Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/17736
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dc.date.accessioned2017-03-22T09:21:40Z
dc.date.available2017-03-22T09:21:40Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar//handle/123456789/17736
dc.descriptionLL.B.en_GB
dc.description.abstractThis paper is dedicated to exploring the scenario regarding the compensability of moral damage in an ordinary tort action, following the landmark decision of Brincat vs Malta. It takes as its starting point the position, often adopted in our judgements, that damages awards under article 1045 and 1046 of the Civil Code are sufficient to compensate adequately for all the damage suffered by the victim, albeit moral damages are not awarded. It asks whether this reasoning remains tenable following this judgement. It focuses on two main critical cases: Busuttil vs Muscat (COA) and Brincat vs Malta (ECtHR), which respectively bring out new elements in the application of moral damages in Malta. These innovative judgements are delved into thoroughly to explore their rationale and the consequences thereof to our system of quantification of damages. The horizontal application of human rights will also be discussed to establish if it is a desirable solution to accomodate the rights of the victim of a tort. The scenario post Brincat vs Malta is then explored via another fundamental judgement called Jane Agius vs Attorney General, which provides authoritative guidance on the applicable scenario after the aforementioned judgements and how the latter have infiltrated this Court’s reasonings. The conclusion attempts to tie together the deductions made in the Chapters and scrutinizes the current situation of the Maltese quantification of damages. It provides recommendations based on fundamental human rights which should lie at the very heart of our system for compensating damages in private law.en_GB
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccessen_GB
dc.subjectTorts -- Maltaen_GB
dc.subjectMoral damages (Civil law) -- Maltaen_GB
dc.subjectDamages -- Maltaen_GB
dc.subjectHuman rights -- Maltaen_GB
dc.subjectEuropean Court of Human Rightsen_GB
dc.titleIs it possible to compensate for ‘moral damage’ without awarding ‘moral damages’ following ‘Brincat vs Malta’?en_GB
dc.typebachelorThesisen_GB
dc.rights.holderThe copyright of this work belongs to the author(s)/publisher. The rights of this work are as defined by the appropriate Copyright Legislation or as modified by any successive legislation. Users may access this work and can make use of the information contained in accordance with the Copyright Legislation provided that the author must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the prior permission of the copyright holder.en_GB
dc.publisher.institutionUniversity of Maltaen_GB
dc.publisher.departmentFaculty of Laws. Department of Civil Lawen_GB
dc.description.reviewedN/Aen_GB
dc.contributora.authoremailjustine.vassallo.12@um.edu.mt
dc.contributor.creatorVassallo, Justine
Appears in Collections:Dissertations - FacLaw - 2016
Dissertations - FacLawCiv - 2016

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