Indirect responsibility and the international criminal court

Abstract

This thesis will discuss the legal notion of indirect responsibility within international criminal law, with a particular focus on the International Criminal Court's provisions in this regard. The various indirect forms of liability found in Article 25 (3) of the Rome Statute - namely ordering, soliciting, inducing; aiding or abetting; common purpose; and incitement to genocide - are dealt with in considerable detail. Furthermore, superior responsibility is also discussed within the concluding chapter. Much of the ICC's provisions are inherited from its predecessor tribunals, the ad hoc ICTY and ICTR. Sometimes these hereditary features derive from the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, but in most cases it is their jurisprudence which has had the most significant effect upon the drafting of the Rome Statute. To this end, an analysis of some of the leading cases within the ICTY and ICTR is necessary in order to correctly understand and interpret various aspects of the Rome Statute The Furundzija, Tadic, Akayesu and Celebici trials are examples of such cases. This thesis draws a number of tentative conclusions, and one more confident one. It is too early to accurately project a future for the ICC, especially given the lack of case law. Its effectiveness may be hampered by its close ties to the UN Security Council. Initial signs, however, point towards a daring chief prosecutor who seems willing to test the juridical limits of the Rome Statute. Finally, the marked improvements in indirect responsibility liability present within tlw Rome Statute are likely to be entrenched into customary law for good regardless of the success or failures of the ICC.