the Faculty to such an inferior status was readily altered by the effective but censurable means then adopted and they would be tempted perhaps to ask and favour a similar procedure. Our answer to that is the negative. It is true that the procedure so far followed by this Society has had no very promising results but then we must remember that the recently acquired University Autonomy is still passing through one of those early and critical periods aptly likened by St Paul to the pangs of childbirth and consequently some patience and goodwill is required for in the very near future we hope and pray that justice and reason will prevail.

TWO AMENDMENTS TO THE CRIMINAL CODE:

Two amendments to the Criminal Code, one of which has been gone through because of a recent case have become the topic of conversation and debate. In the first case which dealt with Section 661 of the Criminal Code, the Courts of Judicature Police found A.B. guilty of having through negligence or non-observance of regulations whilst driving a truck, caused the death of a child five years old. The Court sentenced the accused to imprisonment for six months. A.B. appealed but H.M. Court in its Appellate Jurisdiction upheld the previous sentence. As soon as this sentence was given Dr. A. Magri, Counsel for the Appellant, filed a note invoking the provisions of Section 661 of the Criminal Code which laid down that ".....every decision shall be enforceable as soon as delivered provided that the judgments of the Criminal Court shall be enforced two days after their delivery....." Crown Counsel held that the interpretation of the clause was to be in the sense that sentences of the Criminal Court should be enforceable *not later than two days* after the delivery or that *they shall have been enforced* two days after delivery. The learned Judge however declared that in section 661 the wording of which was sufficiently clear, only one interpretation was possible, moreover, there was no doubt that H.M. Criminal Court in its Appellate Jurisdiction was a criminal court within the meaning of the section quoted. The Court therefore upheld Defendant's plea and ordered that the sentence just delivered should be enforced after two days. The amend-

ment to this section which does away with this forty eight hours grace, the need for which is no longer felt, was introduced in the Legislative Assembly on Thursday, July 5, 1951.

It was pointed out that this provision existed in the draft Code of 1830, it was repeated in the project of 1844 and enshrined in the draft of 1854. But its existence is probably due to the fact that in these projects provision was made for an appeal from sentences given upon indictment to the superior court of penal justice on conditions that it be lodged within two days. Hence the necessity that the execution of such sentences should be stayed for two days in order to enable the person convicted to make such appeal if he desired. So much so that it was likewise provided that, if the person convicted declared, upon delivery of the sentence that he did not intend to appeal, the sentence then was executed on the same day. Had this been otherwise the consequence would be that persons sentenced to punishment restrictive of personal liberty by a sentence which is not subject to appeal would be set free for two days and would begin to undergo the sentence only thereafter. And even in the case of a person sentenced to death, he would be entitled to be at large pending the issue by the Governor of the necessary warrant for the execution of the sentence. When appeals from sentences of the criminal court were dropped, the provision for staying the execution of such sentences became meaningless and in fact since 1854 the principle recognised has always been the general one in the first part of section 661 viz that every decision apart from payment of pecuniary penalties is enforced as soon as delivered.

Another section which needs amendment is section 95 which deals with the punishments awarded for attacking or resisting with violence or active force a person charged with a public duty (96). The text says that "if any of the offenders..... shall use a regular weapon in the act of attacking or resisting, or shall have previously provided himself with such a weapon with the design of aiding such attack or resistance or shall be apprehended with the same in his possession, he shall be punished....." We are not here concerned with the anomalous departures from the general rules as to the communicability of material circumstances laid down in section 46 of our Criminal Code. It must be noted that in the case in which the offender is taken with the weapon (as distinct from

the case in which he actually made use thereof) he is unable for the aggravated form of the crime only if it is to appear that he had previously provided himself with a weapon with the design of aiding the attack or resistance. Art. 179 of the Neapolitan Code, on which the provision of our Code was framed it was sufficient if the offender "nel momento stesso dell'attacco o della resistenza fosse preso con un'arma propria anche nascosta". It appeared to Jameson that such phraseology might lead to injustice. The fact that the offence is taken on the spot and weapons found on him might in some instances be altogether accidental, and if no bad use were made of the weapons being so accidentally in the possession of the offender this would be a circumstance of extenuation rather than of aggravation. Such a provision is both arbitrary in character and contrary to the just principles of a penal code which ought to reject all arbitrary presumptions of guilt or aggravation and allow every circumstance of suspicion to be sifted at the trial according to the evidence. It ought to appear that the weapons were provided beforehand with the intent to make such an attempt or resistance (Report viii).

Jameson therefore recommended that the Article of the draft should be amended, which it was. However in the text of Section 96 of our Code, there is an *or* instead of an *and* and the *or* it must be submitted must have crept in by mistake instead of an *and*, if the idea was, as it was, to give effect to Jameson's commendation. That *or* instead of removing the defect inverted on by Jameson, adds another defect to the section, for it makes a separate case of aggravation of the condition which was suggested should be fulfilled in order that the mere possession of the offender on the spot of the crime should constitute an aggravation. In other words if one were to accept that *or* instead of *and*, not only the mere accidental possession of the weapon at the time of the attack or resistance would be an aggravation in spite of the objection pointed out by Jameson—but there would also be the aggravation if the offender had *previously* to the attack or resistance provided himself with the weapon to aid the attack or resistance, although he may have subsequently thought better and dispossessed himself of such weapon *before* the attack or resistance. *

* Cfr. "Notes on Criminal Law" by Prof. A. Mamo, pp. 41 to 46.

THE RE-INTRODUCTION OF ITALIAN AS A COMPULSORY SUBJECT IN THE CURRICULUM OF THE PREPARATORY COURSE OF LAWS

This is indeed a crucial subject which demands the most urgent attention. For some we know, it may seem an attempt to revive a question of political character and in the excess of their misdirected zeal, they may smell a rat in our attitude. We do not refer to these people, though it would be interesting to see their, re-action when we refer to the fact, that decisions of our tribunals up to the last two decades or so have been published in Italian, not to mention that for the last five or six centuries all acts of civil life were drawn up in the same language. Surely not even these good people do consider that our notarial Archives and our Case Law are but the trappings of a lawyer's profession; that in other words a lawyer may well proceed without understanding anything about his own country's past legal records.

As the position now stands such exactly is the situation. Students in the 1948-55 Course of Laws were expressly debarred from taking up Italian in their Matriculation by having Latin held at one and the same time as Italian (Latin, quite justly, being compulsory). It is true that the new students who have joined the Course were less harshly dealt with but then Italian being optional there is a minority who have never done the language in their lives and so through sheer force of circumstances they were obliged to take up another modern language; these same people to whom the whole of Maltese Jurisprudence is a closed book are now expected to write a thesis. Here it may not be out of place to quote two short passages from the impartial enquiry of the Royal Commission of 1931. On page 128 we have it laid down that "a reason for maintaining Italian in the secondary schools and the university..... is that it is required in the profession of the Law. With few exceptions, the existing records, deeds, wills etc. from the time Latin gradually merged into Italian are in the latter language. "And on page 15 "Maltese Laws particularly civil and commercial, are based almost entirely on Italian legislative types and Maltese Jurisprudence is wholly founded on Italian or, more widely, Latin precedent". These quotations are as true to-day as they were then.

It is because of these reasons that we whole-heartedly concur with what was stated in an appendix on the LL.B. question

sent by the Students' Representative Council to the Government. The "Times of Malta" commenting on a similar Editorial Volume I No. 2 of the Law Journal, while not concurring in our views that Italian should be compulsory admitted in issue of the 22nd March, 1945 that it should be the "choice" of all those students who desire to become more proficient lawyers. Conscious of this desire that animates the whole student body, the sentiment of the good will, the liberal education and background of the Senatorial Body and especially of the Faculty Board, in recognition of our obligation to promote and advance the interests of the members of this Society independently of party politics and partisanship we make our plea cognizant that when it shall be weighed objectively and conscientiously a rational and sensible basis will not be found wanting.

CARLYLE ON AN "ADVOCATE'S TRADE"

Strange trade that of advocacy. Your intellect, your highest heavenly gift, hung up in the shop window like a loaded pistol for sale, either blow out a pestilent scoundrel's brains, or the scoundrel's salutary sheriff's officer's (in a sense) as you please to choose, for your gain.

CUSTOM.

Mudar costumbre a par de muerte. — To change a custom is next to death. — SP. PROVERB

Consuetudo est secunda Natura.—ST. AUGUSTINE.

Nil consuetudine majus.—OVID.

Man yields to Custom as he bows to fate
 In all things ruled—mind, body and estate;
 In pain, in sickness, we for cure apply,
 To them we know not, and we know not why.

— CRABBE

Security has only one law and that is Custom.—HAMMERTON.

The way of the world is to make laws but to follow Customs.

— MONTAIGNE