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Title: | Special classes of shares : a departure from the 'One Share, One Vote' principle |
Authors: | Pace, Christine |
Keywords: | Stockholders’ voting -- Malta Stockholders -- Malta Stockholders -- European Union countries Stockholders' voting -- Law and legislation -- European Union countries |
Issue Date: | 2009 |
Abstract: | The most important contractual right that shareholders have is widely taken to be their right to vote on important corporate matters. This raises the question as to how voting rights should be allocated among shareholders. At first glance, it seems natural to expect that shareholders who supply equal amounts of capital or hold equal claims should have equal opportunity to influence decisions. However, the ‘one share, one vote’ principle is often violated in reality through the allocation of varying rights to different classes of shares. This dissertation deals with special classes of shares in dual-class structures. Companies with more than one type of share do not necessarily deviate from the ‘one share, one vote’ principle. A breach of the principle will only occur if the voting rights, or lack of voting rights without any compensation, of one of the share types leads to a distortion. In dual-class structures the company issues more than one class of shares with varying classes indicating the different voting rights and dividend payments. These types of shares create different classes of shareholders with different rights. Designed to give specific shareholders voting control, unequal voting shares are primarily created to satisfy owners who do not want to give up control but do want the public equity market to provide financing. In most cases, these super-voting shares are not publicly traded, and company founders and their families are most commonly the controlling groups in dual-class companies. This dissertation undertakes to analyse the use of various forms of special classes of shares and deviations from the ‘one share one vote’ principle both from a comparative aspect as well as their use within the local forum. |
Description: | M.A.FIN.SERVICES |
URI: | https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar//handle/123456789/5056 |
Appears in Collections: | Dissertations - MA - FacLaw - 2009 |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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09MFIN011.pdf Restricted Access | 961.04 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open Request a copy |
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