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The Malta Turn of Europe  
The European Union in the age of globality

# The Malta Turn of Europe

## The European Union in the age of globality

Ludger Kühnhardt<sup>1</sup>

### I.

Victor Hugo once described revolutions as a return from the artificial to normalcy. Certainly, revolutions are processes that unveil the unknown in history. Revolutions are revelations. 1989 was such a revelation in Europe. It changed the European perspective from Yalta to Malta, that is: from internal division to global exposure. The turn from Yalta to Malta was not only a semantic gag. It was also more than describing the end of the Cold War. To link Malta to Yalta was not a nice way for writing an obituary to a closed chapter in history. To the contrary, “Malta” opened a new chapter in the history of Europe. I call this fundamental fact “the Malta turn of Europe”. Most people which were living the political events of 1989 or were observing them from a distance did not instantly grasp the meaning of the political changes that happened across Central Europe. Two basic meanings were revealed by the history of 1989: a fundamental geopolitical change and a fundamental socio-cultural change – and both were fundamentally interrelated. The fall of communist regimes that had been governing many societies was met with excitement and joy, sometimes even with disbelief and worry across the world. With hindsight knowledge, two facts remain evident: 1989 did not begin in 1989 and it did not end with 1989. When we compare the fall of communist regimes in Europe with the French Revolution of 1789, we instantly realize the meaning of this thought: also 1789 did not begin in 1789 and it did not end with 1789. The French Revolution in its time went through periods of incubation. And it continued through several periods of transformation, of revolutions inside the revolution, of unexpected results and unintended consequences. The same was happening in Europe again two centuries later. Three insights remain fundamental to better contextualize 1989 and the Malta summit in that year that declared the Cold War dead.

1. Returning from the artificial to normalcy: In the Soviet Union, the centre of the communist empire, the changes had begun as a sort of revolution from above. In the summer of 1989, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev told the communist leadership of the German Democratic Republic that those who come late with reforms will be punished by life. By then, in a way his perestroika had already been taken over by history. Gorbachev wanted to rescue Leninism by reforming the basis of its ideology. Eventually, he lost the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union – I learned from my friend Zoran Djindjic, the slain leader of Serbia who toppled the communist regime of Yugoslavia, extradited Milosevic to The Hague and paid the highest price of political courage when he was assassinated in 2003 – was an artificial state, built on an ideology with wrong anthropological premises and false economic theories. Like the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and Yugoslavia were doomed once the ideological glue did not longer hold these countries together. Like the Soviet Union, these were artificial states. Ideological states cannot survive once history returns to normalcy.
2. The peaceful revolution of 1989 meant a return of history, also regarding the internal recalibration of power, rule and legitimacy. The fall of communist regimes and the struggle for new parameters of power and public authority was beginning as a peaceful revolution. In some cases, the revolution remained peaceful. In other cases, the revolution turned violent.

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, In Romania, in Yugoslavia and in some sense Russia, too, the revolution was devouring its children. Like Saturn. Just as a footnote: Hardly any political party that was born in Central Europe out of the spirit of 1989 still exists under its original name.

After the fall of communist totalitarianism, the transformation continued across Central Europe. The new post-communist and post-totalitarian order required a new type of leadership. Along with constitutional and socio-economic transformation, a substantial transformation of personalities in public life took place in post-communist Europe. Many post-communist leaders would have never entered public life if the totalitarian regimes would have prevailed. Many of the new leaders were – and often still are – of a genuine, authentic type.

3. After the end of communist totalitarianism, the revival of the public sphere was no easy task. Fighting communism had united many. Working for a stable democracy generated manifold splits in each society. Hope and fear, frustration and opportunism, new moral revival and disguised forms of old power overlapped. Alexis de Tocqueville once observed that the French Revolution initially triggered the desire for freedom while only replacing it soon again with the comforting promise of equality. This move from priority freedom to priority equality has happened again in post-1989 Europe. And yet, one overriding quest guided many post-communist societies through the daunting period of transformation and the chaotic phase of reform anarchism and restoration anachronisms: The quest to return to Europe.

At this point in my analysis, the socio-cultural revolution of 1989 inter-relates with the geopolitical revolution of 1989. I would like to offer three thoughts to underline the fundamental character of the transition from Yalta to Malta.

1. After World War II, the countries of Central and South Eastern Europe had fallen under the geopolitical and systemic control of the Soviet Union. For them, Cold War, Iron Curtain and totalitarian dictatorship also meant a separation from “Europe”, from its Western part and its common heritage. “Returning to Europe” was an unfulfilled dream and an obvious aspiration. 1989 opened the doors that had been slammed by the forces of a tragic history. 1989 meant the end of the order of Yalta. Yalta was synonymous for division. Therefore, its end meant a homecoming, the return to a common civilization of freedom, law and democracy. But while they returned, the port of entry was changing too. The Malta summit started the exposure of Europe to the world of globalization.
2. The “Malta turn” meant that ever since the Malta Summit of December 1989 Europe was inevitably opening to the world at large. Europe has become part of the new agenda of globalization, which in the meantime, in my view, has already moved on to a state of globality.

Malta, in my understanding of Europe, has the most reflective yet natural global mind-set on our continent. Malta has been a colony of another European country, yet finds itself today in a reconciled spirit together with its former colonial master in the same European Union; Malta is deeply Catholic yet caters a particular understanding and open-ness for Israel and for the Arab countries as part of the common Mediterranean identity; Malta speaks English yet is proud of its genuine identity, mother tongue and cultural heritage; Malta is a respected member of the Commonwealth yet a deeply loyal and committed member of the European Union and of the Atlantic civilization. President de Marco has taught me the meaning of the *forma mentis* of the Mediterranean, which is the essence of the Maltese character. But Malta is larger than its Mediterranean vocation – as the Mediterranean itself. Malta lives the global view, which the Lisbon Treaty tries to strengthen across the European Union. It is appropriate that a new era for Europe has begun in Malta and will forever carry the name of Malta, as an expression of factual evidence and as a symbol for the meaning of the turn from Yalta to Malta. Malta is the right symbol for the right place standing for the right perspective for us all in Europe: the turn to globality.

3. Social and political transformations are not a mechanic process about power and reconstruction. Social and political processes also reflect generational developments. Those born across Central Europe in 1989 could already participate in the election to the European Parliament in 2009. The young generation of post-totalitarian societies in Europe has become part of a consolidated normalcy across today's European Union. For them, the chapter of Yalta is closed. However, along with their generational peers across the rest of Europe many of them are still trying to fully grasp the meaning of Malta, of the "Malta turn of Europe". For me, the "Malta turn" means that today we live in a Europe that is inescapably open to the world and the impact of it on all of us. The divided Europe has been replaced by an exposed Europe. The "Malta turn" means that Europe needs to find its place in the new age of globality and to shape it wherever possible. As the "Yalta turn" of a bygone era, the "Malta turn" combines socio-cultural with geopolitical issues and perspectives. This chapter of our history has only just begun.

## II.

Since the Maastricht Treaty has come into force in 1993, the European Community is renamed European Union. With the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union completed the initial vision of European integration by launching a common currency for its common market; since 2002, the euro is the only currency in a growing number of EU member states, in fifteen of them in 2010, Malta including. With the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union also started its new rationale for European integration by gradually becoming a global political player; in 2009, the common foreign and security policy of the European Union is still incomplete. The geopolitical as well as the internal transformation that has accompanied the past two decades of European integration was enormous. All in all, the European Union has achieved a lot during these past two decades. But its global strategy and foreign policy is still incoherent. The core of the matter when assessing the root causes of this prevailing deficit: While European integration has started in the 1950s as a project of peace and reconciliation, of pooling of sovereignty and taming of national interests, the world around the European Union until 2009 (and certainly well beyond!) is driven by sets of norms, codes of conflict and forms of pursuing interests which often differ from European self-perceptions. The European Union prefers to be understood as a normative power, yet it is often challenged by the power of external realities that it finds difficult to reconcile with its own set of norms.

Strategically, the European Union is torn between different concepts of geopolitics and different strategies of how to implement them. With William Walters one can define four different types of geostrategies, which the European Union is trying to practice simultaneously:

- The idealistic concept of de-territorializing politics and advancing a borderless sphere of networked, cooperative and multilateral relations. What shall be achieved inside the European Union is also suggested to be the guiding line for trans-national and international relations in the age of globalization. As borders have been abandoned by and large inside the European Union, many in the EU prefer to perceive the world at large through the same lens of potential borderless-ness. Effective control of frontiers and clashing realities should happen through a wide set of cooperative measures. Joint interests instead of conflicting constellations – thus is the mantra of de-territorialized politics.
- The sceptical concept of buffer-zones, which are intended to divide chaos and stability, inside spheres of inclusion and outside spheres of exclusion. Without generating direct confrontation between the two spheres, the "in-between" spheres are left as indistinct, grey and undecided. Inter-zones between powers with potentially clashing norms and interests are a soft form of frontier.
- The aggressive concept of colonial frontier, which is linked to the projection of norms, standards and interests. This concept includes an element of expansion, which is not necessarily violent. It is inherently linked to the desire of transforming the outside spheres in order to enhance joint stability and mutual advantage.
- The rigid, static concept of explicit limits, frontiers and barriers. While the aggressive concept

of expansive frontier is ready to engage with the spheres outside the border, the static concept of protective and defensive frontiers draws a clear line in the sand between inside and outside. Relations between inside and outside, at best, can be asymmetric, implying the unchangeable inferiority of the outside sphere.<sup>2</sup>

In pursuing certain elements of all four concepts, the EU is aiming to reconcile contradicting strategies. This situation is worsened by the fact that the EU is also trying to reconcile different modes of governance. This effort in itself produces a tall agenda of internal coordination and conflict, incoherence and frustration. Scholars such as Jan Zielonka are characterizing the EU as a neo-medieval empire without a stringent centre of power, with loose peripheries, informal modes of projecting norms and with a decentralized implementation of decisions and regulations.<sup>3</sup> In contrast stands the traditional model of the Westphalian state, a centralized state with the monopoly of sovereignty and power. While the EU never intended to emulate the Westphalian state model, its neo-medieval character is curse and benefit at the same time: It helps to accommodate the diversity of Europe but it makes coherent common action difficult. This is especially felt in the European Union's dealings with its strategic neighbourhoods.

- The Northern dimension of the European Union was especially promoted by the Scandinavian states and Finland. They were considering the end of the Cold War an opportunity to explore and tap the resources of the Baltic Sea and, eventually, of the Arctic Circle. The Northern Dimension was designed as an optimistic strategy of cooperative multilateralism.
- The Eastern dimension of the European Union was torn between three geopolitical strategies: hope, fear and uncertainty about the fate of Russia. Cooperation and normative expansionism and new frontiers out of security concern or buffer zones between itself and the newly rising Russian power were combined in the absence of a clear commitment to the states "in-between", especially the Ukraine. The European Union has been adopting elements of all three attitudes in the outlook to its geographic east. The Western energy dependency has helped Russia not only to use a new strategic weapon but to remind the European Union that its development is tight to Russia for better or worse – and that the key to decision-making on energy and other Eastern matters does not simply lie in Brussels.
- The Southern dimension of the European Union has initially been driven by three unrelated aspects: The concern of the Southern EU countries to counterbalance the eastern orientation of Germany and some other North Western European states; the desire to build bridges across the Mediterranean, especially to the Maghreb with its strong links to France and the Iberian peninsula; and the hope to turn the fear of importing insecurity (including migration, radical Islam and poverty) into a new mode of equilibrium and control.<sup>4</sup>

### III.

With the creation of the "Union for the Mediterranean" in 2008, the Mediterranean has returned to the centre of attention in EU policy circles. This was in the interest of all littoral EU member states and it reflects the importance of the Mediterranean for the future of the EU. In 1995, the "Euro-Mediterranean Partnership" (Barcelona Process) had been created. Its inclusive membership turned out to be strength and weakness alike. Israel was sitting next to the Arab states around the Mediterranean, including the Palestinian Authority. In a loose way, the "Euro-Mediterranean Partnership" tried to emulate the

<sup>2</sup> See William Walters, "The Frontiers of the European Union: A Geostrategic Perspective", *Geopolitics* 9:3(2004): 674-698.

<sup>3</sup> Jan Zielonka, *Europe as Empire. The Nature of the Enlarged European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006.

<sup>4</sup> See for a thorough analysis of these aspects: Christopher S. Browning/Pertti Joenniemi, *Geostrategies of the European Neighbourhood Policy*, DIIS Working Paper No.9, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2007; for the EU Neighbourhood Policy see Andreas Marchetti, *The European Neighbourhood Policy. Foreign Policy at the EU Periphery*, ZEI Discussion Paper C 158, Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies, 2006.



Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) that was instrumental in managing the decline of the Cold War in Europe. The three thematic “baskets” of the CSCE were a source of inspiration for the Barcelona Process: security; economic and technological cooperation; and the human dimension, including human rights. By 2010, a free trade zone around the Mediterranean was to be implemented.

The Barcelona Process always was and the Union for the Mediterranean continues to be an incomplete and incoherent combination of impossible factors: The Mediterranean Partnership remains asymmetric, a partnership among un-equals. Neither the strategic goals nor the useful instruments were ever properly defined. They were mostly used in a way in which all partners did hardly mean the same, even when using the same words. Continuously, the Arab states felt blamed by the EU for their political and economic under-performance. At the same time, the EU rejected to fully share the instruments of Europe’s technological progress with the Arab world. The European Union continued to be undecided whether the Mediterranean ought to be a bridge or a barrier, a market place of cooperative networking or a security zone of imminent and growing threats. The Barcelona Process was an insufficient toll to initiate solid contributions to the Middle East peace process. Time and again, projects and plans of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership became hostages of the Middle East conflict.

With the initiation of the Union for the Mediterranean everything shall get better – according to its supporters in the EU, and especially in France where the concept for the Union originated.<sup>5</sup> French President Nicolas Sarkozy was the first to promote the Union for the Mediterranean. He sees it “as the basis for a political, economic and cultural union among strictly equal partners”: These were the words he used when inviting his colleagues to the inaugural summit in June 2008 in Marseille. There, the EU Heads of State and Government proclaimed the Union for the Mediterranean together with their old and new partners from the Southern shores of the Mediterranean. But now, everything should be better, they promised each other. For most Europeans, it was confusing to see the establishment of yet another union side by side and somewhat interlinked with the European Union.

The Union for the Mediterranean is now planning regular joint conferences among member states on the basis of a rotating presidency somewhat following the European Council. Topics of common interest and concern are easy to identify: energy, security, fight against terrorism, migration, trade, corruption, organized crime, human trafficking. The idea of a Mediterranean Investment Bank, following the model of the London-based European Investment Bank, did not materialize. The Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean found its seat in Barcelona, a decision which somewhat pays tribute to the original Barcelona Process. The initial Co-Chairmanship of the Union for the Mediterranean is shared by France and Egypt. Israel and the Palestinian Authority are granted a Vice-Secretary General each (that is two of six Vice-Secretary Generals). The Arab League was accepted as observer without decision-making powers (it is not clear what sort of decision-making powers the 43 member states of the Union for the Mediterranean truly have). In the absence of a coherent and convincing joint strategy consensus-building is vital. Yet, some aspects of the Union for the Mediterranean deserve to be mentioned in more detail:

1. The Union for the Mediterranean includes all EU member states and not only the immediate littoral member states. This decision put to rest a debate President Sarkozy had provoked by suggesting that the Union for the Mediterranean could be a parallel operation beside the European Union. Germany and other EU member states stopped the French President – and thus reinforced the useful fact that all EU member states consider the future of the Mediterranean their genuine and common interest. For better or worse, in the end the Union for the Mediterranean has become the re-vamped prolongation and continuation of the Barcelona Process. But what will happen if one day Israel or Syria (or even the two together)

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<sup>5</sup> For an initial analysis see Roberto Aliboni et.al., *Union pour la Méditerranée: Le potentiel de l’acquis de Barcelone*, ISS No.3, Paris: Institute d’Etudes de Sécurité de l’Union Européenne, 2008; Roberto Aliboni/Fouad M. Ammor, *Under the Shadow of Barcelona: From the EMP to the Union for the Mediterranean*, Euromesco Paper 77, Lisbon: Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission, 2009.

will express the wish to take over the rotating chair of the Union for the Mediterranean?

2. The Union for the Mediterranean intends to gain confidence and reputation through a series of successful and sustainable projects. This includes, for instance, a better use of solar energy and other renewable source of energy in the region. The initial idea for the Barcelona Process was similar – but it never worked to the general satisfaction: Too many countries were pursuing too many different objectives while all of them invested too few means to implement any of them properly. The test case for the Union for the Mediterranean will be its ability to project relevance and legitimacy through successful projects and actions which are capable of substantially transforming realities in the Mediterranean: from intercultural dialogue (a Euro-Arab Dialogue Center has been established in Malta<sup>6</sup>) to issues of good governance, from migration to urban planning, from water security to energy, from technology transfer to education perspectives for the young generation.
3. Initially, French President Sarkozy intended the Union for the Mediterranean to be a substitute for Turkish EU membership. Membership negotiations between Turkey and the European Union are under way since 2005. No matter their slow progress and the tall agenda accompanying this process of steady approximation: The “Union for the Mediterranean” is not going to be the frame to un-do the hopes of EU-enthusiastic Turks or to relieve the fears of Turkophobes in the EU. The Union for the Mediterranean might rather become an ante-chamber to accelerate the EU membership perspective of Turkey, although this is a debatable detail. In any case, Turkey was willing to participate in the Union for the Mediterranean only after its participation was definitely recognized by all EU partners not to be the alternative for Turkish EU membership.
4. In the final analysis, the Union for the Mediterranean is the rhetoric prolongation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The main dilemma of the Mediterranean cannot be transcended by this Union or any other asymmetric constellation: The integrated and powerful European Union is encountering an incoherent, weak and un-integrated group of individual partner countries on the Southern shores of the Mediterranean. While the European Union has begun bi-regional negotiations with various regional groupings across the globe, such as MERCOSUR, the Union for the Mediterranean cannot become such a bi-regional or inter-regional mechanism. In the absence of a regional grouping on the Southern shores of the Mediterranean, the Union at best can be a loose frame to advance pragmatically through cooperative projects. Optimists hope that the Union for the Mediterranean can pragmatically contribute to easing tensions of which the overall region is so loaded with.
5. At best, the Union for the Mediterranean can become a focused regional component of the European Neighbourhood Policy, overcoming its incoherent character. In the meantime, the EU has granted budget resources to implement the European Neighbourhood Policy, aimed at exporting stability and norms while generating an overall atmosphere of cooperation and cordial neighbourhood. A Union of equal partners looks different.

The wise President Emeritus of Malta, Guido de Marco, has spoken of a “*forma mentis*“, which constitutes the Mediterranean and its common heritage, no matter all the existing divisions. With the Union for the Mediterranean, the cultural notion of a “*forma mentis*” is broadened by an open chapter of yet to be gradually developing common interests. In the years to come, this chapter is to be written amidst the mixed atmosphere of scepticism and fear that has accompanied the initiation of the Union for the Mediterranean. It has to stand the test of the new age of globality.

#### IV.

European integration is often understood as the European way of coping with globalization. Whether or not this is a sufficient definition of the purpose and goal of integration in Europe, this assessment

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6 EU-LAS (European Union – League of Arab States) Liaison Office

certainly constitutes a revision of the original *raison d'être* of European integration. While in the early decades of integration, its main purpose was the creation of a European peace order, today European integration is increasingly understood as the frame for European nations to engage jointly with the world at large. European integration is more and more about Europe's reaction to global challenges and about the global role of Europe. No matter transient internal integration obstacles, the European Union is considered by its constituting parts as one of the sources of protection in trying times. Many external observers perceive European integration as a source of inspiration for their own region. They look at the EU to better understand how best to cope with their own challenges of history and identity, politics and economics in the age of globalization. Inside the European Union, the integration idea is confronted with the challenge of legitimacy: How can the EU guarantee socially acceptable and culturally accommodating answers to the manifold challenges of the 21st century? Internal European reservations to European integration do not oppose the "idea of Europe" as such, but rather its concrete realization and the political management through EU institutions (and in fact more often through incompetent national institutions and policy processes).

The notion and character of Europeanization has changed, certainly since the introduction of a common European currency and its underlying transfer of fiscal sovereignty to the European level. European integration increasingly impacts national political and economic but also social and cultural structures: From tax systems to education structures, efforts of benchmarking and European-wide comparisons of standards and qualities are growing. These efforts demonstrate that no member state of the European Union can escape the experiences, norms and debates of other EU partners. The interference into the domestic political, economic and constitutional structure of member states has provoked counter-reactions: Populist, anti-European, xenophobic and other attitudes converge in myopic responses to the ever-increasing Europeanization of the European political and socio-economic spheres. These challenges increase the need to reinvigorate legitimacy and democratic rooted-ness of the European integration project. Neither has representative democracy been properly installed on the EU level yet, nor can participatory, deliberative democracy be the all-encompassing answer to the pending questions of legitimacy and accountability in the European Union. There can be no doubt that the structure of democracy and the perception of democratic norms have entered a phase of transformation in Europe. These developments need to eventually bring a recalibration of the relationship between participatory and representative democracy and its re-connection on the European level.

Against this internal background, the European Union is expanding its global presence. The ever growing global role of Europe is largely influenced by the ability of the EU to project European values and norms beyond the shores of Europe as a contribution to global governance, regional conflict resolution and the stability of countries and societies in turmoil. Whether or not Europe is a community of values is no longer confined to a rhetoric debate inside Europe. Europe as a community of values has to stand the test of a global agenda, where it can succeed only if its political strategies are perceived as contradiction-free. Europe's proliferation of the values of human rights, rule of law and the promise of pooled sovereignty through a global proliferation of regional integration mechanisms will remain dependent on Europe's internal performance, that is to say on its ability to convince through example, and on Europe's relationship with the United States of America. This indispensable partnership is the cornerstone for establishing a consistent and effective global role.

**V.**  
Change – whatever the content of this hypnotising word that has travelled the world since the election of Barack Obama as 44<sup>th</sup> President of the United States: Any lasting change requires that ideas turn into institutions. Each turning point in history was marked by this fundamental phenomenon. Today, the world is moving from the age of globalization to the reality of globality. But institutions of globality are yet to emerge:

- The United Nations Security Council requires a fair representation of those regions in the



world that are not represented yet, including Africa, South East Asia, the Arab world, Latin America and Europe, represented by the European Union.

- The current world financial crisis requires a remaking of the global financial institutions to make them true representatives of globality, including a stronger representation of China, India, Brazil, Russia, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the EU.
- The International Court of Justice will need to be strengthened in its authority as the legal body with the right, no: with the duty to intervene in domestic affairs of any country in the world if these domestic affairs mean genocide, civil war, flagrant violations of human rights, failed statehood.
- The group of G8 has to be replaced by a body better reflecting the key economic regions across the world, especially in regard to their responsibility for climate protection, social inclusion of economic progress and a speedier implementation of the UN Millennium Development Goals for combating poverty worldwide.

Transatlantic relations remain at the heart of managing globality. No other combination of partners around the world has the same breadth, depth and outreach. No other coalition of partners can project the same degree of power, influence and capacity to act – if they wish so. Here is the test-case for a renewal of transatlantic relations under President Barack Obama: To formulate with clarity and to form with patience a new transatlantic frame of mind, an organizing idea for transatlantic relations in managing globality: That is one of the key challenges ahead. During decades of the Cold War, transatlantic relations were inspired by the defining idea of defending freedom through joint security. No transatlantic dispute – and there were many – was able to derail this defining idea. Since 1989, the transatlantic partners almost lost each other. While Europe was absorbed with overcoming the division of the continent and deepening European integration, the United States became autistic about its unitary world power status – and after 9/11 deeply shattered about its limits. During almost two decades, transatlantic relations were defined by their limits and not by their opportunities. A defining and mobilizing idea was missing. The main lesson learned during these past years for the EU: whenever transatlantic relations are strained, European integration suffers, too. The main lesson learned for everybody around the world: Whenever transatlantic partners do not reach consensus, no big global problem can be resolved. Think of climate change, UN reforms, WTO, the Broader Middle East.

Ahead of the Obama presidency of hope and change is the renewal of transatlantic relations.<sup>7</sup> During past years, a lot of noise has been made about soft power and hard power, Venus and Mars. Time has come to re-connect and to re-combine:

- The US and the EU should form a joint policy group to define the hard power agenda ahead of them: how to stabilize a democratic and federal Iraq, how to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, how to win Afghanistan, how to prevent Pakistan from getting lost, how to cope with a neo-authoritarian and neo-imperial Russia, how to deal with China and conflicts in Africa and elsewhere originating in the unresolved power struggles with this new world-power, how to broaden the Atlantic security architecture to the belt of uncertainty that stretches across the Sahara and its adjacent regions north and south.
- The US and the EU should also form a joint policy group to define the joint agenda of their joint soft power projection in the age of globality: how to stabilize the global financial markets, how to re-ignite world trade negotiations aimed at enhancing global free trade, how to cope with global migration pressure, how to turn Africa from the continent of despair into the continent of promise, hope and development, how to institutionalize a form of multilateralism that includes China, India, Brazil, Russia, the Arab Gulf.

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<sup>7</sup> See, e.g., Tomas Valasek, What Europe wants from President Obama, Policy Brief, Centre for European Reform, Brussels 2008; Alvaro de Vasconcelos/Marcin Zaborowski (eds.), European perspectives on the new American foreign policy agenda, ISS Report No.04, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris 2009; Daniel Hamilton et.al., Alliance Reborn: An Atlantic Compact for the 21st century, Washington D.C. 2009.

The world has become ready for a new order. It must be an order at whose heart is a new notion of security. It must be a notion of security for a world that looks for new expressions of the human condition. It must be a strategy aimed at enhancing human security. It is here that the need for a renewal and broadening of transatlantic relations intertwines with the global agenda and especially with the development agenda.

Resistance to change can generate conflicts as much as too rapid, unfocused and misguided change may generate conflict. More than ever, simple answers are out of the question. Multidimensional and multilateral thinking has become the key requirement for understanding, assessing and managing change and transformation in the age of globality. In the past, geopolitics seemed to be the guiding concept for global action. Today, this concept is insufficient and has to be broadened: Geo-economic, geo-demographic and geo-religious dimensions have to be added, at least. It is here where the claim to transatlantic global leadership meets the demands of the developing world. To achieve global stability, Europe and the US must go global, but they must be guided by the compass of human security.

## **VI.**

The geo-religious dimension of this challenge lies at the doorsteps of Europe: Turkey. Eventually, the European Union will probably have to recognize Turkey as an EU member state – provided Turkey accepts all membership criteria. This assessment is based on the assumption that the EU wants a long-term stabilization of its relationship with Turkey and that the EU over time needs to transform the overall debate on Turkey from being one about the limits of Europe to one about the global role of Europe, along with Turkey and its potential and contribution. At the heart of the matter – from a geo-religious perspective – is the successful reconciliation between Islamic democracy and Western values. The question of Turkish EU membership is the key frontier of geo-religious reasoning.<sup>8</sup>

Most issues related to Europe's global exposure find an echo in domestic social, cultural and socio-economic trends inside Europe. This is largely the consequence of migration, enforced or voluntary, and of cultural encounters across religious and habitual lines. In the long run, Europe will only be able to cope with the challenges of globality on the basis of a broadened horizon, an inclusive attitude towards "otherness" and the recognition of a public role and sphere of religion in its plurality. First and foremost, this requires Europe to reflect anew and honestly about its own particular roots, traditions and norms, most notably its Christian roots. As 21<sup>st</sup> century Europe cannot be thought any longer without a public recognition of the role of religion, Europe must, firstly, re-acquire its Christian values and norms in order to engage, secondly, in any meaningful way with the challenges and opportunities of the non-Christian minority sectors of Europe's society, Islam in particular. Without honest and genuine self-assertion of Christian norms and faith-bound values, Europe will become a soulless entity incapable of being respected by other religions and cultures while betraying itself to be only the embodiment of a life-style. Only as embodiment of values and norms, culture and freedom of religion, only in harmony with the Christian faith of its majority and the Islamic and Jewish faith of its minorities can Europe contribute in a meaningful way to the dialogue of religions and will be taken seriously as a global moral voice.

Should Turkey comply with the principle of reciprocity of religious freedom – meant as positive freedom to practice one's religion even if it represents a very small minority in a dominantly Islamic country – it would have become a different Turkey. It would have recognized in practice standards of civilization and standards in the relationship between religion and politics that are nowadays of European normalcy. Such a Turkey could be and, in fact, should be, a welcome part of any European integration scheme and regional grouping.

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<sup>8</sup> On the situation in Turkey see Günter Seufert, *Staat und Islam in der Türkei*, SWP Studie S 29, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin 2004.

It was impressive to see that in the course of his 2006 visit to Turkey, Pope Benedict XVI has set the perspective and framed the central issue that is most pressing and of long-term implication for Europe: He opted for a dialogue among religions and civilizations. This approach to the Turkey-EU issue is of much more long-term significance than all the 35 technocratic “chapters” the EU needs to negotiate with Turkey. During his 2006 visit to Turkey, the Pope entered the world of common Christian roots and of the Christian heritage of Turkey: The origin of Christianity in Europe is unthinkable without the many bridges of Anatolia. The term “Christians” was used for the first time in a cave church in Antioch, now Antakya. Paulus was born in Tarsus. Many of his epistles were written for the early Christian communities in Anatolia, Asia Minor as it then was called. The merger of Greek philosophy and Christian theology happened on that soil.

It is not surprising that the Greek Orthodox Church and its patriarch are in favour of Turkey joining the EU one day. They know that only such a full realization of Turkey’s “European-ness” will ultimately improve their own situation and lead to full recognition of the Orthodox Church by Turkish authorities. Turkey has begun to reconcile Turkish national interests and European obligations. This is a long and complex way. In the end, it would mean nothing less than a revolutionary revision of Turkey’s understanding of religious pluralism, of the relationship between religion and politics, of the relationship between national pride and patriotism on the one hand and European obligations and standards on the other. Turkey will and can by all means remain a Muslim country. But it can and should be a Muslim country that fully recognizes reciprocity in the free exercise of religious faith. Being able to accept this *acquis communautaire* of the contemporary European consent on freedom of religion would mean nothing less than a civilizational quantum leap for Turkey, which has been framed by radical laicism for most of the past century.<sup>9</sup> By all rational accounts, such a reform would lead to the recognition that the EU and Turkey belong to each other, that Turkey inside the EU is no anachronism but a logical consequence of the values and principles the EU stands for in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## VII.

Geo-demographics is the second challenge to turn the world of geopolitics into a world of human security. It is also a fundamental challenge for a renewed transatlantic global contract. The European Union has suggested to discuss the nexus between development and migration – especially in its relation with Africa – from the perspective of brain circulation.<sup>10</sup>

Brain circulation is a rather new concept that suggests to replace the loss of human capital through brain-drain by circular processes of migration that are beneficial and profitable for developing countries and industrial countries alike.<sup>11</sup> Brain circulation has been conceptualized in light of the return of high skilled emigrants to emerging countries, such as India or China. The limits of the concept have also been discussed. Brain circulation may reduce the remittances traditionally transferred by high skilled people to their families in poorer societies. The concept does not give an answer as to how brain circulation could be linked to the fight against absolute poverty. Brain circulation may end as a zero-sum game between the gain of intellectual capital of host countries and the pressure brain circulation might pose for its unskilled labour market.

Yet, it was both surprising and promising that the 2005 “European Union Strategy for Africa” introduced the notion of “brain circulation” as a possibility to “turn migration into a positive force in

9 On the European constellation see: Alessandro Ferrari, Religions, Secularity and Democracy in Europe: For a New Kelsenian Pact, Jean Monnet Working Paper Series, New York 2005; on Turkish laicism in relation to freedom of religion see Otmar Oehring, Zur Lage der Menschenrechte in der Türkei – Laizismus = Religionsfreiheit?, Aachen 2002.

10 See Meng-Hsuan Chou, EU and the Migration-Development Nexus: What prospects for EU-wide policies?, Working Paper 37, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, Oxford 2006.

11 See, e.g., AnnaLee Saxenian, Brain Circulation: How High Skilled Immigration Makes Everyone Better off, Washington D.C. 2002; Yevgeny Kuznetsov, From Brain Drain to Brain Circulation: Emerging Policy Agenda, Washington D.C. 2005; Klaus Friedrich/Andrea Schultz (eds.), Brain drain or brain circulation? Konsequenzen und Perspektiven der Ost-West-Migration, Leipzig 2008 (this last book is focussing on the intra-German aspects of the topic).

the development process”.<sup>12</sup> As far as Europe’s relation with Africa is concerned, it remains somewhat unclear how the potential of skilled African migrants living in the diaspora (or fleeing to reach it!) could be used for the benefit of their home countries. It might even be more difficult to initiate circular and reciprocal migration of Africans and Europeans alike. For the time being, so it seems, Europe is more afraid of migration – legal or illegal – from Africa than ready to rationally reflect about the prospects of brain circulation in which even Europeans could participate.

But this taboo has to be tackled. Not only Africa but also other developing countries and emerging markets are becoming an increasing demographic, social and migratory challenge for Europe: Their population is young, growing and often socially marginalized with all the known problems of instability, including terrorism. At the same time, these non-European populations are growing older – which will increase their social claims against the wealthy Northern hemisphere. In 2050, the average Yemenite will be 32 years younger than the average European. He or she will think of his or her job and children while Europeans think of retirement and health care.

Already in 2020, the European population will on average be older than 50 years. The growing age gap between Europe and the developing world is salient (while the US remains younger than Europe, on average 36 years): While Europeans will be inclined to protect their welfare systems, people from other parts of the world will claim their share in Europe’s affluence that is diminishing due to decreasing population and decreasing productivity. The labour pool in the Arab world will increase until 2020 by 146 million, in sub-Saharan Africa by 402 million. By 2020, the European Union will experience a 20 per cent decrease in its age group between 20 and 25. In Germany, the age cohort born between 1995 and 1999 is even 47 per cent smaller than the group born between 1970 and 1974.

It remains a fundamental issue as to how under such conditions and prospects a pattern of brain circulation might be organized. Brain circulation implies the idea to organize migration in a reciprocal way. Instead of remaining exposed to illegal migration or contingent migratory activities, brain circulation assumes that reciprocal benefits could be drawn from orchestrated and mutual migratory activities: While young African students might come to Europe to acquire new skills, experienced European (or American or Japanese) professionals might go temporarily to Africa to disseminate knowledge and experience before trained Africans will return to their home countries. Whether or not this perspective is a realistic one remains to be seen. But the demographic pressure around the globe forces all responsible actors and analysts to reflect about managed migration.

Demographic patterns define markets, generate growth opportunities or provoke age recessions. Whatever the specific agenda aimed at turning demographic issues from the perspective of threat into one of opportunity, the future of demographics is a global issue that goes beyond the past dichotomy between “old and few in the North” and “many and young in the South”. Illegal migration, boat-people along the shores of Europe, and the growing socio-economic pressure from the Southern hemisphere require Europe to think anew about the connection between demography and migration, development and globality. One fact is certain: Simple answers will not work.

### **VIII.**

Geo-economics is the third important component to turn the world of geo-politics into an agenda of global human security. Unlike geo-religion or geo-demographics, the term geo-economics has long since become an established notion. It claims to be an extension of the concept of geopolitics, covering the economic, social and temporal aspects of the resources and processes of the economy. The links

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12 European Union Strategy for Africa: towards a Euro-African Pact to accelerate Africa’s development (15-16 December 2005), in: Louis Michel (ed.), *Compendium on development strategies*, Brussels 2006, page 121

between these two concepts and their inherent limits have been discussed for more than a decade.<sup>13</sup>

In light of the current global transformation, the concept of geo-economics will need to be enlarged. It cannot suffice to travel the world of globality with a split mindset, on the one hand covering issues of global economy and the global financial system, on the other hand covering issues of development and poverty alleviation. The age of globality requires the need to bridge the existing gap and bring the two divergent approaches to human economic activity conceptually together. Thus development becomes an inherent feature of global economic activity and underdevelopment and poverty another term for the social exclusion in the world of globality.

The traditional approach to development ought to become a sort of global social politics. This would challenge notions of solidarity that are confined to national loyalties – and purses. It would re-define the traditional concept of development aid, which is by and large organized as a mechanism of re-allocation of resources from the Northern to the Southern hemisphere. Development and especially poverty alleviation as painful issues of a global social order would have to take into consideration the fact that inclusion and exclusion are not a matter of statehood or nationality. Poverty and exclusion happen within states and within nations all over the world.

The market economy has proven to be the most dynamic economic model, echoing the most realistic understanding of human nature and economic behaviour: the pursuit of individual advantage. Yet, the market requires a legal frame in order to link freedom to responsibility. Only then will as many participants of the world community as possible be able to benefit from its potential. It is not the market that can be blamed for the absence of order: The root cause of the economic and financial crisis that unleashed with global consequences in 2008 was state failure, not market failure. Wherever state policies deregulated financial markets without providing a sufficient frame and order, the free use of the market could derail or be manipulated.

The main trouble in the age of globality: The global market does not correspond with global political regimes and orders that can frame the market. Efforts to add a geo-economic regime to the mechanisms of the United Nations point into the right direction. But sooner or later, these efforts will have to confront the very autonomy of sovereign legitimacy that the states of the earth preserve as an embodiment of their claim right. It is state autonomy that prevents the emergence of a global political and geo-economic order while it is state failure that has prevented the development of a more inclusive and balanced world economy and social reality in the past centuries. And yet: autonomous state decisions are needed to tackle both its own limits and deficits.

In light of these lacunas in global governance, it is not surprising that regional integration has become attractive for various development regions around the globe. Following the European experience, other regional groupings try to emulate the relationship of politics, law and economic development on the regional level. Region-building is replacing nation-building. Currently, the world is experiencing the daunting first stages of this process. Along with the emerging markets in several regions of the world, new mechanisms of multilateral, regional and bilateral nature define already the trends in trade and investment.<sup>14</sup> Globality is reaching out to new frontiers.

It is here that the European experiment in region-building is encountering a world in search of partnership and order. The most revolutionary element of region-building in Europe has remained the least developed one so far: the notion of transnational solidarity and citizenship. With the Maastricht Treaty, in force since 1993, the notion of a Union citizenship has entered the European Union. Its

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13 See, e.g., Claude Jlien, Die Stabilität der internationalen Ordnung und das Prinzip der Zivilisation stehen auf dem Spiel. Von der Geopolitik zur Geoökonomie, in: *Le Monde diplomatique*, 15.09.2005 online unter: <http://www.monde-diplomatique.de/pm/.search?tx=Claude+Jlien>

14 See, e.g., Philippe de Lombaerde (ed.), *Multilateralism, Regionalism and Bilateralism in Trade and Investment*, Dordrecht 2007.



implications are long-term, its potential scope manifold. For other regions of the world, this concept entails fundamental insights into the path that lies ahead. To liberate poverty from its national home and to turn development into an integral element of global order and governance, the level of regional groupings can – and will – play an enormous role as intermediary. In some cases, region-building can anticipate globality in one given region. In other cases, region-building will serve as a protective force to tame the asymmetries and unbalanced implications of globality. In any case, the global trend of region-building accompanies the European Union as it shapes its new global role as a normative power.<sup>15</sup>

## IX.

Eventually, human security can become the appropriate new label replacing the old notion of geopolitics as the defining parameter of politics in the age of globality. The age of globality will not be an age without conflicts. Nor will the *conditio humana* be different from the past. But Europe has been transformed as it re-enters the global arena. After centuries of internal conflict, a reconciled Europe is returning to the global sphere. By and large, its former colonial and imperial image has withered away. Today, Europe is rather perceived as overly apologetic and its leaders are swift indeed to excuse past deeds. In intellectual circles, a certain normative relativism has replaced Europe's normative self-assertion of past days.

In the age of globality, Europe will have to re-define the balance between normative universalism and cultural dialogue, between smart power and hard power, between interests and values. The notion of human security is a strong guiding star in this effort. A long march has only just begun: Europe is expected to be a partner of the world. It wants to be a partner and it has the ingredients, based on tradition, experience and transformation. For the time being, Europe is still defining its instruments and re-shaping its intellectual frame of mind for a new global role. The results of the new encounter between a Europe transformed and a transforming world will shape the path of the 21st century. Eventually, its result will initiate new waves of transformation in Europe and – hopefully – new dimensions of human security and stability around the globe. One day, Europe will be judged on this account by the quality of its “Malta turn” that has started with the end of the Cold War some twenty years ago.



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<sup>15</sup> See Zaki La di, *The Normative Empire. The Unintended Consequences of European Power*, Garnet Policy Brief 6, Coventry 2006.

# About the author

**Prof. Ludger Kühnhardt**



□ Prof. Ludger Kühnhardt

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## Academic Positions

Since 1997	Univ. Bonn, Director ZEI and Univ. Professor for Political Science
1994-1995	Albert Ludwigs-University Freiburg, Dean of Philosophical Faculty IV
1991-1997	Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg University Professor (Chair), Political Science Department

## Visiting Positions

Since 2008	Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta, Visiting Professor (Global Proliferation of Regional Integration)
2005/2006	St. Antony's College Oxford, Visiting Professor (Stifterverband Fellow)
2004/2005	Seoul National University Visiting Professor and Academic Advisor on European Affairs
2004	Stanford University Visiting Professor, Institute for International Studies and Political Science Department
2002	Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D.C. Public Policy Scholar
Since 2002	Diplomatic Academy Vienna, Visiting Professor
2000	Dartmouth College, New Hampshire Harris Dartmouth-German Distinguished Visiting Professor
Since 1997	Catholic University Milan Alta Scuola di Economia e Relazioni Internazionali (ASERI) Visiting Professor

### Other Positions

1987-1989	Office of the Federal President of Germany Speechwriter for Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker
1978-1984	Rheinischer Merkur / Christ und Welt (weekly national newspaper) Permanent contributor

### Education

1986	Habilitation, University of Bonn Thesis: "Die Universalität der Menschenrechte. Studie zur ideengeschichtlichen Bestimmung eines politischen Schlüsselbegriffs." ("The Universality of Human Rights") Supervisor: Prof.Dr.Drs.h.c. Karl Dietrich Bracher
1984-1985	Harvard University Center for European Studies, J.F.Kennedy Post-Doctoral Fellow
1983-1984	International Christian University and Sophia University, Tokyo Kenkusei (Special Post-Graduate Student)
1983	Ph.D., University of Bonn Dissertation: "Die Flüchtlingsfrage als Weltordnungsproblem" ("The Refugee Question as World Order Problem") Supervisor: Prof.Dr.Drs.h.c.Karl Dietrich Bracher

### Publications

REGION BUILDING Vol. I: The Global Proliferation of Regional Integration, 512 pages, ISBN 978-1-84545-654-2 (TBP June 2010; [www.berghahnbooks.com](http://www.berghahnbooks.com) )

African Regional Integration and the Role of the European Union, ZEI - Discussion Paper (C 184), 2008

European Union - The Second Founding: The Changing Rationale of European Integration, Baden-Baden 2008

European Integration: Challenge and Response. Crises as Engines of Progress in European Integration History, ZEI - Discussion Paper (C 157), 2006

From National Identity to European Constitutionalism  
European Integration: The first fifty years, ZEI (C 141), 2004

Contrasting Transatlantic Interpretations. The EU and the US towards a Common Global Role, Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies 2003, 74 pages.

Constituting Europe. Identity, Institution-Building and the Search for a Global Role, Baden Baden: Nomos 2003, 275 pages.

Prof. Kühnhardt **publishing activity** also includes: Edited and co-edited books, numerous Articles in journals and edited books. He was the Editor of: ZEI Discussion Paper, Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies; 154 Papers between 1998 and 2005 (for the complete list see: [www.zei.de/zei\\_english/publikation/publ\\_zeic\\_dp.htm](http://www.zei.de/zei_english/publikation/publ_zeic_dp.htm) )

### Member of Editorial Boards:

- Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies (Seoul)
- Croatian International Relations Review (Zagreb)

His **journalistic activities** include various: Book reviews, Media comments, Television and radio programs.

His proactive **educational work** involves: Teaching assignments and Thesis supervision, Lectures, Seminars, Conceptual Work, Conference organization and Study Tours.

Current **Advisory Work** includes:

Since 1998 Catholic Central Institute for Social Sciences, Academic Advisory Board

Since 2001 German Bishop's Conference, Advisory Board on European Affairs

Since 2004 Center for International Relations (Warsaw), Program Commission

Since 2005 Asia-Europe Foundation (Singapore), Advisory Board on European Studies in Asia

**Awards:**

2004 European Foundation for Culture - European Science Award

1979 Catholic German Journalists Award

**Membership:**

- German University Council (Deutscher Hochschulverband)
- German Society for Political Science
- Atlantik Brücke e.V. ("Atlantic Bridge")
- Goerres Society
- Corresponding Member "Collegium Europaeum Jenense"

**Personal data:**

Prof. Kühnhardt was born on 4<sup>th</sup> June 1958, in Münster (Germany).

He is married to: Enikő Noemi Kühnhardt, née Auer (Hungarian) with 2 children Victoria Elisabeth, born 1996 and Stephan Maximilian, born 2000.

This is an abbreviated version of Prof. Dr. Ludger Kunhardt's CV - (only newest monographs in English language are quoted). For more see Wikipedia.org (in German) and

[www.zei.de/zei\\_english/mitarbeiter/kuenhardt.html](http://www.zei.de/zei_english/mitarbeiter/kuenhardt.html)



(R to L) Prof. Ludger Kühnhardt at the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies with MEDAC Chairman Prof. Guido de Marco, President Emeritus of Malta and MEDAC Director Prof. Stephen C. Calleya



(L to R) Prof. Ludger Kühnhardt with MEDAC Director Prof. Stephen C. Calleya during MEDAC's 20th Anniversary International Conference „The End of the Cold War and the Mediterranean: 1989 – 2009“



# About MEDAC



The Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC) is an institution of higher learning offering advanced degrees in diplomacy with a focus on Mediterranean issues. The programme consists of courses in International Law, International Economics, International Relations, Diplomatic History and the practice of diplomacy.

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