Literature and the notion of law

Abstract

Chapter One begins with a general introduction to the notion of law. A broad definition of law is adopted that includes what would usually be classed as norms. There is then a brief look at how this notion of law might affect the discursive systems of science, philosophy and literary criticism, with particular focus on traditional forms of the latter. It is suggested that these various systems could all be considered, to an extent, legal systems. Relevant issues, such as the singularity of literature and the impurity of law, are then examined in relation to two essays by Derrida: 'Before the Law' and 'The Law of Genre'. The argument is made that it is law's dependency on repeatable traits that makes its transgression theoretically possible. Chapter Two concentrates on two key texts: 'Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority"' by Derrida, and Just Gaming by Lyotard. The reading of 'Force of Law' which also looks at Benjamin's 'Critique of Violence' - examines the way Derrida differentiates law and justice, and his suggestion that justice only becomes a possibility when law is challenged. Derrida argues that to challenge law one must achieve an aporetic position somewhere between law and justice. In relation to Just Gaming, attention is paid to how Lyotard tries to reconcile a 'pagan' belief that laws should be challenged by judging without criteria, with a Kantian horizon or Idea of justice which, whilst not being determinative, would serve to curb relativistic excess. This ideal position is understood to be, again, somewhere between law and justice. In Chapter Three Shakespeare's Richard II is introduced as an allegory to illustrate the way traditional literary criticism operates in relation to law and how post-structuralist or deconstructive critiques of law might be seen as more effective ways of challenging law. The issue of subjectivity is raised, and the line 'I am a subject, / And I challenge law' is used to suggest that a subject must challenge law because of the fact that he or she is a subject. The chapter concludes with the identification of echoes of an Oedipal complex in Richard II. In Chapter Four, which serves as a conclusion to the whole dissertation, an attempt is made to deconstruct the allegory of Richard II that was presented in Chapter Three, by drawing out an alternative allegorical interpretation. The argument is made that this new interpretation might be considered instructive in indicating deconstruction's potential weaknesses; in particular, its ability to position itself in-between law and justice (from where it can potentially challenge law), given its current position within the academic institution. A possible way that the discourse of deconstructive challenge could sustain and strengthen its claim to marginality is then suggested. It is argued that there should be an effort to develop an emphasis on what is identified as the suicivicidal aspect of the deconstructive challenge. The suggestion is made that any suicivicidal challenge to law must be driven by a particular type compulsion that rejects the idea of finality or totality. The chapter concludes by advocating the need for further, more comprehensive investigation.