The crime of aggression under the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court

Abstract

This thesis will attempt to show how, perhaps, this was the first step towards a thwarted concept of the crime of aggression evidenced by the amendments discussed hereunder. The author will also try to show how the amendments introduced due to Resolution 6 have proved to be problematic in that the crime has become enshrouded in a denser fog of confusion than it was before the Review Conference. The problems presented by the adopted amendments are, in the author's view, threefold. Firstly, the definition of the crime of aggression begs the question as various elements of the crime need further polishing and thus, offer a very wide margin of interpretation which should not be allowed in the criminal law field. Article 22 of the same Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rome Statute') that the Review Conference discussed below sought to (and did) amend, states that '[t]he definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.'1 A wide margin of interpretation as to what constitutes a crime runs contrary to the principle of legality enunciated above. Secondly, it is the author's view that the initiation procedure that has been introduced by the amendment is clearly fallacious and that it runs contrary to the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 from which it is sourced. Lastly, although the author understands the political reasons for the inclusion of an opt-out clause offered to States that ratify the amendments, such an opt-out clause effectively nullifies any kind of hold that the International Criminal Court (hereinafter referred to as ' might acquire through the amendments introduced. The terms 'crime of aggression' and 'aggression' are used interchangeably throughout this paper.