Sameness : Heidegger and Wittgenstein in a post-metaphysical situatedness

Abstract

In this thesis we discuss Heidegger's and Wittgenstein's thinking in such a manner that our encounter with each of them happens already from within the perspective of a Heidegger-Wittgenstein dialogue. 'Sameness', in fact, is but a formal sign signalling that these two thinkers inhabit a common space, an idiosyncratic language-game which is the Heidegger-Wittgenstein dialogue. In a Wittgensteinian manner, we believe that the only way to envisage the possibility of a 'dialogue' between these two thinkers is by taking the 'dialogue' to be a fact; the dialogue is justified only in its occurrence. We believe that, taking the thought of each thinker from the perspective of the factual possibility of the Heidegger-Wittgenstein dialogue should grant us access to an original thought which is neither Heidegger's nor Wittgenstein's but which, subsuming the thought of each, is essentially an original offspring of the dialogue, thus of Sameness itself. In fact, we shall see that this offspring is precisely an original occasion to re-think and re-understand 'post-metaphysics', by becoming aware of the possibility that 'post-metaphysics' is primarily the urge to think 'metaphysics', or what we shall be calling the 'principle(s) of metaphysics' (namely the 'correspondence theory of truth'), without 'metaphysical thinking' or without the thinking 'of tradition'.