The effects of the gender equality mechanism on the composition of the Maltese Parliament

Abstract

Malta’s electoral system was introduced by the British colonial rule in 1921. The system of proportional representation by the single transferrable vote (PRSTV) is the system which the Constitution provides for till this very day, albeit since its introduction the electoral system has changed considerably, encompassing several corrective electoral mechanisms. After the perverse result in the general election of 1981 the first corrective mechanism was introduced in 1986 and which sought to correct the anomalies brought about by the PRSTV in allocating additional seats to the party which would win the general elections. In 1996, a second corrective mechanism was enacted and which provided that where a party gets a relative majority of votes the corrective mechanism would still work to ensure that the party with that relative majority, has a majority of seats in the House of Representatives. The third corrective mechanism, enacted in 2007 guaranteed that the number of Parliamentary seats will be proportionate to the first count valid votes obtained by all the candidates of that party across all thirteen divisions, through the use of a mathematical formula. In 2021, the House of Representatives voted in favour of yet another corrective mechanism, introducing a gender equality mechanism providing that if women or gender-neutral persons elected through the ordinary electoral process, do not form 40% of the composition of Parliament then the House of Representatives will be expanded by a maximum of 12 seats, allocating 6 seats of the under-represented gender to each of the 2 political parties elected. This dissertation will analyse in detail the effect of this latest amendment to Malta’s electoral system and how it will effect the final composition of Parliament through an in-depth analysis of the Constitutional and ordinary law amendments leading to the introduction of the gender corrective mechanism, which albeit being totally distinct and separate from the function of the other three, invasively effects, both qualitatively and quantitively, the ultimate configuration of the House of Representatives, and hence the ultimate composition of Parliament.