<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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  <title>OAR@UM Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/28189" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/28189</id>
  <updated>2026-04-11T10:55:31Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2026-04-11T10:55:31Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Religious personality</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/28212" />
    <author>
      <name />
    </author>
    <id>https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/28212</id>
    <updated>2018-03-24T02:27:47Z</updated>
    <published>1975-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Religious personality
Abstract: 'Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real, and yet waiting to be realized; something which is remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach, something which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest.'</summary>
    <dc:date>1975-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The offertory rite in the Ordines Romani</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/28211" />
    <author>
      <name />
    </author>
    <id>https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/28211</id>
    <updated>2018-03-24T02:27:46Z</updated>
    <published>1975-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: The offertory rite in the Ordines Romani
Abstract: The Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy of Vatican II, when it speaks on the general principles of liturgical renewal, says amongst other things, that, 'the rites should be distinguished by a noble simplicity; they should be short, clear and unencumbered by any useless repetitions; they should be within the people's power of comprehension, and normally should not require much explanation' (n. 34). Later on, in subsequent articles, the same Constitution speaks on more particular principles is it treats on more specific liturgical celebrations. Thus in chapter: U, when it speaks on the Mystery of the Eucharist, it says that 'the rite of the Mass is to be revised in such a way that the intrinsic nature and purpose of its several parts, as also the connection between them, may be more clearly manifested, and that devout and active participation by the people may be more easily achieved' (n.50). In the same article it then stresses the need of simplifying the rites with due consideration to the preservation of their substance; the discarding of those elements which are superfluous and of little advantage, and the reintroduction and restoring of those elements which have suffered injury through accidents of history.</summary>
    <dc:date>1975-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Human being or human person</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/28210" />
    <author>
      <name />
    </author>
    <id>https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/28210</id>
    <updated>2018-03-24T02:27:45Z</updated>
    <published>1975-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Human being or human person
Abstract: My friend Prof. P.J.Micallef is to be highly complemented for tackling the abortion question from a most interesting point of view, from an aspect which is, in my opinion, absolutely fundamental and most likely to lead to far-reaching conclusions. When is the human fetus a person? There shouldn't be any doubt in anybody's mind that whatever new life results from the union of two humans must be human. But a more important question is: what does a human fetus need to be also a human person?</summary>
    <dc:date>1975-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Whether we can speak of a difference between the human being and the human person</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/28209" />
    <author>
      <name />
    </author>
    <id>https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/28209</id>
    <updated>2018-03-24T02:27:44Z</updated>
    <published>1975-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Whether we can speak of a difference between the human being and the human person
Abstract: One of the major issues intimately involved in any serious consideration of abortion concerns the humanity of the fetus: specifically, whether or not in abortion we are dealing with one human being (the mother) or with two (the mother and the fetus). In stricter terms, the problem involved is: (a) whether or not the fetus is as much a human being as the mother; b) consequently, with as much a right to life as the mother; and (c) in cases of conflict of tights (as are raised in most abortion cases), which right or set of rights may prevail. The problem is strictly a moral one but if a reasonably defensible solution is found on the moral level, then the problem of abortion as well as a number of related problems might conceivably become more amenable to a solution on the practical and legal levels.</summary>
    <dc:date>1975-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
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