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A Comparative Analysis of the George W. Bush and the Barack Obama Administrations' Foreign Policy in the Context of the War on Terror: Case Study – Pakistan

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A dissertation presented to the Faculty of Arts in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts (Hons.) in International Relations

May 2013



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Declaration of Authenticity

I hereby declare that I am the legitimate author of this dissertation and that it is my original work.

No portion of this work has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or institution of learning.

Caroline Muscat

May 2013

To my beloved grandfather, the late Kelinu Xiberras, whom although is no longer with us, is forever in my heart.

Acknowledgements

I would first like to express sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Ms Valentina Cassar, who has provided invaluable advice, knowledge and assistance throughout this research. This dissertation would not have been possible without her guidance and support.

I would also like to thank the lecturers within the Department of International Relations, Dr James Calleja, Dr Arsalan Alshinawi, Dr Carmen Sammut, Dr Anna Khakee and the Head of Department, Dr Isabelle Calleja for their help and assistance over the past three years.

Special thanks go to my parents and family for their love, support and encouragement throughout my life. They have showed faith and instilled confidence in me in times of doubt, and for that I am very grateful.

Abstract

Terrorism has been a top national security threat for the U.S. following the attacks of 11 September 2001. For over a decade U.S. foreign policy has given much priority to this threat in order to prevent future attacks on the homeland. This led to the country initiating a Global War on Terror and re-engaging with Pakistan to fight this war.

This dissertation presents an analytical overview and comparison of the U.S. foreign policy of the George W. Bush and Barack Obama Administrations in the context of the War on Terror, focusing on U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relations. Its aim is to analyse and establish if and where there has been change and continuity in the foreign and Pakistan policy of the U.S. from the Bush Administration to that of Obama. The dissertation tries to assert U.S. foreign policy interests in the war, explains the motives of such interests and seeks to explain consequent U.S. foreign policy behaviour and outcomes of both administrations with regards to Pakistan.

With both presidents coming from two different political backgrounds, Bush being a Republican and Obama a Democrat, it was expected that there would be a shift in U.S. foreign and Pakistan policy from one administration to the other. Yet the dissertation argues that in substance there has been little change in the foreign policy area with regards to the War on Terror and the fight against terrorism. However, although there has been continuity to a certain extent, there was change when it came to the style and how to go about such policies. This has been reflected in the case of Pakistan and U.S. bilateral relations with the country. Therefore it can be said that there has been change within continuity when comparing both the Bush and the Obama Administration's foreign policy and bilateral relations with Pakistan during the war.

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Abbreviations:

9/11	11 September 2001
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
EPPA	Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
GWOT	Global War on Terror
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
MNNA	Major Non-NATO Ally
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NSS	National Security Strategy of the United States
OBL	Osama bin Laden
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
PCCF	Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund
PCF	Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

WOT War on Terror

Chapter 1:

Introduction

Chapter 1: Introduction

On 21 September 2001, President George W. Bush put a tough choice on Pakistan and the rest of the world when he declared that 'Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.' Today, over a decade has passed since the U.S. and Pakistan joined hands in the fight against terrorism.

Terrorism has been a great security threat to the U.S. throughout the years. As a result, it has played an important part in American foreign policy, especially after the attacks of 11 September 2001. George W. Bush and Barack Obama have been the two presidents which have had to fight this war against terrorism, and as a result their foreign relations with various countries around the world have revolved around this.

Cooperation with Pakistan has been key to the U.S in meeting its objectives for the war and in the region. Both the Bush Administration and the Obama Administration knew that Pakistan was a critical node in the War on Terror due to its geo-strategic location. Because of this, Pakistan has been essential in order to provide much needed military, diplomatic and logistical support to the U.S.

Historically, U.S. and Pakistan relations were not always smooth. It has been marked by periodic highs and lows, with both countries cooperating when there were mutual interests involved and walking away when such interests were fulfilled or the

other country was no longer of importance. This is evident once again following the attacks of 9/11. Just before the attacks, U.S.-Pakistan relations were at a low point, however they engaged with one another once again to fulfil each of their own interests.

The title of this dissertation is 'A Comparative Analysis of the George W. Bush and the Barack Obama Administrations' Foreign Policy in the Context of the War on Terror: Case Study - Pakistan.' The research will focus on U.S. foreign policy during the Bush Administration's two terms (2001-2009) and the Obama Administration's first term (2009-2013) in the context of the fight against terrorism. More specifically, it will focus on both administrations' foreign policy towards Pakistan.

The purpose of this research is to analyse and compare both administration's foreign policy and bilateral relations over the past decade, focusing on Pakistan as a case study. The main aim of this is to see if and where there has been continuity or change in foreign policy towards Pakistan and how the relationship with the country evolved between one administration and the other.

Since there was a change in presidency in 2009, with Bush and Obama coming from two different political backgrounds, a Republican and a Democrat respectively, than the hypothesis of this research is that some shift in the U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan has occurred.

Chapter II of the dissertation is a literature review. This section explores the dominant themes available in the literature on this subject area regarding the War on Terror and the fight against terrorism. It also serves as a background for the case study in order to have a greater understanding into what context U.S.-Pakistan relations played out following 9/11. It addresses the debate in the literature with regards to a

common definition for terrorism and touches upon the claimed reasons and the people whom were behind the attacks. It also explores the main topics which come out from the literature on America's fight against terrorism and al-Qaeda under Bush and Obama.

Chapter III serves as a theoretical framework and deals with the theoretical aspects that will be used to analyse the foreign policy of the U.S. in Pakistan. It will look at Foreign Policy Analysis, and then will go on to discuss Realism and Liberalism as two theories of foreign policy which allow us to understand the goals, strategies, behaviour and relationships of states. For the purpose of this research, Realism and Liberalism were chosen as they were deemed to be the two best theories which can be used to understand the foreign policy outcomes of both the Bush and Obama Administration.

Chapter IV focuses on the methodology of this dissertation. It describes how the research was conducted, the data sources used and the obstacles and limitations the researcher has come across.

Chapter V gives an overview of U.S. foreign relations with Pakistan, beginning from Pakistan's independence in 1947, right up to the attacks of 11 September 2001. This chapter provides a historical context to U.S.-Pakistan relations, which highlights the origins of alliances between the two countries. It is useful in order to have a better understanding of their relationship from 2001, onwards.

The following two chapters, chapter VI and VII, will focus on U.S. foreign policy and relations with Pakistan following 9/11. The first will discuss U.S.-Pakistan relations under the two terms of the Bush Administration and the second will deal with the first term of the Obama Administration. Each section will focus on certain elements which include: how each administration viewed Pakistan; their strategy and strategic

objectives; democracy promotion; Afghanistan; special operations; aid and assistance and; the India-Pakistan dispute.

Chapter VIII of this research is a comparative analysis of the Bush and Obama Administrations' foreign policy. Bringing together the two previous chapters, it will bring out where there has been continuity and where there has been change vis-à-vis Pakistan.

This dissertation concludes with chapter IX which is a discussion on the research findings and results.

Chapter 2:

Literature Review

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

The War on Terror (WOT) is the result of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in the U.S. It is an international political and military campaign which is led by the U.S. against the al-Qaeda terrorist organisation with the hope of eliminating it and other militant organisations which pose a threat to American security. According to Bergen, the 9/11 attacks were the 'gravest national security failure in American history'.¹ As a result, combating terrorism has been one of the main focal points of U.S. foreign policy in both the Bush and Obama Administrations. This has come to form my area of research.

Since the 9/11 attacks are known to be the most destructive attack in the history of terrorist attacks, it is not surprising that there has been an increase of attention to and information on the subject of terrorism since late 2001. Therefore literature and research on terrorism and the WOT is plentiful.

2.2 Defining terrorism

There has been much debate throughout the literature in trying to define what terrorism is in order to understand what kind of threat it imposes and the problem it creates. Just as White puts it, 'we can agree that terrorism is a problem, but we cannot

¹ Bergen, P.L. (2011). 'The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between America and al-Qaeda.' p.39.

agree on what terrorism is.’² To add with this, Laqueur states that although finding a common definition as to what terrorism is might be impossible, the vast majority of people are able to know it when they see it.³

Throughout the literature it is evident that the lack of a common definition is due to the fact that terrorism is a social construct.⁴ It is a ‘complex phenomena open to subjective interpretation.’⁵ According to Martin, when trying to define terrorism, one encounters ‘grey areas’. This means that ‘political violence can be interpreted either as acts of unmitigated terrorist barbarity or as freedom fighting and national liberation’, all depending on whom is defining the term.⁶

The social context and historical circumstances also influence and change the meaning of the term. In fact, Hoffman states that defining terrorism is difficult since its meaning has constantly changed in the past two centuries.⁷ Yet the term terrorism remains pejorative whenever and in whichever way it is defined due to the negativity it expresses.⁸

According to Kiras, another reason to why there is not a common agreed on definition to the term terrorism is that there is disagreement on ‘the legitimacy of terrorist means and methods.’⁹ Realists believe that only state actors have a ‘monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.’¹⁰ Therefore, they argue that such violence is

² White, J.R. (2012). *‘Terrorism and Homeland Security.’* (7th ed.). p.4.

³ Laqueur, W. (2003). *‘No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century.’*

⁴ Social Construct: “Terrorism is defined by different people within vacillating social and political realities. The definition of any social construct changes with the social reality of the group providing the definition.” White, J.R. (2004) p.4

⁵Kiras, J.D. (2005). *‘Terrorism and Globalization.’* p.480.

⁶Martin, G. (2010). *‘Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues.’* (3rd ed.). p.3.

⁷Hoffman, B. (2006). *‘Inside Terrorism.’* p.3.

⁸Ibid. p.2-3.

⁹Kiras, J.D. (2005). p.481.

¹⁰Ibid.

illegitimate. On the other hand, there are those who consider terrorism as legitimate if such means and methods fit the criteria to be considered as 'just war'. As one can see, there are various interpretations and disagreement on the issue of legitimacy.

Although the various definitions continue to change with time, Dyson and Kiras state that the term always implies the use of violence as being a main characteristic of terrorism, in order to instil fear and terror in people. Terrorism has been known as the weapon of the weak used by small groups of individuals whom conduct such violent attacks since they feel that this is the only way they are able to promote their ideology and voice their problems whilst being heard.¹¹ Such violence is used in order to bring about change in the government and society. Therefore, a key characteristic of terrorism which differentiates it from other types of violence, according to Hoffman, is that it is political since the use of violence is used in order to achieve political aims.¹²

The definition of the term terrorism is not the objective of this literature review, but it is important to be aware of the debate which is going on in the various literatures with regards to the lack of a common definition. By understanding this, one will also understand more on the phenomena of terrorism and how it is such a difficult threat to deal with today since it is not commonly viewed by everyone.

2.3 A shock but not a surprise

The '*9/11 Commission Report*' points out that the 9/11 attacks might have been a shock to many, but they were not a surprise. This threat of Islamist terrorism did not just

¹¹Kiras, J.D. (2005). p.480. - These acts of violence, which are usually targeted at civilians, include bombing, hostage-taking and hijacking amongst others.

¹²Hoffman, B. (2006) p.2.

appear over night, but had been building up decades prior to the attack.¹³ There were a sufficient number of warnings which were given out revealing their want to kill Americans. By spring / summer 2001 the U.S. intelligence system 'was blinking red' with the amount of warnings being received with regards to al-Qaeda's plans.¹⁴ Although the U.S. was the target for such plans, the Commission Report states that the information which was being received seemed to be more related to an attack overseas and not at home. Bergen and Ridgeway question how such an experienced national security team did not realise the gravity of the problem they were about to encounter.¹⁵ In Bergen's view, these attacks were not prevented from happening not due to a lack of information on al-Qaeda's plans, but have more to do with the fact that the Bush Administration did not perceive that such an attack on the U.S. was likely to happen¹⁶. He claims that they failed to do so because at the time the administration was more focused on Iraq being the main threat to America and were 'frozen in a Cold War mind-set'.¹⁷ This leaves the idea that these attacks could have been avoided.

In order to understand how and why the U.S. became involved in the WOT, it is important to understand the background situation. The literature helps the reader understand more by revealing who and what caused the attacks, which ultimately led to the foreign policy objectives of both the Bush and Obama Administrations. They bring

¹³ Other attacks which happened or were planned on Americans prior to 9/11 include: February 1993 – a truck bomb tried to bring down the World Trade Center; Plans to blow up the Lincoln and Holland tunnels as well as other landmarks in New York City were uncovered; October 1993 – event known as 'Black Hawk Down' where American helicopters were shot down; A plot was revealed where U.S. airliners which were crossing the Pacific Ocean would be blown up; and October 2000 – an al-Qaeda team from Yemen tried to sink the USS *Cole* by making a hole in its side with explosives on a motorboat.

¹⁴ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (2004). p.259.

¹⁵ Bergen, P.L. (2011).

¹⁶ Ibid. p.50.

¹⁷ Ibid. p.44.

out how it is important to understand who and what were the reasons behind the attack in order to understand how and why the U.S. responded the way it did.

2.4 Osama bin Laden and the establishment of al-Qaeda

The 9/11 attacks were the result of a vision by Osama bin Laden (OBL). Born in 1957 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, he was a very religious man. From a young age he felt the need to spread Islam and to restore the glories which Muslim nations once enjoyed. Bergen points out that OBL's ideology, as well as the al-Qaeda terrorist organisation, both reflect his personal story and the way he viewed the world.¹⁸

Events occurring during the Islamic awakening, which climaxed in 1979, began to influence OBL and other future members of al-Qaeda.¹⁹ This influence led to him volunteering himself in the Afghan jihad against the Soviets in the 1980's. Bergen claims that this holy struggle truly changed bin Laden.²⁰ The Afghan mujahedeen ultimately defeated the Soviets by the late 1980's. As the war finished, the formation of an armed jihadist group, al-Qaeda, began to take place, with OBL and some others wanting to prepare and organise jihad's elsewhere.²¹ A principle aim for al-Qaeda's jihad was to bring about regime change to Taliban style rule in the Middle East. This included eliminating Western influence and military presence in the region, which also meant removing Arab regimes which were supported by the U.S.²²

Lansford and Covarrubias argue that the U.S. played a part in the growth of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, both of which would ultimately threaten the

¹⁸ Bergen, P.L. (2006). *'The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al-Qaeda's Leader.'* p.12.

¹⁹ Bergen, P.L. (2011).

²⁰ Bergen, P.L. (2006).

²¹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (2004).

²² Bergen, P.L. (2011).

security of America in the near future.²³ During the Afghan war against the Soviets, the mujahedeen received support and assistance from the U.S. since it had its own strategic interests in the country. Yet as the war ended, and so did the American interest in Afghanistan, a kind of void was left which enabled the Taliban and al-Qaeda to be created and grow.

2.5 Reasons behind the attacks

The various reasons to why OBL wanted to attack the West, especially the U.S., are discussed throughout the literature. Lansford and Covarrubias state that OBL felt as if the Muslim society has been 'shamed and humiliated' by the West which was being led by the U.S.²⁴ Bergen continues with this point by expressing how OBL felt as if Islam was under attack and that the only way for this to change was by attacking America.²⁵

The motives behind the 9/11 attacks are outlined in OBL's Fatwa of 1996 and are discussed in the '*9/11 Commission Report*' and by Bergen. Motives include OBL's disapproval of the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia²⁶ after the Gulf War, sanctions which were imposed on Iraq, as well as the U.S. support for the Jewish state of Israel whilst attacking Palestine.²⁷ This shows that the disapproval of U.S. policies in the Middle East played a major part in motivating the attacks. Yet although OBL wanted to bring a change to Middle East policy, Bergen believes that al-Qaeda's ability to do so is quite impossible.²⁸ The Commission Report goes on to say that OBL wanted to confront

²³ Lansford, T., Watson, R.P. and Covarrubias, J. (2009). '*America's War on Terror.*' (2nd ed.). p.17.

²⁴ Ibid. p.29.

²⁵ Bergen, P.L. (2011).

²⁶ Saudi Arabia is the home of Islam's holiest sites.

²⁷ Bin Laden, O. (1996). *Text of Bin Laden's Fatwa: 'Declaration of War Against the American's Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places.'* PBS Translation

²⁸ Bergen, P.L. (2011).

modernity and globalisation as well, yet this motive of globalisation has not been openly stated by al-Qaeda itself.

However, with the 9/11 attacks, OBL expected a different response to which it actually received. According to Bergen, bin Laden had the idea that the West was weak and that it could easily be defeated. He expected either cruise missile strikes or the withdrawal of the West from the Middle East. Yet this was not the case and the U.S. response proved to be in fact the opposite.²⁹

2.6 The Bush Administration and the War on Terror

There is a great amount of literature on Bush's WOT since he spent eight years at the White House and another four years out of office where many authors and researchers have had the time to evaluate his Presidency. Much focus is given on his war in Afghanistan and to a greater extent the war in Iraq. In fact, the war in Iraq is known to be Bush's War. Yet in the literature there is not much focus on Pakistan and its relations with the U.S. in the context of the WOT.

2.7 Prior to the 9/11 attacks

Both Leffler and Lindsay discuss briefly the foreign policy of the Bush Administration prior to the 9/11 attacks. Lindsay argues that when Bush set out to be a presidential candidate in 1999, as well as during his presidential campaign and the first few months in office, his political agenda was more focused on domestic issues rather

²⁹ Bergen, P.L. (2011).

than foreign policy.³⁰ Yet when it came to foreign policy prior to the attacks, Leffler claims that the administration was more focused on

China and Russia; on determining whether a Middle East peace settlement was in the cards; on building a ballistic missile defence system; and on contemplating how to deal with “rogue” states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea.³¹

Therefore, it is evident that there was not as much attention on terrorism, or more specifically, al-Qaeda, as there should have been.

2.8 Response to the 9/11 attacks

As a response to the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration launched the ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWOT). This attack ultimately reordered America’s foreign policy objectives, and according to Bergen it ended up distorting the rule of law.³² Lindsay states that ‘fighting terrorism became not just a priority, but *the* priority.’³³ According to Leffler the WOT was to focus on the global terrorist threat and not just specifically on al-Qaeda. Bush had openly stated that America ‘will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbour them.’³⁴ In other words, the war was to go beyond non-state actors to include regimes which harboured and supported these terrorists.³⁵

President Bush also gave an ultimatum to the rest of the world when he said that ‘every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or

³⁰ Lindsay, J.M. (2011). ‘George W. Bush, Barack Obama and the Future of US Global Leadership.’ p.766.

³¹ Leffler, M.P., (2011). ‘September 11 in Retrospect: George W. Bush’s Grand Strategy, Reconsidered.’

³² Bergen, P.L. (2011). p.52.

³³ Lindsay, J.M. (2011). p.766

³⁴ Ibid. p.766

³⁵ Leffler, M.P. (2011).

you are with the terrorists.’³⁶ Boyle claims that in some instances this deepened U.S. relations with states, yet it also strained others.³⁷

Declaring the WOT meant going on the offensive by taking on a policy of self defence and preventive warfare.³⁸ Bush had expressed that this fight needed to be taken overseas, ‘bringing the war to the bad guys’, and that he would act alone if he had to.³⁹ This eventually led to the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet according to Boyle there are many critics who do not think it is possible to go to war against a method or a tactic (i.e. terrorism).⁴⁰

Bergen notes that by going to war with two states in the Muslim world, i.e. Afghanistan and Iraq, it is as if the U.S. was going to war with Islam – something which OBL himself had claimed.⁴¹

However, Gibbs argues that the attacks and the threat of terrorism were used as pretext by the Bush Administration in order to advance and implement certain objectives which the administration had already decided on prior to 9/11.⁴² This can be seen in the case of Iraq.

2.9 Terrorism as an ideology

Boyle and Lindsay both claim that the Bush Administration considered the threat of terrorism as similar to threats which were posed by Nazi Germany and the Soviet

³⁶ Boyle, M.J., (2008). ‘*The War on Terror in American Grand Strategy.*’ p.191.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Leffler, M.P. (2011).

³⁹ Lindsay, J.M. (2011). p.766

⁴⁰ Boyle, M.J. (2008). p.191.

⁴¹ Bergen, P.L. (2011). p.52.

⁴² Gibbs, D. N., (2004). ‘*Pretexts and US Foreign Policy: The War on Terrorism in Historical Perspective.*’

Union in the past, i.e. fascism and communism.⁴³ Boyle argues that this similarity is a false one and that American policy-makers should discard it since this fight is not one against ideology, but rather against a tactic or method.⁴⁴ Considering terrorism as an ideology which can be defeated just like fascism and communism is false. This ultimately leads to a misinterpretation on the objective of the WOT and causes confusion on how this fight can be won.⁴⁵

2.10 Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan:

The Bush Doctrine was put into practice for the first time in Afghanistan. The U.S. had previously demanded the Afghan leader, Mullah Omar, to hand over OBL, yet the Taliban refused to do so. Therefore Bush decided to militarily overthrow the Taliban since he had issued a policy which specifically stated that the U.S. will go after states which harbour such terrorists. Katzman reveals how it was also important for the U.S. to have a friendly regime in Kabul in order to be able to search for people associated with al-Qaeda in the country.⁴⁶ Bush first obtained the United Nations (UN) backing with the issue of UNSCR 1398 of 12 September 2001. NATO also invoked Article 5 on the same day.⁴⁷ About a week later, the U.S. Congress gave permission to Bush

to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organisations or persons he determines planned, authorised, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11 2001, or harboured such organisations or persons.⁴⁸

On 7 October 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was launched with the U.S. military bombing al-Qaeda and Taliban forces. Its purpose was to help the Northern

⁴³Lindsay, J.M. (2011). p.766. & Boyle, M.J. (2008). p.192.

⁴⁴Boyle, M.J. (2008) p.192.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Katzman, K., (2012). '*Afghanistan: Post Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy.*' p.7-8.

⁴⁷Lindsay, J.M. (2011). p.768. - Article 5 states that an attack against one NATO member is an attack against all.

⁴⁸Grimmett, R.F. (2007). '*Authorization for use of Military Force in Response to the 9/11 Attacks (P.L. 107-40): Legislative History.*' p.4.

Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces to remove the Taliban. The Taliban surrendered Qandahar on 9 December 2001 and Mullah Omar fled. This ultimately marked the end of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.⁴⁹

According to Katzman, the Bush Administration wanted to avoid chaos in Afghanistan after the Taliban was defeated, so the U.S. and its partners began efforts for nation-building in the country.⁵⁰

2.11 The Iraq War

Leffler points out how it was not only important for the U.S. to go after terrorist networks in the WOT, but also after those governments which threaten its security. Iraq was deemed to be one of these countries and required regime change according to the Bush Administration. Therefore, when the Taliban fell in Afghanistan, Bush shifted his focus to Iraq. According to Lindsay, 'Saddam Hussein embodied the convergence of Bush's three fears – terrorism, tyrants and technologies of mass destruction.'⁵¹ Although there was no evidence of a connection between Hussein and al-Qaeda, Bush felt that Iraq would utilise such terrorist networks in order to attack the U.S. without doing the dirty work themselves. The main decision now for Bush, according to Lindsay and Leffler, was how to go to war.

The Bush Administration succeeded in persuading the American's that Iraq was a great threat since it possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The U.S. Congress ultimately approved war against Iraq in October 2002, and in March 2003 the

⁴⁹Katzman, K. (2012). p.8.

⁵⁰ This included trying to build a strong democratic Afghan government as well as economically develop the country.

⁵¹Lindsay, J.M. (2011). p.769.

U.S., together with the help of the 'coalition of the willing'⁵² invaded Iraq.⁵³ This military invasion led to an occupation in Iraq whilst also managing to capture Saddam Hussein. In less than four weeks, Baghdad fell. Yet by summer of the same year there was an insurgency in Iraq. According to Bush, this happened since 'the consequences of a catastrophic success' were not foreseen.⁵⁴ Boyle claims that with the invasion of Iraq, doubts began to grow amongst U.S. allies with regards to the WOT, and when insurgency erupted in Iraq, even those who at the beginning supported the war began to have some reservations.⁵⁵

2.12 Democracy and a shift in priorities

The U.S. invested around \$1 billion in the Iraq Survey Group which consisted of 1,400 people with the hope of locating Iraq's WMD. Such WMD were not found, and so Lindsay states that the main reason to why the U.S. went to war with Iraq proved to be an incorrect one.⁵⁶ Since nothing was found, Bush had to find another reason to justify this war. The promotion of democracy in Iraq and the Arab world was used to do so. Lindsay states that this enabled him to shift away the focus from the WMD as well as to try to quiet down the critics back home. He also takes note that this idea of freedom, although it was never a priority, is not something new for Bush since he had already commented on this theme in a campaign speech he had made.

As Bush entered his second term, the literature proves that there was a shift of policies from the original Bush Doctrine with regards to the WOT. In his second

⁵² The 'Coalition of the Willing' was made up of 48 states, three of which contributed troops to the invasion force, being Britain, Australia and Poland.

⁵³ Lindsay, J.M. (2011). p.769.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Boyle, M.J. (2008). p.192.

⁵⁶ Lindsay, J.M. (2011). p.769.

inaugural speech, Bush begins to shift away from the previous Bush Doctrine, putting democratisation as one of the main objectives of the country's foreign policy. Bush expressed that the promotion of democracy in other lands is of national interest for the liberty of their own country with the main goal of ending tyranny in this world.⁵⁷

In his article, Lindsay points out three problems with regards to Bush's foreign policy objective of democracy promotion. Firstly, there was no strategy on how to go about and achieve such a goal.⁵⁸ The second problem was that such a goal clashed mainly with the foreign policy objective of countering terrorism.⁵⁹ Lastly, the third problem he mentions is that a democracy in a country could ultimately create governments which could be unfriendly to the U.S.⁶⁰

2.13 Consequences of the War on Terror

Leffler takes note of the various negative consequences which came out from the WOT of the Bush Administration. For example, it was important for the U.S. that regional balance in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf would not be destroyed, not only for this war but in general. Yet their actions did the opposite.⁶¹ Also, instead of preventing proliferation, the U.S. ended up motivating rogue states to acquire such WMD since they believed that their survival depended on having such weapons.⁶² Lastly, instead of preventing and putting a stop to terrorism and radical Islamism, which was a main objective of the war, the U.S. actually encouraged it. Even though the U.S. had

⁵⁷Leffler, M.P. (2011). & Lindsay, J.M. (2011). p.770.

⁵⁸ In fact, a budget request was submitted by Bush early on in his second term where the funds for such an effort would be reduced.

⁵⁹This is due to the fact that a good amount of American allies were autocracies and so such a goal can risk losing their cooperation and assistance in the WOT.

⁶⁰Leffler, M.P. (2011). & Lindsay, J.M. (2011). p.770.

⁶¹ This included the U.S. credibility in the Middle East to fade, its ability to mediate Israeli-Palestinian negotiations had diminished, and where Iraq used to be vital in counterbalancing Iran, this too had been eliminated.

⁶² Such states include Iran and North Korea.

managed to capture and kill terrorists, destroy terrorist networks and created various partnership abroad with counterterrorist agencies, there ended up being an increase of terrorist incidents as well as radical Islamists. Yet Leffler also points out that one should not only criticise the Bush administration and the WOT since many of its successes have been overshadowed by such failures. One must note that Bush had to deal with very hard challenges and make choices which were not always easy, but had to be made. Although there are negative consequences which came from this war, they still managed to a certain extent prevent another attack from happening on the U.S and to its citizens, as well as maintained pressure on terrorist organisations, including al-Qaeda.

2.14 The Obama Administration and the fight against terrorism:

Barack Obama became the first President entering office during the 'Age of Terror'. According to the various literature on Obama and the WOT, at the beginning of his presidency there was this belief and hope for change which Americans and the rest of the world believed he could accomplish. During his presidential campaign, as well as coming into office, it was evident that he wanted to step away from the Bush Doctrine.⁶³ In fact, from the beginning of his presidency he neglected the term 'War on Terror'. Yet this did not mean that America was not at war. As Baker notes, Obama wanted to make it clear that this fight was against some terrorist organisations, i.e. al-Qaeda and its partners, and not a war against Muslims.⁶⁴ By reaching out to the Muslim community, changing the choice of language used, as well as shifting its tone from that of the Bush

⁶³ Although he wanted to shed away from the Bush Doctrine, there has been an element of continuity to a certain extent.

⁶⁴ Baker. P., (2010). '*Obama's War Over Terror.*', - This was notably expressed in his Cairo speech of June 2009 which is considered to be central to his efforts to fight terrorism.

Administration's all-or-nothing days, Baker says that this could be considered the biggest change that Obama has made.

When President Obama took office, he pledged to refocus on the threat from al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan whilst ending the war in Iraq. He knew that Afghanistan and Pakistan were the central front in the continuing struggle against terrorism. Bergen found this true.⁶⁵ Obama's strategy was to be focused on 'disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda' and to prevent it from threatening the U.S. or any of its allies in the future.⁶⁶

According to Lindsay, President Obama rejected many of the main principles of Bush's world view. Obama felt that Bush did not see the true impact of globalisation in today's world politics, which made terrorism a whole new problem. He knew that with the military alone there is not much one can do to fight such threats and the U.S. could not do this alone. He knew that the U.S. needed partners and therefore had to get rid of Bush's old practice of bullying other countries and intimidating them. Obama believed the best approach was to engage in diplomacy as a forefront of U.S. policy.⁶⁷ This did not mean only working with U.S. friends, but also enemies. Yet this did not guarantee cooperation since, Lindsay claims, times are changing and the world is not looking up to the U.S. for leadership as it used to.

Once in office, Obama started to put other campaign promises to practice. He ordered the Guantanamo Bay detention centre to be closed within a year, yet the administration has not been able to do so up to date. This was something which,

⁶⁵ Bergen, P.L. (2011). p.309.

⁶⁶ Ibid. p.315. - This would be done by not allowing al-Qaeda to have a safe haven, weaken the Taliban and strengthen Afghanistan's government and security forces in order for them to be capable to take responsibility of Afghanistan in the future.

⁶⁷ Lindsay, J.M. (2011). p.772.

according to Baker, Bush was also planning to do, but did not manage to.⁶⁸ Obama also ended all CIA secret prisons and put a stop to coercive methods of interrogation.

2.15 End of Operation Iraqi Freedom

Lindsay claims how Obama had always been against the war in Iraq from the start, which he considered a 'dumb war'. Iraq was a big issue for the Americans when he was elected into office. His policy was clear: all U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Iraq. By August 2010 the American combat mission in Iraq ended with all combat troops being withdrawn as promised.⁶⁹ Operation New Dawn was initiated with 50,000 troops being sent to Iraq but assigned for non-combat operations. Yet by December 2011, the Iraq War was officially over.

2.16 Afghanistan

When Obama took office, Afghanistan was experiencing a large amount of suicide bomb attacks, great criminal activity which involved the drug trade, as well as a rising Taliban. 40 percent of Afghanistan, mainly in the south and east of the country, was either under Taliban control or was at risk of an insurgent attack. The U.S. was losing ground and therefore a long-term strategy was needed according to Bergen.⁷⁰ By the end of his term, Bush already ordered around 15,000 soldiers to be sent yet had not arrived. Obama added an additional 21,000.⁷¹ President Obama's aim was to 'modestly improve the size and professionalism of Afghanistan's police force and nearly double the ranks of the Afghan army over the next two years.'⁷² This would include helping to train

⁶⁸ Baker, P. (2010).

⁶⁹ Lindsay, J.M. (2011). p.773-775.

⁷⁰ Bergen, P.L. (2011).

⁷¹ Ibid. p.314.

⁷² Ibid. p.315.

the Afghan security services. These troops were meant to go back home in July 2011 yet its commitment to Afghanistan was extended to the end of 2014.

Bergen disagrees with those sceptics who believe that there needs to be less American presence in Afghanistan. He argues that the U.S. had already done this twice and it proved to be counter-productive.⁷³ The author also takes note that the Afghan's who supported the U.S. did not want its soldiers to leave the country, but instead for them to keep their promise and help create a more secure and successful country for them to live in.⁷⁴

2.17 Pakistan drone strikes

Bergen takes note that there is continuity between Bush and Obama with regards to the policy on 'targeted killing of militant leaders in Pakistan by drone strikes.'⁷⁵ Although Obama gave great importance to working with friends as well as enemies, he still would use the military where it was necessary. Not only did he promise that he would increase the amount of troops in Afghanistan, but he would also use drone strikes to attack Pakistan. In fact, in 2007 he stated that 'if we have actionable intelligence about high-value terrorist targets and President Musharraf won't act, we will.'⁷⁶ Obama had authorised the CIA to enlarge this program in order to attack al-Qaeda hideouts

⁷³ The first instance is when the Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan and therefore the U.S. left since it had no strategic interests left in the country. This created a vacuum in which the Taliban ultimately surfaced. The second episode is when the Bush Administration began to focus more on Iraq after they managed to remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. This led to the Taliban resurfacing in Afghanistan.

⁷⁴ Bergen, P.L. (2011).

⁷⁵ Ibid. p.308.

⁷⁶ Ibid. p.772.

which were suspected to be on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In fact, he authorised the number of drones to double.⁷⁷

2.18 Operation Neptune Spear and death of Osama bin Laden

The policy of capturing OBL dead or alive is an element of continuity between the Bush and Obama Administration. Although the capturing and death of OBL would not mean the end of al-Qaeda or the fight against terrorism, it was still quite important for the U.S. Bergen gives three reasons for this. First of all, they wanted to bring justice for the thousands of people who had died during the attacks as well as those whom were victims of al-Qaeda across the globe. A second reason was that every day OBL remained alive would be a victory for al-Qaeda. The inability to capture him looked like a failure to their war.⁷⁸ Just as Ahmed Zaidan, an Al Jazeera reporter stated, 'as long as Osama bin Laden is alive he has defeated America.'⁷⁹ Lastly, he was a reliable guide and an inspiration for jihadist movements and therefore needed to be eliminated.

On 2 May 2011, OBL was found and killed in Abbottabad, Pakistan by the Navy SEALs's under the code name 'Operation Neptune Spear'. As Obama had stated earlier in his presidency, he was ready to attack in Pakistan if the U.S. had any high-value information on terrorists in the country and the Pakistani government won't act. This operation had ultimately changed the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan in the context of the WOT from one of cooperation to one of mistrust.

⁷⁷ Baker, P. (2010). - Data collected by Katherine Tiedemann and Peter Bergen shows that in his first year as president, Obama launched more drone strikes than Bush did in his two terms as president. With these drone strikes, President Obama managed to hit valuable targets such as the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud, and bin Laden's son, Saad.

⁷⁸ Bergen, P.L. (2011).

⁷⁹ Ibid. p.347.

2.19 Conclusion

This chapter has given an overview of the dominant themes within the literature written on this subject area regarding the WOT and the fight against terrorism. This serves as a background in order to understand in what context the following chapters play out.

Literature on terrorism has greatly grown since 9/11. From the literature comes out the debate on a common definition to the term 'terrorism'. The lack of a definition ultimately affects the way this threat is dealt with, since for different people it means different things. The literature also reveals who was behind the attacks and give the reader an insight on why and how the attacks took place.

With regards to the Bush Administration and its WOT, much focus has been given to the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. They are two defining aspects of this administration. The literature also deals with the Obama Administration, especially surrounding the idea of change he was to bring with regards to the war.

It is evident that there are gaps in the literature with regards to the impact of the WOT on U.S. bilateral relations with other states around the world. It is also considered that within the literature Pakistan is not given the focus it deserves since it has played a great part in the war. Such gaps in the literature have come to form the area of this research.

Chapter 3:

Theoretical Framework

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

3.1 Introduction

This chapter will give a theoretical framework which will be applied and used for the analysis of U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan in the following chapters. It will first look at Foreign Policy Analysis. It will then discuss Realism and Liberalism as two theories in order to allow a better understanding of U.S. foreign policy outcomes.

3.2 Foreign Policy

First it is important to note what exactly foreign policy is. According to Walter Carlsnaes, foreign policy consists

those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, commitments and/or directives, and pursued by governmental representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed toward objectives, conditions and actors – both governmental and non-governmental – which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy.⁸⁰

3.3 Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA)

FPA-style work emerged in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Scholars and theorists wanted to make sense of state behaviour and interactions.⁸¹

⁸⁰Carlsnaes, W. (2002). *'Foreign Policy.'* p.335.

⁸¹Hudson, V.M. (2005). *'Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations'* p.7.

Foreign policy analysis is characterized by an actor-specific focus, based upon the argument that all that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision makers acting singly or in groups.⁸²

FPA addresses the important features of foreign policy which include the goals and objectives, the application of instruments to achieve them and the interaction with others. It examines the foreign policies of states and places them in a broader academic context which is defined by theories and approaches.⁸³ The choice of theory likely affects the choice of policy.

FPA has several theoretical commitments which include:

a commitment to look below the nation-state level of analysis to actor-specific information; a commitment to build middle range theory as the interface between actor-general theory and the complexity of the real world; a commitment to pursue multicausal explanations spanning multiple levels of analysis; a commitment to utilise theory and findings from across the spectrum of social science; a commitment to viewing the process of foreign policy decision-making as important as the output thereof.⁸⁴

Hudson claims that there are three themes of work which have contributed to the evolution of FPA. First is the focus on decision making which looks below the nation-state level-of-analysis and is based upon the work of Snyder, Bruck and Sapin. Secondly the focus on the psychological dimension of foreign policy making which would be explained by looking at the psycho-milieu of the individuals and groups which are making the foreign policy.⁸⁵ This theme is inspired by the work of Harold and Margaret Spout. Lastly, the theme is that which deals with the development of Comparative Foreign Policy by Rosenau.⁸⁶

⁸² Hudson, V.M. (2005). p.1.

⁸³ Jackson, R. & Sorensen, G. (2010). *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches.* (4th ed.).

⁸⁴ Hudson, V.M. (2008). *The History and Evolution of Foreign Policy Analysis.* p.26-27.

⁸⁵ 'The psycho-milieu is the international and operational environment or context as it is perceived and interpreted by these decision makers.' Hudson, V.M. (2005). p.6.

⁸⁶ Hudson, V.M. (2005).

3.4 Level-of-Analysis Approach

A level-of-analysis approach is used in FPA by scholars in order to examine state behaviour. It was first introduced by Kenneth Waltz whilst he was studying the causes of war by analysing it at three different levels; the systemic, the state and the individual.⁸⁷ These three level-of-analyses can be utilised in order to study the foreign policy of the U.S.

3.4.1 The Systemic Level

The systemic level-of-analysis looks at the characteristics of the international system in order to examine state behaviour and explain its foreign policy. Therefore the behaviour of a state is caused by the international system. Ultimately, if there is a change in the international system, there will be a change in the behaviour of a state.⁸⁸

Today the international system is considered to be unipolar, with the U.S. being the only superpower. This level-of-analysis can be used in order to analyse its foreign policy objectives with regards to its fight against terrorism. It uses its power in order to advance American interests and preserve its dominance whilst trying to protect itself from other states which threaten its peace and security.

3.4.2 The State Level

The state level-of-analysis analyses the foreign policy of a state by its internal characteristics. It considers the state as the most important international actor. Therefore in order to understand the foreign policy of a state, it is important to look at the

⁸⁷Waltz, K.N. (2001). *'Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis.'*

⁸⁸Jackson, R. & Sorensen, G. (2010). p. 231 - It is important to note that in international relations there are different theories which do not necessarily agree regarding the main characteristics of the state. Yet for realists, this level-of-analysis is the most relevant for explaining and analysing foreign policy.

influence coming from the political structure of the state, as well as the policy-making actors and the interaction amongst them.⁸⁹

In the case of the U.S., it has the belief that other states should have the same political structures as itself and therefore sets out foreign policy objectives in order to achieve such a goal. An example of this can be seen through its democracy promotion around the world which is considered a liberal approach.

3.4.3 The Individual Level

The individual level-of-analysis focuses on the people who make the decisions in a state. The policy-making process is analysed in order to examine how decisions are made by people.⁹⁰ According to Rourke and Boyer, there are three different perspectives in which the individual level-of-analysis can be approached; 1. Observe the fundamental human nature, 2. Study how people act in organisations, and 3. Study the motivations and actions of specific persons.⁹¹

This level-of-analysis can also be applied to both Bush and Obama. In the case of Bush, one can look at his character as well as his beliefs in order to define his response to the attacks of 9/11.

There are various approaches to looking at FPA, with the main two being foreign policy decision making process and foreign policy outcomes. For the purpose of this research, the study shall focus on the foreign policy outcomes. Such theories which are useful for this analysis are Realism and Liberalism.

⁸⁹ Jackson, R. & Sorensen, G. (2010). p. 233-237 - Liberalism can be taken as an example of this. Scholars of Democratic Peace Theory argue that democracies do not go to war with each other.

⁹⁰ Jackson, R. & Sorensen, G. (2010).

⁹¹ For more information on this, as well as the other levels-of-analysis, look at Rourke & Boyer (2009), Chapter 3 http://highered.mcgraw-hill.com/sites/dl/free/0073403881/569832/Rourke12e_Sample_ch03.pdf

3.5 Realism

Realism is the theory mostly used in FPA and is known to be the foundational approach to international relations theory. Realists consider the state as the principal and rational actor in foreign policy, which seeks to maximise its own national interests and objectives since they believe that world politics exist in an international anarchy. What drives realist foreign policy is its focus and responsibility to ensure national security and state survival, as well as its struggle for power. Yet it is important to note that since states pursue their own national interests, this means that other state governments cannot be fully trusted. Realists also have a pessimistic view of human nature, portraying man as a self-interested and power-driven animal.⁹²

Realism is based on three core assumptions: groupism, egoism and power-centrism. Groupism argues that humans face each other as members of groups in order to survive yet this group which keeps people together can ultimately generate conflicts with other groups. In realist theory, the nation-state is this group with nationalism being a source of in-group cohesion.⁹³ Egoism focuses on self-interest which is rooted in human nature and how it drives political behaviour.⁹⁴ Lastly, power-centrism means that power is a fundamental feature of politics and how there are inequalities of power in human affairs with regards to control and resources.⁹⁵ Power, according to realists, mainly comes from economic strength and military potential.

⁹² Donnelly, J. (2008). *'The Ethic of Realism'*

⁹³ Wohlforth, W.C. (2008). *'Realism and Foreign Policy.'* p.32.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

The development of realist thought has led to the emergence of various theoretical schools within realism. This includes classical realism, neorealism, neoclassical realism, and offensive and defensive realism.

3.5.1 Classical Realism

Classical realism puts realist thought from Thucydides to the middle years of the Cold War together.⁹⁶ Realists have a pessimistic view of human nature, that of being self-centred and power-seeking. Classical realists believe that since political groups are made up of such individuals, they inevitably take on such similar negative characteristics. Therefore they put human nature at the centre of their explanation for the cause of war, emphasizing the endless power struggle being rooted in human nature.⁹⁷ Such power struggle ultimately leads to violence since states exist in international anarchy and therefore there is no authority to mitigate conflict of interests.

When Bush took office before the 9/11 attacks, his foreign policy was to be based on various assumptions of classical realism. This thought assumes that the state is the main actor in foreign policy, and therefore the U.S policy would focus mainly on state-to-state relations.⁹⁸ Classical realists also focus on the managing of relations with major powers since they are considered to be the main threats to the international system. In the case of U.S foreign policy of Bush prior to the attacks, he made it clear that the

⁹⁶ Wohlforth, W.C. (2008). p.34.

⁹⁷ Lebow, R.N. (2005). '*Classical Realism*'

⁹⁸ George W. Bush was going against former administrations by neglecting the promotion of democracy, opposing American humanitarian interventions as well as trying to avoid involvement in various international institutions as a part of its foreign policy.

refurbishing of alliances would be a top priority in order to manage great-power relationships.⁹⁹

3.5.2 Neorealism:

Neorealism, also known as structural realism, was developed as a response to the deficiencies of classical realism and deals with political outcomes. According to Waltz, the behaviour of states and the way they interact is based on the nature of the system-level structure and not on human characteristics or motivations of the states themselves. He argues that although states are obliged to look after themselves and regard other states as potential threats, they are not inherently aggressive. Neorealists emphasise that the international system is anarchic and therefore because of this, states act the way they do in order to ensure their own survival.¹⁰⁰

The international system can be considered conflictual. Since states cannot trust each other's intentions in an anarchic system, as one state tries to secure itself for survival for instance through military means, other states try to keep up which leads to a security dilemma. Therefore, war is always possible. Waltz believes that peace is best achieved if there is a balance of power where great powers manage the international system.¹⁰¹

3.5.3 Neoclassical Realism

Neoclassical realism is a combination of both classical realist and neorealist approaches. It departs from neorealism by claiming that states respond to the

⁹⁹McCormick, J.M. (2010) *'American Foreign Policy & Process'* (5th ed.) p.206-207 - Europe and Asia were to be his top foreign policy priorities since they both carry American allies as well as potential rivals.

¹⁰⁰Waltz, K.N. (1979). *'Theory of International Politics.'*

¹⁰¹Ibid.

international system when they conduct foreign policy. However, their response is a result of the unit-level factors which are the internal characteristics such as the perception of state leaders, the relationship between state and society, the state structure as well as the actual motivations of the state.¹⁰² Neoclassical realists put forward that domestic political processes act as a transmission belt 'between systemic incentives and constraints, on the one hand, and the actual diplomatic, military and foreign economic policies states select, on the other.'¹⁰³ Therefore, the international political outcomes usually reflect the actual distribution among states.¹⁰⁴

3.5.4 Defensive and Offensive Realism

According to Walt, an important addition to realism is the offense-defence theory.¹⁰⁵ Van Evera claims that this theory is 'the most powerful and useful realist theory on the causes of war.'¹⁰⁶ He states that 'war is more likely when conquest is easy' or when it is believed to be so.¹⁰⁷ It is the military technology and doctrine, national social structure, geography and diplomatic arrangements which cause this offence and defence dominance.¹⁰⁸ From here develops offensive and defensive realism which are distinguished in terms of respect to states' demands of power.

Offensive Realism is based on the idea that the international system is one of uncertainty and anarchy and therefore the search for security is something which is forced upon states. In fact, Mearsheimer believes that state behaviour is shaped by the

¹⁰² Lobell, S.E., Ripsman, N.M. and Taliaferro, J.W. (2009). *Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy.*

¹⁰³ Ibid. p.4.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Walt, S.M. (1998). *International Relations: One World, Many Theories.*

¹⁰⁶ Van Evera, S. (1999). *Causes of War: Power and Roots of Conflict.* p.117.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Van Evera, S. (1998). *Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War.*

anarchical structure of international relations.¹⁰⁹ Due to this uncertainty and no guarantee of peace in the system, states struggle for power and seek dominance in order to ensure their survival whilst weakening others. Mearsheimer claims that states 'are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals' in order to reach this goal of dominance which can be offensive and lead to greater security fears in the international system.¹¹⁰

Offensive realists believe that

Status quo powers are rarely found in world politics today, because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs. A state's ultimate goal is to be the hegemon of the system.¹¹¹

For Defensive Realists, power is a tool for achieving a goal, i.e. that of state survival and security, but is not the goal in itself. It suggests that states should pursue moderate strategies in order to obtain security.¹¹² Therefore it believes that states should only seek an appropriate amount of power. Defensive realists believe that states should support the status quo and only go to conflict when the security dilemma in the international system is very high.¹¹³ Walt states that in an anarchic system states behaviour is a result of the perceptions of other state's intentions. He claims that states balance against such threats in order to be secure. Therefore, according to Walt, states form alliances with each other in order to remove mistrust and protect themselves.¹¹⁴ In

¹⁰⁹ This is something which Mearsheimer as well as Waltz agree upon. Yet Morgenthau has a different view where he sees behaviour of states being shaped by human nature and the seek for security and survival in an anarchical world. Jackson, R. & Sorensen, G. (2010).

¹¹⁰ Mearsheimer, J. (2001). *'The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.'* p.29. – The goal for a country, such as the US, is to dominate the entire system. Only in that way could it rest assured that no other state or combination of states would even think about going to war against it.

¹¹¹ Ibid. p.21

¹¹² Taliaferro, J.W. (2000-2001). *'Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited.'* p.129.

¹¹³ Rose, G. (October 1998). *'Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.'*

¹¹⁴ Walt, S.M. (1987). *'The Origins of Alliances.'*

fact, Morgenthau refers to alliances as ‘a necessary function of the balance of power operating in a multiple state system.’¹¹⁵

3.6 Liberalism

Liberalism is based on the natural goodness of human nature and the autonomy of the individual. Liberals prioritise the individual over the state and believe that such individuals are rational beings whom share many of the same interests.¹¹⁶ It stresses the significance of civil and political liberties as well as representative government by law. Lastly, it deals with the distribution of economic wealth and its effects on foreign policy. According to Doyle

Liberalism contributes to the understanding of foreign policy by highlighting how individuals and the ideas they espouse (such as human rights, liberty, and democracy), social forces (capitalism, markets), and political institutions (democracy, representation) can have direct effects on foreign relations.¹¹⁷

3.6.1 Classical Liberalism

The main goal for classical liberalism is to maximise individual freedom. ‘Classical liberals define freedom as an area of non-interference by other individuals and the state.’¹¹⁸ War is considered to have a negative impact on human freedom, yet it is a part of human nature and therefore classical liberals try to find how it can be dealt with.¹¹⁹

Natural law is part of the foundation of classical liberalism, that is all individuals have the right to life, liberty and property. Such rights need to be respected in order for humans to cooperate with each other and live together. The classical liberalist support

¹¹⁵ Walt, S.M. (1987). p.1.

¹¹⁶ Jackson, R. & Sorensen, G. (2010).p.97.

¹¹⁷ Doyle, M.W. (2008). ‘*Liberalism and Foreign Policy.*’ p.50.

¹¹⁸ Van de Haar, E. (2009). ‘*Classical Liberalism and International Relations.*’p.36.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

for the 'just war tradition' is what links classical liberalism and natural law together. Hugo Grotius and Michael Walzer are two thinkers whom have contributed to this idea of Just War Theory. This theory is there in order to decide if going to war, and the means used to prosecute the war, are just.¹²⁰ According to Grotius, nations have the right to use force as a means of self-defence. Walzer writes '*Jus as bellum* requires us to make judgements about aggression and self-defence; *jus in bello* about the observance or violation of the customary and positive rules of engagement.'¹²¹ Both conditions need to be met in order to be considered a just act of war. Central to this theory is the idea of non-intervention and nonaggression with each state having the right to self-determination and therefore such sovereignty needs to be respected.

Throughout Bush's WOT, his doctrine was one of pre-emption to prevent another terrorist attack happening to the U.S. which justified his invasion of Iraq. Obama's foreign policy towards Afghanistan has also been identified as just war.

The classical liberalist idea of maximising individual freedoms believes that although the state is to protect such natural rights, it is also capable of abusing them. Therefore, classical liberals argue that states should be bound by constitutions and there should be a separation of powers. When it comes to the foreign policy agenda of a state, classical liberals believe that trade barriers should be removed as well as abolishing international organisations and treaties since they limit the freedom of individuals.¹²²

¹²⁰ Van de Haar, E. (2009).

¹²¹ Walzer, M. (2006). '*Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*'. (4th ed.).p.21.

¹²² Van de Haar (2009). p.38

3.6.2 Perpetual Peace

Immanuel Kant believed that constitutional states – which he calls ‘Republics’ – could ultimately establish ‘Perpetual Peace’ in the world.¹²³ Kant wanted to solve the problem of war without sacrificing the autonomy and independence of states. He wanted to accomplish this by subjecting international anarchy to law. Therefore it is evident that Kant did not want a world government yet instead a law governed international society among states.¹²⁴ He believed that the purpose of international law is to secure peace which is built on justice, democracy and the centrality of human rights which ultimately lead to Perpetual Peace.¹²⁵

Kant believed that living in a natural state is one of war and not that of living in peace. Therefore he suggested three Definitive Articles which are regarded as the foundation on which to bring about Perpetual Peace: 1. ‘The civil constitution of every state should be Republican,’¹²⁶ 2. ‘The law of nations shall be founded on a federation of Free States’¹²⁷ and 3. ‘The law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of Universal Hospitality.’¹²⁸

¹²³Jackson, R. & Sorensen, G. (2010). p.98.

¹²⁴Hurrell, A. (July 1990). ‘*Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in International Relations.*’ p.183

¹²⁵HongjuKoh, H. (1997) ‘*Why Do Nations Obey International Law?*’

¹²⁶By having a Republican Constitution, it is the people who decide if they should go to war. Therefore, such states would be hesitant to do so and would rather go into negotiations.

¹²⁷By Federation of States, Kant is referring to a league of Republican States which come together for the main purpose of putting an end to war.

¹²⁸Kant, I. (1795). ‘*Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.*’

3.6.3 Democratic Peace Theory

The Democratic Peace Theory was foreshadowed by Kant's Perpetual Peace, with Michael W. Doyle being one of the first scholars discussing this subject.¹²⁹

According to the Democratic Peace Theory, liberal states do not go to war with one another. Doyle claims that

Liberal states, founded on such individual rights as equality before the law, free speech and other civil liberties, private property, and elected representation are fundamentally against war... When the citizens who bear the burdens of war elect their governments, wars become impossible. Furthermore, citizens appreciate that the benefits of trade can be enjoyed only under conditions of peace.¹³⁰

So one can say that it is in liberal ideology and culture to avoid war. However this does not mean that it is not possible for a liberal state to go to war with authoritarian regimes or stateless people. They have a sense of distrust with non-liberal states and that sometimes war is required with them. Therefore it is evident that there is a difference between liberal practice towards liberal and non-liberal states.

It can be said that American promotion of democracy overseas is a result of democratic peace thought.¹³¹ Both the Clinton and the Bush Administrations included the promotion of democracy in their foreign policies. With regards to the WOT, there was the idea that democratisation will remove the roots of terrorism. The Bush Administration had set out on a 'freedom agenda', being committed to promote democracy in Iraq as

¹²⁹ View Doyle, M.W. (December 1986). '*Liberalism and World Politics*'. American Political Science Review, 80 (4), 1151-1169

¹³⁰ Doyle, M.W. (1986). '*Liberalism and World Politics*.' p.1151.

¹³¹ Democracy promotion is considered to foster and encourage peace, create political stability as well as result into more cooperation when solving problems.

well as the entire region of the Middle East.¹³² Democracy promotion became the more favoured approach in Bush's second term.

3.6.4 International Law

Liberals view the state as a constitutional entity 'which establishes and enforces the rule of law that respects the rights of citizens to life, liberty and property.'¹³³ Therefore, constitutional states would share mutual tolerance and respect each other. This idea was further developed by Jeremy Bentham whom claims that liberal states respect international law. According to liberal theory, regulating states through international law ultimately helps to achieve the goals and values of society (which includes living in peace).¹³⁴ Bentham's argument was that respecting international law in a constitutional states' foreign policy is of rational interest.¹³⁵

3.6.5 Commercial Liberalism

Commercial Liberalism explains the behaviour of the state and the individual 'based on the patterns of market incentives facing domestic and transnational economic actors.'¹³⁶ It can be said that this theory tries to find peace through commerce by promoting free trade and economic interdependence whilst establishing mutual economic gains. According to this branch of liberal thought, economically liberal states prefer peace than conflict.

¹³²Carothers, T. (2007). *'U.S. Democracy Promotion During & After Bush.'* p.3.

¹³³Jackson, R. & Sorensen, G. (2010). p.97.

¹³⁴Slaughter, A. & Alvarez, J.E. (2000). *'A Liberal Theory of International Law.'*

¹³⁵ For more on this view Rosenblum, N.L., (1978). *Bentham's Theory of the Modern State.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

¹³⁶Elman, C. & Elman, M.F. (2003). *'Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field.'* p.171.

Commercial liberals, such as Adam Smith and Joseph Schumpeter, claim that 'the deeper cause of the zone of liberal peace was commerce.'¹³⁷ Schumpeter claims that the outcome of capitalist democracy is peace since capitalism and democracy are seen as the foundation of liberal pacifism.¹³⁸ His explanation for this is that only those whom profit from war or are military aristocrats will gain from war, and these tend to be at a minority.¹³⁹ Therefore, a democracy would not pursue such a minority interest.

3.6.6 Neoliberal Institutionalism

Neoliberal Institutionalism is based on the idea that international institutions can increase, as well as assist, cooperation amongst states. According to liberal scholars, such as R. Keohane, institutions can help overcome problems, play a mediating role and maintain cooperation. Such institutions are usually set up when there is a high degree of interdependence in order to assist in dealing with common problems.¹⁴⁰ Therefore such institutions help shape the behaviour of a state which is reflected in its foreign policy.

Neoliberal Institutionalism is based on six basic principles: the state is the primary unit of analysis; states are rational-unitary actors; the international system in which states exist is anarchical¹⁴¹; states do share some of the same interests, therefore cooperation is possible; relative gains are conditional, and; there does not need to be hegemony for cooperation.¹⁴² Keohane bases his thought on these six principles. Whilst

¹³⁷ Doyle, M.W. (2008). p.60.

¹³⁸ Doyle, M.W. (1986). ' *Liberalism and World Politics.*' p. 1152-1153

¹³⁹ Ibid. p.1153

¹⁴⁰ Institutions can either be formal organisations (example: NATO, World Trade Organisation) or less formal sets of agreements which are known as regimes. One can say that there has been a rise of institutions since the world has become more globalised with problems transcending across borders.

¹⁴¹ Although states exist in an anarchical system, for neoliberal institutionalists this does not mean that structured interaction does not exist.

¹⁴² Leonard, E.K. (2005). ' *The Onset of Global Governance: International Relations Theory and the International Criminal Court.*' p.76. - Neoliberal Institutionalism deals with concepts such as self interest, the nation state and

other liberals believe that the state is an obstacle to cooperation and peace, he takes on a more state-centred theory. According to Keohane, such institutions are made up of states in which they form a part of in order to fulfil their own self-interests.¹⁴³ Therefore a key component of neoliberal institutionalism is that of states sharing common interests. Without this, cooperation would not be possible. Yet even if there is mutual interests, cooperation can still fail.¹⁴⁴ Keohane also points out that cooperation does not mean that there will be an absence of conflict. To the contrary, cooperation is viewed as a reaction to potential conflict or conflict itself.¹⁴⁵

The U.S. is involved in various institutions. These institutions not only influence its foreign policy, but are also a forum in which it can put forward and pursue its own national interests. Some major institutions which the U.S. is involved in include the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the UN as well as the UN Security Council where it is a permanent member, amongst others.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has given a theoretical framework that shall be applied and used for analyzing the U.S. foreign policy towards Pakistan in the following chapters. FPA contributes to the examination of foreign policy by defining such policies through theories. Therefore, the choice of theory ultimately is reflected in the choice of policy. In the case of the U.S., the two theories most appropriate to analyse its foreign policy outcomes are Realism and Liberalism. Realism examines how the national interests and objectives of the U.S. greatly influence its foreign policy. What drives this foreign policy

anarchy which are characteristics of realist thought. However, there is a difference between these two types of thinking: whilst realism is focused on a power-based theory, neoliberalism is interest-based.

¹⁴³Keohane, R.O. (1993). *'Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War.'* p.271.

¹⁴⁴Keohane, R.O. (1984). *'After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.'* p.6.

¹⁴⁵Keohane, R.O. (2006). *'Cooperation and International Regimes.'* p. 83.

is the aim of state survival and ensuring national security. Liberalism also provides more depth in FPA by addressing liberal goals in foreign policy which are reflected in the policies of the U.S. This is highlighted by how individuals and the ideas they believe in, the social forces as well as political institutions found in such a state can have an effect on its foreign policy.

Chapter 4:

Methodology

Chapter 4: Methodology

This chapter discusses the methodology used for this research. First it will describe the research question, followed by a discussion on the type of research method used, i.e. the qualitative method. It will then go on to discuss data sources used and the obstacles and limitations which were met with throughout the research.

4.1 Research Question

The title of this dissertation is 'A Comparative Analysis of the George W. Bush and the Barack Obama Administrations' Foreign Policy in the Context of the War on Terror: Case Study – Pakistan.' The focus of this research is U.S. foreign policy during the Bush Administrations two terms and the Obama Administrations first term, focusing on the country's bilateral relations with Pakistan in the fight against terrorism. It seeks to analyse and compare both administrations' foreign policy to see where there has been change or continuity in their foreign policy towards Pakistan.

4.2 Qualitative Research Method

The nature and scope of this research is qualitative. Qualitative research has been defined by Strauss and Corbin as 'any kind of research that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of quantification.'¹⁴⁶ With

¹⁴⁶ Strauss, A. & Corbin, J. (1990). *'Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques.'* p.17.

this, the authors indicated that qualitative research analysis involves a 'nonmathematical analytic procedure that results in findings derived from data gathered by a variety of means.'¹⁴⁷ The merit of this research method is that it provides an in-depth examination on the subject, enabling the researcher to get a rich, descriptive and valuable understanding of the research question.

An analytical and descriptive route is taken in order to answer the research question. This is done through a review of literature and the use of a case study. The existing literature will therefore be qualitatively reviewed in order to extract the relevant information regarding U.S. foreign and Pakistan policy of the Bush and Obama Administration's. Such information will then be used in order to compare both administrations' foreign and Pakistan policy in order to bring out where there has been continuity and change.

4.3 Data Sources

A wide range of primary sources have been used for this research. This includes news articles and long-form journalism. They are known as the 'first draft of history' which provide immediate impressions on governmental decisions and foreign policy events. Key elite newspapers include *The New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal* and the *Washington Post*. Other news articles are from *BBC* and *CNN* amongst others.

Presidential and executive-level documentation are also valuable sources. This includes the *National Security Strategy* and the *National Strategy for Counterterrorism* of both administrations. Such documentation is valuable in this research since it outlines

¹⁴⁷ Strauss, A. & Corbin, J. (1990). p.18.

the major national security concerns of the U.S. and how the administration plans to deal with them.

Transcripts of official speeches done by the two U.S. presidents and policy makers were also used. These were vital in order to gather the government's explanation of certain policy areas.

Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports have been a valuable primary source of information as well. The reports focus on public policy research which includes policy analysis, statistical reviews and legal analyses with the purpose of defining issues in a legislative context.¹⁴⁸

This dissertation also draws upon secondary sources from a wide range of published literature. Such literature includes books by investigative journalists, scholarly texts and historical accounts. A great amount of journal articles on international relations, FPA and historical analysis are used as well. Publications include *Foreign Policy Magazine*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, *International Security* and *South Asian Studies* amongst others. A preference for more recently published texts has been made when using such sources. Such sources are essential as they bring out the complete picture of U.S. foreign policy outcomes.

4.4 Obstacles and Limitations:

Obstacles and limitations were not inevitable when researching and writing this dissertation.

¹⁴⁸ CRS Reports can be accessed on the 'Open CRS' website: <https://openocrs.com/>

These primary and secondary sources had their limitations. One limitation is that such literature may become out-dated or replaced by newer publications. To overcome this, more recent publications were used when possible. A second limitation is that journalists can be misinformed. As a result, weekly, fortnightly and monthly publications were used more than daily newspapers as they have more time to fact-check their information and have more information available to them, therefore being more reliable.

Another limitation is that some sources can be politically biased, siding with one party and not the other. Some sources were also biased in the sense that they were anti-American or anti-Pakistan. To overcome this, it was important to find a balance and analyse such sources alongside others and not taken on their own. It was also important to keep in perspective who were the writers of such sources.

The word count has also been an obstacle for this dissertation since it has limited the amount of information which could be included. American foreign policy and the comparison of two administrations is a very vast subject with lots to say. However, due to the word limit it was not possible to mention everything. Therefore, to overcome this, the topic was narrowed down to focus on U.S. foreign policy with one particular country, i.e. Pakistan, and then further narrowed down to focus on the main themes which came out throughout the research.

Lastly, another limitation for the researcher was that various sources were classified. This was because such material would be claimed to be sensitive information and therefore is required secrecy based on the country's national security needs.

Chapter 5:

Historical Overview of U.S. – Pakistan

Relations

Chapter 5: Historical Overview of U.S. – Pakistan Relations

5.1 Introduction

The analysis of this research shall first begin with a historical overview of U.S.–Pakistan relations. This is necessary in order to show the episodic and discontinuous relationship both countries had with each other throughout the years ever since they established diplomatic relations after Pakistan’s independence from the United Kingdom in 1947.

This relationship is described as a ‘marriage of convenience’ full of extreme periodic highs and lows.¹⁴⁹ Their close ties throughout the years have been made up of ‘single-issue engagement[s] of limited or uncertain duration’ being done between the military or military dominated government of Pakistan and Washington policy which is in the hands of the White House, the Pentagon and the CIA.¹⁵⁰

Throughout history there have been three major U.S. engagements with Pakistan. The first engagement is during the Cold War where Pakistan was considered to be ‘America’s most allied ally.’¹⁵¹ The second engagement was during the Afghan jihad, yet once the U.S. lost its strategic interest in this region, relations between the two

¹⁴⁹ Sathasivam, K. (2005). ‘*Uneasy Neighbors: India, Pakistan and U.S. Foreign Policy.*’ p.95.

¹⁵⁰ Hussain, T. (2005). ‘*U.S.-Pakistan Engagement: The War on Terrorism and Beyond.*’ p.2.

¹⁵¹ Wirsing, R.G. (2003). ‘*Precairous Partnership: Pakistan’s Response to U.S. Security Policies.*’ p.70.

ultimately deteriorated. Lastly, the third engagement is that of the WOT from September 2001 to date.¹⁵²

5.2 The First Engagement

The first engagement between the two countries began during the Cold War. The U.S. at the time wanted to promote a strategic alliance of Asian states in order to limit Soviet influence.¹⁵³ Its foreign policy aim was also to protect its national security and expand its influence.¹⁵⁴ Therefore, in the early 1950's the U.S. had turned to Pakistan after India adopted a policy of non-alignment.¹⁵⁵ Pakistan at the time had political, economic and security problems, which included the issue of Kashmir, and therefore was in need of outside support. This ultimately motivated its foreign policy. As it reached out to the U.S., both countries negotiated and signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement in 1954 and again in 1959.¹⁵⁶ Later that year Pakistan became a member of Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and in 1955 it joined the Baghdad Pact which later became the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). Both defence related pacts were American sponsored.¹⁵⁷

As a result of Pakistan joining such agreements, the U.S. 'strengthened Pakistan's defence capabilities and potential for economic development,' therefore obtaining enough military power to keep it in balance with India.¹⁵⁸ One can say that by strengthening Pakistan's defence capabilities and army, it encouraged undemocratic

¹⁵² Hussain, T. (2005). p.3.

¹⁵³ Ibid. p.3.

¹⁵⁴ Soherwordi, S.H.S. (2010). '*U.S. Foreign Policy Shift towards Pakistan between 1965 & 1971 Pak-India Wars.*' p.23.

¹⁵⁵ McMahon, R.J. (1994). '*The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan.*' p.37.

¹⁵⁶ Khan, M.A. (1964). '*The Pakistan-American Alliance: Stresses and Strains.*'

¹⁵⁷ Hasnat, S.F. (2011). '*Pakistan – U.S. Relations on Slippery Grounds: An Account of Trust and its Deficit.*' p.28.

¹⁵⁸ Hussain, T. (2005). p.3.

practices in the country. The military's national profile was raised, leading it to dominate Pakistani politics through a 'pro-Western alliance of conservative forces, including Islamists.'¹⁵⁹ The U.S. at the time was not concerned with the status of Islam in the country though, since it provided internal stability and was naturally immune to communism.¹⁶⁰

It is evident that the two countries had a partnership based on strategic necessities, yet it was not based on shared perspectives. This is clearly seen in the 1960's when relations began to deteriorate. As the regional and international situation evolved, with changes in international relations, the U.S. and Pakistan began to alter their policies which created tension between the two.¹⁶¹ Pakistan was establishing good relations with the People's Republic of China and had turned to China for assistance whilst the U.S. shifted its interests to India by backing the country in the Sino-Indian War.¹⁶² It is important to note that during this time the U.S. and China were in confrontation with each other, mainly over Vietnam. Pakistan was holding an independent position on the issue of Vietnam which did not sit well with the U.S.¹⁶³

During the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, Pakistan was quite surprised at the U.S. reaction to this war. Although the two countries had signed an agreement of cooperation in 1954 and 1959, the U.S. did not fulfil its obligations of providing assistance. According to the U.S. the obligations found in the agreement could only be invoked by Pakistan in the event of an attack from a communist state.¹⁶⁴ Also, the U.S. believed that this war was Pakistan's fault. Therefore, it refused to give Pakistan aid under these

¹⁵⁹ Hussain, T. (2005). p.3.

¹⁶⁰ Cohen, S.P. (March 2003). *'America and Pakistan: Is the Worst Case Avoidable?'* p. 131.

¹⁶¹ Hussain, T. (2005). p.4.

¹⁶² Cohen, S.P. (March 2003). p.131.

¹⁶³ Hasnat, S.F. (2011). p.30.

¹⁶⁴ Soherwordi, S.H.S. (2010). p.31

circumstances, and ultimately imposed an arms embargo on the subcontinent as well as cut military assistance to the country. This greatly hurt Pakistan.¹⁶⁵

Cooperation was revived in 1970-71. Although the U.S. was not fond of Pakistan's China policy, it ended up using it in order to serve U.S. diplomatic aims when the Nixon Administration decided to improve its relations with China.¹⁶⁶ Pakistan was used as a go-between, providing assistance to help open the U.S. embassy in Beijing.¹⁶⁷ This helped relations between the two countries.

However this cooperation did not last long, with relations hitting a low point once again in 1979. As American concerns grew about the development of Pakistan's nuclear program, the Carter Administration introduced sanctions and suspended economic and military assistance to the country in accordance with the Symington Amendment¹⁶⁸ to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.¹⁶⁹

A violent incident also happened in November of the same year when a mob burned down the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad as well as several information centres. This was done after there was an attack on the Great Mosque in Mecca where America was falsely and mistakenly accused of being behind the attack.¹⁷⁰

5.3 The Second Engagement

Although relations were at a low point, the U.S. reengaged with Pakistan in the early 1980's following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, giving it

¹⁶⁵ Soherwordi, S.H.S. (2010). p.31

¹⁶⁶ Hasnat, S.F. (2011). p.31.

¹⁶⁷ Cohen, S.P. (March 2003). p.131.

¹⁶⁸ The Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act was done in 1976 in order to strengthen the U.S. position on nuclear non-proliferation. It does not allow the U.S. to provide economic or military assistance to those countries which deliver or receive nuclear enrichment technology.

¹⁶⁹ U.S. Department of State. '*Pakistan.*'

¹⁷⁰ Hasnat, S.F. (2011) p.38.

high-profile importance.¹⁷¹ As Soviet activity had increased in Kabul in October 1979, Pakistan had expressed concern to the U.S. since Afghanistan's historical role as a buffer was disappearing and it did not feel well prepared or equipped for such a threat.¹⁷² The U.S. was quite upset with the Soviet invasion and therefore it became Pakistan's partner in their proxy war in Afghanistan.¹⁷³ The U.S. promised to help Pakistan by providing it with necessary protection and meeting their defensive military needs,¹⁷⁴ agreeing to give \$3.2 billion in military and economic assistance.¹⁷⁵ It chose Afghan religious extremists as its allies whom were trained by Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI), the CIA, and was given U.S. military assistance.¹⁷⁶

Although the U.S. had various interests in Pakistan, which included containing their nuclear program, averting an India-Pakistan crisis and edging Pakistan towards a more democratic order, the war against the U.S.S.R came before all these other interests.¹⁷⁷ During this time, the U.S. was ignoring the breakdown of the educational system, the uneven economic development and the growing Islamic radicalism happening in Pakistan. When it came to radical Islamists, the Reagan Administration was not quite worried since they were known to be the best fighters in Afghanistan and were considered to be a threat to the U.S.S.R. but not to the U.S.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷¹ Fair, C.C. (2004). *'The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India.'* p.10.

¹⁷² Hasnat, S.F. (2011). p.39.

¹⁷³ Ahmed, S. (2001-02). *'The United States and Terrorism in Southwest Asia.'* p.80.

¹⁷⁴ Hasnat, S.F. (2011). p.40.

¹⁷⁵ U.S. Department of State. Background Notes: Pakistan.

¹⁷⁶ Hasnat, S.F. (2011). p.40.

¹⁷⁷ Cohen, S.P. (March 2003). p.131 – 132.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid. p.132

This engagement was a great contribution to ending the Cold War yet ‘it prospered in the darkening shadow of looming forces that would later come to threaten not only the security of Pakistan and the United States, but also the world.’¹⁷⁹

5.4 U.S. sanctions on Pakistan during the 1990’s

As the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the U.S. no longer had a strategic interest in the region. In fact, U.S.–Soviet relations were improving and therefore its relationship with Pakistan began to fade since it was because of the Soviets in which the two countries had come together. Not only did the U.S. walk away from Pakistan, but it ended up placing three sets of sanctions on the country during the 1990’s.

The first set of sanctions on Pakistan started in the late 1990’s. During the 1980’s there was suspicion that Pakistan was working on a nuclear weapons capability.¹⁸⁰ Yet in 1990 the ‘U.S. government concluded that Pakistan had crossed key thresholds in the development of its nuclear weapons program’¹⁸¹ and so President George Bush Sr. invoked the 1985 Pressler Amendment which suspended all economic aid and military assistance.¹⁸² According to this legislation the U.S. is banned to provide military and economic assistance to Pakistan ‘if an annual Presidential determination that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device was not given.’¹⁸³ It was no coincidence that just a year after the U.S. no longer needed Pakistan’s cooperation, the President refused to certify Pakistan.

¹⁷⁹ Hussain, T. (2005). p.4.

¹⁸⁰ Fair, C.C. (2004). p.11.

¹⁸¹ Ibid. p.11.

¹⁸² Hasnat, S.F. (2011). p.54.

¹⁸³ Hussain, T. (2005). p.5.

The second set of sanctions, known as the Pakistani Nuclear Test Sanctions, was enacted in May 1998 after Pakistan carried out tests of nuclear explosive devices.¹⁸⁴ This led to President Bill Clinton imposing additional sanctions on Pakistan, invoking the Glenn Amendment¹⁸⁵ of the Arms Export Control Act and the Symington Amendment.¹⁸⁶

In 1999, General Pervez Musharraf overthrew the democratically elected Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan.¹⁸⁷ This led to the third set of sanctions known as the Democracy Sanctions. The U.S. Congress invoked Section 508¹⁸⁸ of the Foreign Assistance Act which once again prohibited the U.S. from providing economic and military aid to Pakistan.¹⁸⁹

The U.S. did not offer Pakistan any incentives to change, and despite these sanctions, the U.S. did not manage to control Pakistan's behaviour. 'Sanctions were too weak to be an effective lever against Pakistan yet strong enough to be seen as an affront.'¹⁹⁰ Without economic aid coming from the U.S., Pakistan's institutions deteriorated, 'a huge debt accumulated and official cultivation of radical Islamic groups continued.'¹⁹¹ Despite this, the U.S. had now remained focused on the nuclear issue.

¹⁸⁴ Rennack, D.E. (2001). *'Indian and Pakistan: Current U.S. Economic Sanctions.'* p.2.

¹⁸⁵ The Glenn Amendment to the Arms Export Control Act does not allow the U.S. to provide foreign assistance to those countries which are defined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states which detonate a nuclear explosive device.

¹⁸⁶ Hussain, T. (2005). p.5.

¹⁸⁷ Fair, C.C. (2004). p.11.

¹⁸⁸ According to Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act, the U.S. shall not provide assistance to any country 'whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree.'

¹⁸⁹ Hussain, T. (2005). p.5.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid. p.4.

¹⁹¹ Cohen, S.P. (March 2003). p.132.

5.5 U.S. – Pakistan relationship on the eve of 9/11

On the eve of 9/11, the U.S.–Pakistan relationship was at a low point. Firstly, Pakistan was subject to various U.S. sanctions under the Symington, Pressler and Glenn Amendments. Pakistan felt that these sanction were being put on the country only because Pakistan was no longer useful for the U.S.¹⁹² Relations were also strained between the two due to Pakistan’s support for the Taliban. When the U.S. had left after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan continued to interfere in Afghan affairs, therefore establishing a relationship with the Taliban and recognizing it as the government of Afghanistan.¹⁹³ Third issue between the two countries was Pakistan’s desire to create nuclear weapons.

Another issue which was straining their relationship, and may be considered the worst of all, is that the U.S. was creating close diplomatic ties with India, Pakistan’s enemy, in order to balance the growing Chinese influence in South Asia.¹⁹⁴ Such instances which proved to Pakistan that the U.S. was pursuing an India first policy is in 2000 when President Clinton visited India for five days yet his next visit to Pakistan only lasted five hours. Also, President Clinton had refused to shake General Musharraf’s hand due to removing Prime Minister Sharif which further humiliated Pakistan.¹⁹⁵

Another strain to their relationship was that in Pakistan there was great anti-American sentiment. Such reasons for this included the American support for Israel, its

¹⁹² Fair, C.C. (2004). p.13-14.

¹⁹³ Ahmed, S. (Winter 2001-02). p.80-81.

¹⁹⁴ Hasnat, S.F. (2011). p.23.

¹⁹⁵ Fair, C.C. (2004). p.13.

response to the Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971, as well as abandoning the region once the U.S.S.R withdrew in 1989.¹⁹⁶

5.6 The domestic situation in Pakistan prior to 9/11

It is also important to refer to the domestic situation present in Pakistan at the time before the attacks which would ultimately affect its relationship with the U.S. Pakistan's domestic situation was one of disorder and was in a quite vulnerable position due to its political, economic and military instability. There were dangers found in the country which could provide opportunities for Islamist recruitments as well as help grow militants in the country. These include corruption, an increasing population, an underdeveloped economy, unemployment, poverty and an often ineffective government with weak institutions.¹⁹⁷ Also, the poor educational system is of major concern since there is not much opportunity for education except for certain religious schools, also known as madrassahs, which are known to nurse and expose violent extremism.¹⁹⁸ These domestic conditions which made Pakistan vulnerable would give an environment for Islamist extremism to rise, therefore being dangerous and threatening American security.

5.7 Conclusion

This historical overview makes clear the main features of U.S. Pakistan relations as well as helps identify the main concerns and challenges they have had. It is an episodic and discontinuous relationship. From the American side, the relationship tended to always be based more on strategic objectives, as can be seen in the case of

¹⁹⁶ Fair, C.C. (2004). p.13-14.

¹⁹⁷ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (2004). p.367.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

the Cold War. When such objectives would be reached and the U.S. would no longer need Pakistan as an ally, they would leave. One may note that its relationship with Pakistan was also motivated throughout the years by the U.S. concern of its possession of nuclear weapons. On the other side, Pakistan's relationship with the U.S. was more focused on obtaining political support and resources due to its own dispute with India.

Although this relationship lacked consistency, with its various high's and low's, the cooperation between the two countries has served various important mutual interests in the past. This is evident once again with their relationship which has been transformed as a result of 9/11 and being a part of the GWOT.

Chapter 6:

U.S. Foreign Policy and Pakistan -

The Bush Administration

Chapter 6: U.S. Foreign Policy and Pakistan - The Bush Administration

6.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explore U.S. foreign policy and the relationship with Pakistan under the Bush Administration's two terms.

Prior to the attacks of 9/11, the administration's foreign policy did not give much attention to terrorism and the country's relationship with Pakistan was at a low point. However, this was to change following the attacks on the U.S. homeland, with the Bush Administration shifting its foreign policy attention and fixing its relations with Pakistan.

This chapter shall first look at the foreign policy of the administration prior to the attack and its response. It will then go on to focus on the importance of Pakistan for the U.S. and how the U.S. foreign policy and bilateral relationship with the country evolved between 2001-2009.

6.2 The Bush Administration prior to the events of 9/11

During the 2000 U.S. election campaign, as well as the first months in office in 2001, the Bush administration was committed to a 'distinctly American internationalism' for its foreign policy.¹⁹⁹ There was to be greater focus on American national interests

¹⁹⁹ Bush, G.W. 'A *Distinctly American Internationalism*,' speech delivered at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, November 19, 1999.

rather than on global interests and would narrow American involvement abroad.²⁰⁰ The U.S. military was to be considered a top priority, as well as the refurbishing of American alliances. When it came to dealing with the international system, the administration preferred to use 'hard power' rather than 'soft power'.

6.3 The U.S. response to the 9/11 attacks

The 9/11 attacks was a 'spectacular political event' which greatly affected the U.S., ultimately changing its foreign policy attention.²⁰¹ As a response to the events of 9/11, the Bush Administration declared a GWOT, shifting the focus of its foreign policy towards counterterrorism and making the fight against terrorism its main priority.²⁰² The WOT was to be an international political and military campaign to eliminate al-Qaeda and other militant organisations and was based on a 'struggle between good and evil' which affected all nations across the world.²⁰³ The fight against terrorism came to dominate the foreign policy agenda of its two terms in office since according to Bush, the U.S.' responsibility was to 'answer these attacks and rid the world of evil'.²⁰⁴

²⁰⁰ McCormick, J.M. (2010). *'American Foreign Policy & Process'* (5th ed.). p.202 - Prior to the events of 9/11, the Bush Administration was to mainly focus on actions which would be considered strategically important when it came to American involvement abroad. This meant that it would not get involved in changing internal structures of other states, such as promoting and imposing political democracy. It also meant that U.S. humanitarian interventions would not be done if there was no strategic rationale. One may also note that the Bush Administration wanted to avoid involvement with international institutions, as well as opposed various key international agreements.

²⁰¹ McCormick, J.M. (2010). p.207. - The attacks had a great effect on the U.S. for three main reasons: It was the first attack on the American continent, it was an attack on American civilians rather than the countries military, and lastly it was the deadliest terrorist attack in U.S. history.

²⁰² Lindsay, J.M. (2011). *'George W. Bush, Barack Obama and the Future of US Global Leadership.'* p.766. - One may note that although the content of the Bush Administration's foreign policy quickly changed directions, there still remained some elements of continuity.

²⁰³ Ibid.. p.766.

²⁰⁴ George W. Bush, *'President's Remarks at National Day of Prayer and Remembrance Service.'*

6.4 The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terror

The Bush Administration's foreign policy principles are known as the Bush Doctrine and are outlined in the National Security Strategy of the U.S. (NSS) published in 2002.²⁰⁵ The Bush Doctrine was greatly influenced by the new threat environment which came to existence following the attacks and outlined the country's approach to fighting the WOT.²⁰⁶ The Bush Administration acknowledged the fact that the U.S. possessed great strength and influence in the world and knew that 'this position comes with unparalleled responsibilities, obligations and opportunity.'²⁰⁷

According to the NSS, the main aim of U.S. foreign policy was 'to create a balance of power that favours freedom'.²⁰⁸ In order to do so, the U.S. would

defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants... will preserve peace by building good relations among the great powers... [and] extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.²⁰⁹

To achieve such a goal, seven courses of action were outlined.²¹⁰ Actions for defending the peace include: Strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against the U.S. and its friends; Work with others to defuse regional conflicts; Prevent their enemies from threatening them, their allies, and their friends with WMD, and; Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century. Its action for preserving the peace was to develop agendas for cooperative action with the other main centres of global power. Lastly, its action for extending the peace included: Igniting a new era of global and economic

²⁰⁵ The NSS was updated in 2006.

²⁰⁶ The U.S. recognised that it was now more threatened by failing states and catastrophic technologies rather than by conquering states or fleets and armies.

²⁰⁷ The National Security Strategy of the United States (2002). p.1.

²⁰⁸ Ibid. p.i.

²⁰⁹ Ibid. p.i.

²¹⁰ McCormick, J.M. (2010).

growth through free markets and free trade, and; Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy.²¹¹

6.5 Strengthening bilateral alliances

Strengthening bilateral alliances was a part of the Bush Administration's strategy to defeat global terrorism.²¹² The WOT meant 'fighting a war against terrorists of global reach', and so Bush recognised that such a war would not be successful without the participation of the international community.²¹³ In fact, according to the 9/11 Commission, 'practically every aspect of US counterterrorism strategy relies on international cooperation.'²¹⁴ However, although under Bush the U.S. was to 'constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community', if necessary, it was ready to act alone.²¹⁵

The role of allies in counterterrorism as part of Bush's strategy include: '1. Providing intelligence and disrupting terrorists through aggressive law enforcement; 2. Conducting counterinsurgency operations; 3. Augmenting pressure on state sponsors and strengthening weak or failed states; and 4. Adding legitimacy.'²¹⁶

6.6 The Bush Administration and Pakistan

As the U.S. began to prepare itself for this war, it put a tough choice before Pakistan, and the rest of the world. Bush had declared that 'Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the

²¹¹ The National Security Strategy of the United States (2002). p.5-31.

²¹² One can say that there were two wars on terrorism during the Bush Administration: One was a general war to eradicate all forms of terrorism and the second was a more specific war to dismantle Al-Qaeda.

²¹³ The National Security Strategy of the United States (2002). p.5.

²¹⁴ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (2004). p.379

²¹⁵ The National Security Strategy of the United States (2002). p.6.

²¹⁶ Byman, D. (2006). '*Remaking Alliances for the War on Terrorism.*' p.778.

terrorists.²¹⁷ There was to be no distinction between the terrorists themselves and those who harbour them.²¹⁸ This declaration ultimately indicated the future of U.S.-Pakistan relations.

6.7 Reasons for the need of Pakistan in the War on Terror

When Bush initiated the WOT, it was important for the administration to identify those countries which it needed in order to fight and achieve its aims. Pakistan was deemed to be one of these countries. Therefore, to assess U.S. objectives in Pakistan it is first important to understand the reality found in the country and why it was needed.

6.7.1 Stability

The need for political, economic and military stability in Pakistan was quite important for the U.S. since such challenges leave Pakistan vulnerable, therefore being dangerous and ultimately threatening American security.²¹⁹ A vulnerable Pakistan provides opportunities for Islamist recruitments and helps grow militants in the country and therefore can be said to provide conditions which enable terrorist production.²²⁰ In Pakistan you also find unregulated regions in which Islamist extremists whom want to set up a base or who are looking for refuge might find attractive to settle down in.²²¹

²¹⁷ CNN. (21 September 2001). '*Transcript of President Bush's address to a joint session of Congress on Thursday night, September 20, 2001.*'

²¹⁸ This came to define the Bush Doctrine.

²¹⁹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (2004). p.367.

²²⁰ Cohen, S.P., 2005, p.132. (The domestic situation in Pakistan can be viewed in the previous chapter.)

²²¹ According to the *9/11 Commission Report*, many of the attackers from 11 September 2001 had set up bases in these unregulated regions to operate whilst using the north-south nexus of Kandahar – Quetta – Karachi. Also, many extremists had set up bases in such regions in order to take action against the coalition forces in Afghanistan.

6.7.2 Geopolitical value

Another reason is that once the U.S. had determined that al-Qaeda was behind the 9/11 attacks and that the Taliban government of Afghanistan was protecting them, it was obvious that they needed Pakistan's support for geopolitical reasons. Pakistan's strategic worth comes from its 'geographical proximity to Afghanistan, her military superiority in the region and sophisticated intelligence and logistic facilities.'²²² This made it an ideal headquarter for the U.S. military campaign.

6.7.3 Relations with the Taliban

Prior to 9/11 Pakistan made it a priority to keep good relations with the Taliban and has even assisted its growth. The Pakistani government had supported, as well as provided aid for such extremists and tried to avoid having any confrontation with them.²²³ There was no other state which knew the Taliban better than Pakistan.

6.7.4 Nuclear weapons possession

Lastly, the fact that Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons was a problem for the U.S. since there was a serious concern with regards to the possibility that such nuclear material may be acquired by the wrong people and may lead to devastating results.²²⁴

²²² Khan, J. (2010). *'U.S.-Pakistan Relations: The Geo-Strategic and Geopolitical Factors.'* p.74.

²²³ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (2004). p.368.

²²⁴ Armitage, R.L., Berger, S.R. & Markey, D.S. (2010). *'U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan.'* - It is no secret that al-Qaeda, as well as other Islamist terrorists, would like to acquire such nuclear power. In fact, prior to the attacks of 9/11 bin Laden had met with veterans of the Pakistan nuclear program to discuss his desire for nuclear weapons.

6.8 Pakistan joins the War on Terror

Pakistan at first was caught up in a difficult decision as to whether or not join the war.²²⁵ Before taking a side, it tried to convince the Taliban to accept U.S. demands which were previously rejected, but to no avail.²²⁶ As the U.S. decided to go to war with the Taliban, Pakistan was presented with seven demands in order to cooperate with them. The seven demands were:

- Stop al-Qaeda operatives at its borders, stop the arms transfer through Pakistan and also end logistical support to Osama
- Pakistan should allow the blanket over flight rights to conduct air operations
- Provide territorial access to the U.S. That included the use of naval ports, air bases and strategic location and borders
- Pakistan should provide the intelligence support to the U.S. authorities about the Taliban and al-Qaeda
- Continue to condemn publically the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and also any other act of terror against the U.S. and its coalition partners
- Cut off all shipments of fuel and any other items to the Taliban
- Pakistan should cut off all diplomatic ties with the Taliban.²²⁷

Pakistani President General Musharraf ultimately decided to support the U.S. and its coalition partners, therefore ending its relationship with the Taliban.²²⁸ He accepted all seven demands for four main reasons which include the security of the country, in

²²⁵ It was quite hesitant due to its ties with Afghanistan at the time.

²²⁶ Sohrab, W. & Choudhry, I.A. (2012). *'Pak-U.S. Relations in 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan.'* p.6. - President Bush had given five demands to the Taliban: Hand over all al-Qaeda leaders and members to the U.S.; Close all terrorist camps in Afghanistan; Give access to US authorities to verify the elimination of training camps; Taliban should release all foreigners, and; Taliban should protect foreign aid workers.

²²⁷ Ibid. p.6.

²²⁸ *'Musharraf Speech Highlights.'*, BBC News. (12 January 2002).

order to fulfil economic challenges, due to the issue of Kashmir and because of the need for secure strategic assets.²²⁹ From this point onwards, Pakistan was to become an essential and key ally in the WOT. In return, President Bush removed the sanctions which were imposed on the country during the 1990's.²³⁰

6.9 Strategic objectives towards Pakistan

The Bush Administration addressed Pakistan within a regional context; that of South Asia. Its policy goals in the region were to combat terrorism as well as eradicate those conditions which breed terrorism.²³¹ In this new security environment it had specific strategic objectives applicable to Pakistan. One of the first objectives which was mentioned previously was that of bringing Pakistan to join the WOT since it was necessary for its counterterror campaign in Afghanistan.²³² Another was that Islamabad would cut its ties with the Taliban and deny it any sanctuaries. This would include serving as a 'U.S. staging ground and logistics hub.'²³³ A third strategic objective was to provide economic and military aid to Pakistan.²³⁴

As it became clearer to the administration that the threat of terrorism had roots in Pakistan's tribal areas and cities, Washington adopted a broader definition of its objectives. This included efforts to strengthen the Pakistani economy as well as strengthen intelligence and military ties. The U.S. also wanted to assure the security of Pakistan's nuclear assets which included having a quiet dialogue and an assistance

²²⁹ Javaid, U. & Fatima, Q. (2012). 'U.S. Foreign Policy Parameters towards Pakistan and India 2001-2008.' p.24-25.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid. p.25.

²³² Armitage, R.L., Berger, S.R. & Markey, D.S. (2010). p.29.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ The Bush Administration utilised both multilateral and unilateral tools in order to provide economic and military aid to Pakistan. Such examples include aid being given for FATA under its Sustainable Development Plan, initiatives under the Friends of Pakistan Group, as well as other multilateral bodies, some of which were also involved in Afghanistan.

program to address nuclear security issues.²³⁵ By 2005 the Bush Administration began to focus more on Pakistan's internal politics.

6.10 The Bush Administration, Pakistani government and democracy promotion

According to the Bush Administration, the U.S. was to support democratic institutions and processes as part of the WOT. However, Bush embraced the nondemocratic government of Pakistan under Musharraf.²³⁶ Bush overlooked Musharraf's antidemocratic character and never really pushed for democratic reform, a return to civilian rule, or human rights abuses. This is a result of the administration's focus of gaining cooperation from Musharraf and therefore trying to avoid any potential conflict. Another reason was that Bush believed that Musharraf was holding Pakistan together, and although democratisation may have been positive in theory, in practice it was too risky. The U.S. believed that the military was the only effective institution in Pakistan when taking into consideration the other two centralist political parties in Pakistan which were not considered more capable or democratic than Musharraf's military rule.²³⁷

Within its second term, the Bush Administration began to put more emphasis on democracy promotion as a part of its foreign policy. When it came to Pakistan, although it supported Musharraf, there began to be the realisation that extremism was actually growing rather than decreasing under military rule. By 2006 Bush made it clear that

²³⁵ Armitage, R.L., Berger, S.R. & Markey, D.S. (2010). p.29.

²³⁶ Carothers, T. (2007). *'U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush.'*

²³⁷ Carothers, T. (2007). p.8.- These two political parties were the Pakistan People Party, led by Benazir Bhutto, and Pakistan Muslim League which was led by Nawaz Sharif.

The United States strongly supports Pakistan's efforts to develop robust, transparent, and representative democratic institutions open to participation by all Pakistanis, as well as conduct elections that reflect the will of the Pakistani people and that meet international standards.²³⁸

In fact, the U.S. provided election support to Pakistan by installing a computerised electoral rolls system for the government. In summer 2007 the Bush Administration also worked behind the scenes to conduct a transition to democracy which would leave Musharraf as President.²³⁹

However, by the end of 2007 the administration began to give up on the Pakistani government, especially when Musharraf declared a state of emergency in Pakistan.²⁴⁰ Bush's response was for Musharraf to resign from head of the military and urged restoration of civilian rule which included him holding elections as soon as possible since it was in the best interest for the country and people.²⁴¹ As a result, elections were held in 2008 with the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League forming a new coalition government with Yosaf Raza Gillani as Prime Minister.²⁴²

6.11 Pakistan's involvement in Operation Enduring Freedom

It can be said that the Bush Administration would not have been able to take the WOT to Afghanistan if Pakistan did not help and join in. In fact, long term stability in

²³⁸ 'Fact Sheet: United States and Pakistan: Long-Term Strategic Partners.', March 2006

²³⁹ Cooper, H. (2007). 'U.S. Strategy for Pakistan Looks More Fragile.' - The Bush Administration hoped that this would be done through a power sharing deal between the General himself and Ms. Bhutto, the leader of the PPP whom was considered pro-American and had much support.

²⁴⁰ Rohde, D. (2007). 'Musharraf Declares State of Emergency.' - It can be said that Musharraf made such a move in order to reassert his fading power in Pakistan which faced a growth of opposition from civilian political parties, extreme Islamists and the country's Supreme Court. One may also take note that this happened just days before the court ruling on the legality of his rule.

²⁴¹ 'Bush Urges Musharraf on Election.', BBC News. (8 November 2007)

²⁴² Kronstadt, K.A. (2008)1. 'Pakistan's 2008 Elections Results and Implications for U.S. Policy.'

Afghanistan, which is the main goal of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), is quite dependent on Pakistan's 'willingness to cooperate.'²⁴³ According to Zahid Hussein,

Pakistan's support was important for the USA... [because] its geographic proximity and its vast intelligence information on Afghanistan were seen as crucial for any military action against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.²⁴⁴

When Pakistan joined the WOT it offered as much help as it could possibly give to the U.S. in order to carry out OEF. This included military intelligence from Pakistan's ISI and the use of airbases/airfields, air corridor and naval facilities in order to carry out its operations in Afghanistan.²⁴⁵ Pakistan had provided over 35,000 troops to protect these military bases.²⁴⁶ Pakistan also provided logistical support to the U.S. for its efforts in Afghanistan.²⁴⁷ Most of this support was provided to the U.S. with no formal agreements of user fees, which showed Pakistan's full support to the U.S.

6.12 Afghan-Pakistan Border

The U.S. and Pakistan have also closely cooperated along the Afghan-Pakistan border.²⁴⁸ The U.S. regards this border as a 'crucial front' in the WOT.²⁴⁹ After the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban crossed the border into Pakistan where they set up sanctuaries in the northwest, in the Federally Administrative Tribal Areas (FATA) where they felt safer.²⁵⁰ The U.S. relied on Pakistan to repress Islamist extremists and to remove al-Qaeda terrorists which were operating

²⁴³ Javid, U. & Fatima, Q. (2012). p.28.

²⁴⁴ Hussain, Z. (2008). *'Frontline Pakistan: A Path to Catastrophe and the Killing of Benazir Bhutto.'* p.37.

²⁴⁵ United States Central Command. *'Pakistan.'*

²⁴⁶ These bases were to be only used for offensive operations.

²⁴⁷ Such logistical support for the U.S. included large amounts of fuel for coalition aircrafts (an average of 100,000 gallons per day in the first five months), as well as access to ports where supplies would be delivered.

²⁴⁸ *'Fact Sheet: United States and Pakistan: Long-Term Strategic Partners.'* March 2006

²⁴⁹ Ignatius, D. (2008). *'A Quiet Deal with Pakistan.'*

²⁵⁰ Bergen, P.L. (2011). p.248-254.

on the border. In fact, the Pakistani military stationed around 80,000 soldiers on the border.²⁵¹

Yet by 2007 there was a resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and a reconstitution of al-Qaeda in the FATA since they were able to find a secure sanctuary in Pakistan. The Bush Administration throughout the years had provided Pakistan with large sums of money in assistance and compensated the Pakistani military for its counterterrorism efforts. Therefore, they began to wonder if Pakistan's efforts were effective and if they were actually doing their part in the WOT.²⁵²

6.12.1 Drone strikes in Pakistan

From 2004 the U.S. military began to launch drone strikes in northwest Pakistan targeted at the Taliban and al-Qaeda militants. Such attacks were part of Bush's WOT. Between 2001-2009 the Bush Administration administered 52 drone strikes in Pakistan which were greatly increased in 2008.²⁵³ Such strikes managed to kill hundreds of militants as well as civilians. The Pakistani government had publically condemned such attacks since they were violating its sovereignty. At first such strikes were coordinated with Pakistan, yet almost by the end of Bush's second term, Pakistan was not being informed of such strikes.²⁵⁴

6.13 Intelligence cooperation

As Pakistan took part in the WOT, Musharraf had pledged to eliminate terrorists from Pakistan and deny the use of Pakistan as a base for terrorism. Pakistani

²⁵¹ Cohen, C. (2007). *'A Perilous Course: U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan.'* p.3.

²⁵² Tellis, A.J. (2008). *'Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance.'* p.1.

²⁵³ The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. (2011). *'The Bush Years: Pakistan Strikes 2004-2009.'*

²⁵⁴ Hussain, Z. (2008)1. *'Pakistan Issues Threat Over U.S. Incursions.'*

intelligence cooperated with the U.S. and has been vital in the hunt for al-Qaeda.²⁵⁵ Around 3,300 extremists were detained, various militant leaders were put under house arrest and militant group bank accounts were frozen.²⁵⁶ According to Musharraf, Pakistan managed to capture 672 al-Qaeda members, of which 369 were handed over to the U.S.²⁵⁷ By handing over suspected militants to the U.S., Pakistan in return received millions of dollars.²⁵⁸ Such arrests were important for the U.S. according to FBI Director Mueller since their

view of the capabilities of Al Qaeda becomes more transparent and it gives us more confidence that we have an understanding of plots in the past, plots that were on the table, and future possibilities.²⁵⁹

6.14 U.S. Aid and Assistance to Pakistan (2001-2009)

Prior to 9/11, the economy of Pakistan was in quite a bad state. By joining the WOT and being a partner to the U.S. in the Afghanistan war, Pakistan was granted large amounts of economic and military aid and assistance which continually rose throughout the Bush Administration.²⁶⁰ The intention of U.S. aid was for counterterrorism efforts as well as border security.²⁶¹ This included about \$3.1 billion for economic purposes as well

²⁵⁵ Reveron, D.S. (2008). *'Counterterrorism and Intelligence Cooperation.'*

²⁵⁶ Javaid, U. & Fatima, Q. (2012). p.26.

²⁵⁷ Musharraf, P. (2006). *'In the Line of Fire: A Memoir.'* - Various high-ranking al-Qaeda officials were captured by Pakistan. These include Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (whom planned the 9/11 attacks), Ramzi bin al-Shibh (whom financially backed operations done by al-Qaeda), and Zayn al-Abidin Muhammed Hasayn Abu Zubaydah (an operations chief who took care of al-Qaeda training camps) amongst others.

²⁵⁸ Bergen, P.L. (2011). p.254.

²⁵⁹ Mueller, R. (2003). *'Hearing of the Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee.'*

²⁶⁰ Epstein, S.B. & Knonstadt, K.A. (2011). *'Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance.'*

²⁶¹ Javaid, U. & Fatima, Q. (2012). p.30.

as having \$1 billion of debt which was owed to the U.S. cancelled.²⁶² Pakistan's economy greatly benefitted from this aid.

It is important to note that American assistance to Pakistan was not just aid; it was an investment in U.S. and global security. Therefore, such assistance was not intended to strengthen Pakistan's internal stability, but rather in order to achieve counterterror objectives.

In June 2003 Bush and Musharraf had met at Camp David where the U.S. proposed a five year \$3 billion economic and defence aid package for Pakistan.²⁶³ This package was in order to help advance security and economic opportunity. This exemplified the U.S.' commitment to stay involved with Pakistan in the long term and reaffirmed their ties.²⁶⁴

In 2006-2007 the administration restructured its foreign aid program and developed a framework which would put greater importance on U.S. security and democracy building as the main goals of such aid.²⁶⁵ This framework had five objectives: Peace and security; Governing justly and democratically; Investing in people; Economic growth, and; Humanitarian assistance.²⁶⁶ This created a challenge for the U.S. on how to provide assistance to Pakistan and reward its cooperation in the war, whilst putting pressure on the country for democratisation and non-proliferation.²⁶⁷

²⁶² Kronstadt, K.A. (2009). *'Pakistan – U.S. Relations.'*

²⁶³ Javaid, U. & Fatima, Q. (2012). p.29.

²⁶⁴ U.S. Department of State. (June 2003). *'President Bush Welcomes President Musharraf to Camp David.'*

²⁶⁵ Javaid, U. & Fatima, Q. (2012). p.30.

²⁶⁶ Tarnoff, C. & Lawson, M.L. (2011). *'Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy.'* p.3.

²⁶⁷ Javaid, U. & Fatima, Q. (2012). p.30.

6.14.1 U.S. Military Aid and Assistance and Pakistan-U.S. Security

Cooperation

Bilateral military cooperation between the two countries was revived again under Bush following the attacks of 2001. In fact, by 2008 Pakistan was one of the largest recipients of U.S. military aid, with approximately \$10 billion in military (and economic) assistance being given since 2002.²⁶⁸

Aspects of U.S. counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan include the revival of the high-level U.S.-Pakistan Defence Consultative Group in September 2002 in order to discuss military cooperation, security assistance and anti-terrorism.²⁶⁹ The following month, joint military exercises between the U.S. and Pakistan began.²⁷⁰ In 2003 a U.S. – Pakistan – Afghanistan Tripartite Commission was established in order for military commanders to come together and discuss border security and Afghan stability.²⁷¹

The Coalition Support Fund (CSF) was created by the administration as well, which was 'designed to support only the costs of fighting terrorism over and above regular military costs incurred by Pakistan.'²⁷² According to the Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, the CSF funds were used to keep about 100,000 Pakistani soldiers close to the Afghan border and to support approximately 90 Pakistani army operations.²⁷³

In June 2004 President Bush formally named Pakistan a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), upgrading their relationship. This was a way of giving recognition and saying

²⁶⁸ Bruno, G. & Bajoria, J. (2008). *'U.S. – Pakistan Military Cooperation.'*

²⁶⁹ The Defence Consultative Group had been inactive from 1997 to 2001.

²⁷⁰ Javaid, U. & Fatima, Q. (2012). p.30.

²⁷¹ Kronstadt, K.A. (2009). p.57.

²⁷² Ibrahim, A. (2009). *'U.S. Aid to Pakistan – U.S. Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption.'* p.8.

²⁷³ United States Senate. (2008). *'Robert Gates: Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee'*

thank you to Pakistan's contribution in the WOT.²⁷⁴ Being an MNNA brought additional benefits in areas such as foreign aid and defence cooperation.²⁷⁵

In 2001 the U.S. resumed arms sales to Pakistan which included items that would be useful for counterterrorism operations.²⁷⁶ According to the Pentagon, from 2001 to 2007, the total amount of military sales to Pakistan was \$4.55 billion.²⁷⁷ The U.S. also provided Pakistan around \$1.6 billion in Foreign Military Funding which is used to purchase military equipment.²⁷⁸

The Bush Administration had also helped strengthen the capacity of the Frontier Corps which were responsible for border security in Pakistan. In 2007, funds began to be used in order to train and equip the Frontier Corps and also to increase the U.S. Special Operations Command's involvement in assisting the counterterrorism efforts of Pakistan.²⁷⁹

6.14.2 U.S. assistance and Pakistani nuclear security

As a part of the Bush Doctrine, the U.S. was to prevent its enemies from threatening itself, as well as its friends and allies, with WMD.²⁸⁰ From the world's nine declared and undeclared nuclear arsenals, Pakistan's was of greatest concern for the Bush Administration since it was considered to be the most vulnerable to terrorist

²⁷⁴ 'Bush names Pakistan "Major Ally."', BBC News. (17 June 2004)

²⁷⁵ Major Non-NATO Allies are eligible for priority delivery of defence material, can stockpile US military hardware, can participate in defence research and development programs, and can benefit from a US loan guarantee program.

²⁷⁶ Kronstadt, K.A. (2009). p.57.

²⁷⁷ Javaid, U. & Fatima, Q. (2012). p.30.

²⁷⁸ Kronstadt, K.A. (2009). p.57-58.

²⁷⁹ Kronstadt, K.A. & Epstein, S.B. (2012). 'Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance.' p.17.

²⁸⁰ The National Security Strategy of the United States (2002).

groups.²⁸¹ This was due to the fact that Pakistan's government was the least stable and officials which were close to the seat of power are known to transfer nuclear designs and technology to others.²⁸² Therefore, this led the administration to worry that this nuclear arsenal could be a security threat to the U.S. if the Pakistani government were to lose control. This meant that there was the need for them to be safeguarded.²⁸³

Musharraf agreed with the U.S. to make policy changes and security upgrades. He removed some Pakistani intelligence officials which were suspected of having ties with the Taliban. The Pakistani President also agreed to move its nuclear weapons to more secure locations 'and accepted a U.S. offer to help design a system of controls, barriers, locks and sensors to guard against theft.'²⁸⁴ By 2007 the administration had spent around \$100 million to help Musharraf secure such weapons. Pakistan was given equipment such as helicopters, intrusion detectors, night-vision goggles and nuclear detection equipment. Such aid was also used for building a nuclear security training camp and for the training of Pakistani personnel in the U.S.²⁸⁵

6.15 Regional conflict in South Asia

Defusing regional conflict was a part of the Bush Doctrine in order to fight the WOT. According to Bush, regional conflicts affect the national security of the U.S., and therefore it was important to resolve them.²⁸⁶ The administration stressed the need for the regional conflict in South Asia, that of Pakistan-India, to be resolved. In fact, the

²⁸¹ Warrick, J. (2007). '*Pakistan Nuclear Security Questioned.*' and Sanger, D.E. & Broad, W.J. (2007). '*U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms.*'

²⁸² Ibid. - These include people such as A.Q. Khan who is a nuclear engineer, and his part collaborators whom were in the Pakistani Military.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Sanger, D.E. & Broad, W.J. (2007).

²⁸⁶ The National Security Strategy of the United States (2006). p.14.

administration has invested 'time and resources [into] building strong bilateral relations with India and Pakistan.'²⁸⁷

Throughout the Bush Administration, President Musharraf hoped that Bush would use his influence to settle the dispute. However when Bush made his first official visit to Pakistan in 2006, he made it clear that both leaders should 'step up and lead' in order to resolve their issues, therefore encouraging both sides to come together, but on their own.²⁸⁸

With regards to nuclear arms, the Bush Administration strongly encouraged the continuation of the bilateral ceasefire and dialogue between both countries. The U.S. has given much focus on non-proliferation efforts in South Asia with regards to a perceived India-Pakistan nuclear arms race. Much focus was given especially ever since the U.S. obtained evidence that Pakistani nuclear materials and technologies were being transferred to third parties.²⁸⁹

6.16 Conclusion

Following the attacks of 9/11 the Bush Administration declared a GWOT, shifting the focus of its foreign policy towards counterterrorism efforts. It went on the defensive to achieve national security and state survival as a response to the international threat environment it came to face. A part of this was forming alliances in order to protect itself. This led to the third engagement between the U.S. and Pakistan.

Obtaining Pakistan's cooperation in the war was important for the U.S. Not only was it of geopolitical value, but it also possessed WMD and lacked stability in the

²⁸⁷ The National Security Strategy of the United States (2002). p.10.

²⁸⁸ 'Bush Urges End to Kashmir Conflict.', CNN. (4 March 2006).

²⁸⁹ Kronstadt, K.A. (2008). 'Pakistan – U.S. Relations.'

country. By gaining its cooperation, bilateral relations between the two under the Bush Administration greatly improved, enjoying good relations not only at the state level but also at a personal level, with Bush greatly trusting in Musharraf.

The bilateral relationship under the Bush Administration was greatly based on counterterror efforts and the eradication of conditions which breed terrorism. Cooperation between the two mainly focused on building military and intelligence partnership to capture militants and it included fighting the OEF and securing the Afghan-Pakistan border. As a part of its efforts and as a reward to Pakistan for its cooperation, the administration provided large sums of dollars in aid and assistance. Yet this aid was not just aid. It was an investment in U.S. and global security to be used to achieve counterterror objectives.

Chapter 7:

U.S. Foreign Policy and Pakistan -

The Obama Administration

Chapter 7: U.S. Foreign Policy and Pakistan: The Obama Administration

7.1 Introduction

Winning the U.S. Presidential elections of 2008, Barack Obama was the first president to enter office during the WOT. Throughout his presidential campaign he projected and instilled the belief of 'hope' and 'change' to the American's and the international community. However, coming into office his administration had many challenges to face, with Pakistan being one of them.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore U.S. foreign policy and the relationship with Pakistan under the Obama Administration's first term. It will first look at the administration's strategy for counterterrorism and its objectives in Pakistan. It will then look at the country's foreign policy, strategy and how its relationship with Pakistan evolved from 2009 to the end of its first term.

7.2 The National Strategy for Counterterrorism

The National Strategy for Counterterrorism is one part of the Obama Administration's larger NSS, outlining the country's approach to fighting terrorism. This National Strategy is built upon the progress which had been made under the previous administration, yet 'neither represents a wholesale overhaul – nor a wholesale retention-

of previous policies and strategies.²⁹⁰ The Obama Administration recognised that the threat and main focus of its counterterrorism strategy was al-Qaeda, its affiliates and supporters and made it clear that the U.S. was at war and was prepared to use every element of its power to fight and defeat the enemy.

In order to defeat al-Qaeda, the administration outlined its specific goals. These were: Protect the American people, homeland and American interests; Disrupt, degrade, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda, its affiliates and supporters; Prevent terrorist development, acquisition and use of WMD; Eliminate Safe havens; Build counterterrorism partnerships and capabilities; Degrade links between al-Qaeda and its affiliates and supporters; Counter al-Qaeda ideology and its attempts to justify its use of violence, and; Deprive terrorists of their enabling means, which include financing, logistical support and communications.²⁹¹

7.3 Challenges in Pakistan

Upon taking office, the Obama Administration had inherited various difficult challenges in Pakistan. During this time there was a new civilian government which was trying to establish itself in Pakistan after years under military rule.²⁹² The country's economy was also suffering and in a bad state due to the financial crises.²⁹³ Therefore, Pakistan's political stability and economy were 'under severe stress.'²⁹⁴

By 2009 terrorist violence and militancy in Pakistan was on the rise. The Taliban, al-Qaeda and the Haqqani Network were still operating, with al-Qaeda's leadership

²⁹⁰ 'Fact Sheet: National Strategy for Counterterrorism.' June 2011.

²⁹¹ National Strategy for Counterterrorism (2011). p.8-10.

²⁹² Armitage, R.L., Berger, S.R. & Markey, D.S. (2010). 'U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan.' p.10-11.

²⁹³ Blake Jr, R.O., (2009). 'The Obama Administration's Policy on South Asia.'

²⁹⁴ Armitage, R.L., Berger, S.R. & Markey, D.S. (2010). p.11.

being settled in the FATA region of Pakistan. According to Obama, this managed to happen because the previous administration had gotten distracted, diverting its resources, which ultimately allowed OBL to escape and find sanctuary in Pakistan.²⁹⁵ Pakistan's efforts to fight terrorism and extremism were also weak and inconsistent. Although it had taken action to fight militants throughout the years, especially on its border with Afghanistan, such efforts lacked when it came to certain militant groups which Pakistan considered as a 'strategic asset against India.'²⁹⁶

From this, the Obama Administration realised that the real war was not only in Afghanistan, but also in Pakistan.

7.4 U.S. policy and strategic objectives towards Pakistan

Pakistan was to become a main focus area in the administration's efforts in counterterrorism.

The Obama Administration considered Pakistan, as well as Afghanistan, as the central front to the war, and therefore felt the need for a change in U.S. strategy. Although they are two different countries, the administration knew that they could not succeed in either of them without stability in both, recognizing that in order to resolve the problem in one country, you must address what is occurring in the other.²⁹⁷

This new strategy is known as AfPak. Both countries were to be treated as a part of a single theatre of war. The goal of this strategy was to 'disrupt, dismantle and defeat'

²⁹⁵ The New York Times. (26 September 2008). *'The Second Presidential Debate: Transcript.'* - According to Obama, the Bush Administration was more focused on the war in Iraq, ultimately distracting it from hunting down OBL and Al-Qaeda.

²⁹⁶ Armitage, R.L., Berger, S.R. & Markey, D.S. (2010). p.11.

²⁹⁷ Blake Jr, R.O., (2009).

Al-Qaeda from having safe havens in Pakistan and preventing them from returning to Afghanistan where they would be able to plot attacks against the U.S.²⁹⁸

According to the White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, to reach such a goal required realistic and achievable objectives. When it came to Pakistan, two major objectives were outlined: 1. To disrupt terrorist networks in Pakistan (and Afghanistan) in order to not allow them to be able to plan and launch international terrorist attacks, and 2. Assist efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan with a good economy which would provide opportunity for the Pakistani people. When taking into consideration the situation in Pakistan upon taking office, such objectives were important in order to create a stable state.

To achieve such objectives in Pakistan, the Obama Administration was to use military, diplomatic and development tools which were available to it.²⁹⁹ First and foremost it was to strengthen its relationship with Pakistan based upon mutual respect and interests. For the first objective in Pakistan, that of defeating terrorist networks, the U.S. was to strengthen Pakistan's capacity to target such militants and continue to provide security assistance to support such efforts. With regards to the second objective, to strengthen Pakistan's democracy and development, the administration was to provide assistance which would respond to the needs of the people.³⁰⁰

Although the administration wanted to have a partnership with Pakistan based on mutual interests, respect and trust, Obama made it clear, even before being elected,

²⁹⁸ Mazhar, M.S. & Goraya, N.S. (2009). *'Changing Trends in American Policy Towards Pakistan and Afghanistan.'* p.26-27.

²⁹⁹ Blake Jr, R.O., (2009).

³⁰⁰ National Security Strategy (2010). p.21.

that if the U.S. had OBL or al-Qaeda in their sights and Pakistan was not willing or unable to act, they would do it themselves because this was their biggest national security priority.³⁰¹ Whether Pakistan was to cooperate or not, Obama was ready to 'take the war to Osama bin Laden's cave door.'³⁰²

7.5 Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan

As indicated in Obama's election campaign, a Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan was appointed by the administration. He was 'entrusted with the responsibility of looking after all diplomatic and political efforts for winning the US-led war against terror in Afghanistan and Pakistan'.³⁰³ The appointment of a Special Envoy was a way of showing that the Obama Administration was giving importance to the region. According to the Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, its 'challenge would be to coordinate US efforts in the region, including those of the Pentagon.'³⁰⁴

The first envoy appointed was Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. However, with his death in 2010 he was succeeded by Marc Grossman whom then resigned in December 2012. Grossman's deputy, David Pearce, became the acting Special Envoy.³⁰⁵

7.6 U.S. Aid and Assistance to Pakistan (2009-2013)

The Obama Administration had created a generous aid and assistance program as a part of its effort to build a more effective relationship with Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan has been a leading recipient of U.S. aid and assistance. In 2010 Pakistan was listed as the second largest recipient of U.S. aid with \$4.3 billion, and in 2012 it ranked third with

³⁰¹ The New York Times. (September 26, 2008). *'The Second Presidential Debate: Transcript.'*

³⁰² Azam, O., (2008). *'Obama, McCain Differ Over Policy Towards Pakistan.'*

³⁰³ *'Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Pakistan Named: Hillary Clinton Calls Zardari.'*, Dawn News. (23 January 2009)

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

³⁰⁵ Dormandy, X. (2013). *'The Next Chapter: President Obama's Second-Term Foreign Policy.'*

approximately \$2.1 billion.³⁰⁶ This included economic, security and non-military aid in order to help Pakistan defeat extremism with counter-insurgency capabilities, create strong governing institutions and rebuild its failing economy.³⁰⁷

It is important to note that in 2009 Musharraf, the former Pakistani president, had admitted that aid given to Pakistan which was to originally be used for counterterrorism efforts, had instead been used to prepare itself for a war with India.³⁰⁸ It was also known that certain militants in the country were receiving support from Pakistan and therefore the Obama Administration began to find Pakistan as an unreliable partner in U.S. counterterrorism efforts.³⁰⁹ This led the U.S. to begin questioning the amount of aid being given and knew that there was need for some change.

7.6.1 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPPA)

The U.S. had been rethinking how to provide assistance to Pakistan. Its first step was the creation of the EPPA.³¹⁰ This was a key aspect of the administration's approach to Pakistan, with it tripling its non-military aid to help improve the lives of the Pakistani people. It also increased its military aid which was to be conditional aid, being given according to the government's progress in furthering democracy and fighting militancy in the country. This legislation is also referred to as the Kerry Lugar-Berman bill.³¹¹

³⁰⁶ Kronstadt, K.A. & Epstein, S.B. (2012). *'Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance.'* p.7.

³⁰⁷ Blake Jr, R.O., (2009).

³⁰⁸ *'Musharraf Admits U.S. Aid Diverted.'*, BBC News. (14 September 2009)

³⁰⁹ Kronstadt, K.A. & Epstein, S.B. (2012). p.1.

³¹⁰ Zaidi, S.A. (2011). *'Who Benefits from U.S. Aid to Pakistan?'* p.8.

³¹¹ Kronstadt, K.A. & Epstein, S.B. (2012). p.8-9. - According to the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, this legislation was to be 'a historic chapter' in U.S. bilateral relations with Pakistan which would strengthen the cooperation and friendship between the two.

The EPPA authorises \$7.5 billion of non-military aid³¹² to Pakistan for five years, providing \$1.5 billion annually.³¹³ Such aid would mainly go to education, infrastructure development, poverty efforts and health care programs amongst other things.³¹⁴ The EPPA also allowed 'such sums as may be necessary' for security assistance.³¹⁵

The EPPA has three main goals: 1. For Pakistan to support and consolidate democracy as well as the rule of law in the country; 2. To provide Pakistan with means to prevent and not allow the use of its territory for terrorist camps,³¹⁶ and; 3. To show its commitment to help create stability in Pakistan.

In this legislation, aid conditionality was included, 'designed to increase the accountability of the Pakistani military.'³¹⁷ It required the Secretary of State to certify that the Pakistani government is cooperating with the U.S. in efforts to combat terrorists³¹⁸ and non-proliferation. Under this legislation, aid would only be provided to a freely elected government.³¹⁹

One may note that various segments of Pakistan, including the military, the Pakistan Muslim League and other secular parties, were critical of the EPPA, especially the conditionality of such aid. They felt that this legislation interfered with Pakistani affair's, dictating the country on its national security and foreign policy issues. However,

³¹² This included economic and development aid.

³¹³ Kronstadt, K.A. & Epstein, S.B. (2012). p.9.

³¹⁴ Economic and development assistance under EPPA would also be used in order to promote Pakistani economy and sustainable economic development, support democratic institutions, the rule of law and strength public diplomacy amongst other things.

³¹⁵ Kronstadt, K.A. & Epstein, S.B. (2012). p.10.

³¹⁶ This included assisting Pakistan in the development of tools to help improve coordination and cooperation with the military, paramilitary and police action against terrorists.

³¹⁷ Zaidi, S.A. (2011). p.8.

³¹⁸ This included certifying that Pakistan's intelligence and military had stopped supporting extremists and militants.

³¹⁹ Zaidi, S.A. (2011). p.9.

President Zardari had dismissed such criticisms being 'misguided and misinformed.'³²⁰

Zardari supported the EPPA since he believed that

President Obama understands that for Pakistan to defeat the extremists, it must be stable. For democracy to succeed, Pakistan must be economically viable. Assistance to Pakistan is not charity; rather, the creation of a politically stable and economically viable Pakistan is in the long-term [a] strategic interest of the United States.³²¹

7.6.2 U.S. Military and Defence Aid and Assistance

Although the administration emphasised on civilian aid, military aid was also an important part of U.S. efforts in Pakistan. In fact, it ranks amongst the top five recipients of military aid.³²² During the fighting in South Waziristan in 2009, U.S. provided Pakistan helicopters, infantry equipment, intelligence and shared surveillance videos amongst other things. In 2010 the U.S. transferred weaponry to Pakistan, including 1,000 quarter-ton bombs and gravity bombs, which were given prior to counterinsurgency operations.³²³ In October 2010 the U.S. offered a \$2 billion military aid package to Pakistan which would complement the EPPA. Such a package was offered with the hope of reassuring Pakistan of the U.S.' long term commitments.³²⁴

In 2009 two new funds were also established: The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF).³²⁵ Such funds were developed in order to effectively channel U.S. security aid and assistance to Pakistan. The objectives of the PCF and the PCCF are similar to those of the CSF from

³²⁰ Kronstadt, K.A. & Epstein, S.B. (2012). p.11.

³²¹ Zardari, A.A. (2009). 'Partnering with Pakistan.'

³²² Armitage, R.L., Berger, S.R. & Markey, D.S. (2010).

³²³ Kronstadt, K.A. & Epstein, S.B. (2012). p.16-17.

³²⁴ Schmitt, E. & Sanger, D.E. (2010). '*U.S. Offers Pakistan Army \$2 Billion Aid Package.*'

³²⁵ The PCF was established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009.

the Bush Administration, with the funds being used in order to build, strengthen and maintain Pakistan's counterinsurgency capabilities.³²⁶

7.6.3 U.S. Humanitarian Assistance

As a part of the Obama Administration's broader foreign policy objective of improving the U.S.'s image abroad, it provided large amounts of humanitarian assistance, especially following the flooding in Pakistan in 2010. The U.S. was one of the largest donors, providing Pakistan with more than \$600 million in funds and services.³²⁷ The administration knew that such floods would be a great problem for Pakistan, distracting it from counterinsurgency operations and counterterror efforts, since its energy would be focused on meeting the basic requirements of the Pakistani people. Therefore it was important for the U.S. to assist Pakistan in achieving stability.³²⁸

7.7 The Obama Administration, Pakistani government and democracy promotion

Since it became clear that the situation in Pakistan was a dangerous one, not only for the U.S., but also for Pakistan and the international community, Obama argued that more political action was needed in the country in order to tackle internal and external terrorism problems.³²⁹ The administration's position was that by improving the political situation in Pakistan, which in other words meant democracy promotion, the country would be more successful in dealing with the problem. For the administration, the removal of military rule and the restoration of democracy in Pakistan did not mean

³²⁶ Kronstadt, K.A. & Epstein, S.B. (2012). p.12.

³²⁷ Kronstadt, K.A. & Epstein, S.B. (2012). p.4.

³²⁸ Armitage, R.L., Berger, S.R. & Markey, D.S. (2010). p.12.

³²⁹ Barack, O., *'Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan.'*

that political problems were done with since the government still failed to address the demands and needs of its people.

In 2009 Obama had stated that the U.S.'s relationship with Pakistan would be grounded in support for Pakistan's democratic institutions and its people. Such support was done through economic and non-military aid and assistance and conditioning such assistance that it would only be given to a free elected government. Yet although it supported civilian rule, due to the fact that the government did not manage to assert greater civilian control over the ISI and army, the Obama Administration had to accept the reality that the military still holds a dominant role in the country. Therefore, the administration has greatly used its close working relationship with Pakistan's army chief in order to deal with sensitive strategic issues.³³⁰

Although the Obama Administration had increased resources towards Pakistan, it is argued that it has lacked a clear plan on how such resources are used to support such economic and political reforms. This is considered a weakness in its policy in the region.³³¹

7.8 Afghan-Pakistan Border

According to President Obama, 'For the American people, this border region [Afghan-Pakistan] has become the most dangerous place in the world...'³³² Therefore, as part of the AfPak strategy, there was to be more focus on enhancing military cooperation along the border and improvement in intelligence sharing on the area.³³³

³³⁰ Armitage, R.L., Berger, S.R. & Markey, D.S. (2010). p.38.

³³¹ Katulis, B. (2011). *'The Problems that need Fixing in Obama's Pakistan Plan.'*

³³² Barack, O., *'Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.'*

³³³ General Jone, J., *'President Obama's Afghanistan-Pakistan AfPak Strategy.'* (March 27, 2009).

This included placing more emphasis on special operation in this area with drone strikes.

7.8.1 Drone strikes in Pakistan

As a part of its strategy in Pakistan, the Obama Administration increased and intensified its use of drone strikes in the FATA region and Afghan border. Such attacks were against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, with the U.S. acting alone when Pakistan was not able or was unwilling to do so itself. It is said that the increasing use of drones is a result of the administration's banning secret CIA detention centres, its effort to close Guantanamo Bay prison and ending harsh interrogation methods as a part of repairing America's damaged image. As a consequence, there was nowhere to put captured militants and so drones became a more viable option.³³⁴ Another reason was that there was an improvement in drone technology and precise targeting due to improvements in gathering on-the-ground intelligence in the FATA region.³³⁵

By February 2013, the total amount of strikes under the Obama Administration totalled to 312.³³⁶ These strikes managed to kill high-profile al-Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban commanders like Baituallah Mehsud³³⁷ and militants from the Haqqani Network.³³⁸

Despite such tactical successes, drone strikes in Pakistan came with a cost. It is reported that a great amount of Pakistani civilians are victims of such attacks. It is also argued that the U.S. is violating Pakistani sovereignty. In fact, the parliament had

³³⁴ Entous, A. (2010) *'Special Report: How the White House Learned to Love the Drone.'*

³³⁵ Ali, I. (2012). *'United States – Pakistan Relations: Facing a Critical Juncture.'* p.14.

³³⁶ The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. (January 3, 2013). *'Obama 2013 Pakistan Drone Strikes.'*

³³⁷ Baituallah Mehsud was a militant in Pakistan and was the leader of the Pakistani Taliban.

³³⁸ Ali, I. (2012). p.14.

passed a unanimous resolution against drone attacks which was to immediately end such operations. The U.S. had also been accused of carrying out such strikes without Islamabad's permission. However, in 2010 diplomatic cables obtained by WikiLeaks revealed that the Pakistani government was secretly allowing U.S. Special Operations units to operate in its territory.³³⁹

7.9 Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and security concerns

Pakistan, being a nuclear power, has been of great concern for the U.S. throughout the years, and more so now, since it threatens U.S. goals. However, the U.S. has engaged with Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division³⁴⁰ and has assisted the government in enhancing nuclear security.³⁴¹ As a result, Obama Administration officials have expressed confidence in the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons with Obama himself stating that he felt 'confident that [the] nuclear arsenal will remain out of militant hands.'³⁴²

Pakistan had always been quite sceptical and concerned with U.S. motives when it came to their nuclear arsenal. They feared that the U.S. planned to take away their arsenal if they felt it was at risk.³⁴³ In order to remove such fears and address this security concern, the administration accepted Pakistan's status as a declared nuclear weapon state.³⁴⁴

³³⁹ Lister, T. (2010). *'WikiLeaks: Pakistan Quietly Approved Drone Attacks, U.S. Special Units.'*

³⁴⁰ Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division is a military unit which is responsible for maintaining Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

³⁴¹ In fact, it has spent more than \$100 million in order to help the country secure such weapons.

³⁴² Iqbal, A. (2009). *'Pakistan Can Protect its Nukes, says Obama.'*

³⁴³ Schmitt, E. & Sanger, D.E. (2011). *'Pakistani Nuclear Arms Pose Challenge to U.S. Policy.'*

³⁴⁴ Iqbal, A. (March 6, 2010). *'U.S. Accepts Pakistan as a Declared Nuclear State: Report.'*

Since Obama came to office, U.S. intelligence discovered that Pakistan had been expanding its nuclear arsenal. According to estimates, Pakistan's arsenal had ranged from 60 to 90, and by 2011 it ranged from 90 to 110.³⁴⁵ This was an alarming development for the administration and was considered as a challenge to the NSS of the administration which wanted to reduce nuclear stockpiles around the world. Although they were confident that the nuclear arsenals were secure, some officials were concerned that nuclear material which is kept in laboratories and storage centres are vulnerable and can be stolen.³⁴⁶

Obama was seeking to negotiate and adopt the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty which would be a global treaty to ban the production of new nuclear material. However, Pakistan was quite irritated at the U.S. since it had engaged in civil nuclear agreements with India and did not do the same with it.³⁴⁷ As a result, Pakistan felt the need to oppose any treaty which would threaten its nuclear program and its ability to match India's arsenal, therefore not supporting the U.S. in this regard.³⁴⁸

7.10 Regional conflict in South Asia

The administration expected Pakistan to improve and normalise its relations with neighbouring India as part of its AfPak strategy.³⁴⁹ The U.S. was aware that Pakistan's

³⁴⁵ Schmitt, E. & Sanger, D.E. (2011).

³⁴⁶ Ibid. - In 2010 WikiLeaks had released State Department cables in which the American ambassador of Pakistan, Anne Patterson, had expressed her concern with regards to such nuclear material being vulnerable to theft from insiders.

³⁴⁷ Armitage, R.L., Berger, S.R. & Markey, D.S. (2010). p.36.

³⁴⁸ Schmitt, E. & Sanger, D.E. (2011).

³⁴⁹ Blake Jr, R.O., (2009). - Following the Mumbai attacks in 2008, relations between Indian and Pakistan had deteriorated. The Obama Administration wanted to bring back the cooperation they enjoyed between 2004 and 2007. This meant trying to rebuilding confidence between the two.

Indo-centric security policy was an obstacle for peace and stability in the region.³⁵⁰ By dealing with the Kashmir issue it was believed that they would be able to shape Pakistan's world view and limit military power in domestic politics.

Prior to being elected, Obama had declared that working with the two countries to try to resolve the Kashmir crisis in a serious way would be one of his main missions if he were to be elected. Although Pakistan is in favour of having foreign intervention in this conflict over Kashmir since they believe it will promote Pakistani interests, India continues to insist that 'foreign – especially American – hands off Kashmir.'³⁵¹ When Obama took office, India made it clear that the U.S. trying to play a role in India-Pakistan relations was not acceptable. Therefore Obama had to go back on what he said earlier and accepted this position.³⁵² Refusing to mediate the Kashmir dispute led to the souring of relations between the U.S and Pakistan.³⁵³

7.11 Deterioration of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship

2011 was a difficult year for the bilateral relations between the two countries as a result of various developments and events. According to Anwar Iqbal, 'the year 2011 was like 2001 – a game changer.' He compares the two by stating that 'while the September 11, 2001 terrorists' attacks brought Pakistan back into the game, events happening in 2011 are pushing [the country] out.'³⁵⁴ Such events are discussed below:

³⁵⁰ Ali, I. (2012). - It was a known fact that Pakistan was trying to influence Afghanistan as part of its efforts against India. If India and Pakistan were to reach a level of cooperation, the Obama Administration believed that this would lead to peace in Afghanistan.

³⁵¹ Schaffer, H.B. (2012). '*The Kashmir Issue: What is America's Role?*'

³⁵² The administration wanted to avoid any tension which could be caused in U.S. – Indian relations. At this time Obama was committed to continuing the progress George W. Bush had managed to achieve during his time in office. This was because Obama, just like Bush, believed that India was a rising global power and therefore its friendship was important.

³⁵³ Schaffer, H.B. (2012).

³⁵⁴ Iqbal, A. (2011). '*The Washington Diary.*' Dawn News.

7.11.1 Capture of Osama bin Laden

As mentioned previously, the Obama Administration was ready to act unilaterally if they had any information of OBL and al-Qaeda. In May 2011, the U.S. Navy Seals Special Operations team carried out a unilateral operation against OBL whom was hiding in Abbottabad in which the Pakistani military base and the military academy of the Pakistani government were situated.³⁵⁵

Due to the fact that OBL was found in Pakistan led to great suspicion from the U.S. side, intensifying tensions between the two governments. There was suspicion that the Pakistani government was protecting OBL and the belief that the ISI and military of Pakistan lost credibility since they were not capable of finding the al-Qaeda leader in their own country. However, the Pakistani government denies that its military or the ISI knew about OBL's hide-out.³⁵⁶

Following this raid, American policy makers began to question the purpose and usefulness of military aid to Pakistan if some institutions or individuals were either aware or incapable of capturing OBL.³⁵⁷ Yet although there were those whom wanted to reduce or cut aid to Pakistan, the administration wanted to avoid breaking relations with the country in order to not endanger the counterterrorism network the CIA was able to construct in Pakistan, and because Pakistan was necessary to end the war in Afghanistan.³⁵⁸

³⁵⁵ Baker, P., Cooper, H. & Mazzetti, M. (2011). *'Bin Laden is Dead, Obama Says.'*

³⁵⁶ Myers, S.L. & Perlez, J. (2011). *'Tensions Rise as U.S. Officials Press Pakistan for Answers.'*

³⁵⁷ Zaidi, S.A. (2011). p.12.

³⁵⁸ Myers, S.L. & Perlez, J. (2011). - In contrast to what was being said, the U.S. Secretary of State stated that Pakistan had contributed greatly towards U.S. efforts to eliminate al-Qaeda, and has cooperated with counterterrorism efforts throughout the years. She stated that in fact, such cooperation with Pakistan is what led the U.S. to finding OBL.

The relationship was further deteriorated since the Pakistani government considered this raid as 'an unauthorised unilateral action' which violated its sovereignty.³⁵⁹ This operation also fuelled anti-Americanism in the country.

7.11.2 Admiral Michael Mullen accusations

During his September 2011 testimony before the Senate, Admiral Mullen accused the ISI of supporting the insurgents who attacked the U.S. embassy in Kabul, also saying that 'the Haqqani network acts as a veritable arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency'.³⁶⁰ This was considered the most serious accusation an Obama Administration official had made against Pakistan. He went on to say that the ISI was undermining U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Such accusations continued to strain the U.S.-Pakistani relationship.³⁶¹

Pakistan rejected such claims by the U.S. The government also stated that it would 'not allow' any U.S. operations in North Waziristan which were to be aimed at the Haqqani network. It argued that the Pakistani government was already cooperating with the Americans, yet they should respect the country's sovereignty.³⁶²

³⁵⁹ Myers, S.L. & Perlez, J. (2011).

³⁶⁰ Bumiller, E. & Perlez, J. (2011). '*Pakistan's Spy Agency Is Tied To Attack On U.S. Embassy.*' - It can be said that such accusation were made as a part of the U.S. effort to put more pressure on Pakistan and perhaps to try and introduce more drone strikes or cross-border raids into Pakistan to eliminate militants from having a safe haven.

³⁶¹ For quite a while the U.S. suspected that the ISI was supporting the Haqqani network in order to help extend Pakistani influence in Afghanistan. However, Admiral Mullen made a further step in these claims, stating that he believed such support extended to high profile attacks in Afghanistan which were targeted at the U.S. Such attacks included a truck bombing at a NATO outpost in Kabul, killing five and wounding 77 coalition soldiers.

³⁶² Bumiller, E. & Perlez, J. (2011).

7.11.3 NATO attacks

Relations continued to be strained following the November 2011 attacks by NATO airstrikes on two military check points in the Pakistani tribal areas, killing 24 Pakistani soldiers.³⁶³ Pakistan responded by closing the Ground Lines of Communication, therefore stopping NATO's access to Afghanistan and putting their relationship on hold.³⁶⁴ The U.S. was also asked to leave the Shamsi air base³⁶⁵ and the Pakistani government boycotted the international conference in Bonn regarding the future of Afghanistan.³⁶⁶

7.12 Conclusion

When the Obama Administration took office in 2009, it was prepared to use every element of its power to fight and defeat al-Qaeda, its affiliates and supporters. It had to deal with various challenges in Pakistan and knew that the real war against terror was in this country. Therefore, Pakistan became a main focus area of the U.S.' counterterror efforts which resulted in the AfPak strategy. Pakistan, as well as Afghanistan, was to be treated as a single theatre of war.

The Obama Administration's objectives in Pakistan were to disrupt terrorist networks in the country so that they would not be able to plan another attack and to enhance civil control and its economy for a more stable state. In order to try and reach such objectives, military, diplomatic and development tools were used. However, Obama had made it clear that he was ready to act unilaterally if Pakistan failed to cooperate, which he ultimately did.

³⁶³ Brulliard, K. & Partlow, J. (2011). *'NATO Airstrike Strains U.S.-Pakistan Relations.'*

³⁶⁴ Kronstadt, K.A. & Epstein, S.B. (2012). p.3. - The Ground Lines of Communication were reopened in July 2012.

³⁶⁵ This airbase was used for drone strikes aimed at militants in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

³⁶⁶ Masood, S. (2011). *'C.I.A Leaves Base in Pakistan Used for Drone Strikes.'*

Yet throughout the first term of the Obama Administration, one can say that relations between the U.S. and Pakistan deteriorated, especially from 2011 onwards. From the Pakistani side, there was the argument that the U.S. was violating its sovereignty. On the other side, the U.S. questioned as to whether Pakistan was a true ally in the fight against terrorism.

President Obama's re-election in 2012 suggests that there will be continuity in U.S. foreign policy in his second term. With regards to Pakistan, the Obama Administration's foreign policy is likely to be no less eventful than it has been during its first term. The administration will continue to give particular attention to the country given the combination of its continued militancy, possession of nuclear arms and its unstable democracy. The U.S. strategy and response towards this region is not just vital for Pakistan, Afghanistan and itself, but also for the international community since it continues to be a dangerous region.

Chapter 8:

**Comparative Analysis of the Bush and
Obama Administrations**

Chapter 8: Comparative Analysis of the Bush and Obama Administrations

8.1 Introduction

This chapter will be a comparative analysis of the Bush and Obama Administration's foreign policy in the context of the WOT and the fight against terrorism. The chapter will first look at the broader foreign policy of both administrations with regards to the fight against terrorism. This includes focusing on points such as American leadership and grand strategy, cooperation with allies, Afghanistan and Iraq amongst other foreign policy areas. The second part of this chapter will focus on the comparison of U.S. foreign policy of both administrations with regards to the country's bilateral relations with Pakistan based upon what has been discussed in previous chapters.

8.2 Comparison of the Bush and Obama Administration's Foreign Policy

In 2008, Obama's presidential campaign was built around the idea of 'change', especially when it came to the foreign policy of his predecessor. However, when it came to American grand strategy and policy following the elections, there has been continuity to a certain extent.

8.2.1 American leadership

Both the Bush and Obama Administration emphasised on American leadership as a part of their grand strategy. In the Bush Administration's 2006 NSS this was a key theme. According to the strategy, effective action depended on American leadership since 'the international community is most engaged in such action when the United States leads.'³⁶⁷ Similar to this, the Obama Administration in its 2010 NSS mentions America's 'global leadership', stating that 'global security depends upon strong and responsible American leadership.'³⁶⁸

8.2.2 Cooperation with allies

Both administrations focused on cooperating with allies and working with others in order to address the challenges which the world is facing. According to the Bush Administration, it was 'to strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends' and was to also 'develop agendas for cooperative action with the other main centres of global power.'³⁶⁹ Continuing with this, the Obama Administration included 'comprehensive engagement' as a part of its strategy.³⁷⁰ Such engagement would not only focus on its traditional allies, but would expand to include 'more effective partnerships with other key centres of influence.'³⁷¹

Although the two administrations preferred cooperation with allies and partners, they both were willing to act unilaterally if need be. The Bush Administration was

³⁶⁷ National Security Strategy (2006). p.22.

³⁶⁸ National Security Strategy (2010). p.17 & 7.

³⁶⁹ National Security Strategy (2006). p.1 & 35.

³⁷⁰ National Security Strategy (2010). p.11.

³⁷¹ Ibid. p.3. - Other key centres of influence would include countries such as China, Russia and India.

'prepared to act alone if necessary.'³⁷² The Obama Administration was also ready to work alone which was evident in the case of Pakistan and the killing of OBL.

8.2.3 U.S. Secretary of Defence

The U.S. Secretary of Defence under the Bush Administration, Robert Gates, was also kept during the Obama Administration.³⁷³ This was a sign of continuity amongst Obama's promise for change. This implied that defence policies would remain consistent, especially in areas where both Gates and President Obama would agree.³⁷⁴

8.2.4 Afghanistan

Continuity has also been evident in the policy area on Afghanistan. The Obama Administration increased the number of troops present in Afghanistan, which were on a mission to defeat al-Qaeda and reverse Taliban's momentum in order for them not to be able to overthrow the government.³⁷⁵ This increase was the same option which was recommended to the Bush Administration by the war strategy reviews of 2008.³⁷⁶ In fact, by the end of his second term, Bush had already approved the deployment of around 15,000 troops to Afghanistan for the following year.³⁷⁷

8.2.5 Iraq

The withdrawal of U.S. troops and the ending of the war in Iraq under the Obama Administration also represents continuity. In 2008 the Bush Administration had

³⁷² National Security Strategy (2006). p.37.

³⁷³ Baker, P. & Shanker, T., (2008). *'Obama Plans To Retain Gates At Defense Department.'*

³⁷⁴ Areas in which the Secretary of Defence, Gates, and President Obama agreed upon include: Reduction of troops in Iraq (although they disagreed over timing); To send more U.S. forces to Afghanistan, and; The want to close Guantanamo bay prison. Obama also backed the Bush Administration's plan to increase the size of the U.S. military.

³⁷⁵ *'Barack Obama Orders 30,000 More Troops to Afghanistan.'*, BBC News. (2 December 2009)

³⁷⁶ Schmitt, E. & Shanker, T., (2008), *'Bush Administration Reviews its Afghanistan Policy, Exposing Points of Contention.'*

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

negotiated a U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement³⁷⁸ in which it agreed that by the end of 2011 there would be a total withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraqi territory.³⁷⁹ When Obama took office, the administration kept the date set by its predecessor for the departure of troops, which brought the war in Iraq to an end.

However, there has also been change between the two administrations' foreign policy.

8.2.6 Foreign Policy Strategy

The Bush Doctrine was greatly based on realist beliefs. The administration's foreign policy was focused on the idea of American exceptionalism and the idea of the predominance of American power, especially hard power, based on military and economic might. Such a 'self-centred' foreign policy led to the deterioration of U.S. image abroad and brought a rise to anti-American sentiment.³⁸⁰

In contrast to the Bush Doctrine, Obama's foreign policy strategy aimed at reaffirming U.S. leadership in a world where America's power has been challenged by new actors.³⁸¹ Smart Power had become the core principle of Obama's foreign policy, and was used in order to improve the country's image, therefore attracting others and permitting the U.S. to continue to lead. Smart Power is a combination of soft and hard

³⁷⁸ The official name of this agreement is: Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organisation of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq.

³⁷⁹ Mason, R.C. (2009). *'U.S.-Iraq Withdrawal/Status of Forces Agreement: Issues for Congressional Oversight.'* p.10.

³⁸⁰ Dimitrova, A. *'Obama's Foreign Policy: Between Pragmatic Realism and Smart Diplomacy?'*

³⁸¹ The new actors challenging America's power include Russia, India, Brazil, China and South Africa.

power, i.e. the U.S. trying to find a balance between defence and diplomacy (as well as development aid) in order to achieve foreign policy goals.³⁸²

8.2.7 The War on Terror

The Bush Administration responded to the 9/11 attacks by declaring a GWOT which came to dominate its foreign policy. Iraq and terrorism became two of its top priorities. When it came to the terrorist threat, the administration did not make a distinction as to which terrorists he was after, focusing on the global threat of terrorism. In Obama's presidential campaign, he made it evident that he wanted to shed away from the Bush Doctrine. Right from the beginning he neglected the term WOT, yet this did not mean that the U.S. was to no longer be at war. To the contrary, the Obama Administration continued the war. However, the administration refocused the war to be a fight against some terrorist organisations, i.e. al-Qaeda and its partners.³⁸³

The Obama Administration also attempted to reframe the war by giving it a lower profile since it did not want counterterrorism to dominate its foreign policy. It wanted to give more priority to foreign policy areas such as nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. However, although the WOT dominated the Bush Administration's foreign policy, by its second term there had already began a shift in foreign policy priorities, taking a more liberal approach. Democracy promotion became a leading goal of U.S. foreign policy.³⁸⁴ Although it was a change in priority, it was still part of a long-term solution for winning the WOT. From here we can see that although there was a change coming from the Obama Administration, change was already taking place during the final years under Bush.

³⁸² Dimitrova, A.

³⁸³ Baker, P. (2010)

³⁸⁴ Lindsay, J.M. (2011). *'George W. Bush, Barack Obama and the Future of US Global Leadership'*. p.770.

8.2.8 Capture of Osama bin Laden

Both administrations wanted to capture OBL 'dead or alive' and bring him to justice.³⁸⁵ Yet during the Bush Administration OBL began to be marginalised and was not considered 'a top priority use of American resources.'³⁸⁶ Just six months after the attacks Bush stated that

The idea of focusing on one person really indicates to me people don't understand the scope of the mission. Terror is bigger than one person. He's a person who's been marginalized. ...I really just don't spend that much time on him...³⁸⁷

The Obama Administration revived this policy, pointing out throughout his 2008 campaign that his administration would work towards capturing and killing OBL since he was the biggest national security priority of the U.S. He was willing to do so at all costs.³⁸⁸ It was a defining moment for the Obama presidency when he managed to fulfil this promise in 2011.³⁸⁹

8.3 U.S. Foreign Policy and Relations with Pakistan:

8.3.1 Strategy towards Pakistan

When it came to fighting the war, both administrations considered Pakistan as of vital importance, especially when it came to their objectives in Afghanistan. However, their strategy towards the country differed.

It can be said that the Bush Administration lacked a clear strategy for Pakistan. Bush got distracted with Iraq, therefore losing focus on the threat in Pakistan. This allowed the Taliban and al-Qaeda to find sanctuary and rebuild itself in the tribal areas

³⁸⁵ 'Bush: bin Laden "Wanted Dead or Alive".' CNN. (17 September 2001)

³⁸⁶ Seitz-Wald, A. (2011). 'Flashback: Bush on Bin Laden: 'I Really Just Don't Spend That Much Time On Him'.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ President Obama was even willing to risk military confrontation with Pakistan in order to achieve this.

³⁸⁹ Milne, D. (2012). 'Pragmatism or what? The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy.'

of Pakistan after they were chased out of Afghanistan. On the other hand, the Obama Administration knew that the real threat to the U.S. was found in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As a result, it reoriented the war back to where it believed it belonged, leading to the creation of the AfPak strategy. This meant putting more focus on Pakistan when compared to the Bush Administration.³⁹⁰ As part of this strategy, it also appointed a Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, showing the importance it was giving to the region.

The Pakistani's were not too keen on the AfPak strategy. They especially resented the term since it put them on the same level with Afghanistan. They disagreed with this since according to them Afghanistan is a smaller country with a destabilised government, unlike itself.

8.3.2 Drone strikes

Certain Bush Administration strategic principles have been embraced by the Obama Administration in the case of Pakistan. This includes the Administration's campaign of drone strikes against terrorists in the tribal areas and Afghan border region of Pakistan. Under both administrations this strategic doctrine was considered as the pre-emptive use of force. Yet one can say that such a campaign was greatly increased and intensified under Obama. Drone strikes under the Obama Administrations' first term were six times more than those which were done under Bush's two terms.³⁹¹

³⁹⁰ General Jone, J. (2009). *'President Obama's Afghanistan-Pakistan AfPak Strategy.'*

³⁹¹ The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. (2013). *'Obama 2013 Pakistan Drone Strikes.'*

8.3.3 Aid and assistance

Both administrations emphasised the use of aid and assistance as a part of its foreign policy since they both strived to have a stable Pakistan in order to be able to cooperate in the war. However, they differed on the kind of aid they were providing Pakistan.

In eight years the Bush Administration transferred approximately \$10 billion to Pakistan which mainly focused on military aid and assistance. Aid was given for counterterrorism efforts and border security, therefore in order to achieve counterterror objectives rather than internally strengthen Pakistan. In the eyes of Obama, such aid was useless since he believed that the money was not going towards eliminating al-Qaeda. To the contrary, al-Qaeda was growing in Pakistan and the rest of the world. In fact, Musharraf had openly admitted that such aid was being used for its own security interests, which included war with India and supporting certain militants.

Upon taking office, the Obama Administration wanted to change the kind and the way aid was being given. It continued to provide military and defence aid, however Obama stated that 'a campaign against extremism will not succeed with bullets or bombs alone.'³⁹² The administration therefore gave much focus on non-military aid which was to support democracy and commit to stability in the country.

Aid under Obama also differed from his predecessor since it included conditionality. This meant giving more importance to accountability and in order to avoid such aid and assistance from being misused as was previously done.

³⁹² Barack, O., *Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan*, speech delivered at the Eisenhower Hall Theatre, United States Military Academy at West Point, West Point, New York, December 1, 2009

8.3.4 Pakistani sovereignty

The Bush and Obama Administration's had a difficult task of eliminating terrorists in Pakistan whilst respecting the country's sovereignty at the same time. Both dealt with accusations of violating Pakistani sovereignty through their use of drones. However, the issue of violating their sovereignty came out to a greater extent under Obama. Not only did his administration increase the use of drones in the country, but it has been argued that adding conditionality to aid meant interfering in Pakistani affairs and that it breached the country's sovereignty by raiding OBL's compound on Pakistani soil without its consent. This proves to be problematic for Obama when taking into consideration his Cairo speech where he openly stated that the U.S. would 'defend itself, respectful of the sovereignty of nations and the rule of law.'³⁹³

8.3.5 The India-Pakistan dispute

When it came to the India-Pakistan dispute, although it appeared that there was going to be a shift in the way the issue was going to be dealt with if Obama were to be elected, there seems to have been continuity. Both administrations have given great focus on the resolution of the conflict between India and Pakistan and normalizing their relations. This was in order to ensure peace and security in the region and to eliminate the global threats of terrorism and nuclear arms which both countries possessed. With regards to Pakistan, it was important for both administrations that there would be resolution in order for the country to be an effective partner to the U.S. in Afghanistan since skirmishes with India were a distraction.³⁹⁴

³⁹³ Barack, O., *'Remarks by the President on a New Beginning.'*, speech delivered at the Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt, 4 June 2009.

³⁹⁴ Jauhari, A. (2013). *'India-Pakistan Relations: International Implications.'*

8.3.6 Shift in relations between the U.S. and Pakistan

It has been evident that Pakistan's bilateral relationship with the U.S. has shifted from being a strong ally under Bush to the deterioration of relations under Obama.

Following the 9/11 attacks, the third engagement between the U.S. and Pakistan began. During its two terms in office, the Bush Administration strived to keep Pakistan on its side. Not only did it give it large amounts of aid and assistance, but it even embraced the military rule of General Musharraf. It turned a blind eye to Musharraf's undemocratic ways because it believed that the military regime was keeping Pakistan stable. The administration wanted to avoid conflict with Pakistan as much as possible, and focused on maintaining cooperation between the two. In fact, under Bush they enjoyed good bilateral relations, with Pakistan being considered a strong ally in the WOT, and taking on the status of a MNNA.

However, the relations between the two countries soured under Obama. From the beginning, the administration had been sceptical as to how much Pakistan was a true ally. Although it wanted to maintain the cooperation the two countries enjoyed under the previous administration, Obama was ready to risk military confrontation with Pakistan if needs be. Prior to being elected he had made it clear that if the U.S. were to have any valuable information and Pakistan was unwilling or unable to act, it would do so itself. This indicated the shift of relations which were to happen.

Unlike its predecessor, the Obama Administration was unwilling to support military rule in Pakistan.³⁹⁵ The administration emphasised the importance of improving the

³⁹⁵ However, at times, the Obama Administration did recognise the dominant role the Pakistani military played in the country.

political situation in Pakistan in order for it to be more successful in dealing with terrorism.

Yet in a few years bilateral relations between the two managed to deteriorate under Obama. This has been a result of various factors and events which have occurred and been mentioned previously. These include the increase of drone strikes which are killing more civilians and were allegedly unauthorised, the capture of OBL on Pakistani soil without its consent, the Admiral Mullen accusations, the AfPak strategy and the NATO airstrikes which killed Pakistani soldiers, amongst other reasons.

8.4 Conclusion

President Obama had based his 2008 presidential campaign on the idea of bringing about change for the U.S. However, following this comparative analysis it is evident that in the area of foreign policy there has been much continuity from the Bush to Obama Administration. In fact, much of the change in foreign policy which seemed to have appeared to be happening under Obama, was in fact already occurring under the Bush Administration, such as the increase of troops in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of troops in Iraq.

When it came to the foreign policy of the U.S. to Pakistan and its relations with the country, although there has been continuity in certain aspects, one can say that overall there has been a change in their bilateral relationship. Such continuity can be found in policies such as providing aid and assistance and the use of drones. However, the way the Obama Administration went about these policies and the introduction of a new strategy brought about some change. Ultimately, this change has been reflected in

the U.S.-Pakistan relationship which has worsened in the past years under the Obama Administration.

Therefore, one can say that overall in substance there was little change in the foreign policy area. But when it came to the style of how to go about these policies, there has been some change which is evident in the case of bilateral relations with Pakistan. In other words, there has been change in continuity.

Chapter 9:

Conclusion

Chapter 9: Conclusion

The foreign policy of the U.S. is the way in which it conducts international relations and interacts with foreign states. According to the U.S. Department of State, the official goal of its foreign policy is 'to create a more secure, democratic and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community.'³⁹⁶

This research has examined American foreign policy in the context of the WOT and the fight against terrorism under the Bush and Obama Administrations. Its aim was to analyse the U.S. Pakistan policy of both administrations and compare them in order to identify whether there has been change or continuity. The understanding of U.S. foreign policy was done through the use of both realism and liberalism as two theories which encompass and explain the country's foreign policy towards Pakistan.

Seeing terrorism as an existential threat, the Bush Administration opted for a realist approach to its foreign policy. The administration responded to the attacks by initiating the WOT which meant going on the offensive by taking a policy of self-defence and pre-emptive warfare. It utilised American power to shape the international system in order to ensure state survival in this threat environment. The Bush Administration's foreign policy was also influenced by the country's internal political structures, therefore also taking a liberal approach with its promotion of democracy as a part of its war. When

³⁹⁶ U.S. Department of State. '*Mission Statement.*'

compared to its predecessor, the Obama Administration took a more liberal approach to its foreign policy by 'harness[ing] every tool of American power... with the concerted efforts of allies, partners, and multilateral institutions.' This included the use of a combination of hard and soft power – also known as Smart Power.³⁹⁷

Due to the interconnected security environment of the 21st century, the U.S. has had to invest in alliances with foreign states in order to protect and ensure the national security of its homeland as a part of its foreign policy. Such alliances are security commitments between states, sharing recognition of common threats and pledging to take action in order to counter them.³⁹⁸ Both administrations recognised that the war would not be successful without these alliances and participation of other states. This led to Pakistan becoming an important ally in the war, especially under Bush. An alliance between the two meant providing intelligence, conducting counter insurgency operations and adding legitimacy to the war.

Pakistan also became an important part of the war under both administrations since it was key to achieve other aims in the region with regards to Afghanistan due to its geo-strategic value. At the same time, Pakistan was considered a security threat to the U.S. since the country provided safe havens for terrorists plotting attacks against the homeland, it suffered from terrorist threats within its own borders and it possesses WMD, therefore causing fear that if the country becomes destabilised, the nuclear arsenal may fall in the wrong hands.

However, the two countries never had a smooth and consistent relationship since diplomatic relations were established in 1947. This was to be the third engagement

³⁹⁷ 'National Strategy for Counterterrorism.' (2011). Washington, DC: The White House. p.2.

³⁹⁸ Sherwood-Randall, E. (2006). 'Alliance and American National Security.'

between the two, with their last engagement being in the 1980's with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. At the time, the U.S. became Pakistan's partner in the proxy war, training and providing military assistance to religious extremists which they chose as their allies. During this time the U.S. did not consider these religious extremists as a threat. Yet they soon turned to be a major security concern for the country in the following decades.

On the eve of the attacks, U.S.-Pakistan relations were at a low point. However, the Bush Administration managed to gain Pakistan's cooperation in the war and relations between the two were deepened. Both countries enjoyed a good relationship under the Bush Administration, even at a personal level with Bush greatly trusting in Musharraf. This personal relationship influenced America's policy towards the country. Pakistan ultimately became an important ally, obtaining the status of a MNNA.

Much of the Bush Administration's policy was based on aid and assistance, mainly military. Such assistance was considered an investment in U.S. and global security. It included the revival of the US-Pakistan Defence Consultative Group, the creation of the CSF and the resuming of arms sales for counterterror operations. It also provided assistance for nuclear security. Under this administration the two countries cooperated in areas of military intelligence, logistical support, the capturing of militants, OEF and the use of air bases and naval facilities. The administration also began the use of CIA drone strikes, going on the offensive in order to eliminate those extremists which were planning attacks on the U.S. from Pakistan. Although the Bush Administration supported military rule in Pakistan, during its final years in office it began a more liberal policy, shifting its focus onto democracy promotion, therefore supporting a transition to

civilian rule in the country. The objective of the administration's policy in Pakistan was to combat and eradicate those conditions which breed terrorism in the region.

When Obama took office, he set out to refocus the war where he believed the real threat was, i.e. Pakistan and Afghanistan. The administration therefore put more focus on these two countries. It introduced the AfPak strategy as a part of this war, giving more focus on Pakistan when compared to the previous administration. This included appointing a Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Yet although the Obama Administration wanted to maintain good relations with the country, Obama had made it clear from early on that he was ready to risk military confrontation with Pakistan if needs be.

Much of the Obama Administration's foreign policy was also based on aid and assistance, putting more emphasis on non-military aid in an effort to build a more effective relationship with Pakistan. This included the creation of the EPPA with conditionality being added to such aid. The administration also provided military assistance by transferring weaponry, equipment and helicopters. The PCF and the PCCF were also established with similar objectives to that of the CSF under Bush. Furthermore, the administration was supportive of democracy and civilian rule in the country since it believed that such a government would be able to tackle the problem of internal and external terrorism. It also heavily used drone strikes as a part of its war efforts in the border region with Afghanistan as a mean of pre-emptive warfare and self-defence.

However, bilateral relations were bound to change. Coming into office, the Obama Administration was quite sceptical as to how much Pakistan was truly a loyal ally

to the U.S. since it was known that the country was using aid in other areas than counterterrorism and was also supporting certain terrorists. From 2011 onwards, relations began to deteriorate with the growth of anti-U.S. sentiment in the country due to various events such as the killing of OBL and the NATO attacks killing Pakistani soldiers. In the U.S. there were also anti-Pakistan sentiments amongst policymakers whom were frustrated at Pakistan's failure to crackdown militant safe havens in the country. As a result, relations between the two have been greatly strained.

Therefore it is evident that there has been some continuation of policies within Pakistan from the Bush to the Obama Administration. However, the Obama Administration differed in the way it went about such policies which ultimately was reflected in the U.S. relationship with Pakistan.

When looking at the broader foreign policy of the U.S. in the context of the WOT, the analysis concludes that there has been a continuation of policies from one administration to the other despite Obama being heralded as an agent of change. The Obama Administration not only continued aspects of foreign policy from its predecessor, but even reinforced some of them. However, the foreign policy of the Obama Administration is not a complete replica of that of the Bush Administration. There has been change in certain regards, including areas of language used and who they were after in the war.

From the findings of this research it is evident that Pakistan has played an important part in the U.S. led GWOT initiated by President Bush following the attacks of 9/11. Under both administration's it was a key player to help fight this war. Yet although there was to a certain extent continuation of foreign policy in the context of the WOT

from the Bush to Obama Administration, the bilateral relationship greatly changed under Obama, with an increase of tension between the two. Therefore one can conclude that there has been change within continuity when comparing the Bush and Obama Administrations' foreign policy, and although Pakistan has been an important American ally in the WOT, it has also been one of its greatest obstacles to winning and ending the war.

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