Malta's direct tax regime in a global environment undergoing fiscal convergence

Abstract

Globalisation and technological advancement have permitted the proliferation of tax regimes designed to attract geographically mobile activities. One may argue that competition between different national tax policies is just as healthy, desirable and efficient as competition in the provision of goods and services. Conversely, one can argue that preferential tax regimes erode the tax base of other countries by attracting investment or savings originating elsewhere and facilitating the avoidance of other countries' taxes. Such loss of revenue will cause the effected countries to reduce their social expenditure and/or increase taxes on less mobile activities, thus creating less equitable tax systems. This study will analyse briefly the arguments for and against tax competition. Until now, most governments have acted independently to protect their tax bases and fiscal policies. But more recent developments within the OECD, the EU and beyond, indicate a growing awareness that such a challenge can only be counter-acted on a more global level. Thus this study will proceed to indicate areas of Maltese fiscal legislation that may potentially be defined as harmful tax practices and thus subject to counter-measures. This will also have regard to the experience of other countries having comparable fiscal regimes. The expected repercussions on the Maltese fiscal regime are discussed.