Sovereignty, EU competence and monetary policy : an analysis of the major questions, the Hungarian question and the new fiscal pact

Abstract

This thesis provides an examination of the prevailing power structures affecting the determination, implementation and exercise of monetary policy within the European Union. The main contention of this work is that these structures have constitutional relevance and basically demonstrate a general tendency to deny sovereignty at a national level and confer it at a European level. This holds true for the vast majority of EU member states, even though one could question whether the political elites in those countries actually reflected and represented their demoi. One cannot avoid mentioning those EU member states outside of the Eurozone and Eurosystem which, in a European socio-political and economic environment which is growing weary of the euro and "Brussels", seem to be jealous of that amount of sovereignty they retain in the realm of monetary policy. This thesis will highlight how the set up of the prevailing power structures for the Eurozone basically annihilates member state sovereignty as regards monetary policy. This is somewhat of an epochal feat, for monetary policy and power in its regard have traditionally been held as a central prerogative of statehood, sovereignty and independence in relation to the outside world. While politically speaking one cannot avoid raising doubts as to the democratic accountability of this process, one cannot fail to point out that according to the doctrine of conferral of powers, the EU has no power which has not been volitionally conferred to it by its constituent Member States. The thesis also points out what is a major pitfall of the treaties. This is the fact that there is neither a withdrawal clause nor one for the expulsion from the Eurozone and the Eurosystem, leaving member states no other option save their withdrawal from the EU as a whole, or treaty amendment to facilitate the process.