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Postcolonial Directions in Education is a peer reviewed open access journal produced twice a year. It is a scholarly journal intended to foster further understanding, advancement and reshaping of the field of postcolonial education. We welcome articles that contribute to advancing the field. As indicated in the Editorial for the inaugural issue, the purview of this journal is broad enough to encompass a variety of disciplinary approaches, including but not confined to the following: sociological, anthropological, historical and social psychological approaches. The areas embraced include anti-racist education, decolonizing education, critical multiculturalism, critical racism theory, direct colonial experiences in education and their legacies for present day educational structures and practice, educational experiences reflecting the culture and ‘imagination’ of empire, the impact of neoliberalism/globalisation/structural adjustment programmes on education, colonial curricula and subaltern alternatives, education and liberation movements, challenging hegemonic languages, the promotion of local literacies and linguistic diversity, neo-colonial education and identity construction, colonialism and the construction of patriarchy, canon and canonicity, Indigenous knowledges, supranational bodies and their educational frameworks, north-south and east-west relations in education, the politics of representation, unlearning colonial stereotypes, internal colonialism and education, cultural hybridity and learning in postcolonial contexts, education and the politics of dislocation, biographies / autobiographies reflecting the above themes, deconstruction of colonial narratives of civilization within educational contexts. Once again, the field cannot be exhausted.

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DECOLONIZING UNESCO’s POST-2015 EDUCATION AGENDA: GLOBAL SOCIAL JUSTICE AND A VIEW FROM UNDRIP

Lynette Shultz,
University of Alberta

ABSTRACT As education actors gather to review the failure of the 1990 – 2015 global Education for All (EFA) agendas to achieve their goals of universal delivery and access to education, there are few new ideas being submitted on how to change directions. This study brings together the two worlds of UNESCO’s Post-2015 Education Agenda and the United Nations Declaration of the Rights on Indigenous People (UNDRIP) in a policy encounter that not only highlights the colonial legacies present in global education policy but suggests how renewed efforts for EFA might be a decolonizing contribution if UNDRIP was taken as a starting place for policy development. It is my objective, in this article, to provide a de-colonial and anti-colonial lens on the processes, objectives, and aims of Post-2015 EFA, as well as to propose some alternatives that could enhance global education goals of equity and enhanced citizenship and democracy.

KEYWORDS Global, decolonizing, anticolonial, UNESCO, UNDRIP, Indigenous

Introduction: The Two Worlds of UNDRIP and UNESCO’s Education For All (EFA)

With the failure of the global Education for All (EFA) agenda to achieve its goals for universal access to education (UNESCO, 1990; UNESCO, 2000), it is interesting to watch as global and local education actors assemble to construct the next version, the Post-2015 Education Agenda (Post-2015 EA), as it is being called. While there are some noticeable changes including, for example, the much more visible participation by countries like
the Republic of Korea (host of a 2015 Global Education Conference, as well as a 2013 Technical Consultation on Global Citizenship Education) and Lithuania (President of the Council of the European Union), the key processes of coming to a “global” agenda reflect many of the same actors and ideas as with other EFA goal-setting attempts. After 25 years of EFA goals, it is time to try something new, if the potential of education as a path of freedom and wellbeing for communities and citizens is to be realized.

While many people who have analyzed EFA over that period have concluded that its real agenda was to shift national policies to fit neoliberal ideologies and open a massive market to eager transnational corporations (see for example, Shultz, 2010; 2013) and that the agenda, as well as the whole system of decision-making and education provision, is colonial (see for example Abdi, 2012; Abdi & Shultz, 2008), there are also important justice reasons for advancing a global understanding of education that will provide a platform for decolonizing education goals, policies, and implementation. It is my objective, in this article, to provide a decolonial and anticolonial lens on the processes, objectives, and aims of Post-2015 EA, as well as to propose some alternatives that could enhance global education goals of equity and enhanced citizenship and democracy.

I will do this by bringing together two global policies and in the second part of the article, describing the subsequent policy encounter as read through a decolonizing theoretical framework. The analysis is informed by Fanon’s description of the anticolonialism required to divest our lives of the racism of colonialism and how it placed goodness as only possible in the realm of whiteness (1967). Walter Mignolo (2000; 2009) along with other decolonial writers like Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007) and Catherine Odora Hoppers and Richard Howard (2011) describe the deep onto-epistemic divide created by colonialism as an abyssal line, where knowledge of any significance to humanity was seen to exist only in the “western” mind. What is needed is a decolonizing of the global landscape of knowledges to decentre western thinking to make visible those epistemologies hidden by colonialism. In this process, it is an anticolonial politics that acknowledges the racism and sexism of colonialism and the violence done to
uphold the colonial project that is required to decolonize any encounter that claims to be *global*.

The two policies, UNESCO’s “*Concept note on the Post-2015 education agenda*”\(^1\) and the *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People* (UNDRIP, 2007)\(^2\), exist as if in two different worlds. UNDRIP was adopted in 2007 after nearly two decades of negotiation. The focus of the declaration is on the development of international standards, as well as national legislation for the protection and promotion of indigenous peoples’ rights, an agenda motivated by interests in improving the almost universal economic peril with which indigenous people live; the need to challenge structural racism and discrimination that work against indigenous people throughout the world; and the impact that a lack of autonomy has in keeping indigenous people marginalized economically, politically, and socially. UNDRIP proposed a significant shift in understanding human rights, what Evans (2008) described as the next generation of deepening human rights, to include collective rights, cultural rights, and rights to self-determination.

Of course, as negotiations and ratification of UNDRIP proceeded, there were compromises made to bring the many disparate actors together. Some of the controversy was about the idea of self-determination. The African Union (AU) worried that any new movements of indigenous self-determination would lead to a more fragmented continent and the loss of any post-colonial gains in independence from colonial powers. Tribal conflicts in African countries have been used to further many local and global/ internal and external agendas of oppression, so the AU pressed for a definition of self-determination that did not mean a right to statehood.

African indigenous struggles, as well as those in Latin America, centered on demands for decolonization that would lead to more autonomy, and economic and social justice.

For indigenous people in much of North America, who already identified as independent nations, their struggle was how to make human rights claims in societies operating as liberal democracies for non-indigenous people, but working as

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colonial societies in relation to indigenous people. Overall, the demands in UNDRIP are both anti-colonial and liberal, asking for indigenous peoples’ freedom to pursue economic, social and cultural development and resist any action by external actors to control their lands, resources, institutions, and livelihoods. While the struggle is not new, the hope is that a global framework might add policy legitimacy and solidarity to the anti-colonial work that indigenous people are doing around the world.

The Post-2015 EA is the result of several responses to the failure of the global Education for All initiatives. Since 2012, UNESCO has been the coordinating agency for Education for All activities and it now hosts the Post-2015 education policy and processes. It initiated several consultation processes, international and inter-sectoral, to respond to, if not develop, the framing of a global agenda to support planning and delivery of education.

Much of the framework is familiar territory with reference to quality education, education for a culture of peace, lifelong learning for all, education for sustainable development, all themes and strategies that emerged over the past 25 years of EFA. The Post-2015 EA suggests that the failure to achieve the 1990 and 2000 EFA goals should be linked to the lack of targets, indicators, measureable outcomes, and evaluation, as well as the problem of the too focused target of access to primary education (See Post-2015 Education Agenda, p. 4-5). “The new post-2015 education agenda should therefore be broad enough to encompass a holistic approach to education and mobilize all countries and stakeholders around a common education agenda that would be applicable and relevant to all countries” (p. 5).

The contradictions for implementation of the Post-2015 EA are significant. The contrast between calls for more targets and measurements at the same time as a call for a more holistic approach reflects the struggle to control this global agenda. That it is embedded in a neoliberal and liberal democratic framework is significant. Throughout the document, there are references to the importance of focusing education on the individual, the direct link of education to economic goals, and education as a tool to develop human capital, as it is referred to in neoliberal discourse (See Post-2015 EA, p 5 – 7). The fundamental assumptions of the
agenda are that, as a global agenda, all individuals and states will be assimilated into the institutionalizing of the Post-2015 education goals and their implementation. This agenda is liberalized through the apprehending of the idea of education as a universal human right. It is clearly not the same understanding of rights put forth in UNDRIP. Noticeable in their absence are references to the many efforts of educators contributing to anti-colonial cognitive justice, decolonized education policy (spaces, knowledges), or the recognition and rights of indigenous people.

When indigenous people are left out of policy, by excluding any authentic representation, recognition, or even visibility, it is impossible to view such policy as legitimate, particularly when it claims to be global. If the global community, assembled to address education, is serious about any of its statements about equity and the importance of education to solve the issues that face us on this planet, then surely, the inclusion of UNDRIP as a guide would be evident. How would this change a post-2015 education agenda? How might a global education agenda, informed by and affirming the rights of indigenous people in all parts of the world, enhance the wellbeing of people on this planet?

**A Global Social Justice Framework as a Decolonizing Lens**

One of the first places that an anti-colonial analysis makes its demands is in the acknowledgement of the location of the territory, people, conditions and analysis that people use. Having said this, it is important to highlight that what is *local* is not separate or disconnected from what is *global*. The overflowing of discursive arenas, sites of struggle, and exchange of ideas and materials, across boundaries of space and time are well documented. Even the legacies of European colonialism, that continue to structure international relations, serve to highlight the blurring of boundaries of global and local. Global policymaking creates the possibility of a decolonizing space for making visible the knowledge, experience, contributions, and demands of people cast to the periphery by powerful elites who enact their entitlements to declare what is universal and what is particular, without having any understanding of how others are made invisible by such declarations.
With the deep connections that globalization has brought, for better or for worse, there has been a turn toward the decolonial in globalization scholarship and global education. We see more emphasis on practice that troubles modern liberal constructions of equality and inclusion, and contributes to understanding how global policy knowledges, spaces, and actors continue to enact colonial patterns that are racist, imperialist, and paternalistic, all destructive to civilizations’ wellbeing (See for example, Andreotti & de Sousa, 2012; Jefferes, 2012; Khoo, 2013; Odora Hoppers, 2009). These patterns are addressed differently in the two different worlds of the Post-2015 EA and UNDRIP.

The frame of global social justice provides conceptual and communicative categories to use to understand complex contexts, structures, and relations of injustice. Fraser (1996; 2007) suggests that justice must be understood through more than distributive considerations or how benefits and burdens are shared within a society. Rather, an analysis that nests together the conditions of (re)distribution, recognition, and representation provides us with a way to frame situations of injustice.

In what Fraser (2007) describes as abnormal justice conditions, “the decentering of the distributive ‘what’ renders visible, and criticizable, non-economic harms of misrecognition and misrepresentation. Likewise, the denormalization of the Westphalian ‘who’ makes conceivable a hitherto obscure type of meta-injustice, call it ‘misframing’” (p. 57). While an equitable access to education is the “what” in this discussion of justice, it is the invisibility, a profound form of misrecognition, and the enduring assumption that the elite can speak for indigenous people (cast as a marginalized, anonymous \textit{they}), a profound form of misrepresentation, that informs the questions about injustice and the misframing of the claims of indigenous people in this study.

If participative parity (Fraser, 2007; 2014) is one demand of justice, it will be important to note that in 2009-2010, UNESCO rather quietly removed references to democracy from its goals and themes. While democracy is always a site of contestation and struggle, from a global social justice frame, the removal of democracy signals a significant shift in the “who” (recognition) and the “how” (representation) of the initiative. How could a global policy for the provision of
education deal with the expanded contestation and necessary democratization needed to achieve equitable access to education?

One way this has been resolved in the Post-2015 EA is to make the individual the focus of the policy suggesting that it will be the educated and empowered individual who will succeed in the global system. This highly neoliberal view of society, education, and what is needed in the world, highlights how the misframing in this policy marginalizes the rights of indigenous people. Missing also is the role that education plays in social development through citizenship education and the myriad of relations held within the concept and practice of *citizen and citizenship* (Coulthard, 2014; Dryzek, 2002; 2012; Weber-Pillwax, 2008), including among states, publics, fellow citizens, and with all living beings on the planet.

In *Red Skin, White Masks*, Greg Coulthard (2014) challenges liberal readings of the role of the state and that the state is in a legitimate position to categorize and recognize indigenous people. Instead, he draws on Fanon (1963; 1965; 1967) to reject liberalism’s recognition that supposes the dominant group (dominating the democratic state) creates the categories to which the marginalized/colonized person or group must react (see also Weber Pillwax, 2008). Instead, categories and acts of existence and relations must be founded on processes of self-affirmation, “critical individual and collective self-recognition” (Coulthard, 2014, p. 131). Categories of citizenship, as defined by current governments, exist within colonial histories, structures, and the colonial matrix of power (Mignolo, 2000). “In situations where colonial rule does not depend on the exercise of state violence, its reproduction, instead, rests on the ability to entice Indigenous peoples to identify, either implicitly or explicitly, with the profoundly asymmetrical and non-reciprocal forms of recognition either imposed or granted to them (Coulthard, 2014, p. 25).

**Policy Study by Creating an Ethical Space for a Decolonizing Policy Encounter**

An encounter in the space between UNDRIP and Post-2015 EA, each with its own macro-actors and local actors,
highlights how both policies work. In fact, the distance between the peoples’ demands expressed in the two policies highlight the dual nature of colonialism: the objective and subjective (Abdi, 2008; Fanon, 2008; Coulthard, 2014). Stability in the global system of capitalist colonialism created subjects of colonial rule through categories that worked control the people encountered in the colonized places. The construction of categories of racist (mis)recognition were used to turn the colonized populations into less-than-humans, invisible in the equations of equality championed by the liberalism of the colonial powers.

Both UNDRIP and Post-2015 EA have their own statements about their agenda for justice. Again, these statements stand as if in two different worlds. Ermine (2007) describes an ethical space that can exist between two disparate worldviews when they are poised to engage each other. It is this space between that is the location of the dynamics that make the change toward justice possible. The space between global actors and local actors is not a rigid space but one that is dynamic and constantly being remade. Actors also shift from locations of betweenness and withinness as difficult knowledge is encountered, subjectivities recognized, or retreat becomes necessary. The image Ermine uses to describe an ethical space comes from Poole (1972). In a photo of a Czech peasant and a Russian soldier sitting on a public bench during the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, Poole identifies that the story is in the space between these two actors. They have a shared history but it is the space between them that holds what might be their future. Such is the case with the worlds presented in the two policies in this study, and it opens our thinking to what might be possible when we bring them together to understand how the policies work as colonizing and decolonizing what is possible in education.

Processes of Encounter

The policies exist within a wider context and the stability of this context, for example, capitalist colonialism, appears to work as a unified structure but in fact, it requires constant remaking to give it stability. By studying the process of a policy encounter we can understand what Bruno Latour (2008;
2009) and Tor Hernes (2008) describe as durability in systems and how they are sustained and strengthened through multi-scalar processes of enrollment. “Internal actors [are] able to significantly influence the outcomes of a [case] by speaking with the voices of their chosen institutional macro-actors” (Latour, 2008, p. 74). Through processes of encounter and translation, particular policy knowledge is made legitimate. Of course, this is a heavily contested site of struggle where some local actors (having been enrolled as actors and legitimized by their macro-actor connections), point to the indisputability of macro-institutionalized logics and the actors who espouse these logics (who are in turn created and made legitimate by the local actors). Latour argues that “macro-actors tend to be perceived as facts in themselves, and this confers upon them a temporal stabilizing force. Therefore, although they are perpetually in the making, they are treated as ready-made entities with certain characteristics” (2008, p. 77).

Three areas of stability: assimilation, neoliberal capitalism, and representation, and how they work, are surfaced in this policy encounter.

*Encounter 1: Assumption of Assimilation*

UNDRIP is very clear in its framing of the rights of indigenous people within the histories and legacies of colonialism, a context that continues to create immense problems for all relations (settler, colonial, colonized). The declaration begins with statements affirming equity and the dignity of difference. The right to be self-affirming forms the foundation of this document that reflects years of discussion and negotiation among indigenous people and also with members of the UN system. Article 13 to 15 are important examples to use in a policy encounter with the UNESCO Post 2015 EA:

*Article 13:*

1. Indigenous people have the right to revitalize, use, develop and transit to future generations their histories, languages, oral traditions, philosophies, writing systems and literatures, and to designate and retain their own names for communities, places and persons.
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that this right is protected and also to ensure that indigenous peoples can understand and be understood in political, legal, and administrative proceedings, where necessary through the provision of interpretation or by other appropriate means. (p. 7)

*Article 14:*
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish and control their educational systems and institutions providing education in their own languages, in a manner appropriate to their cultural methods of teaching and learning.
2. Indigenous individuals, particularly children have the right to all levels and forms of education of the State without discrimination.
3. States shall, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, take effective measures, in order for indigenous individuals, particularly children, including those living outside their communities, to have access, when possible to an education in their own culture and provided in their own language. (p. 7)

*Article 15*
Indigenous peoples have the right to the dignity and diversity of their cultures, traditions, histories, and aspirations which shall be appropriately reflected in education and public information. (p. 7).

Both the universalism and the liberal notion of assimilation that are at the foundation of the UNESCO policy keep UNDRIP invisible, even as the policy is designed to create education that includes indigenous children. In this policy, the categories of actors reflect the division between powerful decision-makers and the marginalized recipients of education while suggesting a universal education agenda (UNESCO2014; 2015). In the UNESCO policies, actors are created and cast into authority and obedience roles through the development and (future) implementation of the policy. The boundaries of local and global become blurred in the focus on universalism. While much in the Post-2015 EA speaks to important issues, for example, equitable access and good quality education,
what these mean in practice is really a matter of how the actors are positioned by and in the policy and its context.

By bringing these two policies together, I don't want to set up the UNDRIP as a post-colonial project that speaks back to or responds to the Post-2015 EA. This would require a return to the demand that indigenous people continue as the objects of the recognition of the non-indigenous. Instead, a decolonizing encounter in the space between can surface how a call for universalism shifts from the intended equity and inclusion focus to one of misrecognition and a demand for assimilation given the legacies of colonialism. This misrecognition makes it impossible for indigenous people to participate in the ongoing (re)making of the world or what Jean Luc Nancy names as mondialisation (2007). The injustice continues as we see how the non-participation becomes translated as deficiency of the indigenous individuals and communities rather than the context and policy. Indeed, indigenous people have a right to education of high quality but this can only take place if the context of this education is a decolonizing context where indigenous people are engaged as full participants based on their self-recognition and not on the categories created and applied by non-indigenous people.

*Encounter 2: Neoliberalism and a Capitalist (Neo)Colonial Structure*

The Post-2015 EA sees “a humanistic and holistic vision of education as fundamental to personal and socio-economic development” (p. 5). It aims to help people “meet their basic individual needs, fulfill their personal expectations and contribute to the achievement of their communities and countries’ socio-economic development objectives” (p. 6). The document continues with many references to individual empowerment and personal achievements but no reference to educational goals for communities and societies, for relations of justice, or for citizenship. There is little reference to knowledges that are beyond those for skilling a global mobile workforce. Too often, the education statements are taken only for their words and not the deeper meaning connected to their context. The Post-2015 EA goals speak to the level that neoliberalism is embedded in UNESCO. The very significant
focus on the individual and the primary connection of education to the global economy are ideas that gained dominance in the post-Washington Consensus era (after 1989) as the International Financial Institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization) became the dominant agenda setters for all national governments. Of importance, in this study and the policy encounter of Post-2015 EA and UNDRIP, is the fundamental difference in underlying values and how individuals and their communities are interconnected as their economic, social, environmental, and political needs are met. Given the universalism of the Post-2015 EA policy, we see that the policy encounter must once again begin by listening to indigenous peoples. There are several important UNDRIP Articles that provide a clear challenge to the universal, capitalist system for which the Post-2015 EA was designed. It is evident from the UNDRIP introduction onward, that the experiences of indigenous people with the global economic system have been re-colonizing. The policy articulates how indigenous people will approach relations of economy, coloniality (which here is mainly about territory, land rights, and decision-making), and the links among health, education, and wellbeing from indigenous perspectives. Neoliberal economic/financial decisions that give corporations rights to access resources without consideration of environmental, social, or local economic impacts, will fail the indigenous people of the world, as will economic policy that requires a mobile global workforce or an education policy that strives to educate a global labour force.

UNDRIP acknowledges and seeks to transform the ongoing suffering of indigenous people due to dispossession of their territory and resources. A policy encounter between the UNDRIP and Post-2015 EA would provide the space to listen to indigenous people and redirect the education policy to reflect non-colonizing relations with particular attention to the following Articles of UNDRIP:

Article 20:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain their own political, economic, social systems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of their own means of
subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all their traditional and other economic activities.

2. Indigenous peoples deprived of their means of subsistence and development are entitled to just and fair redress. (p. 8)

Article 23:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for exercising their right to development. In particular, indigenous peoples have the right to be actively involved in developing and determining health, housing and other economic and social programmes affecting them and, as far as possible, to administer such programmes through their own institutions.

Article 26
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories, and resources that they have traditionally owned or occupied, or otherwise used or acquired.

2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop, and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired. (p. 10)

3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories, and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions, and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned. (p. 10)

Article 28
1. Indigenous people have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation for the lands, territories, and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior, and informed consent. (p. 10)

Encounter 3: Invisibility, Silence, and Misrepresentation

One of the most basic conditions of global social justice and of global citizenship is representation or as Fraser (2014)
suggests, participative parity. This involves both inclusion (the 
*all affected have a right to be included* principle) and parity 
that refers to processes of equitable engagement, access to 
agenda setting and speaking (including being heard), and to 
the access and right to question others (p. 27-29). It is 
significant in this analysis that there is an absence of any 
reference in the Post-2015 EA to the participation of 
indigenous peoples in any policy processes or procedures. 
Even as the developers of the EA state their intentions of 
providing universal education to people who are marginalized, 
justice is not served if people remain the objects of someone 
else’s efforts (even if these are well intended) in place of 
authentic participation and representation at decision-making 
tables. Indigenous people express clearly (in UNDRIP and a 
multitude of other venues) that all settler-indigenous relations 
must be a based on the self-determination of indigenous 
people as equal agents of policy and change. This is 
particularly important in policies that have a global impact 
such as Post-2015 EA.

In addition to the problems of exclusion, policies that claim to 
be universal, particularly when this universalism is a 
statement from the centre in unbalanced *centre-periphery 
relations*, sustain indigenous peoples’ invisibility in the policy 
processes (and certainly other aspects of the life viewed from a *centre of power*) when these policies reflect the values, 
principles, and conduct of the dominant class or group. 
Invisible groups are not included groups, even if they are 
deemed to be members of general categories (for example, the 
poor; the marginalized; the uneducated) when the dominant 
group has established these categories.

In this policy encounter, listening to indigenous peoples’ 
calls for justice is the necessary beginning in an ethical 
encounter. While participation, representation, recognition, 
and distribution are all nested and interconnected in a justice 
perspective, understanding the need to transform exclusion 
and then *listening* deeply can open the possibility for new 
understandings of what justice will be.
The following UNDRIP Articles are a call for participation:

Article 18
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions. (p. 8)

Article 19
States shall conduct and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adoption and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them. (p. 8)

Article 27
States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving due recognition to indigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, customs, and land tenure systems, to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to their lands, territories, and resources, including those which were traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. Indigenous peoples shall have the right to participate in this process. (p. 10).

Re-writing An Education Agenda as a Decolonizing Act of Global Citizenship

If we were to rewrite the Post-2015 EA after an ethical encounter with UNDRIP, what might emerge as new foci for a global education agenda? Perhaps as the most basic level, UNDRIP would be visible and take its position as a UN declaration to inform the working of not only UNESCO, but also the wider global education agenda. In this act, UNESCO would be refusing to perpetuate the invisibility of indigenous people and the silence of multilateral agencies. Recognizing the deep discrimination toward indigenous people put in place through colonialism, UNESCO stands to lead by including not only the knowledge of this history, but perhaps more profoundly significant, the knowledge that indigenous people
have about the world and how to live sustainably. Given the profound global environmental issues we face, this seems an urgent place to initiate a global education agenda.

From here, alternative economic strategies will develop, some that are already reflected in global policies, but also alternatives such as those referred to as green economy, gift economy, or an economy based on common wealth (Evans & Reid, 2014; Lewis & Conary, 2012; Maathai, 2010; Odora Hoppers & Richards, 2012; Smith & Max-Neef, 2011;), all challenges to the idea that (colonial) capitalism is the only legitimate way to frame economic relations.

In the introductory sections of Post-2015 EA, the Status of the EFA Agenda is discussed. If the UNDRIP were taken seriously, commitments to decolonize the global agenda would become a thread throughout the document. Drawing on the UNDRIP Annex (p. 1-4), there could be several important principles that would lead global education policy efforts. As a starting point, the recognition of a fundamental interconnectedness and the necessity of diversity for life on the planet that winds its way through UNDRIP will help locate discussions of education for economy and skill development into a much more holistic idea of the role of education.

The need for education to play a key role in decolonizing can be brought into a global education policy and have a profound effect on countering the enduring racism and discrimination that non-European people continue to experience as part of the legacy of colonialism. UNDRIP provides the foundation for this: “Affirming further that all doctrines, policies and practices based on or advocating superiority of peoples or individuals on the basis of national origin or racial, ethic or cultural differences are racist, scientifically false, legally invalid, morally condemnable and socially unjust” (p. 2). Not only will this open the way for education based on a global cognitive justice (Odora Hoppers, 2009; Souza Santos, 2007), but it will also support a radical recognition of the knowledges that exist and have always existed in non-European locations. This changes the content of education, and also demands a reconstruction of educational foundations, policies, and systems.

Of course, one of the key ideas to be challenged is who are legitimate education policy actors and knowledge holders.
The whole of the EFA process will be understood differently through a decolonial commitment that “[recognizes] the urgent need to respect and promote the inherent rights of indigenous peoples which derive from their political, economic, and social structures, and from their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories, and philosophies, especially their rights to their lands, territories and resources” (UNDRIP, p. 2). It is important to note here that UNDRIP is not calling for what Walter Mignolo (2000; 2009; Tlostanova and Mignolo, 2012) describe as *dewesternization*, a process where the global system is kept the same but the players are moved around, with non-western actors (state and private) moving into the dominant positions. Instead, a decolonial commitment recognizes indigenous knowledge as that which can contribute to practices of “equitable development and proper management of the environment” (UNDRIP, p. 3). A global education policy that takes such ideas seriously stands to contribute to the transformation of many of the world’s relations that sustain the vast social and economic inequality and environmental destruction that frame our future on the planet.

**Conclusion: Decolonizing global policies and global social justice**

This study has attempted to bring together the *two worlds* of UNDRIP and Post-2015 EA to provide a conceptualization of how a more sustainable and just global education policy might emerge from such an encounter. The two frames for this encounter-- decolonialism and global social justice-- suggest the Education for All efforts will be better focused when they are based on the recognition that local communities know how to solve their problems and the global community can support this by ensuring that global policies reflect and protect the diversity of people and their livelihoods in all parts of the world. This must include support for indigenous communities in their move towards self-determination by working collectively to remove structures of oppression and racism that continue to impede the wellbeing of indigenous and poor people around the world.

Global policy can support indigenous people in their national drive to negotiate a place at the table and in building
a more inclusive process. This will also include other marginalized voices left out of the mainstream of a
globalized/globalizing economy (for example, small farmers,
women, and small business owners).

A global education policy can provide an important
foundation for a decolonial future, based on pluraversalism
rather than universalism (Mignolo, 2000; 2009). The
principles of global justice, including environmental, social
and economic justice, should begin with a recognition of the
territory, location of knowledge, and the impact that the
history of colonialism has had on understandings of what is
legitimate knowledge, wellbeing, and sustainable livelihoods
on a finite planet. Any global policy should ensure that there
is an agreement with indigenous people as the original
knowledge holders and landholders. Of course, here, it is
important to recognize that a naïve approach to these
relations is also problematic. Indigenous / non-indigenous
relations are at a particular point in time when, while more
people recognize the legacies of colonialism, they must also
recognize that indigenous people are not a homogenous group,
to be categorized once again by outside actors.

As with all people who are marginalized in the frantic
drive of the globalized economy, consensus is not the starting
place for engagement. All global policy must at all times, be
facilitated and held by processes that ensure participative
parity. While some argue this is inefficient in terms of time
when urgent agendas are being explored, surely a look at the
failure of the EFA from 1990 to 2015 will suggest that a more
inclusive policy, although demanding new participatory
designs and methods that locate power in new arenas and
bodies, is certainly worth the effort.

One of the most significant contributions of a new global
education agenda could be the emergence of a new process for
authentic engagement, based on the ethics and principles of
global social justice. The possibility of a global education
policy that draws on UNDRIP might prepare people much
more able to ensure that life is sustained on the planet, that
the important knowledge held by indigenous people is not lost
to a capitalist knowledge economy that desires only
technology and consumerism focused ideas, and that
education contributes to the total wellbeing on and of the
planet.
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UNESCO's “Concept note on the Post-2015 education agenda”  


CULTURAL HEGEMONY TODAY. FROM CULTURAL STUDIES TO CRITICAL PEDAGOGY

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ABSTRACT The concept of cultural hegemony is much broader than that of ideology, because it refers to the construction process of the collective experience, of the modelling of meanings, from the development of values, the creation of world conceptions and of the moral, cultural and intellectual direction of society through education. In this paper, the evolution of this concept is analysed from its origins to its configuration as a method of study in Cultural Studies by Antonio Gramsci and later, to its articulation through a system of representations, a discourse framed by political forces via an entire system of thought in Critical Pedagogy. According to Lorenzo Milani, this ‘Pedagogy against Empire’ searches for an approach to learning for social justice, emphasises the collective dimension of learning and action, and reflects the struggle for school and social reform. This education will combine instruction or a purely technical approach with a humanistic education, brooking no differentiation or social division between manual and intellectual work where the union between theory and action is perceived as key to understanding reality and, at the same time, to transform it.

RESUMEN (Spanish) El concepto de hegemonía cultural es mucho más amplio que el de ideología, porque se refiere al proceso de construcción de la experiencia colectiva, de modelación de significados, desde el desarrollo de los valores, de la creación de las concepciones del mundo y de la dirección moral, cultural e intelectual de la sociedad a través de la Educación. En este trabajo, la evolución de este concepto se analiza desde sus orígenes hasta su configuración como un método de estudio en los Estudios Culturales por Antonio Gramsci y más tarde, en su articulación mediante un sistema de representaciones, un discurso enmarcado por las fuerzas políticas a través de un sistema completo del pensamiento en Pedagogía Critica. Según Lorenzo Milani, esta ‘educación contra el
imperio' busca un enfoque para la justicia social, la dimensión colectiva del aprendizaje y la acción, la lucha por la escuela libre y la reforma social. Esta educación unirá la instrucción o la cultura técnica con la formación humanística y ninguna diferenciación o división social se producirá entre el trabajo manual e intelectual, donde la unión entre teoría y acción ayudará a comprender la realidad con el fin de transformarla.


**Introduction: Why Cultural Hegemony Today?**

In the course of different interpretations throughout history, the concept of hegemony has been shaped under several forms. What all those forms have had in common is the renewal of critical consciousness as the key to designing a new framework for a new kind of coexistence. For this reason, in the words of Antonio Gramsci, hegemony was a process where subalterns (Spivak, 1985, pp. 120-130; Nelson & Grossberg, 1988, pp. 271-313) had to impose another scenario not to irretrievably find themselves in the same previous social structure. For Gramsci, hegemony is exercised by the ruling class not only through coercion, but also through consensus, managing to impose their worldview, a philosophy of customs and ‘common sense’ that favour the recognition of its domination by the dominated classes:

Hegemony is not equal to (....) ideology, consciousness formations of the ruling class are not reduced, but include the relations of domination and subordination, according to (.....) practical consciousness configurations, as an effective saturation of the process of life in full (....) hegemony is a body of practices and expectations regarding the whole of life. Our senses and energy (.....) define perceptions we have of ourselves and our world. It is a vivid system of meanings and values. To the extent they are experienced as practices (they) appear to confirm each other. It is a sense of reality for most people in society (....) (Williams 1977: 109).
The hegemony of a social group, however, is the culture that this group has generated for different social collectives. The notion of hegemony is proved to be similar to that of culture, but with added values. Through its contribution, culture embraces a specific distinction of power, hierarchy and influence. In the late twentieth century, Paulo Freire claimed that by means of channeling critical concerns in a particular political, cultural, moral and ideological direction, scientific and humanist intellectuals and educators, according to their revolutionary commitment, must fight against the myth of the ignorance of the people. Although they may legitimately recognize themselves as having, due to their revolutionary consciousness, a level of revolutionary knowledge different from the level of empirical knowledge held by the people, they cannot impose themselves and their knowledge on the people. They cannot pepper the people with slogans, but must enter into dialogue with them. In this way, the people’s empirical knowledge of reality, nourished by the leaders’ critical knowledge, gradually becomes transformed into knowledge of the causes of reality (Freire 1968: 132). This transition from the people’s empirical knowledge of reality to the causes of reality occurs through the awakening of critical consciousness. And this critical consciousness is raised through the process of hegemony. Gramsci’s notion of a moral and intellectual reform or hegemony is based on subjectivity as being of primary importance for the development of a global process of humanistic study.

This new sense of the concept of hegemony as a cultural method, started to be developed through the writings of Matthew Arnold. The name of the English poet and essayist Matthew Arnold is immediately related to a defense of a very specific way of understanding the humanities and cultural studies. According to William Spanos, the writings of Arnold established the fundamental principles of humanistic research in our time. Spanos describes him as the "father of the most influential humanist modern period" (Spanos, 1993, p. 70). Eagleton detected in Culture and Anarchy “a drive to deepen the spiritual hegemony of the middle class” and to “convert the Philistines into a truly hegemonic class” (Eagleton 1978: 104). According to Edward W. Said, whose concept of culture was deeply influenced by that of Arnold, any aspect that has to do with human history has its roots in the earth (Said, 1993, p. 247). This means that the habitat is not only the
unique focus of concern. That is why there are people who plan to own more territory (this habitat) and recognise the need to do something with the native residents who populate that habitat.

Their imperialism entails establishing their presence in and controlling the lands that they do not possess, and which, moreover, are distant. They are inhabited and belong to others. For various reasons, this situation causes a double feeling, not only contradictory, but also antagonistic. On the one hand, this situation foresees how some people waken their colonist vocation. But on the other, this situation carries an inexhaustible source of suffering for the colonized. As Edward Said has argued in his book Orientalism, the suffering of the people is the direct effect of cultural exchange between partners who are aware of the inequality of this exchange (Said, 1978, p. 95).

This entire universe, captured and re-ordered through the represented power, is transformed into literary productions where the passion for the East can be verified. And this passion neither can be understood if the origin of its birth is ignored. This passion is born as a result of the clash that happened between the West as a colonizer and the colonized East. This passion generates, in both the East and the West, an effect of contaminatio or impregnation. Thus, the East is impregnated by the political domination of the West, by its philosophy and with that, the philosophical justification for this invasion. And for the West, Eastern religiosity is transmitted in this process. The East begins to rationalize its feelings and the West begins to raise its thought. This passion that is born of this clash has the most immediate consequence: the continuous rebirth of self-criticism in the West conceived as a thought of resistance in the East.

From time immemorial, human history is the history of the cultural exchange that has emerged from an imperialist situation. Eastern history is the story of the gradual step taken through the religious movement from the East towards the West and the philosophical ideas from the West to the East. A large number of people that come from what is known as the Western world or metropolitan world and another group who were born in the colonized ancient world or Third World, agree that the era of classical or higher imperialism has continued to exert a considerable cultural influence till present times. Throughout this series of reasons, all these
people feel a new need to re-understand both what is concluded as what is still pending in the past. By means of critical consciousness, Gramsci’s notion of a "moral and intellectual reform" (hegemony), is based on the primacy of subjectivity for the development of an overall method of humanistic study. The paper now turns to tracing the genealogy of the notion.

The Origin of a Notion.

The term *hegemony* derives from the Greek verb *eghesthai*, meaning "to drive", "to be the guide", "to be the boss"; or maybe from the verb *eghemoneno*, that means "to guide", "to precede", "to drive", and hence "to stay ahead", "to command", "to rule". In Classical Greek, the term *eghemonia* was understood as the army’s supreme direction. It is a military term. *Egemone* was the driver, the guide and also the commander of the army. At the time of the Peloponnesian War, reference was constantly made to the "hegemonic" city, the town that managed the alliance of Greek cities fighting each other.

The notion of hegemony, before being adopted by Antonio Gramsci, already had a long history. Knowledge of this history is vital to gaining an understanding of the term’s immediate influence within Cultural Studies. Antonio Gramsci’s notion of national-popular was conceived as part of an effort to recover the hegemonic class control in the service of the proletariat. For Gramsci, the national-popular notion is the rubric under which intellectuals could join the people, and therefore constitutes a powerful resource for the construction of a popular hegemony (Gramsci, 1975, 13-20; Azor, 1976).

Edmund Wilson states that the term *gegemoniya* or hegemony, was one of the most important political slogans in the Russian Social Democratic movement from the end of 1908 till1917 (Wilson, 1940, pp. 28-32).

After the October revolution, hegemony as a term ceased to be in force in the newly created USSR. It survived, however, in external documents of the Communist International. In the first two congresses of the Third International, Lenin adopted a series of theses which first led to the internationalization of the concept of hegemony under the Soviet Prism. The duty of the proletariat was to exercise hegemony over the other exploited groups. These groups, moreover, were allies in the
struggle against capitalism within their own Soviet institutions. Thus, hegemony would make possible the progressive lifting of the proletariat and the peasantry.

If hegemony could not extend to the working masses in all areas of social activity, it would fall into corporatism, because it would only confine them separately to and within their own particular economic objectives. If this were to occur, according to Lenin and Trotsky, the industrial proletariat could not meet its world historical mission, which was no other than the emancipation of humankind from submission in the services of capitalism and war. But Lenin’s and Trotsky’s fears became reality when, during the Fourth Congress of 1922, there was a transformation of the concept. For the first time, the term hegemony extended its semantic limits to the domination of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat. If the bourgeoisie managed to reduce the proletariat to a corporate role, this would have induced the latter to accept a division between political and economic struggles at the heart of its own praxis. For Lenin, the bourgeoisie has always attempted to separate Politics from Economics, because this class understands very well that if it manages to keep the working class within the corporate framework, no serious danger may threaten its hegemony (VVAA, 1969: 20). But one should not forget that the existence of the popular element had hardly been considered by exponents of Orthodox Marxism. The ‘popular’ was considered negatively within the paradigms of the so-called ‘actually existing socialism’, where culture was rendered subservient to ideology. The post-1924 Orthodox Marxist tradition had continued to use the concept of hegemony exclusively as domination. The effects of this definition were felt during the internal debate of the 1930s. Inability to capture and to reflect the complexity and the cultural richness of this moment was also reflected in the tendency to idealize “proletarian culture” and regard as decadent the cultural manifestations of avant-garde movements (Martin-Barbero, 2010, 30). Since the 1960s, criticism of this position targeted two aspects. The first target of criticism was the predominance of the negative conception of ideology, and the second, the use of hegemony in a reductionist manner. Both were imposed for decades through what was perceived by critics of the 1960s as a falsification of social reality.
Between 1924 and 1953, Stalinism had forced the acceptance of other considerations and meanings attached to the concepts of ideology and hegemony. These included only one conception of the world and the question of the capacity of the individual as a subject. In this regard, and from positions closer to democratic socialism advocated by Antonio Gramsci, break with this official and artificial orthodoxy occurred. A new theoretical space arose with regard to conceptions of the subject and the relations of production as external to the processes of construction of feeling. Gramsci’s vision comprises key issues such as the relationship between culture and ideology and hegemony and education.

**Consolidation of Hegemony as a Method by Antonio Gramsci.**

In the second half of the 19th century progressive utopia had become ideology. It was a vision of the world that was at odds with the real social situation. At that time, an intellectual movement came into being, one which sought to analyse, make sense of then-current events. They made their mark as did movements from the political right. Theories concerning the forging of partnership relations with the masses became one of the fundamental pillars on which the hegemony was restructured at a time when the bourgeoisie sought the means to control, curb and eradicate any kind of revolutionary fervour. So, therefore, the discussions that took place at the heart of the Social Democratic Party prior to 1914, were set aside after the October Revolution. It should be noted that, in 1922, there was a substantial effort with respect to the evolution of the concept of hegemony and subsequent creation of a relevant method of analysis. At that time, Antonio Gramsci travelled to Moscow to participate in the Congress; he spent a year in the Russian capital. During that period, it is practically unlikely that he obtained a direct knowledge of the texts of Martov and Potresov or Lenin, who had discussed the role of hegemony. On the other hand, Gramsci perfectly knew the decisions that had been taken by Lenin at that time, as a participant in the Fourth Congress as Italian representative. For this reason, it can be deduced that the basis of his concept of hegemony was established by the principles defined by Lenin during the Third International. But in the 1930s, the
concept of hegemony was transformed to reverse its direction giving it a Copernican twist. While Europe at first regarded much of mass culture as being a denial of what was then for them ‘the culture’, the 1940s and 50s decades, characterised by the influence of American thinking, rendered mass culture as an important aspect of a democratic society (Martín-Barbero, 2010: 89).

If we return to Gramsci’s texts, it is evident, throughout the *Quaderni dal Carcere*, that the term *hegemony* is repeated in a multitude of different contexts. But there is no doubt that Gramsci retained certain connotations deriving from Lenin’s formulations regarding the term. Against the rationalism of classical Marxism and his conception of the necessary development of history according to its own laws, Gramsci made an important contribution to the development of concept. He provided an approach to the issue of contingency in history, presenting it as an important factor when reflecting on the complexity of then contemporary reality (Butler, 2003).

Lenin used the term with reference to the proletariat’s alliance with other exploited groups, notably the peasantry in the common struggle against the oppression of the capital. For this reason Lenin, supported by Leon Trotsky and Nadia Krupskaya, lays the groundwork for developing a New Economic Policy (NEP). Being in agreement with the reality that had been defined by Lenin in his NEP, Gramsci emphasized the need of concessions and sacrifices of the proletariat to its allies to be able to exert hegemonic direction over them, thus extending the notion of corporatism from a limited view of economic struggle to a view comprising struggle on a broader social class scale and involving other sections of the masses. According to Gramsci, to understand and to practice hegemony, one must first recognise and appeal to the interests and tendencies of the groups to whom the group leader aspires to provide direction. To earn their consent, there is need for a certain level of commitment between leaders and the allied groups. Even though the concept of hegemony is located within political and ethical parameters, for Gramsci this should also entail an economic commitment. Therefore, hegemony must be necessarily predicated on the critical role that the ruling group exerts in the decisive core of economic activity (Gramsci, 1975, p 55).

At the same time, Gramsci also underlined the cultural influence that the proletariat was to exercise on the allied
classes. Ideologies that had been previously developed come into conflict and confrontation, until only one of them, or at least one of their possible combinations, tends to prevail and is gradually diffused throughout society. Therefore, not only does hegemony entail a combination of economic and political objectives, but it also comprises intellectual and moral objectives, embracing all areas in which the struggle is carried out transcending corporate positions. The hegemony of a main social group is to be finally exerted on a number of subordinate groups. Later, Gramsci rejected the use of violence by the proletariat against the exploited classes. He did this to foster the commitment to hegemony as a constructive mechanism based on dialogue and consensus among such classes, generally being, in his time, those of the industrial proletariat and the peasants. Through this, Gramsci's conceptualisation superseded those characterising the traditional debate concerning the dictatorship of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, and the hegemony of the proletariat, exerted on the peasantry, reminiscent of Leon Trotsky. According to Gramsci, if two forces are needed to defeat a third, the recourse to arms and coercion, assuming even that these are available, can only be a partial part of the struggle and not the only one. Coercion needs to be accompanied by consent.

Commitment offers important concrete possibilities. Force can be used against enemies, but not against those allied groups that need to be quickly assimilated, and whose good faith, trust and enthusiasm are needed (Gramsci, 1975, p. 62). The union that Gramsci refers to here takes a much more pronounced inflection than in the Bolshevik vocabulary. The Russian metaphor of the union or smychka between the working class and the peasantry that had been popularized during the New Economic Policy, is transformed into the organic fusion of a new historic block in the Quaderni. Gramsci also alludes to the need to absorb allied social forces, to create a new historical, political, economic and homogeneous block, without internal contradictions (Gramsci, 1975, p. 65). This new sense under which this concept has been developed, reflects the important role assigned to the moral and cultural dimensions of hegemony, key components according to Gramsci's conception of the concept. For Jesús Martín-Barbero the concept of hegemony, as elaborated by Gramsci, allows us to think about direction occurring not as a
result of imposition but through a process wherein the interests of the classe dirigente (directing class) are also felt to be the interests of the other classes and groupings involved in this block. (Martín-Barbero, 1991: 82-83).

Towards the Construction of a Critical Pedagogy.

After having seen how this concept has evolved, we can move on to consider some sharp and creative uses made of it. Such uses can be found in the appropriation of Gramsci’s ideas in Cultural Studies and Postcolonial theory, a development which dares back the second half of the 20th century, and which anticipated Critical Pedagogy. For this reason, some famous passages from the Quaderni should be considered, especially those where Gramsci contrasted the political structures of East and West. One should do so without overlooking the relevant revolutionary strategies contained in each. On the one hand, some of these texts, already cited, represent the most convincing synthesis of the essential terms and concepts in Gramsci’s theoretical universe. On the other hand, they recur, in a non systematic manner, throughout the Quaderni.

These texts do not immediately introduce the issue of hegemony. However, all of them meet all the necessary elements for the emergence of hegemony as a key concept in Gramsci’s discourse. For this reason, the relationship between the State and Civil Society should be considered as a starting point for understanding this concept. Drawing on the recent memories of the First World War, Gramsci appreciated that the war was becoming the basic organizing principle of society. When the State of emergency becomes the rule, with a war taking place, the traditional distinction between war and politics is refuted. After the Great War, the war metaphor gained widespread usage especially to describe ongoing social relationships. Apart from Gramsci, this situation was also availed of by such contemporary authors as Michel Foucault, who sought to reverse Clausewitz’s classic formula. It may be that war is the continuation of politics by other means. But it may also be that politics is becoming the continuation of war by other means (Foucault, 1997, pp. 16 and 41; Pandolfi, 2002, pp. 391-410).

According to Gramsci, war has become the general matrix of all the relationships of power and domination,
involving bloodshed or not. For this reason, Gramsci divides political strategies into ‘wars of position’ and ‘wars of manoeuvre.’ Military experts were in favour of a ‘war of position’ (Gruppi, 1972, p. 128) characterised by advances and retreats. But they believe, however, that the war of manoeuvre should be deleted from military science. They simply maintain that, in those wars that have broken out among the most industrial and socially advanced States, the war of manoeuvre must be reduced to having simply a tactical purpose, and never a strategic one. The same would apply to the art of politics and science, at least in the case of states, where Civil Society has become a very complex structure resistant to immediate economic setbacks such as recession, depression, etc. The trenches system that had emerged from the concept of modern warfare is emulated by Civil Society’s superstructure. In modern warfare, sometimes, a fierce artillery attack that prima facie appears to have destroyed the enemy defence lines might, in reality, have only caused damage to their external surface. The same effect occurs in political science, during major economic crises. Gramsci proposes a return to Lenin and never to his successors and interpreters. For Gramsci, this transmutation of strategic and tactical elements to the political and cultural scene by Lenin, laid the groundwork for the turn to Gramsci and hegemony in Cultural Studies.

1. The Shaping of the Method.

When the configuration of this method is considered, there is a need to go back to the second half of the 20th century that marks the beginning of the debate concerning modernity. Imbued with that innovative spirit, Stuart Hall founded, in 1960, The New Left Review, a publication inspired by Gramsci. The debate on modernity ushered in discussions around key issues such as the relationship between Culture and Ideology and Hegemony and Education. The former echoes critiques by the Frankfurt School and subsequently Post-structuralism. The latter derives from Historicism and characterises debates in Critical pedagogy. In this sense, both visions complement each other to create a unique method.

A good starting point, for a configuration of this method, would be Henry Giroux’s work. According to Giroux, Gramsci discusses hegemony in two ways. One centres around a
process of domination with which a ruling class exercises control, on other allied classes, through its intellectual and moral leadership. The second concerns the dual use of force and ideology to engender relations of socialization among the ruling classes and subordinate groups. The main issue for Gramsci is the role played by the State in terms of its active participation as a repressive and cultural/ethical force (educational). The role of the State was extensively discussed by Gramsci with reference to the relationships established between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (Giroux, 1985). Gramsci opposes the concept of hegemony to that of domination. While domination is a form of coercive social control, only political and violent, hegemony is an ongoing social process of renewal of socio-cultural and economic influence of one class over another. The concept of hegemony is much broader than that of ideology, because it refers to the process of construction of the collective experience, of the modelling of meanings, including the development of values, the creation of conceptions of the world (*weltanschaung*) and the moral, cultural and intellectual direction of society through education. Similarly, Gramsci divides the State into two specific areas: the political society, which refers to the State apparatuses of Administration, law and other coercive institutions whose primary, not exclusive, function is based on the logic of force and repression. Civil society refers to public and private institutions that used meanings, symbols and ideas in order to universalize the ideologies of the ruling class, and at the same time, to form and limit the discourse and oppositional practice.

With regard to these practices, Raymond Williams insisted that hegemony is an ongoing process which is reconstituted in a perpetual manner through the popular passion in a form of genesis of the people’s own culture. For this reason, renegotiating hegemony could be regarded as one of the methodological challenges for a Critical Pedagogy. Gramsci stated that the idea of passion is based on the concept of value. And the concept of value arises as a result of meticulous research that has been carried out through mechanisms for the perpetuation of the power of one social class over another. To elaborate this concept, Gramsci used another conceptual tool to describe class power. Gramsci refers to the dichotomy established by the distinctive terms: *leading/directing class* and *ruling class*. The ruling class is
distinguished from the former by being able to imbue society with its values and ideology for the sole purpose of developing the same society into its own image and likeness. The ruling class is able to do so by availing itself of the means that Civil Society has placed at its disposal, these being the ideological state apparatuses such as the media, educational institutions, the church, etc. This situation, according to Raymond Williams (Williams, 1958: 118), occurred in Italy in the 1920s.

Various factors that marked the pulse of Italy between the wars should be considered. These include Italian Liberalism’s weakness, the Italian bourgeoisie, the day by day ever deepening influence of Socialist ideas and practices and the progressive breakdown of a potentially revolutionary society. In the course of these events, the bourgeoisie used its last resort to maintain its power. And this resource was none other than Fascism. In terms of the dominant class, one of Fascism’s most predominant features was its increasing need to use the coercive power of the State to perpetuate its domination. The bourgeoisie resorted to the use of the army, the police and the judicial system, among others, due to their inability to acquire and maintain the passive consent of the subaltern classes, having lost its ideological and cultural dynamism. Gramsci’s political project was to transform workers into a class for itself, in Marx’s terms. Gramsci saw the working class as a social group whose interests were in dialectical relation with and antagonistic to those of the bourgeoisie.

On the other hand, Gramsci affirmed the potential of subaltern classes to develop a counter hegemony in all areas of their daily lives, even though counter-hegemony is a term he never used in his writings. According to Antonio Gramsci, this was the only way forward to render the subaltern society’s ruling class. The impetus for developing and sustaining political consciousness derives from the ruling class. The tension between Culturalism and Economism (Mouffe, 1991: 175-184) was presented as being occasionally creative. Gramsci encouraged critique deriving from an elaboration and reinterpretation of some of the main Marxist concepts around the base-superstructure metaphor –economic base and cultural superstructure.

The formula of base and superstructure was branded as ‘rigid’ by Raymond Williams, who preferred to study what was understood as relations between elements in a ‘way of life’.
Williams was attracted to the idea of cultural hegemony. And regarding Cultural Hegemony, Williams followed Antonio Gramsci’s suggestions, whereby the dominant classes directly controlled the rest of society not only by means of force and the threat of force, but also through their ideas and encouraged ‘body of practices’ that had come to be accepted by the subordinate classes or classi subalterni (Williams, 1977: 98-101)/strumentali. This vision for social stability and change lies at the heart of critical pedagogy. As a Marxist, Gramsci’s thought regarded custom as lying at the epicentre, being “constituted by real human activity” as the main target, whereas human beings were perceived as the creator of reality and of society itself (Borg, Buttigieg and Mayo, 2012, p. 19-44).

**Cultural Hegemony as a Method in Critical Pedagogy.**

To serve as the basis for an analytical method, Cultural Hegemony must be implemented in two phases. The first phase entails the process of democratization of cultural production. The second phase, regards the potential for social change to be brought about as a primary consequence of this method. For Raymond Williams, this method essentially derives from the relationship established between culture and society. But, according to Edward Palmer Thompson, this method involved an attempt to study each specific culture as a whole, as an integral, autonomous and complementary part of a homogeneous superstructure. And this process of examination involves drawing on both scholarly and popular cultural traditions (Thompson, 1963). The idea of culture implies the idea of tradition. However, Thompson revealed a contradiction, in popular culture from the 18th to the 19th Century, recognition of which is key to a contemporary understanding of the shaping of hegemony. It is the contradiction produced between the conservatism of the forms and the rebelliousness of the contents. Thompson has often been criticized for his emphasis on analysing rebel consciousness. He saw elements of resistance in this rebel consciousness rather than what others interpreted as being glimpses of irrationality. To evade a very bold tradition one unfortunately has to exaggerate one’s attitude and disposition with regard to knowledge and skills that have been handed down from one generation to the next.
So, therefore, it should not be forgotten that, within the same society, multiple traditions can co-exist. For this reason, two clear problems have to be confronted. First, the apparent process of innovation which seems to have modified the tradition can, in actual act, be masking its (the tradition) very persistence. The second problem would be a consequence of the first. No one better than Pier Paolo Pasolini can be called upon to lend authority to this view: that there is no revolution that dispenses with tradition (Pasolini, 1972, p. 182).

Raymond Williams and the contents of consciousness production

The paper now turns to a discussion around Raymond Williams’s ideas on the network of social institutions that conditioned the contents of consciousness production and broadcasting currently shaping the ‘collective imaginary.’ This imaginary is held to restrict the free development of subjectivities. Following this, some of Williams’ proposals for cultural democratization will be described and contextualized with regard to his overarching vision for socialist transformation.

According to Williams, the institutional framework that directs the production and diffusion of contents of consciousness comprises four types: authoritarian, patronizing, commercial and democratic. The authoritarian system is characterized by muzzling the media, in a broad sense, to submit them to the whole apparatus controlled by a minority governing society. For Williams, the main purpose of this media is to broadcast instructions, ideas and rules of the hegemonic class (Williams, 1958, p. 121). In this kind of regime, the monopoly over these communication instruments is a necessary part of a political system where censorship is combined with direct control over the media, the population and the legal system. This authoritarian system was a characteristic of fascist and Stalinist dictatorships. Authoritarian systems lead to patronizing systems. A paternalistic system differs from an authoritarian system in that it takes the form of authoritarianism with a conscience. The patronizing system involves possessing values and objectives that extend beyond the maintenance of its exponents’ own power. Both systems are, for various reasons, predicated on the ‘right to rule’. When an authoritarian regime
leads to one characterized by a patronizing stance, the power elite are asserting "their" duty to protect and to lead the social majority in ways that appeal to the minority. Unlike the authoritarian regime that simply barks and transmits orders, the patronizing regime transmits values, customs and tastes that would justify the power of the ruling group. Williams would speak of a third typology, the commercial system. As a general rule, this system is regarded as standing in a contrary position to authoritarianism and to patronizing stances. According to Williams, the citizen has the right to sell any type of work which is performed because everyone has the right to buy all that is offered. This would be the key to freedom of communication. Therefore, the market plays its role in bringing freedom of expression under control. This process comprises the most important means of communication and, consequently, the most expensive and sophisticated ones at that. This power of control lies with groups who can avail themselves of the necessary capital. Then, for all practical purposes, the lack of representation in control of the media, in the authoritarian and patronizing control systems, can be reproduced in a system that appeals rhetorically to 'freedom'. This freedom is however none other than the freedom of capital rather than the freedom of the people, owing to the huge economic inequalities on which our societies are built (Blackwell, 1997: 48-49).

According to Williams, the authoritarian and patronizing systems tend to merge in the majority of societies. However, the fourth, the democratic model, is running at full tilt in any society. It is, rather, an ideal, an aspiration, a theoretical model that is the focus of reflection and permanent debate, often using 'hegemony' as tool of analysis. It is a model that should be based on the following fundamental rights of all populations:

- the right to emit and to broadcast culture and information.
- this right should not be limited without being widely discussed and decided upon by the entire society.
- the consolidation of hegemony as a method has necessitated an inter and transdisciplinary challenge (Mackenbach, 2014: 32) that is unbreakable, especially between Culture and Ideology and Hegemony and Education.
One notices several trends in debates concerning culture and ideology and modernity. They derive from Post-structuralism and Neo-Marxism. Most prominent, in these debates, are the positions defended by Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe and Slavoj Zizek. According to Perry Anderson, Post-structuralism is the reviewed version of Structuralism from Lacan and Derrida’s positions. One of the challenges that Neo-Marxism tried to confront is identity politics foregrounding the role of social movements. The debate was transformed into one concerning the relations between culture and postmodernism. Here the relationship between hegemony and the subaltern was raised. For Zizek, this relationship has a spectral character (Derrida, 1993; Butler, Laclau and Zizek, 2003: 235). In fact, the major problem lies with the relationship between identification and identity, between the subject and the real ‘thing.’ All this militates against the notion of ‘association’ since it foregrounds relationships regarded as ‘antagonistic’.

Ernesto Laclau understood hegemony as entailing the indivisibility of the constitution of common identity within social power settings. The two elements occur in an indivisible and parallel way. In order to understand this parallelism of the identity of groups or social movements, Laclau speaks of three times or stages. The first stage is set by a system of differences, where roles or social behaviours are set. Here is where the groups are recognized as having roles that induce stability, for instance, those of parents, children, peasants, workers, industrialists, teachers, priests, etc. In a second stage, according to Laclau, we find the category of displacement, or the inability to successfully establish a definitive fixing of the identity of the social order to the extent that there is always one constitutive outsider, the Other, that is unsettling the formation of such a fixed or stable identity.

The process of displacement refers to something concerning all social orders because identities are always subject to destabilization and radical change. This existing duality between the stable and the unstable is part and parcel of identity configuration. In a third stage, according to Laclau, there is the chain of equivalencies triggered by a common enemy: an Us against a Them. The dividing line serves to forged a new identity, a political identity (Gadea, 2008, p. 13-14).
These categories are based on an intellectual spectrum deriving from Derrida and Lacan and also including Wittgenstein. This domain of the ‘real’, to echo Zizek, brings them closer to Hegel. Differing from Zizek, Judith Butler is looking for a slightly different Hegel, while she adds possibilities of denial in her work, along with some echoes from Derrida and Foucault, in order to consider what is not workable in the discursive constitution of the subject. What would be the relationship between hegemony and the subaltern? For Zizek, there is no logically possible answer to such a question, nor is there a politically possible answer. Regarding its logical impossibility, if the answer were in the affirmative, the subaltern would be eliminated. Put simply, once a subaltern group exercised hegemony it would stop being subaltern. That the answer to the question was based on the presence of a subaltern group or groups is a historical accident since there were structural or transcendental conditions that prevented the removal of the subaltern. Although denying transcendentalism in these terms, a particular kind of transcendental position would be assumed. The answer is that the conditions for a full social emancipation understood in the old Hegelian and Marxist terms, are no longer possible.

This ‘full emancipation’, for Laclau, Butler and Zizek, would be at the same time, necessary and impossible. For Laclau, if the logic of the transparency of Modernity was able to suggest the possibility of full emancipation of the social from its need, Nihilistic Postmodernism would now underline the denial of its need (Butler, Laclau and Zizek, 2003: 74-75). However, Laclau insists that hegemony is a useful category to describe the political leanings of a people. He adds that more than one useful category is needed to define the same ground where political relationships are developed in a ‘real way.’

Laclau insisted on what Marx defined as the so-called *degree zero of hegemony*, stating that poverty does not come naturally, but is produced artificially. For this reason, Marx set out a challenge claiming that, as philosophy discovered its material weapons in the proletariat, the proletariat, for its part, found in philosophy its spiritual weapons (Butler, Laclau and Zizek, 2003: 49).

In view of this challenge, in my view still relevant to the early 21st Century, Gramsci became concerned for education due to the existing cultural crisis that had been caused by the
political and structural crisis in society during his time. According to Gramsci, it was a crisis that did transverse all social layers and gave education a distinctive bourgeois class imprint. The Italian traditional school was in crisis. This school was once considered by Gramsci as formative, humanist and able to understand all areas of society. Gramsci observed that this school was characterised by the imposition of a culture that was completely unconnected to the subaltern.

Based on the concept of hegemony, Gramsci defends the creation of a new culture. For Gramsci, a proletarian culture is the uniformity of common interests among the masses and intellectuals in a corresponding conception of the world that is to be built on the basis of an educational relationship. This education will see the conjoining of instruction or a technical culture with a humanistic education. There was to be no differentiation or social division between manual and intellectual work. The unity of theory and action, brooking no dichotomy between the two, will help one obtain a better understanding of reality with a view to transforming it—echoing Marx's sixth thesis on Feuerbach.

According to Joseph Buttigieg, for Gramsci, each relationship of hegemony is necessarily educative (Buttigieg, 2012, p. 153). Gramsci posits that education is not considered as a dissemination of ideas from above. It, to the contrary, involves an exercise of critical organic intellectuality engaging the people's political practice. He defines the character of education as bi-directional, never one way, where people and organic and assimilated intellectuals educate each other (Mayo, 2014, p. 6), as the educator must also be educated, as, once again, in Marx’s theses on Feuerbach, this time the third thesis.

Conclusion

To ensure the creation of a truly democratic society, institutions that could generate public service must be created which, under no circumstances, should mask attitudes of the authoritarian and paternalistic type. The basic principle which must rule these institutions is that of cultural hegemony. According to Gramsci’s method of analysis, society is developed when the cultural workers, the organic intellectuals, control their own means of expression (Giroux, 1988). This
analysis emphasizes the need to covering the needs which the liberal ideology had left exposed. According to the liberal conception, which had also become popular in large sections of the labour movement, the "public" is identified with 'State'. According to this liberal conception, the vices of State bureaucratic management can only be eradicated through private and commercial management, the basis of the current Neoliberal policy regime. It is true that the problems of bureaucratic governance are considerable. However, history has shown that private management does not solve them, a point drive home in any analysis developed around Gramsci’s conceptualisation of hegemony.

Adopting this type of analysis, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, following Williams and Gramsci, appeal to the idea of self-management of the cultural media as the most effective resolution to be adopted by the producers of culture and its professionals (Laclau & Mouffe, 1987, p. 86-92). In this way, cultural hegemony will evade the clutches of a management structure controlled by amateurish bureaucrats. The appeal is to administration being a matter of public responsibility. Other essential conditions that emerge from such an analysis include are that of creating a free and transparent broadcasting system.

Bureaucracy must developed according to society and never in opposition to it. This should never be the veil that covers political manipulation. Governments must not exercise any control over artists and producers of culture. In terms of resource allocation, these decisions must be taken in a public way, with extensive discussions, enabling its criticism and subsequent review. For these reasons, a progressive cultural democratization process would provide a huge stimulus for the active defence of democracy in general.

Today, the same situation that Gramsci defined a century ago is present in Europe. There have been moments since then when the official culture conceal widespread cultural concerns by way of greatly valorising narrow technical education to the detriment of humanistic education. Gramsci advocated a process involving the mutual and constant education of society. In the 60s, an Italian priest, named Lorenzo Milani, opened a school in the Italian city of Barbiana where he developed an approach that reflected cognizance, on his path, of the notion of hegemony in Gramsci. This approach has been referred to as il metodo della Scuola di
Barbiana. Faithful to these Gramscian principles, Milani was influential in his approach to education for social justice through his main focus on racial issues, comprising North/South dialogue and cultural technologic transmission, the collective dimension of learning and action, giving the necessary importance to reading and collective writing of the word and the world, the relationship between the people and the intellectual, the media and the merger of academic and technical knowledge. When Barbana’s main work was published, in the form of an extended narrative titled Lettera a una professoressa in 1967 (round about Milani’s premature death through cancer at 46), it provided a source of inspiration to the movement for change known as the movement of 1968. Pier Paolo Pasolini declared it as one of the few books that aroused his enthusiasm at that time.

In the same way that the Lettera anticipates much sociological work on social and cultural reproduction/production and resistance, deriving from France and the Anglophone world, ‘hegemony as method’ has still been defended by, among others, Louis Althusser, Nicos Poulantzas, Jürgen Habermas, Herbert Marcuse, Henry Giroux, G. A. Cohen, Peter McLaren, John B. Thompson, Carlos Alberto Torres, Antonia Darder, Paula Allman, Jorge Larrain, Jean Marsh, Pierre Bourdieu and Jean Claude Passeron. For all these authors, this method cannot be understood apart from an analysis of the symbiosis of culture and ideology, hegemony or education.

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MARXIST HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION: FROM COLONIAL TO NEOCOLONIAL SCHOOLING IN THE UNITED STATES

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ABSTRACT This essay draws on Marx’s scholarly contributions to historiography to examine the history of and approach to the history of education in the United States. The primary theoretical perspective is drawn from the materialist approach outlined in *The German Ideology* (Marx & Engels, 1846/1996). The Marxist historiography in the history of education developed here is then employed to analyze and critique narratives of the colonial and common school eras. This work disrupts Eurocentric tendencies in Marxist history of education by returning to the work of Marx himself.

Este ensayo utiliza las contribuciones eruditas de Marx a la historiografía para examinar la historia y el enfoque de la educación en los Estados Unidos. El enfoque principal teórico está basado en el materialismo delineado en *The German Ideology* (Marx & Engels, 1846/1996). La historiografía Marxista en la historia de la educación es utilizada en este ensayo para analizar y criticar las narrativas educativas de épocas coloniales. Este ensayo interrumpe las tendencias eurocéntricas en la historia de la educación Marxista a través de la revisión del trabajo de Marx.

Keywords: Capital, historiography, Materialism, labour, revolution, education, schooling

Introduction

This essay draws on Marx’s scholarly contributions to historiography to examine the history of and approach to the history of education in the United States. Before delving into a Marxist historiography, however, we review the developments within the history of education beginning with Michael Katz.
(1975; 1987) and Bowles and Gintis (1976) focusing exclusively on the U.S., even though the goal of a Marxist pedagogy is global in nature. For example, Katz (1975) approached the history of education in the U.S. from the tradition of historiography, which focuses on the theories, methods, and at its most relevant, the political economy of doing historical research. Many trace this method back to Marx himself. We argue that Katz’s central questions behind his historiography seem to be grounded in a materialist approach not entirely unrelated to that found in Marx, such as, “what drives the politics of educational history?” (Katz, 1987, p. 1) While Katz (1975, 1987) did not identify his work overtly with Marx, he did situate it as belonging to the same general trajectory as the work of Bowles and Gintis (1976).

What is more, one of Katz’s (1975) central critiques is that traditional history of U.S. education texts tend to advance the idea that the U.S. is a meritocracy and social class therefore plays no role in the purpose or outcomes of education, despite mountains of evidence to the contrary (Kozol, 2012). Katz (1975; 1987), however, argues that class is not only a central determinant of capitalist schooling, but it is much more than a thing or a group of categories, differentiating consumption levels and patterns, but rather, is a divisive, always-in-process social relation between the dispossessed, the excluded, and the laborers (i.e. those who rely on a wage of some sort to survive, including teachers, inmates, and all oppressed nations) and capital (i.e. those whose wealth comes from the labor and land of others, either directly as in industrialists and imperialist colonizers or indirectly as in investment bankers). As argued below, Katz’ (1975) class analysis here is undeniably influenced by education scholars who identify as Marxist (Cole, 2007; Darder, 2014; Malott & Ford, 2015; McLaren, 2004). This essay therefore follows Katz on two inter-related lines of reasoning: his focus on social class (i.e. capitalism) and his historiography—inter-related because historiography itself suggests critique, which, in the case of the history of education, has led a number of educational historians to not only social class since social class predates bourgeois society, but to capitalism, or the uniquely capitalist process of expanding value itself. At the same time, however, the bulk of Katz’s work focuses mainly on the ideological aspects of how the poor are themselves blamed for their poverty (Ryan, 1976)
rather than the more Marxist critique of political economy, which is central to our understanding of capitalism and the process of historical change and development. Furthermore, we contend that, unlike Marx, the Marxist and class analysts of the history of U.S. education of the 1970s seemed to have failed to fully grasp the importance of racialization, colonialism, imperialism, and the global class war in the histories of education they constructed. This conclusion is based on the observation that in constructing the larger social, political, and economic context in which capitalist schooling is unavoidably situated, the radical revisionists (as Katz, 1987, referred to them and himself) scarcely mention slavery or the conquest and genocide of American Indians and the American continents, and they also tend to distance themselves from actually existing socialist countries while oddly supporting the idea of socialism in the abstract.

One of the benefits of historiography is that it demands such critiques because it brings the method of inquiry to the surface by interrogating the historically-contextualized theoretical and political influences behind the construction of history of education texts. Attempting to capture this process, Thomas Holt (1992), in a short manuscript on doing history, argues that histories are narratives constructed through various philosophical frameworks. Following this approach, Katz (1975) argued that traditional history of education texts tend to be written from bourgeois theoretical frameworks as apologies for capital since they deny the existence of systematic or institutional colonization, exploitation and oppression, that is, of social class as either a socially-reproduced category, or an antagonistically-related social relation between labor and capital.

We provide a broad view of the historical development of education in capitalist society through the lens of how the telling of that story has changed over time and through the construction of a Marxist historiography for the history of education drawing primarily on The German Ideology (Marx and Engels, 1846/1996) and The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Marx, 1852/1972).

The debate and struggle over the narrative of the history of education in the United States never exists in a vacuum, unaffected by the larger society in which it is situated. For example, because textbook companies in the U.S. are
capitalist enterprises driven by the desire to create capital (i.e. self-expand), they gravitate toward narratives perceived to be popular, and in today’s hyper bourgeois U.S. society where even the left has largely abandoned Marx and the notion of a global class war (i.e. capitalist countries against both socialist countries and workers and the colonized in their own countries), the prospects of major textbook companies adopting Marxist titles appears to be slim. Successful professors in the U.S. therefore tend to be professors that reproduce the dominant ideology—the ideology of the ruling class—not because of a conspiracy, but because it has become common sense. That is, the idea that communism equals a static, authoritarian inevitability is largely taken for granted even in critical pedagogy. While Marxist perspectives are far less common, interest in Marx’s vast body of work is experiencing a global rejuvenation as the bigotry and fog of anti-communism slowly dissipates. This essay hopes to contribute to this resurgence.

However, highlighting the importance of historical contextualization, the Marxist approaches to the history of education, represented by Katz (1975; 1987) and Bowles and Gintis (1976), emerged during the height of the global communist movement and national liberation struggles against colonialism that manifested itself in the U.S. with the American Indian Movement, which was a response to the era of Termination (i.e. the U.S. government terminating the official status of many federally recognized tribes) and Urban relocation (i.e. moving American Indians from reservations to urban areas) and the Civil Rights Movement (i.e. the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee), which developed into the more revolutionary Black Panther Party. Again, this is another reason why it is unfortunate that Marxist educational historians seemed to have missed Marx’s long discussions on colonization and slavery and the ways in which capitalism, for example, intensified its horrors in the American South, which point to the historical significance of Black liberation movements and the struggle of American Indians for national sovereignty.

What follows is a brief outline of three of the major approaches that tend to be employed in the creation of historical narratives; traditional, constructivist, and postmodern. This brief discussion is not comprehensive but
essential as it introduces readers to the field of the history of education. Next, a considerable amount of space is dedicated to developing a Marxist historiography in the history of education. This section draws on Marx in unique ways and provides the theoretical foundation for the remainder of the essay. We then briefly engage the radical revisionist challenge to the history of education during the 1960s and 1970s. Finally, we provide a critique of two major periods in the history of U.S. education making a case for a Marxist historiography in the history of education. In the process we draw on, critique and add to Bowles and Gintis (1976) and others. The approach to the history of U.S. education we offer is informed by a commitment to challenge the ongoing and deepening capitalist or bourgeois control over the purpose and outcome of education. That is, education continues to perpetuate and extend racial, linguistic, and ethnic inequality through unequal funding schemes, and the ongoing assumption that Black, Brown, immigrant, and English as a second-language students are inherently low-achieving and prone to violence and criminality. Such scapegoating and state-sanctioned strategy, in the face of deepening global poverty, serves to keep the price of labor low, justifying extreme exploitation on one hand, and over-the-top wealth amongst the capitalist class on the other.

**Bourgeois Approaches to the History of U.S. Education**

The traditional approach to history in Western society treats history as the objective, verifiable, predetermined unfolding of events. At its most harmful, the traditional approach uses the notion of objectivity to hide the agenda of situating bourgeois, settler-state, U.S. society, the center of which is the capitalist mode of production, as inevitable and permanent. At its best, however, traditional history, and the traditional historian, engages the documentary evidence with a genuine attempt to uncover hidden truths as part of the process of creating texts that reflect, as does a mirror, past events. The traditional approach to the history of education seems to reflect the former tendency—it therefore seems to be a product of the global expansion of bourgeois society combined with elements
(such as hero-worship of the elite) carried over from European feudalism.

Pedagogically, traditional history of education, of whatever sort, tends to separate thinking from doing. Students, in this context, confront the history curriculum passively, expected to memorize its narrative presented not as a narrative with a worldview and political ideology (even if unstated), but just as it is, objective reality (Freire, 1970; Holt, 1995; Katz, 1987). Such a pedagogical approach is particularly conducive to indoctrination. Consequently, it is not surprising that history has been used to serve the interests of the elite. Summarizing Marx (1857-1858/1973), we contend that as long as there are elite classes, from feudal lords, the enslaving plantocracy of the antebellum south, the giants of industrial capitalism to the financial investor class of late capitalism, there will be an attempt to convince the laboring classes, the dispossessed, and the colonized that their particular era is permanent, fixed, all that is holding evil at bay, the people’s true salvation, and when possible, preordained by God.

A response to this approach has been the constructivist model that argues that histories are not mirror images or reflections of past events but are narratives written from different points of view informed by various analytical frameworks, serving particular interests (Holt, 1995). Perhaps the most famous of books advocating for this perspective is What is History? written in 1961 by British historian, Edward Hallett Carr (1961/1997), and is still often used in England and the U.S. in introduction to history survey courses (Evans, 2000).

According to Evans (2000), What is History?, “challenges and undermines the belief, brought to university study by too many students on leaving high school, that history is simply a matter of objective fact,” and rather, “introduces them to the idea that history books, like the people who write them, are products of their own times, bringing particular ideas and ideologies to bear on the past” (pp. 1-2). This tradition, associated with sociology, places complexity at the center arguing that it is misleading to treat any historical narrative as the only valid story because history is so complex and can be constructed from a nearly limitless range of points of view. Katz (1987) calls Carr’s (1961/1997) approach
interdependence and argues that it is a form of bourgeois ideology designed to thwart genuine inquiry into the nature of what drives historical change.

At its more useful moments, pedagogically, constructivism leads to deeper understandings of power and how it operates placing students at the center of investigation and inquiry, actively engaged in the construction process of political consciousness and knowledge formation, among other things. Critical social justice and multicultural approaches to education challenge students to place their own family histories in the context of the historical narratives they construct.

Consequently, students are challenged to understand their own connection to major events, processes, privileges and oppressions, such as colonization, religious indoctrination, genocide, manifest destiny, slavery, industrialization, patriarchy, white-supremacy, etc., as part of the educational purpose of creating democratic citizens actively engaged in social justice work. However, while these pedagogies are invaluable sources of critical education, they are not without limitations. For example, the constructivist trail to social justice can easily lead to the dead-end of over-relativism, where anything goes, and nothing is concretely and systematically confronted or challenged. Jodi Dean (2012), in her ground breaking work, argues that the Left’s call for democracy amounts to nothing more than a call for more of what already exists, which has long since proven ineffective in eradicating capital’s need for exploitation or settler-state oppression.

This is to say that the notion of social justice is so vague and all encompassing that it has arguably become safe and even a self-validating aspect of bourgeois society. The idea that a more genuine or deep democracy is the critical pedagogical path to social justice also tends to fail to push beyond the social universe of capital. Stated otherwise, a call for more democracy suggests that what is missing is more participation therefore ignoring the inherent antagonism between the capitalist class and the working class (Dean, 2012; Malott and Ford, 2015). Because this class antagonism is based on the fact that the capitalist can only create new or more value by accumulating the realized value provided by surplus labor hours (i.e. by exploiting the labor of workers), it
cannot be resolved once and for all time without the abolition of both the self-expansive process of accumulation and the settler-states’ required private ownership of the means of production in the hands of a few capitalists and investment bankers. What this analysis points to is the Marxist approach to history outlined below.

Contributing to the bourgeois attacks against a revolutionary Marxism, in the 1980s, a new pseudo-radical tradition emerged from critical theory, postmodernism, which challenged both constructivist and traditional assumptions regarding the nature of truth and objectivity associated with the scientific method. Risking over-simplification, we might note that postmodernists tend to argue that language does not mimic concrete reality, but only reproduces the identity-based ideology and signifiers of particular language users. In other words, human interpretation and perspective are far too varied and infinitely complex for language and narrative to be able to fulfill Western science’s promise that it can be disconnected from the relative power, privilege, and biases of its users.

While Carr and Elton (1961) argued for the central importance of causes and that one should study the historian before her or his facts, the postmodernist argued that histories are nothing more than competing discourses where causal explanations for the emergence of institutions, for example, such as systems of education (i.e. social class, colonialism, slavery, etc.) are too simplistic to be regarded as anything more than primitive discourses. At the heart of postmodernism is the rejection of what is identified as the Enlightenment grand narratives of Western science, including Marxism, which exclude non-Western voices by claiming itself as the one absolute, objective truth. What is more, it was argued that the break down of Fordism (i.e. the contract between labor and capital), the further globalization of the economy, the flexibilization of labor, and the creation of computers and robotics were leading to a knowledge economy and a fundamentally new era.

That is, postmodernists argued that “…the Western world...was entering a ‘postmodern’ epoch fundamentally different from industrial capitalism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries” therefore arguing that “the classical Marxist stress upon the class struggle as the driving force of
history and the working class as agency of socialist change” was outdated (Callinicos, 1989, p. 4). The postmodern challenge therefore included the position that Marxism had been proven authoritarian and thus dangerous by so-called Stalinism and misguided as evidenced by the fall of the Soviet Union.

Postmodernism therefore signaled a more complete break with the proletarian global class camp by more fully denouncing the world’s past and present socialist states and parties. The Party itself was abandoned as an inherently oppressive hierarchical, Western construct embracing the fragmented, more identity-based new social movement with no identifiable leaders. What is more, the emergence of a more fragmented, fractured postmodern condition relegated working-class movements irrelevant because industrial production had been replaced with a new knowledge economy accompanied by new forms of control and new relations of production. Dean (2012) argues that the result of the deindustrialization of imperialist centers, such as the U.S., as been accompanied by de-unionization and the emergence of a service-sector-oriented work force. The challenge for a Marxist history of education here is therefore to recover the collective sense of the Party needed to push toward the communist horizon situated in the context of a settler-state that has always been at war with the national sovereignty of Native North American tribes and confederacies. This entails a complex mix of defending, challenging, and advancing the past work of Marxist educational historians.

In the history of education the radical revisionist work of Katz (1975; 1987) and Bowles and Gintis (1976) has therefore been under attack as modernist and thus vulgar. According to Milton Gaither (2012) the postmodern challenge has left the field of the history of education without direction or purpose, which we hope our efforts here begin to change. While Gaither (2012) argues for a free-market libertarian direction for the history of education, this essay makes the case for the contemporary relevance of a Marxist history of education. That is, like Callinicos (1989), we too believe that postmodernists are wrong in their assertion that we are in a qualitatively new era rendering Marx’s analysis of how capital is augmented and circulated, globally, and colonially, irrelevant.
Following McLaren (2005), we argue that the changes mentioned above point not to a new era, but rather to a more intensified hyper-capitalism rendering the work of Marx, not less relevant, but more relevant, than ever. However, while our place of departure is the Marxist history of education work of the 1970s and 1980s, it is our intention here to go beyond it. In the process we argue that Marx’s theory of history and historical work is an under-used and under-theorized source of direction for the history of education. Therefore, what follows is a brief summary of a Marxist approach to history, looking specifically at Marx.

**Marx and Engel’s Materialism: Contributions to a Marxist Historiography**

This approach to historical investigation identifies a force, *contradiction*, embodied in all entities, as driving all change and movement. The challenge is therefore to identify the primary contradiction (i.e. driving force) behind the movement of any historical era. Marx and Engels (1846/1996) identify and outline this approach and source of contradiction in *The German Ideology*, and is therefore, worth outlining and quoting at length.

Marx and Engels’ (1846/1996) chapter on Feurbach in *The German Ideology* offers a logical place of departure for elaborating on a Marxist historiography—transforming the world cannot happen in the realm of pure thought alone. Seeming so obvious, yet unfortunately in the context of critical pedagogy in general and critical theoretical approaches to the history of education in particular, it still needs restating. If a Marxist pedagogy is revolutionary, then a Marxist historiography must too transcend the realm of pure thought, that is, it must be grounded in a materialist understanding of the world as it exists.

What follows is an outline of the premises of the materialist method as laid out in *The German Ideology* (1846/1996). We pursue this line of reasoning because a Marxist historiography must be firmly situated in Marx’s materialism, and *The German Ideology* (1846/1996) patiently spells it out. Like a Marxist critical pedagogy of becoming in general (see Malott and Ford, 2015), Marx and Engels
(1846/1996) argue “communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things,” (pp. 56-57). Communism can therefore only develop out of existing production relations at their present highly advanced stage of development with all its diversity and colonial contradictions (i.e. the contradiction that the privilege of the white working class in the U.S. stems from its historic role serving as the exploited labor used to do the work of colonialism, and whose ultimate emancipation depends upon the unification with the very oppressed nations their labor has been employed by capitalist interests to oppress and commit endless acts of violence and genocide against).

**Idealism and the Materialist Method in a Marxist Historiography**

True to their critical approach to theory building Marx and Engels (1846/1996) start *The German Ideology* critiquing German philosophy. However, rather than proceeding as might be expected, they deliver a hefty dose of sarcasm:

> As we hear from German ideologists, Germany has in the last few years gone through an unparalleled revolution. The decomposition of Hegelian philosophy…has developed into a universal ferment into which all the “powers of the past” are swept…Principles ousted one another, heroes of the mind overthrew each other with unheard of rapidity...All this is supposed to have taken place in the realm of pure thought…(p. 39)

Marx and Engels’ sarcastic reference to the dismissal of Hegel must be understood in the context of Marx's (1844/1988) correction, not dismissal, of Hegelian dialectics (see Malott and Ford, 2015). Continuing to up the sarcastic ante Marx and Engels (1846/1996) go on naming the German warriors of pure thought “industrialists of philosophy” who had built their fortunes on exploiting Hegel’s concept of the absolute spirit until it had been overthrown, leading these opportunistic theoreticians to begin forming commodities from the new materials, which Marx and Engels (1846/1996) suggest are faulty critiques of Hegel. In their description of these
industrial philosophers Marx and Engels (1846/1996) begin to allude to their correction of the German ideologists. Due to its sheer brilliance, sarcastic playfulness, and biting precision we reproduce a sizable excerpt:

Certainly it is an interesting event we are dealing with: the putrescence of the absolute spirit. When the last spark of its life had failed, the various components...began to decompose, entered into new combinations and formed new substances. The industrialists of philosophy, who till then had lived on the exploitation of the absolute spirit, now seized upon the new combinations. Each with all possible zeal set about retailing his appropriated share. This naturally gave rise to competition, which, to start with, was carried on in moderately staid bourgeois fashion. Later when the German market was glutted, and the commodity in spite of all efforts found no response in the world market, the business was spoiled...by fabricated and fictitious production, deterioration in quality, adulteration of the raw materials...The competition turned into a bitter struggle, which is now being extolled and interpreted to us as a revolution of world significance. (pp. 39-40)

It is worth noting that the closely related constructivist and postmodern dismissals and critiques of Marx amongst the U.S. educational left, including educational historians, in the 1980s and 1990s, were based on similar types of partial understandings of Marx as the industrial philosophers' rejection of Hegel referred to by Marx and Engels above. We caution against dismissing Marx (or any body of work for that matter) based on secondary sources such as Bowles and Gintis (1976). For this reason we are engaging Marx and Engels in a more systematic analysis to build our Marxist historiography rather than rely on other Marxist educational historians, such as Michael Katz or Bowles and Gintis. It is this approach that demonstrates the ongoing relevance of Marx despite the so-called new philosophers (from postmodern and others) bold claims of expanding beyond an outdated Marx due to the new knowledge economy.

This does not mean we endorse an uncritical acceptance of the totality of Marx, but that there is an
indispensable advancement within his systematic critique of political economy. Similarly, Marx and Engels’ (1846/1996), referring to the Young Hegelians, argue that not one of them had attempted to offer a systematic critique of the Hegelian system even though they claimed to go beyond it. Marx and Engels (1846/1996) summarize this debate arguing that the old Hegelians excepted the idea that the alienation of humanity is the alienation of humanity from their own consciousness, which is represented as the absolute idea, or the absolute spirit (i.e. God), whereas the young Hegelians took this as an enslaving consciousness to be replaced by a new consciousness. What the Old and New Hegelians had in common, for Marx and Engels (1846/1996), was the shared believe in, “a universal principle in the existing world” (p. 41). That is, they challenged the believe that the fight for a just society is primarily an ideological fight, and is thus a battle for a predetermined consciousness, and the imposition of a fixed ideology. Notions of creating social justice through critical consciousness might be understood as informed by purely ideological conceptions of transformation and social change. As we explore below, a Marxist historiography is therefore not only interested in challenging the ideology and bourgeois constructions of U.S. educational history. Consider:

Since the Young Hegelians consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the products of consciousness, to which they attribute an independent existence, as the real chains of men (just as the Old Hegelians declared them the true bonds of human society) it is evident that the Young Hegelians only have to fight against these illusions of consciousness...This demand to change consciousness amounts to a demand to interpret reality in another way. (p. 41)

If our Marxist historiography is to point beyond narrative and consciousness as the target of transformation, it must also move the historian beyond the archives and the educator beyond the classroom (i.e. the shop floor of the educational machine factory) and into confrontation with the state and corporate material basis of the education industry and its managers and shareholders. If constructivist approaches to American educational history tend to take the development of
narrative and critical consciousness as the sole objective for achieving social justice, then it too has fallen for the same mistakes Marx and Engels (1846/1996) critique the Young Hegelians for. Before this task can be further elaborated on, we would be wise to revisit the premises of Marx and Engels’ (1846/1996) materialist method.

Their place of departure, of course, are “real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity” (Marx & Engels, 1846/1996, p. 42). What Marx and Engels (1846/1996) are pointing to here is the empirical evidence that demonstrates the specifics of the existence of actually existing human beings, their “physical organization” and “their consequent relation to nature” (Marx & Engels, 1846/1996, p. 42). Although the point of their text is not to explore the “physical nature of man” (Vygotsky takes up this in Mind in Society) or the physical properties of nature, the study of history should begin with the physical properties of humanity and nature and “their modification in the course of history through the action of men” (Marx & Engels, 1846/1996, p. 42). Such considerations point to concrete aspects of human society that should underlie any serious Marxist history of education. The error made by most history of education texts is that the connections between education, the settler-state, colonialism, and the uniquely capitalistic quest to perpetually expand capital are either loose and undeveloped or they are treated as separate, mostly unrelated spheres or aspects of human society. These points are explored in later sections of this essay.

In the development of their materialist system Marx and Engels (1846/1996) then note that they are not suggesting consciousness is not important. To the contrary, they then argue that what distinguishes humans from other animals is their consciousness, and as soon as humans began producing their own means of subsistence, by transforming nature, they began distinguishing themselves from other animals. Making themselves absolutely clear here Marx and Engels (1846/1996) note that they are not just talking about “the production of the physical existence of the individuals,” but rather, “a definite form of activity of these individuals” (p. 42). Marx and Engels (1846/1996) therefore conclude that what people are, is directly related to what they produce and how
they produce it. If a history of education does not capture these aspects of what makes different modes of production distinct from each other, then it will have failed to offer a complete analysis of the developing and often contested purposes and processes of schooling. Contrary to the idealists of German philosophy who take existence and nature as unchanging, Marx and Engels (1846/1996) argue that, “the nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production” (p. 42). Such insights pose a difficult challenge to current trends in the history of education that reduce global struggles between competing classes to theories of power.

The conscious forms of activity referred to by Marx and Engels (1846/1996) only emerge with population, with increasing intercourse between individuals. The interaction of not only individuals within nations, but the interaction between separate nations is also determined by their internal development, which is measured by the degree of their division of labor. While Marx and Engels (1846/1996), at this early, Eurocentric stage in their intellectual development, conceived of all societies as moving through the same stages of development, they eventually adopted a more sophisticated global analysis, discussed below (Anderson, 2010). However, the core of their materialist method remained relevant. If the actual existence of humans and the means by which they have developed to produce their actual lives is the primary focus of concern for a materialist method, then it follows that the particular ways production has developed within nations would be of central importance to Marx and Engels (1846/1996) and to a Marxist history of education. Of special importance to Marx and Engels (1846/1996) here is the division of labor as an indicator of society’s level of development. Whereas in The German Ideology Marx and Engels (1846/1996) argue that all societies develop into patriarchies due to the natural division of labor between men and women, in the last years of Marx’s life he began exploring with great joy and excitement the more egalitarian matriarchal division of labor in traditional Native American societies (Anderson, 2010). The implications of these insights for the communist horizon and for refusing to accept settler-state colonialism, and for Marxist and Indigenous solidarity, are tremendous. Let us consider Marx and Engels’ (1846/1996)
insights regarding the division of labor at this point in their discussion:

How far the productive forces of a nation are developed is shown most manifestly by the degree to which the division of labor has been carried. Each new productive force, insofar as it is not merely a quantitative extension of productive forces already known (for instance the bringing into cultivation of fresh land), causes a further development of the division of labor. The division of labor inside a nation leads at first to the separation of industrial and commercial from agricultural labor, and hence to the separation of town and country and to the conflict of their interests. Its further development leads to the separation of commercial from industrial labor. At the same time through the division of labor inside these various branches there develop various divisions among the individuals co-operating in definite kinds of labor... The various stages in the division of labor are just so many different forms of ownership. (p. 43)

Clearly, the materialist method outlined here is based upon the European society Marx and Engels were born into. Their framework, philosophically, stems from their correction of Hegel’s system of dialectical movement and change outlined in Marx's (1844/1988) *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. That is, as humans engage their world and transform it through their activity, the division of labor naturally develops as new means of production are introduced into the growing co-operation between producers. This division of labor, in Europe, first emerges in the family and reflects differences in strength and ability due to age and sex. The father assumes the role of the patriarch dominating the labor of his wife and children laying the relational foundation for slavery. But what is dialectical about Marx and Engels’ (1846/1996) approach here is that each era embodies its own negation as the development of its internal logic. While not all societies develop into patriarchies, all societies develop dialectically. The significance of looking at the development of Europe is that it is within this context that the current global capitalist system developed.

Marx and Engels (1846/1996) refer to the first form of “ownership” in the historical development of the division of labor in Europe as *tribal*, which they argue is relatively
underdeveloped beyond the forms of the division of labor found within the so-called family. They identify power as patriarchal, an extension of the form of slavery found within the European family. However, as mentioned above, within the notes found in the studies Marx engaged in late in his life are detailed discussions of non-European societies. Again, Marx was particularly interested in the high degree of power afforded women and thus the gender equality found within many Native American societies, such as the Iroquois or Six Nations. We might therefore read Marx and Engels' (1846/1996) universal depiction of tribal societies not as being informed by prejudice or bias, but rather, the Eurocentric result of not being aware of the Native American examples. Marx himself never traveled to the Americas, and therefore relied on anthropologists' secondary sources for his understanding of Native North Americans.

However, The German Ideology, like all of Marx's other major works, is primarily concerned with the development of capitalism specifically, and it specifically emerged in only one physical location, England, and thus from the European model of tribal society. With that in mind, we can appreciate Marx not just as a philosopher, an economist, or a revolutionary, but as an historian as well. Following the patriarchal form of tribalism in Europe, Marx and Engels (1846/1996) argue a form of communal State ownership emerged marked by the merger into a city of two or more tribes, either voluntarily, or by conquest.

It was within this mode of production that both movable and immovable forms of rudimentary types of private property emerged, but were subordinated by the communal nature of the society and thus the power of individuals. As immovable forms of private property began to grow in proportion to movable forms of private property, the ancient communal state gave way to feudalism. Marx and Engels (1846/1996) move through this historical development of productive forces as part of their larger critique of German idealists:

The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into these definite social and political relations. Empirical observation must in each separate instance bring out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation, the connection of the social and political
structure with production. The social structure and the State are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals, but of individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people’s imagination, but as they really are; i.e. as they operate, produce materially, and hence as they work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will. (pp. 46-47)

Again, what Marx and Engels are getting at here is the challenge to idealism that consciousness does not create reality, nor that reality necessarily or automatically informs consciousness, but that concrete material conditions exist despite individual consciousness, which can even work to distort consciousness. For example, for capitalism to function as such, the price of labor always has to be less than the value it produces, but is hidden by the money relation creating the illusion that every minute of one’s labor is paid. That is, the unpaid portion of the workday, the source of capitals’ augmentation, is hidden and mystified by the material relations between labor and capital themselves, as well as by an ideology of fairness and the objectivity of the market. Material conditions, in this instance, therefore do not enlighten consciousness, but distort it, serving as an obstacle to the full self-emancipation of the global proletarian class camp. Continuing with this example, we might note that developing an awareness of the hidden process of value expansion, which is the exploitation of labor, does not automatically change reality. Social change cannot happen in the mind alone.

Developing a correct understanding of the world as it exists and develops through history can only ever be a part of a materialist project, however indispensable. Speculative discussion of consciousness therefore ceases and in its place steps a Marxist history of education fully grounded within the material limits, presuppositions and conditions that education is a part of, which should therefore be reflected in any Marxist history of education. From here, Marx and Engels (1846/1996) specifically outline their materialist approach to history, which is of particular importance to this essay.

Arguing that the abstractness and idealism of German philosophers has left them with virtually no premises upon which their theories are built Marx and Engels (1846/1996)
state that the first premise of history is that “men must be in a position to live in order to ‘make history’” (p. 48). In other words, “life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of these needs, the production of material life itself” (Marx and Engels, 1846/1996, p. 48). The ability to produce and reproduce life, for Marx and Engels (1846/1996), is therefore “a fundamental condition of history” (p. 48). The implications of this premise for doing history, for Marx and Engels (1846/1996), is that “in any interpretation of history one has first of all to observe this fundamental fact in all its significance and all its implications and to accord it its due importance” (p. 49). A Marxist history of education therefore begins with considerations of how education relates to this first premise. The second premise is that in the quest to satisfy basic needs, new needs arise, which Marx and Engels (1846/1996) refer to as “the first historical act” (p. 49). Education, in the capitalist era, we might observe, has played an increasingly crucial role, historically, in the creation of new needs. The development of new needs historically gave rise to the development of societies of humans, beginning with the family. This occurs not with some abstract, fixed conception of family, but as they have developed in reality. Describing this third condition of history, which is intimately connected to the first two premises, Marx and Engels (1846/1996) note:

The third circumstance, which, from the very outset, enters into historical development, is that men, who daily remake their own life, begin to make other men, to propagate their kind: the relation between man and woman, parents and children, the family. The family, which to begin with is the only social relationship, becomes later, when increased needs create new social relations and the increased population new needs, a subordinate one...and must then be treated and analyzed according to the existing empirical data, and not according to “the concept of the family.” (p. 49)

The final point in the above quote that abstract conceptions of the family are of little use to developing an empirical understanding of concrete reality provides the tools to critique their earlier universalization of European development. The three interrelated aspects of social existence thus far identified
(i.e. the satisfaction of needs, the creation of new needs, and with them, the growth of the size and complexity of society), for Marx and Engels (1846/1996), are *universal* aspects of history that *always* exist *despite* mode of production, mode of cooperation, or degree and form of productive development.

At this point Marx and Engels (1846/1996) introduce the significant historical observation that the reproduction of life simultaneously embodies both a natural aspect and a social aspect. Again, a Marxist approach to the history of education is concerned with the role of schooling in the development of this double relationship within the production of life—that is, as a natural relationship fulfilling the basic needs all humans require to daily maintain their existence; and the social relationship, or “the co-operation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end” (Marx and Engels, 1846/1996, p. 50).

To reiterate, this conclusion does not equate to the dismissal of considerations of race, gender, sexual orientation, and so on, but rather, encompasses all aspects of social life as they relate to specific historical time periods. Offering a particularly significant observation when considering a Marxist historiography in the history of education Marx and Engels (1846/1996) are instructive:

...a certain mode of production, or industrial stage, is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or social stage, and this mode of co-operation is itself a “productive force.” Further, that the multitude of productive forces accessible to men determines the nature of society, hence, that the “history of humanity” must always be studied and treated in relation to the history of industry and exchange...This connection is ever taking on new forms, and thus presents a “history” independently of the existence of any political or religious nonsense which in addition may hold men together. (p. 50)

It is clear here that Marx and Engels (1846/1996) are offering another cautionary transition into their discussion of consciousness. However, before we proceed, it should be noted that it is only after elaborating on the aforementioned “four aspects of the primary historical relationships” (Marx and Engels, 1846/1996, p. 50) that the notion of consciousness is introduced. As argued above, Marx and Engels (1846/1996)
repeatedly make clear their opposition to the notion of pure consciousness because consciousness or thought arises through language, which is a response to the intercourse between individuals in the production of life itself. Language and consciousness are therefore always a social product intimately connected to the material conditions previously discussed.

For Marx and Engels (1846/1996) the division of labor is really only present with the separation between thinking and doing, that is, between mental and manual labor. In the capitalistic era in particular, the history of education offers a way to understand how this division of labor has expanded on an extending scale. At this point Marx and Engels (1846/1996) offer another fundamental insight regarding the role of consciousness in the division of mental labor and manual labor in the history of education:

From this moment onwards consciousness can really flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness of existing practice, that it really represents something without representing something real; from now on consciousness is in a position to emancipate itself from the world and to proceed to the formation of “pure” theory, theology, philosophy, ethics, etc. But even if this theory, theology, philosophy, ethics, etc. comes into contradiction with the existing relations, this can only occur because existing social relations have come into contradiction with existing forces of production...(pp. 51-52)

Coming full circle we then begin to gain an understanding of the ways in which historical narratives in the history of education can depart from reality and thus come into contradiction with it. As we see below, a more empirically-based history of education true to Marx and Engel’s (1846/1996) conception of the four aspects of history offers a clearer path out of the contradictions of capital and settler-state colonialism, that is, out of capitalism itself.
Bourgeois and Proletarian Revolutions and a Marxist Historiography

Marx and Engels’ (1846/1996) materialist method clearly departs from any form of mysticism as it is driven by a desire to critique narratives and construct analysis around what rigorous inquiry suggests are the most determining factors or contradictions driving society’s historical development. According to Frederick Engels (1885) Marx’s approach to history, as outlined above, was particularly innovative:

It was precisely Marx who had first discovered the great law of motion in history, the law according to which all historical struggles, whether they proceed in the political, religious, philosophical, or some other ideological domain, are in fact only the more or less clear expression of struggles of social classes, and that the existence and thereby the collisions, too, between these classes are in turn conditioned by the degree of their development of their economic position, by the mode of their production and of their exchange determined by it. (p. 14)

For Engels (1891/1993) then, Marx had a “remarkable gift...for grasping clearly the character, the import, and the necessary consequences of great historical events, at a time when these events are still in process before our eyes, or only have just taken place” (p. 9). This presents a steep challenge to our Marxist history of education, for it is no easy task to grasp the full significance of current developments in educational policy and practice, which are almost always steeped in racializations, national chauvinism, and all manner of bourgeois conceptions of intelligence and worth, as actually a clear historical manifestation and expression of the division and subsequent struggle between capital and labor. Demonstrating his skills as a historian and his theory of history in the Preface to the Second Edition of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx (1869/1972) provides a succinct summary of three different approaches to the history of the 1851 coup d’etat. However, our interest in this essay is less with the content of the coup and more on what Marx (1869/1972) contributed to, by providing an example, and thus expanding on the materialist premises of history outlined...
above. Our Marxist approach to historiography therefore has much to gain through Marx’s (1869/1972) analysis:

Victor Hugo continues himself to bitter and witty invective against the responsible publisher of the *coup d’etat*. The event itself appears in his work like a bolt from the blue. He sees in it only the violent act of a single individual. He does not notice that he makes this individual great instead of little by ascribing to him a personal power of initiative such as would be without parallel in world history. Proudhon, for his part, seeks to represent the *coup d’etat* as the result of an antecedent historical development. Unnoticeably, however, his historical construction of the *coup d’etat* becomes an apologia for its hero. Thus he falls into the error of our so-called objective historians. I, on the contrary, demonstrate how the *class struggle* in France created circumstances and relationships that made it possible for a grotesque mediocrity to play a hero’s part.

What stands out here is Marx’s reference to various versions of an historical event as *constructions*, which highlights his deep understanding of the implications of the division between mental labor and manual labor, or when consciousness is separated from the life activity it is supposed to reflect. Alienated consciousness, and bourgeois consciousness in particular, is therefore free to invent all manner of stories or histories to hide or distort the class antagonism and the class struggle. This is key to Marx’s method. That is, Marx’s approach to constructing historical narratives always takes as its place of departure a critical engagement with existing narratives refracted through the light of empirical evidence and systematic reasoning. In other words, Marx was well aware that worldviews, and especially the products of industrial philosophers, are themselves products of history serving various purposes from justifying and perpetuating a particular practice, relationship, or society to ushering in a new one.

The challenge for the Marxist history of education, in confronting the world as it actually is, requires the ability to detect the inaccuracies and distortions that characterize bourgeois historical constructions. Without these insights the material reality of education will not be grasped, and any
attempt to put the history of education to the service of a communist alternative and challenging settler-state colonialism will be nearly impossible. Making a similar point in a relatively famous passage Marx (1852/1972) observes:

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. (Marx, 1852, p. 15)

Similarly, we do not make the history of education just as we please, but we construct it based on our knowledge of the world in which we confront, the world as it is. Understanding this world that we are a part of therefore requires a thorough analysis of the traditions of all dead generations that developed into the here-and-now. This is the task of history, and the stakes could not be higher. That is, knowledge about the past shapes our conceptions about the nature of the present and possibilities for the future. Constructing such Marxist-informed narratives of the history of education in the United States continues to be an unfinished project. For Marx, the task of knowledge production is not done simply for the sake of doing it, but it is part of a larger push toward removing all of the barriers that prevent the world’s working classes (including teachers) from becoming (see Malott and Ford, 2015).

Contributing to a Marxist historiography of becoming (i.e. becoming communist) is Marx’s (1852/1972) conception of bourgeois and proletarian revolutions. That is, if we understand education as never neutral, but always political, or always either serving the interests of the world system as it exists or challenging it, then education either serves the bourgeois revolution and system or it works for proletarian revolution and communism. In other words, if we view education as either revolutionary or counter-revolutionary, then Marx’s discussion of bourgeois versus proletarian revolutions is highly important to our Marxist historiography for the history of education. Consider: while revolutions in general tended to, “conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them their names, battle cries, and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in
this time-honored disguise and this borrowed language,” bourgeois revolutions in particular “awakened the dead in order to glorify the new struggles, not to once again find the spirit of revolution, or of making its ghost walk again” (Marx, 1852/1972, pp. 15-17).

In other words, Marx (1852/1972) argued that bourgeois revolutions, “required recollections of past world history in order to drug themselves concerning their own content” (p. 18). That is, the content of bourgeois revolutions (and the content of bourgeois constructions of the history of education) that Marx so often refers to is the promise of freedom and equality, which he argues, because of the creation of a working class of dependents it requires, can only ever be an empty promise. As a result, bourgeois revolutions do not deliver societies new content for themselves, but rather, “the state” returns it “to its oldest form...shamelessly simple domination...easy come, easy go” (Marx, 1852/1972, pp. 18-19).

Bourgeois revolutions...storm swiftly from success to success; their dramatic effect outdo each other; men and things seem set in sparkling brilliants; ecstasy is the everyday spirit; but they are short lived; soon they have attained their zenith, and a long crapulent depression lays hold of society before it learns soberly to assimilate the results of its storm-and-stress period. (p. 19)

Bourgeois or traditional conceptions of the history of education serve this same master, full of the same delusions of benevolence and hostility towards the inconvenient facts of class antagonism and class struggle. Offering a helpful yardstick in which to judge the precision and effectiveness of our revolutionary Marxist historiography of becoming for the history of education Marx’s (1852/1972) conception of proletarian revolutions is indispensible:

...Proletarian revolutions, like those of the nineteenth century, criticize themselves constantly, interrupt themselves continually in their own course, come back to the apparently accomplished in order to begin afresh, deride with unmerciful thoroughness the inadequacies, weaknesses and paltriness of their first attempts, seem to throw down their adversary only in order that he may
draw new strength from the earth and rise again, more
gigantic, before them, recoil ever and anon from the
indefinite prodigiousness of their own aims, until a
situation has been created which makes all turning
back impossible...(p. 19)

Paulo Freire’s (1970) *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, unlike many
of his later works, is informed by this rigorous, never-ending
cycle of reflection and action tirelessly committed to and
driven by the urgency of the global, proletarian class camp to
succeed in capturing the capitalist state and abolishing
surplus labor time (i.e. exploitation), the foundation of
capital’s economic existence. Internal, comradely critique
(including self-critique) of Marxist, educational theory and
historiography is therefore similarly informed by the desire to
improve not only our understanding, but our ability to
practice an effective Marxist historiography of becoming
communist. In other words, a Marxist history of education is
equally committed to an analysis of the present moment as
*history in the making* always committed to pushing the
capitalist *now* into a socialist future through the organization
of the *party*.

However, rather than building upon Marx, as we have
sought to do thus far, with the postmodern turn away from
Marxism in critical education theory in the 1980s, the Marxist
history of education work of Bowles and Gintis (1976) and
Michael Katz (1975, 1987) has largely stagnated and even
faded from the offerings of big publishing corporations that
supply the country’s foundations of education classes with
textbooks. There are, however, noteworthy exceptions, such as
Peter McLaren’s (2006) Marxist, foundations of education
book, *Life in Schools*. However, *Life in Schools* is not
specifically a history of education book. It is more of an
introduction to critical pedagogy. If this essay can contribute,
in any way, to bringing Marx back to the history of education,
then it will have been a worthwhile effort.

While we have countless brilliant colleagues around the
world, and in the US in particular, doing important critical
pedagogy work in colleges and universities, it is probably not
too far fetched to assume that the history of education classes
that have managed to survive in this hostile environment are
being taught from increasingly uncritical perspectives that
turn a blind eye to the massive devastation being wrought by
global capitalism, especially on Black lives, which Black Lives Matter, as a resistance movement, is arguably at the frontlines of. Part of the problem, as suggested above, is that current mainstream history of education books do not do an even mildly satisfactory job of demonstrating how the traditions of the past weigh like a nightmare on the brain of the living, to paraphrase Marx.

However, we do not want to suggest that there are no Marxist scholars advancing this history of education work. Peter McLaren’s vast body of work, as well as John Bellamy Foster’s (2012) “Education and the Structural Crisis of Capital” are good examples that have advanced Bowles and Gintis’ (1976) Marxist approach to the history of education. However important and insightful this work is, it is not to be found in today’s history of education textbooks. This essay is an attempt to contribute to the vast body of recent Marxist education work (see, for a very small sample; Allman, 1999; Darder, 2009; Ford, 2014; Hill, 2013; Kumar, 2011; Malott, 2012; Malott and Ford, 2015; McLaren, 2005; McLaren and Farahmandpur, 2001; McLaren and Jaramillo, 2007, 2010), which is a vital foundation for this on-going project.

However, it is worth noting that this discussion on a few of the primary approaches to teaching history should begin to shed light on why there are competing approaches to teaching history and therefore competing historical narratives. History, we might say, is not a fixed set of facts, but rather is an ongoing debate. But historical narratives are not merely neutral constructions informed by a multitude of positionalities representing the fractured, fragmented postmodern condition. Histories are either bourgeois and counter-revolutionary, and therefore, designed to serve the interests of a dominant/ruling class, or they are revolutionary, and thus, strive to be part of the global class war and proletarian movement against global capitalism and settler-state colonialism.

**A Revolution in the History of Education**

Beginning in the 1960s the history of education, as a discipline, began to be fundamentally challenged, especially in terms of debating the historic role that social class has or has
not played in educational outcomes, policies, and purposes. In *Reconstructing American Education* Michael Katz (1987) offers a significant contribution to this *history* of the history of education. Reflecting on the transformation that began to challenge traditional approaches to the history of education, Katz (1987) notes:

Starting in the 1960s, a modest revolution took place in historical writing about education. Historians rejected both the metaphor and the method that had characterized most reconstructions of the educational past. The method had divorced inquiry into the development of educational practices and institutions from the mainstream of historical scholarship and left it narrow, antiquated, and uninteresting. The metaphor had portrayed education as a flower of democracy planted in a rich loam that its seeds replenished. (p. 5)

Katz here, employing the methods of historiography, echoes Marx and Engels’ (1846/1996) insistence on empirical accuracy and sensitivity to the politics and processes of the construction of historical narratives. Working to reunite cutting edge developments in history with narratives on the history of education, the result was a much more critical assessment of the origins and purposes of public education. However, despite this advancement, many important developments in history proper continued to remain absent from the work of the radical revisionists referred to by Katz (1987). For example, much of the historical work pertaining to the colonization of the Americas, the genocide and ongoing subjugation of Native Americans, as well as the work documenting the African holocaust of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and slavery, and the resistance to it, as well as the militant history of African American led share croppers’ unions after the Civil War, are no where to be found in the work best known as the epitome of a Marxist history of education in the U.S., that is, Bowles and Gintis’ (1976) *Schooling in Capitalist America*.

Bowles and Gintis’ (1976) important advancement could have contributed significantly to the relevancy of a Marxist historiography through a critical engagement with a number of fundamental texts representing an African American and Native American renaissance in throwing off the colonialist narratives of bourgeois interests and building the disciplines
of African American studies and Native American studies. At the very least George James’ (1954/2005) ground-breaking book *Stolen Legacy* exploring the intellectual and scientific knowledge European slavers and capitalist society in general, benefited from. The important work of Harry Haywood (2012), the self-proclaimed Black Bolshevik, building upon Stalin’s position of oppressed nations within nations, such as African Americans in the U.S., as an argument and strategy for fighting capitalism within the U.S., would have added tremendously to *Schooling in Capitalist America*. Even W.E.B. DuBois’ (2001) and Walter Woodson’s (2013) texts, *The Education of Black People* and *The Miseducation of the Negro*, respectively, would have provided much needed historical insight for better understanding Bowles and Gintis’ (1976) discussion of the education of America’s Black working class.

In terms of better understanding the conquest of America and the ongoing oppression of American Indians, Vine Deloria Jr.’s (1969) classic text, *Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto*, signaled the beginning of the American Indian Movement and a vast body of work. Published seven years before *Schooling in Capitalist America*, Deloria’s (1969) work would have been readily available to Bowles and Gintis (1976) as they wrote their classic text. While engaging in what is somewhat of a pointless exercise, the point here is that we can look back critically as current trends in educational Marxism tend not to fall victim of such errors that wrongfully open the door for counter-revolutionaries to argue that Marxism believes the working class is a group of privileged white workers. While the so-called first-world, white working class is undeniably the most privileged sub-group of the working class, they represent only a small fraction of the global working class.

Nevertheless, before the work of Michael Katz (1975) and Bowles and Gintis (1976), the class antagonisms that have propelled the quantitative changes in specific modes of production, that, when having reached a certain point of development, give way to qualitative transformations leading to the transition from feudalism, to capitalism, to socialism, have tended not to be identified as an important tendency or dialectical law of historical change characteristic of the human societies in which histories of education are situated. However, despite this important shift, the revisionists, including Bowles and Gintis (1976), while supporting socialism in the abstract, turned against actually
existing socialism. For example, in their chapter explaining capitalism and thus critiquing capitalist countries such as the U.S., Bowles and Gintis (1976) make a point to also break from “state socialist countries” in “Eastern Europe” because they “were never democratic” due to the “ruling elites” maintaining a hierarchical system of control over “production” (p. 81). Bowles and Gintis (1976) therefore fail to lay bare the global class war and acknowledge their lack of solidarity with the proletarian global class camp, which, during the time of their writing, represented socialist countries and millions of people of color over the world (Malott and Ford, 2015). It is a tragedy that the global proletarian class camp representing the desires of so many millions of people of color from Africa to Latin America has been propagandized in the U.S. as a movement of the white working class.

Situated within this context, we might observe that the term critical pedagogy was created by Henry Giroux’s (1981) as an attempt to dismiss socialism and the legacy of Karl Marx, first appearing, I believe, in Ideology, Culture, and The Process of Schooling. Critical pedagogy, as a discipline within educational theory, therefore seemed to have been constructed as a conscious break from Marx, from Marxism, and from actually existing socialism. We might therefore argue that critical pedagogy has not become counter-revolutionary, it began as a conscious betrayal of the global proletarian class camp. This is not to say that actually existing socialist governments have not committed serious mistakes. Rather, to oppose socialist countries and to celebrate their demise, is to join the capitalist class’s attack on the worlds’ working class’ struggle against exploitation and resistance against colonialism and imperialism. Giroux’s (1983) widely influential text, Theory and Resistance in Education: A Pedagogy for the Opposition, continued to serve this purpose.

That is, Giroux (1983) argues that after World War II, in both imperialist capitalist states and countries in the so-called socialist bloc, workers suffered the same forms of increasing alienation and the suppression of political and economic freedom due to repression and authoritarianism. Giroux (1983), in line with imperialist propagandists, contributes to the exaggerations and generalizations of the mistakes and shortcomings of various communist countries while ignoring the social gains and achievements of the workers’ states, from
Eastern Europe, North Korea, Burkina Faso, China, to Cuba. However, while Bowles and Gintis (1976) and the radical revisionists sought to employ Marx in their work, Giroux sought to not only contribute to the attack on real existing socialism, he also sought to break from Marx all together. In other words, even though Bowles and Gintis (1976) took an incorrect stance against socialist countries, they supported the possibility of a more perfectly worked out socialist alternative not yet created.

Giroux (1983), on the other hand, made a case against existing workers’ states as part of his argument against Marx in general. Giroux’s work has therefore contributed to the shift from the materialism of Marx, represented by Paulo Freire’s (1970) Pedagogy of the Oppressed, to a turn back to ideology, culture, and knowledge production similar to the German philosophers critiqued by Marx and Engels (1846/1996) in The German Ideology. While a full engagement in the history of critical pedagogy is beyond the scope of this essay, we can re-emphasize the depth of the anti-communist trends operating within imperialist states, especially in the U.S., and thus found in both critical pedagogy and historiography. In other words, the fact that even within Marxist scholarship and scholarship stemming from critical theory you find strong currents against the legacy of worker states, is telling.

Again, it is not to say that serious mistakes were not made under socialism. The point is to support the millions of brothers and sisters around the world fighting imperialism and capitalist exploitation through the creation of worker states, however imperfect and unfinished. The communist challenge and responsibility is to support forward communist progress rather than sitting back while worker states are overrun by capitalists, who themselves are governed by the laws of accumulation, that is, an insatiable appetite for surplus value, whatever the human or environmental costs. The decline of the socialist states since the fall of the Soviet Union therefore represents a major set back for the process of overcoming imperialism and global capitalism. This is a position that is at odds with nearly the entire critical pedagogy movement. However, if we are to take Marx’s description of the proletarian revolution seriously, then such biting self-critiques must be considered.
Nevertheless, the radical revisionists offered an important advancement from the traditional narrative. For example, in 1919, Ellwood Cubberley, Dean of the School of Education at Stanford University, in his book, *Public Education in the United States: A Study and Interpretation of American Educational History*, offers a seemingly safe, nothing-to-be-alarmed-by approach to history and the role of education in the history of human societies. Cubberley’s (1919) narrative is devoid of the class antagonism and struggle a genuine engagement with the messy facts of history reveals. Rather, Cubberley (1919) paints an abstract picture of relative social harmony marching along the road of progress:

The history of education is essentially a phase in the history of civilization. School organization and educational theory represent but a small part of the evolution, and must be considered after all as but an expression of the type of civilization which a people has gradually evolved… Its ups and downs have been those of civilization itself, and in consequence any history of education must be in part a history of the progress of the civilization of the people whose educational history is being traced. (p. 2)

Cubberley’s (1919) narrative is predictable enough: good triumphs inevitably, and the evidence, of course, resides in the very existence of the U.S. and its public education system. The story would not be complete if Cubberley (1919) had not gone on, as he did, to triumphantly trace the roots of American society exclusively to European sources arguing that it was Christianity that preserved the civilized culture of ancient Greece following the wreck of the Middle Ages allowing the modern era to emerge. Rather casually Cubberley (1919) goes on to explain the “discovery and settlement of America” (p. 11) as a carry over effect of the sense of adventure engendered by the Crusades.

In the process, Cubberley (1919) offers no mention of the tumultuous, violent and uneven transition from feudalism to capitalism or the diverse interactions with, and crimes against, the hundreds of distinct Native American civilizations that populated the Americas, many of whom continue to struggle to survive in what has been referred to as the *colonial present* (Grande, 2015). Cubberley’s (1919) narrative is consequently wholly supportive of not only colonization, but
capitalist production relations, suggesting (by not mentioning them) that bourgeois society is either timeless (i.e. as natural as gravity and thus one of the immutable laws of nature) or is one of the great accomplishments of antiquity preserved, somehow (luckily, it is suggested), by Christianity. As mentioned below by Marx (1857-1858/1973), this is an old ideological tactic used by many elite, ruling classes from era to era, that is, to suggest their time is timeless and thus inevitable and perpetual.

Challenging the rosy picture painted by traditional historians who argue it was the transition from a rural to an urban social context that led to the emergence of public education, Katz (1987) argues a more thorough engagement with the history literature suggesting that the most important development in the United States during the late nineteenth century was the monumental growth of capitalism, which was the real impetus for not only public education, but urbanization and mass immigration. As we will see below the difficulty of capitalists establishing capitalism on the Eastern seaboard of what came to be the United States was due to the overabundance of cheap land made available by the unintentional genocide of Native Americans, a major barrier to establishing the necessary dependence among producers on capitalists for jobs. This nuance is missed by Katz, which greatly impedes his analysis of the emergence of capitalism in the U.S. Consequently, once capitalist production relations appear to be more permanently established the educational needs of capitalists begin to change. However, as we will further illustrate, the radical revisionists challenged the traditional narrative that depicted the growth of common schooling and public education as evidence of the flourishing of democracy and equal opportunity, arguing, instead, that the emergence of alienating and immiserating capitalist production relations and new dehumanizing factory-based means of production led to worker unrest and rebellions leading industrialists to realize workers had to be socialized into capitalist society as a form of social control. This long-held argument, while important for understanding how to subvert capitalist schooling practices and policies, misses an important nuance of the factory machine and how it accelerated the intellectual degradation of individual workers prompting the British government in the mid nineteenth century to pass a series of Factory Acts requiring the
education of child laborers in an attempt to save society from capitalism (Malott and Ford, 2015). While this discussion is important for understanding the depths of capitalism’s tendency to degrade and mangle the human laborer, industrialists, while resisted early attempts of mandated education in England, were soon convinced of the need to control the ideas and beliefs of their workers. That is, the self-empowerment of those relegated to the status of wageworker needed to be eroded and replaced by a sense (i.e. a false consciousness) that the dependence of labor on the capitalist for a job is permanent, inevitable, and beneficial to the working-class. In other words, the production relations between workers and capitalists needed to be cemented in the minds of workers as permanently fixed and thus normal and natural. Offering another insight into the changing educational needs of an emerging capitalist class, Bowles and Gintis (1976) point out that ideologically, feudalism was informed by a religious interpretation of the world where one’s social rank or position was not understood to be the product of a political history of conquests and subjugations, or even the outcome of one’s own intelligence and drive, but preordained by God rendering any challenges to the caste system or one’s place within it as an attack on, and thus, a crime against, God.

Bourgeois society, on the other hand, is based upon an ideology of freedom and equality, while actually practicing an historical process of inequality and dehumanization. Consequently, unlike in feudalism, in capitalist democracies (i.e. bourgeois society), there exists an obvious contradiction between discourse and practice that has created a need for a series of cultural/ideological/political institutions (such as schools, the state, religion, the public relations advertising firm, the media spectacle, etc.) whose purpose is to both train workers in the necessary skills for productive labor as well as to manufacture consent through ideological indoctrination. Following Bowles and Gintis (1976), we can call this the purpose of education in capitalist society, which changes over time, and from region to region, depending on capital’s changing needs.

The dominant ideology also changes as it is met with and challenged by, the collective agency of various strata of labor and non-capitalists, from unions, settler-state
environmentalists, to Indigenous revolutionaries and sovereigns to Black Lives Matter rebels.

However, these and many other developments (some of which are discussed below) were not greeted with open arms by the history of education establishment. Katz (1987) dedicates a substantial part of his book, *Reconstructing American Education*, to discussions on the severe backlash against what were new developments in American history and the history of American education. Katz (1987) concludes that because of the new critical scholarship, the old story lines could no longer be used. As a result, new narratives were constructed or developed by bourgeois historians that seemed to be dedicated to downplaying the significance of capitalism in the history of American education. Summarizing this tendency Katz (1987) argues:

...Even critics of the new history of education admit that a simple narrative of the triumph of benevolence and democracy can no longer be offered seriously by any scholar even marginally aware of recent writing in the field. The problem for critics, therefore, has been twofold: the destruction of critical historians' credibility and the construction of an alternative and equally plausible interpretation of the educational past...At their worst, the new critics have descended to falsification, distortion, and ad hominem attacks as they have tried to build an apologist case for American education...One major intellectual goal has animated the work of the new critics since the 1970s: as much as possible, they want to loosen the connections between education and social class in America’s past and present. (pp. 136-137)

Katz is documenting here the back and forth between scholars of the history of education and the role the critical revisionists played in transforming the field. We might argue that the 1960s revolution in the history of education failed to adequately critique the narratives and assumptions surrounding the colonization of the Americas. If traditional history of education scholars failed to engage virtually all of the latest research in history, much of which came to rather revolutionary conclusions, the critical or Marxist revisionists seemed to have missed new developments in history pertaining to the colonial era, as suggested above. The following section is therefore crucial in bringing to the surface
the significance of the colonial era in the establishment of global capitalism and creating the capitalist need for a common system of mass education around the 1840s.

**The Colonial Era**

The discovery of America was another development of the desire for travel and discovery awakened by the Crusades...After the first century of exploration of the new continent had passed, and after the claims as to ownership had been largely settled, colonization began. (Cubberley, 1919, p. 11)

Cubberley’s (1919) quote (and the history of education book it was taken from more generally) represents a combination of what Katz (1987) describes as a pre-twentieth-century approach that seeks “direct and superficial causes—such as an unmediated link between immoral behavior and poverty” and the approach of “the first social scientists in the 1890s” who “viewed the world as an immensely complex series of interconnecting variables mutually reacting to one another” (p. 140). Katz (1987) argues that interdependence “signals a retreat from any attempt to find a principle or core within a social system,” consequently, “the levers of change remain obscure and no basis exists for moral judgment” (p. 140). Clearly, Cubberley’s (1919) explanation for European expansion and colonial pursuits as the result of a thirst for adventure can be described as “superficial” and “lacking in moral judgment.” Cubberley’s (1919) larger discussion of the history of education is unapologetically Euro-centric. We can observe this legacy of pro-capitalist Euro-centric apology reproduced in history of education textbooks in the decades following Cubberley. Vassar’s (1965) history of American education text offers an example:

The missionary organizations were far more successful in their endeavors among the Negroes than among the Indians...in this great crusade...developing honest hard working Christian slaves...A large population [of Native
Americans were not slaves [adding to the difficulty of educating Indians]. (Vassar, 1965, pp. 11-12)

While Cubberley's (1919) Euro-centrism stems from his glaring omission of even the mention of a Native American presence, Vassar's (1965) narrative is equally Euro-centric, but for implying that the assimilation of Native Americans into mainstream America represents a “great crusade.” That is, Vassar (1965) presents colonialism, a process that led to centuries of physical, biological, and cultural genocide, as a positive force. What Vassar (1965) does not explicitly state, but implies, is that bourgeois society represents a more advanced stage in human social development as compared to not just Europe’s feudal societies, but pre-Columbian Native American societies as well. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, the racism and white supremacy of bourgeois historians was either not discussed by the radical revisionists, or they themselves reproduced it:

The Western frontier was the nineteenth-century land of opportunity. In open competition with nature, venturesome white adventurers found their own levels, unfettered by birth or creed. The frontier was a way out—out of poverty, out of dismal factories, out of crowded Eastern cities. The frontier was the Great Escape. (Bowles and Gintis, 1976, p. 3)

We present Cubberley (1919) and Vassar (1965) next to Bowles and Gintis (1976) to demonstrate both the difference and continuity between traditional, conservative education historians and Marxist education historians on the issue of colonialism/Westward expansion. As previously suggested, Bowles and Gintis’ (1976) somewhat apologetic statement on the colonization of the Americas is not a position they borrowed from Marx for Marx was well aware of the barbaric destructiveness the expansion of capital had on the non-capitalist and non-Western societies it expanded into.

What is most obvious here is Bowles and Gintis’ (1976) empathy for the children and grand-children of the expropriated peasant-proprietors of Europe who were
“chastised for their enforced transformation into vagabonds and paupers” (Marx, 1867/1967, p. 734). The acknowledgement of the destructive and oppressive nature of capitalism here represents a clear break from the corporate apologist narratives that have dominated before and since Bowles and Gintis (1976). However, at the same time, there is a haunting silence within Bowles and Gintis’ narrative seemingly more interested in the fate of immigrant laborers than the ancient tribes and confederacies that continue to struggle to survive within a colonial present that can too easily seem perpetual or permanent. This exclusionary tendency within the Marxist tradition, despite the contrary testimony of Marx’s own work, has contributed to an unfortunate misunderstanding of the contributions of Marx.

Even progressive education historians in the 1980s and beyond continued to reproduce colonialist narratives. Button and Provenzo (1983/1989), for example, after explaining the colonization of the Americas as the result of a growing middle-class gaining wealth from a period of “peace, prosperity and trade” (p. 6), portray Native Americans as the helpless, primitive victims of progress:

The Native Americans...belonged to hundreds of tribes with almost as many different languages. In general, they had little in common with one another and did not unite to resist the settlement of their lands by the early colonists. The existence of numerous rivers and harbors, of a moderate climate, and natives unorganized for resistance, made North America splendid for colonization, if not for immediate exploitation. (p. 6)

After offering a contradictory paragraph on the next page regarding Native American resistance in what is now Virginia, Button and Provenzo (1983/1989) seem to offer this short passage as their explanation for the disappearance of Native Americans on the Eastern seaboard—an assumption that is patently false. Even more recent history of education texts written from progressive, constructivist perspectives too often reproduce the old colonial narratives:
Native Americans...were a diverse and occasionally contentious population, embracing hundreds of different social and cultural groupings. The vast majority lived in agricultural and hunting societies, cast on a scale considerably smaller than European nations, even if there were exceptions in certain tribal confederations. Although the American Indian population was substantial, it was spread thinly across the landscape. Divided into relatively small and isolated tribes and without advanced military technology, the Native Americans were often unable to resist the demands of Europeans in disputes over land or other issues. As a consequence, they were readily defeated, exploited, and pushed out of the way to make room for the expanding White population. (Rury, 2013, p. 27)

It is astonishing that a book published in 2013 called *Education and Social Change* would continue to depict American Indians or Native Americans as primitive victims helpless against the powerful onslaught of Europe’s superiority. If the many interpretations of Marx’s work all tend to embrace the ethics of international solidarity among the world’s oppressed peoples, then why have Marxists, of all people, too often been silent on the long legacy of colonialism? The most plausible explanation for this silence has to do with Marx’s early work that viewed colonialism as a positive force (Marx, 2007). If mainstream Marxism tends to be based on the Communist Manifesto, which is situated within the assumption that colonialism is a positive, civilizing force because it is a necessary step toward socialism, then this confusion can partly be explained by the complexity of Marx himself. That is, because of the enormity of Marx’s body of work, and because he was perpetually and rigorously advancing his ideas and deepening his insights, his positions on various topics like colonialism changed over time.

Consequently, it is easy to understand how Marx’s work can lead to many different versions of Marxism (Hudis, 2012). Much of Marx’s late writings (a great deal still unpublished), which have been largely discounted as the product of a liberal turn, boredom, or triviality (Anderson, 2010), contain explorations into gender equality within non-Western societies, for example, offering a substantial challenge to the
homogenizing drive of the global expansion of capitalism through colonialism. In other words, it seems as if Marx began to conclude that the challenges of creating a post-capitalist global society are so enormous, all of humanity’s gifts are needed, from our intellectual endowments to our vast cultural, linguistic, and ethnic diversity. However, even in Marx’s most known work, Volume I of Capital (1867/1967), a clear understanding of the destructive role of colonialism’s primitive accumulation is expressed:

The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of primitive accumulation. (pg. 751)

However, while mainstream textbooks tend to continue to reproduce dominant narratives ignoring such critical insights regarding the very early roots of capitalism as a global system, an early partial-exception to the rule is Joel Spring’s (1986/1994) The American School, which dedicated individual chapters to various ethnic groups, including Native Americans and African Americans, for example. However, Springs’ (1986/1994) engagement with indigenous communities begins in the mid-nineteenth century, skipping the entire colonial era thereby leaving the legitimacy of the colonial expansion of capital’s bourgeois society unaddressed. Outside of the history of education discipline there exists a vast body of critical pedagogy work that addresses, in various ways, the history of education as revolutionary pedagogy challenging all that is dehumanizing from the rule of capital, the colonial present, to the new Jim Crow and racism without race. Before we move on, it is worth noting that even David Boers’ (2007) History of American Education Primer, published in a well-respected critical education series, begins his book with a familiar story:

The evolution of American education has occurred since our nation was founded in the 1600s. Jonathon
Winthrop and his band of followers sought to avoid religious persecution in England. They sailed to America and began to set up communities in the New England area that were meant to be models for what would eventually become American society. (p. 1)

It is bewildering that well-established history of education scholars would continue to reproduce the simplistic argument that it was religious persecution alone, existing in a vacuum, that accounts for the first permanent, English settlements in America. Fortunately, there exists other history of education texts offering some diversity of narrative. For example, and to their credit, Wayne Urban and Jennings Wagoner (2009), in the fourth edition of their text, *American Education: A History*, reassess the old narrative reproduced by Boers (2007), arguing, instead, that the colonies were not established with the intention of building a new society, but rather, were a business venture, that is, an investment opportunity. To understand the first New Englanders’ relationship with pre-existing indigenous confederacies, it is important to remember that the colonists faced the continent and its communities as religiously-mediated investors who came from a pre-existing English capitalist society that had long been primitively accumulated and normalized and naturalized traditions of private property and a market in human labor.

In Jamestown, VA, the continent’s first permanent English settlement established in 1607, relied on a friendly relationship with the local Powhatan Confederacy for their own survival and for the success of their investment. However, the capitalist purpose of the colony, and thus its very existence, presented a major barrier to peace. At the same time, renowned American Indian historian, Robert Venables (1994), makes a compelling case that, before dissolving, the relationship between the colony and the Powhatan Confederacy was mutually beneficial.

...The London Company’s investment in the highly profitable tobacco plantation business relied on peaceful relations with the local Powhatan Confederacy. Tobacco farmers supplied Powhatans with trade goods in exchange for food, which allowed colonists to invest
their labor in the cash crop not worrying much about food. Powhatan’s access to trade goods allowed them to grow stronger and defeat their rivals to the west thereby gaining access to trade with the copper-producing Indians of the Great Lakes (Venables, 2004, Pp. 81)

Clearly, Venables (2004) does not see the Powhatans’ as helpless victims, but as savvy negotiators committed to their own national interests. However, because of the labor-intensive nature of tobacco production and because of its profitability as a use-value, by 1619 a Dutch ship brought the first shipment of African slave-laborers to Virginia to keep pace with the demand for labor. Because of these reasons, it also made more sense to focus labor on tobacco production and continue to rely on the Powhatans for food. Consequently, fifteen years after their arrival, the colonists continued to rely on the Native communities for food, which might not have been a problem, but their numbers were forever growing, therefore placing increasing pressure on the Powhatan’s food supply.

The colonists also came to the Americas with an old racist ideology stemming from an invented, Christian-related, European identity (Mohawk, 1992), which resulted in a long legacy of colonists viewing and treating Native Americans as inferior. Consequently, it was not uncommon for colonists to disregard Powhatan national authority and settle land without compensation or consultation, leading to tension and conflict with Native communities. Perhaps one of the last straws was the colonialists’ plans to establish an Indian college, which American Indians saw for themselves no advantages. It was understood that adopting the settlers capitalistic ways would give the elites among the new settlers a major advantage by stripping the Powhatans of their own economy and means to satisfy and expand their needs. If the foreign capitalist becomes the ruler of the land, then the American Indians would forever be subordinate in the relationship. Eventually, having their land-base, food supply, culture, and very existence threatened, the Powhatans decided to terminate the colony. Commenting on this decision Venables (2004) explains:
In 1622 Powhatan warriors, intimately familiar with colonists routines from being their primary food vendor, simultaneously struck 31 locations across a 70 mile area killing nearly 350 of a population of 1200. (Pp. 81-82)

In the aftermath, hundreds of settlers sailed back to England. Cut off from their food supply as many as five hundred more colonists die of starvation that winter. As a result, James I took over the London Company’s investment. That is, having been operated as a private venture for the first 17 years, Virginia, “became a royal colony in 1624 and control transferred to the Crown appointed governor” (Urban & Wagoner, Pp. 18). While this was an important development, following Venables (2004) and other historians, the ten years of bloody war that followed and the ways Indian policy were forever transformed (from co-existence to extermination), have had far more serious implications for the fate of the indigenous communities in North America (and the world over). According to Venables (2004), “the 1622 attack did more than merely define future Indian policy in Virginia as one of conquest...It encouraged an already existent English colonial attitude of racial superiority” (p. 84). For example, after learning of the Powhatan war, the Pilgrims in Massachusetts erected a fort fearing the Narragansetts. However, the struggle for the Eastern seaboard was ultimately determined in 1633/1634 as smallpox wiped out Indians in a massive epidemic. Puritans, as might be expected, viewed this unintentional genocide as an act of God. Governor Winthrop:

If God were not pleased with our inheriting these parts, why did he drive out the natives before us? And why does he still make room for us by diminishing them as we increase? (Quoted in Venables, 2004,Pp. 89)

Following conquest, and the finalization of the process of westward expansion, settler-state policy toward indigenous communities has consistently eroded indigenous independence/sovereignty, characterized by paternalism, indifference, and exploitative abuse. The boarding school era is a case in point. As is demonstrated throughout this section,
the failure to critically engage the legacy of colonialism and expansion within the history of education is a failure to fully grasp what Marx characterized as the global expansion of capitalism and bourgeois society.

**The Common School Era**

As Native Americans were being pushed west into *Indian Territory* and the process of physically expanding the social universe of capital across the continent was under way, the middle-class, Calvinist, Massachusetts education crusader of the mid nineteenth century, Horace Mann, worked hard to establish a state system of common schooling for all children (which, during the mid-1800s, meant white children). Educational historians, from conservative traditionalists, progressives, to Marxists, concede the importance of the first successful common school movement to the development of the United States. That is, because of the central importance regarding Horace Mann in colleges of education across the United States (he is the equivalent of the founding father of public education in the US who realized the vision of Thomas Jefferson’s failed proposals, at both the state and national level, for a General Diffusion of Education, penned with an eye toward greater participation, at least for white males), Katz’ (1975) and Bowles and Gintis’ (1976) challenge to how he had traditionally been conceptualized represents a paradigm shift in the field. However, as we will see below, these new, critical narratives focused on bringing to the surface the importance of social class in explaining why common schools were ultimately supported by industrial capitalists, but do not situate the process of capitalistic expansion within the context of Native American subjugation and agency, which one would expect given their silence on the issue in general. Our intention here is to highlight the important contributions of the critical education historians while simultaneously contributing to the discussion. Summarizing the dominant view of Horace Mann in their book, *History of Education and Culture in America*, Button and Provenzo (1983/1989) offer the following analysis:
Historians have tended to look upon the Common School Movement in wholly positive terms. The traditional wisdom has been that by providing free universal elementary education, the common schools were important vehicles of social reform that provided opportunities for newly arrived immigrants and the poor to improve the conditions of their lives and those of their children. Led by idealistic and humanitarian intellectuals, an enlightened working class was able to overcome the narrow interests of not only the wealthy elite, but also the conservative religious groups. (pg. 93-94)

This traditional narrative that replaces class struggle with educational attainment as the true path to economic advancement is more or less today’s rallying cry of progressive educators fighting for public education and its necessary funding. For Mann, however, as Secretary of Education of Massachusetts with a background in law, prosperity came not from education, but it stemmed from the rapid expansion and development of capitalism. The role of education was to provide workers and immigrants with the proper moral foundation (Cremin, 1957). Mann believed that if the children of workers and capitalists alike attended the same schools, workers would develop a life-long loyalty for the bosses and industry. This was the basis for Mann’s so-called moral education. Mann’s reports and speeches were therefore filled with vague relationships between intelligence and poverty. For his moral curriculum Mann held all the pedagogical sophistication of his day conscious that a student-centered pedagogy was fundamental to the common schools’ success because a child will not really learn and internalize the lessons unless he is engaged and genuinely committed to the learning experience (Cremin, 1957).

As was the case with the transition from feudalism to capitalism, bourgeois society is being portrayed here as the embodiment of freedom of opportunity and thus equality. Marx argues that the mistake social-reformers make is believing that the freedom and equality promised by bourgeois society is actually possible within the production relations of capital. Mann demonstrated no real understanding of capitalism and the way its internal drive to limitlessly expand value will always lead to the premature exhaustion and death
of the laborer unless regulated by policy, or slowed down by working class resistance. But the whole legacy of education reform, especially since the Great Depression of 1929, including the Civil Rights Movement that made equal educational opportunity one of its central rallying cries, is based on the cruel illusion that enough social justice can be obtained within capitalism thereby inadvertently working as a counter-revolutionary force against the full emancipation of the global proletarian class camp.

At the same time, popular movements, such as the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s in the United States that led to the social movement era of the 1960s and 1970s represents the developing sophistication of the theory and practice of a movement with very deep roots. Today this legacy can be witnessed in the riots in Ferguson sparked by the police murder of Michael Brown to the outright uprising in Baltimore, MD as a response to the police murder of Freddy Grey, which, like in Ferguson and elsewhere, just happened to be the tipping point in a city whose African American communities have been suffering under more than forty years of savage poverty, and the centuries old racist scapegoating and violence of a crisis-ridden capitalist system.

The Marxist history of education we have constructed views the global proletarian class camp, including labor movements, the colonial resistances of Indigenous nations, the Civil Rights Movement that developed into a more militant and revolutionary Black Panther Party for Self Defense, the teacher and professor movement against high stakes testing, privatization, and school closures, etc. as past and present influences—even if none of our influences are without at least some critique. What all of these movements teach us is that material conditions and the dominant discourses that justify and mystify them should never be accepted or internalized passively. These conditions and discourses need to be critically analyzed. The traditional narrative regarding the emergence of common schools, for example, falsely portrays their emergence as stemming from the needs and desires of the American people, rather than a system that seems to have been imposed on labor to serve the needs and interests of capital, as argued throughout this essay.

Offering an example of the traditional narrative of the common school era Cubberley (1919) argues that its
emergence in the 1840s, beginning in New England, represents a move toward secularization, which was a response to the country's "shifting needs" from "religious" to "industrial and civic and national needs" (p. 172). For Cubberley, then, common schooling was not a response to the changing needs of the elite, but reflected the needs and desires of the majority of the population. In the dominant discourse the people are never described as the working class, and therefore not directly connected to the capitalist class in a production relation, whose productive capacity, beyond what is socially necessary for survival, is appropriated by the capitalist for the self-expansion of capital. Horace Mann, in fact, viewed this kind of class analysis that connects the wealth of the capitalist to the unpaid labor hours of workers, as dangerous and the product of uncivilized revolutionizers who do not possess the proper moral, religious foundation.

This process, whose internal drive is for perpetually expanding surplus value and therefore tends toward the immiseration of labor, is fundamentally alienating (i.e. separating the individual from her or his very humanity), which led Bowles and Gintis (1976) to conclude that industrialists came to understand that to prevent working class resistance, workers require ideological management. Horace Mann was fearful of the power of organized labor (remember, labor had a long history of having the ability to demand high wages because of the availability of cheap land). Mann therefore believed that society's salvation rested on taming the laboring masses to ensure they do not destroy God's society through strikes and other labor actions Mann considered to be crimes (Cremin, 1957). Through his work crusading for common schooling Mann developed a series of additional arguments for why common schooling should be supported, which he seemed to employ depending upon who his audience was.

For industrial capitalists, Mann had two primary lines of reasoning. First, an educated worker, it was argued, is more passive and controllable because he will have grown up with the children of the bosses and more successfully indoctrinated with the idea that capitalism is inevitable and the capitalists are wise and just and thus the saviors of the peasants of feudalism, and the peoples of every other primitive society in the world (i.e. the world). More fully expanding on this logic
Bowles and Gintis (1976) offer an important analysis noting that:

Inequality was increasingly difficult to justify and was less readily accepted. The simple legitimizing ideologies of the earlier periods—the divine origin of social rank, for example—had fallen under the capitalist attack on royalty, and the traditional landed interests. The broadening of the electorate and of political participation generally—first sought by the propertied and commercial classes in their struggle against the British Crown—threatened soon to become a powerful instrument in the hands of the farmers and workers...The process of capitalist accumulation drastically changed the structure of society: The role of the family in production was greatly reduced; its role in reproduction was increasingly out of touch with economic reality. A permanent proletariat and an impoverished and, for the most part, ethnically distinct, reserve army of unemployed had been created...With increasing urgency, economic leaders sought a mechanism to insure political stability and the continued profitability of their enterprises. (p. 159)

Clearly, Bowles and Gintis (1976) offer a sophisticated framework to understand the emergence of common schooling. After all, the transition from feudalism and the old apprentice system that ties many individual families to specific types of labor activity to capitalism and the rapid spread of a generalized market in labor was not just an economic transformation, but impacted the entire social universe including the family structure, the legal system, the holdings of land, and so on. Given such monumental revolutionary changes, it is not surprising that the conscious molding of the public mind through education would come to play such a central role in these processes.

The other argument Mann had for capitalists appealed to the religious background of most, if not all, of Americas’ New England capitalists. That is, he talked a lot about capitalists as stewards of the Earth, who should give back a little in the form of taxes to fund common schools, an act God would certainly smile upon. They would also secure a positive legacy for themselves among mortals. This argument tends to be the one reproduced in history of education books
conveniently forgetting to mention its connection to social control to subvert working class resistance against the destructive process of the self-expansion of capital. For example, Gerald Gutek (1970), in his book, *An Historical Introduction to American Education*, creates a narrative that matches Katz’ (1987) description of the narratives created by traditional historians to counter the new research produced in the 1960s by critical education historians:

In framing his appeal for a tax-supported system of common schools, Mann developed a theory of humane and responsible capitalism which greatly resembled the stewardship concept contained in the Protestant ethic...Mann saw the abuses in the ruthless capitalism of the nineteenth century, he believed in working with the system rather than against it. (p. 56)

Where Cubberley (1919) fails to mention the working class, the capitalist class, or even capitalism, Gutek (1970) recasts capitalism from an inherently oppressive social relation to a reformed and socially responsible harmonious utopia. Before the criticalists shifted the paradigm, education historians, such as Cubberley (1919), were able to construct a purely ideological fantasy world characterized by vast omissions. For example, Cubberley (1919) identifies the movement for common schooling as a response to Americans’ push for “secularization,” but offers no evidence that Americans were becoming less religious. Cubberley attempts to argue that Mann’s response to Americans’ demand for secularization was a nondenominational form of common schooling. Since Bowles and Gintis (1976), however, it has become clear that the push for nondenominational approaches to common schooling reflected a desire to attract all segments of U.S.-born and immigrant American workers to attend schools because issues of social control and worker militancy were escalating striking fear in the hearts of the industrial capitalist class. This, then, is the third argument Mann used, that is, his argument to convince workers to attend his schools, especially Irish Catholics who were naturally suspicious of Mann because of his Protestant, colonizing background. It is also apparent in the above excerpt that Bowles and Gintis (1976), following Marx, hone in on the transition from feudalism to capitalism as an important period rendering the process of formal...
schooling increasingly important. Speaking more directly to this issue Bowles and Gintis (1976) argue:

In the United States, unlike Europe, market and property institutions were developed and strengthened quite rapidly. For preindustrial America already possessed essential elements of a capitalist class structure. United States capitalism sprang from a colonial social structure closely tailored to the needs of British mercantile society. Whereas, in Europe, the transformation of property relations in land from a system of traditional serfdom and feudal obligation to the capitalist form of private ownership required half a millennium of conflict and piecemeal change, in the United States, private property was firmly established from the outset. Only in seventeenth-century New England did land-use patterns approximate communal property relations of an earlier European era. In areas held by Native Americans, communal property relations also predominated... However, the emergence of a developed market in labor, perhaps the most critical aspect of capitalist growth, involved at least two centuries of protracted and often bitter struggle. (p. 58)

It is interesting that Bowles and Gintis (1976) do not make the connection between establishing a market in labor and the inter-related, yet separated, processes of the westward expansion of the primitive accumulation of Native American land, and then the process of blocking working class direct access to its natural material wealth to which human labor is added in hopes of increasing its use value. The difficulty of this process, as discussed by Marx above, contributed to both the growth of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, and the elite insight that labor will not voluntarily appropriate themselves from the earth and their own humanity. In light of these comments, we can conclude that education, as well as laws and practices such as artificially inflating the price of land to prevent working-class access, assisted in the establishment of a stable market in labor.

**Conclusion: Looking at the Global Class War**

The competitive drive among capitalists for progressively greater and cheaper sources of labor power, raw materials,
and new markets led to a series of stages or eras identified by V.I. Lenin in his globally influential pamphlet, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, and recently updated in a book by the Party for Socialism and Liberation (PSL) (2015), *Imperialism in the Twenty First Century: Updating Lenin’s Theory a Century Later*. Summarizing this movement of capital Lenin argued that during Marx’s time capitalists competed amongst themselves nationally in leading capitalist nations, the U.S., England, France, and Germany in particular, which led to national monopolies.

The General Law of Accumulation identified by Marx (1867/1967) then led capitalist nations to face each other in competition over the dividing up of Africa and East Asia in particular. The imperialist nations, argued Lenin, underwent significant shifts such as exporting capital rather than products of labor, which was made possible by the merging of bank capital with industrial capital giving way to financial capital, which occurred during capital’s earlier monopoly phase of development. Imperialist capital was becoming a more globalized and dominating force (PSL, 2015).

Lenin emphasized how such imperialist tendencies emerged within competing capitalist nations not as the product of particular policy choices, but as a result of the internal laws of capitalist accumulation that Marx (1867/1967) repeatedly pointed out acted upon individual capitalists as an external coercive force (PSL, 2015). In fact, in every stage of the development of capital the laws of accumulation compel capitalists to act in particular kinds of savage ways or be driven out of business by their competitors. This tendency remains true today. In other words, U.S. imperialism is not the product of a group of evil Republicans and corrupted Democrats who have subverted the “democratic” process, but rather reflect the current stage in the historical development of capital, which can only be temporarily slowed down, it cannot be reformed out of capital. Only a worldwide working class revolution can transcend imperialist capitalism. Our Marxist historiography must be employed in the service of this anti-capitalist movement. Central to imperialism is settler-state colonialism. The sovereignty and self-determination of colonized Indigenous and oppressed nations must therefore be a central focus of a communist pedagogy and Marxist history of education.
Once the world was divided up into colonies controlled by the Imperialist nations, the only path to the ongoing expansion required by capital’s laws of accumulation, beyond revolutions in production, was for nations to encroach on each others colonial territories, which Lenin correctly predicted would lead to the World Wars. After World War II the Soviet Union emerged stronger than ever giving way to a global working class socialist camp with Soviet supported socialist countries all over the world. The so-called Cold War consisted of the U.S. and its supporting countries waging a global class war on the socialist bloc. Once the Soviet Union fell, the U.S. emerged as the world’s single capitalist super power targeting independent peripheral capitalist nations able to survive under the protection of the socialist bloc. Again, today’s communist global movement must target U.S. imperialism.

This is the current task of a Marxist historiography in the history of education. That is, the challenge is to uncover the ways today’s education policies in the U.S. and around the world are an expression of the capitalist class’ perpetual war waged on the working class and colonized peoples. This Marxist history of education must advance the rigorous and militant proletarian model of revolution identified by Marx (1852/1972). In other words, a Marxist historiography must be based on Marx and Engels’ (1846/1996) premises of history with an eye toward subverting the process of capital’s self-expansion for communist and sovereign alternatives (i.e. a pedagogy of becoming). This means to cease to exist as alienated labor and to cease to exist as colonized subjects. This might simultaneously mean recovering what has been lost and creating something that never has been.

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Malta hosted the 2015 Commonwealth Heads of Government Forum, known as CHOGM, the second time the country hosted the event in the last ten years. As usual, this forum is preceded by the People’s Forum which takes place in the same host country and which attracts participants from various international NGOs, educators, social activists, professionals and academics, among others.

Given the UN’s 2030 Agenda, Sustainable Development was the theme of this forum which kicked off with an educational session, the Civil Society Dialogue on Education and Sustainable Development in Small States, a day long session held on Saturday 21 November. The actual title of the day forum was ‘Transformative Education and Sustainable Development in Small States: Building resilience through skills and livelihoods.’ The forum raised themes that are of interest to the ongoing conversations regarding postcolonial education and which will be the focus of this report. This particular forum was ably put together by a Maltese social activist, Vincent Caruana and International Social Development Consultant, Fatimah Kelleher.

Participants came from a range of countries such as New Zealand, Cyprus, Samoa, Tonga, Lesotho, Malta, Bahamas, Fiji, Tanzania (Zanzibar) and Mauritius. The presence of participants from small island states reflects the importance given to these states or what are called ‘developing’ small island states by the UN in its 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda documents. The setting for this forum and potential themes were laid out, at the forum’s
opening, by Kruse-Vaai from the National University of Samoa. Prominent among the themes, and of great relevance to the journal, was ‘colonialism and its legacies’ that was given extensive treatment in the opening presentation by Joel Warrican from the University of the West Indies Open Campus.

His presentation focused on postcolonial curricula. He demonstrated how a thematic dialogical approach to concepts of sustainability can be woven into the curricula which need to be developed in such a way that one does not throw out the knowledge and core competences baby with the colonial ‘banking education’ bathwater. Echoes of Paulo Freire and Franz Fanon reverberated throughout his and discussant, Shaun Grech’s (Manchester Metropolitan University and The Critical Institute) address at the end of the morning session, Grech himself a key contributor to praxis concerning disability in the Global South (he is the founding editor of a journal and a book series in the area).

Themes regarding biodiversity, education for sustainable development (ESD) and their relation to power were broached by other speakers. Paul J. Pace from the University of Malta’s Centre for Environmental Education & Research, discussed trends in ESD. He concluded his talk with reference to the Eco-schools project in his country, Eco schools being given importance in another ‘on the ground presentation’, a recorded one, by Marcia D Musgrove from the Bahamas Reef Environment Education Foundation. Other ‘on the ground projects, this time involving university partnerships were presented by environmental social scientist, Nicholas Watts who also spoke about the ‘Blue Economy’ regarding communities of fishers. Higher education for transformation was also the theme of Kavriaj Sukon’s presentation from the Open University of Mauritius.

My contribution to the meeting was to raise issues of critical education, sustainable development and power in my presentation concerning a critically engaged pedagogy. I made extensive reference to transformative learning as developed by Paulo Freire, in his later years, and his legatees with reference to the Carta da Terra (Earth Charter) and the thematic complexes chosen for the popular public schools when Freire was Education Secretary in the Municipal Government of São Paulo. The notion of lifelong learning, as promoted by the UN
in its 2030 Agenda, was unpacked with a critique of its recent OECD and EU-induced economistic baggage.

Also focusing on the issue of education and power was the presentation by fellow Maltese academic and social movement activist, Maria Pisani, founder of Integra Foundation. Her presentation on migration across the Mediterranean, as well across the globe, with its colonizing foundation, broached pertinent areas such as questioning the citizenship assumption in critical education concerning the oppressed (in her case migrants), intersectionality, the subaltern migrants lack of safety to speak, social movement organisation and their successes (reference to her direct involvement in coordinated protests against a government-attempted ‘push back’ policy regarding migrants) and indeed colonialism itself.

Other subaltern groups were the focus of presentations at this forum including the disabled, the focus of the presentation of Nkasi Sefuthi from the Lesotho National Federation of Organisations of the Disabled.

Issues arising from activism within movements and organisations were provided by Omar Mattar Tajir from ZAYADESA (youth and livelihoods education and the environment) in Zanzibar, a presentation which raised, at least in my mind, questions regarding the legacies or otherwise of the massive reforms introduced by Tanzania (Zanzibar forms part of this country), under the presidency of Julius K.Nyerere, a key figure in African decolonizing politics. This presentation touched on the role of CSOs (civil society organisations), and their capacity building, with regard to developing sustainable development. The CSO theme was also addressed by Felicity Humblestone from the Bahamas and by Timote Vaioleti, the latter from an adult education perspective given that the speaker belongs to the Asia South Pacific Association of Basic and Adult Education, as well as being a teacher-educator at Waikato University, New Zealand.

A synthesis of main points from the presentations and ensuing discussions was agreed in the afternoon workshop with a view to presenting them as signposts for future policies among stakeholders, including policy representatives from different Commonwealth countries. A group of participants
from this forum met these policy representatives the following Tuesday at the same venue.

Here are some of the main points selected for presentation to policy makers: Re-conceptualization of education and lifelong learning that should not be limited to employability’ and the economy but entail a holistic and humanistic approach with people as social actors, both as individuals and as members of a collectivity (self-and collectively directed learners), for Sustainable Development. This has implications for a globalised curriculum not only for small states and small island ‘developing’ states (SIDS) but also for ‘developed’, mainly Northern, countries. There was a case made for going beyond the mere functional form of old and new literacies, including digital literacies, to incorporate what Paulo Freire would call ‘critical literacy’, that is the ability to read/write the word and the world. This necessitates a safe space for critical thinking without fear, including the fear of freedom and change.

The conference highlighted a call for policies alert to the demands of several marginalised populations. These policies would entail bottom up approaches to policy formulation that involve the traditionally voiceless and emphasise the right to livelihood and basic human dignity as an essential feature of a genuinely inclusive and transformative education and a more socially-just and ecologically responsible society. Citizenship is often a means of exclusion and this situation needs to be addressed. There is a need to develop policies that protect environmental refugees, given that climate change was an important topic in this forum and was shown to hit hardest the formerly directly-colonised populations in the South. In this respect, we require policies that facilitate safe and legal migration for all, in keeping, I would add, with the spirit of the 1951 Geneva Convention.

The forum called on policy makers to seek to develop education curricula that impart the necessary communication skills to bridge the gap between disabled and non-disabled. Furthermore, in a vein that accommodates postcolonial and decolonizing thinking, it called on policy makers to develop curricula characterised, as in the case of the Kiribati Climate Change initiative, by a combination of local knowledge systems and modern technology. Policy makers are also called on to recognise the contextual bases of learning and education
when borrowing from best practices from abroad. As Freire argues, experiments cannot be transplanted but must be reinvented.

The Commonwealth might be viewed with suspicion by those bent on decolonizing approaches to education and action but events such as the People’s Forum offer important spaces for people from different parts of the postcolonial world, notably activists, to come together and place on the agenda important issues that need to be confronted in the spirit of realizing some of the UN goals. In the 2005 Malta Forum, the education session addressed the Millennium Development Goals. This time the focus is on the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda goals. One hopes that these goals do not remain a mere pipe dream, as in the case of the EU poverty reduction agenda for 2020 (rather than decrease, the EU poverty figure is set to increase from 80 million to a 100 million by 2020). As stated, time and time again during this opening part of the People’s Forum, further decolonizing approaches to education are key in this regard. Hope springs eternal!
How might educators understand the nature of their task in today’s world? Of course, there is no one answer to the question. It might be argued that, in the “West”, where affluence abounds and peace is relatively common, the forces of global competition have functioned to situate research output as central to higher education (Lynch, 2014; Woeleer & Yates, 2014). Within compulsory education, high-stakes testing may result in the ultimate sign of success being understood as moving up the ladder of achievement in numeracy and literacy (Klenowski & Wyatt-Smith, 2011; Lewis & Hardy, 2014).

It may just be that this kind of focus for educators in the West (such as myself) is symptomatic of our affluence and high standard of living. Perhaps it is no surprise, then, that alongside measurements of literacy and numeracy, there is an increased interest in the metrics of happiness. The most materially well-off in the world have the means to build “wellbeing centres” and focus on developing a positive psychology in our students, ironically perhaps, in order to help them cope with their knowledge of the problems faced by the world “out there” (Waters, 2011). But are we educators happy with the end goal of our work being about little more than developing citizens who, as a result of their strong foundations in reading, writing and arithmetic, contribute to
the national economy and live “happy” lives despite the ongoing problems in our world?

Anthony C. Alessandrini’s latest book, *Frantz Fanon and the Future of Cultural Politics: Finding Something Different*, while not a book written for educators, provides us an opportunity to reconsider some key aspects of our profession. We are encouraged to reflect on the place of the person – of humanism – and how this influences the way we go about life within the social world of culture and politics. In this sense, his work is deeply important for education which, if nothing else, is always necessarily imbricated in the stuff of humans’ lived experiences. Of course, there is no education free from cultural politics. But what might Frantz Fanon have to say for education today? What use is it for a teacher’s practice to reflect on the work of Fanon?

Alessandrini begins the book with an introductory essay that explores the question of how we might treat Fanon fifty years since his death. He writes, ‘If we are to truly keep Frantz Fanon’s legacy alive, it means treating him as a contemporary, testing and critiquing his work accordingly. He will not spare us, and we in turn must not spare him’ (p.3). Fanon’s influence amongst scholars and activists has really always been a posthumous one. And Alessandrini argues that this has meant that ‘Fanon’s readers have produced an ongoing series of appropriations of Fanon’s work’ (p.5).

To see Fanonian studies as engagement with appropriations removes from the critic’s set of tasks the “discovery” and explication of the “real” Fanon. This does not mean that all appropriations of Fanon are equal, but nor does it mean that ‘every appropriation is a misappropriation’ (p.5). At this point, it might appear that there is a risk that to engage with the work of Fanon is simply to ‘wrest him from the past into the present’ (p.6), however, Alessandrini makes clear that an understanding of, and sensitivity toward, the particularity of Fanon’s time and place is essential to a good reading. And so it is that he proposes that the way forward is to take lessons for the contemporary situation in regards to Fanon’s approach to solidarity, but that ‘this can only be approached through an engagement with his singularity’ (p.6). Explaining further, Alessandrini writes:
Fanon’s work provides us with an incredibly useful framework for understanding the fundamentally de-humanizing dynamics of racism and colonialism. But the work that is left to us is to pick up and appropriate this framework in order to apply it to specific historical and political instances, including contemporary political struggles (p.8).

Such a strategic use of a scholar, theorist and activist presents a challenge to educators. Is the educator’s task to teach Fanon in a way that ensures that students have “the facts straight”? Moreover, is the intention when engaging the historical work of Fanon to prove or disprove his own accuracy in describing the political situation in which he found himself?

Of course, these questions can be applied to the teaching of social sciences and the humanities more generally. These questions do not assume that historical accuracy is unimportant (and “accuracy” must be read differently to “truth” or “fact”) but rather assume that the analysis of theory not only help us understand perspectives within a particular historical moment, but also provides us strategic and analytic tools for the problems facing us today. In this respect, Alessandrini uses his analysis of the work of Fanon to read the contemporary event commonly known as the Arab Spring (or African Spring as Alessandrini refers to it) and its aftermath.

In taking this approach, Alessandrini exemplifies his claim that:

...adapting and appropriating Fanon’s work for our own present and future must involve two separate but related forms of labor: first, offering close readings of Fanon’s work that are equal to the complexity and unsparingly revolutionary nature of his writings; and second, appropriating his work in ways that help to create new contexts for anti-racist and anti-colonial thought and action in the present, and that in many cases force us to move beyond the parameters set out in his work (p.15).

For the educator, this provides a dangerous challenge to see the reading of Fanon, and texts generally, as always political. The real challenge here is not for the educator to try and work out how to bring this to their pedagogy, but rather to re-orient their own relationship to a text so that their pedagogy emerges from this new approach. It is a reminder of the way Edward
Said went about his work; assiduous reading that was always politically engaged in the real-world struggles of the contemporary moment. When the educator themselves practices this, their pedagogy will almost certainly reflect the political character and usefulness of the text.

This call to appropriate Fanon’s work for the contemporary moment continues in Chapter One, Reading Fanon Anti-Piously: On the Need to Appropriate. Core to Alessandrini’s argument in this chapter is the claim that, ‘if Fanon’s legacy is to have any real meaning for us today, it will be only insofar as we are able to appropriate his work in order to apply it — with all of its insights and all of its limitations — to the pressing issues of contemporary cultural politics’ (p.23). And this claim becomes, then, the foundation for the book. The rest of the chapter provides an example of how close reading, through the demands of paying careful attention to the details of the text, provides the opportunity to read contemporary questions into the text in ways which allow for appropriation in the best possible way – a good lesson for both students and teachers.

Chapter Two, The Struggle within Humanism: Fanon and Said, provides an analysis of the ways in which both Fanon and Edward Said work through their understandings of humanism. Alessandrini argues the case that while both Fanon and Said renounce an essentialist Eurocentric form of humanism, they nevertheless workout their humanism from within.

Moreover, it would seem that both Fanon and Said do not see anything better than a reconstructed and reconstituted humanism, freed of its universalism and imperial violence. In arguing that Fanon and Said represent emergent forms of humanism as opposed to a residual Enlightenment form, Alessandrini skilfully works through the range of criticisms that both – but especially Said – have encountered for advocating humanism. The importance of their commitment to humanism is, as mentioned earlier, particularly relevant for those in education. There is a sense that the reason both Fanon and Said remain within humanism rather than dismissing it is because their engagement with it functions at the level of political involvement, not philosophical musing. Indeed, educators are also involved in a practice that takes them beyond the
abstract and the hypothetical. In an era where humanism, if acknowledged at all, gets little hearing in education, this chapter by Alessandrini gives a picture of what is at stake politically should we abandon all forms of humanism.

In the next chapter, *The Humanism Effect: Fanon, Foucault, and Ethics without Subjects*, Alessandrini takes his interrogation of humanism further, demonstrating how scholars as theoretically diverse as Fanon and Foucault may actually share an important commitment to a non-essentialist humanism. Particularly important is the way in which Alessandrini avoids the easy slippage into assuming that Foucault and Fanon represent binary positions in regards to humanism. Too often, engagement with the “problem” of humanism suffers this fate. By taking what I regard as a Saidian approach of working the complex issues without the need to initially set-up position A and position B, Alessandrini is able to reveal a shared project aimed at the political defence of human rights without the need for a sovereign human subject.

Such a project has powerful implications for educators insofar as it provides a framework for helping students to develop attitudes that prioritise human rights without universalising the human and thereby committing an act of violence on the necessary “other”. But the process by which we might come to this, if we are to follow Alessandrini’s argument, is certainly not easy – especially if we are thinking of the task faced by teachers in the compulsory years of schooling. The challenge is to create educational opportunities where students’ relationship to the world involves ‘giving of oneself to that which has not yet come into existence, and may never come into existence, but towards which one’s actions are nevertheless aimed’ (p.93). In doing so, rather than beginning with an ideology or ontology of humanism, a “humanism effect” emerges from a relation to the world that works toward it being a better one.

This argument for a humanism (effect) focused on, and arising from, a future that has yet to come into existence is developed further through chapters four, *The Futures of Postcolonial Criticism: Fanon and Kincaid* and five, “Enough of this Scandal”: Reading Gilroy through Fanon, or Who Comes After “Race”? Moreover, there is an extension and elaboration on the view that humanism must be completely re-thought
after colonialism. Indeed, Alessandrini writes, ‘as both Fanon
and Kincaid insist, the only way to “work through” this history
is to imagine the human, not as a category that can be
redeemed or broadened, but as one that has been completely
obliterated and thus must be completely remade’ (p.132).

And part of this re-making, claims Alessandrini, arises
from us being engaged with the ‘trauma’ of colonialism which
is alive today. One way we do this is through the reading of
texts such that transform us into ‘new readers and new
subjects’ (p.134). And this comment is a good example of a
point Alessandrini makes about his use of humanism as both
a concept and a strategy at the beginning of his essay on
reading Gilroy through Fanon. Gilroy and Fanon’s strategic
humanisms share with Foucault, Alessandrini writes, an
orientation towards a ‘future that has not yet come (thus the
need to continuously write and rewrite “the history of the
present”).

In the case of Gilroy and Fanon, the orientation is
specifically towards a radically nonracial future’ (p.139).
Another way of putting this is that their humanism is one that
‘is called from the future’ (p.147), rather than one fixed in its
essence; and thus, it is a strategy. At the time of writing this,
the pages of the newspapers continue to be filled with stories
about Islamic State (IS), the killing of Christians in Egypt and,
here in Australia, the plight of refugee children in detention. It
would be easy for any of us – but perhaps especially our
young people – to develop a sense of hopelessness in the face
of these global problems. As educators, we cannot provide
solutions, but we can provide strategies and we can encourage
solidarity.

The book begun by suggesting that the strategy for
appropriating Fanon involves reading him in his singularity
and through this, we learn about solidarity. That is, not only
might we find solidarity with Fanon, bringing him into the
contemporary context, but we are challenged to stand in
solidarity with our contemporaries engaged in political
struggles. But we must work through just how it is that we
are able to understand, read and participate in these political
struggles. As Alessandrini points out,

National independence may indeed be the indispensable
condition for the human liberation that Fanon is calling us
towards, but he takes pains to point out that “independence” itself is not a magic formula that will set the colonized free. Similarly, “true liberation” is not the automatic or natural outcome of national independence; while the latter is the condition of the former, it will not come about without a further struggle (p.165).

Yet while national independence is no guarantee of liberation, the title of chapter six makes explicit the argument that Alessandrini nevertheless adopts: “Any Decolonization Is a Success”: Fanon and the African Spring. It is a bold argument in light of the significant ongoing implications of the African Spring. Alessandrini locates his argument in the kinds of claims made by the revolutionaries that suggest a feeling of self-determination and achievement when a regime has toppled. If nothing else, he suggests, momentum has been gained. But, of course, critics may counter that the long-term effects have to be the evaluation. If what comes after the initial revolution is worse than that which existed previously, in what way can any decolonization be seen as a success? But the claim that any decolonization is a success gains its required nuance from the acknowledgement that ‘decolonization, in the narrative provided by Fanon, is not a thing achieved all in one blow’ (p.171). What opens up through this chapter is an example of the kind of critical reading that students need to develop in a complex global age.

Teachers need to help students to ask questions such as: how important is the success of the will of the people, irrespective of the initial outcome? What kind of involvement should the “democratic West” have in conflict such as the African Spring? What kind of criticism is necessary and helpful? What conditions see Western critique function as an act of solidarity? It is the questions that don’t assume easy answers, cause-and-effect logic or binary oppositions that create the environment for the kind of critical thinking that is necessary in today’s world. But importantly, Alessandrini also offers a significant challenge to educators to consider what it might mean to eschew the intellectual pretence to detached objectivity and to instead “get political” by standing in solidarity with those struggling for freedom and justice.

In the final chapter, Conclusion: Singularity and Solidarity: Fanonian Futures, Alessandrini writes of his attempt throughout the book to provide 'both a scrupulous
attention to the specificity of particular political and historical contexts, and a scrupulous remembrance that engaging in politics necessarily involves struggling towards the sorts of difficult generalizations that make collective social change possible’ (p.190). To understand the kind of singularity which Alessandriní believes is important to our being able to appropriate Fanon in a move of solidarity is significant. While singularity may initially evoke images of something static, fixed and detached, Alessandriní, following Hardt and Negiri, suggests instead that ‘movement, metamorphosis and multiplicity’ are at the heart of singularity politics (p.191). Why this is important is because it guards against the potential reification of Fanon’s work and ‘is the antithesis of the Manichean [logic within the] world of colonialism’ (p.193).

We can see how this view of singularity fits with the argument that Fanon, Said (and Foucault) speak of an emergent humanism. The logic of singularity, as opposed to stasis, ensures that something like humanism or the nation is something that is moved towards and achieved by the collective will of the people and ‘cannot be reduced to any other particular form of identity or essence’ (p.195). So rather than humanism being of a fixed essence or ontological structure that is either true or false, it is something that exists only insofar as it emerges. Furthermore, the emergence of humanism from the collective will can be understood as a process embedded in solidarity. Illustrating this, Alessandriní ends the book by discussing the situation in Palestine where internationals (part of the International Solidarity Movement) have tried to intervene in the conflict on the West Bank and in Gaza. He notes that the events that have played out (often tragically) signal something greater than a movement of national independence; something more Fanonian. Alessandriní’s contention is that the ISM has come to represent a solidarity movement whose concern with national sovereignty has been replaced by a broader concern for national consciousness. What this amounts to, for Alessandriní, is ‘a renewed sense of solidarity, in the sense of quite literally putting oneself at the service of the other, in the name of the betterment of humankind’ (p.223).

The reality is that this book is not an obvious choice for educators – indeed, it is not aimed at them. But the focus on contemporary conflicts and issues of global significance,
through an appropriation of Fanon that puts his (and others’) humanism at the centre is of such great importance for educators looking to be and do something more than the policymakers have in mind. The book provides a very different (postcolonial) conceptualisation of humanism than that which has historically had a stronghold on Western educational thinking. In an era when old constructions of humanism have largely been abandoned, finding new ways to think and act – especially within education – that are oriented toward the betterment of humankind is not just relevant, but urgent. For those educators unfamiliar with the heritage of postcolonial theory and Fanon, this will not be an easy read. But doing the hard work to get through it should prove to be generative, prompting ideas for how educational thinking and practice might be reshaped in light of the cultural and geo-politics of the contemporary moment.

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References


