War as ant-Communism. “Fraternal” Catholic modernism by contrast was more anti-fascist, social democratic, and internationalist than anti-Communist. It too focused on the family but it “decentered” reproduction as the primary end of marriage by also stressing love and marital amity (Chappel names Dietrich von Hildebrand, an originator of a more expansive and not strictly generative concept of marital sexuality – also a Jewish convert – as one of its representatives). It looked to build social solidarity in a pluralistic civil society via such things as a lively free press and trade-union activism on an inter-faith basis.

Catholic Modern charts how these two Catholic modernisms emerged in the 1930s in competition with one another, were joined and mutually altered in the Christian Democratic consensus of the consumerist societies that arose in the capitalist and democratic west during “the long 1950s,” and then separated once again in the cultural and political upheavals of the 1960s. “Fraternal” modernism came to the fore first at Vatican II, then in the protest against Humanae Vitae, Paul VI’s 1968 encyclical rejecting artificial forms of contraception, in the student uprisings of that same year, and in the rise of leftist “political theology” in Germany (Johann Baptist Metz), which helped inspire Latin American liberation theology. Chappel builds his narrative around a rich array of representative figures, some well-known to American Catholic analysts (e.g., Jacques Maritain, von Hildebrand, and Bernard Häring), many others less so. This reviewer was also familiar with Hugo Ball and Waldemar Gurian in Germany and Friedrich Heer in Austria. Chappel quotes liberally from mid-level literary sources such as journal and magazine articles, conference programs, calls to action, essays, letters, and the like, rather than formal church pronouncements or theological treatises, and coming very largely from lay people rather than clerics.

Chappel’s typology is a bit brittle, but the story he tells is subtle and complex. He is fair to all his sources, though his sympathies are with fraternal modernism. His book will rightly be used as a brief for Pope Francis’ call to a Catholicism of solidarity in the streets and a chastened austerity towards the gospel of economic growth. Apologists who want to put Catholic social teaching in the service of the free market ideology of the Koch brothers and their kind will be discomfited. So will Catholic neoconservative advocates for American nationalist exceptionalism. By the same token, defenders of a strong regulatory state will have to acknowledge the deeply anti-statist roots of modern Catholic social teaching, for which subsidiarity and decentralization were cardinal values and a precondition for acceptance of the secular state. When Jacques Maritain came to America, writes Chappel, he was especially enthralled by … Saul Alinsky’s 1946 book Reveille for Radicals (161), which he wanted translated into French and Italian! He was not happy to see social welfare coopted by the nation-state.

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Technology can increasingly give us the possibility of overcoming our physical limitations, of extending life indefinitely and even of improving our intellectual, moral, emotional and social
capabilities beyond our current state. The question is, are we morally obliged to pursue, or rather to eschew, this transhumanist ideal? In her insightful work, Melinda C. Hall, assistant professor of philosophy at Stetson University, addresses the age-old question of therapy versus enhancement through the dual lens of biopolitics and of disability issues against a Foucauldian backdrop. This equips her with a new methodology to confront transhumanism in a more holistic and consistent manner.

The groundwork of Hall’s argument is laid in the first chapter, “Dragon Slayers: Exploring Transhumanism,” where she makes reference to the mythical Dragon-Tyrant taken from the writings of Nick Bostrom, and which symbolizes death, the ultimate human limitation. She shows how transhumanists such as Bostrom, Julian Savulescu and Donna Haraway strive to annihilate this oppressive force once and for all through technology. Hall draws attention to the rhetoric used by these authors who make their case for radical enhancement before comparing their views with those of bio-conservatives including Paul Ramsey, Leon Kass, and Michael Sandel, who are critical of this project. These arguments however, fail to convince Hall and she shows how the rhetoric used by bio-conservatives (playing God, authenticity, human nature and equal opportunity) is in many respects the same as that used by transhumanists, and is based on an Enlightenment humanism which she attacks.

Hall develops her argument further in Chapter 2, “Rethinking Disability: Dodging Definitions, Muddying Models,” where she proposes that having a more holistic view of how the subject is socially construed would enable us to identify the flaws inherent in the transhumanist dream. Using insights from Michel Foucault to buttress her argument, she makes the point that “disability is connected to the idea of abnormality … [and] is produced, not born” (31). She surveys the strengths and weaknesses of the different models of disability, including the moral, charity (persons with disability as objects of pity), medical, social and minority models before finally settling on the cultural model. Transhumanists, Hall insists, resort to biological reductionism, which separates cognition from embodiment, gives too much importance to genetic factors, is highly individualistic, and reinforces the narrative of stigma.

I found Hall’s argument all the more compelling when in Chapter 3, “Rethinking Enhancement: A Genealogical Approach,” she traces how the quest for enhancement over the past century has resulted in a culture of eugenics ingrained in research. Hall faults biological reductionism, which has appeared from the Life Extension Institute to the Nazi eugenics program, to excessive concern with physical health culminating in the genetic determinism we are currently experiencing.

This leads her to the question of choice. In the fourth chapter, “Choosing, for Choice’s Sake: A Case Study,” Hall convincingly argues that when taken to an extreme, choice actually leads to the inability to choose. In the long run, choosing which lives to enhance and in what manner limits our choice. Therefore, if there is any choice that must be made, it must be one in favor of social transformation. This is Hall’s key point, which she fleshes out more extensively in Chapter 5, “Disability as/at Risk: The Biopolitics of Disability.” Bioethics itself, the author holds, is a political discourse where the subject, as a responsible decision-maker, is expected to overcome problems such as end-of-life issues, genetic counseling, and the rationing of healthcare. In so doing, however, risk is augmented. Hall’s proposal is, therefore, that enhancement must indeed be sought: not of bodies but political, social and technological changes that improve care and interdependence without falling into eugenics.

Hall makes her argument fairly convincingly, but falls short of articulating how exactly this project might look in practice, providing avenues for herself or others who would like to take up the challenge. Were it not for its rather prohibitive price, The Bioethics of Enhancement would perhaps enjoy circulation among an even wider audience, including bioethics and disability studies students and indeed anyone keen on entering into dialogue with pluralist culture.
on bioethical issues. Readers would also be able to relate to the many references, made throughout the book, to important bioethical cases that have received extensive press coverage over the past decade or so. Intentionally or not, Hall fails to engage with South American, African or Asian authors and realities, a silence which speaks volumes in the context of the project itself.

Although *The Bioethics of Enhancement* is not a work of theology per se, and although we only find passing reference to Paul Ramsey’s contributions to questions of enhancement, Hall’s insights can significantly broaden the discourse of theological bioethics by shifting attention to cultural change. Her novel approach to addressing the “therapy versus enhancement” conundrum through biopolitics and the cultural disability model can lead to deeper theological reflection on the virtues needed to transform society into one that values its most vulnerable members. I look forward to seeing how the conversation that Melinda C. Hall has initiated will continue to shape the moral landscape of bioethics in a rapidly changing world.

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**The idea of the Muslim world: a global intellectual history**, by Cemil Aydin,
Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2017, 293 pp., $29.95 (hardcover),
ISBN 978067405037

Cemil Aydin’s *The Idea of the Muslim World* is an ambitious book that takes up the concept of the “Muslim world” with a wide-angle lens, interrogating how this idea entered the vernacular through intellectual and political struggles over the last 150 years. Aydin’s central thesis is that the idea of the Muslim world was invented in response to nineteenth century imperial racism, and that the endurance of the illusion of the Muslim world obscures political debates and divergent interests between Muslims in different parts of the globe.

The core of the text comprises six chapters drawing a history from medieval Islam until the present, with a focus on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries during which the idea of the Muslim world emerged as a political concept. Aydin begins by demonstrating that prior to that moment, the idea of the Muslim world had no currency; rather, allegiances and geopolitical struggles found their fault lines in the contest of empires in which Muslim rulers were just as likely to ally with Christian European powers as they were with other Muslims. Even when these rulers instrumentalized their Muslim identity, as for example Ottoman attempts to ally with Muslim sultanates in Africa and South Asia against the Portuguese in the sixteenth century, Aydin points out that these appeals were not always successful: in that case, Portugal had its own Muslim allies against the Ottoman empire (30). Against the French invasion of Egypt in 1798, the Ottomans called upon the British and Russians, and “Napoleon, not the Egyptians or the Ottomans … tried to appeal to an abstract notion of Islam … [presenting] himself as a friend of Muslims” (33).

Thus, for Aydin, the eighteenth century is the height of what he calls “universal” imperialism as well as Muslim cosmopolitanism, a time he seems to look on nostalgically as he turns his attention to the increased racialization of nineteenth and twentieth-century empire and nation-states. It is against the backdrop of imperial racism that Aydin argues the idea of the