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    <link>https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/9211</link>
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    <pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2026 00:20:47 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-06-25T00:20:47Z</dc:date>
    <item>
      <title>Iura novit curia? : the aim of the preliminary ruling procedure and its achievement from a civil law perspective</title>
      <link>https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/19128</link>
      <description>Title: Iura novit curia? : the aim of the preliminary ruling procedure and its achievement from a civil law perspective
Abstract: This study presents a critical assessment of the preliminary reference procedure of the European Union, particularly the burden which is put on the national judiciary of “new” Member States with a civil law legal tradition in order to comply with Article 267 TFEU. The purpose of this thesis is not just a mere analysis of the provisions of the Treaty and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court of Justice), it is intended to explore the determining elements which can explain the fluctuating numbers of initiated preliminary reference procedures amongst Member States. The principles, concepts and theories which have been developed by the Court of Justice are scrutinized from a civil law aspect whether the Court’s rulings – which are considered to broaden the limits of applicability or the effectiveness of the procedure – helped to achieve the aims of the preliminary ruling procedure, in particular in Member states with civil law legal system. This thesis also contains a discussion of a survey carried out amongst Hungarian judges in order to verify or disaffirm the author’s hypothesis, namely that one significant factor – which influences the decisions of national judges whether to refer of not – is his/her level of familiarity with the law of the European Union.
Description: LL.M.EUR.COMP.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2016 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/19128</guid>
      <dc:date>2016-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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    <item>
      <title>Reviewing safety regulations in the maritime industry within the EU and their impact on international trade</title>
      <link>https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/19127</link>
      <description>Title: Reviewing safety regulations in the maritime industry within the EU and their impact on international trade
Abstract: The word ‘regulation’ is used in a manner that extends to cover not only the EU&#xD;
legislative meaning but also any type of legislation, convention or agreement&#xD;
which is intended to regulate maritime safety and which is currently in force&#xD;
within the EU. Hence for this scope the United Nations Conventions, other&#xD;
International Conventions, the EU Regulations and Directives, and domestic&#xD;
legislation of key Maritime states will be analysed and reviewed.&#xD;
A critical analysis will be made of key provisions relating to safety at sea and&#xD;
how they are affecting international trade economically, competitively and&#xD;
through a labour perspective.
Description: LL.M.EUR.COMP.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2016 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/19127</guid>
      <dc:date>2016-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice of the European Union :   a façade for a ‘narcissistic’ motif?</title>
      <link>https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/19124</link>
      <description>Title: Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice of the European Union :   a façade for a ‘narcissistic’ motif?
Abstract: The immeasurable significance of fundamental human rights is nowadays an open secret, and mankind has moved on from the need to establishing any assertion as regards their irreplaceable contribution to any legal order. Referring to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as “the crown jewel”1 of the world’s most advanced international system is talk of the past, one would dare say an accepted “dogma’ in a world where the importance of human rights is accentuated and well established. &#xD;
The atmosphere has been revived as the focus has been redefined towards the European Union (EU), no longer viewed as simply a monetary one, signaling a development of a parallel world where the economic concerns are matched by a politically oriented human rights angle, establishing the Union’s own moral status. 2 The discourse shifted to a new level of appraisal, rethinking the steps of the Union and what it can do more to be no less than any of its Member State (MS) counterparts. It was time for different applauses, well deserved to the Union for showering the ECHR3 with “the best gift” for its’ 60th anniversary.  &#xD;
The Lisbon Treaty5 has provided the legal basis for accession by the Union to the ECHR, upon which the Draft Accession Agreement6 (DAA) was formulted, giving legal embodiment to such accession. It was a celebrated process, however, Luxembourg rejected the DAA nonetheless.  Against this background, the following thesis examines the five reasons submitted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Opinion 2/137 for its rejection to the DAA. It considers whether the DAA does indeed create difficulties which would render it incompatible with the Treaties8. The study goes into the autonomy discourse put forward by the CJEU matched by its exclusive jurisdiction. As importantly, it examines the procedural mechanisms envisaged by the DAA, more specifically the co-respondent mechanism and the procedure of prior involvement. While additionally examining if accession really does create obstacles in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the present study considers throughout all the analysis conducted whether Opinion 2/13 was rather motivated by the CJEU’s own narcissistic interests above anything else.
Description: LL.M.EUR.COMP.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2016 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/19124</guid>
      <dc:date>2016-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis for European agencies to adopt direct regulatory measures vis-a-vis third parties</title>
      <link>https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/19123</link>
      <description>Title: Article 114 TFEU as the legal basis for European agencies to adopt direct regulatory measures vis-a-vis third parties
Abstract: `Agencification` in the European Union is a process that has intensified significantly during the last&#xD;
decade not only in respect of the numbers of EU agencies operative in the European Union today&#xD;
but also with regards to the functions and powers which are delegated to them. With few&#xD;
exceptions, EU agencies created in the past did not have regulatory powers in the sense that they&#xD;
could adopt individual binding decisions vis-à-vis third parties but instead were limited to assistance&#xD;
functions towards the Member States and the Commission. Besides the political reluctance of the&#xD;
Member States and as well of the Commission to delegate far reaching decision making powers to&#xD;
EU agencies, the principles established in the Meroni judgment are said to have hindered further&#xD;
agencification in the past. &#xD;
This picture changed with the establishment the Security and Market Authority (ESMA) in 2010&#xD;
through Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.  By Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 on short selling and&#xD;
certain aspects of credit default swaps, ESMA was empowered to adopt direct regulatory measures&#xD;
vis-à-vis third parties. However, despite its increasing relevance, the Treaties do not provide for a&#xD;
comprehensive normative framework with general criteria and conditions for the establishment,&#xD;
running and monitoring of EU agencies. Only indirectly the existence of EU agencies is acknowledged&#xD;
in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), namely by mentioning acts of EU&#xD;
agencies in the context of the judicial review mechanism available under Articles 263 TFEU and 267&#xD;
TFEU.  Moreover, those Treaty provisions which expressly deal with the implementation of EU law,&#xD;
these are Articles 290 TFEU and 291 TFEU, do not mention EU agencies either.&#xD;
In the absence of specific Treaty provisions, most EU agencies in the past have been either adopted&#xD;
under sectorial Treaty provisions6 or under Article 352 TFEU which requires unanimity voting in the&#xD;
Council.
Description: LL.M.EUR.COMP.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Jan 2016 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/19123</guid>
      <dc:date>2016-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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