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    <title>OAR@UM Collection:</title>
    <link>https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/13770</link>
    <description />
    <pubDate>Thu, 21 May 2026 05:10:38 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-05-21T05:10:38Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>Faces of Europe : structural drivers of visual personalization in political parties’ Facebook campaigns</title>
      <link>https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/146569</link>
      <description>Title: Faces of Europe : structural drivers of visual personalization in political parties’ Facebook campaigns
Authors: Magin, Melanie; Russmann, Uta; Vulcano, Rossella; von Nostitz, Felix‐Christopher; Wurst, Anna‐Katharina; Gattermann, Katjana; Alonso‐Muñoz, Laura; Cristina Balaban, Delia; Baranowski, Paweł; Burai, Krisztina; Cachia, Jean Claude; Deželan, Tomaž; Garaj, Michal; Hermans, Babette; Kallinikos, Konstantinos; Kannasto, Elisa; Kruschinski, Simon; Lappas, Georgios; Machado, Sara; Macková, Alena Pospíšil; Segesten, Anamaria Dutceac; Skulte, Ilva; Vučković, Milica; Wal, Matt
Abstract: Social media platforms have become central arenas for election campaigning, pushing political actors to adapt to their attention‐driven logics. One prominent strategy is visual personalization, reflecting the platforms’ person‐centered, image‐driven design. This study offers the first large‐scale, cross‐national analysis of how political parties across 23 EU countries strategically employed two dimensions of visual personalization—individualization and privatization—on Facebook during the 2024 European Parliament election campaign. It examines how their digital campaign output was shaped by two party‐level factors (populist vs. non‐populist status; government vs. opposition) and two country‐level factors (electoral systems; degree of authoritarianism). Based on a manual content analysis of 14,553 posts, we find that individualization was far more common than privatization and that party‐level characteristics exerted stronger influence than country‐level contexts. Populist and governing parties used more individualization. Privatization was more prevalent among non‐populist parties and in more liberal environments. These findings challenge assumptions about populist and authoritarian communication styles and make a theoretical contribution by demonstrating that visual personalization is a multidimensional phenomenon whose specific dimensions respond differently to structural incentives. Our results underscore the need to analytically separate individualization and privatization and to account for their distinct contextual drivers when assessing political personalization in digital environments.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Ir-rwol tar-reliġjonijiet għall-paċi : xkiel jew opportunità?</title>
      <link>https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/142866</link>
      <description>Title: Ir-rwol tar-reliġjonijiet għall-paċi : xkiel jew opportunità?
Authors: DeBattista, André P.
Abstract: Ir-reliġjon – jew ir-reliġjonijiet – huma ta’ spiss akkużati li huma &#xD;
kawża ta’ diviżjoni u xkiel għall-paċi. Storikament, issir referenza għall-Kruċjati tal-Medju Evu u l-Gwerer tar-Reliġjonijiet ġewwa Franza. &#xD;
Fi żmien eqreb lejn tagħna, isiru wkoll referenzi għall-kunflitti bejn &#xD;
gruppi differenti, fosthom il-Kattoliċi u l-Protestanti fl-Irlanda ta’ Fuq &#xD;
u l-estremiżmu f’isem ir-reliġjon f’bosta pajjiżi tal-Lvant Nofsani iżda &#xD;
wkoll f’pajjiżi oħra bħall-India, Sri Lanka u Burma. &#xD;
Ir-realtà hija iktar kumplessa minn hekk. Apparti dan, hemm bosta &#xD;
paradossi. Fosthom, hemm il-fatt li kull reliġjon titkellem dwar il-paċi; &#xD;
imma jekk dan hu minnu, għax hemm tant kunflitti li jsiru taħt il-kappa &#xD;
tar-reliġjon, tant li din taf tidher bħala ostaklu għall-paċi?</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Anti-Western sentiments, disinformation and the reactions to Russia’s war on Ukraine in the Global South</title>
      <link>https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/141825</link>
      <description>Title: Anti-Western sentiments, disinformation and the reactions to Russia’s war on Ukraine in the Global South
Authors: Weilandt, Ragnar
Abstract: While the West was rather fast, united and unequivocal in condemning Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, reactions from the &#xD;
Global South were more varied. Russia’s war is that of a European &#xD;
empire against a country it formerly colonised. Yet, among those &#xD;
most sympathetic to Russian narratives and most critical of Western &#xD;
support for Ukraine are people and elites in many of those countries &#xD;
that were formerly colonised by European empires themselves. This &#xD;
paper examines the origins of such sentiments. It discusses how the &#xD;
particular features of both Western and Russian imperialism as well &#xD;
as Western and Soviet conduct during the Cold War help to explain &#xD;
a certain level of sympathy for Russia in the Global South. It shows &#xD;
how perceived and actual Western hypocrisy has made the Global &#xD;
South less receptive to Western narratives about principles, norms &#xD;
and international law and more receptive to Russian propaganda &#xD;
and disinformation. On that basis, it argues that in receiving only &#xD;
limited open support from non-Western countries, the Ukrainians &#xD;
are, to some extent, paying the price for perceived and actual &#xD;
double standards in European and American foreign policy.</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Navigating polarisation Malta’s two-party dynamics in the 2024 EU election</title>
      <link>https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/139713</link>
      <description>Title: Navigating polarisation Malta’s two-party dynamics in the 2024 EU election
Authors: Cachia, Jean Claude
Abstract: On 8 June 2024, Maltese voters joined the rest of the EU member states in &#xD;
selecting their sixth representatives for the European Parliament. With a &#xD;
population of around 563,000 over an area of 316 km² (122 sq. mi), Malta is &#xD;
the smallest EU member state. The governing Nationalist Party applied to &#xD;
join the EU in 1990; however, it took until 2004 for Malta to become a member &#xD;
alongside Cyprus and eight member states from Central and Eastern Europe. &#xD;
Since joining the EU, the role of the country’s MEPs has grown more important, &#xD;
with increased media and political attention on their work. This was particularly true for Roberta Metsola, who was elected President of the European&#xD;
Parliament in 2022. Following the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia &#xD;
in 2017, debates emerged within the European Parliament regarding the rule &#xD;
of law, democracy, and freedom of the press in Malta. These issues sparked &#xD;
controversies over how MEPs should approach these debates, particularly &#xD;
concerning the national interest. The national interest would also become a &#xD;
point of contention in Malta’s electoral campaign for the 2024 EU Elections.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/139713</guid>
      <dc:date>2024-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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