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  <title>OAR@UM Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/129355" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/129355</id>
  <updated>2026-04-18T07:21:59Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-04-18T07:21:59Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>The IGC - where will it end?</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/129020" />
    <author>
      <name>Usher, John A.</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/129020</id>
    <updated>2024-11-27T13:19:21Z</updated>
    <published>1996-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: The IGC - where will it end?
Authors: Usher, John A.
Abstract: For many years changes to the text of the EC Treaty were few and far between, and tended to be highly specific in their nature, such as the 1965 Merger Treaty leading to a common institutional structure for the three Communities, and the 1975 Budgetary Treaty. Indeed between the signature of the original EEC Treaty in 1957 and that of the Single European Act in 1986, no change was made to the substantive policy provisions of that Treaty. The Single European Act however combined institutional reform with amendments and additions to the substantive provisions of the Treaty, providing for the completion of the internal market by the end of 1992 and conferring other express new competences on the Community; it also introduced express provisions on Political Cooperation which fell outside the normal Community legislative process and fell outside the jurisdiction of the European Court. [excerpt]</summary>
    <dc:date>1996-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The de minimis doctrine in EC competition law</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/128979" />
    <author>
      <name>Buttigieg, Eugene</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/128979</id>
    <updated>2024-11-27T13:12:23Z</updated>
    <published>1995-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: The de minimis doctrine in EC competition law
Authors: Buttigieg, Eugene
Abstract: Section 1 examines how the principle of de minimis was first enunciated by the European Court of Justice-and applied to Article 85(1) in the early years of the Community in order to exclude from the scope of the prohibition in Article 85(1), those parties to an agreement, decision or concerted practice which hold a weak position on the market in the products in question. Since the concept was, however, couched in vague terms, the Commission issued in 1970 a Notice concerning Agreements of Minor Importance with the aim of giving more concrete meaning to the notion of de minimis by laying down specific quantitative criteria regarding the market shares and the size of the parties concerned having regard to their aggregate annual turnover. Section 2 examines in detail the content of this notice, as it was later revised, and identifies its shortcomings and limitations and considers the question of its legal status. Though the notice is useful and serves as a form of guidance to undertakings and their legal advisers attempting to invoke the de minimis rule, it is not completely reliable since the European Court of Justice and the Commission itself have, on certain occasions, in the particular cases before them, taken into consideration other factors as well, besides those indicated in the notice, in order to determine whether an agreement, concerted practice or decision of an association of undertakings falls within the de minimis rule and so escapes the prohibition in Article 85(1). Sections 3 and 4 review the case-law of the European Court of Justice and the Commission respectively in order to analyse how, throughout the years, they have applied the rule in practice and what other factors and considerations must be taken into account by an undertaking before it can be certain that it falls within the confines of the de minimis rule.</summary>
    <dc:date>1995-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The jurisdictional aspects of Regulation 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/128976" />
    <author>
      <name>Gatt, Bernardette</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/128976</id>
    <updated>2024-11-27T12:57:05Z</updated>
    <published>1999-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: The jurisdictional aspects of Regulation 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings
Authors: Gatt, Bernardette
Abstract: One of the main tasks of the European Community is to assimilate commercial activities in and between its twelve Member States to commercial activities within a single state. The creation of such a common market involves several critical elements, including the removal of internal tariffs, the creation of a common external tariff, and the elimination of non-tariff barriers to the free movement of goods and services. The European Community Treaty eliminated all internal tariffs and vested power to set common external tariffs in the Commission. In order to eliminate non-tariff barriers, such as divergent quality standards, the European Community has enacted numerous directives and regulations. In addition to these necessary elements for perfecting the common market, the Community's 1992 internal single market programme contained another significant feature: adoption of a merger control system intended to strengthen EC competition policy and to promote the Commission's antitrust enforcement programme. This was achieved by the enactment of the EEC Regulation on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings.' The Merger Regulation is a new legal instrument, primarily based on Article 235 of the EC Treaty' and thus creates new substantive rules for the evaluation and control of concentrations, which go beyond those provided for in Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty dealing with competition in general. The Regulation need not be approved or implemented by national legislation and is directly applicable in all the EU Member States. It-applies to EU as well as to non-EU companies, and it also extends to all countries of EFTA3 (European Free Trade Association) since the entry into force of the Agreement on a European Economic Area on 1 January 1994, which Agreement has been concluded between the EU and EFTA countries. However, since the accession of Austria, Sweden and Finland to the EU on 1 January 1995, this agreement is now of more limited importance. The new Regulation comes in against a background of increasing merger activity in the EU and beyond. Although mergers very often lead to beneficial results, such as economies of scale, the Regulation in its Recital 5 recognises the need for merger control in order to ensure that the formation of mergers "does not give rise to lasting damage to competition".</summary>
    <dc:date>1999-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Preferential rules of origin as an EC trade policy instrument with particular reference to Malta</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/128971" />
    <author>
      <name>Zahra, Helga J.</name>
    </author>
    <id>https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/128971</id>
    <updated>2024-11-27T13:24:46Z</updated>
    <published>1997-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Preferential rules of origin as an EC trade policy instrument with particular reference to Malta
Authors: Zahra, Helga J.
Abstract: The post-war trading system, supposedly based on the twin principles of non-discrimination and liberalisation embodied in the use of Most-Favoured-Nation treatment (as set out in Articles I and II of the GATT), has become increasingly subject to exceptions. A proliferation of bilateral trade agreements have delivered quite a few blows to the principle of non-discrimination. The EC itself has entered into a proliferation of preferential agreements thus availing itself widely of the exception for customs unions and free trade areas ( or interim agreements leading to the formation thereof) found in Art XXIV of the GA TT. In fact, nowadays, the EC's MFN tariff applies to few countries. Why is the EC pursuing the establishment of special trade links with countries as different as Norway and Algeria so enthusiastically? Leaving aside the question of geographic proximity, which has a major influence in the negotiation and conclusion of agreements establishing Free Trade Areas, the EC's main reason for entering into so many preferential arrangements appears to be political. However, the instruments available in practice to the EC as a policy-making body are economic. T-tade preferences are one of the few tools, available to the EC for forging special relations with third countries. The EC utilised them particularly enthusiastically with regards to its Mediterranean neighbours. In fact, the overall policy of the Community towards to Mediterranean countries (if such an overall policy existed in the seventies) constitutes an important element in Malta-EU relations. The Malta-EC/EU Association Agreement should be viewed against this context. It can also be seen as containing elements of development policy. The three policy aspects - political, trade/economic and development have all contributed to the resulting Agreements and amendments thereto which have taken place over the years. [excerpt]</summary>
    <dc:date>1997-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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