Una pesante debacle britannica

Abstract

Britain committed what may be called an "auto-goal." According to political decisions that eluded strategy, on February 24, 1941 London ordered the General Archibald Wavell, the British Commander-in-Chief in Egypt, to halt his advance westwards and to consider Cyrenaica as a "buffer zone" between Egypt and Tripoli employing the minimum of the necessary forces to hold the front. The rest of his troops and his weaponry were to be transferred to Greece. At the same time, it is estimated that the Axis forces in Libya would not have been able to engage in a counteroffensive towards Cyrenaica before the end of May, at which time it was expected the arrival of reinforcements in the forms of troops and tanks in Benghazi. As a result of this decision the British lost both Greece and Cyrenaica. General Rommel launched the British offensive on April 2, finding the British too weak and unprepared to resist, while their reserves were still in Greece. By mid-April, Cyrenaica was lost.